CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
1.) NOCUM v. TAN
Statement of the Case: This is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petitioners are Armand Nocum and The Philippine Daily Inquirer, and
the respondent is Lucio Tan.
Facts: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand Nocum,
Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary damages for the
alleged malicious and defamatory imputations contained in a news
article. It appeared that the complaint failed to state the residence of
the complainant at the time of the alleged commission of the offense
and the place where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an Order dated
February 10, 1999, dismissing the complaint without prejudice on the
ground of improper venue.
Lucio Tan filed an amended complaint which cured the defect of the
original complaint. The lower court, after having the case dismissed
for improper venue, admitted the amended complaint and deemed set
aside the previous order of dismissal. Petitioners appealed the RTC
decision to the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition for lack
of merit. Petitioners, in the Supreme Court, assigned the following as
errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING (1) THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE (ON THE
BASIS OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE
FACT THAT THE LOWER COURT HAD EARLIER DISMISSED THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER
JURISDICTION UPON THJE COURT; AND (2) THAT THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED OR
ADMITTED BECAUSE THE LOWER COURT WAS "NEVER
DIVESTED" OF JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
Issue: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the civil case upon
the filing of the original complaint for damages?
Ruling: Yes, the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the civil case.
It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts
alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's causes
of action. In the case at bar, after examining the original complaint,
the court finds that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case
when the case was filed before it. From the allegations thereof,
respondents cause of action is for damages arising from libel, the
jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is
specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon. Florenz D.
Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as follows: (a)
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a case; venue
is the place where the case is to be heard or tried; (b) Jurisdiction
is a matter of substantive law; venue, of procedural law; (c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the
subject matter; venue, a relation between plaintiff and defendant,
or petitioner and respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law
and cannot be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred
by the act or agreement of the parties.
In the case at bar, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint
that the article and the caricature were printed and first published in
the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and not
jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer
jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondents failure to include
the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction over the case. Respondents failure to allege these
allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a party, to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not properly laid.
2.) HEIRS OF VALERIANO CONCHA, SR. VS LUMOSCO
Statement of the case:
On appeal by certiorari under rule 45 of the rules of court are
the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP no.
59499, annulling the resolutions and order of the Regional trial court
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434
which denied the separate motions to dismiss and joint motion for
reconsideration filed by the respondents. Petitioners are the heirs of
spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., and the respondents are
Gregorio Lumosco Vda. De Daan and Jacinto Lumosco.
Facts:
Petitioners claim to be the rightful owner of three lots situated in
Dipolog City under CA 141. Respondents are the patent holders and
registered owners of the subject lots.
Petitioner claim that their parents acquired by homestead a 24-hectare
parcel of land situated in Dipolog City. Since 1931, the spouses
Concha preserved the forest in this land including the excess four
hectares untitled forest land, and they possessed this excess land
continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith,
and in concept of owner. On November 12, 1996, respondents, by
force, intinmidation and stealth forcibly entered the premises and
disposed of 21, 22, and 6 trees for the three lots in question. Thus,
Valeriano Sr. and his children filed a complaint for Reconveyance
and/or annulment of title with damages against respondents.
Respondents moved to dismiss their respective cases on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC, failure to state causes of action for
reconveyance, prescription, and waiver, abandonment, laches and
estoppels. Petitioners oppose contending that the instant cases
involve actions that the subject matter are incapable of pecuniary
estimation, thus falls under the RTCs exclusive original jurisdiction.
They also contended that they have two main causes of action: for
reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees cut down by
the respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered
which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC.
The RTC denied the motions to dismiss. Respondents filed a joint
motion for reconsideration but was denied. On appeal, the CA
reversed the order of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
case?
Ruling: No.
Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or
actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to
determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.--
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction: x x x
(2) In all civil actions which involve the
title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots
are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values
are less than P20,000.00,
The law is emphatic that in determining which court has
jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the realty involved that
should be computed. In this case, there is no dispute that the
assessed values of the subject properties as shown by their tax
declarations are less than P20,000.00. Clearly, jurisdiction over
the instant cases belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC.
Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant
cases.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
3.) ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO v. HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA and
the HEIRS OF SPOUSES APOLONIO V. DIONISIO and
VALERIANA DIONISIO (namely, ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO
and ELEANOR R. DIONISIO, herein represented by ALLAN
GEORGE R. DIONISIO)
FACTS: Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of
spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a Complaint2 against
herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc.,
for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer
for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that
subject property located in Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an
assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled in the name of spouses
Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and
evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land
that encompasses and covers subject property. Private respondents
had allegedly been prevented from entering, possessing and using
subject property. It was further alleged in the Complaint that
petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged property was
spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the
sole and absolute owners of the subject property; that petitioners be
ordered to surrender possession of subject property to them; that
petitioners and Wood Crest and/or its members be ordered to pay
actual and moral damages, and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 said complaint on
the ground that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action, as the subject of litigation was incapable of pecuniary
estimation.The MeTC then issued an Order4 dated July 4, 2002
denying the motion to dismiss, ruling that, under Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had exclusive original
jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property
of small value. MR likewise denied. Petitioners assailed the
aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87. However, in its
Decision5 dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition,
finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding
Judge. The RTC sustained the MeTC ruling, stating that, in
accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,
amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint
for Accion Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and
possession of real property with an assessed value not
exceeding P50,000.00. MR was denied. Petitioners then filed with the
Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting that both the
MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of the
complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the
same. CA dismissed the petition outright, holding that certiorari was
not available to petitioners as they should have availed themselves of
the remedy of appeal. MR was denied.
ISSUE: WON the MeTC had jurisdiction over private respodents
complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria
HELD: YES. Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have
been entertained from the very beginning. The settled rule is that
appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA
should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as
provided for under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Thus, in Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court
expounded as follows:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or
final order of the CA via Rule 65, because such recourse is proper
only if the party has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate remedy,
namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil
action for certiorari was, therefore, the correct remedy. Where an
appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by Petition for Certiorari
was a fatal procedural error, and the instant petition must, therefore,
fail.11
For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted
properly when it dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
ground that petitioners should have resorted to the remedy of appeal
instead of certiorari. Verily, the present Petition
for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.
Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the
subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property
or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided
between the first and second level courts, with the assessed
value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This
amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the
RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice." 13
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint forAccion
Reivindicatoria.
4.) VICTORINO QUINAGORAN v.COURT OF APPEALS and THE
HEIRS OF JUAN DE LA CRUZ
Facts of the Case:
This involves a case for recovery of portion of registered land with
damages filed by respondent before the RTC. Respondents prayed
for the reconveyance and surrender of the disputed 400 sq. meters
which he allegedly co-owned with petitioner, among other things.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming that RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case under RA No. 7691, which expanded the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court to include
civil actions which involve title to, or possession of real property or any
interest therein which does not exceed PPH/20,000.00. He argues
that since the 364 sq. m. lot which he owns adjacent to the contested
property has an assessed value of PPH1,730.00, the assessed value
of the lot under controversy would not be more than the said amount.
The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss finding that the present action
on the basis of the complaint partakes of the nature of action
publiciana and jurisdiction over the said action lies with the Regional
Trial Court, regardless of the value of the property, because under
paragraph 8 of the complaint, it alleged that plaintiff demanded from
defendant the removal of the house occupied by defendants and the
possession of which is only due to tolerance of the plaintiffs.
Petitioner appealed before the CA but the latter affirmed the decision
of the RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAVE JURISDICTION
OVER ALL CASES OF RECOVERY OF POSSESSION
REGARDLESS OF THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
INVOLVED
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT MUST ALLEGE
THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY
INVOLVED
RESOLUTION:
Issue No. 1
No. The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioners
Motion to Dismiss as affirmed by the CA-that all cases of recovery of
possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts
regardless of the value of the property- NO LONGER HOLDS TRUE.
As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is below PPH/20,000.00, if
outside Metro Manila, and PPH/50,000.00 if within. Jurisdiction over
an accion publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
Specifically, the regional trial courts exercises exclusive
jurisdiction in all actions which involve possession of real
property. However, if the assessed value of the real property
involved does not exceed PPH/50,000.00 in Metro Manila, and
PPH/20,000.00 outside Metro Manila, the municipal trial court
exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property.
Issue No. 2
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
The Court held that a complaint MUST allege the assessed value
of the real property subject of the complaint or the interest
thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action.
This is because the nature of the action and which court has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for
by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of
the claims asserted therein.
In this case nowhere in the complaint was the assessed value of
the subject property ever mentioned. There is therefore no
showing on the face of the complaint that the RTC has exclusive
jurisdiction over the action of respondents. The absence of any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property,
it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over petitioners action. The courts
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed market value of the land.
The RTC and the CA in affirming the denial of the Motion to Dismiss
erred considering that respondents failed to allege in their complaint
the assessed value of the subject property.
The petition is granted and all proceedings held before the RTC were
declared null and void. The Decision of the CA is reversed and set
aside. The complaint in Civil Case No. 240 before the RTC is
dismissed without prejudice.
5.) HEIRS OF JULAO V. DE JESUS
Facts: Sometime in the 1960s, Telesforo Julao (Telesforo) filed
before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Baguio City, two Townsite Sales Applications. Upon his
death on June 1, 1971, his applications were transferred to his heirs.
On April 30, 1979, Solito Julao (Solito) executed a Deed of Transfer
of Rights transferring his hereditary share in the property covered by
TSA No. V-6667 to respondent spouses Alejandro and Morenita De
Jesus. In 1983, respondent spouses constructed a house on the
property they acquired from Solito. On March 15, 1996 however, the
DENR rejected TSA No. V-6667 and recognized TSA no. 2132 valid,
thus, the lands were transferred to the heirs represented by Anita Vda.
De Enriquez.
On March 2, 1999, petitioners Anita Julao vda. De Enriquez, Sonia J.
Tolentino and Roderick Julao, representing themselves to be the heirs
of Telesforo, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Baguio City,
a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property against
respondent spouses. Petitioners alleged that they are the true and
lawful owners of a 641-square meter parcel of land located at
Naguilian Road, Baguio City, that respondent spouses house
encroached on 70 square meters of the subject property; and upon
demand, refused to leave the said land and insisted.
