1.

Paulo

Cases in Constitutional Law 1

MACARIOLA VS. JUDGE ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77

2. Lemy
MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228
3. Deauna
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408
4. De Leon
MIRIAM DEPINSOR-SANTIAGO. et aL Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325
5. Aurora
RAUL L. LAA1BINO and ERICO B. AUMENTAD0, togethenvith 6,327,952 registered voters vs. THE
COMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 174153, Octcbei 25,2106, 505 SCRA 160
6. Harriet
MABANAG vs. LOPEZ V[TO, 78 Phil 1
7. Robert
GONZALES vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774
8. JR
TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (Doctrine of proper submission)
9. Raffy
SANTDAD vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
10. Palsiw
ALMARTO vs. .ALBA, 127 SCRA 53
11. Ruby
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
12. Besov
AGLIPAV VS. RUIZ, f-l PUH. 201

13. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. THE GOV'T. OF TILE REPUBLIC OT THE PHILS. G.R.
No. 183591

14. Jose
PROF. MERLIN M. Ml GALL ON A, A [EBAY AN PARTY-LIST RIP. RISA HONTIYEROS, PROF. HARRY C
ROQUE, THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF 'LAW STUDENTS VS. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECREI ARY, ET AL. G.R. No. 1S7167
15. Sheila
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REPUBLIC OP THE PHILS. VS. PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

16. Timothy
COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUED A, 42 SCRA 23
17. Torres
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE. ICS SCRA 757
18. Torres
LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418
19. Palsrx
BACANI VS. NACOCO, 1M PLfl. 468
20. Abuan
ACCFA VS. CUGCO. 30 SCRA 649

1 ACARIOLA VS. JUDGE ASUNCION, 114 SCRA 77

Bernardita Macariola vs Judge Elias Asuncion

114 SCRA 77 Political Law Abrogation of Political Laws Change of Sovereign
Legal Ethics Judicial Ethics Property Dealings of Judges Involving a Litigants Property
Civil Law Law on Sales Contract of Sale Subject Matter Under Litigation
In 1963, Bernardita Macariola and her step sister and other kins (Priscilla Reyes et al)
had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial
ensued and Judge Elias Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to inherit
rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted
a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project partition was,
however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly
authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The
decision became final in 1963 as well.
Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property
to Judge Asuncion in 1965.
In August 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with acts
unbecoming a judge on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by
Macariola) which was involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is
averred by Macariola to be against Art. 1491, par. 5 of the Civil Code which provides:
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Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose
jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes
the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the
property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession.
Also, Macariola said that Asuncions act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that
the project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition
were insignificant portions of the parcels of land.
Further, Macariola alleged that the act of Asuncion engaging in commerce is said to be
a violation of pars. 1 and 5, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce which prohibits judges in
active service (among others) to do so within the limits of the place where they discharge
their duties.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said Civil Code provision.
2. Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated the said Code of Commerce provision.
HELD:
1. No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought
the property in 1965 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not
buy the property directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought
by Galapon, who then sold the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that
Galapon acted as a dummy of Asuncion.
Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or
that what she got were insignificant portions of the land.
The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his
personal transactions.
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2. No. Article 14 (Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, effective August 1888) of the
Code of Commerce, prohibiting judges from engaging in commerce was political in
nature and so was automatically abrogated with the end of Spanish rule in the country
(Change of Sovereignty to the US by virtue of cession, 1898 Treaty of Paris).

2. MUTUC VS. COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228

Amelito Mutuc vs Commission on Elections

36 SCRA 228 Statutory Construction Ejusdem Generis
Political Law Bill of Rights Freedom of Expression
Amelito Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970).
His candidacy was given due course by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) but
he was prohibited from playing his campaign jingle on his mobile units because that
was an apparent violation of COMELECs ban (via a COMELEC resolution) to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda
gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or
materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of
domestic or foreign origin. It was COMELECs contention that the jingle proposed to
be used by Mutuc is a recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible
propaganda material (falling under and the likes category), and under the above
COMELEC rule, the same is subject to confiscation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COMELECs contention is correct.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC ban is valid.
HELD:
1. No. By virtue of Ejusdem Generis, general words following any enumeration must be
of the same class as those specifically referred to. COMELEC contended that the
ban makes unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being
made of pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like. For
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COMELEC, the last three words sufficed to justify such an order. The Supreme Court
did not agree. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the said law violated
by Mutuc was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution.
It does not include campaign jingles for they are not gadgets as contemplated by the
law.
2. No. This is a curtailment of Freedom of Expression. The Constitution prohibits the
abridgment of the freedom of speech.

3. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408

Manila Prince Hotel vs Government Service Insurance System
267 SCRA 408 Political Law Constitutional Law Supremacy of the Constitution Filipino First
Policy
Self-Executing Provisions of the Constitution Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two
bidders participated, Manila Prince Hotel (MPH) and the Malaysian Firm Renong
Berhad (RB). MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share.
RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but
is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the
Filipino First Policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
which provides:
Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
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The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.
But GSIS refused to accept said offer. In turn MPH filed a petition for TRO against GSIS
to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. TRO was granted.
RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:

1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it
is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national
patrimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be
proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.
HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This
is in light of the Filipino First Policy.
Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is
the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.
Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also
refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not
only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to
individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term
qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who
can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence
and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment
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to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an

indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common
good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to
be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be
chosen over the former.

4. MIRIAM DEPINSOR-SANTIAGO. et aL Vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325

Miriam Defensor Santiago et al vs COMELEC

March/June 1997
Amendment to the Constitution
On 6 Dec 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by Peoples Initiative The COMELEC
then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates for signature gathering all over the
country, b.)caused the necessary publication of the said petition in papers of general
circulation, and c.) instructed local election registrars to assist petitioners and
volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18 Dec 1996, MD Santiago et al filed a
special civil action for prohibition against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that 1.) the
constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed
by Congress, 2.) RA 6735 indeed provides for three systems of initiative
namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statues and on local legislation. The two latter
forms of initiative were specifically provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no
provisions were specifically made for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission
indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law as pointed out by former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to
the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
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HELD: RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the

constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article 17 of
the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . . The
Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This provision
is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by Congress.
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without implementing
legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional action in the last
analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated, the right of the
people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system of
inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right, though
constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide for its
implementation.

***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices of
the SC ruled that RA 6735 is adequate enough to enable such initiative. HOWEVER,
this was a mere minute resolution which reads in part:
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic Act
No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis. See
discussion here
See also Lambino vs COMELEC.
Read other versions of this digest here:
Separation of Powers
Revision vs Amendment to the Constitution
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5. LAMBINO and AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 registered voters vs. COMELEC
GR No. 174153
October 25, 2006
Carpio, J.
FACTS: On 15 February 2006, the petitioners (Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado)
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On
25 August 2006, the Lambino group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite
which will ratify the said petition under Republic Act 6375. The Lambino group alleged that the
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals, which fulfilled what was provided under
Article XVII of the Philippine Constitution (Amendments and Revisions) wherein it states that
amendments may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition
of at least twelve per centum of the total amount of registered voters. The petitioners also
claimed that every legislative district is represented by at least three percent of the total
number of gathered signatures, and that the signatures of those registered voters who signed
the said petition were validated by COMELEC representatives. The said petition changes the
1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (The Legislative Department) and
Sections 1-4 of Article VII (The Executive Department) by adding Article XVIII (Transitory
Provisions). These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential government
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary government. However, COMELEC denied the petition because
of the lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago vs.
COMELEC ruling, which stated that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative
petitions.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the Lambino groups initiative petition complies with Article XVII,
Section 2 of the Constitution through a peoples initiative
b) Whether or not the Court should revisit the ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC
c) Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying due
course to the Lambino groups petition
RULING: a) The Lambino groups petition failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a peoples initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on direct peoples initiative. There is a clear distinction between amendment and revision.
The Lambino groups petition seeks to merge article VI and VII of the Constitution, which is a
change in the constitution. Therefore, the petition is declared void.
b) The revisit of Santiago vs. COMELEC is not necessary, because of the petitioners violated
Sec. 2 of Art XVII of the Constitution even assuming that RA 6735 is valid.
c) The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in denying the Lambino groups decision.
Therefore, the petition is dismissed.
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6. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ V[TO, 78 Phil 1

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL petitioners vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET AL,
respondents
G.R. No L-1123 March 5, 1947

