The Modal Ontological Argument: Understanding and Defense

We as Christians have several very convincing arguments for the existence of God.
Arguments such as the Kalam Cosmological Argument, the Argument from Design,
Argument from the Resurrection of Christ and others are often the forefront of any
debate with our atheist friends. One often highly overlooked and rarely used
argument is the Modal Ontological Argument.

The reason why the Modal Ontological Argument (from now referred to as the MOA) is
rarely used is not because it is in some way flawed or unsubstantiated, but because
the concepts it is making use of are often very hard for most people to grasp.

There are 2 standard formulations of the MOA, one as formulated by William Lane
Craig and Alvin Plantinga and the other as formulated by Norman Malcolm. Both are
perfectly sound. For the most part in this article, premises of the Craig/Plantinga
argument will be referenced, however the defense of both arguments is pretty much
identical.

The Craig/Plantinga argument goes like this:

1. It is possible that God (the Maximally Great Being) exists

2. If it is possible that God exists, then God exists in some possible worlds
3. If God exists in some possible worlds, then God exists in all possible worlds
4. If God exists in all possible worlds, then God exists in the actual world
5. (C) God therefore exists

Now most people when they look at this argument usually "scratch their head and
walk away". The purpose of this article will be to explain the underlying concepts
of the argument in the simplest ways possible and then address commonly raised
objections, from both people who do not, and those that do understand its concepts.

Firstly, the argument makes extensive use of Modal Logic. In simplest terms, Modal
Logic usually deals with possibility, impossibility and necessity of beings. For
this purpose a "being" is simply defined as some conceivable concept, thing or
person, whether such a being is possible, impossible or necessary.

To explain this further, in Modal Logic, there exists a semantic of what we would
call "possible worlds". A possible world is simply defined as an imaginable world
ruled by the laws of logic. An actual world, the world we live in is also a
possible world, it can be imagined and it is ruled by the laws of logic. A possible
world is not some universe, region of space or anything like that, although such
beings can exist in possible worlds.

To distinct these types of possible worlds, for example, we can imagine 2 possible
worlds.

1.A world in which Donald Trump won the US Presidential Election of 2016
2.A world in which Hillary Clinton won the US Presidential Election of 2016

We know that in the actual world, Donald Trump won the election. However, there is
nothing problematic with stating that Hillary Clinton could have won the election
and thus in some imaginable world ruled by the laws of logic (possible world)
Hillary Clinton HAS won the election.

Keeping all of this in mind, let's further expound on what kinds of beings we can
have in Modal Logic. As hinted above, there exist 3 kinds of such beings:

1. Impossible beings: These are the beings that could not exist in any possible
world. Examples would include square circles, four sided triangles, married
bachelors etc. Such beings are plainly illogical and thus could not exist in any
possible world.

2. Possible (or Cogent) beings: These are the beings that could exist in some
possible worlds but do not exist in others. Examples would include unicorns,
humans, cars, planets etc. We can easily imagine worlds with or without such
beings.

3. Necessary beings: These are the beings that must exist in every possible world
such as for example numbers, mathematical axioms, laws of logic etc.

Anything that could, could not, does or does not exist can be put in these 3
categories. Thus the question arises, in which one do we put God?

God is properly defined as a Maximally Great Being. A Maximally Great Being would
be the greatest conceivable being. A Maximally Great Being is an Omnipotent (All
Powerful), Omniscient (All Knowing), Morally Perfect being. To this we can add that
such a being is also Omnipresent (Present Everywhere).

Now here is where most people would get into S5 system Modal Logic, which would
lead to a conclusion that if God is possible, he is necessary and thus does exist.
However, while this is correct, for most people, understanding this concept is
nothing short of a nightmare.

Instead of going into S5 I will actually go the Norman Malcolm route, specifically
using God's Omnipresence as a focusing point. Norman Malcolm correctly stated that
God is either Impossible or Necessary. He CAN NOT be simply Possible. Why would
this be the case? Here is where Omnipresence comes into play.

God is by definition Omnipresent. That is, if he exists, he is present everywhere

(both in spatial and non spatial sense).