During the trial, petitioners disputed the validity of the Deed of Transfer
of Rights executed by Solito. They presented evidence to show that
Telesforo submitted two applications, TSA No. V-2132 and TSA No.
V-6667. The first one, TSA No. V-2132, resulted in the issuance of
OCT No. P-2446 in favor of the heirs of Telesforo, while the second
one, TSA No. V-6667, was dropped from the records.
The RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Julao stating that they were able
to convincingly show that Telesforo filed with the DENR two
applications, covering two separate parcels of land, and that it was his
first application, TSA No. V-2132, which resulted in the issuance of
OCT No. P-2446. And since what Solito transferred to respondent
spouses was his hereditary share in the parcel of land covered by TSA
No. V-6667, respondent spouses acquired no right over the subject
property, which was derived from a separate application, TSA No. V-
2132 The CA however overruled the decision of the RTC stating that
petitioners-herein failed to identify the land, and the RTC has no
Jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: RTC has no Jurisdiction over the case.
Jurisdiction as we have said is conferred by law and is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. An action for recovery of possession,
the assessed value of the property sought to be recovered
determines the courts jurisdiction. In this case, for the RTC to
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
exercise jurisdiction, the assessed value of the subject property
must exceed P20,000.00. Since petitioners failed to allege in their
Complaint the assessed value of the subject property, the CA
correctly dismissed the Complaint as petitioners failed to
establish that the RTC had jurisdiction over it. In fact, since the
assessed value of the property was not alleged, it cannot be
determined which trial court had original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the case.
6.) HEIRS OF MAURA SO v. OBLIOSCA
Statement of the Case: This is a petition for review on certiorari of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals that declared that a petition for
annulment of judgment cannot be availed of when the petitioner had
already filed an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petitioners are Heirs of Maura So, namely, Yan Lam Lim, Jimmy So
Lim, and Ferdinand So Lim. The respondents are Lucila Jomoc
Obliosca, Elvira Jomoc Gardinab, and Heirs of Abundia Jomoc Balala,
namely, Rosita Balala Acenas, Evangeline Balala Baaclo, Oliver
Jomoc Balala, and Perla Balala Condesa.
Facts: Jomocs heirs sold a parcel of land they inherited from
Pantaleon Jomoc to Petitioners. After petitioners have made partial
payment thereto, said heirs executed another sale in favour of Sps.
Lim. Petitioners sought the delivery of the instruments of conveyance
to which the lower court granted. Respondents now invoke their right
to legal redemption on the ground that they did not sell their shares to
the parcel of land hence, they remain co-owners thereof and are
entitled to recover entire property from Petitioners. Respodents
successfully recovered the property. Petitioners now files a petition for
review under rule 45 assailing the award given by the trial court and
subsequently files a petition for annulment of judgment, both before
the CA.
Issue/s: Did the RTC acted without jurisdiction when it rendered
the Resolution which recognized respondents right to redeem the
property because this, in effect, amended the Decision of the Supreme
Court which sustained the sale of the property to Maura So?
Ruling: Yes, Petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error
in the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as the
exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not
the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other
questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such
jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the
exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are
the proper subject of an appeal.21 The error raised by petitioners
pertains to the trial courts exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of
authority to decide the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment
based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse
of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear and
decide the case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant
the petition for annulment of judgment.
7.) BONGATO vs. MALVAR
Facts: Spouses Severo and Trinidad Malvar filed a complaint in the
MTCC for forcible entry against Teresita Bongato, alleging that
Bongato unlawfully entered a parcel of land belonging to the spouses
and erected thereon a house of light materials.
MTCC decided in favor of Malvar and ordered Bongato to vacate the
land. RTC affirmed the decision. CA also held that MTCC had
jurisdiction. On appeal, Bongato raised the issue of MTCC jurisdiction;
that the complaint was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTCC had jurisdiction since the Complaint was
filed beyond the one-year period from date of alleged entry?
Ruling:
No, MTCC had no jurisdiction. It is wise to be reminded that forcible
entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is
prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process.
Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible
entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land.
However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year
period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After
the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of the
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
parcel of land may file either accion publiciana; or an accion
reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well
as possession.
One the basis of the facts, it is clear that the cause of action for
forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when
they filed the complaint on July 10, 1992 (the house was built as
early as 1987), thus the MTCC had no more jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case.
8.) THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN v. JODY KING CONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FACTS: On January 12, 1998, the Province of Aklan (petitioner) and
Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered
into a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty
Port and Terminal (Phase I) in Malay, Aklan. The total project cost
is P38,900,000: P 18,700,000 for the design and construction of
passenger terminal, and P20,200,000 for the design and construction
of the jetty port facility.5 In the course of construction, petitioner issued
variation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work under
these change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.6
On January 5, 2001, petitioner entered into a negotiated contract with
respondent for the construction of Passenger Terminal Building
(Phase II) also at Caticlan Jetty Port in Malay, Aklan. The contract
price for Phase II is P2,475,345.54.7 On October 22, 2001, respondent
made a demand for the total amount of P22,419,112.96 which
petitioner allegedly failed to settle. On July 13, 2006, respondent sued
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City (Civil Case
No. 06-1122-MK) to collect the aforesaid amounts.9 On August 17,
2006, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment. 10
Petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent.
It asserted that the sums being claimed by respondent were not
indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of
Provincial Governor. Also cited was respondents June 10, 2003 letter
absolving petitioner from liability for any cost in connection with the
Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project.11 RTC rendered a judgement in
favor of plaintiff Jody King Construction And Development Corporation
and against defendant Province of Aklan. MR likewise denied. On
November 24, 2009, the trial court issued a writ of execution ordering
Sheriff IV Antonio E. Gamboa, Jr. to demand from petitioner the
immediate payment of P67,027,378.34 and tender the same to the
respondent. Consequently, Sheriff Gamboa served notices of
garnishment on Land Bank of the Philippines, Philippine National
Bank and Development Bank of the Philippines at their branches in
Kalibo, Aklan for the satisfaction of the judgment debt from the funds
deposited under the account of petitioner. Said banks, however,
refused to give due course to the court order, citing the relevant
provisions of statutes, circulars and jurisprudence on the
determination of government monetary liabilities, their enforcement
and satisfaction.17
Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for certiorari with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction assailing
the Writ of Execution dated November 24, 2009, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 111754. On December 7, 2009, the trial court denied
petitioners notice of appeal filed on December 1, 2009. MR likewise
denied. On May 20, 2010, petitioner filed another petition for certiorari
in the CA questioning the aforesaid orders denying due course to its
notice of appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114073. CAs First
Division dismissed the petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion
in the lower courts issuance of the writ of execution. MR was likewise
denied by the CA. The CA also held that petitioner is estopped from
invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as it only raised the issue
of COAs primary jurisdiction after its notice of appeal was denied and
a writ of execution was issued against it.
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in
this case and WON the writ of execution was proper.
HELD: YES. COA has primary jurisdiction over private
respondents money claims. Petitioner is not estopped from raising
the issue of jurisdiction The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds
that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.22 It applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative
agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view or, if the parties would
not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.23
The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide the
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined
some question or some aspect of some question arising in the
proceeding before the court.24 The court may raise the issue of
primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be
waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine
exists for the proper distribution of power between judicial and
administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the
parties.29 Respondents collection suit being directed against a local
government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to
the COA.30 Hence, the RTC should have suspended the
proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA.
Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction even after the denial of its notice of appeal and before the
CA.
NO. Writ of Execution issued in violation of COAs primary jurisdiction
is void
Since a judgment rendered by a body or tribunal that has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is no judgment at
all, it cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation.34 All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
have no legal effect and the void judgment can never be final and any
writ of execution based on it is likewise void.35
9.) METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, INC., v.
NATIONAL WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION and
REGIONAL TRIPARTITE WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY BOARD
REGION II
Facts of the Case:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals which denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition of
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, praying that Wage Order No.,
R02-03 be declared null and void and of no legal effect. Said Wage
Order provides that upon effectivity thereof, all employees/workers in
private sector throughout Region II, regardless of the status of
employment are granted an across-the-board increase of PPH/15.00
daily. Petitioner in seeking the nullification of the Wage Order involved,
claims that the Regional Tripartite Wage and Productivity Board,
Region II, Tuguegarao, Cagayan (RTWPB) 1) acted without authority
when it issued the questioned Wage Order; 2) that even assuming that
the RTWPB was vested with the authority to prescribe an increase, it
exceeded its authority when it did so without any ceiling or
qualification; 3) that the implementation of the Wage Order will cause
petitioner and other similarly situated employers to incur huge financial
losses and suffer labor unrest. To said Petition, the OSG filed its
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment affirming the petitioners
claim that the RTYWPB acted beyond its authority in issuing the
questioned Wage Order prescribing an across-the-board increase to
all workers and employees in Region II, effectively granting additional
or other benefits not contemplated by RA 6727 otherwise known as
the Wage Rationalization Act.
ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS RECOURSE TO A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WITH
THE CA WAS PROPER
2. WHETHER OR NOT WAGE ORDER NO. R02-03 IS
VALID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT
RESOLUTION:
8
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
Issue No 1-
In resolving the procedural matter, the Court explained when the
remedy of special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition may
be availed of as provided for under Rule 65, Section 1 and Section
2 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, likewise, made a
distinction between, the exercise of judicial function, quasi-judicial
function and ministerial function.
It ruled that in the issuance of the questioned Wage Order, respondent
RTWPB did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
capacity. The action of said Board was in the nature of
subordinate legislation exercised by it in the exercise of
delegated power under R. A. 6017 or done in the exercise of
quasi-legislative power or rule-making power which is exercised
by administrative agencies through promulgation of rules and
regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers flowing from the
separation of the great branches of government.
Further, the Court ruled that certiorari and prohibition requires that
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law which is not true in the case
at bar. Section 13 of the assailed Wage Order provides for appeal
of the questioned Wage Order and the procedure thereof for any
aggrieved party. Petitioner did not avail of such remedy. Its Letter of
Inquiry is not an appeal.
