Foreign Affairs This Week 10th November 2017 PDF

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10th November 2017
Table of Contents
Kurd Your Enthusiasm By By Behnam Ben Taleblu and Merve Tahiroglu .................................................... 5
What Hariri's Resignation Means for Lebanon By Bilal Y. Saab .................................................................. 16
A Purge in Riyadh By Toby Matthiesen ....................................................................................................... 19
Religion and Violence in Myanmar By Matthew J. Walton ........................................................................ 24
What Would a U.S. Intervention in Venezuela Look Like? By Frank O. Mora ........................................... 30
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10th November 2017
Kurd Your Enthusiasm By By Behnam Ben

Taleblu and Merve Tahiroglu
The U.S. Needs to Talk About Its Favorite Allies
On October 16, the world woke to footage of the Iraqi army barreling toward Kirkuk,
several hundred miles north of Baghdad. Their mission was to reclaim the city, but
not from jihadists; rather, they planned to win it back from the Kurds. Three years
ago, as the Islamic State (ISIS) tore into Iraq, the countrys Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) fought back against the fundamentalists and captured Kirkuk
for itself. At the time, Baghdad reluctantly acquiesced. But by October 2017, Iraqs
central government was becoming anxious. Buoyed by Kirkuks oil revenues, the
KRG had held a historic independence referendum in September. Washington
quickly urged Baghdad not to move forward with any offensive against the Kurds.
But the Iraqi army pressed toward Kirkuk anyway, relying on Iran-backed Shiite
militias while also courting Turkish support.
In this saga of power dynamics and kaleidoscopically shifting rivalries, the United
States is a key player. But its incomplete understanding of the regional dynamics

10th November 2017
harms both its own and its allies interests. Indeed, Washingtons understanding of
the Kurds, in particular, is limited in that it is defined by a focus on the war against
ISIS, as well as a reluctance to give up on Arab Iraq and its massive oil reserves.
The United States has consistently failed to comprehend the fact that Kurdish
independence is a direct threat to the territorial and political integrity of all the
KRGs neighbors, be they friend or foe of America, and that any U.S. policy toward
the Kurds must therefore contemplate the wide-ranging implications of Kurdish
autonomy rather than simply viewing the group as an instrument in the fight against
ISIS.
BEST FRIENDS, NOT FOREVER
Since the rise of ISIS, the Kurds who have helped to repel the jihadist scourge
have become an American darling of sorts. Periodicals esteem Kurdish
sovereignty, running articles such as A Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS
Backyard. Magazines fetishize Kurdish womeneven childrenfor taking up
arms against Islamic fundamentalism. Even ordinary Americans are willing to fight
and die alongside Kurdish militias. Kurdish zeal and efficacy in the fight against
ISIS, coupled with their underdog status as a stateless ethnicity, has led to
Western perceptions that they deserve support.
The tipping point may be many Kurds wish for an independent state. Although the
KRG emerged from its plebiscite with a clear mandate, the Western narrative
masks deep rifts that still plague intra-Kurdish politics. Even as Iraqi forces
prepared to pour into Kirkuk, northern Iraqs premier Kurdish political parties
remained divided, with one faction even opting to coordinate with the Iraqi central
government. For decades, regional players with Kurdish populationssuch as
Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syriahave exploited these divisions to pit Kurdish groups
against each other, using them as proxies in their interstate conflicts. American
policymakers and media elites, meanwhile, have downplayed or ignored these
complex dynamics, preferring to highlight the Kurds as indispensable allies against
ISIS, a simplification from which no effective diplomatic policy can be formed.
Indeed, it has created a central and confusing ambivalence: while Washington

showers the Kurds with praise for fighting common enemies, it strongly opposes
Kurdish independence. The KRG, emboldened by the recent referendum, will no
doubt seek to hold Washington to its own talking points. Already, Western pundits

10th November 2017
are doing that for them, chastising the United States for shirking its debt to its
bold Kurdish allies.
Washington must therefore shed the simplistic Kurds vs. ISIS paradigm and begin
an honest conversation about the complex promises and pitfalls of Kurdish
independence and the U.S. relationship with the Kurds.
Americas reimagining of the Kurds must begin with the term Kurdistan. Most
well-read Americans take this to mean Iraqs Kurdish-dominated north,
administrated by the KRG. But to many Kurds, it refers to a much greater concept
that includes predominantly Kurdish regions of Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Furthermore, it behooves any reader to remember that the Kurdish people have
largely governed themselves in those lands for hundreds of years, until their
comparatively recent subjugation by newly formed nation states in the twentieth
century. Kurdish history therefore views these borders as modern, unnatural,
andhopefullytemporary. To the Kurds, northern Syria is in fact Rojava, that is,
the West; northern Iraq is Basur, the South; southern Turkey is Bakur, the North;
and western Iran is Rojhelat, the East.
However, even as the Kurds bridle at imposed modern borders, these same
borders have divided them in important ways. Separate Kurdish national
experiences and political leaderships have emerged across each border. Although

10th November 2017
each of these leaders has challenged the states encompassing their homeland,
they have consistently done so in isolation or competitionand only rarely through
collaborationwith one another. This rivalry continues, conspicuously, today.
A TALE OF THREE MEN
Mullah Mustafa Barzani was the first and most prominent Kurdish leader of the
post-WWII era. A series of revolts earned him exile from Iraq until the 1958 coup
dtat in Baghdad. He then returned to continue his quest for Kurdish secession
under the auspices of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), founded in Iran in
1946. When the Iraqi army overwhelmed Barzani and forced him to admit defeat
in 1975, many feared that the Kurdish national movement was dead.
But Barzanis setback only birthed a schismatic new cadre of Kurdish leaders. Jalal
Talabaniwho became Iraqs first post-war president and died in late 2017split
from the KDP and formed his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975. In Turkey,
meanwhile, the young revolutionary Abdullah Ocalan established the far-left,
Kurdish-nationalist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in 1976. Three years later,
Barzani passed away, and his son, Massoud Barzani, succeeded him as leader of
the KDP.
The United States has consistently failed to comprehend the fact that Kurdish
independence is a direct threat to the territorial and political integrity of all the
KRGs neighbors.
By 1980, these three men and their organizationsBarzani and the KDP, Talabani
and the PUK, and Ocalan and the PKKwere vying for leadership of the Kurdish
people. As the newcomer, Ocalan sought good relations with the other two,
soliciting cooperation to set up bases in Syria through Talabani and, later, in Iraq
through Barzani. A Kurdish entente proved impossible, however. To gain Barzanis
favor, Ocalan terminated his alliance with Talabani in 1982. When the pact
between the PKK and the KDP also collapsed in 1986in part because of the
PKKs attacks on the KDPs allies in IraqBarzani changed tacks, merging forces
with Talabani (his erstwhile antagonist) against Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein.
Ocalan, at this point, reverted back to the PUK; this produced a PKK-PUK accord
in 1988, which lasted only a year.

