Stuart B. Schwartz - The Iberian Atlantic Empires PDF

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CHAPTER 9
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THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC

TO 1650
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STUART B. SCHWARTZ
The Castilians and Portuguese were the rst Europeans to create systems of continual
communication, trade, and political control spanning the Atlantic. Following medieval
precedents and moved by similar economic and demographic factors, these two king-
doms embarked in the late fteenth century on a course of expansion that led to the
creation of overseas empires and contact with other societies and peoples. This process
produced a series of political, religious, social, and ethical problems that would
confront other nations pursuing empire. Portugal and Castile were sometimes rivals,
sometimes allies, and for sixty years (15801640) parts of a composite monarchy under
the same rulers. Their answers to the challenges of creating empires varied according
to circumstances and resources, but they were not unaware of each others efforts,
failures, and successes nor of their common Catholic heritage and world-view that set
the framework of their imperial vision, their rule, and their social organization.
It makes sense, therefore, to view the early creation of the Iberian Atlantic as a joint
process and a dialogue, recognizing the differences, but emphasizing the common
responses.
ATLANTIC ORIGINS
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By the fteenth century both Castile and Portugal had emerged as Catholic monarchies
seeking to achieve religious unity. In both kingdoms a precocious move towards royal
centralization and the bureaucratization had taken place. Portugal had emerged from
the shadow of Castile, its larger neighbour, as an independent and unied kingdom
after 1385. In Castile, the process of unication took a century longer, and was
facilitated by a dynastic marriage in 1469 that brought together Isabela, princess of
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148 STUART SCHWARTZ
Castile, and Fernando, prince of Aragon. In the 1480s and 1490s, as monarchs of their
respective kingdoms, these enacted religious and civil reforms and military campaigns
against Muslim Granada, which nally fell in 1492. By 1500 religious unication of
Iberia had ostensibly been achieved with the conversion or expulsion of Castilian Jews
(1492), the forced conversion of Jews in Portugal (1498), and a programme of conver-
sion of Muslims left in Iberia.
The chapter by J.-P. Rubies has explained how the pursuit of Portuguese interests in
cereal and gold led to exploration down the African coast and resulted also in the
occupation of Atlantic islands: Madeira (1418), the Azores (1427), and So Tom (1471),
and the creation of Portuguese factories on the coast of West Africa from which gold,
spices, ivory, and, after 1441, slaves were shipped to Europe. The presence of powerful
African kingdoms and Portugals own limited resources discouraged attempts at
territorial acquisition. This push into the South Atlantic eventually became directed
towards opening a sea route into the Indian Ocean, a dream realized in 1498 with Vasco
da Gamas voyage. For a century thereafter, Portugals preoccupations with the Indian
Ocean and the spice trade meant that their interest in the Atlantic remained limited.
This was in marked contrast to developments in Castile where its territories in the
Americas rapidly became the heart of its overseas empire.
Castilians, although less inclined to maritime activities, had nonetheless contested
control of the Canary Islands with the Portuguese, and, by 1480, after prolonged
conict, had wrested control of most of the islands from the indigenous Guanche
population, and had been assigned responsibility by the papacy for their evangelization.
Further papal intervention culminating in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) solidied
a Portuguese sphere of inuence in the eastern Atlantic and a Castilian sphere to
the west, and previous essays have shown how Spain and Portugal as well as the
papacy applied the theory and practice of these earlier experiments at exploration
and settlement to subsequent endeavours in the Atlantic, aided always by foreign
capital and personnel, especially from the Mediterranean basin, France, and Flanders.
Therefore the life and career of the Genoese Christopher Columbus reected the
continuity between the Mediterranean and Atlantic worlds and his own transitional
position between them. His early career in the eastern Mediterranean had not only
sharpened his maritime skills, but had exposed him to a variety of mercantile practices
such as the use of merchant settlement outposts which in Europe had been strictly
commercial bases, but in Africa had taken on certain military and political functions.
While living and working in Portugal and Madeira, he had visited the outpost at El
Mina in West Africa, a source of both gold and slaves; he had carried sugar from the
Atlantic islands, and he had seen both the trades in sugar and slaves in the Atlantic
islands as well as the arrangements for settlement under proprietary captains. These
experiences seem to have inuenced his own conception of his authority, his rights, and
his goals, and the presence of foreigners like him, and of foreign capital, was a common
aspect of the early Iberian experience in the Atlantic.
THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 149
CARIBBEAN BEGINNINGS, 14921530

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Sailing under Castilian auspices in 1492, but with the support of Aragonese courtiers
and Genoese investors, Columbus small eet, seeking a sea route to Asia, made a
landfall in the Bahamas and proceeded to further exploration of the Caribbean and its
peoples in all his four voyages to America. His techniques of contact with native
populationstrade in trinkets, seizing hostages, depositing convicts on shore who, if
they survived, could become translatorsrecalled earlier Portuguese practices on the
African coast. Columbus hoped to manage the full-blown settlement which he estab-
lished on Hispaniola in 1493 like a Mediterranean or African commercial outpost under
his personal control with colonists serving as employees. Tensions arose because the
colonial model fostered by the colonists was the reconquest and settlement of lands
taken from the Muslims in Spain where individual, noble, municipal, and corporate
privileges and opportunities were granted by grateful monarchs. Because gold was
scarce in Hispaniola efforts were made to send slaves back to Spain, while in 1497 the
Spanish colonists and employees revolted against Columbus authority. The rebels were
placated when they were conceded control over the indigenous population in a kind of
vassalage that eventually developed into the encomienda, a system of labour and tribute
extraction from the indigenous population that would be employed by Spain in all its
American territories. The appointment of a royal governor, in 1502, placed a limit on
Columbus authority. Continued dissatisfaction of the colonists and a rapid decline of
the native population meant that by 1520 the crown had assumed government of the
islands. Nevertheless, Hispaniola was long known as another Portugal, and the
vocabulary, techniques, and practices of the African coast persisted on the island,
especially when African slaves began to be supplied there, principally by Portuguese
merchants. From thenceforth to the mid-seventeenth century, Portuguese artisans,
mariners, merchants, and settlers were the most prominent and numerous foreigners
in the Spanish Caribbean.1
After sixteen years on Hispaniola, Spanish dominance and settlement extended over
the Caribbean region, especially the other islands of the greater Antilles (Puerto Rico,
Cuba, and Jamaica) and the coasts of Panama and Tierra rme (Venezuela). The
Caribbean served as a crucible for the subsequent conquest of the Americas. Relations
with the Tainos, the indigenous population of the larger islands, quickly moved from
barter to mandatory labour in the gold washings, with devastating effects. Unlike the
Portuguese experience in West Africa where gold and local products were acquired by
trade, the Spanish found that gold, pearls, and later silver in the Americas could be
obtained only by plunder or by mining, or, in the case of pearls, by collecting, always
1 Marcel Bataillon, Santo Domingo Era Portugal , in Historia y sociedad en el mundo de habla
espaol (Mexico City, 1970), 11320; Henry Keith, New World Interlopers: The Portuguese in the
Spanish West Indies from the Discovery to 1640, The Americas, 25/4 (1969), 36071.