Thus, it was ruled that under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,
courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal, especially where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact.
Issue No. 2
The court ruled that while it cannot rule on the petition under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it will, however, resolve the petition
on the matter of the the substantial issue regarding the validity
of the questioned Wage Order in accordance with the well-
accepted principle that acceptance of a petition for certiorari or
prohibition as well as the grant of due course thereto is
addressed to the sound discretion of the Court, on the premise
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
The Court ruled that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is
confined to implementing the law and puting it into effect.
Administrative regulations, therefore, cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment.
The Court held that Section 1, Wage Order R02-03 is VOID insofar
as it grants a wage increase to employees earning more than the
minimum wage rate at the time of the passage of said Wage
Order; and pursuant to the separability clause of the Wage Order,
Section 1 is declared VALID with respect to employees earning
the prevailing minimum wage rate. Employees other than minimum
wage earners who received the wage increase mandated by the Wage
Order need not refund the wage increase received by them since they
received the wage increase in good faith, in the honest belief that are
entitled to such increase and without any knowledge that there was no
legal basis for the same.
10.) VDA. DE BARRERA v. HEIRS OF VICENTE LEGASPI
Facts:
This case involves the decision of the RTC of Tangub ordering the
defendants-petitioners herein Fernanda Geonzon Vda. De Barrera
and Johnny Oco Jr. to return the possession of the subject land to
plaintiffs herein respondent heirs of Vicente Legaspi.
The case started on October 1, 1996 when petitioner Johnny Oco Jr.
(Oco), said to be a peace officer connected with the PNP,
accompanied by unidentified CAFGU members, forced his way into
respondents 0.9504-hectare irrigated farmland located at Liloan,
9
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
Bonifacio, Misamis Occidental. After dispossessing respondents of
the property, Oco and company used a tractor to destroy the planted
crops, took possession of the land, and had since tended it.
Respondents filed with the RTC of Tangub a comlaint for the
Reconveyance of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
and Damages against the petitioners.
Petitioners raised the issue of ownership as a special affirmative
defense. In their Memorandum, however, they questioned the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the complaint,
the assessed value of the land being only PHP11, 160 as reflected in
Tax Declaration No. 7565.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering petitioners to return
the land in question. CA affirmed the RTC ruling as well.
Issue: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling:
No, the said court lacks jurisdiction.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, (the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980), as amended by Republic Act No. 7691
provides for the jurisdiction of metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial
courts and municipal circuit trial courts, to wit: (3) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein where
the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs
The first level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction
over accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria where
the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the
aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is
the assessed value of the property.
Assessed value is understood to be the worth or value of
property established by taxing authorities on the basis of which
the tax rate is applied. Commonly, however, it does not represent
the true or market value of the property.
In fine, since the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint filed by
respondents, all the proceedings therein as well as the Decision
of November 27, 1998, are null and void. The complaint should
perforce be dismissed.
11.) FLORES-CRUZ vs. GOLI-CRUZ
Statement of the Case:
This is a petition for review on certiorari. The petitioners are Spouses
Lydia Flores-Cruz and Reynaldo I. Cruz. The respondents are
Spouses Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-Cruz, Spouses Rico and Feliza
De La Cruz, Spouses Boy and Lani De La Cruz, Zenaida A. Jacinto
and Rogelio De Los Santos.
Facts:
Petitioner spouses Lydia Flores-Cruz and Reynaldo I. Cruz purchased
a 5,209-sq. m. lot situated in Pulong Yantok, Angat, Bulacan from
Lydias siblings, the heirs of deceased Estanislao Flores the former
owner of said land. After the death of Estanislao, petitioners found out
that respondent spouses Leonardo and Iluminada Goli-Cruz et
al. were occupying a section of the land. Efforts to settle were made
but failed.
Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession of the land in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. Respondents filed
a motion to dismiss claiming, among others, that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case as it should have been filed in the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) since it was a summary action for ejectment under
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the motion in an order.
The CA reversed said decision of the RTC. According to the CA,
considering that petitioners claimed that respondents were
possessors of the property by mere tolerance only and the complaint
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
had been initiated less than a year from the demand to vacate, the
proper remedy was an action for unlawful detainer which should have
been filed in the MTC
Issue: Does the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case. The
necessary allegations in a complaint for ejectment are set forth in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Based on the allegations
in petitioners complaint, it is apparent that such is a complaint
for unlawful detainer based on possession by tolerance of the
owner. It is a settled rule that in order to justify such an action,
the owners permission or tolerance must be present at the
beginning of the possession. Such jurisdictional facts are
present here.
There is another reason why petitioners complaint was not a proper
action for recovery of possession cognizable by the RTC. Congress
had already approved Republic Act No. 7691 which expanded the
MTCs jurisdiction to include other actions involving title to or
possession of real property (accion publiciana and
reinvindicatoria) where the assessed value of the property does
not exceed P20,000 (or P50,000, for actions filed in Metro Manila).
To determine which court (RTC or MTC) has jurisdiction over the
action, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real
property subject of the complaint or the interest thereon. The
complaint did not contain any such allegation on the assessed
value of the property. There is no showing on the face of the
complaint that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of
petitioners. Indeed, absent any allegation in the complaint of the
assessed value of the property, it cannot be determined whether
it is the RTC or the MTC which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the petitioners action.
Since petitioners complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer
which should have been filed in the MTC and it contained no allegation
on the assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred
in proceeding with the case. The proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and void. It follows that the
CA was correct in dismissing the case.
12.) FRIANELA VS. BANAYAD, JR.
Statement of the case:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the June 17, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 53929, and the August 17, 2005 Resolution
denying the motion for partial reconsideration thereof.
Petitioner is Apolonio Banayad Frianela, and the respondent is
Servillano Banayad, jr.
Facts: Following the death of her uncle, the testator Moises F.
Banayad, petitioner, who was named as devisee in the will, filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, on June 3, 1991, Sp.
Proc. No. 3664-P for the allowance of the November 18, 1985
holographic will of the decedent. Petitioner alleged that Moises died
without issue and left to her the following properties, namely: (1) a
parcel of land situated in Pasay City and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 9741; (2) images of Oracion del Huerto and
Pieta including the crown; and (3) all personal belongings.
Respondent, a cousin of the petitioner, filed his opposition and
counter-petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic wills of
the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989 and another dated
September 28, 1989.
After trial on the merits, the RTC, on September 29, 1995, rendered
its Decision6 declaring the September 27, 1989 holographic will as
having revoked the November 18, 1985 will, allowing the former, and
appointing respondent as administrator of Moisess estate.
On appeal, the CA, in the assailed June 17, 2005 Decision, modified
the decision of the trial court and ruled that the September 27, 1989
11
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
holographic will had only revoked the November 18, 1985 will insofar
as the testamentary disposition of Moisess real property was
concerned.
With the denial of her motion for reconsideration in the further assailed
August 17, 2005 Resolution, petitioner elevated the case before the
SC via the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Pasay city has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: No.
SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00)
SECTION 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the demand does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos exclusive of interest and costs but inclusive of
damages of whatever kind, the amount of which must be specifically
alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same
complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims
in all the causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions; and
The applicable law, therefore, confers jurisdiction on the RTC or
the MTCs over probate proceedings depending on the gross
value of the estate, which value must be alleged in the complaint
or petition to be filed.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of the gross value of
Moisess estate. Thus, from a reading of the original petition filed,
it cannot be determined which court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The RTC therefore committed
gross error when it had perfunctorily assumed jurisdiction
despite the fact that the initiatory pleading filed before it did not
call for the exercise of its jurisdiction. The RTC should have, at
the outset, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Be it noted
that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered motu
proprio by the courts. Further, the CA, on appeal, should have
dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is the doctrine
that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised by any of the parties
or may be reckoned by the court, at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
13.) ALLGEMEINE-BAU-CHEMIE PHILS., INC. v. METROPOLITAN
BANK & TRUST CO.
FACTS: Under a loan agreement1 dated November 19, 1996, Asian
Appraisal Holdings, Inc. (AAHI) obtained a loan amounting
to P442,500,000 from Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) for the
construction of Asian Star Building, a 20 storey commercial
condominium built on lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and
2059692 located at the Filinvest Corporate City, Alabang, Muntinlupa
City. As security for the loan, AAHI executed a security agreement3 or
real estate mortgage dated November 19, 1996 over its property
consisting of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 205967 and 205969 and
the condominium built thereon including all units, parking slots,
common areas and other improvements, machineries and equipment.
On November 17, 1999, AAHI entered into a contract to sell4 with
petitioner for the purchase of Units 1004 and 1005 covered by CTC
No. 546665 and CTC No. 546676 , respectively, and the right to the
exclusive use of parking slots P515, P516, P517, and P514 covered
by CTC No. 54986,7 CTC No. 54987,8 CTC No. 54988,9 CTC No.
5498510 (the subject properties), respectively, for a total purchase
price of P23,571,280.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
On December 22, 1999, the parties executed an addendum 11 to the
contract to sell whereby AAHI assigned to petitioner the right to the
exclusive use of parking slot P504 covered by CTC No. 54975 for a
consideration ofP600,000, which petitioner paid on even date. By
separate letters12 dated March 23, 2000, AAHI and Solidbank
informed petitioner of the real estate mortgage forged by them and
was advised to remit its monthly amortizations for the units and
parking slots it purchased to Solidbank. Petitioner was also requested
to inform Solidbank of the total installments it had paid for these units
and parking slots and the balance still due thereon13 Petitioner which
occupied the condominium units as its place of business had, by
October 2001, fully settled its obligation to AAHI in the total amount
of P26,588,409.30.14
On October 21, 2000, as AAHI defaulted on its loan obligation,
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), to which the
banking operations of Solidbank were integrated, filed before the
Muntinlupa RTC a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of the Real
Estate Mortgage.15 AAHI not long after filed on October 30, 2000 also
before the Muntinlupa RTC a complaint16 against Solidbank, for
Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, docketed as Civil Case No.
00-196, and raffled to Branch 256 of the RTC.
On October 31, 2000, the mortgaged properties were sold at public
auction to the highest bidder, Metrobank.17 On January 24, 2002,
Metrobank filed an Ex-Parte petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession19 of the properties subject of the foreclosed mortgage.
