G.R. No.
74431 November 6, 1989
PURITA MIRANDA VESTIL and AGUSTIN VESTIL, petitioners,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, DAVID UY and
TERESITA UY, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente
Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, in Cebu City.
She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was
treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" and
administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo.
She was discharged after nine days but was readmitted one
week later due to "vomiting of saliva."
The following day, the child died.
The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that
the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of "Andoy,"
the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter. The
Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to
the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and
that in any case no one had witnessed it bite Theness.
After trial, Judge Jose Ramolete of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the
complaint.
The respondent court arrived at a different conclusion when
the case was appealed. 5 It found that the Vestils were in
possession of the house and the dog and so should be
responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries
caused by the dog.
Accordingly, the Vestils were ordered to pay the Uys damages
in the amount of P30,000.00 for the death of Theness,
P12,000.00 for medical and hospitalization expenses, and
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or
of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been
partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing
the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in
Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog
simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs. However, that is
hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession
of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in
question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the
house.
Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever
may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility shall
cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from
the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Purita Vestil's testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda's
house is hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left
by her father were related to him ("one way or the other") and
maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of
arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate ). 7 She
mentioned as many as ten of such relatives who had stayed in the
house at one time or another although they did not appear to be
close kin.8 She at least implied that they did not pay any rent,
presumably because of their relation with Vicente Miranda
notwithstanding that she herself did not seem to know them very
well.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which
was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she
and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in
question. She was the only heir residing in Cebu City and the most
logical person to take care of the property, which was only six
kilometers from her own house.
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the
possessors of the dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing
that she died as a result thereof. On the contrary, the death
certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia, which had
nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously
hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended
scientific discussion of the causal connection between the dog bites
and the certified cause of death except to note that, first, Theness
developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog
bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which
ultimately caused her death, was a complication of rabies.
the Court finds that the link between the dog bites and the certified
cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate
our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that
the death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but
only of the fact of death. Indeed, the evidence of the child's
hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she died because she
was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different
cause of death.
In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even
if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his
control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also
contend, the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child
into biting her.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of
vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage.
It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest
that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the
monetary awards except only as to the medical and hospitalization
expenses, which are reduced to P2,026.69, as prayed for in the
complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring back to the
private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least
be eased by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is AFFIRMED as above
modified. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
G.R. No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
MARCIAL T. CAEDO, JUANA SANGALANG CAEDO, and the
Minors, EPHRAIM CAEDO, EILEEN CAEDO, ROSE ELAINE
CAEDO, suing through their father, MARCIAL T. CAEDO, as
guardian ad litem, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
YU KHE THAI and RAFAEL BERNARDO, defendants-appellants.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
There are two principal questions posed for resolution: (1) who was
responsible for the accident? and (2) if it was defendant Rafael
Bernardo, was his employer, defendant Yu Khe Thai, solidarily liable
with him? On the first question the trial court found Rafael Bernardo
negligent; and on the second, held his employer solidarily liable with
him.
The mishap occurred at about 5:30 in the morning of March
24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the
vicinity of San Lorenzo Village.
Marcial was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home
in Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was
scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro.
With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters.
Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe
Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking the
owner from his Paraaque home to Wack Wack for his regular
round of golf.
The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds,
considering the condition of the road and the absence of
traffic the Mercury at 40 to 50 kilometers per hour, and the
Cadillac at approximately 30 to 35 miles (48 to 56 kilometers).
Their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance.
Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same direction, was
a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista.
The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short
rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and
held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista.
Rafael Bernardo testified that he was almost upon the rig
when he saw it in front of him, only eight meters away. This is
the first clear indication of his negligence. The carretela was
provided with two lights, one on each side, and they should
have given him sufficient warning to take the necessary
 precautions. And even if he did not notice the lights, as he
claimed later on at the trial, the carretela should anyway have
been visible to him from afar if he had been careful, as it must
have been in the beam of his headlights for a considerable
while.
In the meantime the Mercury was coming on its own lane from the
opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping
altogether behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the
left in order to pass. As he did so the curved end of his car's right rear
bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel, wrenching it off
and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane,
where it collided with the oncoming vehicle. On his part Caedo had
seen the Cadillac on its own lane; he slackened his speed, judged the
distances in relation to the carretela and concluded that the Cadillac
would wait behind. Bernardo, however, decided to take a gamble
beat the Mercury to the point where it would be in line with
the carretela, or else squeeze in between them in any case. It was a
risky maneuver either way, and the risk should have been quite
obvious. Or, since the car was moving at from 30 to 35 miles per hour
(or 25 miles according to Yu Khe Thai) it was already too late to apply
the brakes when Bernardo saw the carretela only eight meters in front
of him, and so he had to swerve to the left in spite of the presence of
the oncoming car on the opposite lane. As it was, the clearance
Bernardo gave for his car's right side was insufficient. Its rear
bumper, as already stated, caught the wheel of the carretela and
wrenched it loose. Caedo, confronted with the unexpected situation,
tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the
right, but was unsuccessful. The photographs taken at the scene
show that the right wheels of his car were on the unpaved shoulder of
the road at the moment of impact.
There is no doubt at all that the collision was directly traceable to
Rafael Bernardo's negligence and that he must be held liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiffs. The next question is whether or
not Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, is solidarily liable with the
driver. The applicable law is Article 2184 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
ART. 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's
negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held
liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due
diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for the first
time in the new Civil Code. It was expressed in Chapman vs.
Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374, where this Court held:
... The same rule applies where the owner is present, unless
the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length
of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to
observe them and to direct his driver to desist therefrom. An
owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits
his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable
opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver
cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts.