150 STUART SCHWARTZ
enabled by exploiting indigenous workers. Demographic collapse, caused by disease,

labour exploitation, and the disruption of indigenous society and economy, became
widespread. The period of gold production on Hispaniola and Puerto Rico proved
short-lived, and by the 1540s an agricultural economy based on sugar, livestock, and
ginger had emerged.2 On Cuba and Jamaica crop production and husbandry were
established, and the introduction of new cultigens and livestock transformed the
natural habitat, as would soon happen elsewhere in the Atlantic world. New economic
activities created new labour demands which, as indigenous workers died off, were
increasingly satised by African slaves from Portuguese African trading posts. The rst
arrivals came as house servants and artisans, but after 1520 Africans began to replace
Indian workers on the sugar estates and other agricultural operations. A sense of
permanency was conveyed by the arrival, about 1500, of the rst Spanish women
immigrants.
The forms and practices of Spanish government also took shape in the Caribbean.
Spanish desire for urban living was symbolized in America by the city of Santo
Domingo which became an administrative and commercial centre. Smaller cities and
towns quickly followed until, by 1540, there were thirty-four towns and cities on the
islands and shores of the Caribbean, each, as in Spain, extending authority over the
surrounding countryside. A basic city layout was developed that would also be extend-
ed to later Spanish conquests. Ships brought immigrants to the Spanish Indies at a rate
of perhaps 2,000 a year who responded to changing economic opportunity within the
Caribbean sphere. Meanwhile, the crown created the basic structures of civil life
extending from a royal governor and treasury ofcials, to a court of appeals or
audiencia in 1511, staffed by university-trained judges. The arrival of missionaries in
the 1490s, the creation of three bishoprics in 1511, and the nomination of Santo
Domingo as an archdiocese in 1545 pointed to Spains intention to make this part of
Christendom.
Experience in the Caribbean shaped the Spanish Atlantic colonies in two other
signicant ways. Exploitation of indigenous labour interested the Spanish far more
than the acquisition of land, and they adopted the hierarchical divisions in the society
of the Taino to meet the purposes of the encomienda by assigning chieftains (caciques)
and their villages to individual Spaniards. Thus indigenous leaders and communal
organization were made to serve Spanish ends, and a pre-conquest category of depen-
dent workers called naboras was enlarged and adapted to create dependent personal
servants for the Spanish.
Since Castile claimed all the new lands, the inhabitants were theoretically vassals of
the crown and their enslavement was prohibited in general, but those who resisted did
not enjoy such protection. Spaniards made a distinction between Indians who were
guatiao or friendly allies and those who were Caribs (caribes) and who resisted Spanish
authority. That latter status was then associated with savagery and cannibalism that
2 See Frank Moya Pons, Despues de Coln: trabajo, sociedad y poltica en la economia del oro
(Madrid, 1986).
justied enslavement. The designation of Carib then was partly ethnographic, partly
locational, and always political. The backdrop of all these developments was the
vertiginous decline of the indigenous population. By the 1520s colonists on Hispaniola
were petitioning to bring natives from other islands because there were none left. One
Spanish response to this problem was a policy of resettlement or congregation, in
which Indians would live in more easily controlled nucleated settlements where
colonists, crown, and missionaries would have better access to them, and where in
theory they could learn to live in a civilized manner like Spaniards. This technique of
forced resettlement was used later throughout the Spanish conquests. The contact,
exploitation, and decimation of the native peoples provoked questioning and debate as
theologians, humanists, and lawyers sought to reconcile the otherness of the indige-
nous inhabitants and place them within the ideal of human universality and ius
naturae. As early as 1504 a commission met in Spain to debate the legality of assigning
Indians to Spaniards; by 1511 there were missionary voices raised in Santo Domingo
against Spanish abuses, and in the Laws of Burgos of 1512 the rst specic legislation to
regulate Spanish control of Indians was issued. The debates begun in the Caribbean
were extended throughout the rest of the Indies in the subsequent century.3
Finally, the Caribbean was also a proving ground for Spanish culture and social
organization. Attempts to limit and restrict immigration to only Castilians of unques-
tioned Catholic orthodoxy proved unsuccessful. Both foreigners and descendants of
Jews and Muslims found ways to evade the prohibitions. The shortage of European
women and the sexual exploitation of indigenous women quickly led to the rise of a
population of mixed origin that slowly was dened as a distinct intermediate category,
neither Indian nor Spaniard. The full panoply of Spanish mental and material culture
was winnowed and screened by distance, local conditions, indigenous practices, and
eventually by earlier practices as successive groups of immigrants disembarked. What
crystallized in the Caribbean was a streamlined, innovative conquest culture that
reected a heavy dose of Andalusian and maritime inuences and which incorporated
local realities, vocabulary, and practices. This was then carried in the conquest to the
rest of the Indies where it was again modied and reshaped by local human, geograph-
ic, and cultural realities.4 It should be emphasized that in the matter of cultural transfer
as in the matter of social organization, despite continuing attempts by the crown at
control, most of the process was unplanned and undirected, the result of individual
decision and local practice.
