In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No.163397
BRENDANDASSEY,
PetitionerAppellee,

v.

MICHAELA.DITTMANN,
RespondentAppellant.
____________________

AppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtforthe
EasternDistrictofWisconsin.
No.14cv1310WilliamE.Duffin,MagistrateJudge.
____________________

ARGUEDSEPTEMBER26,2017DECIDEDDECEMBER8,2017
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK, KANNE,
ROVNER,WILLIAMS,SYKES,andHAMILTON,CircuitJudges.*
HAMILTON,CircuitJudge.PetitionerBrendanDasseycon
fessedonvideotapetoparticipatinginthe2005rapeandmur
derofTeresaHalbachandthemutilationofhercorpse.The
WisconsinstatecourtsupheldDasseysconvictionsforthese
crimes,findingthathisconfessionwasvoluntaryandcould

*CircuitJudgesFlaumandBarrettdidnotparticipateintheconsider

ationordecisionofthiscase.
2 No.163397

beusedagainsthim.Theprincipalissueinthishabeascorpus
appealiswhetherthatfindingwasbasedonanunreasonable
applicationofSupremeCourtprecedentoranunreasonable
viewofthefacts.See28U.S.C.2254(d).
Whether Dasseys confession was voluntary or not is
measuredagainstageneralstandardthattakesintoaccount
thetotalityofthecircumstances.SeeWithrowv.Williams,507
U.S. 680, 69394 (1993); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55
(1962);seealsoFarev.MichaelC.,442U.S.707,727(1979)(ad
missibilityofjuvenileconfession).Somefactorswouldtendto
supportafindingthatDasseysconfessionwasnotvoluntary:
hisyouth,hislimitedintellectualability,somesuggestionsby
theinterrogators,theirbroadassurancestoavulnerablesus
pect that honesty would produce leniency, and inconsisten
cies in Dasseys confession. Many other factors, however,
point toward a finding that it was voluntary. Dassey spoke
withtheinterrogatorsfreely,afterreceivingandunderstand
ingMirandawarnings,andwithhismothersconsent.Thein
terrogationtookplaceinacomfortablesetting,withoutany
physicalcoercionorintimidation,withoutevenraisedvoices,
andoverarelativelybrieftime.Dasseyprovidedmanyofthe
most damning details himself in response to openended
questions.Onanumberofoccasionsheresistedtheinterro
gatorsstrongsuggestionsonparticulardetails.Also,thein
vestigatorsmadenospecificpromisesofleniency.
After the state courts found the confession voluntary, a
federaldistrictcourtandadividedpanelofthiscourtfound
thatthestatecourtsdecisionwasunreasonableandthatDas
seywasentitledtoawritofhabeascorpus.Wegrantedenbanc
reviewtoconsidertheapplicationofthedeferentialstandards
No.163397 3

of28U.S.C.2254(d)andtheimplicationsofthepaneldeci
sionforinterrogationsofjuvenilesuspects.Thestatecourts
finding that Dasseys confession was voluntary was not be
yondfairdebate,butweconcludeitwasreasonable.Were
versethegrantofDasseyspetitionforawritofhabeascor
pus.
PartIprovidesanoverviewoftheapplicablelaw.PartII
sets forth the relevant facts about Teresa Halbachs murder,
Dasseys confession, and the court proceedings. Part III ap
pliesthelawtotherelevantfacts,keepinginmindthedefer
encewemustgiveunder2254(d)tostatecourtdecisionsas
towhichreasonablejudgesmightdiffer.
I. TheApplicableLaw
WefirstdiscussourstandardofreviewundertheAntiter
rorismandEffectiveDeathPenaltyActof1996(AEDPA)and
thendescribetheSupremeCourtsclearlyestablishedlawfor
when a confession, particularly a confession by a sixteen
yearoldlikeDassey,isdeemedvoluntaryandadmissible.
A. DeferenceUnderAEDPA
In considering habeas corpus petitions challenging state
courtconvictions,ourreviewisgoverned(andgreatlylim
ited) by AEDPA. Hicks v. Hepp, 871 F.3d 513, 524 (7th Cir.
2017)(citationomitted).Thestandardsin28U.S.C.2254(d)
weredesignedtopreventfederalhabeasretrialsandtoen
surethatstatecourtconvictionsaregiveneffecttotheextent
possibleunderlaw.Id.,quotingBellv.Cone,535U.S.685,693
(2002).Section2254(d)providesthatastatecourtconviction
cannotbeoverturnedunlessthestatecourtsadjudicationof
afederalclaimonthemerits:
4 No.163397

(1)resultedinadecisionthatwascontraryto,orin
volvedanunreasonableapplicationof,clearlyes
tablished Federal law, as determined by the Su
premeCourtoftheUnitedStates;or
(2)resultedinadecisionthatwasbasedonanun
reasonabledeterminationofthefactsinlightofthe
evidencepresentedintheStatecourtproceeding.
The decision federal courts look to is the last reasoned
statecourtdecisiontodecidethemeritsofthecase,evenif
the states supreme court then denied discretionary review.
Johnsonv.Williams,133S.Ct.1088,1094n.1(2013).Inthiscase,
welooktotheWisconsinCourtofAppealsdecisionthatDas
seysconfessionwasvoluntary.1
The standard for legal errors under 2254(d)(1) was
meanttobedifficulttosatisfy.Harringtonv.Richter,562U.S.
86,102(2011).Theissueisnotwhetherfederaljudgesagree
withthestatecourtdecisionorevenwhetherthestatecourt
decision was correct. The issue is whether the decision was
unreasonablywrongunderanobjectivestandard.Williamsv.
Taylor,529U.S.362,41011(2000)(majorityopinionofOCon

1OnOctober30,2017,theSupremeCourtheardargumentinWilson

v.Sellers,No.166855,whereonequestioniswhetherfederalcourtsinha
beascasesshouldcontinuetolookthroughstatesupremecourtsum
marydecisionsonthemeritstothelaststatecourtdecisionthatprovided
an explanation. See generally Hittson v. Chatman, 135 S. Ct. 2126, 2127
(2015)(Ginsburg,J.,concurringindenialofcertiorari).IftheCourtholds
in Wilson that federal courts reviewing a state supreme court summary
denialofreviewshouldgivethestatecourtsthebenefitofanymeritsra
tionale the record could support, our review would become even more
deferential,sotheoutcomeherewouldnotchange.
No.163397 5

nor,J.).Putanotherway,weaskwhetherthestatecourtdeci
sion was so lacking in justification that there was an error
wellunderstoodandcomprehendedinexistinglawbeyond
any possibility for fairminded disagreement. Richter, 562
U.S.at103.Theexistinglawthatappliesislimitedtothatof
theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,whichhasinstructed
thelowerfederalcourtstoupholdastatecourtconvictionun
lesstherecordcannot,underanyreasonableinterpretation
ofthe[Courts]controllinglegalstandard,supportacertain
ruling.Panettiv.Quarterman,551U.S.930,953(2007).Evenif
weweretoconsidertheapproachinpastSupremeCourtde
cisionsoutmoded,asthedissentssuggest,astatecourtsdeci
sionconsistentwiththeSupremeCourtsapproachcouldnot
beunreasonableunderAEDPA.
Asaresult,federalhabeasrelieffromstateconvictionsis
rare. It is reserved for those relatively uncommon cases in
whichstatecourtsveerwelloutsidethechannelsofreasona
ble decisionmaking about federal constitutional claims.
AEDPAdeferenceisnotconclusive,however.Wheretherec
ordshowsthatstatecourtshavestrayedfromclearlyestab
lishedfederallaw,wecananddograntrelief.E.g.,Richardson
v.Griffin,866F.3d836(7thCir.2017);Jonesv.Calloway,842F.3d
454 (7th Cir. 2016); McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634 (7th Cir.
2015); Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2013); Harris v.
Thompson, 698 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2012); Jones v. Basinger, 635
F.3d1030(7thCir.2011).
Review of state court factual findings under AEDPA is
similarlydeferential.Under 2254(d)(2),federalcourtscan
notdeclarestatecourtfactualdeterminationsunreason
ablemerelybecause[we]wouldhavereachedadifferentcon
clusioninthefirstinstance.Brumfieldv.Cain,135S.Ct.2269,
6 No.163397

2277 (2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

AEDPAdoesnotpermitfederalcourtstosupersedethetrial
courtsdeterminationifareviewoftherecordshowsonly
that[r]easonablemindsmightdisagreeaboutthefinding
in question. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Butagain,deferencedoesnotimplyabandonmentorabdi
cationofjudicialreview,anddoesnotbydefinitionpreclude
relief.Id.(internalquotationsandcitationsomitted).
B. TheLawofConfessions
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
forbids the admission of an involuntary confession in evi
denceinacriminalprosecution.Millerv.Fenton,474U.S.104,
109(1985).Indecidingwhetheraconfessionwasvoluntary,
courts assess the totality of all the surrounding circum
stancesboth the characteristics of the accused and the de
tailsoftheinterrogation.Schnecklothv.Bustamonte,412U.S.
218,226(1973);seealsoWithrowv.Williams,507U.S.680,693
94(1993)(collectingrelevantfactors).Thepurposeofthistest
istodeterminewhetherthedefendantswillwasinfactover
borne.Miller,474U.S.at116.
TheSupremeCourtsmanycasesapplyingthevoluntari
nesstesthavenotdistilledthedoctrineintoacomprehensive
setofhardrules,thoughprohibitionsonphysicalcoercionare
absolute.SeeMinceyv.Arizona,437U.S.385,401(1978)(state
ments resulted from virtually continuous questioning of a
seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of con
sciousness); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279 (1936)
(confessions extracted by brutality and violence). AEDPA
does not require state and federal courts to wait for some
nearlyidenticalfactualpatternbeforealegalrulemustbeap
pliedbecauseevenageneralstandardmaybeappliedinan
No.163397 7

unreasonablemanner.Panetti,551U.S.at953,quotingCarey
v.Musladin,549U.S.70,81(2006)(Kennedy,J.,concurringin
the judgment); accord, Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,
66364(2004).
Nevertheless,applyingageneralstandardlikevoluntari
ness can demand a substantial element of judgment, and
determining whether that judgment is reasonable requires
considering the rules specificity. Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 664.
Themoregeneraltherule,themoreleewaycourtshavein
reaching outcomes in casebycase determinations. Id. (up
holdingstatecourtMirandaconclusionwherefactorspointed
inoppositedirections).Thestatecourtshadsuchleewayhere,
andintheend,thatleewayisdecisiveasweapplythetestof
2254(d)(1).
Thisgeneralstandardhas somespecific requirementsto
guidecourts.First,apersonarguinghisconfessionwasinvol
untarymustshowthatthepoliceengagedincoerciveprac
tices. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 16465 (1986).
Physicallyabusiveinterrogationtacticswouldconstituteco
ercionperse.Steinv.NewYork,346U.S.156,182(1953)(phys
icalviolenceispersecoercion),overruledonothergroundsby
Jacksonv.Denno,378U.S.368,381(1964);Brown,297U.S.at
28687 (coercion and brutality); United States v. Jenkins, 938
F.2d934,938(9thCir.1991)(physicalabuseiscoercionperse);
Millerv.Fenton,796F.2d598,604(3dCir.1986)(same).
Interrogationtacticsshortofphysicalforcecanamountto
coercion. The Court has condemned tactics designed to ex
haustsuspectsphysicallyandmentally.Suchtacticsinclude
long interrogation sessions or prolonged detention paired
withrepeatedbutrelativelyshortquestioning.Davisv.North
Carolina,384U.S.737,752(1966)(findingcoercivethepractice
8 No.163397

ofrepeatedinterrogationsoversixteendayswhilethesuspect
wasbeingheldincommunicado).
TheSupremeCourthasnotfoundthatpolicetacticsnot
involvingphysicalormentalexhaustiontakenaloneweresuf
ficienttoshowinvoluntariness.Inseveralcases,theCourthas
heldthatofficersmaydeceivesuspectsthroughappealstoa
suspectsconscience,byposingasafalsefriend,andbyother
meansoftrickeryandbluff.See,e.g.,Procunierv.Atchley,400
U.S.446,45354(1971)(suspectwasdeceivedintoconfessing
tofalsefriendtoobtaininsurancepayouttochildrenandstep
children);Frazierv.Cupp,394U.S.731,739(1969)(deceiving
suspectaboutanothersuspectsconfession).Falsepromisesto
asuspecthave similarlynotbeen seenasperse coercion, at
leastiftheyarenotquitespecific.SeeArizonav.Fulminante,
499U.S.279,285(1991)(rejectinglanguageinBramv.United
States,168U.S.532(1897),statingthataconfessioncouldnot
beobtainedbyanydirectorimpliedpromises,id.at542
43,butfindingpromisetoprotectsuspectfromthreatenedvi
olencebyothersrenderedconfessioninvoluntary);WelshS.
White,ConfessionsInducedbyBrokenGovernmentPromises,43
DukeL.J.947,953(1994).
False promises may be evidence of involuntariness, at
leastwhenpairedwithmorecoercivepracticesorespecially
vulnerable defendants as part of the totality of the circum
stances.E.g.,Lynumnv.Illinois,372U.S.528,534(1963)(pre
Mirandaconfessionfoundinvoluntarybasedonfalsepromise
of leniency to indigent mother with young children, com
bined with threats to remove her children and to terminate
welfarebenefits,alongwithotherfactors).ButtheSupreme
Courtallowspoliceinterrogatorstotellasuspectthataco
operativeattitudewouldbetohisbenefit.Farev.MichaelC.,
No.163397 9

442U.S.707,727(1979)(reversingfindingthatconfessionwas
involuntary).SupremeCourtprecedentsdonotdrawbright
linesonthissubject.
Inassessingvoluntariness,courtsmustweighthetactics
andsettingoftheinterrogationalongsideanyparticularvul
nerabilitiesofthesuspect.Bustamonte,412U.S.at226.Rele
vantfactorsincludethesuspectsage,intelligence,andeduca
tion,aswellashisfamiliaritywiththecriminaljusticesystem.
Withrow,507U.S.at69394(collectingfactors);MichaelC.,442
U.S.at72526(significantcriminaljusticeexperience);Clewis
v.Texas,386U.S.707,712(1967)(limitededucationalattain
ment);Culombev.Connecticut,367U.S.568,620(1961)(intel
lectual disability); Gallegos v.Colorado,370U.S.49, 53(1962)
(age).
Theinteractionbetweenthesuspectsvulnerabilitiesand
thepolicetacticsmaysignalcoercionevenintheabsenceof
physicalcoercionorthreats.TheSupremeCourthasmadeit
clearthatjuvenileconfessionscallforspecialcareinevalu
ating voluntariness. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599
(1948);seealsoJ.D.B.v.NorthCarolina,564U.S.261,277(2011);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967); Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54. In
juvenilecases,thelawisparticularlyconcernedwithwhether
afriendlyadultispresentfororconsentstotheinterrogation.
InreGault,387U.S.at5556;Gallegos,370U.S.at5354;Haley,
332U.S.at600.Concernsaboutphysicalexhaustion,navet
about friendly police in the context of an adversarial police
interview,andintellectualdisabilityalsotakeonheightened
10 No.163397

importanceforassessingwhetherajuvenileswillwasover
borne.2
Aswedetailbelow,Dasseyscasepresentsdifferentfactors
pointinginoppositedirections.Thosemostimportanttoour
analysisinclude:hisageandintellectualability;thephysical
circumstancesoftheinterrogation;themannerandactionsof
the police in questioning Dassey, including bluffing about
what they knew and assuring him of the value of honesty;
Dasseysresistanceorreceptivenesstosuggestionsbyinterro
gators;andtheextenttowhichheprovidedthemostincrim
inatinginformationinresponsetoopenended,nonleading
questions.