The owner of an automobile who permits his chauffeur to
drive up the Escolta, for example, at a speed of 60 miles an
hour, without any effort to stop him, although he has had a
reasonable opportunity to do so, becomes himself responsible,
both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts
of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden
act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable
opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a
person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the
automobile, although present therein at the time the act was
committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the
presence of the owner for such a length of time that the
owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent
superior but rather the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that
ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if
he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
In the present case the defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo
had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been
employed by Yutivo Sons Hardware Co. in the same capacity for over
ten years. During that time he had no record of violation of traffic
laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all
may be imputed to his master. Negligence on the part of the latter, if
any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a
course which not only gave him clear notice of the danger but also
sufficient time to act upon it. We do not see that such negligence may
be imputed. The car, as has been stated, was not running at an
unreasonable speed. The road was wide and open, and devoid of
traffic that early morning. There was no reason for the car owner to
be in any special state of alert. He had reason to rely on the skill and
experience of his driver. He became aware of the presence of
the carretela when his car was only twelve meters behind it, but then
his failure to see it earlier did not constitute negligence, for he was
not himself at the wheel. And even when he did see it at that
distance, he could not have anticipated his driver's sudden decision to
pass the carretela on its left side in spite of the fact that another car
was approaching from the opposite direction. The time element was
such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to
assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. The
thought that entered his mind, he said, was that if he sounded a
sudden warning it might only make the other man nervous and make
the situation worse. It was a thought that, wise or not, connotes no
absence of that due diligence required by law to prevent the
misfortune.
The test of imputed negligence under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is,
to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a
uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. In many cases they refrain from driving their own cars and
instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they
are not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the
rules of traffic or to appreciate the relative dangers posed by the
different situations that are continually encountered on the road.
What would be a negligent omission under aforesaid Article on the
part of a car owner who is in the prime of age and knows how to
handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old
and infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain
measure of skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in
the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle.
The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his
omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he
should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that
appears to be fraught with danger to one passenger may appear to
be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require
a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional
drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real need
of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
We hold that the imputation of liability to Yu Khe Thai, solidarily with
Rafael Bernardo, is an error. The next question refers to the sums
adjudged by the trial court as damages. The award of P48,000 by
way of moral damages is itemized as follows:
1. Marcial Caedo P 20,000.00
2. Juana S. Caedo 15,000.00
3. Ephraim Caedo 3,000.00
4. Eileen Caedo 4,000.00
5. Rose Elaine Caedo 3,000.00
6. Merilyn Caedo 3,000.00
Plaintiffs appealed from the award, claiming that the Court should
have granted them also actual or compensatory damages,
aggregating P225,000, for the injuries they sustained. Defendants, on
the other hand maintain that the amounts awarded as moral damages
are excessive and should be reduced. We find no justification for
either side. The amount of actual damages suffered by the individual
plaintiffs by reason of their injuries, other than expenses for medical
treatment, has not been shown by the evidence. Actual damages, to
be compensable, must be proven. Pain and suffering are not capable
of pecuniary estimation, and constitute a proper ground for granting
moral, not actual, damages, as provided in Article 2217 of the Civil
Code.
It is our opinion that, considering the nature and extent of the above-
mentioned injuries, the amounts of moral damages granted by the
trial court are not excessive.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in the sense of
declaring defendant-appellant Yu Khe Thai free from liability, and is
otherwise affirmed with respect to defendant Rafael Bernardo, with
costs against the latter.
G.R. No. L-23052 January 29, 1968
CITY OF MANILA, petitioner,
vs.
GENARO N. TEOTICO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
City Fiscal Manuel T. Reyes for petitioner.
Sevilla, Daza and Associates for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico was at the corner of
the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a
"loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney to take
him down town.
After waiting for about five minutes, he managed to hail a
jeepney that came along to a stop.
As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney, and
took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted
catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue.
Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the manhole breaking
his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his
left eyelid.
As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision, several
persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the
manhole.
One of them brought Teotico to the Philippine General
Hospital, where his injuries were treated, after which he was
taken home.
In addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid,
Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper
arm, the right leg and the upper lip apart from an abrasion on
the right infra-patella region.
These injuries and the allergic eruption caused by anti-tetanus
injections administered to him in the hospital, required further
medical treatment by a private practitioner who charged
therefor P1,400.00.
As a consequence of the foregoing occurrence, Teotico filed, with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint which was,
subsequently, amended for damages against the City of Manila, its
mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of
police. As stated in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with
approval by the Court of Appeals,
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public
accountant, a businessman and a professor at the University
of the East. He held responsible positions in various business
firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A.U. Valencia
and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the
Sincere Packing Corporation. He was also associated with
several civic organizations such as the Wack Wack Golf Club,
the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club of
Manila and the Knights of Rizal. As a result of the incident,
plaintiff was prevented from engaging in his customary
occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has lost a daily income of
about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the
incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his
business associates and friends. During the period of his
treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and anxiety for
 the welfare of his minor children since he was their only
support. Due to the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated
himself to pay his counsel the sum of P2,000.00.
On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and
documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of
the City Engineer of Manila, received a report of the uncovered
condition of a catchbasin at the corner of P. Burgos and Old
Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same
was covered on the same day (Exhibit 4); that again the iron
cover of the same catch basin was reported missing on
January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next
day (Exhibit 5); that the Office of the City Engineer never
received any report to the effect that the catchbasin in
question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1968;
that it has always been a policy of the said office, which is
charged with the duty of installation, repair and care of storm
drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a report is received
from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the
matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately
replacing the missing cover or covering the catchbasin with
steel matting that because of the lucrative scrap iron business
then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was
rampant; that the Office of the City Engineer has filed
complaints in court resulting from theft of said iron covers;
that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catchbasins in the City by
constructing them under the sidewalks with concrete cement
covers and openings on the side of the gutter; and that these
changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time
whenever funds were available.
After appropriate proceedings the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of the
defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which
was sentenced to pay damages in the aggregate sum of
P6,750.00. 1 Hence, this appeal by the City of Manila.
The first issue raised by the latter is whether the present case is
governed by Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) reading:
The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions.
or by Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages
for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason
of defective conditions of road, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the
latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively
for the City of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law,
applicable to the entire Philippines.
The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think,
correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a
general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the
provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a
general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages
or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city
officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or
ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or
other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason" specifically "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public
works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section
4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of
the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based
upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is
decisive thereon.
It is urged that the City of Manila cannot be held liable to Teotico for
damages: 1) because the accident involving him took place in a
national highway; and 2) because the City of Manila has not been
negligent in connection therewith.
As regards the first issue, we note that it is based upon an allegation
of fact not made in the answer of the City. Moreover, Teotico alleged
in his complaint, as well as in his amended complaint, that his injuries
were due to the defective condition of a street which is "under the
supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to the amended
complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets aforementioned
were and have been constantly kept in good condition and regularly
inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof covered by the
defendant City and the officers concerned" who "have been ever
vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions
and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in
effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control
and supervision.
Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said Avenue is a national
highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion raised,
therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the
trial court, and cannot be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much
less after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a
motion for the reconsideration thereof.
At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary
for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads
or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which
responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over
said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract
from its "control or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic
Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Sec. 18. Legislative powers. The Municipal Board shall have the
following legislative powers:
(x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to provide for the laying
out, construction and improvement, and to regulate the use of
streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, cemeteries,
and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and
sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the
inspection of, fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the
same for the laying of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building
and repair of tunnels, sewers, and drains, and all structures in and
under the same and the erecting of poles and the stringing of wires
therein; to provide for and regulate cross-works, curbs, and gutters
therein, . . . to regulate traffic and sales upon the streets and other
public places; to provide for the abatement of nuisances in the same
and punish the authors or owners thereof; to provide for the
construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of bridges,
viaducts and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing, kite-flying,
hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons using
the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals;
to regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other
vehicles, cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city;
to regulate the lights used on all vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . .
to provide for and change the location, grade, and crossing of
railroads, and compel any such railroad to raise or lower its tracks to
conform to such provisions or changes; and to require railroad
companies to fence their property, or any part thereof, to provide
suitable protection against injury to persons or property, and
to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts along and
under their tracks, so that the natural drainage of the streets and
adjacent property shall not be obstructed.
This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic
Act No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon
which the City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation
of the highway funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered
cities and municipalities in the construction of roads and streets within
their respective boundaries, and Executive Order No. 113 merely
implements the provisions of said Republic Act No. 917, concerning
the disposition and appropriation of the highway funds. Moreover, it
provides that "the construction, maintenance and improvement of
national primary, national secondary and national aid provincial and
city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District Engineers
and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines
in annual or special appropriation Acts."
Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is
under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the
latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of
said road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative, is one of fact, and the findings of said Court thereon are
not subject to our review.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be as it is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the City of Manila. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 71049 May 29, 1987
BERNARDINO JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. CITY OF MANILA and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The evidence of the plaintiff (petitioner herein) shows that in the
morning of August 15, 1974 he, together with his neighbors, went to
Sta. Ana public market to buy "bagoong" at the time when the public
market was flooded with ankle deep rainwater. After purchasing the
"bagoong" he turned around to return home but he stepped on an
uncovered opening which could not be seen because of the dirty
rainwater, causing a dirty and rusty four- inch nail, stuck inside the
uncovered opening, to pierce the left leg of plaintiff-petitioner
penetrating to a depth of about one and a half inches. After
administering first aid treatment at a nearby drugstore, his
companions helped him hobble home. He felt ill and developed fever
and he had to be carried to Dr. Juanita Mascardo. Despite the
medicine administered to him by the latter, his left leg swelled with
great pain. He was then rushed to the Veterans Memorial Hospital
where he had to be confined for twenty (20) days due to high fever
and severe pain.
Upon his discharge from the hospital, he had to walk around with
crutches for fifteen (15) days. His injury prevented him from
attending to the school buses he is operating. As a result, he had to
engage the services of one Bienvenido Valdez to supervise his
business for an aggregate compensation of nine hundred pesos
(P900.00). (Decision, AC-G.R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, pp. 13-20).
Petitioner sued for damages the City of Manila and the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation under whose administration the Sta. Ana
Public Market had been placed by virtue of a Management and
Operating Contract (Rollo, p. 47).
The lower court decided in favor of respondents, the dispositive
portion of the decision reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint with costs against
the plaintiff. For lack of sufficient evidence, the counterclaims of the
defendants are likewise dismissed. (Decision, Civil Case No. 96390,
Rollo, p. 42).
As above stated, on appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court held the
Asiatic Integrated Corporation liable for damages but absolved
respondent City of Manila.
Hence this petition.
The lone assignment of error raised in this petition is on whether or
not the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in not ruling that
respondent City of Manila should be jointly and severally liable with
Asiatic Integrated Corporation for the injuries petitioner suffered.
In compliance with the resolution of July 1, 1985 of the First Division
of this Court (Rollo, p. 29) respondent City of Manila filed its comment
on August 13, 1985 (Rollo, p. 34) while petitioner filed its reply on
August 21, 1985 (Reno, p. 51).
Thereafter, the Court in the resolution of September 11, 1985 (Rollo,
p. 62) gave due course to the petition and required both parties to
submit simultaneous memoranda
Petitioner filed his memorandum on October 1, 1985 (Rollo, p. 65)
while respondent filed its memorandum on October 24, 1985 (Rollo,
p. 82).
In the resolution of October 13, 1986, this case was transferred to the
Second Division of this Court, the same having been assigned to a
member of said Division (Rollo, p. 92).
The petition is impressed with merit.
As correctly found by the Intermediate Appellate Court, there is no
doubt that the plaintiff suffered injuries when he fell into a drainage
opening without any cover in the Sta. Ana Public Market. Defendants
do not deny that plaintiff was in fact injured although the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation tries to minimize the extent of the injuries,
claiming that it was only a small puncture and that as a war veteran,
plaintiff's hospitalization at the War Veteran's Hospital was free.
(Decision, AC-G.R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, p. 6).
Respondent City of Manila maintains that it cannot be held liable for
the injuries sustained by the petitioner because under the
Management and Operating Contract, Asiatic Integrated Corporation
assumed all responsibility for damages which may be suffered by third
persons for any cause attributable to it.
It has also been argued that the City of Manila cannot be held liable
under Article 1, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 as amended
(Revised Charter of Manila) which provides:
The City shall not be liable or held for damages or
injuries to persons or property arising from the failure
of the Mayor, the Municipal Board, or any other City
Officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or any
other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said
Mayor, Municipal Board, or any other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions.
This issue has been laid to rest in the case of City of Manila v.
Teotico (22 SCRA 269-272 [1968]) where the Supreme Court squarely
ruled that Republic Act No. 409 establishes a general rule regulating
the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of city officers" to enforce the
provisions of said Act, "or any other law or ordinance or from
negligence" of the City "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers
while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions."
Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides that:
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by any
person by reason of defective conditions of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings and other public
works under their control or supervision.
constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities ... liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered
by any person by reason" specifically "of the defective condition
of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works
under their control or supervision." In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A.
