DAY SEVEN

N. JURISDICTION REMEDIES AND APPEAL

1. Labor Arbiter
Art. 217, Labor Code

1.1 Strikes and Lock-outs

1.2 Termination disputes
1.3 ULP cases
1.4 Damages
1.5 Small money claims with claim for reinstatement
1.6 Other claims

Cases:
San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC, 161 SCRA 719
ISSUE: Whether the money claims by the private respondent, arising from the Innovation Program
incentive scheme that is offered and open only to employees, falls within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
RULING: No. The jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission is outlined
in Article 217 of the Labor Code, as last amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 227 which took effect on 1
June 1982. While paragraph 3 above refers to all money claims of workers, it is not necessary to
suppose that the entire universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their
employers has been absorbed into the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters. In the first
place, paragraph 3 should be read not in isolation from but rather within the context formed by paragraph
1 (relating to unfair labor practices), paragraph 2 (relating to claims concerning terms and conditions of
employment), paragraph 4 (claims relating to household services, a particular species of employer-
employee relations), and paragraph 5 (relating to certain activities prohibited to employees or to
employers). It is evident that there is a unifying element which runs through paragraphs 1 to 5 and that is,
that they all refer to cases or disputes arising out of or in connection with an employer-employee
relationship.
The Court, therefore, believes and so holds that the money claims of workers referred to in paragraph 3
of Article 217 embraces money claims which arise out of or in connection with the employer-employee
relationship, or some aspect or incident of such relationship, Put a little differently, that money claims of
workers which now fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters are those money
claims which have some reasonable causal connection with the employer-employee relationship.
[Nonetheless,] the important principle that runs through [the] three (3) [cited] cases is that where the claim
to the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations
statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute
belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations,
resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage structures and
other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly,
such claims fall outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to Labor Arbiters and the
NLRC and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.

Sanyo Philippines Workers Union PSSLU vs. Canizares, 211 SCRA 361
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union-PTGWO vs. Bersamira, 186 SCRA 496
Contra: Molave Sales, Inc. vs. Laron, 129 SCRA 485
Medina vs. Castro-Bartolome, 116 SCRA 597

2. National Labor Relations Commission

Art. 217 (b]; Art. 223, Labor Code
2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended by NLRC En Banc Resolution No. 11-12, series of
2012
 How appeal is perfected from Labor Arbiter to NLRC. --
Soliman Security Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 384 SCRA 514 [2002]).

Issue: Whether the appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC is perfected.

Held: Yes. Appeal to the NLRC is perfected once an appellant file the memorandum of appeal, pays the
required appeal fee and, where an employer appeals and a monetary award is involved, the latter posts
an appeal bond or submits a surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company. In the present case,
the records before the Court would show, however, that an appeal bond was posted with the NLRC at
the same time that the appeal memorandum of petitioners was filed on 16 October 1998. A certified true
copy of the appeal bond would indicate that it was received by the Commission on 16 October 1998, the
date reflected by the stamp-mark thereon. In addition, the Order dated 11 November 1998, the NLRC
categorically stated that records disclose that the instant appeal was accompanied by a surety bond, as
the Decision sought to be appealed involved monetary award. The Commissions declaration that the
appeal was accompanied by a surety bond indicated that there had been compliance with Article 223
of the Labor Code. Therefore, the appeal was perfected.

Posting of Bond; Rules Navarro vs. NLRC, 327 SCRA 22 [2000]; Article 223, LC

ISSUE: WON the appeal was filed/perfected on time

RULING: NO.

Perfection of an appeal includes the filing, within the prescribed period, of the memorandum of
appeal containing, among others, the assignment of error/s, arguments in support thereof, the
relief sought and, in appropriate cases, posting of the appeal bond. In case where the judgment
involves a monetary award, as in this case, the appeal may be perfected only upon posting of a
cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC. The
amount of the bond must be equivalent to the monetary award, exclusive of moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees.
The records indicate that private respondents received the copy of labor arbiters decision on April
3, 1992, hence, they had only until April 13, 1992 to perfect their appeal. While private
respondents filed their memorandum of appeal on time, they posted surety bond only on April 30,
1992, which is beyond the ten-day reglementary period, a procedural lapse admitted by private
respondents. Private respondents failure to post the required appeal bond within the prescribed
period is inexcusable.

Passbook not equivalent of bond. -- Mindanao Times Corporation vs. Confesor, G.R. No. 183417,
05 February 2010

When bond is issued by surety company with revoked permit. -- Cesario del Rosario vs. Philippine
Journalists, Inc., G.R. No. 181516, 19 August 2009

Issue: Whether the bond posted by the surety company PPAC, whose permit was subsequently
revoked, is sufficient to perfect the appeal.

Ruling: YES. Article 223 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases of judgment involving a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. The requirement that
employers post a cash or surety bond to perfect their appeal is apparently intended to assure
 workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the
dismissal of the former's appeal. It was intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to
delay, or even evade, their obligations to satisfy their employees' just and lawful claims.

At the time of the filing of the surety bond by respondent, PPAC was still an accredited bonding
company. Thus, it was but proper to honor the appeal bond issued by a bonding company duly
accredited by this Court at the time of its issuance. The subsequent revocation of the authority of a
bonding company should not prejudice parties who relied on its authority. The revocation of
authority of a bonding company is prospective in application. The Court, in allowing the appeal to
proceed, is guided by the principle that technical rules of procedure should not hamper the quest
for justice and truth.

Motion to Reduce Bond; Requisites. - Andrew James McBurnie vs. Eulalio Ganzon, EGI Manager
G.R. No. 178034, 178117, 17 October 2013

Issue:
What are the requisites for a motion to reduce bond

Held:
The prevailing jurisprudence on the matter provides that the filing of a motion to reduce bond,
coupled with compliance with the two conditions emphasized in Garcia v. KJ Commercial for the
grant of such motion, namely, (1) a meritorious ground, and (2) posting of a bond in a reasonable
amount, shall suffice to suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal from the labor
arbiter decision to the NLRC. To require the full amount of the bond within the 10-day
reglementary period would only render nugatory the legal provisions which allow an appellant to
seek a reduction of the bond.