10th November 2017
The 1990s brought Iraqi Kurdistan autonomy but no unity or settling of baroque
internecine conflict. Parliamentary elections in 1992 paralyzed Kurdish politics,
provoking a civil war in May 1994. As the fighting intensified in the fall of 1996,
Iraqi Kurdistan further fractured: Barzanis KDP governed from Erbil, a city near
the Turkish border, and Talibanis PUK from Sulaymaniyah, near Iran. Conflict
continued for another two years, as the parties agreed on littlebesides the need
to continue to sideline the PKK.
In the early 2000s, the U.S. invasion of Iraq united Iraqi Kurds in a quest to
preserve their autonomy, and the rivalry in greater Kurdistan eclipsed the
quiescent Kurdish rivalry within Iraq. The PKK begot the Democratic Union Party
(PYD) in Syria and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran, the latter to fight
the clerical regime there. With the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2012, the PYD
attained its own autonomous zone in northern Syria, making the PKK/PYD axis
critical to Iraqs Kurdish leadership. Then, in 2013, the PUK reportedly solicited
PKK support to offset the growing influence of Barzanis KDP in Syria. Meanwhile,
the PYD, in expelling ISIS from northern Syria, earned Western support and
expanded the territory under its control. And in Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK liberated
the town of Sinjar and declared its own autonomy there.
This quick and dense timeline makes one thing clear: Kurdistan cannot be treated
as a simple and localized geographic designation.

10th November 2017
ENEMIES AND PATRONS
In this quagmire of alliances, meanwhile, the Kurds have repeatedly relied on

foreign patrons to make incremental gains in their quest for statehood and, in some
cases, against other Kurdish intra-national groups. Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey
have had no qualms repressing their own Kurdish populations while
simultaneously exploiting the grievances of Kurds beyond their borders. Nor have
Kurdish leaders been unified enough to resist such patronage-cum-meddling.
The only independent Kurdish modern state, the short-lived Kurdish Republic of
Mahabad in Iran in 1941, was made possiblefor exampleby Soviet support.
Then, as the epicenter of Kurdish nationalism moved to Iraq with Barzani, the
Kurds there became targets of inter-state proxyism. In 1961, both Iran and Israel
began to aid Barzani against their shared Baathist enemy in Baghdad, even
managing to enlist Washingtons support in the early 1970s. The strategy worked:
in the 1975 Algiers Accord, Tehran obtained territorial concessions from Baghdad
in return for agreeing not to further meddle with Iraqs other ethnic minorities.
Baghdad promised the same. The shah subsequently terminated Iranian support
for the Kurdish insurgency, forcing America to do the same. A KDP official later
dubbed this the most cruel betrayal in Kurdish history.
Weaponization of the Kurdish people, however, was just picking up steam. With
Barzani humbled, Ocalan and Talabani in 1979 moved to Damascus, where Syrian
dictator Hafez al-Assad granted them certain freedoms. Assad cautiously
supported the PKK, which trained in Syrian-occupied Lebanon, because he saw it
as a bargaining chip against Turkey. That support, too, paid off: in 1987, Turkeys
government in Ankara agreed to a quid pro quo that limited its disputed dam
projects on the Euphrates River (shared with Syria).
Still, Iran was by far the Kurds most active regional patron. Following the Islamic
Revolution of 1979, Irans Kurds revolted. Tehran took advantage of its regime
change, however, to re-establish ties with Barzani in Iraq. This new partnership
required Barzani to fight his own party affiliates in Iran, which he did, prompting the
PUK to counter by coming to the aid of the suddenly beset (and, some might say,
double-crossed) Iranian Kurds. Thus was the stage set for a total collision of
Kurdish military-political entities: three years into the Iran-Iraq war, in 1983, the
KDP aided Tehrans fight against Baghdad while the PUK aligned with Saddam.

10th November 2017
The deck was again reshuffled, however, in 1985; this time, the PUK allied with
Tehran, and by 1987, both Kurdish groups were fighting Irans war against Iraq.
Washington has been all too willing to act unaware of the Kurds tormented history.
Things didnt get any less complicated from there. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war,
Tehran was cautious not to provoke Ankara, but it was nonetheless eager to
squeeze intelligence out of the PKK, especially on U.S. military installations in
NATO-allied Turkey. In exchange, Iran reportedly furnished the PKK with medical
and military supplies. Ocalan and the PKK forged similar ties with Iraq after 1988
following, of all things, Saddams genocidal campaign against Iraqi Kurds.
Apparently willing to sleep with the enemy, the PKK agreed to provide Saddam
with information on Turkish and KDP movements in northern Iraq in return for
Baghdads turning a blind eye to its own bases.
Outsiders meddled even when Kurds physically clashed with each other. In the
Iraqi Kurdish civil war of the 1990s, as the KDP and PUK battled one another, Iran
first backed the former but then defaulted to the latter. Talabani and the PUK took
refuge in Iran as Tehran dispatched Shiite militiamen from the Badr Corps to
bolster PUK strongholds in Iraq. In 1996, Iran escalated, deploying troops in PUK
territory, to Barzanis alarm. To offset this Iranian support for the PUK, Barzani
solicited aid for himself and the KDP from Baghdad.
Iran, meanwhile, also deepened its ties with the PKK, to which Turkey responded
by throwing its weight behind Barzani. Ankaras plan was to co-opt the KDP into
crushing the PKK in Iraq, thus balancing out Irans influence. Barzani indeed
allowed Turkish interventions against the PKK in his territory, with significant
collateral losses and complications. In at least one of its 1997 campaigns, Turkey
bombed PUK positions alongside PKK ones. And in 1999, Turkish raids
accidentally killed Iranians in what Ankara argued was Iraq but Tehran insisted
was Iran, causing a diplomatic spat.
Ocalan was jailed, with American assistance, in 1999an attempt to stifle the
PKK. Syria then signed a deal with Turkey, agreeing to stop supporting the PKK.
Over the next decade, Ankara boosted economic ties with the KRG, becoming its
top trading partner. In 2011, the situation seemed finally to be settling down, with
Tehran agreeing to a tenuous ceasefire with its own Kurds and Turkey launching
peace talks with the PKK in 2012.