The petition was granted and a writ of possession was issued on April
9, 2002.20 Also on April 9, 2002, petitioner filed before Branch 256 of
the RTC in Civil Case No. 00-196 (AAHIs complaint against Solidbank
for Specific Performance with Preliminary Injunction) a motion for
intervention,21 to which it attached a complaint-in-intervention22 with
prayer for the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, delivery
of title, and damages and for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Metrobank to
consolidate its title and to take possession of its properties.
The court Sheriff on April 15, 2002 issued a notice to vacate23 which
was served on May 16, 2002 upon all building occupants who were
advised to make the necessary arrangements with Metrobank
regarding their occupancy.24 In the meantime, the Motion for
Reconsideration of the April 9, 2002 Order of Branch 276 filed by AAHI
was denied by Order25 dated May 13, 2002, prompting it to file before
the appellate court a petition for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed on June 18, 2002 a separate petition for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction
with the appellate court,26 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71217, also
to enjoin the implementation of the writ of possession issued by
Branch 276 of the Muntinlupa RTC. In its petition, petitioner alleged
that its complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 pending in
Branch 256 is its principal action but as the said court could not enjoin
Branch 276 from implementing the writ of possession, both courts
being of equal jurisdiction, it had no choice but to file the petition with
the appellate court.27 On August 22, 2002, the Tenth Division of the
Court of Appeals granted petitioners prayer for, and issued a
temporary restraining order28 in CA-G.R. SP No. 71217. By
Decision29 of January 22, 2003, the Seventh Division of the Court of
Appeals denied, however, petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction for failure to establish a clear and
unmistakable right to the subject properties. MR denied. Before this
Court on a petition for review, alleging that the appellate court
committed grave and palpable error in denying its prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction in flagrant violation of laws and jurisprudence.32
ISSUE: WON the CA has jurisdiction over an original action for
injunction.
HELD: NO. An original action for injunction is outside the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however. Under B.P. 129, the
appellate court has original jurisdiction only over actions for
annulment of judgments of the RTCs and has original jurisdiction
to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes
whether or not they are in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.35 The
appellate courts jurisdiction to grant a writ of preliminary injunction is
limited to actions or proceedingspending before it.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
In the case at bar, petitioners complaint-in-intervention in Civil Case
No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC,
not with the appellate court. Petitioners petition before the appellate
court does not show, nay allege, that in issuing the writ of
possession, the Muntinlupa RTC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion for it to be treated
as either one for certiorari36 or prohibition.37 Thus, for want of
jurisdiction, the petition before the appellate court should have
been dismissed outright. At all events, it is well-settled that an
order granting or denying a preliminary injunction is not
appealable.
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action and
hence, the jurisdiction of a court, are the allegations of the
complaint and the character of the relief sought.33 Petitioners only
prayer in CA-G.R. No. 71217 is "for the preservation of the status quo,
that is, petitioner, having in possession over the subject properties for
several years, shall retain such possession until the controversy [Civil
Case No. 00-196 before the said trial court [Branch 276, RTC of
Muntinlupa City] has been finally resolved and respondents be
prevented from taking over such possession." Clearly, what
petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for
preliminary injunction which is a provisional and extra-ordinary
remedy calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of
things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until
the merits of the case can be heard.
14.) LBPS COMMERCIAL, INC vs. HON. VENANCIO J. AMILA &
THE FIRST CONSOLIDATED BANK (FCB) OF BOHOL, INC.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the Order of RTC-Bohol
(Branch 3) denying petitioners Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a
TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Petitioner obtained several loans from respondent bank which were
covered by promissory notes and secured with a Real Estate
Mortgage covering Five Parcels of land. Originally, the interest rate
per annum, per the promissory notes, is 20%. These were cancelled
and replaced with new ones, with 30% interest rate per annum.
Petitioner failed to settle its obligations which caused the respondent
bank to apply for an extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage. Because of this, petitioner filed a complaint for reformation
of documents, recovery of excessive interest payments, and injunction
with preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
Despite numerous efforts to amicably settle the issue, no resolution
was reached by the parties. The case was then set for trial and the
trial court issued an order denying the issuance of a TRO. Petitioner
moved for a reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: W/N the writ of injunction prayed for by petitioner is within the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
HELD:
No, it is not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court just yet.
The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, heabeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive with the Supreme Court. It is
concurrent with the RTC (and CA in certain cases). Taking into
consideration the hierarchy of courts, petitioner should have
filed the same to the RTC. It was also emphasized that a direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. The same is absent in the case.
15.) GSIS V. HEIRS OF F.F. CABALLERO
Facts:
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered
owner of a residential lot with an area of 800 square meters and
situated at Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent
built a residential/commercial building consisting of two (2) stories.
14
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)

On March 7, 1968, Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured After trial, the RTC, in its Decision[5] dated September 27, 1994, ruled
a loan from petitioner Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint. In the same
in the amount of P20, 000.00, as evidenced by a promissory decision, the trial court granted petitioner's counterclaim and directed
note. Fernando and his wife likewise executed a real estate mortgage Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount
on the same date, mortgaging the afore-stated property as security. of P249,800.00. When Fernando elevated the case to the CA, the CA
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. Hence, affirmed the decision, but modified the portion wherein Fernando had
to pay the rental amounting to P249,800.00 to GSIS.
on January 20, 1973, the mortgage covering the subject property was
foreclosed, and on March 26, 1973, the same was sold at a public
Issue: WON the CA is correct in modifying the decision of the RTC as
auction where the petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P36, regards with the rentals paid to Fernando by CMTC?
283.00.
Ruling: Yes, the CA is correct in removing the said part.
On November 26, 1975, petitioner wrote a letter to Fernando,
informing him of the consolidation of title in its favor, and requesting
Going now to the first assigned error, petitioner submits that its
payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's continued occupancy
counterclaim for the rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is
of the subject property. In reply, Fernando requested that he be
in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the original action of
allowed to repurchase the same through partial payments. Negotiation
Fernando against petitioner for annulment of bid award, deed of
as to the repurchase by Fernando of the subject property went on for
absolute sale and TCT No. 76183. Respondents, on the other hand,
several years, but no agreement was reached between the parties.
alleged that petitioner's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to
pay the prescribed docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner scheduled the subject property for
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the
public bidding. On the scheduled date of bidding, Fernando's
Court has devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact
daughter, Jocelyn Caballero, submitted a bid in the amount
and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
of P350,000.00, while Carmelita Mercantile Trading Corporation
same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
(CMTC) submitted a bid in the amount of P450,000.00. Since CMTC
defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c)
was the highest bidder, it was awarded the subject property. On July
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs
27, 1989, a deed of absolute sale was executed by CMTC and
claim as well as the defendants counterclaim? and (d) Is there
petitioner.
any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the
Because of what transpired, Fernandos daughter Jocelyn filed a
counterclaim is compulsory.
complaint with the RTC of Cotabato to declare the sale null and void.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award,
Also, they alleged that there were irregularities in the conduct of the
deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different
bidding, and that the petitioner disregarded the prior right of
from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether petitioner is entitled
redemption of the said property. Petitioner and its officers filed their
to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when
Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. The GSIS
petitioner became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the
alleged that Fernando lost his right of redemption. He was given the
consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor.
chance to repurchase the property; however, he did not avail of such
option compelling the GSIS to dispose of the property by public
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to
bidding as mandated by law.
acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees.[13] This, petitioner did not do, because it

15
 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was
a compulsory counterclaim. Since petitioner failed to pay the
docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its
permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC,
insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay petitioner the rentals which
he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down
at any time, even on appeal before this Court
16.) INTERNATIONAL MGT. & DEV. CORP. v. CA
Statement of the Case: This is a special civil action for certiorari. The
petitioner is International Industrial Management and
Development Corporation. The respondents are Hon. Court of
Appeals, Hon. Salvador Tensuan and Filipinas Carbon and
Mining Corporation.
Facts: Private respondent Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation
filed against herein petitioner and Central Mining Consultants (CMC)
an action for rescission or annulment of contract with damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case since the complaint does not specifically state the amount of
damages sought therein by private respondent, thereby rendering the
docket fee corresponding thereto undeterminable and, as a matter of
course, unpaid.
Issue/s: WON THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION
Ruling: In the present petition before us, petitioner does not seek a
review of respondent court's aforesaid decision but prays for the
issuance of an order requiring the clerk of court of the court below to
reassess and collect in full the prescribed docket fee in the original
case, as was done in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., et al. vs. Hon.
Maximo C. Asuncion, et al. 6 It will be recalled that in said case, we
ruled that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment thereof
within a reasonable time but not beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
Petitioner avers that the aggregate of private respondent's claims
amounts to P29,600,000.00, hence the docket fee due is
P118,000.00, allegedly pursuant to Section 5, subsections 7 and 8,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended on September 18, 1984.
Since only P2,626.00 was paid by herein private respondent, the
former contends that the latter still has to pay the balance of
P115,374.00.
The computation submitted by petitioner, however, is partly
based upon and includes what private respondent, under the
second alternative cause of action in its second amended
complaint, 7 claims should be paid or performed by petitioner or
CMC in the event that rescission or cancellation is no longer
possible by virtue of the expiration of the agreement entered into
by the parties on September 30, 1988 which is the subject of the
present controversy. In other words, these are contingent or
alternative reliefs, the demandability of which arises only if the
condition for the principal relief sought shall have occurred and has
been so determined by the trial court.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that considering that
its main action is for specific performance and/or rescission which is
not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the money claim
is purely incidental to or a consequence of the particular relief sought,
the docket fee it has paid is reasonably sufficient.