Substantial compliance. -- Grand Asian Shipping Lines vs. Galvez, G.R. No. 178184, 29 January
2014.

Issue:
W/N NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining petitioners appeal despite the
insufficiency of the bond posted by the latter.
No, there was substantial compliance with the rules on appeal bonds. In order to perfect an appeal
from the decision of the LA granting monetary award, the Labor Code requires the posting of a
bond, either in cash or surety bond, in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
Nonetheless, the SC has held that riles should not be applied in a very rigid and strict sense. This
is true in labor cases wherein the substantial merits of the case must accordingly be decided upon
to serve the interest of justice. When there has been substantial compliance, relaxation of the rules
is warranted.
In this case, petitioners appealed from the decision of the LA awarding the crewmembers in the
amount of P7,104,483.84 by filing a notice of appeal with a very urgent motion to reduce bond and
posting a cash bond in the amount of P500,000 and a supersedeas bond in the amount of P1.5
million. SC ruled that this is a substantial compliance in accordance with the law entitled to the
relaxation of rules.

3. Secretary of Labor
Arts. 128 and 263 (g), Labor Code

Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union FFW vs. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 565
Issue:
Whether or not the mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor
automatically carries with it a return to work order even when there is no such directive
in the order.
Ruling:
Yes. It is clear from the foregoing legal provision that the moment the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest,
such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another
order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the
Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return to work order, even if the
directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. However,
petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on September
8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly directing the
striking workers to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to immediately return to
work but which directive herein petitioners opted to ignore.
Phimco Industries, Inc. vs. Brillantes, 304 SCRA 747
National Federation of Labor vs. Laguesma, 304 SCRA 405

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR vs. LAGUESMA [G.R. No. 123426. 10 March 1999. J.
Kapunan]

ISSUE: Whether judicial review is available as a remedy to review the decision of Secretary of
Labor and Employment?

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court have always emphatically asserted its power to pass the
decisions and discretionary acts of the NLRC well as the Secretary of Labor in the face of the
contention that no judicial review is provided by the Labor Code. The purpose of judicial review is
to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties
affected by its decision (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec, 165). It is part of the system of checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of this Court, St. Martin Funeral
Homes v. NLRC succinctly pointed out, the remedy of an aggrieved party is to timely file a motion
for reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably
file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Proceeding therefrom and particularly considering that the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, all such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of
the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.

In the original rendering of the Labor Code, Art. 222 thereof provided that the decisions of the
NLRC are appealable to the Secretary of Labor on specified grounds. The decisions of the
Secretary of Labor may be appealed to the President of the Philippines subject to such conditions
or limitations as the president may direct. Thus under the state of the law then, this Court had
ruled that original actions for certiorari and prohibition file with this Court against the decision of
the Secretary of Labor passing upon the decision of the NLRC were unavailing for mere error of
judgment as there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which
was an appeal to the President.

In fine, we find that it is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65 against the decisions of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the Labor Code
 and its implementing and related rules be filed initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount
consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, emphasized in St.
Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our
primary jurisdiction."

4. Regional Director - Art. 129 & 217, LC

3.1 Small money claims without reinstatement

3.2 Visitorial powers
3.3 Petition for certification election
3.4 Decision of RD appealable to NLRC

Cases:
Maternity Childrens Hospital vs. Sec. of Labor, 174 SCRA 632

Odin Security Agency vs. Dela Serna, 182 SCRA 472

Issue: WON the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the claims of the respondents.

Held: YES.
The petitioner is estopped from questioning the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the Regional
Director over the private respondents' claims. Petitioner submitted to the jurisdiction of the
Regional Director by taking part in the hearings before him and by submitting a position paper.
When the Regional Director issued his order requiring petitioner to pay the private respondents
the benefits they were claiming, petitioner was silent. Only the private respondents filed a motion
for reconsideration. It was only after the Undersecretary modified the order of the Regional
Director that the petitioner moved for reconsideration and questioned the jurisdiction of the public
respondents to hear and decide the case.

In addition, the Regional Director and the Undersecretary did have jurisdiction over the private
respondents' complaint which was originally for violation of labor standards (Art. 128[b], Labor
Code). Only later did the guards ask for backwages on account of their alleged constructive
dismissal. Once vested, that jurisdiction continued until the entire controversy was decided.

SSK Parts Corporation vs. Camas, 181 SCRA 675

Issue: Whether the Regional Director has jurisdiction over claims for violation of labor standards.

Held: YES.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Director over employees' claims for wages and other monetary benefits
not exceeding P5,000 has been affirmed by Republic Act No. 6715, amending Article 129 of the Labor
Code. Being a curative statute, Republic Act No. 6715 may be given retroactive effect if, as in this case,
no vested rights would be impaired.

Under the exception clause in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, the Regional Director may not be
divested of his jurisdiction over these claims, unless three (3) elements concur, namely: (a) that the
petitioner (employer) contests the findings of the labor regulation officer and raises issues thereon; (b)
that in order to resolve such issues, there is a need to examine evidentiary matters; and (c) that such
matters are not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In this case, although the petitioner
contested the Regional Director's finding of violations of labor standards committed by the petitioner, that
issue was resolved by an examination of evidentiary matters which were verifiable in the ordinary course
of inspection. Hence, there was no need to indorse the case to the appropriate arbitration branch of the
NLRC for adjudication.

Guico vs. Quisumbing, 298 SCRA 666

ISSUE: Whether the Regional Director of DOLE properly took cognizance and later decided on
the letter-complaint filed in the DOLEs office, or as alleged by petitioner, citing Art 129 LC should
have indorsed the same to the Labor Arbiter for a more formal proceeding and presentation of
evidence.

HELD: The RD has jurisdiction over the case.

That the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor
standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer
be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7730 amending Article 128 (b) of the Labor
Code, viz:
Article 128 (b) - Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this
Code to the Contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee
still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to
the labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation based on
the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety
engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized
representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the
enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the
findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues
supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of
inspection.
An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said
order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in order appealed from.