Facts:
This is a petition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution
designated Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance thereto.
Three of the plaintiff senators were suspended by the Senate shortly while the eight
of the plaintiff representatives had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except
to take part on the election of Speaker, both on account of alleged irregularities on
their election.
As a consequence the petitioners did not take part in the passage of questioned
resolution nor was their membership reckoned with in the computation of the
necessary three-fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members had been counted, the affirmative votes in favour of
the proposed amendment would had been short of the necessary three-fourths vote
in either branch of Congress.
Issue:
Whether the Court may inquire upon the irregularities in the approval of the resolution
proposing an amendment to the Constitution

Held:
No. The political questions are not within the province of the judiciary except to the
extent that power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts
by express constitutionality or statutory provision. This doctrine is based on the
principle of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require
clarification or citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in determining what matters
fall within the meaning of political question. The term is not susceptible of exact
definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the
scope of the restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions
of the political departments of the government. If a political question conclusively
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binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If
ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to
ratification has to be a political question. The two steps complement each other in
a scheme intended to achieve a single objective. It is to be noted that the
amendatory process as provided in section I of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution "consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification." There
is no logic in attaching political character to one and withholding that character
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function
performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to
its charge by the Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even in
dependent of any intervention by the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency
scrupulous attention of the judiciary be needed to safeguard public interest, there
is less reason for judicial inquiry into the validity of a proposal then into that of
ratification.

*Political Question : A political question is one the resolution of which has been vested
by the Constitution exclusively in either the people, in the exercise of their sovereign
capacity, or in which full discretionary authority has been delegated to a co-equal branch
of the Government.

Thus, while courts can determine questions of legality with respect to

governmental action, they cannot review government policy and the wisdom thereof, for
these questions have been vested by the Constitution in the Executive and Legislative
Departments.

* Enrolled Bill Rule- the Enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed

by Congress and approved by the President. If a mistake as in fact made in the printing of the bill before it was

certified by the officers of the congress and approved by the Chief Executive, the remedy is amendment or

corrective legislation, not by judicial decree.

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7. GONZALES vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774

21 SCRA 774 Political Law Amendment to the Constitution Political
Question vs Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC
to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided
in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general
national elections shall be held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by
Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups as they argued that this was
unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals to the people who
would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather than
in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when
they came up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this
regard, the COMELEC and other respondents interposed the defense that said act
of Congress cannot be reviewed by the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political
question.
II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD:
I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend
as well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in
the general grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not
constitutionally granted to Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to
the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when
Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not actually doing so
as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly. Such act is not a
legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent
assembly is within constitutional limitations.
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II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a
special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935]
Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special, not a general
election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the Constitution had
been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that
Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does
not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general
elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. Plebiscite should be
scheduled on a special date so as to facilitate Fair submission, intelligent
consent or rejection. They should be able to compare the original proposition with
the amended proposition.

8. TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (Doctrine of proper submission)

TOLENTINO vs. COMELEC 41 SCRA 702
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

FACTS:
The constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite on the proposal to
lower the voting age from 21 to 18, before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then
under revision) had been approved. Tolentino et al filed a motion to prohibit such
plebiscite and the same was granted by the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition will prosper

HELD:
The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is
singular which meant that the entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one
plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were not given a proper frame of reference in
arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea yet of what the rest of the
revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to assess the
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proposed amendments in the light of the entire document. This is the Doctrine of
Submission which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be
presented to the people for the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

9. SANIDAD vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and
conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and
effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the
president has no power to propose amendments to the new constitution, as such,
the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.
ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the
Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time
frame allowed sufficient and proper submission?
HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly
is a justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of
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the president to perform such act is in question. The president has the authority to
propose amendments as the governmental powers are generally concentrated to
the president in times of crisis. The time for deliberation of the referendum-
plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the questions are
issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation
of martial law.