The fact that the main action or principal relief sought in the
complaint is for specific performance and/or rescission is only
determinative of jurisdiction in the sense that, regardless of the
amount of incidental or additional claims for damages, the case
is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. This does not mean, however, that the separate claims for
damages therein are exempt from the payment of docket fees. The
prayer in private respondent's second amended complaint 8 reveals
that, in addition to the principal relief of specific performance and/or
rescission, it categorically and unconditionally seeks the payment of
actual, moral and exemplary damages, with attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
Under paragraph 2(c) to (d) of the petitory portion of said second
amended complaint, the amount of damages being claimed as
additional relief by private respondent is P3,450,000.00, as set out in
the third to the sixth causes of action. Pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 141 then in force, the docket fee for such additional claims
by themselves would be P13,400.00, and it is admitted that only
P2,626.00 has been paid by private respondent. We, therefore,
find it appropriate to adopt the relevant paragraph in the
dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Sun Insurance, as
prayed for by petitioner, so that this matter may be disposed of
with dispatch.
17.) HEIRS OF J. PADILLA VS. MAGDULA
FACTS:
On 26 October 2001, petitioners (Padilla) filed an action with
the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 34, for recovery of ownership,
possession, partition and damages. Petitioners sought to declare void
the sale of the land by Ricardos daughters, Josephine Bahia
and Virginia Bahia-Abas, to respondent Dominador Magdua
(Dominador). The sale (through misrepresentation by Ricardo) was
made during the lifetime of Ricardo. Dominador filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the assessed value
of the land was within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of
Tanauan, Leyte. In an Order (2006) the RTC dismissed the case for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the assessed value of the
land in the amount of P590.00 was less than the amount cognizable
by the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioners
argued that the action was not merely for recovery of ownership and
possession, partition and damages but also for annulment of deed of
sale. Since actions to annul contracts are actions beyond pecuniary
estimation, the case was well within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issues: Should the RTC take cognizance of this case?
Ruling: YES.
When petitioners filed the action with the RTC they sought to recover
ownership and possession of the land by questioning (1) the due
execution and authenticity of the Affidavit executed by Juanita in favor
of Ricardo which caused Ricardo to be the sole owner of the land to
the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and
entitled to the land, and (2) the validity of the deed of sale executed
between Ricardos daughters and Dominador. Since the principal
action sought here is something other than the recovery of a sum
of money, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
thus cognizable by the RTC. Well-entrenched is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law
and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the party is
entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.
18.) IRENE SANTE v. HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL and VITA
N. KALASHIAN
FACTS: On April 5, 2004, respondent filed before the RTC of Baguio
City a complaint for damages4 against petitioners. In her complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5794-R, respondent alleged that while she
was inside the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the
presence of other persons and police officers, petitioner Irene Sante
uttered words, which when translated in English are as follows, "How
many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You
fuckin bitch!" Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, respondents friend and
one (1) of her hired personal security guards detained at the said
station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners close relative.
Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling
people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the
aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be held
liable to pay moral damages in the amount
of P300,000.00; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00
attorneys fees; P20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of suit.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss5 on the ground that it was the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that
had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the
claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount
of P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be
excluded in computing the total claim. On June 24, 2004, 6 the trial
court denied the motion to dismiss that the total claim of respondent
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
amounted toP420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount
for MTCCs outside Metro Manila MR likewise denied
Aggrieved, petitioners filed on August 2, 2004, a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition,10 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85465, before the
Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, on July 14, 2004, respondent and her
husband filed an Amended Complaint11 increasing the claim for moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and Counterclaim, but
the trial court denied their motion in an Order 12 dated September 17,
2004. Hence, petitioners again filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition13 before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 87563, claiming that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the amendment of the complaint to increase the
amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00. The
case was raffled to the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held that the case clearly falls under the
jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that plaintiff was
seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00,
which amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC.
The Court of Appeals added that the totality of claim rule used for
determining which court had jurisdiction could not be applied to the
instant case because plaintiffs claim for exemplary damages was not
a separate and distinct cause of action from her claim of moral
damages, but merely incidental to it. Thus, the prayer for exemplary
damages should be excluded in computing the total amount of the
claim.
On January 31, 2006, the Court of Appeals, this time in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87563, rendered a decision affirming the September 17, 2004
Order of the RTC denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam.
In the said decision, the appellate court held that the total or aggregate
amount demanded in the complaint constitutes the basis of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals did not find merit in petitioners
posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorneys fees
are merely incidental to the main cause and should not be included in
the computation of the total claim. The Court of Appeals additionally
ruled that respondent can amend her complaint by increasing the
amount of moral damages from P300,000.00 to P1,000,000.00, on the
ground that the trial court has jurisdiction over the original complaint
and respondent is entitled to amend her complaint as a matter of right
under the Rules.
ISSUE: WON the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case and WON
the granting of amendment of the complaint was proper.
HELD: YES. RTC had jurisdiction over the original complaint and
amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right. At
the time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004, the MTCCs
jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to P300,000.00. In this
regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-9419 is instructive:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one
of the causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
In the instant case, the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 5794-R is for
the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners.
The complaint principally sought an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation
expenses, for the alleged shame and injury suffered by
respondent by reason of petitioners utterance while they were at
a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is
conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of action. 20 It is
clear, based on the allegations of the complaint that
respondents main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms
of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not merely
incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute
the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
19.) ALBERTO PAT-OG, SR., v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts of the case:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision of the CSC and the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision
of the CSC ordering the dismissal of petitioner.
Robert Bang-on a second year high school student, filed an Affidavit-
complaint against Pat-og, a third-year high school teacher of the same
school, before the Civil Service-Cordillera Administrative Region
(CSC-CAR), claiming he was punched in the stomach by Pat-og for
which he sustained injuries and was confined in the hospital. At the
same time, Bang-on filed with RTC a criminal case against Pat-og for
the crime of Less-Serious Physical Injury.
After finding probable cause the CSC-CAR commenced
administrative proceedings against Bang-on and while the
administrative case was going on, Pat-og was found guilty of the
offense of light physical injury by the RTC and was meted the penalty
of imprisonment from eleven (11) to twenty (2) days for which he
applied for probation.
The CSC-CAR found Pat-og guilty of simple Misconduct and imposed
upon him the maximum penalty attached to the offense which is six
months suspension without pay due to seriousness of the resulting
injury to the fragile body of the minor victim.
Pat-og appealed said Decision to the CSC, which affirmed the
Decision of the CSC-CAR with a modification that Pat-og is adjudged
guilty of grave misconduct, for which he was meted out the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of
cancellation of eligibilities, perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service and forfeiture of retirement
benefits.
In his Motion for Reconsideration, Pat-og, among other things
questioned the jurisdiction of CSC over the case. He contended that
administrative charges against a public school teacher should have
been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which motion was denied,
prompting Pat-og to bring the matter to the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision of the CSC.
ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED: WHETHER OR NOT THE CSC HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
RULING:
The Court held that the CSC, the DEp-ED and the Board of
Professional Teachers-Professional Regulatory Commission have
concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public
school teachers. Such that, where concurrent jurisdiction exists in
several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In this case,
it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case because the
complaint was filed before it giving it the authority to proceed and
decide the case to the exclusion of the Dep-Ed and the Board of
Professional Teachers.
20.) ONG CHING V. CHINA NATIONAL CEREALS
Facts:
Wilson Ong Ching Kian Chung is selling vermicelli (sotanghon) using
his copyrighted cellophane wrapper with the two-dragons designed
label. In 1993, Wilson Ong sued Lorenzo Tan for infringing upon his
copyrighted cellophanes. Wilson Ong alleged that Tan was importing
sotanghon from China National Cereals Oils and Foodstuffs Import
and Export Corporation and then Tan would use Wilson Ongs
copyrighted cellophanes to sell the sotanghon.
While the case was pending before the Quezon City RTC, China
National Cereals filed another complaint to cancel the copyright of
Wilson Ong before the Manila RTC. Judge Palattao of the Manila RTC
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Wilson Ong from using
his copyrighted cellophanes.
Eventually, Wilson Ong appealed before the Court of Appeals
questioning the TRO. The Court of Appeals in the body of its decision
cited that the case before the Manila RTC should have been dismissed
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
because of litis pendentia and forum shopping, there being an existing
case before the QC RTC which is a co-equal court of the Manila RTC.
But in the dispositive portion of the CA decision, it said that the Manila
RTC has the discretion to dismiss the case. Manila RTC did not
dismiss the case but rather it ordered the cancellation of Wilson Ongs
copyright. The Manila RTC invoked that though the CA cited forum
shopping and litis pendentia as grounds for dismissing the case the
CA did not order Manila RTC to actually dismiss the case but rather it
gave the Manila RTC the discretion to continue hearing the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Manila RTC is correct.
HELD: No. The general rule states that the dispositive portion of a
Judgment becomes the subject of execution. However, there are
exceptions to this rule and one of the exceptions is that if the
dispositive portion differs with the discussion in the body of the
decision such as in the case at bar. This is because the dispositive
portion finds support from the decisions ratio decidendi.
The Quezon City court and the Manila court have concurrent
jurisdiction over the case. However, when the Quezon City court
acquired jurisdiction over the case, it excluded all other courts of
concurrent jurisdiction from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. The
Manila court is, therefore, devoid of jurisdiction over the complaint filed
resulting in the assailed decision which must perforce be declared null
and void. To hold otherwise would be to risk instances where courts
of concurrent jurisdiction might have conflicting orders.
21.) RAYOS v. CITY OF MANILA
Statement of the Case: This is a petition for review on certiorari under
rule 45 and declaratory relief assailing the denial of the trial court of
petitioners motion to dismiss directly filed before the Supreme Court.
Facts: The City of Manila passed an ordinance expropriating a parcel
of land owned by the defendants. The City of Manila offered to buy the
property at 1,000 per sq. m. While the defendants were willing to sell
the said parcel of land, they oppose the just compensation offered
contending that they should be paid the amount of 50,000 per sq. m,
the latter representing fair market value of the said property.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the ordinance
was unconstitutional and the rulings of Lagcao v. Labra and Jesus Is
Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality of Pasig so
applies in this case.
Issue/s: Does the SC have jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari
directly filed before it?
Ruling:
Yes, the SC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. The Rules
provide that the SC, the CA and the RTCs exercise concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo
warranto. However, even if the said courts have jurisdiction to issue
the said writs, petitioner should nevertheless follow the hierarchy of
courts in assailing orders of inferior courts. In this case, Petitioners
should have assailed the denial of their motion to dismiss before the
CA first before filing the same to the SC. The SCs original jurisdiction
may only be invoked in special and important issues clearly provided
for in the petition. Furthermore, Petitioners filed a petition for review
under Rule 45 to assail the denial of a motion to dismiss. A denial of
a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory hence, it cannot be the
subject of an appeal. However, even if the SC treats of the petition as
one for certiorari under rule 65, the petition will likewise be denied for
violating the hierarchy of courts.