4. Bureau of Labor Relations - Art. 226, LC

4.1 Inter-union and intra-union conflicts

4.2 Disputes arising from or affecting labor-management
relations except grievances
4.3 Registration of CBA

Cases:
Pepsi Cola Sales & Advertising Union vs. Sec. of Labor, 211 SCRA 843
Issue: Is the case within the original jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of
Labor Relations?
Holding: Art. 226 of the Labor Code states The Bureau of Labor Relations and the Labor
Relations Divisions in the regional offices of the Department of Labor shall have original and
exclusive authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both parties, on all
inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes, grievances or problems arising from or
affecting labor management relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural,
except those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
which shall be the subject of grievance procedure and/or voluntary arbitration.
The controversy between Alisasis and his union, PSAU respecting the former's rights under
the latter's "Mutual Aid Plan" would be an intra-union conflict under Article 226 of the Labor
 Code and hence, within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of
Labor Relations whose decision, it may additionally be mentioned, is appealable to the Secretary
of Labor.

Abbot Laboratories Phils, Inc. vs. Abbot Laboratories Employees Union, 323 SCRA 392
Issue: Does the Secretary of Labor have the jurisdiction to entertain appeals of
decisions rendered by the Bureau of Labor Relations in its appellate power?
Holding: Clearly, the Secretary of Labor and Employment has no jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal of ABBOTT. The appellate jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is
limited only to a review of cancellation proceedings decided by the Bureau of Labor Relations in
the exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Secretary of Labor and Employment has
no jurisdiction over decisions of the Bureau of Labor Relations rendered in the exercise of its
appellate power to review the decision of the Regional Director in a petition to cancel the union's
certificate of registration, said decisions being final and inappealable.

5. Voluntary Arbitrator
Art. 261, Labor Code
Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings, 15 October
2004, Rules IV and VI.

Cases:

Ludo & Luym Corp. vs. Saordino, 395 SCRA 451

ISSUE:

Whether the Voluntary Arbitrator has jurisdiction to award of benefits which were beyond the
terms of submission agreement.

(Petitioner asserts that the arbitrator must confine its adjudication to those issues submitted by
the parties for arbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the date of regularization of the
workers.)

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262,
can possibly include money claims in one form or another. Generally, the arbitrator is expected to
decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement. Nevertheless,
the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since
arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes.

Vivero vs. Court of Appeals, 344 SCRA 268

Issue: Whether the NLRC is deprived of jurisdiction over illegal dismissal cases whenever a CBA
clearly provides for grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration proceedings.

Held: Generally, no, unless the CBA provision on voluntary arbitration is restrictive in nature.

Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. - (2) Termination disputes;

(b) The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the
interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by
referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said
agreements.

However, any or all of these cases may, by agreement of the parties, be submitted to a Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for adjudication. Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code
provide

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. - The Voluntary Arbitrator
or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies
referred to in the immediately preceding article

Art. 262. Jurisdiction Over Other Labor Disputes. - The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including
unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks.

In San Miguel Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission this Court held that there is a need for an
express stipulation in the CBA that illegal termination disputes should be resolved by a Voluntary
Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, since the same fall within a special class of disputes that are
generally within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters by express provision of law. Absent
such express stipulation, the phrase "all disputes" should be construed as limited to the areas of conflict
traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators, i.e., disputes relating to contract-interpretation,
contract-implementation, or interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. Illegal
termination disputes - not falling within any of these categories - should then be considered as a special
area of interest governed by a specific provision of law. In this case, however, while the parties did agree
to make termination disputes the proper subject of voluntary arbitration, such submission remains
discretionary upon the parties. A perusal of the CBA provisions shows that Sec. 6, Art. XII (Grievance
Procedure) of the CBA is the general agreement of the parties to refer grievances, disputes or
misunderstandings to a grievance committee, and henceforth, to a voluntary arbitration committee.
Voluntary Arbitration is mandatory in character if there is a specific agreement between the parties to that
effect. It must be stressed however that, in the case at bar, the use of the word "may" shows the intention
of the parties to reserve the right of recourse to Labor Arbiters.

Tabigue et al vs. Intl Copra Export Corp., GR 183335, 23 Dec 2009

Issue: WON petitioners contention that unsettled grievances should be referred to voluntary arbitration
as called for in the CBA is proper.

Held: NO.
Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, only disputes involving the union and the company shall be
referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
Petitioners have not been duly authorized to represent the union.
Also, under Art. 255, the labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit
for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present grievances to the employer
does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.

Goya Inc. vs. Goya Employees Union, G.R. No. 170054, 21 January 2013

Cf. Grievance Machinery (Art. 260, Labor Code.)

Master Iron Labor Union vs. NLRC, 219 SCRA 47

San Miguel Corp. vs. NLRC, 304 SCRA 1

6. NCMB - B5 R13 S3, IRR

NCMB Manual of Regulations for Conciliation and Mediation, 31 Jan 1992

5.1 Strikes and Lock-outs; See previous chapter on Strikes

CONTRA: Labor Injunctions (Arts. 254; 218 and 263, Labor Code.)

7. Court of Appeals
Rules 43 and 65, Rules of Civil Procedure

Cases:
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC, 295 SCRA 494
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the NLRC are appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Held:
The Supreme Court is of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC
to the SC were eliminated, the legislative intendment was the Special Civil Action
for certiorari was and still the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances, we have
noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and original
action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate
courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with which the court
is particularly concerned here is that the Special Civil Action for certiorari is within
the concurrent original jurisdiction of this court and CA; whereas to indulge the
assumption that appeals by certiorari to the SC are allowed would not subserve, but
would subvert, the intention of the Congress as expressed in the sponsorship bill no.
1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended sec 9 of B.P. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the SC are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be
initially filed in the CA in strict observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts as
the appropriate forum for the relief desired.
Veloso vs. China Airlines, Ltd., 310 SCRA 274
 ISSUE: WON the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to challenge the resolution of
the NLRC

RULING: NO.

Petitioner received copy of the aforesaid resolution of public respondent on January 7, 1992. However,
instead of filing the required motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

This precipitate filing of petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of this case. As we have consistently held in numerous
cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable, for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify
errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had.