10. ALMARIO vs. .ALBA, 127 SCRA 53

Almario v alba
Gr no. L-66088
January 25, 1984

FACTS:
Batas Pambansa blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls on
January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject amendments to the Constitution. The
proposed amendment are embodied in 4 separate questions to be answered by
simple yes or no. Petitioner herein seek to enjoin the submission on January 27,
1984 of question 3 and 4, which cover resolution nos. 105 and 113, for the people
for ratification or rejection on the ground that there has been no fair and proper
submission following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v Comelec. The petitioner
do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more time for
the people to study the meaning and implications of Resolution nos. 105 and 113
until the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the
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electorate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not grant of public land and urban land reform are unwise or
improvident or whether or not the proposed amendments are unnecessary is a
matter which only the people can decide.
RULING:
Reflecting on the foregoing Constitutional provisions, it seems evident that what is
sought to be adopted under Questions 3 and 4 of the forthcoming plebiscite based on
Resolutions Nos. 105 and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa, is already authorized under the
existing Constitution.
If the foregoing be correct and the proposed Constitutional amendments under Questions
3 and 4 would just be confirmatory of a legislative power already existing, it stands to
reason that a protracted discussion of the proposed Constitutional amendments under
Questions 3 and 4 is neither necessary nor constitutionally required.
At any rate, I find that there is compliance with Article XVI, Section 2 of the Constitution,
under which a proposed Constitutional amendment shall be submitted to a plebiscite
"which shall be held not later than 3 months after the approval of such amendment." The
proposed amendments under Questions 3 and 4, as embodied in Resolutions 105 and 113
of the Batasang Pambansa, were adopted on November 21 and December 19, 1983,
respectively. From November 21, 1983, when Resolution No. 105 was adopted, up to
January 27, 1984, there would be a spread of 67 days. On the other hand, from December
19, 1983, when Resolution No. 113 was adopted, up to January 27, 1984, there would be
a spread of 39 days.

Finally, apart from legal considerations, I do not see any compelling reason why so much
of the peoples money should be spent for holding a separate plebiscite when the
purpose, by and large, of the second is merely to confirm an existing Constitutional
power.
ADJUDICATION:
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit
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11. Ruby
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
12. Besov
AGLIPAV VS. RUIZ

Gregorio Aglipay vs Juan Ruiz

64 Phil. 201 Political Law Appropriation Religious Sect Religious Freedom
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church
took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan
Ruiz, initiated the production of certain stamps the design of which would have in their
center a chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually, the
stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides
for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church, assailed the
production and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that the funding of said stamps
commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of Sec 13, Article 6 of the
Philippine Constitution which prohibits the appropriation or usage of public money for
the use or benefit of any church or denomination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps violate the Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was
emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila
as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not appropriate any
public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for
the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses
incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated
in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
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Government. The fact that the fund is being used for such is only incidental to the
function of Director of Posts and under his discretion.
On religious freedom
The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is recognized
here as elsewhere. Evidence would be our preamble where we implored the aid of
divine providence to establish an ideal government. If should also be further noted that
religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not an inhibition of profound reverence
to religion.

13. THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS. THE GOV'T. OF TILE REPUBLIC OT THE PHILS. G.R. No.
183591

Province of North Cotaba to v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines October 14, 2008, GR 183591

Facts:
In 1996, peace negotiations between the government of the republic of the Philippines and the MILF started. In
2001, peace talks between the government of the republic of the Philippines and the MILF in Tripoli, Libya (Tripoli
Agreement 2001) resulted on the Tripoli agreement on peace where the agenda and principles are based on the aspects of
rehabilitation aspect, security aspect, and ancestral domain aspect. In 2005, the two parties had many fact-finding talks at
Kuala Lumpur where it led to the creation of the draft of the MOA-AD (Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral
Domain). The final form of the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 but there are several petitions stating
that the Provisions of the MOA-AD would violate the constitution.
The MOA-AD mentions the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) where it grants the authority and jurisdiction on the
ancestral lands of Bangsamoro including the land mass, the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, the
aerial domain, and the atmospheric space above it. Parties to the MOA-AD specify that: The BJE
shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its internal waters, it shall have its own territorial
waters, BJE and the central government shall exercise joint jurisdiction on the territorial waters wanted, it shall be free to
enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with other countries and enter into environmental cooperation
agreements, external defense o f the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government
where it is given the right to attend international meetings in the UN or ASEAN, and BJE is entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for
protection o f the environment where it can provide the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters
between the central government and BJE that would favour it because of production sharing and
economic cooperation.

ISSUE :
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Whether MOA-AD is constitutional.