No. 409 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general,
regardless of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code
governs liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and other
public works" in particular and is therefore decisive on this specific
case.
In the same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the liability
therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong
to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or
municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public
building in question.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public
Market, despite the Management and Operating Contract between
respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under
the control of the former.
For one thing, said contract is explicit in this regard, when it provides:
II That immediately after the execution of this contract, the SECOND
PARTY shall start the painting, cleaning, sanitizing and repair of the
public markets and talipapas and within ninety (90) days thereof, the
SECOND PARTY shall submit a program of improvement,
development, rehabilitation and reconstruction of the city public
markets and talipapas subject to prior approval of the FIRST PARTY.
(Rollo, p. 44)
VI That all present personnel of the City public markets and talipapas
shall be retained by the SECOND PARTY as long as their services
remain satisfactory and they shall be extended the same rights and
privileges as heretofore enjoyed by them. Provided, however, that the
SECOND PARTY shall have the right, subject to prior approval of the
FIRST PARTY to discharge any of the present employees for cause.
(Rollo, p. 45).
VII That the SECOND PARTY may from time to time be required by
the FIRST PARTY, or his duly authorized representative or
representatives, to report, on the activities and operation of the City
public markets and talipapas and the facilities and conveniences
installed therein, particularly as to their cost of construction, operation
and maintenance in connection with the stipulations contained in this
Contract. (lbid)
The fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public
market was admitted by Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to
Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata which reads:
These cases arose from the controversy over the
Management and Operating Contract entered into on
December 28, 1972 by and between the City of Manila
and the Asiatic Integrated Corporation, whereby in
consideration of a fixed service fee, the City hired the
services of the said corporation to undertake the
physical management, maintenance, rehabilitation and
development of the City's public markets and'
Talipapas' subject to the control and supervision of the
City.
It is believed that there is nothing incongruous in the
exercise of these powers vis-a-vis the existence of the
contract, inasmuch as the City retains the power of
supervision and control over its public markets
and talipapas under the terms of the contract. (Exhibit
"7-A") (Emphasis supplied.) (Rollo, p. 75).
In fact, the City of Manila employed a market master for the Sta. Ana
Public Market whose primary duty is to take direct supervision and
control of that particular market, more specifically, to check the safety
of the place for the public.
Finally, Section 30 (g) of the Local Tax Code as amended, provides:
The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision
administration and control over public markets and the personnel
thereof, including those whose duties concern the maintenance and
upkeep of the market and ordinances and other pertinent rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied.) (Rollo, p. 76)
The contention of respondent City of Manila that petitioner should not
have ventured to go to Sta. Ana Public Market during a stormy
weather is indeed untenable. As observed by respondent Court of
Appeals, it is an error for the trial court to attribute the negligence to
herein petitioner. More specifically stated, the findings of appellate
court are as follows:
... The trial court even chastised the plaintiff for going to market on a
rainy day just to buy bagoong. A customer in a store has the right to
assume that the owner will comply with his duty to keep the premises
safe for customers. If he ventures to the store on the basis of such
assumption and is injured because the owner did not comply with his
duty, no negligence can be imputed to the customer. (Decision, AC-G.
R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, p. 19).
As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasi-delict, one must
have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. (Art. 1173
of the Civil Code).
There is no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to
exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably safe
for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs.
While it may be conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is
extremely difficult during storms and floods, it must however, be
admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken during
good weather to minimize the dangers to life and limb under those
difficult circumstances.
For instance, the drainage hole could have been placed under the
stalls instead of on the passage ways. Even more important is the
fact, that the City should have seen to it that the openings were
covered. Sadly, the evidence indicates that long before petitioner fell
into the opening, it was already uncovered, and five (5) months after
the incident happened, the opening was still uncovered. (Rollo, pp.
57; 59). Moreover, while there are findings that during floods the
vendors remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water (Decision,
AC-G.R. CV No. 0 1387; Rollo, p. 17), there is no showing that such
practice has ever been prohibited, much less penalized by the City of
Manila. Neither was it shown that any sign had been placed
thereabouts to warn passersby of the impending danger.
To recapitulate, it appears evident that the City of Manila is likewise
liable for damages under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, respondent
City having retained control and supervision over the Sta. Ana Public
Market and as tort-feasor under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delicts
Petitioner had the right to assume that there were no openings in the
middle of the passageways and if any, that they were adequately
covered. Had the opening been covered, petitioner could not have
fallen into it. Thus the negligence of the City of Manila is the
proximate cause of the injury suffered, the City is therefore liable for
the injury suffered by the peti- 4 petitioner.
Respondent City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corporation being
joint tort-feasors are solidarily liable under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby MODIFIED, making the City of Manila and the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation solidarily liable to pay the plaintiff P221.90
actual medical expenses, P900.00 for the amount paid for the
operation and management of the school bus, P20,000.00 as moral
damages due to pain, sufferings and sleepless nights and P10,000.00
as attorney's fees.
G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005
QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT and Engineer RAMIR J.
TIAMZON, Petitioners, vs. FULGENCIO DACARA*, Respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
"Sometime on February 28, 1988 at about 1:00 A.M., Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of '87 Toyota
Corolla 4-door Sedan with Plate No. 877 (sic), while driving the said
vehicle, rammed into a pile of earth/street diggings found at
Matahimik St., Quezon City, which was then being repaired by the
Quezon City government. As a result, Dacarra (sic), Jr. allegedly
sustained bodily injuries and the vehicle suffered extensive damage
for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
"Indemnification was sought from the city government (Record, p.
22), which however, yielded negative results. Consequently, Fulgencio
P. Dacara (hereinafter referred to as FULGENCIO), for and in behalf of
his minor son, Jr., filed a Complaint (Record, p. 1) for damages
against the Quezon City and Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, as defendants,
before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 101, Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-233.
FULGENCIO prayed that the amount of not less than 20,000.00
actual or compensatory damages, 150,000.00 moral damages,
30,000.00 exemplary damages, and 20,000.00 attorney's fees and
costs of the suit be awarded to him.
"In an Answer with Affirmative and/or Special Defenses (Record, p.
