9/9/2016 G.R.No.

L16749

TodayisFriday,September09,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

ENBANC

G.R.No.L16749January31,1963

INTHEMATTEROFTHETESTATEESTATEOFEDWARDE.CHRISTENSEN,DECEASED.
ADOLFOC.AZNAR,ExecutorandLUCYCHRISTENSEN,Heirofthedeceased,ExecutorandHeirappellees,
vs.
HELENCHRISTENSENGARCIA,oppositorappellant.

M.R.Soteloforexecutorandheirappellees.
LeopoldoM.AbelleraandJovitoSalongaforoppositorappellant.

LABRADOR,J.:

ThisisanappealfromadecisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofDavao,Hon.VicenteN.Cusi,Jr.,presiding,in
SpecialProceedingNo.622ofsaidcourt,datedSeptember14,1949,approvingamongthingsthefinalaccounts
oftheexecutor,directingtheexecutortoreimburseMariaLucyChristensentheamountofP3,600paidbyherto
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, onehalf of said residue to be
payabletoMrs.CarrieLouiseC.Borton,etc.,inaccordancewiththeprovisionsofthewillofthetestatorEdward
E.Christensen.ThewillwasexecutedinManilaonMarch5,1951andcontainsthefollowingprovisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney),whowasborninthePhilippinesabouttwentyeightyearsago,andwhoisnowresidingatNo.665
RodgerYoungVillage,LosAngeles,California,U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named
daughter,MARIALUCYCHRISTENSENDANEY.

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7.Igive,deviseandbequeathuntoMARIAHELENCHRISTENSEN,nowmarriedtoEduardoGarcia,about
eighteenyearsofageandwho,notwithstandingthefactthatshewasbaptizedChristensen,isnotinany
wayrelatedtome,norhasshebeenatanytimeadoptedbyme,andwho,fromallinformationIhavenow
resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen
withtheDavaoBranchofthePhilippineNationalBank,andpaidtoherattherateofOneHundredPesos
(P100.00),PhilippineCurrencypermonthuntiltheprincipalthereofaswellasanyinterestwhichmayhave
accruedthereon,isexhausted..

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12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my wellbeloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSENDANEY(Mrs.BernardDaney),nowresidingasaforesaidatNo.665RodgerYoungVillage,
Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate,real,personaland/ormixed,ofwhatsoeverkindorcharacter,andwheresoeversituated,ofwhichI
maybepossessedatmydeathandwhichmayhavecometomefromanysourcewhatsoever,duringher
lifetime:....

Itisinaccordancewiththeabovequotedprovisionsthattheexecutorinhisfinalaccountandprojectofpartition
ratifiedthepaymentofonlyP3,600toHelenChristensenGarciaandproposedthattheresidueoftheestatebe
transferredtohisdaughter,MariaLucyChristensen.

OppositiontotheapprovaloftheprojectofpartitionwasfiledbyHelenChristensenGarcia,insofarasitdeprives
her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L

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1148384anacknowledgednaturalchildofthedeceasedEdwardE.Christensen.Thelegalgroundsofopposition
are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural
children,onehalfoftheestateinfullownership.Inamplificationoftheabovegroundsitwasallegedthatthelaw
thatshouldgoverntheestateofthedeceasedChristensenshouldnotbetheinternallawofCaliforniaalone,but
theentirelawthereofbecauseseveralforeignelementsareinvolved,thattheforumisthePhilippinesandevenif
thecaseweredecidedinCalifornia,Section946oftheCaliforniaCivilCode,whichrequiresthatthedomicileof
thedecedentshouldapply,shouldbeapplicable.ItwasalsoallegedthatMariaHelenChristensenhavingbeen
declaredanacknowledgednaturalchildofthedecedent,sheisdeemedforallpurposeslegitimatefromthetime
ofherbirth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
Californiaatthetimeofhisdeath,thesuccessionalrightsandintrinsicvalidityoftheprovisionsinhiswillaretobe
governedbythelawofCalifornia,inaccordancewithwhichatestatorhastherighttodisposeofhispropertyin
the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel'sEstate,77Cal.Appl.2d877,176P.2d952,andInreKaufman,117Cal.286,49Pac.192,citedin
page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for
reconsideration,buttheseweredenied.Hence,thisappeal.