HELD:
No. The MOA-AD is unconstitutional and is not compatible to laws such as the following:

1. The idea of association is not acknowledged under the current Constitution. No LGU not even the ARMM, is
allowed as having an associative relationship with the national government under our laws. It also
strongly suggest the recognition of the associated entity as a state. Article X, Section 18 of the
Constitution provides that the creation o f the autonomous regions shall be effective when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.

2. The MOA-AD would not comply with Article X Section 20 of the Constitution. Article X Section 20
providesthat the organic acts of the autonomous regions shall provide legislative powers over such other matters
authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people the same must be subject to the provisions
of the Constitution. A constitutional amendment would also be needed if BJE is to be allowed to make treaties with
other countries even though it will be considered as an autonomous region because the president is the only one
allowed to make treaties and negotiations with other countries.

3. Article II Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be
effected. Article II, Section 2 states: The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultu ral
communities within the framework of national unity and devel opment. We can not
uphold national unity and development with an associative arrangement.

4. The MOA-AD is also inconsistent with R.A. No. 9054 (The Organic Act of the ARMM). Article X, Section 3 of the
Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD.
the term Bangsamoro in the MOA-AD sharply contrasts with that found in Article X because it differentiated
Bangsamoro people with the tribal people.

5. The MOA-AD is also inconsistent with IPRA. MOA-ADs manner of portrayal of the ancestral domain of the
Bangsamoro people is not following the procedure given by IPRA on delineation and recognition of ancestral lands.

6. Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part o f the law of the land pursuant to Article II,Section
2 of the Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with
other laws unnecessary. The Philippines is in favour of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UN DRIP) where it recogn ized the right of indigenous peoples to self-
determinat ion, encompass ing the right to a u t o n o m y o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . H o w e v e r ,
it does not allow the indigenous people to have an internal security force of its
own and allow it to have the powers and rights in the MOA-AD.
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14. Jose
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C.
ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS VS. HON. EDUARDO
ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ET AL. G.R. No. 187167

Merlin Magallona vs Secretary

Eduardo Ermita
655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional
In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the
Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was
meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend,
among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the
law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary
treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as archipelagic
waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to
maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight),
undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant
constitutional provisions;
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c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the
loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a
means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do
with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls
when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the international law principle
on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply
with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under
the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines
enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical
miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the inclusion of the exclusive economic
zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below
for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the
maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based
rights.
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Anent their particular contentions:

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a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section
2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as
our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over
these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of
international law, we allow the exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage
that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as
a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the
baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime
zones in short, they are not to be enclosed within the baselines of the main
archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that, then
we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of
UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal
through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where
we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the
right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
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Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by
Article 77 of the UNCLOS.

15. REPUBLIC OP THE PHILS. VS. PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA
THE DECISION OF THE UN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL IN THE HAGUE, THE
NETHERLANDS, JULY 12, 2016

FACTS: On 22 January 2013, the Republic of the Philippines instituted arbitral

proceedings against the Peoples Republic of China under Annex VII to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention). The arbitration concerned the role
of historic rights and the source of maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, the status
of certain maritime features in the South China Sea, and the lawfulness of certain actions
by China in the South China Sea that the Philippines alleged to be in violation of the
Convention. China adopted a position of non-acceptance and non-participation in the
proceedings. The Permanent Court of Arbitration served as Registry in this arbitration.
ISSUE: (a) Whether or not China has historic rights to resources in the South China Sea
beyond the limits of the maritime zones that it is entitled to pursuant to the Convention?
(b) Whether or not China actually had historic rights to resources in the South China Sea
prior to the entry into force of the Convention?
(c) Whether certain coral reefs claimed by China are or are not above water at high tide?
(d) Whether any of the features claimed by China could generate an entitlement to
maritime zones beyond 12 nautical miles?
(e) Whether or not China had violated the Philippines sovereign rights with respect to its
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and the traditional fishing rights of Filipino
fishermen?
(f) Whether or not China had violated its obligation to protect marine environment?
(g) Whether or not Chinas recent large-scale land reclamation and construction of
artificial islands at seven features in the Spratly Islands since the commencement of the
 13. fi3ndorull

arbitration had aggravated the dispute between the Parties?