2Wehavereservationsabouttheuseofsuggestibilityasafactorin

thisanalysis,atleastonthesefacts.Dasseyreliesheavilyontheresultsof
aGudjonssonSuggestibilityScaletestmeasuringhimasmoresusceptible
tofabricationthan95peopleoutof100,givenslightproddingbyques
tioners.AGudjonssontestisadministeredbyreadingashortstoryaloud
toanexamineeandthenlateraskingleadingquestionsaboutit.Themore
answersthatchangeinresponsetomildpressure,themoresuggestible
theexamineeis.Theadministrationofthistestforpeoplewithintellectual
disabilitieshasbeencriticizedbecausetheymayhavegoodrecalloftheir
ownlivedexperiencesbutpoorrecalloffactsnotrelevanttotheirlives.
PaulWillner,Assessmentofcapacitytoparticipateincourtproceedings:aselec
tive critique and some recommendations,17 Psychology, Crime & Law117,
117(2011).ThiscriticismmirrorsDasseysowntestimonythathisrecall
wasbetterforlivedexperiences.Inanyevent,theStatesexpertforcefully
contestedboththeadministrationandmeaningofDasseysGudjonsson
testattrial.Wecannotdrawconclusionsfromthesedisputedresults.

No.163397 11

II. TheMurder,theInterrogation,andtheConvictions
A. TheMurderofTeresaHalbach
Withtheapplicablelawinmind,weturntothehorrifying
murderofTeresaHalbachandthenthecircumstancesofDas
seysconfession.Moredetailedaccountsareavailableinthe
panel, district court, and state court opinions. See Dassey v.
Dittmann,860F.3d933(7thCir.2017);Dasseyv.Dittmann,201
F.Supp.3d963(E.D.Wis.2016);Statev.Dassey,346Wis.2d
278, 2013 WL 335923 (Wis. App. 2013) (per curiam) (un
publisheddisposition);seealsoStatev.Avery,804N.W.2d216
(Wis.App.2011)(affirmingconvictionsofDasseysuncle).
In2005,TeresaHalbachwasayoungphotographerwith
her own business based in Calumet County, Wisconsin. On
October 31, her last appointment of the day was at Averys
AutoSalvagetophotographavanforanadvertisement.Hal
bachneverreturnedfromthatappointment.Afewdayslater
duringamissingpersonsearch,hercarwasfoundatthesal
vage yard. Her blood stained the cars interior. A further
searchturnedupHalbachscharredremainsinaburnpiton
theproperty,alongwithshellcasingsonthefloorofSteven
Averysgarage.
B. DasseysEarlyPoliceInterviews
PoliceinvestigatorsspokewithanumberofAverysrela
tivesinearlyNovember,includinganhourlonginterviewof
hissixteenyearoldnephewBrendanDassey,wholivedclose
by. Dassey said he had seen Halbach taking pictures at the
salvageyardontheafternoonofOctober31,butheresisted
the suggestion that she had entered Averys home. At that
time,heprovidednootherusefulinformation.
12 No.163397

Severalmonthslater,though,investigatorsreceivedword
that Dassey had been crying uncontrollably and had lost
aboutfortypoundsofweight.Theyproceededtointerview
himatotalofthreetimesonFebruary27,2006.Inthesevol
untarywitnessinterviews,itbecameclearthatDasseyknew
much more about Teresas murder. (Dassey was not in cus
tody on February 27th. He signed and initialed a Miranda
waiver,andhismotherconsented,thoughshedidnotsitin.)
Inthoseinterviews,DasseyadmittedthatonOctober31st,he
hadgoneovertoAverystraileraround9:00p.m.tohelpwith
abonfire.Hetoldthepolicethathehadseenpartsofahuman
body in the fire. He also said that Avery had threatened to
hurt him if he spoke to the police. When the police asked
about a pair of bleachstained jeans they had learned about
from another family member, Dassey admitted that he had
helped Avery clean up a spill on the garage floor late that
night.ButDasseyclaimedtohavehadnothingtodowithTe
resasdeath.
C.TheMarch1stInterviewandConfession
1. TheCircumstancesoftheInterview
Afterthoseinterviews,investigatorsthoughtDasseyhad
beenawitnesstoatleasttheaftermathofaterriblecrimeand
wasstrugglingwiththehorrorofwhathehadseen.OnMarch
1st,theinvestigators(MarkWiegertandTomFassbender)ob
tained his mothers permission for another interview. They
tookDasseyfromhishighschooltoalocalsheriffsdepart
ment, where he was questioned without the presence of a
friendlyadult.InthecartheinvestigatorsgaveDasseystand
ard Miranda warnings about his right to remain silent, his
right to an attorney, and the possibility that statements he
gavecouldbeusedagainsthim.Dasseyorallyacknowledged
No.163397 13

thewarnings,andheinitialedandsignedawrittenMiranda
waiverform.Heandtheofficerschattedduringtheride.The
threetookashortdetourtoDasseyshometoretrievehispair
ofbleachstainedjeans,whichwerekeptasevidence.When
they arrived at the sheriffs department, Dassey confirmed
thatheunderstoodhisrightsandstillwantedtotalktothem.
The interview took place in a socalled soft interview
roomequippedforvideotaping.Dasseysatonacouchfacing
twoofficersandacamera.Overthenextthreehours,Dassey
wasrepeatedlyofferedfood,drinks,restroombreaks,andop
portunitiestorest.Atnopointintheinterviewdidtheinves
tigatorsthreatenDasseyorhisfamily.Nordidtheyattempt
to intimidate him physically. They did not even raise their
voices.NeitherinvestigatortriedtopreventDasseyfromleav
ingtheroom,nordidtheyuseanysortofforcetocompelhim
to answer questions. Dassey never refused to answer ques
tions,neveraskedtohavecounselorhismotherpresent,and
nevertriedtostoptheinterview.
2. TheFirstHourofQuestioning
OneofficerbeganbytellingDasseyhowhecouldhelpthe
investigation, since this information and that information
frompreviousaccountsneededjustalittletighteningup.
SensingthatDasseymayhaveheldbackforwhateverrea
sons,theofficerassuredDasseythatMarkandIbotharein
your corner, were on your side. Acknowledging Dasseys
potentialconcernthattalkingtothepolicemeanthemight
getarrestedandstufflikethat,theinvestigatorurgedDassey
to tell the whole truth, dont leave anything out. Talking
couldbeinDasseysbestinteresteventhoughitmightmake
you look a little bad or make you look like you were more
14 No.163397

involvedthanyouwannabe,becauseadmittingtounfortu
natefactswouldleavenodoubtyouretellingthetruth.The
firstinvestigatorclosedbysayingthatfromwhatImseeing,
evenifIfilledinsomeholesinDasseysstory,Imthinkin
youreallright.OK,youdonthavetoworryaboutthings
[W]eknowwhatSteven[Avery]didwejustneedtohear
thewholestoryfromyou.Theotherinvestigatorwentnext:
HonestyhereBrendanisthethingthatsgonna
helpyou.OK,nomatterwhatyoudid,wecan
work through that. OK. We cant make any
promisesbutwellstandbehindyounomatter
what you did. OK. Because youre being the
goodguyhere.Andbyyoutalkingwithus,
its, its helping you. OK? Because the honest
personistheonewhosgonnagetabetterdeal
outofeverything.
Supp.App.30.AfterDasseynoddedinagreement,theinves
tigatorcontinued:
Youknow.Honestyistheonlythingthatwillset
youfree.Right?Andweknow,likeTomsaidwe
know, we reviewed those tapes . We pretty
much know everything thats why were .
talkingtoyouagaintoday.Wereallyneedyou
to be honest this time with everything, OK.
[A]s long as you be honest with us, its OK. If
youlie about itthatsgonna be problems.OK.
Doesthatsoundfair?
Id. Dassey again nodded and the questioning turned to the
eventsofOctober31st.
No.163397 15

Over the course of the next three hours, with several

breaksastheinvestigatorsconferredoutsidetheroom,Das
sey told an even more disturbing and incriminating story
aboutOctober31st.Inthefirsthour,Dasseyadmittedthathe
received a telephone call from Avery, went over to Averys
garageinthesixoclockhour,andfoundTeresaalreadydead
inhercar. DasseythensaidhehelpedAverylowerTeresas
bound bodyontoa creeper(usedtoworkunderneathan
automobile),whichheandAveryusedtotakeherbodyout
sideandthrowherontothealreadyburningbonfire.
Atthatpoint,lessthananhourintotheinterview,Dasseys
story pivoted dramatically. Dassey revised his story to say
thathefirstnoticedsomethingamissinthefouroclockhour.
Dasseyvolunteeredthatwhenhewasoutgettingthemail,he
heardawomanscreaminginsideAverystrailer.Supp.App.
50.Dassey knockedonAverysdoor,ostensiblyto deliver a
pieceofmail,andasweatyAveryansweredthedoor.
Dassey said he then saw Teresa alive, naked, and hand
cuffedtoAverysbed.DasseysaidhewentinsideatAverys
invitationandhadasodawhileAverytoldhimthathehad
raped Teresa. Dassey said that, at Averys urging, he then
rapedTeresa,havingintercourseagainstherwillasshewas
bound to the bed, and as she protested and begged him to
stop.Aftertherape,Dasseyreported,hethenwatchedtelevi
sionwithAveryforawhile.Supp.App.5565.
InDasseystelling,henexthelpedAverysubdueandkill
Teresaandmovehertothegarage.Id.at6676.Inresponseto
questioning and prodding, Dassey told a confusing story
aboutthesecriticalevents.DasseysaidthatAverystabbedTe
resawithalargeknife,thatherhandcuffswereremoved,and
thatshewastiedupwithrope.HealsosaidthatAverycutoff
16 No.163397

someofherhairwiththatlargeknife,thathe(Dassey)cuther
throat with the same knife, and that at some point Avery
chokedorpunchedher.Alltheseeventsreportedlyhappened
by6:00or6:30p.m.3
Thedetailsandsequenceoftheseeventschangedrepeat
edly,however,asinvestigatorspressedDasseyformorede
tails.Thisportionoftheinterrogationprovidesthemostsup
portforDasseysclaimthathisconfessionwasbothinvolun
taryandunreliable.4Forexample,becausetherecoveredrem
nantsofTeresasskullcontainedtraceamountsoflead,thein
vestigators believed that Teresa had been shot in the head.
TheywereeagerforDasseytodescribewhatelsewasdone
toherheadbesidescuttingandpunching.Inthisexchange,
Dasseydidnotprovidetheanswertheywerelookingfor.He
offered what seemed like guesses. The investigators aban
donedtheirvagueadmonitionstotellthetruth.Theylostpa
tienceandblurtedout:
Wiegert: Allright,Imjustgonnacomeout
andaskyou.Whoshotherinthe
head?

3GiventhedamagetoTeresasbody,fewofthesedetailscouldhave

beenconfirmedorcontradictedbythesurvivingphysicalevidence.But
whatdidsurviveelsewheredoesnotnecessarilyvindicateDassey.Forex
ample,Dasseycontendsthatnohandcuffmarkswerefoundonthehead
boardofStevenAverysbed,butathinplasticfilmfromasubstanceused
inropemanufacturingwasfoundontheheadboard.
4ThisportionofDasseysconfessionalsoledtoanothersearchofSte

venAverysgaragethatuncoveredperhapsthemostpowerfulphysical
evidence of the investigation: a bullet fragment with Teresa Halbachs
DNAonit.
No.163397 17

Brendan: Hedid.
Fassbender: Thenwhydidntyoutellusthat?
Brendan: CuzIcouldntthinkofit.
Fassbender: Nowyouremember it? (Brendan
nods yes) Tell us about that
then.
Supp. App. 76. Dassey continued to do so over the whole
courseoftheMarch1stinterview,revisingupwardsthenum
berof timesTeresawas shotfromtwice to threetimes, and
thenuptotentimes.5Dasseyalsorevisedthelocationofthe
shooting, first outside the garage, then inside Teresas car,
thenonthefloorofthegarage.Afterthisshiftingexchange
abouttheshooting,thefirsthouroftheMarch1stinterview
concludedwithDasseyexplaininghowheandAveryputTe
resasbodyonthefire,howtheymovedhercar,andfinally
howtheycleanedupthestaininAverysgaragebeforeDassey
wenthome.
3. TheSecondHourofQuestioning
Theinvestigatorsthentookabreaktoconfer.Duringthe
break,Dasseyhadtheopportunitytorestandtousetherest
room.Beforestartingupagain,DasseyandWiegerthadthis
exchange, indicating that Dassey did not understand the
gravityofwhathehadtoldtheinvestigators:
Brendan: Howlongisthisgonnatake?

