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    Ames - Deadlock-Intro & Conclusion

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    Victoria Ortiz de Rozas
    The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil Intro & Conclusion

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    k | | E | The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil Barry Ames Ann Arbor ‘Tre UNIVERsrrr OF MICHIGAN PRESS Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2001 llrightsreserved Published in the United States of America by ‘The University of Michigan Press ‘Manufactured in the United States of America @Primted on acid-free paper 2004 2003 2002 2001-43-21 No pat ofthis publication may be reproduced, stored ina retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any mean, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the writen permission ofthe publisher. ACIP catalog record for this book is availabe from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in-Publication Data ‘Ames, Bary ‘The deadlock of democracy in Brazil Barry Armes . cm. — (terest, identities, and instttions in comparative politics) Includes bibliographical references and inde, ISBN 0-472-11160-4 (elo: alk, paper) 1, Blections—Brazil. 2. Brazil. Congresso Nacional. 3, Brazil—Polites and government 1985-1. Tile. Seis. TL2492.A44 2000 32881—ae2 0.068773, Introduction Imagine the following puzzle: A formally democratic nation confronts, over ‘many years, crises of inflation, government waste and corruption, pension sys- tem deficits, inadequate social services, violence, and social inequality. Sub- ‘stantial majorities of the population support proposals dealing with these crises. In the legislature, few parliamentarians oppose the proposals because of prin- ciples or voter pressure. And yet these proposals rarely emerge unscathed from the legislative process. Many, because they have no chance of passage, never arrive at the Congress's door. Others die in committees. Some proposals ult- ‘mately win approval, but long delays and substantive concessions weaken their impact. Rarely can the president avoid paying a high price, in pork and patron- age. for legislative snpport This puzzle cheracterizes the past fifteen years of polities and poliey-mak- {ng in Brazil, Latin America’s largest democracy. Brazil is often described as @ nation where govemnability is permanent problem. Governabitity i the sort of hhot topic whose meaning is hard to pin down, but at its core lie two political processes. One involves the efficiency of a nation’s executive and legislative branches inthe making of programs and policies; the other relates to the gov- cernment’s ability to implement these programs and policies. This book ad- dresses the policy-making aspects of governability in Brazil. More precisely, the book explores the elationship between Brazil's national political institu. tions, especialy the rules and practices of electoral and legislative politics, and the probability thatthe central government will adopt new programs and pol cies. Although the empirical analysis centers on the pas fifteen years of Brazil- ian politics along with the last years of military role, the explanatory ideas and theories come from the broader literature of contemporary political science, and the results ofthe investigation have implications for developed and developing countries alike, ‘To.comprehend more concretely Brazil’s governability crisis, consider just ‘the most recent presidential administration. When Fernando Henrique Cardoso ‘assumed Brazil's presidency in early 1995, his prospects seemed extremely fa- 2 The Deailock of Democracy in Breil Vorable. The new president was credited with authoring the Plano Real, an eso- ‘nomic program that had stabilized the economy and lifted millions out of Poverty. The five partes backing Cardoso’s election (some only inthe second, ound) included more than 400 deputies, easily sufficient to pass regular legis lation and even enough to amend the Constitution, Leftist opposition tothe ad- ‘ministration was in disarray, utterly demoralized and with no credible alterna- ‘tive program. And the president himself was no lightweight; indeed, a ‘distinguished foreign historian claimed that Cardoso would “arguably be the ‘most intellectually sophisticated head of any contemporary state” (Anderson 1994, 3), With such an auspicious—and unusual—beginning, Cardoso’s pro- ‘gram should sail through the Congress, and Brazil could begin an assault on its central problems: an oppressive and costly state apparatus, economic inefficiency, and widespread povery.! Has the Cardoso administration, now six years in office, lived up to its beady prospects? Policy successes, mainly in the area of economic reform, surely exist. Liberalization, following the path of Cardoso’s predecessor, Fer~ ‘nando Collor de Mello, has proceeded apace, with significant areas of the con- ‘omy opened to foreign investment, major state enterprises sold, and trade lib- eralized (Kingstone 1999). In other policy areas, however, progress has been