10th November 2017
But the Syrian civil war and rise of ISIS again shook up the regions power politics,
transforming the Kurds into proxies once more. In September 2012, Turkish
authorities aired footage of alleged Iranian spies interviewing PKK fighters about
Turkish military positions near the Iranian border. That December, Turkeys interior
minister accused Iran of affording the PKK logistical support. Around the same
time, rumors surfaced that Iraqs then pro-Iranian prime minister was hosting the
PKK and its Syrian branch in Baghdad for talks. In April 2013, Irans notorious
Quds-Force Chief Qasem Soleimani reportedly met with a top PKK commander in
Iraq, allegedly offering the group heavy weapons if they agreed to maintain an
active presence in Turkey. Late last year, Soleimani reportedly urged the group to
fight in Mosul. And in December, Iran-backed Shiite militias sent reinforcements to
PYD-controlled Syria, much to Turkeys fury. To check these advances, Turkey
threw in its lot with Barzanis Syrian branch, and in 2014, when ISIS besieged the
PYD-controlled Syrian town of Kobani, Ankara blocked access to the landlocked
town and, instead of helping Syrian Kurds defend themselves, allowed only Iraqi
Kurds to come to their rescue.
FRAGILE BALANCE
And so we finally arrive at the present day. Iraqi and Syrian Kurds have been
fighting ISIS, while the PKK remains at war with Turkey. As long as these theaters

10th November 2017
are aflame, Kurdish firepower will be directed away from Syria and its patron, Iran
(whose own Kurdish minority nevertheless remains restive). Tehran and Ankara
are both aware of this, knowing that any Turkish peace with the PKK could prompt
the groups affiliates to rekindle their insurgency against Iran.
Since January, the Kurdish Game of Thrones has picked up speed in a

sometimes blinding back and forth of alliances dissolving, reforming, and
dissolving again. In March, a KDP official complained to Turkish media that
elements in Iranian-backed Shiite militias were openly supporting the PKK. That
same month, PJAK clashed with Iranian border guards by the Turkish border,
violating its 2011 ceasefire with Tehran. Iran quickly blamed Turkey for this
infraction. Soon thereafter, Turkish media reported a secret meeting in Syria,
where Soleimanichief of Irans Quds Forceallegedly offered full support for the
PYDs moves along the Turkish border. On August 7, an Iranian headline shot
back: Turkey, after killing Kurds, grabbing land in Syria. The next week, Iran
reportedly shelled militants inside the KRG, only to signtrade deals with the KRG
several days later. On August 16, a top Iranian general made an unprecedented
visit to Turkey, pledging to deepen military ties. Iranian Kurds soon steppedup
attacks against Tehran. The next week, reports touted Turkish-Iranian coordination
in Syria. On August 21, Ankara suggested a possible joint operation with Iran
against the PKK.
A month later, Ankara, Baghdad, and Tehran held a trilateral meeting to discuss
and condemn Barzanis historic referendum, perhaps finding the rare impetus for
true collaboration amidst strengthening calls for true Kurdish autonomy. Within
weeks, Iran mobilized Shiite militias to support Baghdads punitive offensive
against Kirkuk and even managed to enlist the PUKs coordination for ita move
KDP officials described as a historic betrayal. Baghdad also awkwardly cited the
PKKs presence in Kirkuk as casus belli for conflict, securing Ankaras support for
the operation.
A ROLE FOR AMERICA?
Readers could be forgiven for losing their way in this thicket of personalities,
entities, and shifting alliances. It is this very complexity that makes the situation so
fraught for the United States. Not helping matters is the fact that, for all the regimes
ruling parts of greater Kurdistan, the Iraqi Kurds independence referendum is a

10th November 2017
menace to their territorial integrity and national identity. Their fear will drive regional
policy for years. Iran, Iraq, and Turkey are already acting to offset the fallout: they
have each threatened to economically stymie the landlocked KRG and conducted
military drills on the KRGs borders.
Washington, in contrast, has been all too willing to act unaware of the Kurds
tormented history. The U.S. government may claim that it is solely focused on
combating ISIS, not other regional issues, but regional powers see no firewall
between Washingtons tactical relationship with Kurdish groups and these groups
strategic designs for a greater Kurdistan. Iran has already framed the KRGs quest
for independence as a Western imperial project, likening a potential Kurdish state
to a colonial outposta new Israel. Meanwhile, Turkeys anxieties are
inseparable from ongoing U.S. military aid to Syrian Kurds.
By claiming a limited focus on ISIS, Washington does itself no favors. It takes

blame with no gain: simultaneously undermining its ties with both regional states
and Kurdish actors. It is seeking to bypass Iraq to directly arm the KRG but telling
the KRG to remain subordinate to Baghdad. It is arming the PYD in Syria while
supporting Turkeys war against the PKK in Iraq. These contradictions might
appear to give the United States flexibility, but the policy mix is ultimately self-
defeating. U.S. support has emboldened Kurdish actors just enough to sharpen
the already acute fears of Ankara, Baghdad, and Tehran but not enough to check
these states destabilizingand perhaps catastrophicreactions. Americas
narrow lens, in other words, offers no roadmap to either the Kurds or their
adversaries. It only strengthens the chances of future conflict. The strategy is not
even effective on its own terms: regional actors will continue to pit one Kurdish
group against another, taking aim at those they consider most beholden to the
United States, thus limiting the efficacy of any transactional U.S. relationship with
Kurds.
What the U.S. needs is a strategic, long-term relationship with the Kurds that
contemplates the vast complexity of their place in the region. This is not to say that
formulating such a strategy is simple. It will require a larger American political,
economic, and military commitment to the Middle East, for one thing. Such support
may not sit well with most Americans, who are tired of nation-building and costly
foreign adventures.