If God is possible, he exists in at least one possible world. If God, an

omnipresent being, exists in a single possible world, then this being exists in ALL
possible worlds, as it is omnipresent, that is, it exists everywhere by definition
of its very being. A being that exists in all possible worlds is Necessary.
However, if this being is impossible, then it does not exist in any possible
worlds. A being that does not exist in any possible worlds is Impossible.

What this being CANNOT BE is simply Possible, as this being, if it is at all

Possible, by its virtue of Omnipresence, exists in all possible worlds, and is thus
Necessary.

With this in mind, Norman Malcolm formed his own version of the MOA which I will
slightly modify for the purposes of this article. (Namely, replacing the word
Unlimited with Omnipresent to focus the reader):

1. God is by definition an Omnipresent being

2. An Omnipresent being is either Impossible or Necessary
3. An Omnipresent being is not Impossible
4.(C) Therefore an Omnipresent being is Necessary

This is thus the very climax of the MOA, either of the Plantinga/Craig or the
Malcolm version: You either have to demonstrate that God is Impossible, or accept
that God is Necessary.

This is thus the part of the article where we get into objections, both from the
scholarly and other, less informed sources.
I will begin by restating what has to be done in order for MOA to fail. In the
Plantinga/Craig version, one has to demonstrate that a Maximally Great Being (God)
is Impossible, that is, refute the first premise. If this cannot be done, premises
2-5 follow necessarily. In the Malcolm version, one has to, again, demonstrate that
an Omnipresent being (God) is Impossible, that is, refute the third premise. If
this cannot be done, then premises 1-4 follow necessarily.

Objection #1 "The Reverse MOA"

Some Atheists, sadly, even from the more Philosophical spectrums, have undertaken
on themselves to make a caricature out of the MOA by attempting to reverse it
against the position of Theism.
Namely, their argument would go like this:

1. It is possible that God (the Maximally Great Being) does not exist
2. If it is possible that God does not exist, then God does not exist in some
possible worlds
3. If God does not exist in some possible worlds, then God does not exist in any
possible worlds
4. If God does not exist in any possible worlds, then God does not exist in the
actual world
5. (C) God therefore does not exist

An obvious problem with this argument is in its very first premise. To state that
it is possible that God does not exist is to state that in fact, God is illogical.

Why is this the case? Well, to assert that God possibly does not exist in some
possible world is to state that the idea of a being that is Omnipresent, that is,
exists everywhere is possibly incoherent. Our Atheist friends however, cannot say
that God is incoherent without showing that God actually is incoherent. Thus the
entire charade falls apart. Unless the Atheist can demonstrate that God is in some
way illogical, he cannot assert that God is possibly incoherent.

To put it in the words of Shaun Doyle of CMI (who wrote an awesome article on the
topic,linked bellow): "Many people when they hear Its possible that God doesnt
exist dont hear what the first premise is actually positing. They hear things
like As far as I know, God might not exist or God couldve existed, but doesnt
actually exist. Neither of these are right; the first is an issue of what we know,
not an issue of whats really possible, and the second makes God out to be a
contingent being, which is nonsense. Rather, its asserting that God possibly
cant exist, like how we could assert that married bachelors possibly cant
exist. Remember that part of the definition of God these arguments work with is
that God cannot fail to exist. In other words, the first premise isnt simply
asserting the idea that God might exist, but doesnt actually exist; its asserting
that the concept of God is possibly incoherent." (1)

Objection #2 "The Omnipotence Paradox"

The basic purpose of the argument is to attack the possibility premise of the MOA.
It attempts to show that the very idea of God is incoherent and thus is not to be
regarded as possible in any possible world.

There are many different forms this argument can take. A common one would be to
state that God is Omnipotent and Morally Perfect. So if God can do all things and
yet is Morally Perfect, can he perform evil actions? If he can then he is not
Morally Perfect. If he cannot he is not Omnipotent. Without either of these, he is
not God.
The problem with this argument is improper defining of Omnipotence. An Atheist
would simply define Omnipotence as someone "being able to do everything". This,
however is a very simplistic and incorrect definition and it presents a strawman.