Themostimportantassignmentsoferrorareasfollows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURTTHATHELENISTHEACKNOWLEDGEDNATURALCHILDOFEDWARDE.CHRISTENSEN
AND,CONSEQUENTLY,INDEPRIVINGHEROFHERJUSTSHAREINTHEINHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATIONOFINTERNALLAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARDE.CHRISTENSENSHOULDBEGOVERNEDBYTHELAWSOFTHEPHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTEDBYTHEEXECUTORISCONTRARYTOTHEPHILIPPINELAWS.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSENGARCIAISENTITLEDTOONEHALF(1/2)OFTHEESTATEINFULLOWNERSHIP.

ThereisnoquestionthatEdwardE.ChristensenwasacitizenoftheUnitedStatesandoftheStateofCalifornia
at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the
Philippines,aswitnessthefollowingfactsadmittedbytheexecutorhimselfinappellee'sbrief:

Intheproceedingsforadmissionofthewilltoprobate,thefactsofrecordshowthatthedeceasedEdward
E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A. his first arrival in the
Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport
"Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He
stayedinthePhilippinesuntil1904.

InDecember,1904,Mr.ChristensenreturnedtotheUnitedStatesandstayedthereforthefollowingnine
yearsuntil1913,duringwhichtimeheresidedin,andwasteachingschoolinSacramento,California.

Mr.Christensen'snextarrivalinthePhilippineswasinJulyoftheyear1913.However,in1928,heagain
departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine
yearslater,in1938,heagainreturnedtohisowncountry,andcamebacktothePhilippinesthefollowing
year,1939.

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Wherefore,thepartiesrespectfullypraythattheforegoingstipulationoffactsbeadmittedandapprovedby
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
coveredbythisstipulationoffacts. 1 w p h 1 . t

BeinganAmericancitizen,Mr.ChristensenwasinternedbytheJapaneseMilitaryForcesinthePhilippines
during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the
Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits
"AA","BB"and"CCDaney"Exhs."MM","MMl","MM2Daney"andp.473,t.s.n.,July21,1953.)

InApril,1951,EdwardE.ChristensenreturnedoncemoretoCaliforniashortlyafterthemakingofhislast
willandtestament(nowinquestionherein)whichheexecutedathislawyers'officesinManilaonMarch5,
1951.HediedattheSt.Luke'sHospitalintheCityofManilaonApril30,1953.(pp.23)

InarrivingattheconclusionthatthedomicileofthedeceasedisthePhilippines,wearepersuadedbythefactthat
he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicatethathewouldultimatelyabandonthePhilippinesandmakehomeintheStateofCalifornia.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the
most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical
presence.(GoodrichonConflictofLaws,p.29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a
territoryoftheUnitedStates(notastate)until1946andthedeceasedappearstohaveconsideredhimselfasa
citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that
StatesothatheappearsnevertohaveintendedtoabandonhisCaliforniacitizenshipbyacquiringanother.This
conclusionisinaccordancewiththefollowingprincipleexpoundedbyGoodrichinhisConflictofLaws.

Theterms"'residence"and"domicile"mightwellbetakentomeanthesamething,aplaceofpermanent
abode.Butdomicile,ashasbeenshown,hasacquiredatechnicalmeaning.Thusonemaybedomiciledin
aplacewherehehasneverbeen.Andhemayresideinaplacewherehehasnodomicile.Themanwith
twohomes,betweenwhichhedivideshistime,certainlyresidesineachone,whilelivinginit.Butifhewent
onbusinesswhichwouldrequirehispresenceforseveralweeksormonths,hemightproperlybesaidto
havesufficientconnectionwiththeplacetobecalledaresident.Itisclear,however,that,ifhetreatedhis
settlementascontinuingonlyfortheparticularbusinessinhand,notgivinguphisformer"home,"hecould
notbeadomiciledNewYorker.Acquisitionofadomicileofchoicerequirestheexerciseofintentionaswell
asphysicalpresence."Residencesimplyrequiresbodilypresenceofaninhabitantinagivenplace,while
domicilerequiresbodilypresenceinthatplaceandalsoanintentiontomakeitone'sdomicile."Residence,
however,isatermusedwithmanyshadesofmeaning,fromthemeresttemporarypresencetothemost
permanentabode,anditisnotsafetoinsistthatanyoneuseettheonlyproperone.(Goodrich,p.29)

ThelawthatgovernsthevalidityofhistestamentarydispositionsisdefinedinArticle16oftheCivilCodeofthe
Philippines,whichisasfollows:

ART.16.Realpropertyaswellaspersonalpropertyissubjecttothelawofthecountrywhereitissituated.