22.) CABRERA v. FRANCISCO
Facts: Respondents father, atty Lorenzo C. Gella executed a private
document confirming that he has appointed Severino Cabrera,
husband of Arceli and father of Arnel Cabrera (petitioners) as
administrator of all his real properties located in Antique. When
Severino died, petitioners, with the consent of respondents, took over
the administration of the properties. Respondent likewise instructed
them to look for buyers of the properties, allegedly promising them a
commission of 5% of the total purchase price of the said properties as
compensation. Petitioners introduced Erlinda Venegas to the
respondents who agreed to have the said properties developed by
Erlindas company. However, respondents appointed Erlinda as the
new administratix of the properties and terminated petitioners
services. Petitioners the demanded for their 5% commission to no
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
avail. Hence, they filed a complaint for collection of agents
compensation, commission and damages against respondents before
the RTC.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
a) lack of jurisdiction, b) failure to state cause of action and c) lack of
legal capacity of petitioners to sue in behalf of the other heirs of
Severino. They argued that for the RTC outside Manila to acquire
jurisdiction, the amount demanded must exceed php 200, 000
pursuant to R.A. 7691. Since market value of the lot is php 3,550,072,
5% thereof is Php 177,506.60 is less than the said jurisdictional
amount, thus RTC has no jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
Ruling: No.
The complaint is not incapable of pecuniary estimation because the
main purpose of petitioners is to collect the commission allegedly
promised by the respondents should they be able to sell the lot, as
well as the compensation for the services they rendered. Also, the
commission sought for by the petitioners is only 177, 503.60 which is
less than the amount fix by law of php 200,000 in order for the RTC to
acquire jurisdiction.
23.) EULALIA RUSSELL, PUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO
TAUTHO, SUSANA T. REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO
TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T.
JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM
TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES v. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE
A. VESTlL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO TAUTHO, JUANITA
MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND
ARTEMIO CABATINGAN
FACTS: On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against
private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY
AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City,
Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275. The complaint, in
substance, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of
land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of
56,977.40 square meters, more or less. The land was previously
owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon
the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their legal
heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents.
Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners discovered
a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND
DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT
OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed,
private respondents divided the property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of
the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners
claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private
respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the
property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The
complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an
order be issued to partition the land among all the heirs. 1
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss 2 the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the case as the total assessed value of the subject land is
P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 4 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Curt of Liloan, Compostela. 5
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 6 saying that
the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action
is one which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the
contemplation of Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended. 7
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting
the Motion to Dismiss. 8 A Motion for Reconsideration of said order
was filed by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is
contrary to law because their action is not one for recovery of title to
or possession of the land but an action to annul a document or declare
it null and void, 9 hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation falling
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
did not oppose the motion for reconsideration. MR was likewise
denied.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No.
MAN-2275.
HELD: YES. The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is
doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within
the jurisdiction of said court. In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 12 we
had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in instance would depend on the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal
relief sought, this Court has considered such where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts). 13
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for
specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or
annulment of judgment; 14 also actions questioning the validity of a
mortgage, 15 annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover
the price paid 16 and for rescession, which is a counterpart of specific
performance. 17
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are
cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value
of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila,
or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00
or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which
have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). 18 However, the subject matter of
the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated
as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF
PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION." The main purpose of petitioners in
filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which
private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his
property among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also
claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint
also prays for the partition of the property, this is just incidental to the
main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-
described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
24.) PHILNABANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEMA), DBP
EMPLOYEES UNION (DBPEU), LBP EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION
(LBPEA), ALERT AND CONCERNED EMPLOYEES FOR BETTER
SSS (ACCESS) & KAPATIRAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS
(KMG), vs. HON. JESUS ESTANISLAO & HON. RUBEN TORRES
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari assailing a provision of the
Supplemental Rules Implementing RA 6971 (Productivity Incentives
Act of 1990) which excludes the employees of the PNB, DBP, LBP,
SSS and GSIS from the coverage of said Act.
Labor Secretary Ruben Torres and Finance Secretary Jesus
Estanislao promulgated the Rules Implementing RA 6971. However,
they issued a subsequent Supplemental Rules Implementing RA
6971, clarifying or amending the previously promulgated rules
because the coverage of the GOCCs performing propriety functions
must be in harmony with the prevailing definitions and concepts
involving the rationalization of the government corporate sector.
The Kapatiran ng Manggagawa sa GFI, PEMA sent a letter contesting
said Supplemental Rules which caused serious demoralization among
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
employees. Subsequently, this petition for certiorari was filed on the
basis that respondents have overstepped the bounds of their rule-
making authority by amending the coverage of the Act as provided in
Section 3 thereof.
ISSUE:
W/N the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
No, the Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction over the
matter involved. In this case, although in the form of a certiorari, what
the petitioners are seeking is a declaration of the court of the
unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule. This is a
declaratory relief which the Supreme Court only has appellate
jurisdiction. The hierarchy of courts must be observed and it is the
judicial policy that the Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to
it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify the
same.
25.) CITY OF LAPU-LAPU V. PEZA
Facts:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the City of
Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed against the
Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA).
In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails the Court
of Appeals decision2 dated January 11, 2008 and resolution3 dated
August 6, 2008, dismissing the Citys appeal for being the wrong mode
of appeal. The City appealed the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111,
Pasay Citys decision finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real
property taxes.
In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province) assails the
Court of Appeals decision4dated August 27, 2008 and
resolution5 dated April 16, 2009, granting the PEZAs petition for
certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 115, Pasay City gravely abused its discretion in finding the
PEZA liable for real property taxes to the Province of Bataan.
Facts common to both cases:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 66 in
1972, declaring as government policy the establishment of export
processing zones in strategic locations in the Philippines. To carry
such policy, the Export Processing Zone Authority was created. The
said decree declared that EPZA will be a non-profit entity, and was
also declared to be exempt from taxes.
Facts of G.R. No. 184203
On March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the
Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA PHP 32,912,350.08 in real
property taxes for the period from 1992 to 1998 on the PEZAs
properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone. The City pointed out
that no provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically
exempted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike
Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided for
EPZAs exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly exempted the
PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the City argued that it can
tax the PEZA. On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for
declaratory relief25 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, praying
that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of real property
taxes. Pursuant to Rule 63, Section 3 of Rules of Court, the Office of
the Solicitor General filed a comment31 on the PEZAs petition for
declaratory relief. It agreed that the PEZA is exempt from payment of
real property taxes, citing Sections 24 and 51 of the Special Economic
Zone Act of 1995. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the
National Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no authority
to tax the PEZA under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of the Local
Government Code of 1991. In the resolution32 dated June 14, 2006,
the trial court granted the PEZAs petition for declaratory relief and
declared it exempt from payment of real property taxes.
Issue: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on the
petition of declaratory relief by PEZA against the city of Lapu-Lapu
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
Ruling: The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to
hear, try, and decide the PEZAs petition for declaratory relief
against the City of Lapu-Lapu
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for
declaratory relief against the City. The City had already issued
demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA,
in violation of the PEZAs alleged tax-exempt status under its
charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter
of PEZAs petition for declaratory relief, had already been
breached. The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the
petition for declaratory relief.
A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial
determination of any question of construction or validity arising from,
and for a declaration of rights and duties, under any of the following
subject matters: a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation. However, a declaratory judgment may issue
only if there has been no breach of the documents in question. If the
contract or statute subject matter of the action has already been
breached, the appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. If
adequate relief is available through another form of action or
proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action for
declaratory relief. In the present case, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, specifically, over the
remedy sought.
In sum, a petition for declaratory relief must satisfy six
requisites:c[F]irst, the subject matter of the controversy must be a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order
or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms of said documents and
the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third,
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth,
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds"
of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate relief is not
available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for
declaratory relief against the City. The City had already issued
demand letters and real property tax assessment against the PEZA,
in violation of the PEZAs alleged tax-exempt status under its
charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter
of PEZAs petition for declaratory relief, had already been
breached. The trial court, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the
petition for declaratory relief.
In the present case, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action, specially, over the remedy. The trial
court should have dismissed the PEZAs petition for declaratory relief
for lack of jurisdiction.
26.) THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., v.
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
Statement of the Case: This is a petition for prohibition and
declaratory relief seeking annulment of a status quo order issued by
COSLAP.
Facts:
A property in Dominican Hills was mortgaged and eventually awarded
to UCPB. UCPB subsequently donated said property to the
government on the condition that the same will be utilized for the
priority projects of the Ministry of Human Settlements. The Ministry of
Human Settlements was replaced later by the Presidential
Management Staff who later sold the said property to Home Insurance
Guaranty Inc. and eventually to United. After United acquired the
property, Respondents entered the same and started erecting houses
therein. United secured a demolition order. Respondents now seek
the annulment of the contracts entered into by United and a TRO for
the said demolition order before the COSLAP by way of a petition for
declaratory relief. COSLAP issued the TRO hence, the current
petition.
Issue/s:
Does the COSLAP have jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
declaratory relief?
Ruling:
COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over this case.
Original jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief have been
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
vested before the RTCs. COSLAP was created as a means of
providing a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement
of land problems in general, which are frequently the source of
conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. COSLAP
nevertheless remains to be an administrative agency. It does not form
part of the judiciary because its not a court. Therefore, COSLAP
abused its discretion when it issued the TRO to stop the demolition
order. Therefore, the COSLAP order should be annulled.
27.) MIRASOL vs. CA
Facts: The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine
National Bank (PNB) financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture
FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan financing scheme. The Mirasols
signed CreditAgreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops,
and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell the latter's sugar and to apply
the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it.
President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974 authorizing
Philippine Exchange Co., Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated
for export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX's purchases. The
decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be
remitted to the government. Believing that the proceeds were more
than enough to pay their obligations, petitioners asked PNB for an
accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continued to
avail of other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from
their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due
and demandable accounts. As a result, petitioners, conveyed to PNB
real properties by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid
amount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had a deficiency claim.
Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting
that said proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding
obligations. PNB remained adamant in its stance that under P.D. No.
579, there was nothing to account since under said law, all earnings
from the export sales of sugar pertained to the National Government.
On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific
performance, and damages against PNB
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute
unconstitutional without notice to the Solicitor General where the
parties have agreed to submit such issue for the resolution of the Trial
Court.
(2) Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances thereof are
unconstitutional.
(3) Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held: It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, presidential
decree, or executive order. The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all Regional Trial Courts.
The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable
the Solicitor General to decide whether or not his intervention in the
action assailing the validity of a law or treaty is necessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of
his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the
mandatory notice requirement is not limited to actions involving
declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that
such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Where there is noambiguity in the words used in the
rule, there is no room for construction. 15 In all actions assailing the
validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or proclamation,
notice to the Solicitor General is mandatory.
Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances
are void for violating the due process clause and the prohibition
against the taking of private property without just compensation.
Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power of judicial review.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise
of this power: First, there must be before the Court an actual case
calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the question before
the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging
the validity of the actmust have standing to challenge. Fourth, the
question of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest
opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.
28.) VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA v. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA
FACTS: On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-
square-meter parcel of land located in Poblacion, Parang,
Maguindanao, now Shariff Kabunsuan, from one Ceres Caete. On
March 3, 1996, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15633 covering the
parcel of land was issued in Roldans name.3 At the time of the
purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land.4 By
2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192
issued by the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same
parcel of land.5 On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land
surveyed. In a report, Geodetic Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that
Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by Roldans certificate
of title. To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated
barangay conciliation proceedings before the Office of the Barangay
Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan. Failing to settle
with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan filed an action to recover
the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Sharia
District Court.7 In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino
Muslim; that he is the registered owner of the lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that Vivencio occupied his property,
depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy it. He prayed that
respondent Fifth Sharia District Court order Vivencio to vacate his
property.8
Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of
summons on Vivencio. However, despite service of summons,
Vivencio failed to file his answer. Thus, Roldan moved that he be
allowed to present evidence ex parte, which motion respondent Fifth
Sharia District Court granted in its order9 dated January 30, 2008.10It
ruled that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess
the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it
over to Roldan, and pay P10,000.00 as moderate damages
and P5,000.00 as attorneys fees. On December 15, 2008, respondent
Fifth Sharia Distict Court issued the notice of writ of execution12 to
Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to comply with
the decision. He received a copy of the notice on December 16,
2008.13
On January 13, 2009, Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment
with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.14 In his
petition for relief from judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph
(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines 15 and
argued that Sharia District Courts may only hear civil actions and
proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a
Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Sharia District Court
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldans action for recovery
of possession of a parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth
Sharia District Court set aside the decision dated June 11, 2008 on
the ground of mistake.16
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court ruled that Vivencio
"intentionally [waived] his right to defend himself."17 It noted that he
was duly served with summons and had notice of the following:
Roldans motion to present evidence ex parte, respondent Fifth
Sharia District Courts decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ of
execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right
to assail the decision via certiorari."18 Thus, in its order21 dated May
29, 2009, respondent Fifth Sharia District Court denied Vivencios
petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its order
directing the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision dated June
11, 2008. Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition
for relief from judgment on June 17, 2009.22 On August 6, 2009,
Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order with this court.23In the resolution26 dated
August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment on Vivencios
petition for certiorari. This court subsequently issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution
against Vivencio.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
ISSUE: WON the 5th Shariah Disctric Court has jurisdiction over a real
action where one of the parties is a non-muslim.
HELD: NO. The law conferring the jurisdiction of Sharia District
Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines.
Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Sharia District Courts have
concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real
actions not arising from customary contracts41 wherein the parties
involved are Muslims
In this case, the allegations in Roldans petition for recovery of
possession did not state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio
stated in his petition for relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim,
Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent
Fifth Sharia District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the
case. Under Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action based
on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the
claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or
the evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, that there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had no authority under the law
to decide Roldans action because not all of the parties involved in the
action are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldans action
for recovery of possession. All its proceedings in SDC Special
Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter only after respondent Fifth Sharia District Court had rendered
judgment is immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a court
or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal.59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of
and to render judgment on the action."
29.) AMADO G. PEREZ v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
FACTS OF THE CASE:
This is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 from the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration
which in turn dismissed the petition for certiorari and mandamus, for
lack of jurisdiction. The dismissed petition questioned the Office of the
Ombudsmans dismissal of petitioners criminal complaint against
Mayor Ignacio Bunye.
Mayor Ignacio Bunye was one of the respondents in this case for
violation of RA 3019 (also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). Allegedly, respondents destroyed the doors of the
KBMBPM office while serving on petitioners the Take-Over Order of
the KBMBPM management issued by then Agriculture Secretary
Carlos G. Dominguez.
In disposing said complainants, the Office of the Ombudsman issued
a Resolution excluding respondent Bunye from the criminal
indictment. Petitioners assailed the exclusion before the CA through
an original petition for certiorari and mandamus. The CA dismissed
the petition for lack of jurisdiction in accordance with Section 27 of RA
6770 (also known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.) The CA also
denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, hence, this petition for
review.
ISSUE TO BE RESOLVED:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS
CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS;
RESOLUTION:
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
The Court ruled that the CA was correct in dismissing the petition
although it erroneously invoked as its basis Section 27 of RA 6770
which applies in administrative cases only, not criminal cases,
such as the graft and corruption charge at bar. As previously ruled
in the Case of Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 470 (1998), which is
still controlling, it was held that Section 27 applies only whenever an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative4 disciplinary action. Nevertheless, the Court had
declared Section 27 unconstitutional for exploding the Supreme
Courts appellate jurisdiction without its advice and consent. It was,
therefore ruled that all appeals from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be
taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.
Because the present controversy pertained to a criminal case,
petitioners were correct in availing the remedy of petition for certiorari
under Sec. 65 but they erred in filing it with the Court of Appeals. The
procedure that requires that petitions for certiorari questioning
the Ombudsmans orders or decisions in criminal cases should
be filed in the Supreme Court and not the Court of Appeals, is
still the prevailing rule.
The Court further ruled that even if the petition for certiorari had been
filed with the Supreme Court, the same would be dismissed on 2
grounds, namely- 1) petitioners should have filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman resolution as it was the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, not filing
a petition for certiorari directly in the Supreme Court; 2) the Office
of the Ombudsman did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the resolution.
The Court had consistently refrained from interfering with the
investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any
compelling reason, for constitutional, statutory and practical
considerations. The Constitution and RA 6670 endowed the Office of
the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutorial powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention, to insulate it from outside pre4ssure and improper
influence.
Petition is denied for lack of merit.
30.) LANTING V. OMBUDSMAN
Facts:
Zenaida F. Lanting, petitioner, was the Administrative Officer IV of the
City Council of Manila. She filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
affidavit-complaint [2] dated May 12, 1998, docketed as Case No.
OMB-0-98-0965, charging then Manila Vice-Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr.,
now City Mayor, Emmanuel Sison, Secretary to the City Council, and
Charito Rumbo, Human Resource Management Officer III, herein
respondents, with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). She alleged that these city officials
unlawfully and feloniously appointed Ernesto Saw, Jr., a Chinese
citizen working in Taiwan, and brother-in-law of Charito Rumbo, to the
position of Researcher in the City Council.
In the same complaint, petitioner further alleged that respondents
fraudulently effected the publication of a vacant position
(Administrative Officer V) in the City Council, in violation of Republic
Act No. 7041.[3] Petitioner also questioned the appointments of
Percival Magalong as Utility I; Atty. Flora Aquino-Togonon as
Administrative Officer V; and three relatives of Charito Rumbo,
Petitioner likewise denounced Erlinda Magalong, Civil Service
Commission (CSC) Director II, for employing Percival Magalong, her
brother, in her office at the Civil Service Field Office, GSIS Building,
Manila.
Everyone except Ernesto Saw, Jr. filed their respective counter-
affidavits.
On April 8, 1999, Oscar P. Ramos, Graft Investigator Officer I, issued
a Resolution recommending that petitioners complaint be dismissed.
The Resolution[7] was reviewed by Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L.
Aportadera, Jr. and approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
on June 25, 1999.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
On July 14, 1999, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
above Resolution on the ground that Investigator Oscar Ramos
conveniently and intentionally skirted the issue of falsification of public
documents which are crystal clear in my complaint.[8] She then prayed
for a re-investigation of her complaint by a Special Prosecutor.[9]
On July 26, 1999, the Ombudsman denied petitioners motion for lack
of merit.
On September 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution
dismissing the petition on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the assailed Ombudsmans Resolution.
Issue: WON the CA is correct in dismissing said petition?
Ruling:
The instant petition is bereft of merit.
Petitioners complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman is
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an
administrative complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did she allege
administrative offenses, such as dishonesty or misconduct on the part
of respondents.
Considering that petitioners complaint is criminal in nature, this Court
has the sole authority to review the Ombudsmans Resolutions on
pure question of law as expressly mandated in Section 14,
2nd paragraph of R.A. 6770. We held that only appeals from the
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under
the provisions of Rule 43
31.) BPI CREDIT CORPORATION vs.COURT OF APPEALS and
DOMINADOR CABACUNGAN
Statement of the Case: This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 assailing the order of the CA ordering defendant to pay moral
and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
Facts:
Dominador bought a vehicle from BMD secured by a promissory note,
a deed of chattel mortgage and a Deed of Assignment to FIlinvest.
Dominador delivered his payments but withheld the same for 2 months
on the ground that he was being charged of interests more than the
amount agreed upon. Subsequently, after the vehicle has delivered a
piece of furniture, Filinvest seized the said vehicle on the ground that
the monthly amortizations were unpaid. Upon learning of the seizure,
Dominador issued a check to cover the said amortizations but the
vehicle was not released until the amount contained in the promissory
note has been paid. Dominador filed a petition for replevin alleging,
among others, that Filinvest took his vehicle through force and
intimidation without a seizure order from the court.