11), defendants admitted the occurrence of the incident but alleged
that the subject diggings was provided with a moun[d] of soil and
barricaded with reflectorized traffic paint with sticks placed before or
after it which was visible during the incident on February 28, 1988 at
1:00 A.M. In short, defendants claimed that they exercised due care
by providing the area of the diggings all necessary measures to avoid
accident. Hence, the reason why Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. fell into the
diggings was precisely because of the latter's negligence and failure
to exercise due care."5
After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 101,
Quezon City, rendered its Decision6 dated June 29, 1990. The
evidence proffered by the complainant (herein respondent) was found
to be sufficient proof of the negligence of herein petitioners. Under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code,7 the latter were held liable as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises above considered, based on the quantum of
evidence presented by the plaintiff which tilts in their favor elucidating
the negligent acts of the city government together with its employees
when considered in the light of Article 2189, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering the defendants to indemnify the plaintiff the sum of
twenty thousand pesos as actual/compensatory damages, 10,000.00
as moral damages, 5,000.00 as exemplary damages, 10,000.00 as
attorney's fees and other costs of suit."8
In their appeal to the CA, petitioners maintained that they had
observed due diligence and care in installing preventive warning
devices, and that it was in fact the plaintiff who had failed to exercise
prudence by driving too fast to avoid the diggings. Moreover, the
lower court allegedly erred in using Article 2189 of the Civil Code,
which supposedly applied only to liability for the death or injuries
suffered by a person, not for damage to property.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA agreed with the RTC's finding that petitioners' negligence was
the proximate cause of the damage suffered by respondent.9 Noting
the failure of petitioners to present evidence to support their
contention that precautionary measures had indeed been observed, it
ruled thus:
"x x x. Sadly, the evidence indicates that [petitioners] failed to show
that they placed sufficient and adequate precautionary signs at
Matahimik Street to minimize or prevent the dangers to life and limb
under the circumstances. Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses
for the [petitioners], namely Engr. Ramir Tiamzon, Ernesto Landrito
and Eduardo Castillo, that there were signs, gasera which was buried
so that its light could not be blown off by the wind and barricade,
none was ever presented to stress and prove the sufficiency and
adequacy of said contention."10
Further upholding the trial court's finding of negligence on the part of
herein petitioners, the CA gave this opinion:
"x x x. As observed by the trial court, the negligence of [petitioners]
was clear based on the investigation report of Pfc. William P.
Villafranca stating to the effect 'that the subject vehicle rammed into
a pile of earth from a deep excavation thereat without any warning
devi[c]e whatsoever and as a consequence thereof, Dacara, Jr. lost
control of his driven car and finally turned-turtle causing substantial
damage to the same.' As a defense against liability on the basis of
quasi-delict, one must have exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family which [petitioners] failed to establish in the instant case."11
Whether Article 2189 is applicable to cases in which there has been
no death or physical injury, the CA ruled in the affirmative:
"x x x. More importantly, we find it illogical to limit the liability to
death or personal injury only as argued by appellants in the case at
bar applying the foregoing provisions. For, injury is an act that
damages, harms or hurts and mean in common as the act or result of
inflicting on a person or thing something that causes loss, pain,
distress, or impairment. Injury is the most comprehensive, applying to
an act or result involving an impairment or destruction of right,
health, freedom, soundness, or loss of something of value."12
Hence, this Petition.13
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of
law/substance contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence
when it affirmed the award of moral damage suit (sic) the
amount of 10,000.00.
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a question of
law/substance contrary to applicable law and jurisprudence
when it affirmed the award of exemplary damage sin (sic) the
amount of 5,000.00 and attorney's fee in the [a]mount of
10,000.00.
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred and/;or (sic)
had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction when it refused to hold that
respondent's son in the person of Fulgencio Dacara, Jr. was
negligent at the time of incident."14
Because the issues regarding the liability of petitioners for moral and
exemplary damages presuppose that their negligence caused the
vehicular accident, we first resolve the question of negligence or the
proximate cause of the incident.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Negligence
Maintaining that they were not negligent, petitioners insist that they
placed all the necessary precautionary signs to alert the public of a
roadside construction. They argue that the driver (Fulgencio Dacara
Jr.) of respondent's car was overspeeding, and that his own
negligence was therefore the sole cause of the incident.
Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise.15 Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each
case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent.16
What really caused the subject vehicle to turn turtle is a factual issue
that this Court cannot pass upon, absent any whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment by the lower courts or an ample showing that
they lacked any basis for their conclusions.17 The unanimity of the CA
and the trial court in their factual ascertainment that petitioners'
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident bars us from
supplanting their findings and substituting these with our own. The
function of this Court is limited to the review of the appellate court's
alleged errors of law. It is not required to weigh all over again the
factual evidence already considered in the proceedings
below.18 Petitioners have not shown that they are entitled to an
exception to this rule.19 They have not sufficiently demonstrated any
special circumstances to justify a factual review.
That the negligence of petitioners was the proximate cause of the
accident was aptly discussed in the lower court's finding, which we
quote:
"Facts obtaining in this case are crystal clear that the accident of
February 28, 1988 which caused almost the life and limb of Fulgencio
Dacara, Jr. when his car turned turtle was the existence of a pile of
earth from a digging done relative to the base failure at Matahimik
Street nary a lighting device or a reflectorized barricade or sign
perhaps which could have served as an adequate warning to motorist
especially during the thick of the night where darkness is pervasive.
"Contrary to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense that there
were signs, gasera which was buried so that its light could not be
blown off by the wind and barricade, none was ever presented to
stress the point that sufficient and adequate precautionary signs were
placed at Matahimik Street. If indeed signs were placed thereat, how
then could it be explained that according to the report even of the
policeman which for clarity is quoted again, none was found at the
scene of the accident.
"Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular
set of events is transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the
greater the danger known or reasonably anticipated, the greater is
the degree of care required to be observed.