5Throughouttheinterview,however,Dasseyresistedallsuggestions

thathepersonallyevershotTeresa,andhedescribedhisdiscomfortwith
gunsfromayoungage.
18 No.163397

Wiegert: It shouldnt take a whole lot

longer.
Brendan: Do you think I can get [back to
school]beforeonetwentynine?
Wiegert: Um,probablynot.
Brendan: Oh.
Wiegert: Whatsatonetwentynine?
Brendan: Well,Ihaveaprojectdueinsixth
hour.
Supp.App.102.
Inthesecondhourofquestioning,theinvestigatorssought
toconfirmdetailsfromthefirst.Theyhadonlylimitedsuc
cess.DasseyprovidedmoreconfusingdetailsabouthowTe
resawaskilledandthestatusofthebonfire.Butinthemain,
Dasseylargelyconfirmedhisaccountfromthefirsthour,es
peciallyaboutthedetailsofhissexualassaultofTeresa.His
storyregardingwhathesawofTeresainthefirehands,feet,
forehead, and part of a torsoalso remained mostly con
sistent.
Signaling that the investigators did not overwhelm his
will,Dasseyresistedrepeatedsuggestionsbybothinvestiga
torsthatheandAveryusedthewiresandcableshangingin
thegaragetotortureTeresa.TheinvestigatorsalsotestedDas
seyssuggestibility.TheytoldhimfalselythatTeresahadatat
tooonher stomachandaskedifhe had seenit. Hereisthe
exchange:
Fassbender: didshehaveanyscars,marks,
tattoos,stufflikethat,thatyoucan
remember?
No.163397 19

Brendan: Idontrememberanytattoos.

Fassbender: OK.(pause)WeknowthatTeresa
hada,atattooonherstomach,do
yourememberthat?
Brendan: (shakesheadno)uhuh
Fassbender: DoyoudisagreewithmewhenI
saythat?
Brendan: NobutIdontknowwhereitwas.
Fassbender: OK.
Supp.App.15052.Inthisexchange,Dasseystucktowhathe
thoughtheknew,despitebeingchallengedandproddedby
theinvestigators.
4. TheFinalHourofQuestioning
Theinvestigatorstookanotherbreak,duringwhichDas
seyateasandwichandbrieflyfellasleep.Theinvestigators
returnedtotalkabouttheconsequencesDasseywasfacing:
Fassbender: What do you thinks gonna hap
pen? What do you think should
happenrightnow?
Brendan: Idontknow.
Fassbender: You know obviously that were
policeofficers,OK.(Brendannods
yes) And because of what
you told us, were gonna have ta
arrest you. Did you kinda figure
thatwascoming?Forwhatyou
did we cant let you go right
20 No.163397

now.Thelawwillnotletus.And
soyourenotgonnabeabletogo
hometonight.Allright?
Brendan: Doesmymomknow?
Fassbender: Yourmomknows.
Supp. App. 157. After briefly discussing some logistics, the
exchangecontinued:
Fassbender: Did you kinda after telling us
what you told us you kinda fig
ured this was coming? (Brendan
nodsyes)Yeah?(Brendannods
yes)
Brendan: Isitonlyforonedayor?
Wiegert: We dont know that at this time,
butletmetellyasomethingBren
dan,youdidtherightthing.OK.
(Brendan nods yes) By being
honest, you can at least sleep at
nightrightnow.
Fassbender: Your cooperation and help with
usisgonnaworkinyourfavor.I
cant say what [its] gonna do or
where[youre]gonnaendupbut
[its] gonna work in your favor
andweappreciateyourcontinued
cooperation. (Brendan nods
yes).
No.163397 21

Id.6
Dasseys mother Barb Janda then came into the room to
speakwithBrendanabouthisarrestandconfession.Dassey,
nowwithhisheadburiedinhishands,askedhismotherwhat
would happen if Avery gave a different version of events,
such as I never did nothin to Teresa Halbach or some
thin.Hismotherfolloweduponthispoint,askingwhether
DasseyhaddoneanythingtoTeresa:
BarbJanda: Didyou?Huh?
Brendan: Notreally.
BarbJanda: Whatdoyoumeannotreally?
Brendan: Theygottomyhead.
BarbJanda: Huh?
Brendan: sayanything.
BarbJanda: What do you mean by that?
(pause)Whatdoyoumeanbythat
Brendan?
Supp.App.157.Dasseywastakenintocustodyafterthisin
terview,whichhenowcontendswasinvoluntaryandshould
nothavebeenusedathistrial.

6 If Dassey had continued to cooperate in the case against Steven

Avery,thatmightwellhaveworkedinhisfavor.Atthe2010postconvic
tionhearings,Dasseyslawyerandtheprosecutorbothindicatedthatthe
StatecouldhaveadvocatedformorelenientpunishmentforDasseyifhe
hadtestifiedagainstStevenAvery.SeeDkt.1926at4748,99100,158
61.
22 No.163397

Attrial,Dasseytestifiedanddeniedanyknowledgeofor
involvementinTeresaHalbachsmurder.Hedidnottrytoex
plain what he had meant by telling his mother not really
andtheygottomyhead.Accordingtohislawyersversion
ofevents,Brendancamehomefromschoolat3:45p.m.onOc
tober31standplayedvideogamesuntilhavingdinnerwith
hisbrotherandmother.Aftertheothersleft,Dasseyclaimed,
he fielded a phone call from his brothers boss and then
shortlyafterthatacallfromAvery.Ataboutsevenish,Das
seyclaimed,hejoinedAveryforthebonfire,makingfouror
fivetripsaroundthesalvageyardpickingupdiscardeditems
tothrowontheflames.Aroundnineoclock,Dasseyhelped
Avery clean up a spill in his garage, and after a phone call
fromhismother,Dasseyclaimed,hereturnedhomearound
9:30or9:45p.m.Accordingtohistrialtestimony,noneofthe
incriminatingeventsrelatedinhisMarch1stconfessionever
happened.7
D. TheStateCourtsTreatmentofDasseysConfession
Beforetrial,Dasseymovedtosuppresshisconfessionas
involuntary. After briefing and a hearing, the trial judge
stateddetailedfindingsoffactinanoralruling.Supp.App.

7AttrialDasseygavenoexplanationforhisMarch1stconfessionbe

yondcontrovertedexperttestimonythathewashighlysuggestibleanda
suggestionthathehadconfusedhisownexperiencesonOctober31stwith
a book he had ostensibly read three, four years before called Kiss the
Girls.Noscenesineitherthebookorthemovieitinspiredareremotely
similartothecrimesDasseydescribedonMarch1st.SeegenerallyJames
Patterson,KisstheGirls(1sted.1995);KisstheGirls(ParamountPictures
1997) (fictional coasttocoast hunt for serial killers) Also, in nearly six
monthsafterMarch1st,Dasseynevermentionedthebookormovietohis
thencounsel.
No.163397 23

16877. The judge noted Dasseys age and observed that he

hadanIQlevelinthelowaveragetoborderlinerange.The
judgenotedthatschoolrecordsshowedthat Dasseywas in
regulartrack classes but had some special education help.
ThejudgealsonotedDasseyslackofacriminalrecord,the
noncustodialnatureoftheFebruary27thandMarch1stinter
views (as the parties had stipulated), and Dasseys Miranda
waiversfrombothdays.ThejudgefoundthatDasseyknew
hecouldstopansweringquestionsandknewhecouldleave
theroomatanytimeonFebruary27th,andthatherepeatedly
indicatedhiscontinuinginterestinspeakingwiththepolice
on March 1st. The judge found that both Dassey and his
motherconsentedto theinterviewonMarch1st.Thejudge
also quoted several of the investigators admonitions to tell
thetruth,includinghonestyhereisthethingthatsgoingto
help you, and honesty is the only thing that will set you
free,uponwhichDasseyreliessoheavilynow.
Throughouttheinterview,thejudgefound,theinvestiga
torshadusedanormalspeakingtonewithnoraisedvoices,
nohectoring,orthreatsofanykind.Nothingonthevideo
tapevisuallydepictsBrendanDasseyasbeingagitated,upset,
frightened,orintimidatedbythequestionsofeitherinvesti
gator,andhedisplayednodifficultyinunderstandingthe
questions asked of him, the judge found. Though at times
proddedtobetruthful,atnotimedidheasktostopthe
intervieworrequestthathismotheroralawyerbepresent.
The admonitions, the judge found, amounted to nothing
morethanaremindertoBrendanDasseythathehadamoral
dutytotellthetruth.ThejudgealsofoundthatDasseywas
not coerced bytheinterviewersoccasionallypretendingto
know more than they did because that did not interfere
with[his] powerto makerationalchoices.Andfinally, the
24 No.163397

judgefoundthat[n]ofrankpromisesofleniencyweremade
bytheinterviewerstoBrendanDassey,andthathewasin
factflatlytoldwecantmakeanypromises.
Onthebasisofthesefindingsoffact,givenBrendanDas
seysrelevantpersonalcharacteristicsandapplyingatotal
ityofthecircumstancestest,whichImusinghere,thejudge
found that Dasseys admissions in the March 1st interview
were voluntary statements and denied Dasseys motion to
suppress.Supp.App.177.
TheMarch1stconfessionwasthemostincriminatingevi
dence at trial. The jury found Dassey guilty on all charges:
participatinginrapeandmurder,andmutilationofacorpse.
InAugust2007,Dasseywassentencedtolifeinprison.Das
seyfileddetailedmotionsforanewtrialin2009,andthesame
trialcourtheldfivedaysofhearingsonthosemotionsinJan
uary 2010, probing Dasseys claims that his attorneys ren
deredineffectiveassistance.
AthreejudgepaneloftheWisconsinCourtofAppealsaf
firmedDasseysconvictions,findingthathisconfessionwas
voluntaryandanyineffectiveassistancewasnotprejudicial.
Statev.Dassey,346Wis.2d278,2013WL335923(Wis.App.
2013).TheCourtofAppealsusedthetrialcourtsfindingsof
facttosummarizethecircumstancesoftheMarch1stconfes
sionandDasseysclaimthatitwasinvoluntary.Thecourtthen
cited the legal standard for such claimsthe totality of the
circumstancesasappliedbyleadingWisconsinstatecases.
Thesestatecases,particularlyInreJerrellC.J.,699N.W.2d110
(Wis.2005),citedanddiscussedseveraloftheleadingprece
dents on voluntariness from the United States Supreme
Court.TheCourtofAppealscitedJerrellC.J.fortheprinciple
No.163397 25

thatavoluntarinessanalysisinvolvesabalancingofthede
fendantspersonalcharacteristicsagainstthepolicepressures
usedtoinducethestatements.Wisconsinlawusesaclearly
erroneousstandardforappellatereviewoftrialcourtfindings
ofvoluntariness.
Aftersummarizingthetrialcourtsfindings,theCourtof
Appealsconcluded:
7 Thecourtsfindingsarenotclearlyerrone
ous.Basedonthosefindings,wealsoconclude
thatDasseyhasnotshowncoercion.Aslongas
investigators statements merely encourage
honestyanddonotpromiseleniency,tellinga
defendant that cooperating would be to his or
herbenefitisnotcoerciveconduct.Statev.Berg
gren,2009WIApp82,31,320Wis.2d209,769
N.W.2d 110. Nor is professing to know facts
they actually did not have. See State v. Triggs,
2003WIApp91,15,17,264Wis.2d861,663
N.W.2d396(theuseofdeceptivetacticlikeex
aggeratingstrengthofevidenceagainstsuspect
does not necessarily make confession involun
tarybutinsteadisfactortoconsiderintotality
of circumstances). The truth of the confession
remainedforthejurytodetermine.
The court went on to reject Dasseys claims that his pre
trial and trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Dasseys petition for re
view.DasseydidnotfileapetitionforcertiorariintheUnited
StatesSupremeCourt.
26 No.163397