RULING: The Tribunals Decisions on the Merits of the Philippines Claim (12 July
2016)
1. The nine-dash line and Chinas claim to historic rights in the maritime areas of the
South China Sea.
- Chinas claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible with the detailed
allocation of rights and maritime zones in the Convention: that China had historic
rights to resources in South China Sea waters, such rights were extinguished when
the Convention entered into force to the extent that they were incompatible with the
Conventions system of maritime zones.
- Historical navigation and fishing by China in the waters of the South China Sea
were an exercise of high sea freedoms rather than a historic right; there is no
evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of
the South China Sea or prevented other States from exploiting their resources.
2. The status of features in the South China Sea
- Articles 13 and 121: features that are above water at high tide generate an
entitlement to at least a 12-nautical mile territorial sea; features that are submerged
at high tide generate no entitlement to maritime zones
- Many of the reefs in the South China Sea have been heavily modified by recent
land reclamation and construction; the Convention classifies features on the basis of
their natural condition
- Evaluation of features based on the assistance of an expert hydrographer and
archival materials and historical hydrographic surveys:
Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross
Reef are high-tide features, and
Subi Reef, Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal
were submerged at high tide in their natural condition
But Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef are high-tide features
- Article 121 of the Convention: islands generate an entitlement to an exclusive
economic zone of 200 nautical miles and to a continental shelf, but rocks which
cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf closely linked to the expansion of
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coastal State jurisdiction and intended to prevent insignificant features from

generating large entitlements to maritime zones that would infringe on entitlements
of inhabited territory or on high seas and the area of the seabed reserved for the
common heritage of mankind.
- Entitlements of a feature depend on the a) objective capacity of a feature, b) its
natural conditions to sustain either c) a stable community of people or d) economic
activity that is neither dependent on outside resources nor purely extractive in
nature.
- All high-tide features in the Spratly Islands are legally rocks that do not generate
an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.
- The Convention does not provide for a group of islands (such as the Spratly
Islands) to generate maritime zones collectively as a unit.
3. Chinese activities in the South China Sea
- Because Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged at
high tide and are not overlapped by any possible entitlement of China, they from
part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines; the
Convention is clear in allocating sovereign rights to the Philippines with respect to
sea areas in its exclusive economic zone.
- China had violated the Philippines sovereign rights with respect to its exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf: China had a) interfered with Philippine
petroleum exploration at Reed Bank, b) purported to prohibit fishing by Philippine
vessels within the Philippines exclusive economic zone, c) protected and failed to
prevent Chinese fishermen from fishing within the Philippines exclusive economic
zone at Mischief Reef and Second Thomas Shoal, and d) constructed installations
and artificial islands as Mischief Reef without the authorization of the Philippines.
- China had violated its duty to respect the traditional fishing rights of Philippine
fishermen by halting access to the Shoal after May 2012.
- Chinas large scale land reclamation and construction of artificial islands at seven
features in the Spratly Islands has caused severe harm to the coral reef
environment.
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-
China violated its obligations under Articles 192 and 194 of the Convention to
preserve and protect the marine environment with respect to fragile ecosystems and
the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species.
- China breached its obligations under the Convention on the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972), and Article 94 of the
Convention concerning maritime safety.
4. Aggravation of the dispute between the parties
- China has a) build a large artificial island on Mischief Reef which is within the
exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, b) caused permanent harm to the coral
reef ecosystem, and c) permanently destroyed evidence of the natural condition of
the features in question.
- China violated its obligations to refrain from aggravating or extending the Parties
disputes during the pendency of the settlement process.
5. Future conduct of the parties
- Both the Philippines and China have accepted the Convention and general
obligations of good faith define and regulate their conduct.
- The root of the disputes at issue in this arbitration lies not in any intention of any
Party to infringe on the legal rights of the other but in the fundamentally different
understandings of their respective rights under the Convention in the waters of the
South China Sea.

16. COLLECTOR VS. CAMPOS RUED A, 42 SCRA 23

Collector of Internal Revenue, petitioner

vs.

Antonio Campos Rueda, respondent

42 SCRA 23 October 29, 1971

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This is an appeal by CIR (Collector of Internal Revenue) from the decision of

the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least

so much thereof as maybe necessary for the acquisition of an international

personality, must be satisfied for a foreign country to fall within the exemption of

Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

Facts:

In January 1955, Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, Morocco, an international principality

in North Africa. At the time of her death, she was a Spanish citizen ad was a resident

of tangier. She however left some personal properties (intangible properties) to the

Philippines. The designated heirs or administrator of her estate here is Antonio

Campos Rueda.