slow and uneven, Congress approved a constitutional amendment allowing re- election for presidents, governors, and mayors. Congressional assent, however, ‘came only after the executive branch doled out pork-barrel inducements and pa- tronage to significant numbers of deputies. In addition, revelations about vote buying suggested that some governors had literally bribed deputies to support ‘eelection in exchange for control over crucial executive appointments in their states (Kramer 1997). By the end of 1998, pension and administrative reform hhad been approved, but both had languished in the Congress for years, and neither passed without substantial concessions from the administration. Tax reform, long regarded as a centerpiece of economic modernization, had disap peared from the executive agenda. The slow progress of pension and adminis- tative reforms, coupled with the absence of anything resembling a new tax pol- jy, had real consequences. In the massive withdrawals of foreign cepital triggered by the Asian crisis inthe late summer of 1998, foreign investors and bankers used these policy failures to justify their concerns over Brazil's eco- ‘nomic program, and their contribution to the public sector deficit forced the ‘government into an even harsher and more recessionary stabilization program, 1, Fora sary of Cados's ee and politcal ess, se Resende Senos 1997, Insroduction 3 ‘Cardoso's inability to move his program quickly through the Congress can not be blamed either on a lack of solid public support or on principled legisla- tive opposition. In all these policy areas (with the possible exception ofthe re- election amendment), substantial majorities of the population supported the presidents reforms. And as political scientist Bolivar Lamounier pointed out, ‘ho altemative proposals competed for the Congress's support ("Soltando as ‘Amarras” 1997). If Cardoso, playing such favorable cards, has had this much trouble ad- vvancing his legislative agenda, imagine the situation confronting a “typical” president. Brazilian executives usually lack even nominal congressional ma Jorities but instead depend on deputies mainly interested in their own fortunes, in local pork, or in the defense of narrow interests, and they face publics dra. ‘matically dissatisfied with governmental performance at all levels ‘The past fifteen years of Brazilian democratic politics, coupled with the pluralist experience of 1946-64, indicate that the nation’s political institutions cteate a permanent crisis of governablity, devastating in normal times and de- Diltating even for presidents like Cardoso, who seem to hold all the cards. 1 ‘conclude from this experience that Brazil's political institutions simply work ‘badly. ‘What does it mean to claim that antion’s politcal institutions work ball? Badly for whom? Do they serve only the rich, the economic elite? The people ‘who design political institutions belong tothe elite, and institutions can hardly be faulted for serving their creators. The tragedy of the Brazilian system is not that it benefits elites; the problem is tet it primarily benefits itself—that is, the politicians and civil servants who operate within it. All institutions are biased ‘against change, but Brazi’s institutional matrix makes it particularly difficult ‘o adopt policies deviating from the status quo, While policymakers have been able to adopt, atleast since 1990, macroeconomic programs facilitating the na- tion's participation in the global economy, they have been unable to push ‘through fiscal reforms that would consolidate stabilization, Policymakers have ‘also been unable to design and implement educational and social programs that ‘ould raise the population's productivity and capacity or ameliorate the effects of global competition, and leaders have made litle progress in reducing the cost of government itslf. ‘The argument thet a state apparatus can benefit mainly those occupying places within it does not imply-—contrary tothe rhetoric of antigovernment con- servatives—that politicians are intrinsically thieves. To the contrary, many Brazilian politicians and civil servants work long hours and sacrifice private 4 The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil ‘gain to serve the public good. Rather, the argument begins with the idea that po- litical institutions generate incentives for politicians. These incentives motivate ‘actions that either facilitate or hinder the adoption of public poticies likely to improve life forthe average citizen. Inthe Brazilian case, the nation’s politcal institutions generate incentives that encourage politicians to maximize their ‘own personal gain and to concentrate on delivering pork-barrel programs tonar- row groups of constituents or politcal benefactors. Some politicians, resisting these incentives, stragle to legislate on national issues, but hey face an uphill and usually unsuccessful bate is necessary to put some substance in the claim that Brazils political in- stitutions function poory. In terms of formal powers, the country’s presidents rank among Latin America’s most powerful. What they need most, however, is support from a potticel party commanding a congressional majority, and only rarely do Brazil's chief executives enjoy such support. Instead, presidential au- thorty—even, at times, presidential survival itself—depends on the distribu- tion of construction projects and politcal jobs to erueil governors, mayors, deputies, and senators Presidents begin thei terms with high-minded pieties about avoiding the troca de favores (exchange of favors) that their predecessors 50 scandalously pursued, But political necessity soon rears its ugly head. Un- fortunately, even after liberally spreading the por, the mos presidents can ex- pect from the Congress—and perhaps the most presidents want—is a limited acquiescence rather than active patcipaton in the legislative process, Because the legislature cannot respond nimbly to presidental initiatives, some Brazilian presidents have ruled mainly through emergency decrees (me- In terms of Brazil's excess of veto players, what are the implications of ex- ecutive reelection? The chances of adopting innovative policies —those deviat- 2 from the status quo—will improve in @ second term only ifthe president's party becomes so strong thatthe number of veto players falls" In Brazil sucht 8 fall depends on the president's costails—that is, on the probability that the president's electoral victory will produce a legislative coalition more support- ive of the presidential program. Unfortunately, President Cardoso's 1998 re- ‘lection strategy suggests that stronger second-term coalitions—cozlitions with fewer veto players—will be the exception rather than the rule. ‘To understand why reelection is unlikely to produce stronger second-tem_ ‘executives, itis important to remember that party alliances vary from state state. Bitter enemies in one state are allies in another. This pattern of alliances ‘naturally hinders president’s ability to campaign for party alles on a national basis; Cardoso in fact, hardly participated a all n state-level campaigns. In ad- «ition, presidents have powerful incentives to deflect potential challengers to- ward state-level contests, even if these adversaries could be running against ‘members of the president's own party. Consider Cardoso’s tactics in 1998: in ‘Minas Gerais, he remained neutral inthe gubernatorial dispute between the in- ‘cumbent, the PSDB's Eduardo Azeredo, and his PMDB opponent, former pres- ident Franco."” In $i Paulo, Cardoso avoided attacking Paulo Maluf (PPB), 1S, tna dy of Mexican fteraism, Dian-Ceyeros (199, chap. 7) found evidence hati the dstbutionof federal eoares, the mmber of yeas eftina sate governor's erm wa diet cexeld with th advantages that sno ext rom the etal goverent. 16. As of this writin, seven month into Cardos's second term, 4 major minserial resufing is inthe ofing. Carden’ PSDB want some ofthe cabinet pos carey held by the PMDB. Reducing the PMDB's share will hardly sueagtheo th presents sive coalition, bat {he PSDB is beting that FAC’ lepislave agen isco slim hate party's 202elactorachanes se more porate Jrnat do Brat ly 12,199, 1 17. Inthe srg or he election amendment, Cardoso seems wo ave promizd active suport to Franc ite stayed in Mines Geral Conclusion 281 ‘who was running against PSDB incumbent governor Mério Covas. And in Rio de Janeiro, Cardoso allied with the PFL's candidate against the PSDB's choice. Inthe end, PSDB candidates lost in Rio and Minas Gerais and won only in S80 Paulo, With these and other state-level defeats, Cardoso's legislative coalition ‘was weaker in his second term than in his first. The long-term implication of the presidem's tactic is clear: the weakness of Brazil's parties—and the short time horizons of politicians facing electoral tests—allows presidents to maxi- ‘mize their own fortunes atthe expense oftheir long-term legislative base."® Cardoso’s second-term weakness also results from another, chronic difficulty. Executive reelection will produce a “piling up” of strong polit- cians. If presidential and gubernatorial elections are held simultaneously and reelection is prohibited, powerful governors and other state-level politicians will compete for the presidency. Losers will find themselves unemployed and ‘ut ofthe spotlight for the next four years. When presidential reelection is al- lowed, however, important politicians will be forced to become (or to remain) governors, and as governors they are well placed to cause serious problems for the president, Stronger governors, seeking to postion themselves forthe next presidential test, are more likely to mobilize their state congressional delega- tions and thus more likely to create new legislative veto players. In the end, presidential reelection is a good example of an institutional ‘change whose effects depend on the overall politcal context, In a unitary po- litical system, reelection should substantially strengthen presidents, But in Brazil's strong federalism, with powerful governors and with electoral districts coinciding with state boundaries, executive election may give the president no advantage at all?" IL How Should Brazil Reform Its Political Institutions? For Brazil, a restructuring of federalism might be one avenue for reducing the excess of veto players, Without question, Brazil's federalism isthe strongest in Latin America. Consttutionally, Mexico, Argentina, and Venezuela ate all fed- eral systems, but only in Brazil can states act so independently of central at- TS Cardoso tactics begin to resemble those of meopopuliss such a Arent’ Cats “Menem (ec Weylnd 19960), 19, Tam indebed wo Tn Power fr pining ot hie "pling up fect. 20, Tis also possible tht governors wil be temp f cute plea poblems for fist. ‘erm president jo forestall scooters 2. Asthe elution ofthese aes becomes cla toplicins ay fester barging ad- ‘vantages for presents may als disappear, becatepoticians wl elie ai they are patent ‘hey wil aon be fing a weaker execute. 282 The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil thority. The first Cardoso administration succeeded in reining in some of the ‘worst excesses of state independence —especially governors’ abil ‘central government to absorb the debts of state development banks—but states ‘iil have far more fiscal privileges than program responsibilities. In erly 1999, Minas Gerais’s governor, Franco, unilaterally halted debt payments tothe cen- tral government: the resulting economic crisis triggered the currency devalua- tion and a recession == AAs Eliza Willis, Christopher Garman, and Stephan Haggard (1999, 18) «demonstrat, the key tothe way federalism functions isthe organization of po- litical parties: “When party leaders are organized at the subnational level and ‘occupy positions in subnational government, then national legislators often act. as ‘delegates’ representing subnational interests." This description, of course, Sts Brazil precisely, but the relationship has an even stronger causal quality. The creation of strong parties atthe national level seems to increase central authos- ity in formerly decentralized systems. Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (1997) shows that {in Mexico the foundation of the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) in the 1930s made it possible for Mexico’s central authorities to adopt new tax poli- ies facilitating industrialization. The PRI monopolized all channels to higher office in Mexico. Favored politicians could be certain they would face no chal- Jengers. Knowing their personal political survival was guaranteed, state poiti- cians accepted federal tax and industrial hegemony. In effect, they traded their states’ parochial interests for personal guarantees. 1f Brazil is unlikely to wansform the formal constitutional bass of federal- ‘sm, can federalism change de facto if political parties become stronger at the national level? Both publicly and privately, Brazilian political leaders seem uite aware of the need for stronger parties, but concrete proposals usually reflect short-term political calculations more than long-term considerations. In late 1998, for example, leaders of Cardoso’s congressional coalition proposed ‘new rule of party fidelity. By this proposal, deputies failing to vote with their parties would face expulsion. ‘The government argued that deputies should vote with their parties because nearly all deputies owed their victories to parties. I claimed, in fac, that only 22, Mostofte decline in Brain eserves ccired before amar moratoiun.AsCalina ‘Sours potted out personal communication, Cardoso wed th ocioriim as pla covet for ‘he ineritable erluton. Ad since te federal government was leally obligated to halt cea aymeats io Minas Geri afte the moratorium, ech om with the sae improved. 25, The government's interest in pany dsiplin is hardly aw phenom=non, Nneeeth- entury cabinets, facing Chambers of Deputies in whic pares were realy clletions of pest slat fesons, a th sume interest a pty dsipline ase Graham 1990, 160), Conclusion 283, 13 of Brazil's 513 deputies elected themselves without help from parties.™* Deputies themselves disagreed, Between 70 and 80 percent of the deputies from the last evo legislatures say their election owes nothing to parties and every- thing to their own efforts Power 1997, 198) The governments reesoning was logically flawed as well, Imagine, in Sio Paulo state, five candidates who ex- pect to collect their votes from electorates that are distinct regionally, occupa- tionally, or ideologically. The five candidates form an electoral alliance and call the alliance a party. With each deputy getting about 200,000 vote, the alliance 48 a whole gamers 1 million votes, Suppose this aggregate vote elect the top three individual vote getters. They win because the system privileges alliances, ‘but their victories have nothing to do with party, at lest not in the sense of a party presenting a program voted up or down by an electorate 5 ‘As eatin chapters demonstrated, Brazil's deputies elect themselves by their own efforts. During campaigns, leaders contribute almost nothing to can-

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