E. FederalHabeasCorpusReview
DasseyfiledafederalhabeascorpuspetitionintheEast
ern District of Wisconsin in 2014. In a detailed opinion, the
districtcourtgrantedhabeasrelief,findingthatfalsepromises
ofleniencywereindeedmadetoDasseyandthathisMarch
1stconfessionwasnotvoluntary.Dassey,201F.Supp.3d963.
Adividedpanelofourcourtaffirmed.Dassey,860F.3d933.
WegrantedtheStatespetitiontorehearthecaseenbancand
nowreversewithinstructionstodismissDasseyshabeaspe
tition.
III.ApplyingtheAEDPAStandard
A.VoluntarinessUnder2254(d)(1)
ThestatecourtdecisionthatDasseyconfessedvoluntarily
wasnotanunreasonableapplicationofSupremeCourtprec
edent.Thestateappellatecourtdrewonfairlydetailedfind
ingsoffact,whichwerenotclearlyerroneous,andprovided
atersebutsufficientexplanationforwhythetrialcourtsde
cision was a reasonable application of the broad totalityof
thecircumstancestest.
1. FactorsPointinginOppositeDirections
Anumberofrelevantfactors,werecognize,tendtosup
portDasseysclaimsabouttheMarch1stconfession.Hewas
young.Hewasalonewiththepolice.Hewassomewhatlim
itedintellectually.Theofficersquestioningincludedgeneral
assurances of leniency if he told the truth, and Dassey may
havebelievedtheypromisedmorethantheydid.Attimesit
appearedasthoughDasseysimplydidnotgraspthegravity
of his confessionafter confessing to rape and murder, he
askedtheofficersifhewouldbebackatschoolthatafternoon
intimetoturninaproject.Portionsofthequestioningalso
No.163397 27

included leading and suggestive questions, and throughout

theinterrogationDasseyfacedfollowupinquirieswhenthe
investigatorswerenotsatisfiedwithwhathehadtoldthem,
leadinghimattimestoseemtoguess.Inaddition,theconfu
sionandcontradictionsinDasseysaccountofthecrimesof
October31stlendsupporttotheviewthathisconfessionwas
the product of suggestions and/or a desire to tell the police
whattheywantedtohear.
Atthesametime,manyotherfactorssupportthefinding
thatDasseysconfessionwasindeedvoluntary.Startwiththe
circumstances of the interrogation. As stipulated by both
sides,Dasseywasnotincustodywhenheadmittedpartici
patinginthecrimesofOctober31st.Hewentwiththeofficers
voluntarilyandwithhismothersknowledgeandconsent.He
was given Miranda warnings and understood them suffi
ciently.Theinterrogationwasconductedduringschoolhours
andinacomfortablesetting.Dasseyshowednosignsofphys
ical distress. He had access to food, drinks, and restroom
breaks.Theinterrogationwasnotparticularlylengthy,espe
ciallywiththebreaksthatweretakeneveryhour.
Dasseywasnotsubjecttophysicalcoercionoranysortof
threatsatall.Giventhehistoryofcoerciveinterrogationtech
niquesfromwhichmodernconstitutionalstandardsforcon
fessionsemerged,thisisimportant.Theinvestigatorsstayed
calm and never even raised their voices. As the Wisconsin
courtsfound,thereisnosignthatDasseywasintimidated.
Turningtothetechniquesusedintheinterrogation,thein
vestigators told Dassey many times that they already knew
whathadhappenedwheninfacttheydidnot.Suchdeception
isacommoninterviewtechnique.Toourknowledge,ithas
notledcourts(andcertainlynottheSupremeCourt)tofind
28 No.163397

that asubjectsincriminatinganswers wereinvoluntary. See

Frazierv.Cupp,394U.S.731,739(1969)(fabricatingacocon
spiratorsconfessionisrelevant,butinsufficientinourview
tomakethisotherwisevoluntaryconfessioninadmissible).
Also,mostoftheincriminatingdetailsinDasseysconfession
werenotsuggestedbythequestioners.Hevolunteeredthem
inresponsetoopenendedquestions.
WhenDasseysstorydidnotmakesense,seemedincom
plete,orseemedtoconflictwithotherevidence,thequestion
erspressedDasseywithfurtherquestions.Thosetechniques
are not coercive. Dassey responded to such questioning by
modifyinghisstoryonsomepoints,buthestucktohisstory
onothers.Thosepassagessupporttheviewthathewasnot
beingpushedtoprovideafalsestoryagainsthiswill.Forex
ample,Dasseyresistedrepeatedsuggestionsthathehadpar
ticipatedinshootingTeresa.Hedeniedrepeatedsuggestions
thatheandAveryhadusedwiresandcablesinthegarageto
restrainorharmher.Inonetellinginstance,thequestioners
testedDasseybyfalselytellinghimthatTeresahadatattoo
onherstomachandaskinghimifhehadseenit.Hetoldthem
no.Whenthequestionerspushedharder,hewasnotwilling
tosayheknewtheywerewrong,buthestucktohisrecollec
tionthathehadnotseenatattoo.
UnderAEDPA,theessentialpointhereisthatthetotality
ofthecircumstancestestgivescourtsconsiderableroomfor
judgmentincaseslikethisone,wherethefactorspointinboth
directions.Giventhemanyrelevantfactsandthesubstantial
weight offactors supportingafinding thatDasseys confes
sionwasvoluntary,thestatecourtsdecisionwasnotanun
reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. This
viewissimilartoYarboroughv.Alvarado,541U.S.652,66465
No.163397 29

(2004), wheretheSupremeCourtappliedAEDPAto a state

courtfindingthataseventeenyearoldsuspecthadnotbeen
incustodywhenheconfessedtomurder.Thecustodyques
tion was governed by a similarly general totalityofthecir
cumstances standard. The Supreme Court summarized the
arrayoffactorspointinginoppositedirections,incustodyor
notincustody.Emphasizingthatthemoregeneraltherule,
themoreleewaycourtshaveinreachingoutcomesincaseby
casedeterminations,theSupremeCourtfoundthatthestate
courtfindingwasnotanunreasonableapplicationofbinding
precedent: These differing indications lead us to hold that
thestatecourtsapplicationofourcustodystandardwasrea
sonable.TheCourtofAppealswasnowhereclosetothemark
whenitconcludedotherwise.Id.at665.
2. TheTerseStateCourtOpinion
DasseycriticizestheWisconsinappellatecourtsdecision
for having been too terse, addressing the confession in just
twopivotalparagraphs.Therelativebrevityofthatpartofthe
opinionisnotareasonforgrantinghabeasrelief.Giventhe
volumeofwordsthatfederaljudgeshavedevotedtothiscase,
one might assume thatthetotalityofthecircumstancestest
requires courts to detail at length the weight they have as
signedtoallfactorsandhowthepresenceofonefactoraffects
theweightorrelevanceofotherfactors.
Thatassumptionwouldbeincorrect.TheSupremeCourt
itself has issued terse final determinations on voluntariness
afterarecitationofrelevantfacts.SeeGreenwaldv.Wisconsin,
390U.S.519,51921(1968)(percuriam);Davisv.NorthCaro
lina,384U.S.737,752(1966).Ithasruledonvoluntarinessby
simplyadoptingthereasoningofothercourts.Bouldenv.Hol
man,394U.S.478,48081(1969).Section2254(d)(1)doesnot
30 No.163397

authorizefederalcourtstoimposemandatoryopinionwrit
ing standards on state courts. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S.
289,300(2013).Statecourtdecisionsreceivesignificantdefer
enceeveniftheyprovidenoreasonsatall.Harringtonv.Rich
ter,562U.S.86,9899(2011);Whatleyv.Zatecky,833F.3d762,
774(7thCir.2016).Inthiscase,thestateappellatecourten
dorseddetailedfindingsbythetrialcourtthatprovidesub
stantialsupportforthefindingthatDasseysconfessionwas
voluntaryintheeyesofthelaw.
3. JuvenilesandSpecialCare
Therequirementthatcourtstakespecialcareinanalyz
ing juvenile confessions does not call for habeas relief here.
Thestateappellatecourtmettherequirementsforanalyzing
juvenileconfessionsbyconsideringDasseysage,hisintellec
tualcapacity,andthevoluntaryabsenceofhismotherduring
theinterrogation.Thestatecourtnotedthattheofficersread
DasseyhisMirandarightsandthatDasseylaterremembered
hisrightsandagreedtotalkanyway.Thecourtassessedcoer
cioninrelationtoDasseysvulnerabilities,includinghisage,
intellectuallimitationsandhighsuggestibility.Thecourtdid
notlimititsinquirytoonlywhetherthemostabusiveinterro
gation techniqueswereused.The courtexamined the tones
andvolumesoftheinvestigatorsvoices,findingthattheof
ficersusednormalspeakingtones,withnohectoring,threats
orpromisesofleniency,thoughtheydidprodDasseytobe
honestandsoughttoestablisharapportwithhim.Thecourt
even considered Dasseys physical comfort by noting he sat
onasofaandwasofferedfood,drink,andrestroombreaks.
No.163397 31

4. Precedent
DasseysimplyhasnotpointedtoSupremeCourtprece
dentthatmandatesreliefunderthesecircumstances.Evenin
caseswheredeferentialreviewunderAEDPAdoesnotapply,
theSupremeCourthasnotfoundaconfessioninvoluntaryin
circumstanceslikeDasseysMarch1stconfession.
Consider Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 48081 (1969).
Thedefendanttherewaseighteenyearsold,hadanI.Q.of83,
sufferedfromananxietycomplex,andwassusceptibletoco
ercion. Boulden v. Holman, 385 F.2d 102, 104, 105 (5th Cir.
1967).Hewasinterrogatedforlessthanthreehoursafterbe
ingtoldhehadtherightnottomakeastatement,andthat
anystatementmademightbeusedagainsthim.Id.at104.
Hewastreatedcourteouslyandallowedtoeat,smokeand
touse[the]toiletfacilities.Id.at105.Thoughtwoyearsolder
thanDassey,Bouldenwasapparentlystilldependentonhis
parents.Id.Otherfactsofhisinterrogationweremoretroub
lingthanthoseinthiscase.Bouldenwasinterrogatedfrom10
p.m.untilaftermidnightafterseveralhoursincustody.Id.at
104.PolicehaddeniedBouldensfatheraccesstohim,andaf
terBouldenaskedwhetherhewassupposedtohavealaw
yer,thepolicesaidhewouldnotgetoneuntilhetalked.
Id.TheSupremeCourtdeterminedthatalthoughtheissueis
a relatively close one, the conclusion was justified that
Bouldenhadconfessedvoluntarily.394U.S.at48081.
In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 727 (1979), the Court
againruledajuvenileconfessionwasvoluntary.LikeDassey,
MichaelC.wassixteenyearsold.Heclaimedthatthepolice
madepromisesandthreatsduringtheinterrogationinthe
hope of obtaining leniency for his cooperative attitude. Id.
MichaelC.indicatedthathispleastostoptheinterrogation
32 No.163397

wereignored.Healsoclaimedhefearedpolicecoercionand
pointedoutthatheweptduringtheinterrogation.Id.De
spitetheseassertions,theCourtdeterminedthatMichaelC.s
claimsofcoercionwerewithoutmerit.Id.
UnlikeDassey,MichaelC.apparentlydidnothavealow
averagetoborderlineI.Q.,andMichaelC.didhavesignificant
prior experience with the criminal justice system. See id. at
726.Thoughthepresenceofthosefactorsmayhaveprovided
room for Dassey to argue on direct appeal that Michael C.
shouldbedistinguished,theydonotshowthattheWisconsin
courtsdecisionherewasunreasonablewithinthemeaningof
2254(d)(1).AsinMichaelC.,thepolicehereindicatedthata
cooperative attitude would be to [the suspects] benefit, but
theirremarksinthisregardwerefarfromthreateningorco
ercive.Id.at727.
In reviewing these cases, we remember the Supreme
Courtsadmonitionthatdeterminingwhetheraconfessionis
voluntary requires more than a mere colormatching of
cases.Reckv.Pate,367U.S.433,442(1961).ButliketheCourt,
wefindthesecomparisonshelpfulaftercarefulevaluationof
allthecircumstancesoftheinterrogation.Mincey,437U.S.at
401; see Reck, 367 U.S. at 442 (finding comparison to analo
gouscasesnotinappropriatewhendeterminingvoluntari
ness).AEDPAwouldbeunderminedifhabeascourtsintro
ducedrulesnotclearlyestablishedundertheguiseofexten
sionstoexistinglaw.Alvarado,541U.S.at666.Tobesure,this
linebetweenapplicationandextensionofexistinglawblurs
whennewfactualpermutationsarise.Id.Thecasesshow,
however,thattheSupremeCourthasconsideredandrejected
claimssimilartoDasseys,andSupremeCourtcasesdonot
require relief here. The Wisconsin courts did not apply the
No.163397 33

lawunreasonablyinfindingthatDasseysconfessionwasvol
untary.
B. FactualFindingsUnder2254(d)(2)
Dassey also argues that he is entitled to relief under
2254(d)(2)onthegroundthatthestatecourtsmadeanun
reasonablefindingoffact:thatthequestionersmadenofalse
promisesofleniency.Affirmingthetrialcourt,whichfound
no frank promises of leniency were made, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals determined that the investigators state
mentsmerelyencourage[d]honestyand[did]notpromise
leniency.Dasseysargumentthatthisfindingwasunreason
ablefocusesontwothings:hisintellectuallimitationsandthe
spotsintheMarch1stinterrogationwhereheclaimsthein
vestigatorsimpliedthathewouldnotevenbearrestedifhe
toldthetruth.Werejectthisargument.
Because the Wisconsin appellate court accepted the trial
courtsfindingsoffact,wereviewthetrialcourtsfactualde
terminations directly. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 339
(2006)(indicatingthatAEDPAreviewanddeferenceinsuch
a situation should extend to state trial court findings). The
trialcourtherehighlightedthekeypointsforbothsides,in
cluding the warning that the questioners could not make
promises(whichsupportstheStatehere)andtheproblematic
assurancethathonestywastheonlythingthatwouldsetDas
seyfree(whichhelpsDasseysclaim,especiallyinlightofhis
limitedintellect).Whetherwetreatthestatecourtsdecision
onthispointasafindingoffactoraconclusionoflaw,wefind
nothingunreasonableaboutit.
Asnotedabove,theSupremeCourthasnottreatedgen
eral assurances of leniency in exchange for cooperation or
34 No.163397