However,intestateandtestamentarysuccessions,bothwithrespecttotheorderofsuccessionandtothe
amountofsuccessionalrightsandtotheintrinsicvalidityoftestamentaryprovisions,shallberegulatedby
thenationallawofthepersonwhosesuccessionisunderconsideration,whatevermaybethenatureofthe
propertyandregardlessofthecountrywheresaidpropertymaybefound.

Theapplicationofthisarticleinthecaseatbarrequiresthedeterminationofthemeaningoftheterm"national
law"isusedtherein.

ThereisnosingleAmericanlawgoverningthevalidityoftestamentaryprovisionsintheUnitedStates,eachstate
of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
"nationallaw"indicatedinArticle16oftheCivilCodeabovequotedcannot,therefore,possiblymeanorapplyto
anygeneralAmericanlaw.SoitcanrefertonootherthantheprivatelawoftheStateofCalifornia.

Thenextquestionis:WhatisthelawinCaliforniagoverningthedispositionofpersonalproperty?Thedecisionof
the court below, sustains the contention of the executorappellee that under the California Probate Code, a
testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of
McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil
CodeofCalifornia,whichisasfollows:

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Ifthereisnolawtothecontrary,intheplacewherepersonalpropertyissituated,itisdeemedtofollowthe
personofitsowner,andisgovernedbythelawofhisdomicile.

Theexistenceofthisprovisionisallegedinappellant'soppositionandisnotdenied.Wehavecheckeditinthe
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testifiedtobyawitness.(OnlythecaseofKaufmaniscorrectlycited.)Itisarguedonexecutor'sbehalfthatasthe
deceasedChristensenwasacitizenoftheStateofCalifornia,theinternallawthereof,whichisthatgiveninthe
abovecitedcase,shouldgovernthedeterminationofthevalidityofthetestamentaryprovisionsofChristensen's
will,suchlawbeinginforceintheStateofCaliforniaofwhichChristensenwasacitizen.Appellant,ontheother
hand,insiststhatArticle946shouldbeapplicable,andinaccordancetherewithandfollowingthedoctrineofthe
renvoi,thequestionofthevalidityofthetestamentaryprovisioninquestionshouldbereferredbacktothelawof
thedecedent'sdomicile,whichisthePhilippines.

Thetheoryofdoctrineofrenvoihasbeendefinedbyvariousauthors,thus:

Theproblemhasbeenstatedinthisway:"WhentheConflictofLawsruleoftheforumrefersajuralmatter
toaforeignlawfordecision,isthereferencetothepurelyinternalrulesoflawoftheforeignsystemi.e.,to
thetotalityoftheforeignlawminusitsConflictofLawsrules?"

Onlogic,thesolutionisnotaneasyone.TheMichigancourtchosetoaccepttherenvoi,thatis,appliedthe
ConflictofLawsruleofIllinoiswhichreferredthematterbacktoMichiganlaw.Butoncehavingdetermined
thetheConflictofLawsprincipleistherulelookedto,itisdifficulttoseewhythereferencebackshouldnot
have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references"
whichhassooftenbeencriticizedbelegalwriters.Theopponentsoftherenvoiwouldhavelookedmerely
totheinternallawofIllinois,thusrejectingtherenvoiorthereferenceback.Yetthereseemsnocompelling
logicalreasonwhytheoriginalreferenceshouldbetheinternallawratherthantotheConflictofLawsrule.
Itistruethatsuchasolutionavoidsgoingonamerrygoround,butthosewhohaveacceptedtherenvoi
theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point applying
internallaw.Perhapstheopponentsoftherenvoiareabitmoreconsistentfortheylookalwaystointernal
lawastheruleofreference.