"The provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the
responsibility of the city government relative to the maintenance of
roads and bridges since it exercises the control and supervision over
the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory
provision found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per
se which renders the City government liable. Harsh application of the
law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the
responsibility for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges
and neither exception nor exculpation from liability would deem just
and equitable."20 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners belatedly point out that Fulgencio Jr. was driving at the
speed of 60 kilometers per hour (kph) when he met the accident. This
speed was allegedly well above the maximum limit of 30 kph allowed
on "city streets with light traffic, when not designated 'through
streets,'" as provided under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
(Republic Act 4136). Thus, petitioners assert that Fulgencio Jr.,
having violated a traffic regulation, should be presumed negligent
pursuant to Article 218521 of the Civil Code.22
These matters were, however, not raised by petitioners at any time
during the trial. It is evident from the records that they brought up for
the first time the matter of violation of RA 4136 in their Motion for
Reconsideration23 of the CA Decision dated February 21, 2001. It is
too late in the day for them to raise this new issue. It is well-settled
that points of law, theories or arguments not brought out in the
original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal.24 To
consider their belatedly raised arguments at this stage of the
proceedings would trample on the basic principles of fair play, justice,
and due process.25
Indeed, both the trial and the appellate courts' findings, which are
amply substantiated by the evidence on record, clearly point to
petitioners' negligence as the proximate cause of the damages
suffered by respondent's car. No adequate reason has been given to
overturn this factual conclusion.
Second Issue:
Moral Damages
Petitioners argue that moral damages are recoverable only in the
instances specified in Article 221926 of the Civil Code. Although the
instant case is an action for quasi-delict, petitioners contend that
moral damages are not recoverable, because no evidence of physical
injury were presented before the trial court.27
To award moral damages, a court must be satisfied with proof of the
following requisites: (1) an injury -- whether physical, mental, or
psychological -- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act
or omission factually established; (3) a wrongful act or omission of
the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219.28
Article 2219(2) specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for
quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical
injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the
quasi-delict resulted in physical injury.29 This rule was enunciated
in Malonzo v. Galang30 as follows:
"x x x. Besides, Article 2219 specifically mentions 'quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries,' as an instance when moral damages may
be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi-delicts not resulting
in physical injuries are excluded, excepting of course, the special torts
referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10,
Art. 2219)."
In the present case, the Complaint alleged that respondent's son
Fulgencio Jr. sustained physical injuries. The son testified that he
suffered a deep cut on his left arm when the car overturned after
hitting a pile of earth that had been left in the open without any
warning device whatsoever.
It is apparent from the Decisions of the trial and the appellate courts,
however, that no other evidence (such as a medical certificate or
proof of medical expenses) was presented to prove Fulgencio Jr.'s
bare assertion of physical injury. Thus, there was no credible proof
that would justify an award of moral damages based on Article
2219(2) of the Civil Code.
Moreover, the Decisions are conspicuously silent with respect to the
claim of respondent that his moral sufferings were due to the
negligence of petitioners. The Decision of the trial court, which
summarizes the testimony of respondent's four witnesses, makes no
mention of any statement regarding moral suffering, such as mental
anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, social humiliation
and the like.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
inflicted on a person.31 Intended for the restoration of the
psychological or emotional status quo ante, the award of moral
damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or
moral injury, competent and substantial proof of the suffering
experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this approximation
are definite findings as to what the supposed moral damages suffered
consisted of; otherwise, such damages would become a penalty
rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.32
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be
awarded -- whether in a civil33 or a criminal case34 -- in the absence of
proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, or similar injury.35 The award of moral damages must be
solidly anchored on a definite showing that
respondent actually experienced emotional and mental sufferings.
Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear
and convincing proof.36
Third Issue:
Exemplary Damages
Petitioners argue that exemplary damages and attorney's fees are not
recoverable. Allegedly, the RTC and the CA "did not find that
petitioners were guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their
duty and responsibilities."37
Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right.38 While
granting them is subject to the discretion of the court, they can be
awarded only after claimants have shown their entitlement to moral,
temperate or compensatory damages.39 In the case before us,
respondent sufficiently proved before the courts a quo that
petitioners' negligence was the proximate cause of the incident,
thereby establishing his right to actual or compensatory damages. He
has adduced adequate proof to justify his claim for the damages
caused his car. The question that remains, therefore, is whether
exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to compensatory
damages.
Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in cases of quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.40 Gross negligence means such utter want of care
as to raise a presumption that the persons at fault must have been
conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and
that they must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the
danger of injury to the person or property of others.41 The negligence
must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or
property. Such a circumstance obtains in the instant case.
A finding of gross negligence can be discerned from the Decisions of
both the CA and the trial court. We quote from the RTC Decision:
"Sad to state that the City Government through its instrumentalities
have (sic) failed to show the modicum of responsibility, much less,
care expected of them (sic) by the constituents of this City. It is even
more deplorable that it was a case of a street digging in a side street
which caused the accident in the so-called 'premier city.'"
The CA reiterated the finding of the trial court that petitioners'
negligence was clear, considering that there was no warning
device whatsoever43 at the excavation site.
The facts of the case show a complete disregard by petitioners of any
adverse consequence of their failure to install even a single warning
device at the area under renovation. Considering further that the
street was dimly lit,44 the need for adequate precautionary measures
was even greater. By carrying on the road diggings without any
warning or barricade, petitioners demonstrated a wanton disregard
for public safety. Indeed, the February 28, 1988 incident was bound
to happen due to their gross negligence. It is clear that under the
circumstances, there is sufficient factual basis for a finding of gross
negligence on their part.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may
be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The
award of these damages is meant to be a deterrent to socially
deleterious actions.45 Public policy requires such imposition to
suppress wanton acts of an offender.46 It must be emphasized that
local governments and their employees should be responsible not only
for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of
the public. Thus, they must secure construction areas with adequate
precautionary measures.
Not only is the work of petitioners impressed with public interest;
their very existence is justified only by public service. Hence, local
governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the
interests of the public foremost in their agenda. For these reasons, it
is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very
parties responsible for endangering the public through such a rash
and reckless act.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages
is DELETED. No costs.
G.R. No. L-25723 June 29, 1984
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
HOMESTEADERS, namely, IGNACIO BANGUG, PASCUAL
BANGUG, EUSEBIO GUMIRAN, SANTIAGO AGGABAO and
ANTONIO DERAY, petitioners-appellants,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF BRUNO
CABAUATAN, respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This is a land registration case involving 128 hectares of land located
in Cabagan, Isabela. On page 125 of the Gaceta de Manila dated
January 30, 1884, it was published that the land applied Or by Bruno
Cabanatan (sic) "en la jurisdiction de Cabagan de la de Isabela de
Luzon" was declared "enagenables" (Exh. P).