confession as coercive. To the extent precedents from other

courtsmightbehelpfulinunderstandingastatecourtsfac
tualfindings,thecasessignalthatsuchgeneralassurancesare
notlegallyrelevantfactsfordeterminingwhetherasuspects
will was overborne and a confession was involuntary. See,
e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Villalpando,588F.3d1124, 1129 (7thCir.
2009);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Binford,818F.3d261,27172(6th
Cir. 2016); United States v. Corbett, 750 F.3d 245, 253 (2d Cir.
2014);UnitedStatesv.Jackson,608F.3d100,103(1stCir.2010);
UnitedStatesv.Kontny,238F.3d815,818(7thCir.2001);United
Statesv.Rutledge,900F.2d1127,1130(7thCir.1990)(Thepo
liceman is not a fiduciary of the suspect. The police are al
lowedtoplayonasuspectsignorance,hisanxieties,hisfears,
and his uncertainties; they just are not allowed to magnify
thosefears,uncertainties,andsoforthtothepointwherera
tional decision becomes impossible.). The state appellate
courtshouldbeunderstoodashavingsaidthattheinvestiga
torsmadenolegallyrelevantfalsepromisestoDassey.
Thedistrictcourt,thepanelmajority,andourdissenting
colleagueshaveviewedtheinterrogationdifferently,finding
psychologicalcoercionthroughaformofoperantcondition
ing, where different investigative tactics combined to con
vinceDasseythatthepolicehadagreedtoendtheinterroga
tion and to grant him leniency in exchange for confessing.
Dassey,860F.3dat963,974.Asthepanelexplained,initsview
oftheinterrogation,theinvestigatorsofferedDasseymultiple
assurances and sounded the theme of truth leads to free
domculminatinginthedirectpromise,honestyistheonly
thingthatwillsetyoufree.Id.
Thestatecourtsdidnotviewthesetacticsthesameway.
Their view was not unreasonable. The state courts saw and
No.163397 35

read,aswehave,exactlywhatthequestionerstoldandasked
Dassey in the interview and how he responded. AEDPA
leavesroomforreasonabledisagreementbetweenstateand
federal courts. Disagreement on a particular judgment call
doesnotshowthatthestatecourtfoundthefactsunreasona
bly.Collins,546U.S.at34142.
In denying Dasseys suppression motion, the state trial
courtweighedthesamestatementsthatconcernedthedistrict
courtandthepanel.Thejudgequotedfourseparateinstances
whereinvestigatorsproddedDasseybystatingthathonesty
wouldhelphim,andthejudgenotedthatthesewerebuta
fewexample[s]ofadmonitionstobehonest.Thestatecourt
alsorecountedfourquotationsandothersimilarstatements
where investigators assured Dassey that they were behind
himandinhiscorner.Itviewedthesestatementsasanat
tempttoachievearapportratherthanfrankpromisesofle
niency.Thesefindingsarereasonableandconsistentwiththe
evidenceandtherelevantlaw.Habeasreviewdoesnotpermit
ustouseasetofdebatableinferencestosetasidetheconclu
sionreachedbythestatecourt.Collins,546U.S.at342.
C. PoliceBestPracticesandtheLaw
Theconcernsexpressedbyourdissentingcolleaguesand
thedistrictcourtaboutthepotentialcoerciveeffectsofthepo
licetacticshereareunderstandable.CriticsofDasseysinter
rogationseeevidenceoffabricationthroughtheconfessions
inconsistenciesandlackofsolidcorroboratingphysicalevi
dence.Someoftheconfessionsinconsistenciesarestartling,
particularlyDasseysshiftinganswersonthelocationofthe
shooting(outsidethegarage,onthegaragefloor,andinthe
carinsidethegarage),andhisfailuretorecallconsistentlythe
order ofattacksinthebedroom(stabbing,haircutting,and
36 No.163397

throatslicing). Also, during the dialogue about Teresas

shooting,theinvestigatorsproddedDasseyandinjectedsome
critical facts into the discussion that corroborated evidence
theyalreadyknew.
Thestatecourtsdidnotaddressthesefactualinconsisten
ciesortheallegedlackofcorroboratingevidence,thoughitis
notclearhowtheyshouldhaveapproachedthequestion,ifat
all. United States Supreme Court precedent on this point is
notunequivocal.InBlackburnv.Alabama,361U.S.199(1960),
theCourtconsideredtheunreliabilityoftheconfessionin
determiningthatamentallyilldefendantsconfessionwasnot
voluntary.Id.at207.TheverynextyeartheCourtindicated
thatthereliabilityofaconfessionhasnothingtodowithits
voluntarinessbecauseextrinsicevidencethataconfessionis
true can confound the inquiry into whether a defendants
willhasbeenoverborne.Jacksonv.Denno,378U.S.368,384
85(1964),citingRogersv.Richmond,365U.S.534,545(1961).
TheCourtlaterseemedtosignalanotherdirection,writingin
Colorado v. Connelly that whether a confession is reliable, as
distinctfromvoluntary,isamattertobegovernedbytheev
identiary laws of the forum and not by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 479 U.S. 157, 167
(1986).
Analysisofaconfessionsreliabilityaspartofthetotality
ofthecircumstancesmaysurvivetheinstructioninConnelly,
but it is not unreasonable to interpret Connelly as foreclos
ingoratleastnotrequiringthislineofinquirybeforetrial.
WecannotfaulttheWisconsincourtsforfailing tomeasure
theinconsistencyofDasseysconfessioninthiscontext.Inad
dition,thecontradictionsastosomedetailsdonotnecessarily
No.163397 37

undermine the reliability of the core incriminating admis

sions.SeeDassey,860F.3dat99394(Hamilton,J.,dissenting).
Theconcernsaboutreliabilityechotheopinionsofschol
arswhobelievethatcertaininterrogationtacticstendtopro
ducefalseconfessions.Somepolicedepartmentsandexperts
haveacknowledgedthiscriticismandhavechangedtheirin
terrogationpracticesinresponse.Wemustnote,though,that
someoftheinterrogationtacticsusedinthiscaselikethere
peatedchallengestoexplaindetailsthatseemimplausible
reflectpracticesadvocatedbysuchreformers.See,e.g.,Saul
Kassinetal.,InterviewingSuspects:Practice,Science,andFuture
Directions,15Legal&CriminologicalPsychology39,47(2010)
(describing as noncoercive the practice of investigators
challeng[ing]suspectsaccounts,oftenbypointingoutcon
tradictions and inconsistencies); Kassin, The Psychology of
Confessions,2008AnnualRev.ofLaw&Soc.Sciences193,208
(favoring interrogation technique where investigators ad
dressdiscrepanciesthatmayappearinthesuspectsnarrative
accounttodetermineifthesuspectisfabricating).
Thesedebatesoverinterrogationtechniqueshavenotre
sultedincontrollingSupremeCourtprecedentcondemning
thetechniquesusedwithDassey.Absentacleardeclaration
from the Court, we may not create new constitutional re
straintsonhabeasreview.SeeKernanv.Cuero,138S.Ct.,
(2017)(circuitprecedentdoesnotsatisfy2254(d)(1),[n]or,
ofcourse,dostatecourtdecisions,treatises,orlawreviewar
ticles).8

8JudgeRovnersdissentcitesstudiesofexonerateddefendantsshow

ingthatfalseconfessionsaremorecommonamongjuvenilesandmentally
illorintellectuallydeficientsuspects.Seepostat6065;Dassey,860F.3dat
38 No.163397

D. IneffectiveAssistanceofCounsel
Finally,Dasseyhasalsopursuedhisseparateclaimthathis
originallawyerprovidedineffectiveassistanceofcounselon
thetheorythatthelawyerwasoperatingunderanactualcon
flictofinterestprohibitedbyCuylerv.Sullivan,446U.S.335
(1980).Onthispointthestateandfederalcourtshaveagreed.
TheWisconsinappellatecourtrejectedthisclaim.Thedistrict
courtalsoconsideredthisclaimcarefullyandrejectedit,cit
ingthelimitsplacedonSullivanclaimsbyMickensv.Taylor,
535U.S.162,175,176(2002).Dassey,201F.Supp.3dat989.9
Weagreeforsubstantiallythereasonssetforthbythedistrict
court.Id.at98793.Inthiscasetherewasnoactualconflictof

95253 (panel majority). False confessions are a real phenomenon, and

evenoneisverytroubling.Yetweshouldnotconcludefromthesestudies
ofexonerateddefendantsthatthereisanepidemicoffalseconfessions,as
mightbeinferredbylookingatstudiesofonlydemonstrablywrongcon
victions.Themorerelevantfractionusesasthedenominatorthenumber
ofallconfessions.Thatnumberisnoteasytoestimate,butwecanestimate
aconservativelowerboundaryforthenumberofconfessionstoviolent
felonies.BureauofJusticeStatisticsreportsonFelonyDefendantsinLarge
UrbanCountiestallyviolentfelonyconvictionsbyguiltyplea(i.e.,bycon
fessionsofguilt)injustthenations75largestcounties.(Themostrecent
reportisBrianA.Reaves,U.S.DeptofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics,
Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2009Statistical Tables
(2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.) The dissents
statisticsreport227demonstrablyfalseconfessionsfrom1989to2016.Post
at60.FromtheBJSreports,wecanestimatethatoverthatperiod,injust
those75largestcounties,thereweremorethan1.5millionguiltypleasto
violent felonies. The relevant fraction may thus be estimated conserva
tivelyas227/1,500,000.Foreveryonedemonstrablyfalseconfessionover
thoseyears,thereweremorethan6,500guiltypleastoviolentfeloniesin
justthosecounties.
9Thepanelmajoritydidnotreachtheissue.860F.3dat983.
No.163397 39

interest and no multiple or concurrent representations that

couldhaveresultedinanactualconflictofinterest.
Conclusion
Giventhestatecourtsreasonablefindingsoffactandthe
absenceofclearlyestablishedSupremeCourtprecedentthat
compelsreliefforDassey,thedistrictcourtsgrantofhabeas
reliefisREVERSED.ThecaseisREMANDEDtothedistrict
courtwithinstructionstodismissthepetition.
40 No.163397

WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and WILLIAMS, Circuit

Judges,dissenting.Psychologicalcoercion,questionstowhich
the police furnished the answers, and ghoulish games of
20Questions,inwhichBrendanDasseyguessedoverand
overagainbeforehelandedonthecorrectstory(i.e.,theone
thepolicewanted),ledtotheconfessionthatfurnishedthe
only serious evidence supporting his murder conviction in
the Wisconsin courts. Turning a blind eye to these glaring
faults, the en banc majority has decided to deny Dasseys
petitionforawritofhabeascorpus.Theyjustifythistravesty
ofjusticeas somethingcompelledby theAntiterrorismand
EffectiveDeathPenaltyAct(AEDPA).Ifthewrit,aslimited
by AEDPA, were nothing more than a dead letter, perhaps
theywouldbecorrect.Butitisnot.Instead,astheSupreme
CourtwroteinHarringtonv.Richter,562U.S.86(2011),[t]he
writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against
imprisonmentofthoseheldinviolationofthelaw.Id.at91.
It is, the Court went on to say, a guard against extreme
malfunctionsinthestatecriminaljusticesystems.Id.at102
(citationandinternalquotationmarksomitted).
Asthedistrictcourtandthepanelmajorityrecognized,we
have before us just such an extreme malfunction. Dassey at
therelevanttimewas16yearsoldandhadanIQinthelow
80s.Hisconfessionwascoerced,andthusitshouldnothave
beenadmittedintoevidence.Andevenifweweretooverlook
thecoercion,theconfessionissoriddledwithinputfromthe
policethatitsuseviolatesdueprocess.Dasseywillspendthe
restofhislifeinprisonbecauseoftheinjusticethiscourthas
decidedtoleaveunredressed.Irespectfullydissent.
No.163397 41

I
As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals correctly noted, the
questionwhetheraconfessionisvoluntary(i.e.,notcoerced)
isassessedinlightofthetotalityofthecircumstances.Theage
andsophisticationofthepersonbeingquestionedarecritical
factors.Whenthesuspectisaminor,courtsmustreviewthe
confession and record with special care. J.D.B. v. North
Carolina,564U.S.261,28081(2011);InreGault,387U.S.1,45
(1967);Gallegosv.Colorado,370U.S.49,5355(1962);Haleyv.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). Courts also must take the
suspects intellectual capacity into account. Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 620, 625 (1961) (opinion of
Frankfurter,J.,joinedbyStewart,J.);639(Douglas,J.,joined
by Black, J., concurring); 64142 (Brennan, J., joined by
Warren,C.J.,andBlack,J.,concurring).Dassey,asthemajority
concedes, was a mentally limited 16yearold. It was thus
incumbentonthestatecourtstoevaluatehisconfessionin
lightofthosetraits.
The Wisconsin courts failed to take this essential step.
Whenaskedatoralargumentwhereonemightfindevidence
that thestateappellate courttookthe requiredspecialcare,
counselforthestatecameupdry.Allcounselcoulddowasto
point out a brief mention in the state courts opinion of
Dasseys age and mental capabilities. But so what? The
SupremeCourthasneversaidorimpliedthatthetotalityof
the circumstances are beside the point as long as the state
courtsimplyjotsdownafactwithoutahintaboutiforhow
thatfactinfluencedtheoutcome.Thereisnothingspecial
(or even meaningful) about a naked word on a page. The
reader has no idea whether the state court mentioned the
word meaningto indicatethat itfound thefactor irrelevant
42 No.163397