Strangelyenough,boththeadvocatesforandtheobjectorstotherenvoipleadthatgreateruniformitywill
resultfromadoptionoftheirrespectiveviews.Andstillmorestrangeisthefactthattheonlywaytoachieve
uniformityinthischoiceoflawproblemisifinthedisputethetwostateswhoselawsformthelegalbasisof
the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the
doctrine,theresultofthelitigationwillvarywiththechoiceoftheforum.Inthecasestatedabove,hadthe
Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman if the suit had been
broughtintheIllinoiscourts,andtheytoorejectedtherenvoi,judgmentwouldbeforthewoman.Thesame
resultwouldhappen,thoughthecourtswouldswitchwithrespecttowhichwouldholdliability,ifbothcourts
acceptedtherenvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and
wherethevalidityofadecreeofdivorceischallenged.InthesecasestheConflictofLawsruleofthesitus
of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further
reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be
recognizedbyeverycourtandeverydivorce,validbythedomicileoftheparties,willbevalideverywhere.
(Goodrich,ConflictofLaws,Sec.7,pp.1314.)

X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in

Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed
amongX'snextofkin.

Assume(1)thatthisquestionarisesinaMassachusettscourt.Theretheruleoftheconflictoflawsasto
intestatesuccessiontomovablescallsforanapplicationofthelawofthedeceased'slastdomicile.Sinceby
hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to
turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a
distribution accordingly. An examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
nationallawofthedeceased,thusapplyingtheMassachusettsstatuteofdistributions.Soonthesurfaceof
thingstheMassachusettscourthasopentoitalternativecourseofaction:(a)eithertoapplytheFrenchlaw
istointestatesuccession,or(b)toresolveitselfintoaFrenchcourtandapplytheMassachusettsstatuteof
distributions,ontheassumptionthatthisiswhataFrenchcourtwoulddo.Ifitacceptsthesocalledrenvoi
doctrine,itwillfollowthelattercourse,thusapplyingitsownlaw.

Thisisonetypeofrenvoi.Ajuralmatterispresentedwhichtheconflictoflawsruleoftheforumreferstoa
foreignlaw,theconflictoflawsruleofwhich,inturn,refersthematterbackagaintothelawoftheforum.

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This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'"
(HarvardLawReview,Vol.31,pp.523571.)

Afteradecisionhasbeenarrivedatthataforeignlawistoberesortedtoasgoverningaparticularcase,
thefurtherquestionmayarise:Aretherulesastotheconflictoflawscontainedinsuchforeignlawalsoto
beresortedto?Thisisaquestionwhich,whileithasbeenconsideredbythecourtsinbutafewinstances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists and the doctrine involved has
beendescriptivelydesignatedbythemasthe"Renvoyer"tosendback,orthe"Ruchversweisung",orthe
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the
adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be
decidedaccordingtothelawoftheforum....(16C.J.S.872.)

Anothertheory,knownasthe"doctrineofrenvoi",hasbeenadvanced.Thetheoryofthedoctrineofrenvoi
isthatthecourtoftheforum,indeterminingthequestionbeforeit,musttakeintoaccountthewholelawof
theotherjurisdiction,butalsoitsrulesastoconflictoflaws,andthenapplythelawtotheactualquestion
which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the
renvoihasgenerallybeenrepudiatedbytheAmericanauthorities.(2Am.Jur.296)

Thescopeofthetheoryofrenvoihasalsobeendefinedandthereasonsforitsapplicationinacountryexplained
byProf.LorenzeninanarticleintheYaleLawJournal,Vol.27,19171918,pp.529531.Thepertinentpartsof
thearticlearequotedhereinbelow:

Therecognitionoftherenvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporatingnotonlytheordinaryorinternallawoftheforeignstateorcountry,butitsrulesoftheconflict
oflawsaswell.Accordingtothistheory'thelawofacountry'meansthewholeofitslaw.

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VonBarpresentedhisviewsatthemeetingoftheInstituteofInternationalLaw,atNeuchatel,in1900,in
theformofthefollowingtheses:

(1)Everycourtshallobservethelawofitscountryasregardstheapplicationofforeignlaws.

(2)Providedthatnoexpressprovisiontothecontraryexists,thecourtshallrespect:

(a)Theprovisionsofaforeignlawwhichdisclaimstherighttobinditsnationalsabroadasregards
their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the
domicile,orevenbythelawoftheplacewheretheactinquestionoccurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is
necessarilycompetent,whichagreeinattributingthedeterminationofaquestiontothesamesystem
oflaw.

