1.

Oh Cho vs Director of Lands 75 Phil 890

G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS.

Facts: Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in
Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January
17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed the
registration on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was an
alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain .

Issue: Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration.

Ruling: No. Petitioner failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under
the Land Registration Act. All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest
since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest. The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest
possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in 1880.Under the Public
Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh Cho predecessors in interest would
have been entitled to a decree of registration had they applied for the same. The application
for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by the
Lagdameos who was not able. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title.
This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien,
the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is
disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.
2. Director of Lands vs. IAC and ACME 146 SCRA 509

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.

Facts: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo
Nazario, acquired 5 parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., from Mariano and Acer Infiel,
members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and owners of the lots-in-question from time
immemorial, on October 29, 1962. This was accordingly only registered on July 17.

Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute

ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public
domain.
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.
The government and the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela also recognized
ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered ,Acme also donated part of the
land as the townsite of Maconacon Isabela.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the land is already a private land ?
2. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations applies?

Ruling:
YES the land is already a private land. Lands already acquired, by operation of law
not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient.
It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued
upon the strength of said patent.The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO. The constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or
associations does not apply. The land was already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said
owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition.The
only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public
agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares
3. Meralco vs. Castro Bartolome 114 SCRA 799

G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES

Facts:
The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at Tanay, Rizal on August13,
1976 from Piguing spouses. After acquisition, they subsequently filed for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title on Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the
corresponding appeal was likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal with the following
arguments; firstly, the land in question had essentially been converted to private land by virtue
of acquisitive prescription as a result of open continuous and notorious possession and
occupation for more than thirty years by the original owner, Olimpia Ramos and his
predecessor in interest, Piguing, spouses whom Meralco acquired
the disputed land, and finally, the substantial rights acquired by Ramos spouses and Piguing
spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, extend to Meralco by virtue of the provision
of the Public Land Law.

Issue:
1. Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the law to hold landsof public
domain and apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
2. Whether or not the possession tacked to predecessor Private Corporation automatically
guarantee its rights to possession and title of the land.
3. Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title before any grant would be
extended to a juridical person.

Ruling:
1. No. Private corporations or juridical person is prohibited and not allowed under the law to
hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec. 14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private
corporations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands not
exceeding one thousand hectares.

2. No. The presumption that since they bought the property from the person who occupied
the land in open, continuous and notorious possession of the public land for more than thirty
years, does not automatically amount to rights and possession.

It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino
Citizen claiming it under the law this conclusion is anchored on the principle that all lands
that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
public domain. The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his predecessors-in-
interest possess and occupied the same since time immemorial. Such possessions justify the
presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.

3. Yes. In this case, the court declared that it is contingent upon the issuance of title before
juridical entity may have acquired possession over the property. That means that until the
certificate of title is issued, a piece of land, over which an imperfect title is sought to be
confirmed, remains public land. Thus, any levy and execution were void.

As between the State and the Meralco, the land in question remains a public land. The Court
also took notice that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on one
hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and
(on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has an
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation. Since section 11 of Article XIV does not
distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification.
4. Suzi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 48 Phil 427

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS

Facts: On December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond,
to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase
the same . After having been in possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond
having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold
it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it. Before the execution
of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land,
availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he
had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question,
first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open,
continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or
disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land. The court
rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon. Angela Razon
applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having learned
of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting
his possession of the land for twenty-five years. After making the proper administrative
investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the
land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August
31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said document,
Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do
so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer. After trial, whereat evidence was
introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment
declaring the Valentin Suzi entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by
the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the cancellation of the certificate
of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of
Lands took made an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Valentin Suzi is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of
land and annul the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon.

Ruling: It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of
the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his
predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. When Angela Razon
applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account
that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December
18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of
time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine
laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Government
of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 4491), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there
is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of
Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession,
personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title
to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of
title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question
to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any
title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.

5. Mc Daniel vs. Apcible and Cuisia 42 Phil 749

G.R. No. L-17597 December 29, 1922

E. W. McDANIEL, petitioner,
vs. GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and JUAN
CUISIA, respondents.

Facts: On June 7, 1916, the plaintiff and his associates located, in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and Act No. 624 of the Philippine
Commission, three association petroleum placer claims, each of an area of 64 hectares on
the public domain in the Philippine Islands, and that such locations were duly recorded in the
office of the Mining Recorder as "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2" and "Maglihi No. 3." Also,
that the plaintiff and his associates remained in the open and continuous possession of the
three petroleum placer claims from June 7, 1916, until the 17th day of October, 1917, at which
time his associates conveyed their respective interests in the claims to the plaintiff. That ever
since October 17, 1917, the plaintiff has remained in the open and continuous possession of
the claims and that in the year 1917 and each year thereafter, he has performed not less than
P200 worth of labor on each of them.

It is stipulated that on October 17, 1917, the plaintiff's associates conveyed their interests in
the claims to him for P100. The pleadings admit that the locations by plaintiff and his
associates of the petroleum placer claims were made in accord with the provisions of the Act
of Congress of July 1, 1902, and Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission. Such acts specify
and point out how and by whom and the conditions under which a mineral location can be
made, and, hence, it must follow that any mineral location made in accord with those
provisions is a valid location. This legally carries with it the existence of every element,
prerequisite and condition necessary or required for the making of a mineral location. Hence,
we must assume that the plaintiff and his associates made a good and valid mineral location
upon the public domain of the Philippine Islands.

Section 2 of the Act No. 2932 provides that "All such lands may be leased by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the manner and subject to the rules prescribed by
the Council of State.
Under the provisions of this Act, the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to make such a lease is confined to lands "containing petroleum and other mineral
oils and gas in the Philippine Islands."

In the instant case, the stipulation shows that the mining claims are situated in a
comparatively uninhabited district four miles from any port, and that they can only be reached
over mountain trails which have been maintained at the expense of the plaintiff. If it be a fact
that the claims do contain petroleum in paying quantities, it would be of immense value to the
commercial interests of the Philippine Islands. As evidence of his good faith, the plaintiff has
expended P12,000 in the development of the property, and has found evidence tending to
show that the claims do contain petroleum and other mineral oils. At this time and under such
circumstances, it would be a gross injustice to deprive him of his property rights through forms
and technicalities. The locations were made upon the unappropriated public domain, and to
maintain them, and as evidence of good faith, the law requires the performance of the annual
assessment work, and that question is not disputed or presented in the record.

In the instant case, we hold that, even though a valid mineral location was made prior to the
passage of Act No. 2932 and the annual assessment work had not been performed since the
passage of the Act, and that question is raised and presented by an appropriate plea and
sustained by the proof, any prior rights under the location would then be forfeited, and such
lands would then be subject to, and come under, the provisions of Act No. 2932.