On page 142 of the Gaceta de Manila dated August 2, 1885, this entry
was published: "Adjudicando a ... D. Bruno Cabanatan (sic) la
extension de 138 hectareas, 91 areas y 50 centiareas de terreno
situado en el pueblo de Cabagan, en Isabela de Luzon, en la cantidad
de pfs. 188'71 6/81" (Exh. Q. The name is "Cabauatan" in Exh. M).
"Bruno Cabanatan "of Cabagan, Isabela appears as No. 322 in
a handwritten list of "Expedientes Remitidos A Terrenos Publicos"
(terminated cases) dated November 30, 1901 in the files the Division
of Archives (Exh. L and O).
However, the applicants have not produced in evidence any
composition title, the basis of their application. It was allegedly
burned in the house of Pepe Buraga during the war (34 tsn June 26,
1956). So, we do not know the boundaries of the 138 hectares land
allegedly adjudicated to Bruno Cabanatan, granting that he was the
same as Bruno Cabauatan, the ancestor of the applicants; in what
barrio or sitio of Cabagan it is located; why in 1932 the 138 hectares
had been increased to 154 hectares. and why in 1921 the same land
was declared for tax purposes in the name of Honofre Cabauatan,
Bruno's nephew, and not in the names of Bruno s heirs.
As correctly contended by the Solicitor General, the land applied for
must be Identified. The claim of possession or having a composition
title is inutile if the land is not Identified.
Bruno died during the Spanish regime. The year when he died is not
known. He is survived by seven children with the following
descendants:
that the land is located at Malasi, Cabagan, bounded on the north,
east and south by public land (P.D.) and on the west by a mountain.
How Onofre came to have a tax declaration for that land has not been
adequately explained.
Emilio Cabauatan, a son of Onofre, in his opposition and testimony
claimed that lawyer Miguel Binag, in behalf of Bruno's heirs, in 1937
proposed to use the said declaration in the land registration
proceeding. He promised to give the heirs of Onofre Cabauatan one-
third of the land. However, lawyer Binag denied that he ever made
such a proposition.

1. Candida, survived by Lucio Guingab and Jose
Buraga.
2. Paulina, survived by Maria, Jose Gregorio and
Epifania, surnamed Samus (children of the first
marriage) and by Eugenia and Vicente Uanan children
of her second marriage.
3. Francisco, survived by Manuel, Faustina, Juan and
Remedios.
4. Bruno 2nd, survived by Purisima, Francisco, Cristeta,
Benjamin and Respicio.
Emilio also claimed that the land of Bruno is in Sitio Malini, three
kilometers from Sitio Malasi. The trial court and Binag denied that
there was a sitio in Cabagan called Malini. It was not found in the list
of sitios in the governor's office.
On March 5,1934 Judge Mariano Rosauro issued Decree No. 536561
for the registration of a parcel of land, plan 95520, with an area of 25
hectares located at the "sitio of Malisi, Barrio of Aggub," Cabagan. It
was registered in the names of the following heirs of Bruno
as proindiviso co-owners without regard to the right of
representation (Exh. J)
1. Candida Cabauatan 16. Rufina Cabauatan

5. Salvador, survived by Paz, Lucio, Lourdes and Pilar, 2. Maria Samus 17. Paz Cabauatan
who is dead and is in turn survived by her children 3. Jose Samus 18. Lucio Cabauatan
Celso Mesa and Ruben, Mesa.
4. Gregorio Samus 19. Lourdes Cabauatan
6. Heculina, survived by Faustino, Maria, Alejandra,
5. Epifanio Samus 20. Cervex Mesa
Genoveva, Amada and Francisco, all surnamed Cauan.
Genoveva Cauan is dead and is survived by her child, 6. Eugenia Uanan 21. Ruben Mesa
Josefina Balmaceda.
7. Vicente Uanan 22. Faustino Cauan

7. Guillermo, survived by his son, Pedro Cabauatan. 8. Manuel Cabauatan 23. Maria Cauan

Bruno had a brother named Leon, who had a son named Honofre 9. Faustino Cabauatan 24. Alejandra Cauan
(Onofre) who, curiously enough, obtained in 1921 a tax declaration 10. Juan Cabauatan 25. Genoveva Cauan
for the 138 hectares at P5,200. In that tax declaration, it was stated
 Lot No. 6 Claimed by Ramon Guingab (already registered,).
11. Remedios Cabauatan 26. Amada Cauan
Lot No. 7 Claimed by Vicente Ramos and Casiano Magbayad.
12. Purisima Cabauatan 27. Francisco Cauan
The provincial fiscal, in representation of the Director of Lands,
13. Francisco Cabauatan 28. Josefina Balmaceda alleged in his opposition that the land claimed by Bruno's heirs was
14. Cristeta Cabauatan And
covered by the approved and subsisting homestead applications of (1)
Santiago Aggabao, deceased, now heirs represented by Simplicio
15. Benjamin Cabauatan 29. Pedro Cabauatan Aggabao; (2) Ignacio Bangug, deceased, now his heirs represented
by Anacleto Bangug; (3) Eusebio Gumiran, deceased, now his heirs
The 25 hectares land already registered has as boundaries parts of represented by Luis Gumiran; (4) Antonio Deray, deceased, now his
the land under controversy. Thus, the decree states that the 25 heirs represented by Pablo Deray; (5) Casiano Magbayad, transferor,
hectares are bounded on the northeast and south by public lands; on now Rodolfo Albano, transferee, and (6) Gaudencio Flores (p. 23,
the east by property of Tomas Vinarao vs. heirs of Bruno RA).
Cabauatan; on the west by property of Lucas Pagulayan vs. heirs of
Bruno Cabauatan and on the northwest by the Lagoon Malasi Grande As already stated, the instant second registration case was filed in
and public land. 1937 based on an expanded survey. The applicants are the very same
heirs of Bruno who were the applicants in the first registration case.
It may be asked: why did not that 1934 registration case embrace the
whole 138 hectares allegedly covered by Bruno's composition title and They claim the land without taking into account the rule on
why did Bruno's heirs have to resort to a second or another representation. The record does not disclose why the case was not
registration case in 1937? The applicants have not offered any finished before liberation. The trial commenced in 1956 or almost
satisfactory explanation. twenty years after the application was filed. That is an unusual
feature of the case.