It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law against acts of public respondent. In this case, the plain and adequate
remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for reconsideration of the impugned resolution, to be made
under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a
procedure which is jurisdictional. Hence, the filing of the petition for certiorari in this case is patently
violative of prevailing jurisprudence and will not prosper without undue damage to the fundamental
doctrine that undergirds the grant of this prerogative writ.

Association of Trade Unions vs. Abella, 323 SCRA 50

Issue:
W/N the filing of petition for certiorari under rule 65 by the petitioners against a decision by the
NLRC was proper?
Held:
No, herein petitioners did not move for reconsideration, as the petition did not so indicate and
non-appeared from the records before the SC.
Filing a petition for certiorari under rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the assailed
resolution generally warrants the petitions outright dismissal. A motion fir reconsideration by
a concerned party is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or
mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against acts of pubic respondents. Here, the plain and
adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the
impugned resolution, based on palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and filed
within (10) days from receipt of the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which is
jurisdictional. Further, without a reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten0day
reglementary period, the questioned order, resolution or decision of the NLRC, becomes
final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
Moreover, in petitions for certiorari under rule 65, it may be noted that want of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of discretion and not merely reversible error, are the proper grounds for
review. Here petitioners neither assail the jurisdiction of respondent not attribute any grave
abyse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. Therefore, this petition must fail, for lack of
substantial requisites under rule 65.
Note: Supreme court still enetered into the merits of the case ultimately dismissing the petition.

8. Supreme Court
Rule 45, Rules of Civil Procedure

9. Liability of the Transferee of an Enterprise

 Sundowner Dev. Corp. vs. Drilon, 180 SCRA 14

Issue:
WON the purchaser of the assets of an employer corporation can be considered a successor
employer of the latter's employees.

Held:

No.

The rule is that unless expressly assumed, labor contracts such as employment contracts and
collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an enterprise,
labor contracts being in personam, thus binding only between the parties . A labor contract
merely creates an action in personally and does not create any real right which should be
respected by third parties. This conclusion draws its force from the right of an employer to
select his employees and to decide when to engage them as protected under our Constitution,
and the same can only be restricted by law through the exercise of the police power.

As a general rule, there is no law requiring a bona fide purchaser of assets of an on-going
concern to absorb in its employ the employees of the latter.

However, although the purchaser of the assets or enterprise is not legally bound to absorb in its
employ the employers of the seller of such assets or enterprise, the parties are liable to the
employees if the transaction between the parties is colored or clothed with bad faith.

Filipinas Port Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 773

Issue: Whether Filport is liable for the retirement benefits due private respondents for services
rendered by them prior to Feb 16, 1977 (the time of merger of different stevedoring and arrastre
corporations).

Ruling: YES. In view of the government policy which ordained that cargo handling operations
should be limited to only one cargo handling operator-contractor for every port, the different
stevedoring and arrastre corporations operating in the Port of Davao were integrated into a
single dockhandlers corporation, Filport. It actually started its operation on February 16, 1977.
As a result of the merger, Section 118, Article X of the General Guidelines on The Integration of
Stevedoring/Arrastre Services mandated Filport to draw its personnel complements from the
merging operators, Thus, Filport's labor force was mostly taken from the integrating
corporations, among them the private respondents.

Filport is liable for the retirement benefits due private respondents for the services rendered
prior to Feb. 16, 1977 being a survivor entity as it merely absorbed the integrating workers in its
labor force. There is clearly an intention to continue the employer-employee relationships of the
individual companies with its employees through Filport. Thus, Filport has the obligation not
only to absorb the workers of the dissolved companies but also to include the length of service
earned by the absorbed employees with their former employees as well. To rule otherwise
would be manifestly less than fair, certainly, less than just and equitable. Finally, to deny the
private respondents the fruits of their labor corresponding to the time they worked with their
previous employers would render at naught the constitutional provisions on labor protection. In
interpreting the protection to labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor
laws, and rules and regulations implementing the constitutional mandate, the Court has always
adopted the liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.

10. May employer offset costs of employees training from retirement benefits?
Bibiano C. Elegir vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. G.R. No. 181995, 16 July 2012.
 11. Workers preference of credit vs lien on unpaid wages, Art. 110 LC

Manuel D. Yngson, Jr., (in his capacity as the Liquidator of ARCAM & Co., Inc.) vs. Philippine
National Bank. G.R. No. 171132, 15 August 2012.

Issue: Whether the unpaid wages has the right of first preference over the claim of secured
creditor PNB.

Held: No. PNB a secured creditor has its preference over unsecured creditors and the secure
asset and the proceeds need to be included in the liquidation and shared with the unsecured
creditors. As to petitioners argument on the right of first preference as regards unpaid wages,
the Court has elucidated in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, 229
SCRA 350 (1994), that a distinction should be made between a preference of credit and a lien.
A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a
charge on a particular property. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages
recognized by Article 110 of the Labor Code, does not constitute a lien on the property of the
insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in
application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should
be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvents assets. It is a right to a first
preference in the discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor. Consequently, the right of first
preference for unpaid wages may not be invoked in this case to nullify the foreclosure sales
conducted pursuant to PNBs right as a secured creditor to enforce its lien on specific
properties of its debtor, ARCAM.