(whichwouldhavebeeninconsistentwiththeclearSupreme
Court precedent listed above), or exculpatory, or damning.
Notably,eventhoughtheWisconsinCourtofAppealsgavea
nodtothetotalitytest,itmadenomentionofthespecialcare
standardforjuvenileconfessions.
Tobesure,Harringtonv.Richter,562U.S.86(2011),holds
generally that federal courts may not draw any dispositive
conclusionsfromastatecourtssilence.Butbythesametoken,
the state courts silence cannot be leveraged into any assur
ance that the court went the extra mile required by the
U.S.SupremeCourtandgaveDasseysageandlimitedmen
talabilityparticularizedcare.Themajoritysfindingtothecon
traryhasnosupportintherecord.Worse,themajoritywrites
off in a footnote Dasseys extreme suggestibility by casting
doubt on the applicability of a formal test (Gudjonsson).
Anteat 10 n.2. As the painstaking review of the record re
flectedinJudgeRovnerspanel opinionreveals, even a lay
personcouldseereadilythatDasseyyieldedtoanysugges
tionthepersoninauthoritymade.860F.3d933(7thCir.2017)
(Dassey I). More generally, no court is entitled to pick and
choosewhichevidencetoconsiderwhenevaluatingthetotal
ity of the circumstances. Clearly established U.S. Supreme
CourtdecisionscompelledtheWisconsincourttopayspecial
attentiontoDasseysageandintellectualabilities,including
hishighlevelofsuggestibility.Itsfailuretodosoisonereason
whyiterroneouslyconcludedthatDasseysconfessionwas
notcoerced.
IftheWisconsinCourtofAppealshaddonewhatitshould
have, it could not reasonably have concluded that Dasseys
confessionwaseithervoluntaryorreliable(bothofwhichare
requiredfortheuseofaconfessiontobeconsistentwithdue
No.163397 43

process).Nevertheless,firstthestateandnowtheenbancma
jority have culled a sentence here and there and have at
temptedtocraftacoherentconfessionfromthem.Thevideo
recordingofthepoliceinterrogationofDassey,however,tells
anotherstoryonethatisdiametricallyopposedtothestates
tidyandselectivesummary.Amongthe manyredflagsare
thefollowing:
Dasseys answers to questions frequently changed at
thedetectivesprodding.
Theofficerslaidatrailofcrumbs(indeed,largesign
posts)totheconfessiontheysought.
Whenever Dassey went offcourse, the investigators
wouldshepherdhimbackinthedesireddirectionat
timeswiththeuseoffatherlyassurancesandgestures,
andfrequentlybyquestioninghishonesty.
OnbothFebruary27andMarch1thedetectivesmis
leadingly conveyed to Dassey, whose ability to think
abstractly was minimal, that his honesty was the
onlythingthatwillset[him]free.
Throughsubsequentquestioningitbecameclearthat
honesty meant what the investigators wanted to
hear.
Dasseys age and mental limitations made him
particularlysusceptibletothispsychologicallymanipulative
interrogation.Manyoftheofficerstacticsappeartobedrawn
fromtheReidTechnique,whichwasforsometimethemost
widely used interrogation protocol in the country.
MiriamS.Gohara,ALieforaLie:FalseConfessionsandtheCase
for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation
Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 808 (2006). The
44 No.163397

technique heavily relies on false evidence ploys and other

formsofdeceit.Id.at809.Itfollowsaninestepapproach:
[A]ninterrogatorconfrontsthesuspectwithas
sertions of guilt (Step 1), then develops
themesthatpsychologicallyjustifyorexcuse
thecrime(Step2),interruptsalleffortsatdenial
(Step3),overcomesthesuspectsfactual,moral,
andemotionalobjections(Step4),ensuresthat
thepassivesuspectdoesnotwithdraw(Step5),
showssympathyandunderstandingandurges
thesuspecttocooperate(Step6),offersaface
savingalternativeconstrualoftheallegedguilty
act(Step7),getsthesuspecttorecountthede
tailsofhisorhercrime(Step8),andconvertsthe
latter statement into a full written confession
(Step9).
Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does
InnocencePutInnocentsatRisk?,60AM. PSYCHOLOGIST215,
220 (2005); see Edwin D. Driver, Confessions and the Social
Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 42, 5155 (1968)
(explaining the social psychological impact of the Reid
tactics).Investigatorsareencouragedtostartbyaccusingthe
suspectwhileemphasizingtheimportanceoftellingthetruth.
FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS213(4thed.2001).Theylearnwaystobuildfalse
empathywithsuspects,suchasshiftingthemoralblamefor
theoffensetoanotherpersonorexpressingunderstandingfor
the suspects actions. Id. at 213, 24142. Investigators are
encouraged to sit physically near the suspect, maintain
softandwarmeyecontact,andspeaksincerely.Id.at214,
349. When a suspect makes an admission implying guilt,
No.163397 45

investigators are directed to make statements of

reinforcement. Id. at 366. The technique builds in
confirmation bias; the instructions assure investigators that
whileaninnocentsuspectwillstayresoluteinherdenials,a
guilty person will submit to the theme the investigator
presents. Id. at 213; see Christian A. Meissner &
MelissaB.Russano, The Psychology of Interrogations and False
Confessions: Research and Recommendations, 1 CANADIAN J.
POLICE&SECURITYSERVS.53,5657(2003).
Courts have long expressed concern about approaches
such as the Reid Technique that rely on psychological
coercion.Justfouryearsafterthefirsteditionofthemanual
waspublished,INBAUETAL.,supra,atix,theSupremeCourt
in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), repeatedly cited
andimplicitlycriticizedtheReidapproach.Gohara,supra,at
808 n.93; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457 (To be sure, this is not
physicalintimidation,butitisequallydestructiveofhuman
dignity.).MirandacommentedthattheCourtfordecadeshad
recognizedthatcoercioncanbementalaswellasphysical,
andthatthebloodoftheaccusedisnottheonlyhallmarkof
anunconstitutionalinquisition.Id.at448(quotingBlackburn
v.Alabama,361U.S.199,206(1960)).Nothinginthatrespect
has changed: the Court continues regularly to hold that
psychological coercion can render a confession involuntary.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 28788 (1991); Miller v.
Fenton,474U.S.104,109(1985);Schnecklothv.Bustamonte,412
U.S.218,226(1973).
Following the Supreme Courts guidance, we too have
repeatedlyrecognizedthatpsychologicalcoercionalonecan
result in an involuntary confession . United States v.
Lehman,468F.2d93,100(7thCir.1972)(concedingthatsubtle
46 No.163397

psychological ploys can render a confession involuntary);

Etherlyv.Davis,619F.3d654,663(7thCir.2010)(considering
possible psychological coercion as part of the totality test,
whilenotingtheneedtodistinguishbetweencoercion,onthe
onehand,andencouragementtotellthetruth,ontheother);
UnitedStatesv.Villalpando,588F.3d1124,1128(7thCir.2009)
([A] false promise of leniency may render a statement
involuntary .); United States v. Dillon, 150 F.3d 754, 757
(7thCir. 1998) (A confession is voluntary if, in light of the
totalityofthecircumstances,theconfessionistheproductof
arationalintellectandfreewillandnottheresultofphysical
abuse,psychologicalintimidation,ordeceptiveinterrogation
tacticsthathaveovercomethedefendantsfreewill.);Burns
v.Reed,44F.3d524,527(7thCir.1995)(describingthebody
of due process case law, which generally proscribes the
physical or psychological coercion of confessions as well
established, albeit heavily factdependent). Outside the
courtroom, our nation has long acknowledged through its
internationalcommitmentsthatmentalmistreatmentcanbe
just as bad as its physical counterpart. Convention against
Torture andOther Cruel, InhumanorDegradingTreatment
orPunishmentart.1,Dec.10,1984,1465U.N.T.S.85(defining
torture to encompass physical and mental pain and
suffering).
Themajorityopiniondownplaysthisrealitybyrefusingto
acknowledge anything more than mental exhaustion and
falsepromises.Butfarworsethanthatwasgoingon.Dasseys
investigatorsrefusedtoleavehimaloneuntilhegavetheman
honestanswerwherehonestmeanttheanswerthatthe
officerswantedtohear.Oneaspect,thoughbynomeansthe
onlyone,ofthecoercionwasthefalsepromisethathonesty
would set him free. But there wasso much more.A brief
No.163397 47

reviewofwhatwentonshowsthatthesetacticsfelldecisively
onthecoercionsideoftheline.
Themajorityfindssomesignificanceinthenotionthatthe
detectives tactics were not per se coercive, but that is a red
herring. These cases cannot be assessed based on one
sentence, or one restroom break, or the comfort (or lack
thereof)ofoneroom.TheSupremeCourthasinstructedthat
thevoluntarinessinquiryrequiresafullconsiderationofthe
compoundinginfluenceofthepolicetechniquesasapplied
tothissuspect.Miller,474U.S.at116.Manyofthefactorsthe
majority cites as evidence leaning in favor of a finding of
voluntarinessthe soft interview room, offers of food and
drink, normalspeakingtonesviewedinthe contextofthe
types of questions and answers the investigators were
demanding and Dasseys conceded intellectual disabilities,
were coercive. Psychological literature makes this clear. See
SaulM.Kassin,ThePsychologyofConfessionEvidence,52AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 221, 22324 (1997) (criticizing the Reid
Techniques maximization methods, or scare tactics, such as
the false evidence ploy, in addition to its minimization
methods,whichimpl[y]anofferofleniency,wherepolice
lull a suspect into a false sense of security by expressing
sympathy, blaming an accomplice, and underplaying the
gravityofthesituation);seealsoMeissner&Russano,supra,
at 5760 (discussing the coercive nature of the Reid
interrogationtechniquesandparticularconcerns forminors
andsuspectswithlowintelligence).
Thestateandmajoritybrushasideeventhepossibilityof
psychologicalcoercionasappliedtoDassey.Theyclaimthat
DasseysMarch1confessionrevealedcertaincriticaldetails
that were corroborated by independent evidence, some of
48 No.163397

whichlawenforcementneverpubliclydisclosed.Ihavesev
eralresponsestothatargument.First,itrestsonthefalseidea
thatifaconfessionisaccurate,thatindicatesthatitwasnot
coerced.SeeConnerv.McBride,375F.3d643,65253(7thCir.
2004)(considering,underthetotalitytest,thereliabilityofa
confession to support a conclusion that the confession was
voluntary). But coercion and reliability are two different
things.Aconfessioncanbecoercedyetreliable,oritcanbe
voluntarybutunreliable.YetevenifitweretruethatDasseys
confession revealed critical details, the confession would
not be admissible in evidence if the totality of the circum
stancesdemonstratedthatitwasnotvoluntary.
Just as importantly, a closer examination of the
supposedlyreliablefactsonwhichthemajorityreliesshows
thattheyarenosuchthing.Withoutreliablefacts,thereisno
way to draw the Conner inference (i.e., to base a finding of
voluntariness on the reliability of the facts), questionable
thoughthatlinkmightbe.Thisjustifiesalookatthereliability
of Dasseys confession, even if for present purposes lack of
reliabilityisnotastandalonetheory.Alookathowsomeof
these key facts emerged instills no faith in either their
reliabilityortheirknowingandvoluntaryquality.Foreaseof
reference,Ihavesummarizedinthefollowingcharthowthe
investigatorsextractedthecriticaldetailstheywerelooking
for from Dassey. It shows that there was nothing to ensure
that Dassey was offering his own independent recollection.
Instead,theofficersusedacombinationofleadingquestions,
coaching,andrefusaltoacceptoneofDasseysguessesasthe
finalansweruntilitmatchedwhattheywantedtohear.


No.163397 49

Critical WhyItIsNot HowItWasCoerced

Fact Critical
Halbach Dasseywasfed Tellus,andwhatelse
wasshotin thisfactthrougha didyoudo?Comeon.
thehead. leadingquestion Somethingwiththehead.
afterunsuccessful Brendan?
guessing.SA73 AfterDasseyguesses
76. cuttingherhair,
punchingher,and
cuttingherthroat,All
right,Imjustgonna
comeoutandaskyou.
Whoshotherinthe
head?
Dasseys Thisevidence Dasseytestifiedthathis
jeanswere corroborates jeansbecamestained
stained Dasseystrial withbleachwhilehe
withbleach. testimony. helpedhisunclecleanup
R.1921:3237. whatlookedlikean
automotivefluidspill.
TheRAV4s Dasseywasfed With,hows,thelicense
license thisfactthrougha platesweretakenoffthe
plateswere leadingquestion. car,whodidthat?
removed. SA90;R.1924: OnFebruary27,the
23. investigatoralsoasked,
Didhetellyouifhedid
anythingwiththelicense
plates?
50 No.163397

Critical WhyItIsNot HowItWasCoerced

Fact Critical
Dassey Thephysical Therewasnoevidenceof
sexually evidencedoesnot handcuffschafingagainst
assaulted corroboratethis theheadboard.The
Halbach fact.R.1917:96 handcuffsandlegirons
whileshe 97;R.1915:214 foundinAverysroom
was 17. containednofingerprints
handcuffed orDNAfromDasseyor
tothebed. Halbach.
Thephysical Theplasticfilmfoundon
evidencefound thebedsspindlewas
onAverysbedis polypropylene,which,
notprobative. accordingtothestates
R.1916:246. forensicscientist,isfound
ingarments,inaddition
toplasticcontainersand
ropemanufacturing.
Thisdetailwas Dasseytestifiedthathe
drawnfrom concoctedthisdetailfrom
popularmedia. KisstheGirls(1995),a
R.1921:6567. bookheread,wherea
womanisrestrained
duringasexualassault.
Halbach Themediawidely Thisfactappearedin
wasinthe publicizedthat newsstories.
backofthe Halbachsblood
RAV4. wasfoundinthe
backofthecar.
RSA70.
No.163397 51

Critical WhyItIsNot HowItWasCoerced

Fact Critical
TheRAV4s Dasseywasfed OK,whatelsedidhedo,
battery thefactthat hedidsomethinelse,
cableswere Averywentunder youneedtotelluswhat
discon theRAV4hood hedid,afterthatcaris
nected. throughaleading parkedthere.Its
questionafterhe extremelyimportant.
unsuccessfully (pause)Beforeyouguys
guessed.SA92. leavethatcar.
AfterDasseyresponded
thatAveryleftthegunin
thecar,Thatsnotwhat
Imthinkinabout.Hedid
somethingtothatcar.He
tooktheplatesandhe,I
believehedidsomething
elseinthatcar.
Idontknow.
OK.Didhe,didhe,did
hegoandlookatthe
engine,didheraisethe
hoodatalloranything
likethat?