10th November 2017
Should the United States decide to back an independent KRG, for example, that
would mean ensuring that Kurdistan does not become a failed state. For a fighting
chance as a republic, the Kurds themselves need to take democracy and
institution-building seriously; this is where America can help. Disabusing the KRG
of dynastic politics, however, will be an uphill battle.
More challenging still will be the constellation of regional issues that American aid
will continue to enflame, no matter what policy the United States chooses.
Assuaging the fears of a post-ISIS Iraq and finding ways to prevent it from further
drifting into the Iranian orbit, will be the first and most obvious challenge. Another
will be reassuring Turkey, a flailing NATO ally, that Kurdish independence could
be confined to Iraq. And for many ordinary Iranians, whom the United States
proclaims to stand alongside in the face of their despotic regime, overt U.S. support
for the KRG will be seen as a precursor to an American embrace of Iranian Kurds
secessionist aspirations and thus a vindication of many of the Iranian governments
anti-American talking points.
Ultimately, a redefined American relationship with any Kurdish polity will mean a
redefined U.S. relationship with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey: in other words, with
the entire region. In each theater, policymakers will have to assess the costs and
risks they are willing to bear and determine what, if any, U.S. interests are at stake.
But before these challenges can even be framed in the public discourse,
policymakers and pundits must start an honest conversation about the Kurds that
transcends the ISIS vs. Kurds narrative. They must acknowledge the complex
history of the Kurdish movement and consider both the plight of the Kurdish people
and the level of U.S. commitment to the Middle Easts existing state system. Thats
a tall order but the only one befitting the worlds sole superpower.

10th November 2017
What Hariri's Resignation Means for Lebanon

By Bilal Y. Saab
An Escalation From Riyadh
On November 4, 2017, Saad Hariri announced live on Al Arabiya satellite television

that he had resigned as Lebanese prime minister.
Very few saw it coming, although it wasnt entirely unexpected. After all, its not as
if Hariri was overjoyed presiding over a government under the control of his
archrival, Hezbollah, the Lebanese political-military party accused of killing his
father, Rafik, in 2005. He wasnt. But for him to quit now, in the absence of obvious
triggers and in such a mysterious fashion, has left Lebanons political classeven
his own entourage and popular basescratching their heads.
That Saad told the world about his decision from Riyadh, not Beirut, was
particularly revealing. It means that Saudi Arabia, which politically supported and
bankrolled the Hariris throughout most of Lebanons post-civil war history, is
readjusting its policy in Lebanon to more effectively weaken Hezbollah. Saudi
Arabias standing in Beirut had been taking hit after hit since Rafiks killing due to
the dominance of Hezbollah and its foreign patrons, Iran and the Assad regime.
What this readjustment might practically accomplish, however, is quite uncertain.

10th November 2017
The timing of this potential reformulation of Saudi policy in Lebanon is curious. The
administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has just rolled out an Iran strategy
thats expected to be more aggressive toward Tehran and its activities across the
region. Theres also increasing tension between Israel and Hezbollah, which might
lead these old antagonists to return to arms, a scenario the Saudis would cheer.
Hariris departure does not necessarily make another Israel-Hezbollah conflict
more likely, but it does make Lebanon as a whole more vulnerable. With Hariri out,
the Lebanese governments legitimacy is immediately in question, making it a
theoretically easier target for Hezbollahs foes, including Washington and Tel Aviv,
who consider the Shia group a terrorist organization.
But none of this changes the following realities: having just won in Syria, and in
Iraq for that matter (now that ISIS is on the run), Irans hand in Lebanon and the
region has never been stronger. Of course, there are still serious limitations to
Irans regional influence and Tehran remains vulnerable in multiple areas, but lets
be honest: its regional stock is on the rise.
Moreover, its desire to counter Tehran in the region notwithstanding, Washingtons

new Iran policy remains an aspiration. The Trump administration has terminated
U.S. support to Syrias moderate rebels. Washingtons already limited attention on
Syria, after whatever is left of ISIS is gone, is likely to disappear altogether. In Iraq,
Trump has expressed no desire to keep a large U.S. military footprint in the
country, and he doesnt seem to have a political-economic strategy either, which
effectively cedes the terrain to Iran. So for all its bark, Trumps Iran strategy, for
now, has no bite. There is a new, young, and hawkish leadership in Riyadh, but it
is neither stupid nor suicidal.
So where does that leave Saudi Arabia and its newfound assertiveness in
Lebanon? Given the absolute military superiority of Hezbollah over any of its
domestic rivalseven the countrys armya physical confrontation with the group
is out of the question. There is a new, young, and hawkish leadership in Riyadh
under the strict control of Crown Prince and soon-to-be-King Mohamed Bin
Salman, but it is not suicidal. Moreover, Lebanons Sunnis have no interest in
getting into a war with Hezbollah, which they know they will lose.
The fight, therefore, will be primarily political, both at home and in international
diplomatic corridors. Lebanons parliamentary elections are around the corner
(assuming they are not postponed). Hariris resignation might mean that he will run

10th November 2017
as leader of the opposition, an opposition that seems to be growing and could grow
even more with financial assistance from the Saudis. Should he win the majority
of seats in the next parliament, he might turn the tables on Hezbollah.
But if thats his calculation, why did he choose to resign from Riyadh? He could
have easily declared his entry into opposition politics in Beirut. Its possible that
Hariri was forced to resign by the Saudis, as part of Riyadhs new anti-Iran
approach. After all, Hariri did look particularly nervous while delivering his speech
and almost puzzled by what he was readinga document that contained a heavy
dose of vitriol against Iran which only the Saudis are accustomed to using. Despite
his old feud with Hezbollah, history has shown that Hariri is a political pragmatist.
What he displayed on Saudi television was out of character.
Yet even if we assume that Hariri did make his move in partnership with, not out
of fear from, the Saudis, its still not clear what happens next. For Hariri to form a
new, broad-based opposition coalition that would include Christians who are loyal
to pro-Hezbollah Lebanese President Michel Aoun, he must return to Beirut. The
Saudis must have a clear plan, too, beyond throwing money at Hariri and some
strategic patience, neither of which is guaranteed.
Hezbollahs response to Hariris resignation, delivered last night by its leader,