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If,forexample,theEnglishlawdirectsitsjudgetodistributethepersonalestateofanEnglishmanwhohas
dieddomiciledinBelgiuminaccordancewiththelawofhisdomicile,hemustfirstinquirewhetherthelawof
Belgium would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he
findsthattheBelgianlawwouldmakethedistributioninaccordancewiththelawofnationalitythatisthe
Englishlawhemustacceptthisreferencebacktohisownlaw.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman,Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforcedjointly,eachinitsownintendedandappropriatesphere,theprinciplecitedInreKaufmanshouldapply
tocitizenslivingintheState,butArticle946shouldapplytosuchofitscitizensasarenotdomiciledinCalifornia
butinotherjurisdictions.Therulelaiddownofresortingtothelawofthedomicileinthedeterminationofmatters
with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
shouldgoverninmostmattersorrightswhichfollowthepersonoftheowner.

Whenamandiesleavingpersonalpropertyinoneormorestates,andleavesawilldirectingthemannerof
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be
lookedtoindecidinglegalquestionsaboutthewill,almostascompletelyasthelawofsitusisconsultedin
questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyondthebordersofthedomiciliarystate.Therulesofthedomicilearerecognizedascontrollingbythe
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate

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succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The
general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere,isoneoftheuniversalapplication.Ithaditsorigininthatinternationalcomitywhichwasoneof
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparentthanever.(Goodrich,ConflictofLaws,Sec.164,pp.442443.)

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens,oneforresidentsthereinandanotherforthosedomiciledinotherjurisdictions.ReasondemandsthatWe
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
lawsrulesforthecitizensdomiciledabroad.IfwemustenforcethelawofCaliforniaasincomityweareboundto
go,assodeclaredinArticle16ofourCivilCode,thenwemustenforcethelawofCaliforniainaccordancewith
the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflictoflawsruleforthosedomiciledabroad.

Itisarguedonappellees'behalfthattheclause"ifthereisnolawtothecontraryintheplacewheretheproperty
issituated"inSec.946oftheCaliforniaCivilCodereferstoArticle16oftheCivilCodeofthePhilippinesandthat
thelawtothecontraryinthePhilippinesistheprovisioninsaidArticle16thatthenationallaw of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the
nationallawmentionedinArticle16ofourCivilCodeisthelawonconflictoflawsintheCaliforniaCivilCode,i.e.,
Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
conflictoflawsruleinCalifornia,Article946,CivilCode,preciselyrefersbackthecase,whenadecedentisnot
domiciledinCalifornia,tothelawofhisdomicile,thePhilippinesinthecaseatbar.Thecourtofthedomicilecan
notandshouldnotreferthecasebacktoCaliforniasuchactionwouldleavetheissueincapableofdetermination
becausethecasewillthenbelikeafootball,tossedbackandforthbetweenthetwostates,betweenthecountry
ofwhichthedecedentwasacitizenandthecountryofhisdomicile.ThePhilippinecourtmustapplyitsownlawas
directedintheconflictoflawsruleofthestateofthedecedent,ifthequestionhastobedecided,especiallyasthe
applicationoftheinternallawofCaliforniaprovidesnolegitimeforchildrenwhilethePhilippinelaw,Arts.887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizingthem.

ThePhilippinecases(InreEstateofJohnson,39Phil.156Rieravs.Palmaroli,40Phil.105Micianovs.Brimo,
50Phil.867BabcockTempletonvs.RiderBabcock,52Phil.130andGibbsvs.Government,59Phil.293.)cited
byappelleestosupportthedecisioncannotpossiblyapplyinthecaseatbar,fortwoimportantreasons,i.e.,the
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines,anditdoesnotappearineachcasethatthereexistsinthestateofwhichthesubjectisacitizen,a
lawsimilartooridenticalwithArt.946oftheCaliforniaCivilCode.

WethereforefindthatasthedomicileofthedeceasedChristensen,acitizenofCalifornia,isthePhilippines,the
validityoftheprovisionsofhiswilldeprivinghisacknowledgednaturalchild,theappellant,shouldbegovernedby
the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with
costsagainstappellees.

Padilla,BautistaAngelo,Concepcion,Reyes,Barrera,Paredes,Dizon,RegalaandMakalintal,JJ.,concur.
Bengzon,C.J.,tooknopart.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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