In 1934, the year the 25 hectares of land located at Malasi, Cabagan,
was registered in the names of Bruno's heirs, they produced a survey Evidence for the applicants, Bruno's heirs. From the testimonies of
plan Psu-95458, for his land which had an area of 154 hectares, much Candida Cabauatan, Jose Buraga, Gabriel Zipagan and Placido
larger than the 138 hectares adjudicated to Bruno in 1885. Clearly, Angoluan, the trial court found that the land in question (128.8 plus
the area was inflated by 16 hectares. The land consisted of seven 25.4 or 154 hectares) was administered by Bruno's son, Salvador.
contiguous lots located in Barrio Aggub, Cabagan. It included the 25 There were allegedly forty tenants during the Spanish regime working
hectares of plan Psu-95520 which was already registered and which in the middle portion of the land.
was designated as Lot No. 6.
Some of the tenants were still on the land during the American
The plan was based on a 1932 survey. The surveyor in 1934 indicated regime. They have been cultivating the land under the overseers,
in the plan Psu-95458 the following claimants of the seven lots (Exh. Zipagan and Angoluan. During the Spanish regime, Bruno's children
F) received 1/3 of the products, such as corn and palay, as the owner's
share. The tenants also planted kapok, acacia trees and some
Lot No. 1 Claimed by Pascual Bangug. oranges.
Lot No. 2 Claimed by Heirs of Antonio Deray.
Lot No. 3 Claimed by Heirs of Ignacio Bangug. They allegedly constructed rice paddies and built dwelling houses.
Lot No. 4 Claimed by Eusebio Gumiran. Bruno's heirs have possessed the land openly, peacefully,
Lot No. 5 Uncultivated.
continuously and in the concept of owner since the Spanish regime up
to the present time.
In 1916, about 50 hectares of the land were under cultivation, the
greater portion of which is included in Lot No. 6, which, as already
mentioned, was registered in 1934 in the names of Bruno's heirs, the
same applicants in this 1937 case. The land taxes were paid since
1921 in the name of Honofre, not an heir of Bruno.
Evidence for the Director of Lands and homesteaders. As oppositor,
the Director of Lands presented the following documentary evidence:
(1) The 1924 homestead application of Eusebio Gumiran and his
intention to make final proof dated July 22, 1930 for 24 hectares of
land located at Sitio Malasi, Barrio Aggub, Cabagan (Exh- 1-3).
(2) The order dated August 28, 1931 for the issuance of a patent
to Pascual Bangug for 24 hectares covered by his 1911 application
(Exh. 5 and 6-DL).
(3) The approval dated November 23, 1931 of Ignacio
Bangug's homestead application for 10 hectares (Exh. 7 and 8-DL).
(4) The approval dated March 23, 1932 of Casiano
Mabbayad's homestead application for 24 hectares (Exh. 10 and 11-
DL)
(5) The approval dated August 12, 1950 of Gaudencio
Flores' homestead application for 24 hectares (Exh. 12 and 13-DL).
(6) The approval dated August 24, 1932 of Santiago Agabao's 1926
homestead application for 24 hectares (Exh. 14 and 16-DL).
(7) The approval dated May 15, 1928 of Antonio Deray's homestead
application for 24 hectares (Exh. 17-DL).
As noted by the Solicitor General, the Court of Appeals failed to
mention in its decision the evidence for the homesteaders. The
following is a summary of that evidence by the Solicitor General and
the trial court.
Ignacio Bangug in 1917 occupied about ten hectares of the land in
Sitio Malasi. He planted it to rice, corn, tobacco and beans. He applied
in 1926 for a homestead over that parcel of land (Exh. 11). He paid
the land taxes as early as 1922 (Exh. 1 to 10). His application was
approved in 1931. After his death in 1931, his son Jose continued to
occupy the homestead. Jose Bangug did not know that the land was
included in the survey made for Bruno's heirs.
Pascual Bangug, who died in 1950, had cultivated a portion of the
disputed land since 1910 and in 1911 he filed his homestead
application (Exh. F). He declared it for tax purposes and paid the land
taxes since 1916 (Exh. 2 to 24). The homestead patent was issued in
1931 (Exh. 25). He built his house on the land. His heirs continued his
possession after his death. Pascual planted the land to rice, corn,
mongo, peanuts, oranges, lemon, acacia and bamboos.
Eusebio Gumiran occupied in 1924 a portion of Lots Nos. 4 and 5
(Exh. K). He filed his homestead application in that same year. He
planted the land to rice and other staple crops. He made a final proof
in 1930. After his death in 1942, his children and widow continued to
possess the homestead.
Santiago Aggabao started occupying the land in Sitio Malasi in 1927.
It has an area of 24 hectares. His homestead application was
approved in 1932 (Exh. 16). His children have possessed the
homestead after his death. They planted it to rice, corn and
vegetables.
Antonio Deray filed in 1924 his homestead application for 24 hectares
in what is now Lot No. 2 of the survey plan. It was approved in 1928
(Exh. 17 and 18-DL). His heirs have been in possession of the
homestead.
Gaudencio Flores and the heirs of Honofre Cabauatan also presented
evidence as oppositors but they did not appeal to this Court.
Ruling. The trial court granted the application for registration of the
six lots with an area of 128 hectares, in addition to the often
mentioned 25 hectares already registered. It reasoned out that if
Bruno's heirs had possession of the said 25 hectares, they could be
deemed to have "constructive possession" of the remaining part of
the land provided that the same is not in the adverse possession of
another person (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175).lwphl@it

We hold that the rule on constructive possession does not apply to

this case because the major portion of the disputed 128 hectares has
been in the adverse possession of homesteaders and their heirs and is
still part of the public domain until the patents are issued.

The area claimed is in excess of that mentioned in the committed

position title. The alleged lost composition title cannot be given any
probative value. Its contents were not proven by secondary evidence.
The precise location of the land and the possession thereof were not
proven by the applicants. The alleged possession of Bruno's heirs may
refer to the 25 hectares already registered in their names.
Inexplicably, the registration of the 154 hectares was made in two
installments.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court
are reversed and set aside. The application for registration is
dismissed. The Director of Lands should issue to appellant heirs of the
deceased homesteaders their patents in accordance with the Public
Land Law. Costs against the applicants.