Issue/s:
Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to address findings of fact
of inferior courts in replevin cases?
Ruling:
No, only questions of law may be entertained by the SC in cases
brought before it. The findings of fact of the CA will not be disturbed.
The CA found that Filinvest unilaterally seized the vehicle from
Dominadors employees. Filinvest did not make any written demand
to surrender the vehicle to warrant its seizure. Filinvest merely made
oral demands for payment of the unpaid monthly installments.
Furthermore, the demand made was to Dominadors newphew and
employee. The law requires that demand should be given to the
mortgagor himself. The mere fact that demand was made to a family
member of Dominador does not warrant a valid demand to the
mortgagor for lack of authority from the latter to the former.
32.) DOLE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTEVA
Facts: Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner argues that
judicial review under Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure
is limited only to issues concerning want or excess or jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion. The special civil action for certiorari is a
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not mere errors
of judgment. It is the contention of petitioner that the NLRC properly
assumed jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the instant
case.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
The errors assigned by the respondents in their Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals do not pertain to th e
jurisdiction of the NLRC; they are rather errors of judgment supposedly
committed by the NLRC, in its Resolution, dated 29 February 2000,
and are thus not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. Petitioner
also posits that the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents with the
Court of Appeals raised questions of fact that would necessitate a
review by the appellate court of the evidence presented by the parties
before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, and that questions of fact are
not a fit subject for a special civil action for certiorari.
Issue: WON questions of fact are not a fit subject for a special civil
action for certiorari.
Held: There is no error on the CAs part when it made anew a factual
determination of the matters. It has long been settled in the landmark
case of St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, that the mode for judicial
review over decisions of the NLRC is by a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The different modes
of appeal, namely, writ of error (Rule 41), petition for review (Rules 42
and 43), and petition for review on certiorari (Rule 45), cannot be
availed of because there is no provision on appellate review of NLRC
decisions in the Labor Code, as amended. Although the same case
recognizes that both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court
have original jurisdiction over such petitions, it has chosen to impose
the strict observance of the hierarchy of courts. Hence, a petition for
certiorari of a decision or resolution of the NLRC should first be filed
with the Court of Appeals; direct resort to the Supreme Court shall not
be allowed unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify an availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise by the Supreme Court of its primary jurisdiction.
The rule is settled that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court to review a decision of respondent NLRC (or Executive Labor
Arbiter as in this case) in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 does
not normally include an inquiry in to the correctness of its evaluation
of the evidence. Errors of judgment, as distinguished from errors of
jurisdiction, are not within the province of a special civil
action for certiorari.
33.) RE: HOLD-DEPARTURE ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE
AGUSTIN T. SARDIDO
FACTS: This refers to an undated indorsement of Honorable
Hernando B. Perez, Secretary of the Department of Justice,
concerning a hold-departure order issued by Judge Agustin T.
Sardido, Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato in
Criminal Case No. 19418 titled "People of the Philippines v. Jinky A.
Besorio" for estafa. The said judge granted the motion of the private
complainants and ordered the Bureau of Immigration to cause the
issuance of a hold-departure order against the accused.
When required to comment on the matter, herein judge explained that
at the time he issued the hold-departure order, he was unaware that
he had no authority to do so. He further explained that he issued the
questioned order based on his belief that he was authorized to do so.
Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez, after finding that MTC
Judge Sardido erred in issuing the subject hold-departure order,
recommended that he be (a) reprimanded with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely, and (b) advised to keep himself abreast with the latest
issuances of the Court.
ISSUE: WON a Hold-Departure Order may be issued by an MTC
judge.
HELD: NO. The recommendation of the Deputy Court Administrator is
well-taken. Circular No. 39-97 provides that hold-departure orders
shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Courts. Clearly then, Municipal Trial Courts do
not have jurisdiction to issue hold-departure orders and it was an error
on the part of MTC Judge Sardido to have issued one in the instant
case.
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 CONSOLIDATED CASE DIGESTS in Civil Procedure (1ST BATCH)
To ensure the strict implementation of the Circular, the following
guidelines. were promulgated:
In order to avoid the indiscriminate issuance of Hold-Departure
Orders resulting in inconvenience to the parties affected, the same
being tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an
individual to travel and to ensure that the Hold-Departure Orders
which are issued contain complete and accurate information, the
following guidelines are hereby promulgated:
1. Hold-Departure Orders shall be issued only in criminal cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts;
2. The Regional Trial Courts issuing the Hold-Departure Order
shall furnish the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
Bureau of Immigration (BI) of the Department of Justice with a
copy each of the Hold-Departure Order issued within twenty-hour
(24) hours from the time of issuance and through the fastest
available means of transmittal;
3. The Hold-Departure Order shall contain the following
information: .
a. The complete name (including the middle name), the date and
place of birth and the place of last residence of the person against
whom a Hold-Departure Order has been issued or whose
departure from the country has been enjoined;
b. The complete title and the docket number of the case in which
the Hold-Departure Order was issued;
c. The specific nature of the case; and
d. The date of the Hold-Departure Order.
If available, a recent photograph of the person against whom a
Hold-Departure Order has been issued or whose departure from
the country has been enjoined should also be included.
4. Whenever (a) the accused has been acquitted; (b) the case has
been dismissed, the judgment of acquittal or the order of dismissal
shall include therein the cancellation of the Hold-Departure Order
issued. The courts concerned shall furnish the Department of
Foreign Affairs and the Bureau of Immigration with a copy each of
the judgment of acquittal promulgated or the order of dismissal
twenty-four (24) hours from the time of promulgation/issuance and
through the fastest available means of transmittal.
All Regional Trial Courts which have furnished the Department of
Foreign Affairs with their respective lists of active Hold-Departure
Orders are hereby directed to conduct an inventory of the Hold-
Departure Orders included in the said lists and inform the
government agencies concerned of the status of the Orders
involved.
34.) HOLD-DEPARTURE ORDFER ISSUED BY JUDGE
SALVADOR M. OCCIANO MCTC-Nabua, Camarines Sur, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 7353 and 7363.
Facts of the case:
Judge Designate Salvador M. Occiano of the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Nabua-Bato, Camarines upon application of Asst. Provincial
Prosecutor Elias Borromeo, on the same day, issued a hold-
departure order against accused Helen S. Zabala, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 7353 and 7363.
The propriety of said hold-departure order was referred by the then
CID Commissioner Homobono Adaza to the Secretary of Justice who
then referred the same for appropriate action to the Court
Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, considering that pursuant to
Supreme court Circular No. 39-97 a hold-departure order may be
issued by a Regional Trial Court only.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AN MCTC JUDGE CAN VALIDLY
ISSUE A HOLD DEPATURE ORDER OR NOT
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HELD: ONLY RTC judges can validly issue a hold departure order in
criminal cases within hits exclusive jurisdiction. Respondent judge was
reprimanded for having issued the order in violation of Circular No., 39-
37.
35.) ANGELES vs. CA
Facts:
A complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage, foreclosure
sale, reconveyance and damages - docketed as Civil Case No. 69213
in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 268 - was filed by
spouses Juan and Anatalia Coronel (the Coronels) against herein
petitioner Elisa Angeles and several other After trial, or on April 3,
2005, the trial court rendered a Decision6 containing the following
decretal portion:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against defendants:
1. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. PT-113632 as null
and void;
2. Ordering the Registry of Deeds for the City of Pasig to cancel
TCT No. PT-113632 in the name of Rosalina Liwag and to issue a
new one in the names of plaintiffs Spouses Juan L. Coronel and
Anatalia Coronel;
3. Ordering plaintiff to pay defendant Miguel Galicia the amount
of P960,000.00 as reimbursement for his redemption of the property;
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner and her co-defendants in Civil Case No. 69213 filed their
Notice of Appeal, while the Coronels filed a motion for execution of the
April 3, 2005 judgment pending appeal, which the trial court denied in
an October 19, 2005 Order. On November 15, 2005, the Coronels filed
their Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner and her co-defendants
appeal to the CA was docketed as CAG. R. CV No. 86451.
In a November 15, 2005 Order, the trial court directed that the
entire record of Civil Case No. 69213 be transmitted to the CA for
appropriate action. In a February 1, 2006 Order,10 the trial court
reconsidered its October 19, 2005 Order and thus granted the
Coronels motion for execution pending appeal. A Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal was thus issued on February 16, 2006.
On February 27, 2006, the record of Civil Case No. 69213 was
transmitted to the CA. On March 9, 2006, petitioner was evicted from
the subject property as a result of the enforcement of the Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal.
On March 24, 2006, petitioner filed a Petition for Contempt13 with the
CA against herein respondents Officer-In-Charge Marilou C. Martin
(Martin), Deputy Sheriff Joselito SP Astorga (Astorga), Clerk III Marco
Boco (Boco), and John Does. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93772,
the Petition alleged that Martin defied the trial courts November 15,
2005 Order to elevate the records of Civil Case No. 69213 to the CA
and acted in collusion with the Coronels to ensure that the latter obtain
execution pending appeal; that the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal
was hastily and irregularly issued. The CA ruled that the petition
should have been filed with the court a quo. It bears stressing that the
power to determine whether x x x the acts alleged by
petitioner constitute indirect contempt, rests exclusively in the court
against which the contumacious act was committed.
Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion for
dismissing the case?
Ruling:
Yes, the CA is correct in dismissing such case.
Indeed, contrary to petitioners claims, it appears that the respondent
public officers acted faithfully in carrying out the trial courts directives.
If petitioner doubted these directives arguing as she does that the
trial court lost jurisdiction over the case when her appeal was
perfected then she should have questioned them by filing the
corresponding appeal or petition in order to set them aside.
And, speaking of contempt, the appellate court is likewise correct in
its position that if respondent public officers should be punished for
their perceived defiance or failure to abide by the trial courts directives
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and processes, then the contempt charge should have been initiated
in the court a quo, and not in the CA. Sections 4 and 5, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court state, respectively, that [p]roceedings for indirect
contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the
contempt was committed and [w]here the charge for
indirect contempt has been committed against a Regional Trial Court
or a court of equivalent or higher rank, or against an officer appointed
by it, the charge may be filed with such court.

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