AMERICAN INTER-FASHION CORP.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS:
- In 1984, Glorious Sun (Glorious) was found guilty of dollar-salting and
misdeclaration of importations by the Garments and Textile Export Board
(GTEB), as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled.
- Glorious then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that
its right to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was
not supported by evidence.
- The Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings.
However, Glorious subsequently filed a motion to withdraw its petition,
which was granted. Glorious then filed another motion to dismiss, which was
duly noted by the court.
- Two years later, Glorious filed with the GTEB a petition for restitution of its
export quota and requested for a reconsideration of the previous decision by
the GTEB. In addition to alleging that it was denied due process, it also
contended that the GTEB decision to cancel its quotas was due to duress and
threats from former Minister Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious quotas to
Marcos crony-owned corporations Del Soleil Apparel Manufacturing and
American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). This petition was denied.
- Thereafter, an appeal was brought to the Office of the President. AIFC
sought to intervene claiming that the GTEB decision had long become final.
- The Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case
to GTEB for further proceedings.
ISSUES and HOLDING:
- WON the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to the instant case
on the ground that the former decision was a final judgment on the merits.
NO
- WON Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB
decision. NO
RATIO:
- A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary
or final or merely technical points.
- The dismissal of the GTEB case cannot be considered as a judgment on the
merits. It was based solely on the notice of withdrawal of Glorious.
-
 - Glorious then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition contending that
its right to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was
not supported by evidence.
- The Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings.
However, Glorious subsequently filed a motion to withdraw its petition,
which was granted. Glorious then filed another motion to dismiss, which was
duly noted by the court.
- Two years later, Glorious filed with the GTEB a petition for restitution of its
export quota and requested for a reconsideration of the previous decision by
the GTEB. In addition to alleging that it was denied due process, it also
contended that the GTEB decision to cancel its quotas was due to duress and
threats from former Minister Ongpin in order to transfer Glorious quotas to
Marcos crony-owned corporations Del Soleil Apparel Manufacturing and
American Inter-Fashion Corporation (AIFC). This petition was denied.
- Thereafter, an appeal was brought to the Office of the President. AIFC
sought to intervene claiming that the GTEB decision had long become final.
- The Office of the President ruled in favor of Glorious and remanded the case
to GTEB for further proceedings.
ISSUES and HOLDING:
- WON the previous GTEB decision constituted res judicata to the instant case
on the ground that the former decision was a final judgment on the merits.
NO
- WON Glorious was accorded due process in relation to the 1984 GTEB
decision. NO
RATIO:
- A judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary
or final or merely technical points.
- The dismissal of the GTEB case cannot be considered as a judgment on the
merits. It was based solely on the notice of withdrawal of Glorious.
On the due process issue:
- Although AIFC admits that the 1984 GTEB decision failed to disclose to
Glorious vital evidence used by GTEB in arriving at its conclusion that Glorious
was guilty of dollar-salting, it contends that the subsequent disclosure in
1987, where relevant documents were given to Glorious and that the latter
was given an opportunity to comment thereon, cured the defect. This
contention by AIFC, the court holds as MISLEADING.
- The SC recognized that the instant petition involves the 1984 resolution of the
GTEB.
- AIFC cannot use as an excuse the subsequent disclosure of the evidence used
by the GTEB to Glorious in 1987 to justify the 1984 GTEB resolution. The
glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB failed to
disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against Glorious.
- Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987 enhanced
the charge that the former was denied due process. The data given showed
that the price of Glorious was actually below the median. Apparently, the
GTEB Investigating Panel picked up four importers whose prices were lower
than Glorious in order to show that the latters prices were the highest.
- Attention was also brought to the Puno affidavit and how AIFC claims that it is
an inconsequential matter in that the GTEB Board did not give credence to it.
To this the court replied that Mr. Puno stated that he was pressured by
Minister Ongpin, not the members of the Investigating Panel. Mr. Puno was
the Chairman of the Investigating Panel. Hence, it is plausible that in view of
his position he was the one pressured by Minister Ongpin. There is every
reason to suspect that even before Glorious Sun was investigated, a decision
to strip it of its quotas and to award them to friends of their administration
had already been made. At the very least, Mr. Puno's "complete turn about"
casts doubts on the veracity and fairness of the Investigating Panel's Report to
GTEB which formed the basis for the 1984 GTEB decision.
- Finally, the court held that although factual findings of administrative agencies
are generally accorded respect, such factual findings may be disregarded if
they are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud,
imposition or collusion; where the procedures which lead to the factual
findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave
abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest.
- Clearly, the right of Gloriuos to due process was violated. Glorious export
quota allocation, which initially was a privilege, evolved into some form of
property right which should not be removed from it arbitrarily and without
due process only to hurriedly confer it to another.
Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization

Facts: Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage

a mass demonstration in front of Malacaang to express their grievances against
the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills
Inc., called for a meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the
planned demonstration was confirmed by the union. But it was stressed out that
the demonstration was not a strike against the company but was in fact an
exercise of the laborers inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the demonstration for it would interrupt the
normal course of their business which may result in the loss of revenue. This was
backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs
if they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that
while the workers may be allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate , otherwise, they would be
dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the No Strike
and No Lockout clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO
were found guilty of bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied by the Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.
Issue: Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA.
Held: No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of
human rights over property rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual
application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting
government regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a
preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil
and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and
the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."The freedoms of speech and of
the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation
to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.