12. Prescriptive period in Labor Code prevails over Civil Code

in termination cases
Laureano vs. Court of Appeals, 324 SCRA 414 [2000]
Victory Liner vs. Race, 519 SCRA 497 [2007]
ISSUE: Whether the prescriptive period for the filing of an action or claim for reinstatement and payment
of labor standard benefits had already lapsed, given that the reckoning period of the accrual of a cause of
action is from the time the employee did not render any services.
RULING: No. In illegal dismissal cases, the employee concerned is given a period of four years from the
time of his dismissal within which to institute a complaint. This is based on Article 1146 of the New Civil
Code which states that actions based upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff must be brought within
four years. The four-year prescriptive period shall commence to run only upon the accrual of a cause of
action of the worker. It is settled that in illegal dismissal cases, the cause of action accrues from the time
the employment of the worker was unjustly terminated.
Thus, the four-year prescriptive period shall be counted and computed from the date of the employees
dismissal up to the date of the filing of complaint for unlawful termination of employment. It is error to
conclude that the employment of the respondent was unjustly terminated on 10 November 1994 because
he was, at that time, still confined at the Specialist Group Hospital, Dagupan City, for further treatment of
his fractured left leg. He must be considered as merely on sick leave at such time. Likewise, the
respondent cannot also be deemed as illegally dismissed from work upon his release from the said
hospital in December 1994 up to December 1997 since the records show that the respondent still
reported for work to the petitioner and was granted sick and disability leave by the petitioner during the
same period.
The respondent must be considered as unjustly terminated from work in January 1998 since this was the
first time he was informed by the petitioner that he was deemed resigned from his work. During that same
occasion, the petitioner, in fact, tried to convince the respondent to accept an amount of P50,000.00 as a
consolation for his dismissal but the latter rejected it. Thus, it was only at this time that the respondents
cause of action accrued. Consequently, the respondents filing of complaint for illegal dismissal on 1
September 1999 was well within the four-year prescriptive period.
It is also significant to note that from 10 November 1994 up to December 1997, the petitioner never
formally informed the respondent of the fact of his dismissal either through a written notice or hearing.
Indeed, it cannot be gainfully said that respondent was unlawfully dismissed on 10 November 1994 and
that the cause of action accrued on that date.

Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp vs. Panganiban, 514 SCRA 404 [2007]

Issue: Whether the respondents filing of a civil action interrupted the prescriptive period of his
claims for unpaid commissions.

Ruling: No. The respondents filing of a civil action has not interrupted the prescriptive period of
his claims for unpaid commissions.
Although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the
same position as though no action had been commenced at all.

In like manner, while the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period, its voluntary withdrawal left the petitioners in exactly the same
position as though no complaint had been filed at all. The withdrawal of their complaint effectively
erased the tolling of the reglementary period.

O. LABOR STANDARDS

1. WAGES
Art. 97, 98, 99, 101-119, LC; R7 and R8 B3 IRR LC
SLL International Cable Specialist vs. NLRC, GR 172161, 2 March 2011

1.1 Exclusions from coverage

1.2 Facilities vs. Supplements

Our Haus Realty Development Corporation vs. Alexander Parian, et al., G.R. No.
204651, 06 August 2014. -- Deductibility of Facility; Purpose Test; Requisites.

1.3 Wages vs. Salaries

Gaa vs. CA. GR No. L-44169, 03 Dec 1985, 140 SCRA 304
Jose Songco vs. NLRC, GR No. L-50999, 23 Mar 1990, 182 SCRA 610

ISSUE: Whether Songcos commissions are part of his wages or salaries. YES.

RULING: The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such type of
remuneration for services rendered demonstrate clearly that commissions are part of
petitioners wage or salary.

Article 97(f) of the Labor Code includes commission as part of ones salary:

Wage paid to any employee shall mean the remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained
on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same,
 which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered, and
includes the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor, of
board, lodging, or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to the employee.
Fair and reasonable value shall not include any profit to the employer or to any person
affiliated with the employer.

Some salesmen do not receive any basic salary but depend on commissions and
allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship exists.
Bearing in mind the preceding discussions, if the SC adopts the opposite view that
commissions do not form part of wage or salary, then, in effect, the SC will be saying that
this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and therefore, not entitled to separation
pay in the event of discharge from employment.

1.4 Payment of Wages (Art. 102-105, 110-11, LC; B3 R8 S1-8; Republic Act No. 6727,
Sec. 7)

1.5 Bonus, not part of basic salary/wage

Protacio vs. Layang Mananghaya, GR 168654, 25 March 2009
Lepanto Ceramics vs. Lepanto Ceramics Employees Association, GR 180866, 02 March
2010

Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. Lepanto Ceramics Employers Association

G.R. No. 180866. March 2, 2010.

ISSUE: Whether bonus is considered part of basic salary/wage.

HELD: NO. By definition, a bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver. It is

something given in addition to what is ordinarily received by or strictly due the recipient. A
bonus is granted and paid to an employee for his industry and loyalty which contributed
to the success of the employers business and made possible the realization of profits. A
bonus is also granted by an enlightened employer to spur the employee to greater efforts
for the success of the business and realization of bigger profits. A bonus is not a
demandable and enforceable obligation. For a bonus to be enforceable, it must have
been promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties. Given that the
bonus in this case is integrated in the CBA, the same partakes the nature of a
demandable obligation. Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA, the Christmas
bonus due to respondent Association has become more than just an act of generosity on
the part of the petitioner but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.

Mega Magazine Publications, Inc., et al., vs. Margaret Defensor, G.R. No. 162021, 16
June 2014. -- grant of bonus, rule and exception.

1.6 Non-diminution of benefits

Manila Jockey Club Employees Union vs Manila Jockey Club, GR 16770, 07 March 2001

Manila Jockey Club Employees Union vs. Manila Jockey Club

GR No. 167760, March 7, 2007

Issue: Whether an inter-office memorandum declaring the hours of work of regular

monthly-paid employees shall be from 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., every Tuesday and
Thursday is violative of the prohibition against non-diminution of wages and benefits
guaranteed under the CBA which specified that the work schedule of respondents
employees to be from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Ruling: NO. While it is true that Section 1, Article IV of the CBA provides for a 7-hour
work schedule from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. from
Mondays to Saturdays, Section 2, Article XI, however, expressly reserves on respondent
the prerogative to change existing methods or facilities to change the schedules of work.
Moreover, it cannot be said that in agreeing to Section 1 of Article IV, respondent already
waived that customary prerogative of management to set the work schedule. Had that
been the intention, Section 2 of Article XI would not have made any reference at all to the
retention by respondent of that prerogative. The CBA would have instead expressly
prohibited respondent from exercising it. As it were, however, the CBA expressly
recognized in respondent the prerogative to change the work schedule. This effectively
rules out any notion of waiver on the part of respondent of its prerogative to change the
work schedule.

The same provision of the CBA also grants respondent the prerogative to relieve
employees from duty because of lack of work. Petitioners argument, therefore, that the
change in work schedule violates Article 100 of the Labor Code because it resulted in the
diminution of the benefit enjoyed by regular monthly-paid employees of rendering
overtime work with pay, is untenable. Section 1, Article IV, of the CBA does not
guarantee overtime work for all the employees but merely provides that "all work
performed in excess of seven (7) hours work schedule and on days not included within
the work week shall be considered overtime and paid as such."