On September 29, 1955, Collector of Internal Revenue filed a provisional estate and

inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira amounting to
 13. fi3ndorull

P161,874.95. Campos Rueda refused to pay the assessed tax as he claimed that the

estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the

Phillipine Tax Code which provides:

"That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal

property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign

country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death

tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines

not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of

which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar

exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of

intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing

in that foreign country."

Campos Rueda was able to prove that there is reciprocity between Tangier and the

Philippines with the evidence submitted to the Court of Tax Appeals consisting

exhibits of laws of Tangier, thus: The transfer by reason of death of movable

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properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including furniture and personal effects as well

as of securities, bonds, share,, were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to

the payment of any death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the

deceased or his heir and legatees.

However, the CIR still denied any tax exemption in favor of the estate as it averred

that Tangier is not a state as contemplated by Section 122 of the tax code and that

the Philippines does not recognize tangier as a foreign country.

Issue: Whether or not Tangier is a state.

Held: Yes. For purposes of the Tax Code, Tangier is a state (foreign country).

In line with Pounds formulation, a foreign country is a politically organized sovereign

community independent f outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally

supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
 13. fi3ndorull

of law. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory,

politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over

the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality.

Further, the Supreme Court noted the existing jurisprudence, De Lara ruling, which

state that even a tiny principality that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international

personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in section

122 of Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Therefore, since it was proven

that Tangier provides such exemption to personal properties found therein so must

the Philippines honor the exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to

the doctrine of reciprocity.

17. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE. ICS SCRA 757
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION VS. OPLE
G.R. No. L-58184, October 30, 1981
FERNANDO, C.J.

Facts:
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On September 14, 1981, there was a notice of strike with the Ministry of Labor
for unfair labor practices stating the following grounds " 1) Unilateral and arbitrary
implementation of a Code of Conduct, a copy of which is attached, to the detriment
of the interest of members; 2) Illegal terminations and suspensions of officers and
members as a result of the implementation of said Code of Conduct; and 3)
Unconfirmation (sic) of call sick leaves and its automatic treatment as Absence
Without Official Leave (AWOL) with corresponding suspensions, in violation of
Collective Bargaining Agreement." Several meetings called by the ministry followed,
with petitioner manifesting its willingness to have a revised Code of Conduct that
would be fair to all concerned but with a plea that in the meanwhile the Code of
Conduct being imposed be suspended a position that failed to meet the approval of
private respondent. Later, the respondent, certified the labor dispute to the National
Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any strike at
the private respondent's establishment.
The labor dispute was set for hearing by respondent National Labor Relations
Commission on September 28, 1981. However, the private respondent, explained its
side on the controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as
alleged in the petition were quite harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite
preventive suspension apparently the principal cause of the labor dispute.
The minister of labor, assumed jurisdiction over the pursuant of Batas
Pambansa Sec. 11 amending Art. 264 of the Labor Code delegating to the Honorable
Minister of Labor and Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction
and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National Labor Relations
 13. fi3ndorull

Commission, and in effect make or unmake the law on free collective bargaining, is
an undue delegation of legislative powers. There is likewise the assertion that such
conferment of authority "may also ran (sic) contrary to the assurance of the State to
the workers' right to self-organization and collective bargaining.

Issue:
Whether BP 130 sec. 11 amending Art. 264 of the Labor Code is an undue delegation
of legislative powers?

Ruling:
No. Primarily the matter is not ripe for judgement. It must be exercised in accordance
with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor. The court holds that Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor
disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest
and thereafter decide it or certify the same the National Labor Relations Commission is not
on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative
power. there is no violation of "the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work

18. LEGASPI VS. SEC. OF FINANCE, 115 SCRA 418

LEGASPI VS SEC. OF FINANCE
G.R. No. L-58289 July 24, 1982
BARREDO, J:.
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Facts:
Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to
declare Presidential Decree 1840 granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets
and liabilities and some other purposes unconstitutional. He argued that the decree was
promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution "The legislative power shall be
vested in a Batasang Pambansa" (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty
only with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art. VII). Since Martial law was
lifted, Legaspi states that Marcos can no longer have the legislative power because of
Amendment no. 6.