Lupangco vs Court of Appeals

Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to
Examiness," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations
in accountancy.
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy, filed with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the
issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain
the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the
same unconstitutional.
Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the
examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the
like 3 days before the date of the examination?
Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a
commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the
licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its
constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable
in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school,
college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
institutions.
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future
examinations conducted by the respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable
how the Commission can manage to have a watchful eye on each and every
examinee during the three days before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act
arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid,
such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in
view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are
authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has
no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare
themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking
all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become
public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors

Balacuit vs. Court of First Instance

Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21

April 1969, penalizing any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the
business of selling admission tickets to any movie to require children between 7-
12 years of age to pay full payment for ticket should only be charged one half.
Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the validity and
constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the
respondents hence the petition for review. Petitioners contend that it violates
due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust,
confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 prohibiting selling of theatre admission
tickets to children 7-12 y/o at full price is constitutional or not?
Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the
assailed ordinance be held constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To
invoke the exercise the police power, it must be for the interest of the public
without interfering with private rights and adoptive means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
US vs. Toribio

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen

in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the
municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding,
and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for
agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the
slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given
by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of
Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his
dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise
of the right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of
owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state
for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may
interfere with personal liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its
sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the interest of the general public
requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from
the municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law
and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle
against theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which
encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the
Philippine islands which threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In
some provinces seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their local
carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of carabaos up
to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the
luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food
production of the country which prompted the government to import rice from
its neighboring countries.
As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental
use for the production of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that
would protect these work animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize the
number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout the
entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles fit forfarm
work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most
importantly, the respondents carabao was found to be fit forfarm work.
These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.
Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The
said law does not constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just
serves as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for
the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus, the demand for
compensation of the owner must fail.

City of Manila vs. Laguio

FACTS:The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC)

is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and
lodgin houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as
a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which
prohibited certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities
where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation
and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and
padlocked permanently.
June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the
Ordinance, insofar as it included motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional for several reasons but
mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it constitutes a denial
of equal protection under the law.
Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUES:
W/N the City of Manila validly exercised police power
W/N there was a denial of equal protection under the law
HELD:The Ordinance infringes the due process clause since the requisites for a
valid exercise of police power are not met. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare
of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills fo
prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual diseases in
Manila. It is baseless and insupportable to bring within that classification sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns. These are lawful pursuits
which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community.

Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent
places.... Every house, building, park, curb, street, or even vehicles for that matter
will not be exempt from the prohibition. Simply because there are no "pure"
places where there are impure men.
The Ordinance seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of
morality. Try as the Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the
illusion that it can make a moral man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a
building or establishment; it is in the hearts of men.The Ordinance violates equal
protection clause and is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires. The Local
Government Code merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights
adn impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance
contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is
not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of
its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council unde the Code had no
power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires null and void.

Restituto Ynot Vs IAC

Facts :On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was
filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the
confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality
issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
Issue:Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to
justify EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said that The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to
be achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see
how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no
less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them
to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment,
which was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the
instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint
for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard,
thus denying due process.

Ang Tibay vs CIR

Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused
the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios
act is not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC, but a motion
for new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the
said motion.

Issue: What is the function of CIR as a special court?

Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The
CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It
is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and
deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative
and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions
are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter
controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and
employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates
the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
CA 103.

The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements, but this not mean
that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal primary rights
which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to
the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new
trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case
shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all
such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth.

Serrano vs. NLRC

FACTS: Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head
of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann phased out its
entire security section and engaged the services of an independent security
agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor
arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its
security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private
respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent
failed to use reasonable standards in selecting employees whose employment
would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be
given separation pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the private
respondent to replace its current security section a valid ground for the dismissal
of the employees classed under the latter.

RULING: An employers good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not

necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an independent
contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to promote
economy and efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or
arbitrary manner, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an
employer.

If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided by law, it is

illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid backwages. To contend
that even if the termination is for a just cause, the employee concerned should be
reinstated and paid backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another
ground for considering dismissal illegal.

If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes mentioned in
Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should not be reinstated but must
be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is
determined that the termination of employment is for a just cause because the
failure to hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without legal
effect.

FABELLA V. CA

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work

order to all public school teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes
on various dates during the period of September to October 1990. The mass
action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and
passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed
administrative cases against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High
School. The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they
should not be punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of
civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on December 1990.
Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the
following due process grounds: first, they were not given copies of
the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access
to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents
to prove their innocence; third, that the investigating body was illegally
constituted, their composition and appointment violated Sec.9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of the
administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision
finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD: YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to

include the following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings

which may affect a respondents legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in
ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers administrative cases
should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a
representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers
organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various
committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of
RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers organization in these
committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be
heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due
process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to
be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was
complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers
Federation. We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective
teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Under this section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its
choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating
committee. Such right to designatecannot be usurped by the secretary of
education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case,
there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members
of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers
organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was
repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a
previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws
so as to harmonize them.