The proper definition of Omnipotence is "being able to do all that can logically be
done".

God as a perfect being cannot logically perform an action that would be contrary to
his nature (his nature being good,he cannot perform an evil action), or perform an
illogical action, such as for example creating a square circle. This is pure
nonsense.

Thus, by the proper definition of Omnipotence, such arguments are shown to be

inapplicable, while our Atheist friends demonstrate that they argue without even
knowing the basic definitions that are in use, at the very core of the argument.

Objection #3 "Goldbach's Conjecture Argument"

Some have attempted to parody the argument by "solving" mathematical problems using
the form of the MOA.

The Goldbach's Conjecture states that: "Every even integer greater than 2 can be
expressed as the sum of two primes."

So they would make an argument in this form:

1. It is possible that Goldbach's Conjecture is true

2. If it is possible that Gold. Conj. is true then Gold. Conj. is true in some
possible worlds
3. If Gold. Conj. is true in some possible worlds then Gold. Conj. is true in all
possible worlds
4.If Gold Conj. is true in all possible worlds then Gold. Conj. is true in the
actual world
5.(C) Therefore Goldbach's Conjecture is true

Since Goldbach's Conjecture is a mathematical problem, it is like God, either

Necessary or Impossible. If it is true in one world, it is true in all of them.

This however is a nonsensical presentation as we do not have any sort of a way in

which we could test the possibility of Goldbach's Conjecture as Goldbach's
Conjecture is an infinite set of numbers. To the contrary, we can examine if
ontological properties of God (Omnipotence, Omniscience etc.) are possible.

The argument therefore, is absolutely useless against the MOA.

Objection #4 "The Maximally Great Pizza"

Some less scholarly Atheists have attempted to state that we could substitute God
for a Maximally Great Pizza (or whatever other physical thing might come to your
mind) and as such demonstrate the ludicrousness of the MOA.

This however, as previously explained is nonsensical, as pizzas are Contingent, not

Necessary beings.

What would make a Pizza maximally great? Is Pizza an all knowing all powerful
person? Couldn't we always imagine a Pizza that has one more pepperoni on it? If
so, how can a Pizza be defined as maximally great?

Objection #5 "The Logical Problem of Evil"

Atheists would attempt to state that God's existence is impossible since evil
exists. They would form an argument in this form:

1.If an Omnipotent, Omniscient, and Omnibenevolent (All Good) God exists, then evil
does not.
2.There is evil in the world.
3.Therefore, an Omnipotent, Omniscient, and Omnibenevolent God does not exist.

They would attempt to say that if God is good, perfectly good, and omnipotent then
he would not allow for evil to exist. If he does allow for evil to exist but is
Omnipotent, he is not good. If he is good but not Omnipotent, how is he God? If he
is neither why call him God?

There are 3 avenues of attack against this argument:

1.The basis of Objective Morality

2.Omniscience Defense
3.Free Will Defense

1.The basis of Objective Morality

The Atheist has to assume that God exists in order to argue that he does not. Why
is this the case? The Atheist assumes the existence of Objective Moral Values by
which he would judge if God's actions, or actions he allows are evil or not. If he
does not have an objective standard, this argument is nonsensical.

An Atheist cannot have an Objective Moral Standard without such a standard being
based on the perfect, eternal and unchanging nature of God. In any other case it is
simply subjective.

If he argues that no Objective Morals exist (he would be wrong) but for the purpose
of this argument, he just sealed its fate.

2. Omniscience Defense

God is by definition Omniscient. Humans are not. It is impossible for a human to

examine all the various reasons as to why God would have allowed evil and since
"Evil Exists" and "God Exists" are not explicitly logically contradictory
statements, one cannot thus propose that the existence of evil would be contrary to
the existence of God.

3.The Free Will Defense

Dr. Alvin Plantinga would argue that God would have a sufficient reason to allow
evil to exist since free will of human agents is valuable.