Hassan Nasrallah, was remarkably calm. Nasrallah seemed almost sympathetic
to the plight of his rival, suspecting, like many others are, that Hariri was compelled
to quit. Hezbollah has no interest in seeing Hariri go, because he provides
legitimacy to the government it controls and represents, along with Nasrallah, the
symbol of Lebanese Sunni-Shia consensus.
But the Shia group wont cry for Hariris departure either. It will struggle mightily in
finding a Hariri replacement that would be acceptable to the Sunnis (very few want
to take the prime minister job for fear of confronting Washington and Riyadh), but
whoever it helps pick, it will make sure not to fall into what it sees as a trap set up
by the Saudis: the formation of what essentially would be a war cabinet that
excludes the Sunnis. Hezbollah has bigger fish to fry in Syria and Iraq, and serious
concerns about a likely war with Israel. The last thing it needs is a distracting
domestic confrontation in Lebanon.

10th November 2017
A Purge in Riyadh By Toby Matthiesen
What Mohammed bin Salman's Crackdown Means for Saudi Arabia and the Middle
East
The night of November 4 will long be remembered in Saudi Arabia as a turning

point. Three events took place in Riyadh: the arrest of several dozen Saudi princes,
officials, and business leaders; the resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad
Hariri; and the shooting down of a ballistic missile, launched from Yemen, aimed
at the citys King Khalid International Airport. What linked all of these developments
was the figure of young Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In a bid to centralize
authority and smooth the path for his eventual accession to the throne, MbS, as
he is known, has sought to overhaul the personnel and organizational structure of
his countrys domestic politics and enact a newly assertive foreign policy.
CLEANING HOUSE
The list of those arrested was long, and shocked Saudis and seasoned observers,
for it included people who had previously seemed untouchablein particular,

10th November 2017
senior royals. The arrests were ostensibly carried out at the request of a new
anticorruption agency, which MbS heads. There is little doubt that a culture of self-
enrichment and collusion prevailed at the top echelons of government and
business in the country, and kickbacks were the norm when it came to large
government contracts. But this night of the long knives also removed a number of
MbS competitors.
Politically, the most significant of those replaced was Prince Miteb bin Abdullah,
the head of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Not only had Miteb been a rival of
MbS in the succession, he was also the last fairly senior prince with an institutional
fiefdomand an armed one at thatleft after MbS became minister of defense in
2015, concentrating many other portfolios, including the economy, in his office.
Saudi Arabias national guard is the praetorian, tribally based protector of the royal
family. For decades, it had been headed by former King Abdullah and then by
Miteb, one of his sons. The guards loyalty to the Abdullah branch of the ruling
family had been built up over decades. Still, MbS could remove Miteb with
apparent ease, and with the exception of a helicopter crash that was deemed an
accident in which a senior prince was killed and rumors of a firefight that killed
another prince, there was surprisingly little unrest. (Mitebs ouster was thus
reminiscent of events this June, when the long-standing minister of interior and
former crown prince, Mohammed bin Nayef, abdicated in favor of MbS.) In order
to defend against coups, Saudi Arabias armed forces had been set up as three
separate institutions: the regular army, the national guard, and the security forces
of the Ministry of Interior, each headed by a different branch of the House of Saud.
This strategy has prevented the emergence of a strong military leader along the
lines of a Nasser or Qaddafi who could overthrow the ruling family, as happened
in many other Middle Eastern countries. But now these institutional divisions are
gone, and MbS seems to directly or indirectly control every branch of the armed
forces.
Another major focus of the arrests were owners of the media companies, such as
MBC and Rotana, which together control most of the kingdoms Arabic-language
television and much of its print media. Senior businessmen, such as Alwaleed bin
Talal, and construction magnates, such as Bakr bin Laden, were also targeted.
The arrests came in the wake of a crackdown on Islamic leaders over the summer
and just two weeks after a huge investment conferenceheld, incidentally, in the

10th November 2017
same hotel, the Ritz-Carlton, where security forces later held some of the leading
princes. Again, MbS took center stage, announcing at the conference a plan to
create a new city, Neom, on the Red Sea, near Saudi Arabias borders with Egypt
and Jordan and not far from Israel.
In a bid to centralize authority and smooth the path for his eventual accession to
the throne, MbS has sought to overhaul the organizational structure of his country.
A NEW AXIS
In Saudi Arabia as elsewhere, domestic and foreign politics are intertwined, and
the government often invokes foreign threats to justify tough measures at home.
Since emerging onto the political scene in early 2015, MbS has sought to
reposition Saudi Arabia as a leader of the Arab world and in particular of Sunnis.
He and his entourage have pushed for an even harder line against Iran, which they
portray as being behind many of the regions problems, and as defense minister
MbS has played a leading role in the Saudi war in Yemena radical departure
from decades of Riyadhs checkbook diplomacy toward its southern neighbor. The
war, ostensibly started to prevent Iran from gaining influence in Yemen, is now in
its third year, and there is still no military solution in sight.
The missile fired at Riyadh was a way for the Houthis to show that they are still a
force to be reckoned with. (But we should remember that the Yemeni army of
former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who is currently allied with the Houthis but
was previously a Saudi ally, also owned a stack of missiles.) The coalition that is
fighting the Houthi--Saleh alliance, however, quickly announced that Iran was
behind the ballistic missile launch, which Riyadh considered a possible act of war
that it had the right to respond to under Article 51 of the UN Charter. MbS sounded
the same note, calling the missile launch direct military aggression. The coalition
swiftly put Yemen under a total air, land, and sea blockade.
Although the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has existed for decades and has seen many ups
and downs, the current situation is particularly dangerous for a number of reasons.
Chief among them is the concentration of power in one man in Saudi Arabia, who
is determined to use the narrative of an Iranian threat to shore up Saudi
nationalism. Unlike under the previous U.S. administration, moreover, the United
States under President Donald Trump appears eager to back MbS unconditionally.