When a practice is deemed to have ripened into a corporate policy:

Vergara vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers, G.R. No. 176985, 01 April 2013

Issue:

Whether the SMI should be included in the computation of petitioners retirement

benefits on the ground of consistent company practice
Ruling:

No. There is diminution of benefits when the following requisites are present:
(1) the grant or benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice
over a long period of time; (2) the practice is consistent and deliberate; (3) the
practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or
difficult question of law; and (4) the diminution or discontinuance is done
unilaterally by the employer.

To be considered as a regular company practice, the employee must prove by

substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit is done over a long period of
time, and that it has been made consistently and deliberately. Jurisprudence
has not laid down any hard-and-fast rule as to the length of time that company
practice should have been exercised in order to constitute voluntary employer
practice.

The common denominator in previously decided cases appears to be the

regularity and deliberateness of the grant of benefits over a significant period of
time. It requires an indubitable showing that the employer agreed to continue
giving the benefit knowing fully well that the employees are not covered by any
provision of the law or agreement requiring payment thereof. In sum, the
 benefit must be characterized by regularity, voluntary and deliberate intent of
the employer to grant the benefit over a considerable period of time.

The Court find no substantial evidence to prove that the grant of SMI to all
retired DSSs regardless of whether or not they qualify to the same had ripened
into company practice. Despite more than sufficient opportunity given him while
his case was pending before the NLRC, the CA, and even to this Court,
petitioner utterly failed to adduce proof to establish his allegation that SMI has
been consistently, deliberately and voluntarily granted to all retired DSSs
without any qualification or conditions whatsoever.

1.7 No work no pay principle

Aklan Electric Cooperative vs. NLRC, 223 SCRA 288 [2000]
vs. Equal pay for Equal work
International School Alliance of Educators vs. Qusiumbing, GR No. 128845, 01 June
2000, 333 SCRA 13

1.8 Prohibitions regarding Wages (Art. 112-119, LC; B3 R8 S9-11, IRR)

Labor code provisions for wage protection
Allowable deductions without employees consent
Other deductions: Attorneys fees & union service fee in labor cases
May employer withhold employees last pay and benefits pending return of
employers properties?

Emer Milan, et al. vs. NLRC and Solid Mills, Inc, G.R. No. 202961, February 04, 2015, J. Leonen

Issue:

Whether the company may withhold the wages of the petitioner

Ruling:

Yes. Claims arising from an employer-employee relationship are not limited to claims by an
employee. Employers may also have claims against the employee, which arise from the same
relationship. Article 217 should apply with equal force to the claim of an employer for actual damages
against its dismissed employee, where the basis for the claim arises from or is necessarily connected with
the fact of termination, and should be entered as a counterclaim in the illegal dismissal case.
Requiring clearance before the release of last payments to the employee is a standard procedure
among employers, whether public or private. Clearance procedures are instituted to ensure that the
properties, real or personal, belonging to the employer but are in the possession of the separated
employee, are returned to the employer before the employees departure.

As a general rule, employers are prohibited from withholding wages. The Labor Code provides: Art.
116. Withholding of wages and kickbacks prohibited.It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, to withhold any amount from the wages of a worker or induce him to give up any part of his
wages by force, stealth, intimidation, threat or by any other means whatsoever without the workers
consent.

The return of the propertys possession became an obligation or liability on the part of the
employees when the employer-employee relationship ceased. Thus, respondent Solid Mills has the right
to withhold petitioners wages and benefits because of this existing debt or liability.
1.9 Workers preference in case of bankruptcy
DBP vs. Secretary of Labor, 179 SCRA 630 [1989]
Contra: Effect if under receivership, Rubberworld Phils. vs. NLRC, 336 SCRA 433

DBP vs. Secretary of Labor

GR No. 79351, November 28, 1989

Issue: Whether the private respondents, who are employees of Riverside Mills
Corporation (RMC), enjoy preferential lien for the payment of their backwages and
separation benefits over the properties of the latter pursuant to Article 110 of the Labor
Code.

Ruling: NO. Article 110 of the Labor Code states that in the event of bankruptcy or
liquidation of an employers business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards
wages due them for services rendered during the period to the bankruptcy or liquidation,
any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Unpaid wages shall be paid in full
before other creditors may establish any claim to a share in the assets of the employer.
It is clear from the wording of the law that the preferential right accorded to employees
and workers under Article 110 may be invoked only during bankruptcy or judicial
liquidation proceedings against the employer. The law is unequivocal and admits of no
other construction. What Article 110 of the Labor Code establishes is not a lien, but a
preference of credit in favor of employees. This simply means that during bankruptcy,
insolvency or liquidation proceedings involving the existing properties of the employer,
the employees have the advantage of having their unpaid wages satisfied ahead of
certain claims which may be proved therein.

Respondents contend that the terms "bankruptcy" or "liquidation" are broad enough to
cover a situation where there is a cessation of the operation of the employer's business
as in the case at bar. However, this very same contention was struck down as
unmeritorious in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Hon. Labor Arbiter
Ariel C. Santos, involving a group of RMC employees which sought to enforce its
preference of credit Article 110 against DBP over certain RMC real properties. In that
case, the Court laid down the ruling that Article 110 of the Labor Code, which cannot be
viewed in isolation of, and must always be reckoned with the provisions of the Civil Code
on concurrence and preference of credits, may not be invoked by employees or workers
of RMC like private respondents herein, in the absence of a formal declaration of
bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation order of RMC.

Rubberworld Phils. vs. NLRC

GR No. 128003, July 26, 2000

Issue: Whether Department of Labor and Employment, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
may legally act on the money claims of private respondents, who are employees of
Rubberworld, despite the order of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
suspending all actions against petitioner which is under rehabilitation by a management
committee created by SEC.