"God's creation of persons with morally significant free will is something of

tremendous value. God could not eliminate much of the evil and suffering in this
world without thereby eliminating the greater good of having created persons with
free will with whom he could have relationships and who are able to love one
another and do good deeds." (2)

Plantinga pointed out that God, though omnipotent, could not be expected to do
literally anything. God could not, for example, create square circles, act contrary
to his nature, or, more relevantly, create beings with free will that would never
choose evil. Taking this latter point further, Plantinga argued that the moral
value of human free will is a credible offsetting justification that God could have
as a morally justified reason for permitting the existence of evil. (3) (4)
Dr. Plantinga argues for this position in much more detail than I could do justice
in this article so for further detail on the argument, one can refer to his book
"God, Freedom and Evil"

Most contemporary philosophers consider his argument successful in dealing with The
Logical Problem of Evil.

Getting into the only objections I would actually consider serious , the one
proposed by Dr. Peter van Inwagen (who is actually a Christian Philosopher) we
would get the "Correct Atheist Argument".

Objection #6 "The Correct Atheist Argument (Modal Knowno)"

To counter the Modal Ontological Argument Dr. Inwagen would propose that there
possibly exists a being that he would call a Modal Knowno. A Modal Knowno is a
being that knows no God exists.

His argument would go like this:

1. It is possible that a Modal Knowno exists

2.If it is possible that a Modal Knowno exists in a single possible world, then God
does not exist in that possible world
3.If God does not exist in a single possible world God is Impossible
4.(C) Therefore God is Impossible

Dr. Inwagen would further argue that since both God and a Modal Knowno are equally
as possible, the MOA is not to be used as a serious argument for either the Atheist
or the Theist position.

However, there are several problems with Dr. Inwagen's argument in this case.

When speaking of possibility in the first premise of these arguments we are

speaking of 2 kinds of possibilities.

1. Purely Logical possibility

2. Metaphysical possibility

Logical possibility would be simply examining if something makes logical sense,

while Metaphysical possibility is regarded as something making logical sense, in
addition to also having some other reasons for thinking it is possible.

In my defense I am going to attack the possibility of the Modal Knowno on both of

these bases.

Firstly, when considering both God and the Modal Knowno on the basis of
Metaphysical Possibility, the existence of God is possible from various arguments
for his existence such as the Kalam Argument, Moral Argument, The Teleological
Argument, Argument from the Resurrection of Jesus etc.

The Modal Knowno enjoys no such Metaphysical support.

Modal Knowno is also a very Metaphysically problematic concept. How would a being
know that God does not exist if God is not an illogical concept? The Atheist would
pretty much have to give the Modal Knowno the Modal property of Omniscience in
order for this to be the case, in which case this would turn into a very funny
charade.

In conclusion, purely on the Metaphysical basis, God is possible while the Modal
Knowno is not.

The Modal Knowno however faces other problems, namely on the purely Logical basis.

When putting God and the Modal Knowno side by side and intuitively examining the
possibility of their natures, the theists confidence in God's possibility is based
upon the intuitive coherence of maximal greatness, considered in and of itself. He
then INFERS that a world with a Modal Knowno is impossible.

When examining the nature of a Modal Knowno in and of itself, the possibility of
its nature ASSUMES the incoherence of maximal greatness.

In other words, when looking purely at the nature of each of these beings in and of
themselves, from God's nature, which just by its properties does not assume
anything, we can conclude that a Modal Knowno is impossible since this nature does
make perfect sense.

However, when looking purely at the nature of a Modal Knowno, such a being, even in
its own name has a property of knowing God does not exist, and thus for its
possibility, it assumes that God cannot exist.

In conclusion the Modal Knowno fails to be possible on both the purely Logical and
the Metaphysical bases and as such is not to be used as an argument against the
MOA.

An examination in this manner is to be used against any other form of the Correct
Atheist Argument (such as the world with only one particle, a world without
sentient beings etc.)

In the conclusion to the article, The Modal Ontological Argument has stood the test
of time against various attacks from various atheologians and philosophers and has
firmly established itself as perhaps the most powerful argument in the theist's
inventory.

References:

(1) https://creation.com/reverse-ontological-argument

(2) http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/

(3) Plantinga, Alvin (1977). God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI:: Eerdmans.
pp. Chapter 4

(4) "Evil and Omnipotence". Mind. 64 (210): 455465.