Issue:
Whether or not the President (prime minister) can validly grant tax amnesties
without the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.

Ruling:
Yes. The SC ruled PD 1840 to be constitutional. It is made clear in the Amendment
no. 6 of the constitution that the President (prime minister) can exercise such power in two
ways: (1)Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or (2) whenever the Interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any
matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which shall
form part of the law of the land. The constitution therefore, grants power to the president
and it allows him to be delegated by the Batasang Pambansa in times of crisis and
emergencies.
The amendment No. 6 is not only limited to the present situation but also to the
seen future situation to avoid the four built-in measures to cope with crises and
emergencies: (a) emergency powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of the
armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks; (c) suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law [being the last]
Thus, the Presidential Decree 1840 was issued through his power to legislate under
Amendment no. 6 and does not need the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa but by
the power vested by the constitution to make such necessary actions.
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19. BACANI VS. NACOCO, 1M PLfl. 468

BACANI V NACOCO (NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION)
GR. NO. L-9657
November, 29, 1956
FACTS:
During the pendency of civil case no. 2293 of respondent, the counsel of
the respondent requested for a copy of the stenographic notes taken by them
during the hearing. The plaintiff complied and delivered the same. The NACOCO
paid the stenographers (plaintiff) the total amount of P714. Upon inspecting the
books of the corporation, the Auditor General of the said corporation disallowed
the payment of these fees and sought for recovery of the amount paid, invoking
that the corporation is a government entity which are exempt from payment of
legal fees. The auditor general directed the cashier of DOJ to deduct some of the
salary of the said plaintiff. To avoid deduction, the plaintiff sought for judicial ruling
alleging that NACOCO is not a government entity. After trial, the lower court found
defendant (nacoco) is not a govt enitity. Hence, the appeal of this decision.
ISSUE:
whether or not the NACOCO is a government entity
RULING:
NO, under section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the scope of
the term government of the republic of the phil.
To begin with, we state that the term Government may be defined as that institution
13. fi3ndorull

or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society makes and carries out those
rules of action which are necessary to enable men to live in a social state, or which are
imposed upon the people forming that society by those who possess the power or
authority of prescribing them This institution, when referring to the national
government, has reference to what our Constitution has established composed of three
great departments, the legislative, executive, and the judicial, through which the powers
and functions of government are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and
ministrant. The former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythe latter are those that are undertaken
only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows:
(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from
violence and robbery.
(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and
children.
(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the
determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime.
(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals.
(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens.
(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external
danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public education, public
charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry. The
principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these
optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those
things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government
should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the
public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
ADJUDICATION:
The decision being appealed from is affirmed
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20. ACCFA VS. CUGCO. 30 SCRA 649

ACCFA v CUGCO

FACTS:
On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement was entered by and between
the Unions and the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
(ACCFA). The Unions started to protest because of such alleged violations and non-
implementation of said agreement. On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother
union the Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO) filed
a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) against the ACCFA for the alleged
committed acts of unfair labour practice, namely: violation of the collective bargaining
agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions to exercise their right to self-
organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions and refusal
to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges and interposed as affirmative and special
defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract,
expiration of said Contract and lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe
benefits provided for therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision
dated March 25,1963 ordered the ACCFA to cease and desist from committing further acts
tending to discourage the members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to
self-organization; to comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining
contract executed on 4 September 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month living
allowance; and to bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants.
ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated 25 April 1963 of
the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought the appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court (GR L-
21484).
During the pendency of the ACCFA's case, specifically on 8 August 1963, the
President of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic
Act 3844),which among other things required the reorganization of the administrative
machinery of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)
13. fi3ndorull

and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA).

ISSUE: Whether the ACA is engaged in governmental or proprietary functions.

HELD:
The Court held that ACA is a governmental office or agency engaged in governmental and
not proprietary function. These functions may not be strictly what they described as
constituent. Such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and prevention of crime,
those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice
and the determination of political duties of citizens and those relating to national defense and
foreign relations. Under this traditional classification, such constituent functions are
exercised by the State as attributes to sovereignity, and not merely to promote welfare,
progress and prosperity of the people. Latter functions being ministrant, the exercise which
is optional on the part of the government. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise
and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only
"because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals" continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be
absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it
is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the
tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces.