Paula de la Cerna, et al., vs. Manuela Rebaca-Potot, et al.

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12 SCRA 576 G.R. No. L-20234 December 23, 1964

Facts:
On May 9, 1939, spouses Bernabe de la Cerna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and
testament. They willed that their two parcels of land acquired during their marriage together with all
the improvements thereon shall be given to their niece Manuela Rebaca because they were childless.
And that while each of the testator is living, he or she will continue to enjoy the fruits of the two lands.
Bernabe died on August 30, 1939. The will was submitted to probate by Gervasia and Manuela before
the CFI of Cebu. The court issued a probate decree on October 31, 1939. Thirteen years later, Gervasia
died. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed on
November 6, 1952. The CFI heard and declared the testament null and void for being executed
contrary to the prohibition of joint wills under the Civil Code. Manuela appealed to the CA, and the
decision was reversed on the ground that the decree of probate on 1939 was issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction and conclusive on the due execution of the instrument. The petitioners,
intestate heirs of Bernabe de la Cerna elevated the case to the SC.
Issue:
Whether Manuela can initiate another petition for probate of the same will concerning the estate of
Gervasia Rebaca.
Ruling:
The SC affirmed the decision but with modification. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the
probate of a will is binding upon the whole world and public policy and sound practice demand that
at the risk of occasional errors judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by
law. The petitioners re concluded by the 1939 decree admitting Bernabes will to probate. Although a
joint will is void and can never be validated, the ultimate decision rests on the probate court, and in
the case the court have spoken with finality when the will was probated in 1939. BUT, the probate
decree in 1939 could only affect the share of the deceased husband. It could not have included the
disposition of the share of the wife Gervasia because she was still alive, the probate court could not
have acquired jurisdiction over her interest. Her estate could not then be in issue. A will could not be
probated during the testators lifetime. The validity of the joint will, insofar as the estate of the wife is
concerned, must be on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered
a separate will of each testator. The CFIs ruling that a joint will is prohibited by law is correct as to
the participation of the deceased Gervasia in the properties in question.
The undivided interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate and not
exclusively to her testamentary heir, unless some other valid will in Manuelas favor is shown to exist,
or unless she be the only heir intestate of Gervasia.