10th November 2017
This special relationship has certainly given MbS the impression that he can act
with impunity. (The United States and United Kingdom are instrumental in the
Yemen war, despite its devastating humanitarian consequences, and when a
heavy-handed crackdown on a handful of Shiite militants in the Saudi Eastern
Province in the summer of 2017 left a whole town destroyed, there was not a word
of disapproval from Washington.)
Meanwhile, the Iranians are extending their power in the Levant, where after the
near-total defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (or ISIS), they have
established a land corridor linking Iran with Syria and Lebanon. And Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu quickly jumped on the Saudi bandwagon, using
Hariris resignation to highlight the dangers Iran posed to the region and talking up
the threat of Hezbollah. The Israeli Foreign Ministry ordered its embassies abroad
to follow the Saudi line on the Hariri resignation and talk up the threat of Hezbollah
and Iran. Indeed, Hezbollah and other Iran-supported groups such as Hamas and
Islamic Jihad would be major obstacles to the Israeli-Palestinian peace plan that
Trump is trying to put together through his son-in-law, Jared Kushner. Israel has
also said that it will not allow the end of the Syrian conflict to result in a strong
Iranian presence on its border with Syria.
It is in this context that Hariris resignation should be understood. On November 3,

Hariri met in Lebanon with an Iranian delegation led by Ali Akbar Velayati, a top
adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. A day later, Hariri, who has
Saudi citizenship and had extensive business interests in the kingdom, appeared
in Riyadh and announced his resignation in an address televised by the Saudi Al
Arabiya news channel. Saying that he had fled Lebanon because of a plan to
assassinate him, Hariri blamed his resignation on Irans mischievous role in the
region and its alliance with Hezbollah. Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan
Nasrallah responded with a speech the next day, putting the blame for the situation
squarely on the Saudis and denying that Hezbollah had sought to remove Hariri,
whom he urged to come back to Lebanon. Hariris resignation aimed to weaken
Hezbollah by denying it legitimacy, but it may also hurt Hariri himself, whose
leadership of the Lebanese Sunni community has long been contested, including
by Sunni Islamists. A Saudi minister said that Saudi Arabia would from now on
deal with the Lebanese government as an adversary because of Hezbollahs
presence in itan official line that will involve isolating Lebanon diplomatically and
punishing it economically.

10th November 2017
In the new Middle East, regional power blocs are emerging across older fault lines.
As MbS has consolidated his power in the kingdom, a new axis is emergingone
running from Washington to Tel Aviv, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi and intent on
countering Iran and its allies. If things continue as they have, Lebanon may turn
out to be only one among many casualties of this conflict.

10th November 2017
Religion and Violence in Myanmar By

Matthew J. Walton
Sitagu Sayadaws Case for Mass Killing
Since late August, more than 600,000 Rohingya have left Myanmar, fleeing a
state-led campaign of violence against them. The Rohingya are a Muslim minority
and predominantly live in Rakhine State, in Myanmars west. They have
experienced persistent, institutionalized discrimination for years. (The members of
the states Rakhine Buddhist majority believe that they, too, have been
discriminated against, mostly by the central government.)
The most common explanation given for the persecution of the Rohingya revolves
around their nationality. Government officials, media commentators, and religious
leaders have claimed that the Rohingya are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
Ethnicity plays a role, as well. The government officially recognizes 135 indigenous
ethnic groups, and Myanmars 2008 Constitution grants those groups certain
rights. The Rohingya are not among them. More broadly, people in Myanmar insist
that the Rohingya are not a real ethnic group because they worry about the unlikely

10th November 2017
possibility that the Rohingya will seek to secede, threatening the country's
territorial sovereignty.
Sitagu's words could provide the final cover for Myanmars Buddhists to ignore
international criticism and cloak themselves in the righteousness of holy war.
National identity in Myanmar has long been intertwined with Buddhist religious
identity. But religion has had a particular effect in the case of the Rohingya. The
so-called War on Terrorwaged primarily against Muslims around the worldhas
made it easier for Myanmars elites to label the Rohingya as terrorists and for
government officials to defend the violence against them as a legitimate response
to extremism. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Armys attacks on government
targets in October 2016 and August 2017, meanwhile, have validated many
citizens belief that Islam is inherently violent and poses an existential threat to
Buddhism, Myanmars majority religion. It has also allowed political and religious
elites to unfairly and inaccurately associate all Rohingya with terrorism. Thanks to
anti-Muslim ideas spread through social media sites, the popular press, and the
writings and sermons of influential laypeople and monks, Myanmars citizens have
come to see the Rohingya as doubly unwantedas both national and religious
others.
Sitagu Sayadaw is one such monk. Highly regarded for his philanthropic work, he
is probably the most popular and well-known religious figure in Myanmar. Many in
the country consider his interpretations of Buddhist teachings authoritative. He has
a global profile, running meditation centers in several countries and making
frequent international appearances.
After the first round of violence broke out between Buddhists and Muslims in
Rakhine State in 2012, Sitagu sought to portray himself as a peace builder,
participating in interfaith discussions as a patron of a nongovernmental
organization called Religions for PeaceMyanmar. Commentators abroad lauded
him as a force for reconciliation. Yet Sitagus usually moderate remarks in English
stood in stark contrast to his Burmese-language sermons, in which he has tended
to portray Islam as a religion of violence and Myanmars Muslims as foreigners in
their own country.
That remains the case today. On October 30, Sitagu delivered a sermon to
members of the military at a training school in Karen State. His remarks had a

10th November 2017
chilling purpose: to provide a religious justification for the mass killing of non-
Buddhists.
IN BUDDHISMS NAME
Sitagus sermon focused on the story of Dutthagamani, a Sinhalese Buddhist king

whose victory over a Tamil ruler in the first century BCE, in what is now Sri Lanka,
is recounted in a fifth-century text called the Mahavamsa. Sitagu framed his
account with a call for unity between the military and the monkhood: the two, he
said, are inseparable. This might seem an unusual comment from a monk who
fled his country in 1988 after criticizing its then-military government. Today,
however, Sitagu counts high-ranking military officials among his donors.
As Dutthagamani agonized over the bloodshed he had caused in battle, Sitagu

told the soldiers, he was visited by eight arahants, or fully enlightened beings. They
assured the king that there was no need to grieve. Of the many Tamils whom
Dutthagamanis forces had killed, the arahants said, only one had committed
himself to the basic ethical code of Buddhism. Another had taken a lesser vow.
And so only one and a half human beings had died: all the other Tamils who had
been had killed were non-Buddhists, and their deaths could not generate bad
karma.