52 No.163397

Critical WhyItIsNot HowItWasCoerced

Fact Critical
Halbach Inadditionto Wassheeverinthe
wasshotin beingfedthatshe garage?
thegarage. wasshot,Dassey No.
wasfedthatshe
wasshotinthe Investigatorsleadhim,
garage,after sayingAgain,wehave,
initiallydenying wweknowthatsome
shewaseverin thingshappenedinthat
there.SA8186. garage,andinthatcar,
weknowthat.Youneed
totellusaboutthissowe
knowyouretellinusthe
truth.
Shortlyafter,theyask,
Telluswhereshewas
shot?
Inthehead.
No,Imeanwhereinthe
garage.
AfterDasseyanswered
thatshewasshotinthe
truckandnotonthe
garagefloor,[C]omeon,
nowwherewassheshot?
Behonesthere.
Thetruth.
Inthegarage.
No.163397 53

Critical WhyItIsNot HowItWasCoerced

Fact Critical
Halbachs Dasseywasfed OnFebruary27,Didhe
cameraand thisfactthrougha tellyaanythingabout
phonewere leadingquestion herotherpossessions
burnedina onFebruary27. sheprobablyhadhercell
barrel. ThenonMarch1, phone,acameratotake
heguessedthat pictures.
theseitemswere
AfterDasseydenied
burned.R.1924:
puttinganythinginthe
36;SA10911.
burnbarrelorknowing
whethershehadapurse,
cellphone,orcamera,he
waspressedaboutwhat
happenedtotheseitems
andguessed,[Avery]
burntem.Theonly
possessionshesaidhe
sawintheburnbarrel
werethosefedtohim
(Likeacellphone,
camera,purse.).






54 No.163397

Critical WhyItIsNot HowItWasCoerced

Fact Critical
Halbachs Fedfactand OnFebruary27,
remains mediareports. investigatorssaid,Ifind
were R.1924:56,9; itquitedifficulttobelieve
burnedin RSA69. thatiftherewasabody
thebonfire inthat[fire]Brendanthat
pit. youwouldnthaveseen
somethinglikeahand,or
afoot,ahead,hair,
something.Mediahad
reportedherremains
werefoundthere.
Dassey Dasseysresponse WeknowthatTeresa
resistedthe seemstoaccept hada,atattooonher
suggestion thesuggestion stomach,doyou
that thatshehada rememberthat?
Halbach tattoo.SA15152. (shakesheadno)uh
hada uh.
tattoo.
Doyoudisagreewith
mewhenIsaythat?
NobutIdontknow
whereitwas.

The majority concedes that AEDPA does not require a
nearly identical factual pattern to find that a decision
involved an unreasonable application of law. Panetti v.
Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citation omitted). But
thatisinessencewhatthemajorityhasdemanded.Inarguing
No.163397 55

that even nonAEDPA cases have found confessions

voluntaryundersimilarcircumstances,themajoritycitestwo
decisions.Butasitconcedes,Farev.MichaelC.,442U.S.707
(1979), is critically different: Michael C. was of average
intelligence and had many prior interactions with the
criminal justice system. Id. at 726. While Boulden v. Holman,
394 U.S. 478 (1969), may superficially appear to be more
similartoDasseyscase,itisofdubiousrelevancegiventhe
factthatitwasdecided(alongwithMichaelC.)decadesbefore
theSupreme Courtinstructedlower courts to recognize the
uniquepsychologicalvulnerabilitiesofyouthstemmingfrom
theirincompleteneurologicaldevelopment.See,e.g.,Graham
v.Florida,560U.S.48,68(2010);Roperv.Simmons,543U.S.551,
56970(2005).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals failed reasonably to
applyinanymeaningfulwayatleastthreeprinciplesthatthe
Supreme Court has clearly established: (1) special care for
juvenile confessions, (2) consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, and, most importantly, (3) prohibition of
psychologically coercive tactics. This led to the kind of
extrememalfunctionintheadjudicationofDasseyscasefor
which section2254(d)(1) provides a remedy. By turning a
blindeyetotheseproblems,themajorityhasessentiallyread
habeascorpusreliefoutofthebooks.
II
There is a second, independent, reason why the district
courtcorrectlygrantedDasseyshabeascorpuspetitionand
our original panel was correct to uphold that ruling: the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals made unreasonable factual
determinations. See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276
(2015)(grantinghabeascorpusreliefundersection2254(d)(2),
56 No.163397

without needing to reach petitioners section 2254(d)(1)

argument). The district court, whose factual assessments
deserve some deference from us, found that the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that investigators
made no promises of leniency. According to the district
court, though no statement in particular rendered the
confessioninvoluntary,thecumulativeeffectofinvestigators
tacticsoverboreDasseysfreewill.
Themajoritydismissesthisconcernbecausetherewasno
specific promise of lenience. But as the district court
concluded,whenexaminingthetotalityofthecircumstances,
it is clear that Dassey was guessing at what he thought the
investigators wanted to hear so that he could leave. Dassey
was reassured across two days of interviews that being
honestwouldallowhimtogofree.Althoughanadultof
averageintelligencemightrecognizetheBiblicalallusion,see
John8:32(Youwillknowthetruth,andthetruthwillsetyou
free.), Dassey was not an adult and not of average
intelligence.Instead,hewasamentallylimitedteenagerwho
didnotunderstandabstractions.Playingtheir20Questions
game,theofficersforcedDasseytotryoutdifferentanswers
untilhestumbledupontheanswertheywanteddefinedby
themastheanswerthatwassufficientlytruthful.Andwhat
wasDasseysresponseafterallthis?Heaskedifhewasfree
to go back to school to turn in a project that was due, and
whentoldthathecouldnot,heindicatedthathethoughthe
wouldbeinjailforjustoneday.Nomoreconclusiveevidence
ofhisliteralismandhislackofunderstandingisneeded.
Byfindingnopromisesoflenienceweremadeandthatthe
confession was voluntary, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
No.163397 57

made an unreasonable determination of fact in light of the

clearandconvincingweightoftheevidence.
III
UnderAEDPA,theroleofthefederalcourtsinreviewing
Dasseyspetitionforhabeasreliefisquitelimited.ButAEDPA
does not paralyze us in the face of a clear constitutional
violation.TheDueProcessClauseandtherightagainstself
incrimination demand that, in order to be admissible in
evidence,asuspectsconfessionmustbevoluntary.Dasseys
was not. Because the detectives used coercive interrogation
tacticsonanintellectuallydisabledjuvenile,Dasseyswillwas
overborne during his March 1 interrogation. Without this
involuntaryandhighlyunreliableconfession,thecaseagainst
Dasseywasalmostnonexistent.Thiscourtshouldbegranting
hispetitionforawritofhabeascorpusandgivingthestatean
opportunitytoretryhim,ifitsodesires.Irespectfullydissent.
58 No.163397

ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and WOOD, Chief Judge, and

WILLIAMS,CircuitJudge,dissenting.Icontinuetobelieve,asI
explained in the panel opinion, and as Chief Judge Woods
dissent so persuasively argues, that the state court failed to
fulfilltheSupremeCourtsmandatetoreviewjuvenilecon
fessions with special care, and unreasonably held that Das
seys confession was voluntary. And for all of the reasons
uponwhichChiefJudgeWoodhasexpoundedandthoseset
forthintheoriginalpanelopinioninDasseyv.Dittmann,860
F.3d933(7thCir.2017),rehgenbancgranted,opinionvacated
(Aug. 4, 2017), I too respectfully dissent. I write separately
simplytopointoutthechasmbetweenhowcourtshavehis
torically understood the nature of coercion and confessions
and what we now know about coercion with the advent of
DNAprofilingandcurrentsocialscienceresearch.
Although I write in the hope of encouraging courts to
update their understandings of the factual nature of coer
cion, my conclusion about the proper outcome of Dasseys
habeaspetitiondoesnotdependonanychangeinlaw.Cur
rentSupremeCourtprecedentrequiresthatacourtviewthe
totalityofthecircumstancesofanyinterrogation,andtotake
specialcarewhenevaluatingtheconfessionsofjuveniles.To
complywiththecommandoftheSupremeCourt,therefore,
a court must include within its evaluation of the totality of
thecircumstancestheimpactofcoerciveinterrogation tech
niques upon the particular vulnerabilities of the individual
subjecttothosetechniques.Thestatecourtdidnotdosoin
considering Dasseys appeal. For this reason, Dasseys con
viction cannot stand. Unfortunately, four members of the
sevenmember en banc panel of this court do not agreea
decision that I believe has worked a profound injustice.
Nevertheless, I hope to convince my colleagues throughout
No.163397 59

the courts that reform of our understanding of coercion is

long overdue. When conducting a totality of the circum
stancesreview,mostcourtsevaluationsofcoercionstillare
based largely on outdated ideas about human psychology
andrationaldecisionmaking.Itistimetobringourunder
standingofcoercionintothetwentyfirstcentury.
Half a century ago the Supreme Court held that police
misrepresentations during interrogations, although relevant
toatotalityofthecircumstancesinquiry,werenotinandof
themselves sufficienttorenderanotherwisevoluntarycon
fessioninadmissible.Frazierv.Cupp,394U.S.731,739(1969).
In other words, police may deceive, trick, conceal, imply,
andmisleadinanynumberofways,providedthat,undera
totalityofthecircumstancesevaluation,theydonotdestroy
asuspectsabilitytomakearationalchoice.Seeid.(finding
an interrogators lie that a fellow suspect had confessed in
sufficient to make an otherwise voluntary confession inad
missible); Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 454 (1971) (de
terminingthatitwasnotpersecoerciveforpolicetosendin
acooperatinginsuranceagenttodeceivethedefendantinto
confessing to obtain insurance payments for his children);
seealso United Statesv.Villalpando, 588F.3d1124,1128(7th
Cir.2009)(Trickery,deceit,evenimpersonationdonotren
deraconfessioninadmissible);UnitedStatesv.Rutledge,900
F.2d1127,1131(7thCir.1990)(notingthatthelawpermits
thepolicetopressureandcajole,concealmaterialfacts,and
activelymisleadalluptolimits).
Thesecases,however,wereborninanerawhenthehu
manintuitionthattoldusthatinnocentpeopledonotcon
fess to crimes was still largely unchecked. This belief is
rooted in the minds tendency to assume that statements
60 No.163397

made to a police officer that are against ones self interest

canbetrustedor,toputitsimply,thethoughtthatmostof
us have that I would never confess to a crime I did not
commit.1Peerreviewedstudiesconfirmthatjurorstendto
havehardtodislodgebeliefsthatasuspectwhoisinnocent
couldnotbemanipulatedintoconfessing.2And,infact,this
falsenotionispreciselywhatthestateimploredthejurorsin
Dasseys trial to believe, arguing in closing that [p]eople
whoareinnocentdontconfess.R.1923at144.Weknow,
however, that this statement is unequivocally incorrect. In
nocentpeopledoinfactconfess,andtheydosowithshock
ing regularity. As of June 7, 2016, The National Registry of
Exonerationshadcollecteddataon1,810exonerationsinthe
UnitedStatessince1989(thatnumberasofDecember4,2017
is2,132),andthatdataincludes227casesofinnocentpeople
whofalselyconfessed.3Thisresearchindicatesthatfalsecon
fessions(definedascasesinwhichindisputablyinnocentin
dividualsconfessedtocrimestheydidnotcommit)occurin
approximately25%ofhomicidecases.4

1SaulM.Kassinetal.,PoliceInducedConfessions:RiskFactorsandRec

ommendations,34L.&Hum.Behav.49,51(2010).
2IrisBlandnGitlinetal.,JurorsBelieveInterrogationTacticsAreNot

LikelytoElicitFalseConfessions:WillExpertWitnessTestimonyInformThem
Otherwise?,17Psychol.,Crime&L.239,256(2011).
3SamuelGrossetal.,For50Years,YouveHadTheRighttoRemainSi

lent,TheNationalRegistryofExonerations,FalseConfessions(June12,
2016), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/false
confessions.aspx.
4 SamuelGrossetal.,ExonerationintheUnitedStates,19892012:Re

port by the National Registry of Exonerations, 58, 60,

No.163397 61

In a world where we believed that innocent people do

notconfesstocrimestheydidnotcommit,wewerewilling
to tolerate a significant amount of deception by the police.
Underthisrubric,thethinkingwent,theinnocentperson(or
atleastthevastmajorityofhealthy,sane,innocentadultsof
averageintelligence)wouldnotconfesseveninresponseto
deceptionandcajoling.Andsoourcaselawdevelopedina
factual framework in which we presumed that the trickery
anddeceitusedbypoliceofficerswouldhavelittleeffecton
theinnocent.
Ifitistruethat,exceptinextremecases,innocentpeople
do not confess, what difference does it make if detectives
FassbenderandWiegertmadefalseassurancesandusedde
ception in interrogating Dassey? So what if they gave gen
eralassurancesofleniency,usedleadingquestions,fedDas
seyinformation,liedabouthowmuchinformationtheyhad,
told Dassey that they were on his side, implored him that
honestyistheonlythingthatwillsetyoufree,suggested
answers, and even went so far as to tell a confused and
floundering Dassey that Teresa had been shot in the head?
Dassey was not subject to physical coercion or any sort of
threatsatall,themajoritytellsus,and[g]iventhehistory
of coercive interrogation techniques from which modern
constitutionalstandardsforconfessionsemerged,thisisim
portant.Anteat27.
But what do we do when the facts that supported our
modern constitutional standards come from a fiftyyear
old understanding of human behavior, and when what we

https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exoneration
s_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf.
62 No.163397

oncethoughtweknewaboutthepsychologyofconfessions
wenowknownottobetrue?Ourlongheldideathatinno
cent people do not confess to crimes has been upended by
advances inDNAprofiling.Weknow nowthatin approxi
mately 25% of homicide cases in which convicted persons
havelaterbeenunequivocallyexoneratedbyDNAevidence,
the suspect falsely confessed to committing the crime.5 The
majority points out that the number of known false confes
sionsislowcomparedtothetotalnumberofguiltypleasto
violent felonies.Ante at 3738 n.8. This comparison is inap
propriatefortworeasons.First,thenumberofguiltypleasis
thewrongdenominator.Defendantspleadguiltyinallman
nerofsituations,notonlyafterinterrogationsbythepolice,
aswasthecasewithDassey.Manydefendants,forexample,
accept a plea after carefully weighing their options with a
lawyerwithouteverhavingbeensubjecttoacoerciveinter
rogationthe only type of confessions with which we are
concerned in this case. Moreover, and more importantly, in
thenumerator,thestatisticsforfalseconfessionsincludeon
ly those who have been exonerated based on some form of
objective evidence (DNA, impossibility, the confession of
another,etc.).Theuniverseofpeoplewhofalselyconfessis
undoubtedlylargerthanthesubsetofpeoplewhohavecon
fessedandthenbeenfortunateenoughtohavebeenexoner
ated by objective, irrefutable evidence.But most important
ly, as the majority concedes, even one coerced false confes
sion is very troubling. Ante at 3738 n.8. Indeed any co
ercedfalseconfessionisanaffronttodueprocessandcannot
stand.