Ruling: NO. Presidential Decree No. 902-A is clear that "all actions for claims against
corporations, partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending
before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be suspended accordingly." The law did
not make any exception in favor of labor claims. The justification for the automatic stay of
all pending actions for claims is to enable the management committee or the
rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra
judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the 'rescue' of the debtor
company. To allow such other actions to continue would only add to the burden of the
 management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources
would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed
toward its restructuring and rehabilitation. Thus, the labor case would defeat the purpose
of an automatic stay. To rule otherwise would open the floodgates to numerous claims
and would defeat the rescue efforts of the management committee.

1.10 Minimum Wages and Wage distortion

1.11 CBA vis--vis Wage Orders

Republic Act No. 6727,Section 7; Rep Act No. 8188.

2. HOURS OF WORK
Articles 82-93, Labor Code; B3 R1 S1-11, IRR

2.1 Exclusions from coverage

Govt employees, including GOCCs with original charters

Managerial employees/staff
Field Personnel
Family members
Domestic helpers and persons in the personal service of another
Workers paid by result

2.2 Normal hours of work: what is considered hours worked/time-in

Exceptions
Health personnel
Compressed Work Week
DOLE Labor Advisory No. 02, s. 2004 (Implementation of Compressed workweek
DOLE Advisory No. 02, s. 2009 (Guidelines on Adoption of Flexible Work
Arrangements)

2.3 Hours worked (Art. 84, LC)

Rada vs. NLRC, 205 SCRA 69 [1992]

2.4 Work interruption due to brownouts: DOLE Policy Instruction No. 36

2.5 Meal Break

2.6 Idle time, waiting time, commuting time,

travel time; whether part of hours of work or not

2.7 Overtime work

Undertime not offset by overtime
Waiver of overtime pay
PALEA vs. PAL, GR L-31341 and 31343, 31 March 1996

Phil. Air Lines Employees Association (PALEA) vs. Phil. Air Lines, Inc.
No. L-31341. March 31, 1976.
ISSUES:
(a) Whether 365 days should be used as the divisor in computing daily and hourly rate.
(b) Whether the civil code (10-yr) or the Eight-Hour Labor Law (3-yr) prescriptive period
should be used in determining whether action to collect overtime pay as stipulated in the
CBA.
 HELD:
(a) NO. There should hardly be any doubt that off-days are not paid days. Precisely, off-
days are rest days for the worker. He is not required to work on such days. This finds
support not only in the basic principle in labor that the basis of remuneration or
compensation is actual service rendered, but in the everpervading labor spirit aimed at
humanizing the conditions of the working man. Since during his off-days an employee is
not compelled to work, he cannot, conversely, demand for his corresponding pay. If,
however, a worker works on his off-day, our welfare laws duly reward him with a premium
higher than what he would receive when he works on his regular working day. Such being
the case, the divisor in computing an employees basic daily rate should be the actual
working days in a year. The number of off-days are not to be counted precisely because
on such off-days, an employee is not required to work.
(b) CIVIL CODE. The present case calls for the application of the Civil Code provisions
on the prescriptive period in the filing of actions based on written contracts. The reason
should be fairly obvious. Petitioners claim fundamentally involves the strict compliance by
PAL of the provisions on wage computation embodied in the collective bargaining
agreements inked between it and the employees representative unions. The three-year
prescriptive period fixed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444, as amended) will
apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely based on said law, and not on
a collective bargaining agreement or any other contract.

Interphil Laboratories Ees Union-FFW vs. Interphil Lab., GR 142824, 19 Dec 2001
Acuna vs. CA, GR No. 159832, 05 May 2006

Acuna vs. CA, GR No. 159832, 05 May 2006

ISSUE: Whether the claim for overtime pay should have been disallowed because they
offered no proof that they actually rendered overtime work. NO.

RULING: The claim for overtime pay should not have been disallowed because of the
failure of the petitioners to substantiate them. The claim of overseas workers against
foreign employers could not be subjected to same rules of evidence and procedure easily
obtained by complainants whose employers are locally based. While normally the Court
would require the presentation of payrolls, daily time records and similar documents
before allowing claims for overtime pay, in this case, that would be requiring the near
impossible.

It is private respondents who could have obtained the records of their principal to refute
petitioners claim for overtime pay. By their failure to do so, private respondents waived
their defense and in effect admitted the allegations of the petitioners.

2.8 Night Work Prohibition lifted: Republic Act No. 10151 [2011]
a. Who may now be assigned the nightshift; exceptions
b. Rights of Pregnant Women and Lactating mothers
c. Rights of Night Shift Workers

3. REST DAYS
Art 83-85, 89-92, LC; Book3 R1 S3-17, IRR; R1-A, S5-10, IRR; R3 S1-9, IRR

3.1 Right to weekly rest day

 3.2 Preference of the employee
3.3 When work on rest day authorized
3.4 Premium Pay, Art. 91-93, LC; B3 R3, IRR

Cases:
North Davao Mining Corp vs. NLRC, GR No. 112546, 13 Mar 1996, 254 SCRA 721
Lagatic vs. NLRC, GR 121004, 28 Jan 1998, 285 SCRA 251

4. HOLIDAYS
Art. 94, LC; R4 S1-11, IRR; Executive Order No. 203 dated 30 June 1987; Republic Act No.
9177 (02 Nov 2002) amending legal holidays and declaring Eid Al Fitr as a holiday. See also:
Republic Act No. 9256 [25 Feburary 2004] declaring Aug 21 Ninoy Aquino Day as special non-
working holiday; Republic Act No. 9492 (26 July 2007) rationalizing the celebration of holidays;
Republic Act No. 9849 [Declaring Eidl Adha as a holiday]).

4.1 Legal holidays vs. special days

4.2 Inclusions and Exclusions from coverage

Ariel L. David, doing business under the name and style Yiels Hog Dealer vs. John G.
Macasio, G.R. No. 195466, 02 July 2014. -- General Rule: Employees on task or pakyaw
basis are entitled to holiday pay and SIL pay; unless they qualify as field personnel.

4.3 Right to holiday pay

Jose Rizal College vs. NLRC, GR No. 65482, 01 December 1987

Jose Rizal College vs. National Labor Relations Commission

No. L-65482. December 1, 1987
PARAS, J.:

Facts: Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines. It has three groups of employees categorized as follows: (a)
personnel on monthly basis, who receive their monthly salary uniformly throughout the year,
irrespective of the actual number of working days in a month without deduction for holidays; (b)
personnel on daily basis who are paid on actual days worked and they receive unworked holiday
pay and (c) collegiate faculty who are paid on the basis of student contract hour. Before the start
of the semester they sign contracts with the college undertaking to meet their classes as per
schedule.

Unable to receive their corresponding holiday pay, as claimed, from 1975 to 1977, private
respondent National Alliance of Teachers and Office Workers (NATOW) in behalf of the faculty
and personnel of Jose Rizal College filed with the Ministry of Labor a complaint against the
college for said alleged non-payment of holiday pay, docketed as Case No. RO4-10-81-72.

Issue: Whether the school faculty who according to their contracts are paid per lecture hour are
entitled to unworked holiday pay?

Held: Yes, petitioners are entitled to unworked special holiday pay.

Petitioner is exempted from paying hourly paid faculty members their pay for regular holidays,
whether the same be during the regular semesters of the school year or during semestral,
Christmas, or Holy Week vacations; but ordering petitioner to pay said faculty members their
regular hourly rate on days declared as special holidays or for some reason classes are called off
or shortened for the hours they are supposed to have taught, whether extensions of class days
be ordered or not; in case of extensions said faculty members shall likewise be paid their hourly
rates should they teach during said extensions.
Subject holiday pay is provided for in the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended), which reads:

"Art. 94. Right to holiday pay(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during
regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly employing less than ten
(10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be
paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; x x x"

and in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Rule IV, Book III, which reads:

"SEC. 8. Holiday pay of certain employees.(a) Private school teachers, including faculty
members of colleges and universities, may not be paid for the regular holidays during semestral
vacations. They shall, however, be paid for the regular holidays during Christmas vacations. x x
x"

The petitioner, although a non-profit institution is under obligation to give pay even on unworked
regular holidays to hourly paid faculty members subject to the terms and conditions provided for
therein.

We believe that the aforementioned implementing rule is not justified by the provisions of the law
which after all is silent with respect to faculty members paid by the hour who because of their
teaching contracts are obliged to work and consent to be paid only for work actually done (except
when an emergency or a fortuitous event or a national need calls for the declaration of special
holidays). Regular holidays specified as such by law are known to both school and faculty
members as "no class days;" certainly the latter do not expect payment for said unworked days,
and this was clearly in their minds when they entered into the teaching contracts.

On the other hand, both the law and the Implementing Rules governing holiday pay are silent as
to payment on Special Public Holidays.

It is readily apparent that the declared purpose of the holiday pay which is the prevention of
diminution of the monthly income of the employees on account of work interruptions is defeated
when a regular class day is cancelled on account of a special public holiday and class hours are
held on another working day to make up for time lost in the school calendar. Otherwise stated,
the faculty member, although forced to take a rest, does not earn what he should earn on that
day. Be it noted that when a special public holiday is declared, the faculty member paid by the
hour is deprived of expected income, and it does not matter that the school calendar is extended
in view of the days or hours lost, for their income that could be earned from other sources is lost
during the extended days. Similarly, when classes are called off or shortened on account of
typhoons, floods, rallies, and the like, these faculty members must likewise be paid, whether or
not extensions are ordered.

4.4 Entitlement of monthly paid workers

Insular Bank of Asia and American Employees Union vs. Inciong, GR L052415, 23
October 1984, 132 SCRA 663

Issue: Whether the claim for service incentive leaves may be limited to a certain number of
years.

Ruling: No.
 Section 2, Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides that every
employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service
incentive leave of five days with pay.

To limit the award to three years is to unduly restrict such right. The law does not prohibit
its commutation.

Therefore, SGs recommendation is contrary to the ruling of the Court in Bustamante et al.
vs. NLRC et al. lifting the three-year restriction on the amount of backwages and other
allowances that may be awarded an illegally dismissed employee, thus: In accordance with
R.A. No. 6715, petitioners are entitled to their full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent, from the time their actual compensation was
withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.

Villuga vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 750038, 23 August 1993

4.5 Effects of absences on day before holiday

If employee is absent with leave
If employee is absent without leave
In case day before holiday is employees rest day or non-working holiday

4.6 Special instances (B3 R4 S1-11, IRR)

In case of two successive regular holidays
In case the regular holidays fall on the same day
In case of temporary or periodic shutdowns
Teachers, pakiao workers and seasonal workers

5. LEAVES

5.1 Service Incentive Leave Pay

Article 95, Labor Code; B3 R5 S1-6, IRR
Purpose of the law
Right to service incentive leave and meaning of at least one year of service
Exclusions from coverage
Commutable nature of benefit

5.2 Maternity Leave

Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997, and Republic
Act No. 7322, amending Sec. 14-A of the Social Security Law
Coverage
Conditions to entitlement
Availment
Whether or not maternity leave benefits are included in the computation of 13 th month
pay.

5.3 Paternity Leave

Republic Act No. 8187, and implementing Rules
Coverage
Conditions to entitlement
Availment

5.4 Solo Parent Leave

Republic Act No. 8972, otherwise known as the Solo Parents Welfare Act of 2000 and its
Implementing Rules
Coverage
Conditions to entitlement
 Availment

5.5 Leaves for victims of violence against women and their children
Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as Anti Violence against Women and Children,
Section 43
Coverage
Conditions for entitlement
Availment

6. SERVICES CHARGES
Article 96, LC; B3 R6 S1-7, IRR)
Coverage
Exclusion
Distribution
Integration in case service charge is abolished

7. THIRTEENTH (13TH) MONTH PAY

Pres. Decree No. 851 and Implementing Rules; Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the
13th month pay issued dated 16 November 1987;
Nature of 13th month pay
Coverage
Exclusions/Exemptions from coverage
What comprises basis salary for purposes of computation of 13th momth pay
Commissions vis--vis 13th month pay
CBA vis--vis 13th month pay

Cases:
Honda Phil., Inc. vs. Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda, 460 SCRA 186 [2005]
JPL Marketing Promotions vs. Court of Appeals, 463 SCRA 136 [2005]