10th November 2017
Dutthagamanis goal in battle, Sitagu noted several times, was not to defend his
throne but to protect his religion. Myamnmars Buddhists have justified violence
against Muslims in similar terms since at least 2012. But Sitagus sermon raised
the stakes: he is a revered monk, and he preached a religious justification for
violence to a gathering of soldiers in the midst of a campaign of mass brutality.
Blurring the lines between a fifth-century legend and the present, Sitagu told the
soldiers that no matter how much they have to fight, they should remember that
those they kill are not fully human.
Dutthagamanis story has been used to justify mass murder in other contexts, even
as Buddhists have sought to frame it as a defense of religion. In Sri Lanka, for
instance, Sinhalese monks invoked the story during the governments brutal,
decades-long war against the Tamil Tigers, an insurgency made up of Christians
and Hindus. The destruction of human beings in defense of Buddhism, the
Sinhalese monk Walpola Rahula wrote in 1972, was not a very grave crime.
A DEEPER TRAGEDY
By denying the humanity of non-Buddhists, Sitagu also imperiled the humanity of

the soldiers to whom he preachedand of all who have taken part in the violence

10th November 2017
against the Rohingya. Seeking to absolve soldiers of their guilt, he justified future
abuses, encouraging a militarized mind set and cruelties that could shatter the
prospects for broader peace and reconciliation.
Some might argue that Sitagus sermon will have no meaningful effect. For years,
after all, some monks in Myanmar have sought to dehumanize Muslims, comparing
them to animals and undercutting whatever compassion lay Buddhists might
otherwise offer them. But Sitagu is not just any monk. He is so influential and
revered that his words could provide the final cover for Myanmars Buddhists to
ignore international criticism and cloak themselves in the righteousness of holy
war.
That is a frightening prospect not only for the Rohingya but also for Myanmars
other minorities. Religious, political, and military leaders could eventually turn
similar logic against groups such as the Kachin Independence Army, a group made
up primarily of Christiansparticularly if Myanmars conflict-ridden regions remain
restive. In Karen State, where Sitagu delivered his sermon, ethnic and religious
minorities have faced violence at the hands of the military for years.
Yet there is also a chance that Sitagus rhetoric will backfire, horrifying at least
some in Myanmar and leading them to reject violence committed in Buddhisms
name. Most of the countrys civil-society and human-rights groups have stayed
quiet over the last few weeks, but the Karen Womens Organization, a community
advocacy group, recently issued a brave statement denouncing the militarys
actions against Rohingyas in Rakhine State, especially its involvement in sexual
violence. In an encouraging sign, the Karen National Union, an armed group in a
tenuous ceasefire with the military, followed up with a similar statement. This might
create an opening for ethnic groups that have experienced brutality at the hands
of the military to recognize some shared solidarity of suffering with the Rohingya
and to reject religious justifications for violence.
These are hopeful signs, but their paucity reflects the distance that most people in
Myanmar feel from the Rohingyas suffering and their fear of speaking out against
it. Ordinary citizens have mostly supported Sitagus remarks on social media. With
popular opinion set so vehemently against the Rohingya, it is hard to know how
many people agree with Sitagu and how many disagree and are afraid to say so,

10th November 2017
either because of his status as a revered monk or because they are scared of
violent reprisals at a moment of high tension.
The government, for its part, has yet to comment on Sitagus sermon. Given Daw
Aung San Suu Kyis claim that she is committed to peacefully ending the conflict
and the intense scrutiny the violence has attracted overseas, she should not let his
sermon pass without a remark. As for the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee,
the countrys highest Buddhist authority, it has done almost nothing to limit monks
incitements to violence over the last five years, and it is unlikely to take action now.
That is bad news, because monks are often the only people with the moral and
cultural authority to challenge the words of their peers. Myanmar desperately
needs Buddhists to speak out and pull their country from the brink of a deeper
tragedy.

10th November 2017
What Would a U.S. Intervention in Venezuela

Look Like? By Frank O. Mora
In August, U.S. President Donald Trump said that the United States was
considering using military force to resolve the crisis in Venezuela. His
announcement was quickly condemned by the United States allies in Latin
America and the Caribbean as reckless and counterproductive. Yet there are
some, mostly in the Venezuelan exile community, who still insist that a U.S. military
intervention to remove the dictatorship of Venezuelan President Nicols Maduro
would be worth the cost.
Not since the United States invaded Panama in 1989 had a U.S. president
threatened to use force for political ends in the Americas, and for good reason.
There are no longer any military challengers to the United States in the region.
Today, the Pentagon focuses on helping Latin American governments dismantle
drug trafficking networks, deal with insurgents, and respond to natural disasters. It
does not plan military interventions in the region, although it certainly could, if
ordered to do so.

10th November 2017
Restoring Venezuelas democracy is a job for the countrys citizens.

If the military were to make such plans for Venezuela, policymakers would need to
answer a few important strategic questions. First, they would need to lay out the
political goals of the intervention. When states use or threaten military force, their
objectives are usually straightforward: they tend to seek either a shift in policy or
regime change. In Venezuelas case, that might mean pressuring the Maduro
government to recommit to the rule of law and to enter into a serious dialogue with
the opposition, or removing it from power entirely. But could achieving those goals
through force undermine more important U.S. objectives in the Americas and
beyond?
The short answer is yes. Fighting in Venezuela could quickly escalate, drawing the
United States into an expensive, long-term occupation. Even if that did not happen,
an intervention would sour the United States relationships with its partners in the
Western Hemisphere and diminish Washingtons influence there. To make matters
worse, using force against Venezuela would undermine the U.S. militarys other
commitments, straining its finances and drawing its assets away from problems far
more important to the United States security. It is unlikely that Trump and those
who support an intervention understand these costs.
The good news is that the United States and its partners in the region have not yet
exhausted their diplomatic options. The solution to Venezuelas crisis lies within
that countryand the United States can help, without its military.
YOU BREAK IT, YOU OWN IT

10th November 2017
There are three ways that the United States could use force against Venezuela:
through coercion, a surgical intervention, or an occupation. Each could open the
way for escalation, and each could lead to unintended consequences. Conflicts
rarely unfold in the way their planners expect.
Coercion involves making a show of force to intimidate a state into changing its
behavior. That show of force has to be credible, convincing the target that it will be
punished if it does not act differently. In the case of Venezuela, sending a U.S.
destroyer to the southern Caribbean Sea would not clear that bar, since Caracas
would probably perceive it as only a symbolic threat to the regime. To convince the
Maduro government to negotiate with the Venezuelan opposition and restore the
rule of law, Washington would probably have to deploy an aircraft carrier and one
or two destroyers to the regionperhaps the same ships that fired missiles at a
Syrian government airfield in April.
A show of force could ultimately lead to a years-long military occupation.

Then again, that might not work. If it didnt, Washington would have to follow
through on its threat, lest it look like a paper tiger. By striking key security and
communications centers from the air, perhaps with B-1 bombers, the United States
could damage the Maduro governments ability to communicate and repress its
people. This would require extra U.S. manpower, in areas from intelligence to
logistics. One purpose of such surgical strikes could be to convince the Maduro
government to change its behavior. But the strikes could also seek to encourage
a military coup against Maduro, led by officers who want to avert a massive U.S.
military intervention.
Surgical strikes would sow chaos in Venezuela, setting off violent clashes among
the countrys competing blocs and perhaps leading to the collapse of the state.
Washington would then have just one option: a full-blown invasion, aimed at
installing a new government and restoring stability. Overpowering Maduros
loyalists and policing the aftermath would take a force of around 200,000 people
20,000 more than the U.S.-led coalition sent to Iraq soon after the invasion of that
country. U.S. troops would have to stay in Venezuela until stability returned and
legitimate, competent authorities took power. If the United States were to destroy
the Venezuelan government, it would be responsible for rebuilding it, and that
could take a long time.

10th November 2017
Because a show of force could ultimately lead to a years-long military occupation,

U.S. officials must not even consider threatening Venezuela unless they are ready
to go all the way. If Washington proved unwilling to escalate, its friends and
enemies would take it as a sign that they should neither trust nor fear the United
States.
THE PRICE OF INTERVENTION
It is hard to say how many lives and how much money would be lost in a U.S.
intervention. But the numbers would not be immaterial, especially if the United
States invaded Venezuela and then sought to stabilize it.
Nor is this all. Using force in Venezuela would redirect the United States attention
and power from issues more important to its security and place an unnecessary
burden on its overstretched military. The U.S. defense budget will probably
increase only marginally in the year ahead, and the Pentagon is busy managing
operations in areas from Iraq and Syria to West Africa and the South China Sea.
As a conflict on the Korean Peninsula grows more likely, it will only grow busier. If
North Korea or Iran believed that the United States was preoccupied with an
operation in South America, those states might take risks they otherwise wouldnt,
threatening U.S. interests in Northeast Asia and the Middle East. Whats more, by
disrupting Venezuelas oil industry, a U.S. intervention would increase global
prices and weaken the governments of energy-dependent states in Africa and the
Caribbean.
Finally, a military intervention would come at a steep cost to the United States
influence in the Western Hemisphere. Colombia, Peru, and a number of other

10th November 2017
states quickly condemned Trumps suggestion that a military option was on the
table. Using force would trigger a far stronger backlash, even from Washingtons
closest partners. By reminding the regions states of the United States history of
meddling in their affairs, Washington would lose their goodwilland with it, the
opportunity to work with them on issues that matter to everyone in the hemisphere,
from dealing with transnational crime to integrating the Americas energy
infrastructure.
A BETTER WAY
History has shown that successful democratic transitions tend to be domestic

affairs. Restoring Venezuelas democracy is a job for the countrys citizens.
Foreign governments can help, but they can play only a supporting role. So far,
however, the divisions within Venezuelas opposition have weakened its attempts
to secure international support for the restoration of democratic rule.
There are a few ways the United States can step up. The Barack Obama and
Trump administrations, for instance, imposed unilateral sanctions against
Venezuelan officials accused of corruption and human-rights violations in an
attempt to create fissures within the regime that could lead it to collapse or change
its behavior. (The Trump administration recently expanded and deepened those
sanctions; so far, that has had little effect.) But some argue that unilateral U.S.
sanctions are counterproductive. Maduro, this thinking runs, can point to the
measures as examples of U.S. aggression, helping him rally at least some support
from abroad and among his weary supporters at home.
That is why the United States should work with European and Latin American
governments to impose multilateral sanctions against government officials and
some of the groups on which the Maduro regime depends, such as the National
Center for Foreign Commerce, a government body that manages currency
exchanges, and Camimpeg, a military-backed energy services company. As those
states do so, they should be sure to avoid restrictions that harm ordinary
Venezuelans, who are already suffering from the effects of a deep economic crisis.
Multilateral sanctions would isolate and pressure the Maduro regime, and the
governments imposing them would have the legitimacy to squeeze the Maduro
government further, if they needed to. This is an approach that the United States

10th November 2017
neighbors in the Western Hemisphere could endorsebut only if Washington

refrains from talk of military intervention and works harder to convince Venezuelas
neighbors to get on board.
Trumps suggestion that the United States could use force in Venezuela may have
been impulsive. Governments and citizens in the Americas and beyond took notice
anyway, to Washingtons detriment. The last thing the United States needs now is
a military intervention that would overstretch its forces and distract it from far more
serious threats to its security.

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Sitagus sermon focused on the story of Dutthagamani, a Sinhalese Buddhist king

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By denying the humanity of non-Buddhists, Sitagu also imperiled the humanity of

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