5Id.at58.
No.163397 63

Certainlyhumanintuitionmakesitalmostinconceivable
toimaginethatsomeonemightfalselyconfesstothemurder
of ones own child. Yet in October 2004, Kevin Fox of Wil
mington, Illinois did just that. He confessed to sexually as
saulting his daughter, placing duct tape over her mouth,
drowning her in the river, and then going home to sleep.6,7
His confession was detailed and included accounts of her
moving and kicking in the water and struggling to remove
theducttapeasshedrowned.Hequicklyrescindedhiscon
fession,butspenteightmonthsinprisonuntilDNAtesting
ruledhimoutasasuspectandtheStateofIllinoisdropped
thecharges.SeegenerallyFoxv.Hayes,600F.3d819(7thCir.
2010).NotonlydidtheDNAaloneexcludehimasasuspect,
butforanywhohadremainingdoubts,theconvictionofan
othermansixyearslatermadeitunequivocallycertainthat
hisconfessionhadbeenfalse.In2010,ScottEby,whowasin
prisonforrapingarelative,confessedtothemurder.8Atthe
timeofthemurderhehadbeenlivingnotfarfromtheFox
home.WhiledrunkandhighoncocaineEbydecidedtorob
somehouses,andwhenhehappeneduponasleepingthree
yearoldRileyFox,heabductedher,sexuallyassaultedher,
andthendrownedhertocoverhiscrime.HisDNAmatched
that found on the duct tape used to bind Riley. A pair of
boots, which had been found at the scene, photographed,

6BryanSmith,KevinFox,inTRUE STORIESOF FALSE CONFESSIONS107

(RobWardenetal.eds.,2009).
7 BryanSmith,TheNightmare:ALookattheRileyFoxCase,Chi.Mag.,

July3,2006.
8 SteveSchmadeke,ImtheLowestKindofSlime,Killerof3YearOld

Confessed.CourtRecordsOutlineInvestigatorsPathtoScottWayneEby,Chi.
Trib.,Feb.26,2011.
64 No.163397

andthenignoredforyears,hadthenameEbywrittenon
thetongue.
Five decades ago, when the Supreme Court issued its
opinionsallowinginterrogatordeception,therewasnoDNA
evidencethatcoulddemonstratewithsuchclaritythatinno
centpeoplewereconfessingtocrimestheyhadnotcommit
tedatasurprisingrate,andtherefore,onlyalimitedbodyof
psychologicalscienceexplainingwhythishappens.
Evennow,despitetheoverwhelmingevidenceregarding
thecoercivenatureofconstitutionallypermissibleinterroga
tiontechniques,wehavenotchangedourunderstandingof
howtoviewthefactssurroundingcoercionwhenevaluating
the totalityofthecircumstances. Yetwenowhave arobust
and growing body of rigorous, peerreviewed, legal and
psychological research demonstrating how current interro
gation tactics influence people, and particularly juveniles
and intellectually impaired people, to act against their own
selfinterestinsuchaseeminglyirrationalmanner.9
Some of the factors that induce false confessions are in
ternal.Studieshavedemonstratedthatpersonalcharacteris
tics such as youth, mental illness, cognitive disability, sug
gestibility, and a desire to please others may induce false
confessions.10Asurveyoffalseconfessioncasesfrom1989
2012foundthatalthoughonly8%ofadultexonereeswithno
knownmentaldisabilitiesfalselyconfessedtocrimes,inthe
population of exonerees who were younger than 18 at the
timeofthecrime,42%ofexonerateddefendantsconfessedto

9
See Saul M. Kassin, False Confessions, 8 WIREs Cogn Sci. e1439
(2017).
10BlandnGitlinetal.,supranote2,at240.
No.163397 65

crimes they had not committed, as did 75% of exonerees

who were mentally ill or mentally disabled.11 Overall, one
sixth of the exonerees were juveniles, mentally disabled, or
both, but they accounted for 59% of false confessions.12 In
deed, youth and intellectual disability are the two most
commonly cited characteristics of suspects who confess
falsely.13 Dassey suffered under the weight of both charac
teristics.
Inadditiontothefactorsspecifictothesuspect,someof
the factors that induce false confessions are externally im
posed. These include isolation, long interrogation periods,
repeated accusations, deception, presenting fabricated evi
dence,implicit/explicitthreatsofpunishmentorpromisesof
leniency, and minimization or maximization of the moral
seriousness or legal consequences of the offence.14 Maxi
mization describes the technique whereby the interrogator
exaggeratesthestrengthoftheevidenceandthemagnitude
ofthecharges.15Dasseysinterrogatorsemployedmaximiza
tion by constantly reminding Dassey, We already know
everything.See,e.g.,R.1925at17,19,23,24,26,28,30,31,
36,37,41,44,47,48,50,54,55,60,63,69,71.Minimization
describes tactics that are designed to lull a suspect into be

11Gross,Exonerations19892012,supranote4,at60.

12Id.

13SamuelR.Grossetal.,ExonerationsintheUnitedStates1989through

2003,95J.Crim.L.&Criminology523,545(2005).
14BlandnGitlinetal.,supranote2,at240.

15SaulM.Kassinetal.,PoliceInterrogationsandConfessions:Communi

catingPromisesandThreatsbyPragmaticImplication,15L.&Hum.Behav.
233,23435(1991).
66 No.163397

lieving that the magnitude of the charges and the serious

nessoftheoffensewillbedownplayedorlessenedifhecon
fesses.16 Studies demonstrate that minimization causes sus
pects to infer leniency to the same extent as if an explicit
promisehadbeenmade,increasingnotonlytheratesoftrue
confessions (from 46% to 81% in one experiment) but also
therateoffalseconfessions(from6%to18%).17,18Althougha
courtmustexcludeaconfessionobtainedbydirectpromise
of leniency (see, e.g., United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d
1124, 1128 (7th Cir. 2009)), the research demonstrates that
minimization techniques are the functional equivalent in
theirimpactonsuspects.19Theinvestigatorsinthiscaseem
ployedclassicminimizationtechniquesbyrepeatedlytelling
Dasseythatitwasnothisfaultthathecommittedthecrime
because his uncle, Steven Avery, had made him do it. See,
e.g., R. 1925 at 28, 47, 50, 60, 62. As Chief Judge Wood
points out in her dissent, interrogators in this case, as in
mostpoliceforcesintheUnitedStates,usedtheReidTech
niquetoobtainDasseysconfession.Thistechniqueinvolves
isolation, confrontation, maximization and minimization
the psychological strongarm tactics that are known to pro
duce coerced confessions even in adults of average intelli
gence.

16Id.at235.

17Id.at241,248.

18
Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating True and False Confessions
WithinaNovelExperimentalParadigm,16Psychol.Sci.481,484(2005).
19 Kassin, Police Interrogations and Confessions, supra note 15, at 241,

248.
No.163397 67

Dasseys interrogation thus combined a perfect storm of

theseinternalandexternalelements.Hewasyoung,oflow
intellect, manipulable, without a friendly adult, and faced
repeatedaccusations,deception,fabricatedevidence,implic
itandexplicitpromisesofleniency,policeofficersdisingen
uously assuming the role of father figure, and assurances
thatitwasnothisfault.20
Formanyyears,theReidtechniquehasbeencriticizedby
scholars and experts for increasing the rate of false confes
sions. 21AsfarbackasMiranda,theSupremeCourtwarned

20 The majority has reservations about the use of the Gudjonsson

SuggestibilityScaleandthusstatesthatitcanmakenoconclusionsfrom
thedisputedexperttestimonyabouttheresults.Anteat10n.2.Whatever
onemightmakeoftheGudjonssonSuggestibilityScale,theinterrogation
speaks for itself. Dassey is almost frantic in his desire to find the story
the investigators seek. For example, in response to the question about
whathappenedtoTeresashead,Dasseyguessedateverypossibleinjury
orinjusticetoahead(hitting,punching,throatcutting,haircutting)hop
ingtopleasetheofficersuntil,infrustration,theyfinallyinformedhim
thatTeresahadbeenshotinthehead.R.1925at6063.Inresponseto
pressurefromtheinvestigators,hechangesthelocaleofthecrimefrom
thehousetothegarage(Id.at7273),thecolorofTeresasclothes(Id.at
20, 3132), the location of the knife (Id. at 8081, 121; R. 1934 at 2324,
27), whetherTeresa was standing on the porch after school (R.1925 at
1920,2728, 9091), whether Avery went under the hood of Halbachs
car(Id.at7780),whenthefireoccurred(Id.at23,3233;R.1934at55),
andwhetherhecutherhair(R.1935at6061;R.1934at3637,6566,
98).Evenunderthestatestheoryofthecase,thenaveDassey,whohad
never been in trouble with the law and had never had a sexual experi
ence with a woman, was readily manipulated by his uncle into partici
patinginarepulsiveandheinouscrime.OnedoesnotneedtheGudjons
son Suggestbility Scale to conclude, under either partys theory of the
case,thatDasseywashighlysuggestibleandmanipulable.
21Kassin,FalseConfessions,supranote9,at8.
68 No.163397

that[e]venwithoutemployingbrutality,thethirddegree
usedintheReidtechniqueexactsaheavytollonindividual
liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals, and
mayevengiverisetoafalseconfession.Mirandav.Arizo
na, 384 U.S. 436, 455 & n.24 (1966). Recently, Wicklander
Zulawski & Associates, one of the nations largest police
consulting firms, said it will stop training detectives in the
methodithastaughtsince1984,statingthatitisnotanef
fective way of getting truthful information.22 After a spate
of highprofile false confession cases in the 1980s, Great
BritaintransitionedfromanaccusatorialandcoerciveReid
like approach to an investigative model of interviewing
which prohibits deception, coercion, and minimization.23
Metaanalyses of twelve different laboratory experiments
indicate that the accusatorial approach increased both true
and false rates of confessions, while the information
gathering approach increased the rate of true confessions
withoutalsoincreasingfalseconfessions.24
Noreasonablestatecourt,knowingwhatwenowknow
about coercive interrogation techniques and viewing Das
seys interrogation in light of his age, intellectual deficits,
and manipulability, could possibly have concluded that

22EliHager,TheSeismicChangeInPoliceInterrogations:AMajorPlayer

In Law Enforcement Says It Will No Longer Use A Method Linked To False

Confessions, The Marshall Project (March 7, 2017, 10:00 p.m.),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/03/07/theseismicchangein
policeinterrogations.
23Kassin,FalseConfessions,supranote9,at8.

24 ChristianA.Meissneretal.,AccusatorialandInformationGathering

InterrogationMethodsandTheirEffectsonTrueandFalseConfessions,AMe
taAnalyticReview,10J.Exp.Criminology459,48182(2014).
No.163397 69

Dasseysconfessionwasvoluntarilygiven.Althoughitismy
hopethatourcourtswill,whenevaluatingthetotalityofthe
circumstances,engagewiththemorecurrentunderstanding
of coercion, as I noted at the start, Dassey does not need a
changeinourexistingSupremeCourtprecedentoranyex
isting law to prevail on his habeas petition. What has
changed is not the law, but our understanding of the facts
that illuminate what constitutes coercion under the law.
Moreover, even under our current, anachronistic under
standing of coercion, Dasseys confession was so obviously
andtransparentlycoercivelyobtainedthatitisunreasonable
tohavefoundotherwise.Dassey,however,neednotrelyon
thisfindingeither.ExistingSupremeCourtprecedentallows
for significantly deceptive and manipulative interrogation
techniques,butthoseverytechniquesmustthenbeevaluat
ed,inatotalityofthecircumstancesanalysis,forwhatthey
are.
Therequirementthatconfessionsmustbevoluntaryisa
principleattheheartofourlegalsystem.Althoughpsycho
logical and physical torture and coercion are commonplace
insomecountriesasameansofobtainingconfessions,our
system of justice rejects the notion that convictions can be
obtainedthroughsuchabuse.Werefusetoacceptsuchcon
ductasameansofobtaininginformation,notonlybecauseit
impactstheveracityoftheconfession,butbecauseitiscon
ductthatweashumanbeingscannottoleratefromourgov
ernment.Inacasesuchasthisone,whereinvestigatorsare
faced with a crime of horrific brutality and the loss of a
treasuredlife,theimpulsetocoerceaconfessionfromasus
pectmaybeparticularlystrong.Asjudges,weareentrusted
with the responsibility to protect against such abusive ac
70 No.163397

tions,andupholdthoseprinciplesthatourConstitutionpro
tectseveninthedarkestoftimes.
Whatoccurredherewastheinterrogation ofan intellec
tually impaired juvenile. Dassey was subjected to myriad
psychologically coercive techniques but the state court did
not review his interrogation with the special care required
bySupremeCourtprecedent.Hisconfessionwasnotvolun
tary and his conviction should not stand, and yet an im
paired teenager has been sentenced to life in prison. I view
this as a profound miscarriage of justice. I respectfully dis
sent.