3 Lewis Hanke, The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America (Philadelphia, PA, 1949);
the excellent summary by John H. Elliott, The Discovery of America and the Discovery of Man, in
Elliott, Spain and its Empire, 15001700 (New Haven, CT, 1989), 4264; Anthony Pagden, The Fall of
Natural Man (2nd edn. Cambridge, 1986).
4 George M. Foster, Culture and Conquest: Americas Spanish Heritage (Chicago, IL, 1960).
152 STUART SCHWARTZ
CONQUEST AND SETTLEMENT TO 1570

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The conquest of the mainland was rapid. With few exceptions, expeditions were
organized locally, often as commercial ventures, and depended on private initiative,
leadership, and nancing although usually done with state approval and licence.
Leadership was based on personal qualities, and kinship, regional, or personal ties
often determined levels of compensation. The participants were a cross-section of
Spanish society; a few with real experience in arms, but the vast majority peasants,
artisans, labourers, and a few gentlemen, all of whom hoped to be rewarded for their
services. Their expectations often went unrealized. Those men dissatised with their
rewards were usually ready to organize the next expedition so that the conquest
proceeded in a leapfrog fashion, but generally the process of conquest went from
areas of dense indigenous population outwards to the more sparsely populated fron-
tiers. Of course, in those frontiers, rumours of settled populations, gold, cinnamon, or
lost cities often lay behind the original motive of conquest in regions such as New
Mexico or the Amazon.
The conquest proceeded on two major fronts. Yucatn and Mexico were an exten-
sion of the Caribbean phase. Setting out from Cuba, Hernn Corts carried out the
conquest of the great Aztec confederation 151921, and established his capital of Mexico
City on the ruins of Tenochtitlan. From there, Guatemala and Honduras were brought
under Spanish control while expeditions moved northward, into Michoacan and New
Galicia, and even further to the north. By the early 1540s, Francisco Vzquez de
Coronados men were raiding the Pueblo villages along the Rio Grande and venturing
on to the great plains beyond. A second front began in Panama. A large expedition sent
in 1514 directly from Spain under Pedrarias Davila had taken over the Isthmus of
Panama or what the Spanish called Castilla del Oro and then reached northward into
Nicaragua. Marches southward by land were blocked by the impenetrable forests of the
Darien, but the Pacic Ocean or Southern Sea provided the way south, and rumours
of great kingdoms in that direction quickly led to new expeditions. Francisco Pizarros
conquest of the Inca empire used Castilla de Oro as a springboard, taking Cuzco, the
Inca capital, in 1533, and then extending control over the territory of the Inca state
northward to Ecuador and southward to Chile, where Santiago was founded in 1541.
The area of Colombia was disputed by expeditions from Peru and the Caribbean, both
attracted by the considerable amounts of gold and relatively dense populations of the
Muisca chiefdoms of the highlands. The Ro de la Plata region was explored and settled
directly from Spain, but Indian resistance and the difculty of the conditions there
led Buenos Aires to be abandoned for a while (154180) and the Spanish outpost in
the region to be established upriver at Asuncin, Paraguay, where villages of the
agricultural Guaran offered some support to Spanish settlement. Buenos Aires was
re-established in 1580 mostly by the mestizo sons of the Spaniards who had settled at
Asuncin. In South America as in Yucatn, resistance of organized indigenous polities
was stubborn and sometimes retreated into inaccessible areas where, like the neo-Inca
state of Vilcabamba, it persisted. Elsewhere, in areas such as south of the Bo-bo River
in Chile and in the north of Mexico, regions that were home to nomadic or part-time
agriculturalists, an active military frontier persisted for centuries. In general, areas of
dense indigenous populations like central Mexico and highland Peru became the
centres of Spanish activity and rule, followed by areas which contained mineral wealth.
The Hispanic population concentrated in the cities and towns of these regions. Between
1514 and 1540 Spanish forces had explored and seized control of the better part of two
continents and an inland sea, overcoming tremendous environmental challenges and
the resistance of the native inhabitants.
Portuguese explorations were concerned primarily with Africa and Asia until an
accidental landfall of 1500 encouraged them to investigate the eastern coast of South
America in parallel with the Spanish conquest we have just discussed. In the case of
Brazil, while the cast of playersroyal ofcials, merchants, settlers, prominent com-
manders, and missionarieswas similar to that involved with Spanish America, local
conditions led to different outcomes and chronology. Since there was no dense
indigenous population or large state in the interior of eastern South America, the
Portuguese conned their exploration principally to the coast where they established
outposts on the African model for cutting dyewood. Gold was always sought but not
immediately found, and the crown, preoccupied with the Indian Ocean route, con-
ceded private contracts for the dyewood trade, but remained committed to preserving
its claims from such foreign competitors as the French.
By the 1530s the monarchy introduced the instrument of proprietorships, or dona-
tary captaincies, previously used for settlement of the Atlantic islands whereby nobles
were granted tracts with authority to develop and settle them. These proved generally
unsatisfactory in America due to poor relations with native peoples or to colonists
objecting to seemingly feudal authority, and succeeded only in Pernambuco in the
north and So Vicente in the south to which sugar cane cultivation was translated from
Madeira and So Tom. In 1549, a royal governor with ofcials occupied a newly
created colonial capital at Salvador and missionary activities under the Jesuits began in
earnest. Labour demands and disease led to Indian depopulation as the Portuguese
sought workers for the growing plantation economy, and then, as on the Atlantic
islands, the Portuguese began to import African slaves for the sugar mills, rst as skilled
workers, and increasingly as a workforce.
By 1570, the main outlines of the colony had been dened; foreign competitors had
been eliminated, the indigenous population had been pushed from the coast or brought
under Jesuit control, and an archipelago of port cities and towns, around which the
Portuguese population concentrated, served a developing sugar export economy. There
were then 60 sugar mills in operation, and by 1610, close to 200. Occasional expeditions
in search of Indian labourers or precious metals brought Portuguese inland, but the
population of 20,00030,000 lived like crabs on the beach. Royal government existed,
but use was still made of seigniorial grants to keep costs low. Essentially, the crown was
154 STUART SCHWARTZ
satised to tax private investment in sugar production and trade, and meddled little in
social and economic matters.
In fact, neither the Spanish nor Portuguese crowns could control the process of
overseas expansion, or explore or settle without private participation. Both crowns
employed medieval precedents; concessions of lands, forms of lordship, grants of
nobility or knighthoods, and monetary rewards or exemptions to encourage private
initiative. Once an area was conquered, or gold was found, or an exploitable indigenous
population was brought under control, earlier arrangements were cancelled. Columbus
and his heirs sought unsuccessfully in the courts for almost a century to regain his
original concessions, while Corts, who did receive a noble title and extensive powers,
later found his authority curtailed. The battle over the encomienda is a case in point.
Intended to reward service, its destructive effects and promotion of semi-independent
colonists moved the crown to revoke those grants over time, a policy that provoked
anger, disobedience, and, in the 1540s, rebellion in Peru.
The Portuguese crown, as was noted, continued, until the late seventeenth century,
to create donatary captaincies to encourage private conquest and settlement.5 Yet the
Iberian monarchies were concerned over the possible emergence of an overseas
aristocracy of independent power and resources. Both crowns made use of an econo-
my of grace, that is promises of social reward in return for services rendered, but such
remained limited. The Castilian crown awarded just two titles of nobility in the
sixteenth century (Corts and Pizarro), and became more generous in subsequent
centuries only because its nancial situation worsened. The Portuguese monarchs
granted no such titles in Brazil, and discouraged the development of a hereditary
colonial nobility. Nonetheless colonial oligarchies developed in control of local
resources and thus could not be ignored by royal ofcers.
If the military conquests were impressive before the 1570s, the civil and ecclesiastical
order was less so, since government was usually a negotiation between the crown and
local interests whether these were former indigenous leaders and nobles, municipal
councils whose members formed a kind of urban patriciate, or prominent encomen-
deros, merchants, or landowners. Cooperation was vital but the price was that personal
and kinship relations often inuenced, facilitated, or subverted the directives of the
crown and its agents.
Discoveries and conquests necessitated institutions of empire in the metropoles. The
fteenth-century Portuguese clearing house and registry for its overseas trade (rst called
the Casa da Mina, later the Casa da India) was imitated in 1503 when Castile created a
House of Trade (Casa de la Contrataccin) to regulate and tax all trade with the Americas.
After 1543 the Consulado or merchant guild of Seville controlled all shipping to the
colonies, while in 1523, the Council of the Indies was created to administer and advise
on all matters relating to the Indies. The Indies were incorporated into the crown of Castile
5 Antnio Vasconcelos de Saldanha, As capitanias: o regime senhorial na expanso ultramarine

portuguesa (Funchal, 1992); Alberto Gallo, Aventuras y desventuras del gobierno seorial en el Brasil, in
Para una historia de Amrica: los nudos 1 (Mexico City, 1999), 198265.
and the laws of Castile applied there, but after 1516, when Charles V succeeded to both
Castile and Aragon, the Indies were perceived as an extension of Spain. Portugal was less
inclined to centralization and numerous councils, handling nancial, judicial, and reli-
gious matters of all the overseas possessions, persisted until 1642 when a separate colonial
council (Conselho Ultramarino) begin to function.
In both empires civil government reected Iberias precocious development of a
professional bureaucracy composed of lawyers (letrados) who became essential to
government. Councils were often staffed by a combination of letrados and nobles,
and it was primarily from them, and in the case of Castile from prominent members of
the regular clergy, that colonial crown ofcers were chosen. Balancing these elements of
government was always delicate. In Spanish America the crown created two vice-
royalties. Viceroys, drawn from families of the high nobility, with broad authority as
representatives of the king, were established in Mexico City (1535) and Lima (1544), the
rst ruling the Caribbean, Central America, Mexico, and after 1570, the Philippines; the
latter ruling all of South America except Venezuela (considered part of the Caribbean).
The viceroys replaced the earlier form of delegated governance to leaders of expeditions
analogous to donatary captains in Brazil.
The administration of justice was one of the Spanish monarchs primary attributes.
All these lands were considered kingdoms of Castile, and Castilian law applied there,
enforced by courts of appeal or audiencias which exercised executive and legislative
powers beyond those normally held by peninsular courts. Ten such courts were created
for the Indies, their administrative districts becoming provinces of the viceroyalties. At
the local level, governance became the responsibility of municipal councils dominated
by local leading families whose interaction with the crown was often through the
corregedor or district judge presiding over the municipal council which was expected
to guard royal interests and enforce laws and ordinances. In Indian communities, these
ofcers also assumed the task of enforcing labour and tribute requirements. In Brazil,
government was left under the control of a governor general and a single appellate judge
rather than a court of appeals, a reection of the colonys secondary position. As in
Spanish America, the lower echelons of civil government were often bought or inher-
itedand were viewed as fee-earning sinecures. These went to Europeans at rst, but,
over time, came into the hands of settlers. As in Spanish America, municipal councils
lled by local elites became a kind of urban patriciate with pretensions to nobility.
Ecclesiastical authority ran parallel to civil administration. Papal concessions
allowed Spanish and Portuguese monarchs to nominate bishops and to control reli-
gious matters. Both monarchies took seriously their responsibility to evangelize as the
primary justication of empire. Thus, especially in the densely populated areas of
Mexico and Peru, spiritual responsibility was dominated by the great missionary
orders, particularly the Franciscans, Dominicans, and Augustinians, with about 2,700
members, between 1493 and 1573, engaged on evangelization.6 Later, especially after
6 Manuel M. Marzal, La evangelizacin en Amrica Latina, in Historia general de Amrica Latina,

9 vols. (Madrid, 2000), ii. 47386.
156 STUART SCHWARTZ
1550, missionaries were pressured to assign responsibility for converts to diocesan

priests and to move to frontier regions, and to this end there were by 1540 fourteen
bishoprics throughout the Indies and archbishops in Mexico City, Lima, and Santo
Domingo.
In Brazil, a bishopric was established in Salvador in 1551, but no archiepiscopal see
was created in Brazil until 1676, and early bishops were frequently at loggerheads with
the Jesuits who were the principal missionary order. The early endeavours of the
Spanish and Portuguese in the Atlantic took place well before the Council of Trent
(154563) and so it was an unreformed Catholicism that was carried from Iberia across
the Atlantic. This, the Protestant challenge in Europe, and the persistence of perverse
practices among the pagan populations of the Americas occasioned constant complaint
from the clergy; criticisms that hardened as Spain moved from the Erasmian reformism
of some of the early missionaries towards the rigid orthodoxy of the Catholic Refor-
mation. One response was the creation of permanent tribunals of the Spanish Inquisi-
tion in Mexico (1571), Lima (1571), and Cartagena (1610). The same challenges existed in
Portuguese Brazil but there cost and perhaps the inuence of the many New Chris-
tians (converts from Judaism) prevented the establishment of a permanent tribunal.
All Inquisition cases from the Portuguese Atlantic were decided in Lisbon, once again
reecting the closer integration of Portuguese Atlantic colonies into metropolitan
institutions.
Before 1570 the two burning issues of debate within the Iberian Atlantic were the
indigenous population and the nature of the economy. The conquest had brought
destruction and disruption everywhere, but Indian societies were remarkably resilient
in the face of demographic disaster and the new demands for labour and tribute. In
Mexico and Peru some continuity was maintained in leadership, cultural forms, and
language, a process sometimes fostered for their own purposes by missionaries,
encomenderos, and the state. Large-scale and rapid initial conversions fostered a certain
millenarian impulse, but by the 1560s continued Indian superstition and backsliding
produced missionary campaigns to extirpate pagan beliefs, indigenous resistance, and
to promote some accommodation between Spaniards and native peoples.7 Throughout
the Spanish Indies indigenous peoples accepted baptism, religious brotherhoods, and
other aspects of the new faith, but altered and transformed their meanings while
maintaining aspects of their former beliefs. Meanwhile the encomienda became the
principal institution for exploiting Indian labour across the Indies, but in central areas,
it faced increasing restrictions, especially after the New Laws of 1542 limited its
longevity and eliminated personal service obligations. Although in marginal areas,
like Chile and Yucatn, encomiendas persisted into the eighteenth century, they were
gradually replaced in the core regions of central Mexico and Peru by state-managed
labour service such as the mita or labour draft for mining. Native peoples also sought
increasingly to become wage labourers as they migrated and sought employment in
7 Kenneth Mills, The Limits of Religious Conversion in Mid-Colonial Peru, Past and Present, 145
(1994), 84121.
cities or mines or on Spanish estates to avoid communal labour obligations. Such

opportunities developed because as the Indian population contracted, colonists identi-
ed land rather than access to Indian labour as the basis of wealth. Partly in response to
this decline, African slaves began to swell labour forces in cities, mines, and plantations.
These changes were related to the rise of the mining economy of the Spanish Indies.
After the decline of the Caribbean gold elds, conquests opened new gold washings in
New Granada and Chile in the 1540s, followed by major silver strikes in Mexico
(Zacatecas, 1546; Guanajuato, c.1550) and in Peru (Potos, 1545), which changed the
nature of the Spanish enterprise in the Indies, especially with the discovery of a great
mercury mine at Huancavelica in Peru and the introduction in 1571 of rening by
amalgamation. Exports of precious metals far outweighed the combined value of all
other American products, and while perhaps less than 15 per cent of the population was
directly involved in mining, it created new population centres and regional markets,
stimulated subsidiary activities, induced or forced migration, demanded a highly
organized, expensive, and complex convoy system, and generally shaped the colonial
economy. The states role in stimulating, protecting, and supplying this industry
became increasingly important to colonial life. If American treasure never exceeded a
quarter of the crowns total revenues access to it maintained Spains credit and allowed
the monarchy to pursue a previously unthinkable foreign policy and imperial projects.
IMPERIAL SPACES AND TRADE

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Relativities in pace and time inuenced ease of contact, communication, and control of
the two empires. Portuguese contact with north-eastern Brazil was relatively easy, with
sailing time to and from Lisbon taking about thirty days on the outward and between
forty and fty on the return.8 This temporal proximity encouraged close royal control
and contact between metropolis and colony, and Brazil developed in many ways as an
extension of Portugal. No separate colonial law code existed, no printing press or
university was founded, and institutions such as convents that reinforced metropolitan
social order were slow to develop. Colonial elites sent children to Portugal for educa-
tion and hoping they would pursue careers in the metropolis and elsewhere in the
empire. Proximity also meant that foreigners and privateers could outt ships at
relatively low risk and cost in hopes of gathering dyewood or of trading, or raiding,
for sugar.
Castilian problems with communication were altogether greater. The major Carib-
bean island ports lay two months away from Seville, while it took seventy to eighty
sailing days from Seville to reach Vera Cruz and Portobelo, the gateways respectively to
New Spain and Peru, and perhaps a voyage of ve to six months to return. While this
8 Pierre Chaunu, Brsil et Atlantique au xvii sicle, Annales, 16 (1961), 1176207.

158 STUART SCHWARTZ
time barrier discouraged interlopers and forced European competitors to organize

larger and more expensive maritime incursions, it also contributed to the Castilian
consciousness of the American territories as remote reinos with their own legal code,
with viceroys enjoying considerable autonomy, and with the precocious growth of
religious and social institutions that reproduced those of the metropole.
While both Spain and Portugal depended on maritime connection with their
Atlantic colonies, the two empires approached commerce differently. Portugal had
created a restricted system in the Indian Ocean in which spices returned to Lisbon
under state control, but the Atlantic system was relatively open, mostly in private
hands, and often dependent on foreign ships sailing under Portuguese licence. Spain
developed an exclusivist policy prohibiting foreigners from direct trade and even
forcing non-Castilian subjects to trade only through Seville. Spanish shipping moved
quickly from loosely organized ventures of single ships or small groups of vessels to a
more regularized commerce. The decisions to centralize all commerce to and from the
Americas at Seville and its nearby ports, to have the state control all trade and
immigration through the House of Trade, and to grant exclusive control over com-
merce to the Indies to the Consulado in Seville, all reected the desire to keep contact
with the Indies economically and politically exclusive. The Consulado, operating in
concert with similar associations in Mexico City and Lima, eventually regulated all
Spanish trade to the Indies and served as the points of collaboration between state and
private enterprise. Until about 1540, outbound ships carried essential supplies such as
metal tools, wine, and olive oil, but mostly immigrants. Over 200,000, perhaps two-
thirds of them men, mostly from Andalusia and Extremadura crossed the Atlantic in
the sixteenth century.9 The conquests of Mexico and Peru created new demands for
return shipping even though these areas were too distant to make most agricultural
products protable for transatlantic shipping. But the discovery of large silver deposits
in both areas created new demands for cargo capacity and for maritime security,
resulting eventually in a system of two large annual eets, the galeones de Tierra
Firme that sailed to Cartagena and Portobelo to pick up Perus silver, and the ota
which headed for Vera Cruz to trade for New Spains production. These eets,
coordinated to link at Havana before return to Seville, formed the principal maritime
link in the Spanish Atlantic, sailing under the protection of specially designed and
heavily armed galleons which also carried the crowns share (about 20 per cent) of the
silver. For the next century, almost 90 per cent of Spanish shipping from the Indies
sailed as part of the eets.
While cumbersome and plagued by graft and occasional incompetence, the system
fullled its principal function. The major part of the silver eet was rarely lost, even if
9 John H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World (New Haven, CT, 2006), 52. Portuguese immigration
specically to Brazil is difcult to establish but it is estimated that over 500,000 people left for overseas
colonies between 1500 and 1640; Vitorino Magalhes Godinho, Lmigration portugaise (xvxx sicles):
une constante structurale et les rponses aux changements du monde, Revista de histria econmica
e social, 1 (1978), 532.
contrabandists, pirates, and European rivals were a constant problem. More serious
was the irregularity of the eets themselves. Of the seventy-nine convoys that sailed to
New Spain between 1560 and 1650 only eleven actually arrived on schedule and the
eets to Panama were even more undependable. Contraband became endemic. By the
1560s French, Portuguese, and English ships were regularly visiting the Caribbean,
combining smuggling and violence and often receiving tacit aid from the local popula-
tion or suborned ofcials. This tension between an exclusivist royal policy and local
economic interests remained the expensive Achilles heel of the Spanish commercial
system.10
T H E I B E R I A N A T L A N T I C 15801640
..................................................................................................................
By the 1570s the general character of two Atlantic empires had been formed. The
Portuguese had carried their Atlantic island experience to the Brazilian coast to create
an extractive and plantation colony dependent on slave labour. Castilians had created
island and mainland settlements based on the exploitation of indigenous populations
and the production of mineral wealth. The Spanish had been attracted inland in a
number of places by large and dense centres of indigenous population or by the
discovery of precious metal deposits. In both empires administrative and social for-
mations reproduced to an extent the institutions and practices of Iberia, although in
Spanish America attempts were made to incorporate native systems of hierarchy and
rank to facilitate control of the indigenous populations. Severe depopulation of native
peoples had everywhere resulted in social, economic, and political readjustments, but
by the 1570s, in some regions of Spanish America, a certain demographic equilibrium
had been achieved. While the patterns of conquest, depopulation, and settlement
continued on the peripheries, the conquest of the central areas had ended and a period
of relative stability, bureaucratization, and evolution ensued. The state, appointing
local administrators and village priests and incorporating native nobilities and leaders,
became a mediator between indigenous populations and Spanish demands which fell
differently on men and women. In the Andean region and Mexico these demands
caused disruption and readjustments in native communities that varied from utopian
religious movements and armed resistance to migration and accommodation.
The Spanish experience resulted in a population of mixed origin, the mestizos, the
product rst of sexual contact between Europeans and Native Americans, and increas-
ingly of contact between those ethnicities and Africans. This new social category
represented no more than 1 to 2 per cent of the population, but mestizos had originally
acted as intermediaries, and they, especially women, continued to do so in marginal
areas with scant European populations. There was also a growth in the American-born
10 Murdo Macleod, Spain and America: The Atlantic Trade, 14921720, CHLA i. 34188.
160 STUART SCHWARTZ
population of European descent, the criollos, who still considered themselves to be

Spaniards, and whose existence transformed the meaning of Spaniard from a descrip-
tion of origin to one of colour. Slowly, they began to see themselves as distinct from
Europeans: never able to secure positions as viceroys and rarely as archbishops or other
high ecclesiastical ofces, they coveted audiencia judgeships, minor ofces, and, most
importantly, grew in strength and inuence as landowners and prominent citizens. In
Spain the distinction between American-born Spaniards and persons of mixed heritage
was blurred by the belief that all, having been corrupted either by blood or milk by
Indians or Africans, were inferior or less trustworthy than persons from Spain itself.
The response of creoles was to seek ways to emphasize their social position above those
other groups.
These same processes operated in Portuguese Brazil, but were retarded since occu-
pation and settlement was slower and European immigrants fewer. To the end of the
seventeenth century, Portuguese-born dominated town councils, the merchant com-
munity, the Jesuit order in Brazil, and the ranks of the sugar planters. Their Brazilian-
born children sought higher education, ofce, or advantage in Portugal. In the sugar
plantation zones the presence of Native Americans was lower and of Africans higher so
that patterns of miscegenation, especially the growth of a population of partly African
heritage, resembled Santo Domingo or Cartagena more than Mexico City or Cuzco. In
the frontier regions of So Paulo, Amazonia, and the cattle-raising areas of the north-
eastern interior a large mixed population, called mamelucos or mestios, developed with
a role and importance similar to that on the fringes of the Spanish Indies. Indian
admixture did not necessarily preclude elite status; African background almost invari-
ably did. In both Spanish America and Brazil the restrictions of purity of blood
originally used to discriminate against descendants of Jews and Muslims were expand-
ed to include blacks and mulattos.
The Iberian empires exceeded an Atlantic boundary. The founding of Manila in the
Philippines in 1571, and developing regular contact across the Pacic to and from
Acapulco, linked Spains Atlantic system to the trade and markets of Asia. Peru, Chile,
and the west coast of Central America were already geographically a far Atlantic. Now
an outpost of New Spain able to trade with China, matching the Portuguese presence in
India, laid the basis for a global imperial system.11 America also became less Iberian
once the initial Portuguese and Spanish successes provoked the envy and interest of
other Europeans. Cupidity as well as European political and religious rivalries increas-
ingly led to attacks upon the Iberian empires, while northern European competitors
also attempted to create their own colonies.
The experiences of Spain and Portugal overlapped and ran in parallel until 1580
when Philip II of Spain resolved a dynastic crisis in Portugal by backing his claims to
the Portuguese throne with money and troops. While Portugal remained a separate
kingdom it was ruled by the Spanish Habsburgs, from 1580 to 1640, as part of a larger
11 Serge Gruzinski, Les Quatre parties du monde: histoire dune mondalisation (Paris, 2004).
composite universal monarchy whose extent far exceeded the boundaries of the
Atlantic. Philip II was more interested in Lisbons strategic location and its spice
trade than in its Atlantic possessions where the sugar industry of Brazil was still
modest, but Philip IIs claims to Portugal had been supported by Portuguese mer-
chants, groups of nobles, and other interests attracted by possible trade with the
Spanish empire and access to American silver.
Although the two kingdoms were theoretically separate in law and practice, a good
deal of contact, penetration, and exchange occurred, creating, in effect, a global empire.
Habsburg reform of Portuguese administration and law resulted in a new legal code,
the Philippine Ordinances (1603), and reforms and conformities were extended to the
colonies, with a high court equivalent to the Spanish American audiencias established
in 1609. The conquest and settlement of the northern Brazilian coasts and the mouth of
the Amazon was promoted as the attacks of English, French, and Dutch enemies of
Philip II increased. Spanish armadas sent to Chile or the Ro de la Plata now stopped in
Brazil, and sometimes assisted campaigns there. Some Spanish garrisons were stationed
in Brazil despite Portuguese complaints, and where the Portuguese had been the largest
foreign minority in the Spanish Indies, Spaniards played a similar role in Brazil.
Spanish geopolitical planning extended to the coasts, fortications and ports of Brazil,
as conquest of the eastwest coast of northern Brazil, elimination of foreign interlopers
from the Amazon, and the foundation of the city of Belm (1614) were promoted for the
security of Peru. Common threats merited collective responses. In 1625, Salvador was
recaptured from the Dutch by a joint Spanish, Portuguese, and Neapolitan force, and in
the 1630s Spanish-led armadas sought to dislodge the Dutch from Brazil. American
colonial governors of the two empires shared information and sometimes collaborated
in legal and illegal trade.
The hopes of discovering mineral wealth in Brazil as in Spanish America led to new
explorations and administrative changes. Occasionally, Portuguese colonists in Brazil
even petitioned for the introduction of the encomienda, but when the crown sought to
limit the enslavement of Indians, the colonists objected that Spanish American pre-
cedents were not valid in Brazil. New demands for labour produced anomalous
expeditions, or bandeiras, from So Paulo into the Spanish Jesuit mission elds of
Paraguay and the Ro de la Plata where they took captives from among the already
Christian Guaran. Such expeditions led to Portuguese activity well beyond the line of
Tordesillas that had separated Spanish from Portuguese spheres.
The two Iberian empires in the Atlantic were linked fundamentally by economics.
The sugar economy of Portuguese Brazil boomed from 1580 to 1630 producing some
120,000 tons a year. This was enabled by a South Atlantic system integrating the
African ports and island settlements with Brazil and Spanish America. After 1580,
Portuguese slaving in the Senegambia region was expanded and intensied. Hopes of
discovering silver in Angola, rst ceded as a captaincy in 1571, were fostered in the
1580s, but by the 1590s Luanda, its main port, had become a major terminal in the
Atlantic slave trade which by 1600 was sending some 10,000 slaves a year to Brazil and
Spanish America. Although it had its own governors, Angolas administration was
162 STUART SCHWARTZ
closely linked to Brazil. Portuguese and Luso-Africans who resided in the ports or
travelled up country supplied slaves to Vera Cruz, Cartagena, and Buenos Aires. The
contacts between Portuguese Africa and Spanish America were regularized after 1595
with the concession of a series of asientos, or exclusive contracts given to Portuguese
merchants for the supply of slaves to Spanish America. Despite complaints from Seville
merchants, about a thousand licensed ships cleared Seville to carry slaves to Spanish
America, and levels of contraband were probably three times greater. In Spanish
America and later in Brazil, precipitous decline of the indigenous population, and
legal prohibitions against its enslavement, increased the demand for imported
labourers. During this period around 750,000 slaves reached Brazil and Spanish
America as part of a broader commercial system controlled by members of the
Portuguese nation in many Atlantic ports, of whom two-thirds may have been New
Christians. During the 1580s, members of this community had created a system of
familial and business links that transcended national boundaries.12
The Atlantic system, and also the Iberian trade in Asia, was enabled by the ow of
American silver. In this period about 85 per cent of the worlds silver was being
produced in Spanish America, with production cresting between 1590 and 1620. In
some years about 1520 per cent of silver output was shipped from Mexico to the
Philippines for trade in Asia. In the legal Atlantic slave trade alone, about 1.8 million
pesos of American silver was transferred each year and levels of contraband were
probably much higher. More and more was also going for the burgeoning government
and the costs of defence in the Indies.
While the Portuguese beneted commercially from the union with Spain, there were
associated costs. War with England (15851603) resulted in major losses of ships and
cargoes; war in Flanders led, in 1591, to the prohibition of trade with the Dutch,
traditional trading partners with Portugal, who began to acquire salt, sugar, and
other commodities by contraband and force in the Caribbean region. Attachment to
Spain also became less attractive when new taxes were imposed, and Spanish ambitions
for an integrated empire were resented as Castilian impositions. After the formation of
the Dutch West India Company in 1621, Portuguese shipping and possessions became
primary targets for Dutch and English attacks. Moreover, in 1621, the creation of an
inland customs house in the Ro de la Plata also made the smuggling of silver through
the back door of Potos more difcult for Portuguese traders. Also from the 1630s an
inquisitorial campaign against Portuguese merchants, sponsored partly by their
competitors, made trade with the Spanish empire more dangerous and costly. The
Dutch capture of Pernambuco and north-eastern Brazil (163054) and their seizure of
the slaving ports of El Mina (1641) and Luanda (16418) was an attempt to create a rival
South Atlantic system devoted to sugar production. Nor were Spains own possessions
exempt from these incursions as freebooters who, sometimes on their own, and
sometimes with state sponsorship, established footholds in the Caribbean in the
12 Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation on the Ocean Sea (Oxford, 2007).

1620s and 1630s. Demand and prices for slaves increased, and the selling price of sugar
in Atlantic markets declined as Barbados, Suriname, Jamaica, and Guadeloupe began to
produce sugar and tropical commodities. Thus, after 1650, the Iberians had to share the
southern Atlantic with unwanted and bothersome neighbours and had to compete with
them as sugar producers.
Foreign penetration of the Iberian Atlantic was one element of a broader problem.
By the 1620s the Iberian Atlantic as part of this Habsburg universal monarchy was
drawn into the more general political and economic turmoil of the seventeenth
century.13 In the South Atlantic, Spains trade with the Indies had declined both
because of contraction of demand and the reduction of silver owing to royal coffers.
For Spain, beset by economic stagnation, foreign wars, and scal problems, the
contraction of colonial trade deepened its crisis and led to a questioning of the benets
and dreams of empire.
From a colonial perspective it was evident that contraction in Atlantic trade was
resulting from the growth in the American economies and a diminished need for the
metropolis. Greater self-sufciency supported an increasingly autonomous political
culture as local elites assumed greater roles in colonial institutions, created large estates,
and exercised considerable inuence over royal ofcials. The age of the hacienda had
arrived and with it the growing strength of local interests and elites.14 Theoretically, the
indigenous population lived in an Indian Republic (republica de indios) under their
own leaders and protected by the state but subject to tribute and labour obligations,
while the remainder, including mestizos and free people of colour, constituted the
Spanish republic, expected to live and worship by the laws and customs of Castile. The
reality was that in the social pyramid, the former supported the latter. As one viceroy
put it, it is not silver that is carried from Peru to Spain, but the blood and sweat of
Indians. The economy and society of the Iberian Atlantic was inextricably bound
together.
Spains problems and its attempts to rectify them provoked a sequence of revolts
during the 1640s, one of which in Portugal, led by a faction of nobles, placed the duke of
Braganza on the throne as John IV. War persisted until 1668 when a Spain that had
been distracted by many other challenges nally recognized Portuguese independence.
To some extent Portugals victory and its ability to reconstitute its South Atlantic
system was made possible by its Brazilian sugar industry and its African slave trade,
both of which, even during the war, continued to drain American silver from Madrid,
provide income to Portugal, and attract the alliance and support of other European
powers. Even in the midst of Portugals independence struggle the old ties of interde-
pendence and cultural borrowing were still visible as Portugal, following the Spanish
model, created a eet system in 1648 for its trade with Brazil. By the mid-century it was
13 Geoffrey Parker, La crisis de la monarqua de Felipe IV (Barcelona, 2006), 1953; Ruggiero Romano,
Coyunturas opuestas: la crisis del siglo xvii en Europa e Hispanoamerica (Mexico City, 1993), 14569.
14 John Lynch, Spain under the Hapsburgs, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1969), ii. 184228.
164 STUART SCHWARTZ
clear that Brazil and the South Atlantic, not the Indian Ocean spice trade, had become
the keystone of Portuguese imperial hopes.15
By this point, the unity of the Iberian Atlantic had ended and its territorial
integrity had been breached by the English, French, and Dutch. The costs of
defending empire had been raised considerably, but while the hegemony of Spain
in the South Atlantic had been weakened, the silver eets continued to sail and there
had been no real threat to the viceregal centres of its empire. The Portuguese South
Atlantic system survived also, but at the price of making commercial concessions to
England and the Netherlands. Foreign competition, falling sugar prices, and natural
calamities made the following decades particularly difcult. As contemporaries viewed
the situation, they could see that Iberian empires had been weakened, but failed to
recognize growing strength and self-condence within the empires themselves. Whether
it was mulatto irregulars and herdsmen on Hispaniola who had turned back Cromwells
invasion in 1655, or the Brazilian rebels of Pernambuco who believed that they had
ousted the Dutch and retaken the African slaving ports without much help from the
metropolis, their growing self-condence and pride was creating a sentiment of autono-
my.16 In both Spanish America and Brazil local elites played an increasingly important
role in defence, governance, the enactment of colonial policy, and in the control of the
complex social hierarchies that the Iberians had created in their Atlantic empires.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bakewell, Peter, Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor at Potos 15451650 (Albuquerque,
NM, 1984).
Fernndez-Armesto, Felipe, The Canary Islands Alter the Conquest (Oxford, 1982).
Freire Costa, Leonor, Imperio e grupos mercantis (Lisbon, 2002).
Lockhart, James, Spanish Peru, 15321560 (Madison, WI, 1968).
and Stuart B. Schwartz, Early Latin America (Cambridge, 1983).
Moya Pons, Frank, Despus de Colon: trabajo, sociedad, y poltica en la economa del oro
(Madrid, 1986).
Romano, Ruggiero, Coyunturas opuestas: la crisis del siglo xvii en Europa e Hispanoamerica
(Mexico, 1993).
Schwartz, Stuart B., Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia 15501835
(Cambridge, 1985).
Studnicki-Gizbert, Daviken, A Nation on the Ocean Sea (Oxford, 2007).
Wachtel, Nathan, Vision of the Vanquished: The Spanish Conquest of Peru through Indian
Eyes 15301570, trans. Ben and Sian Reynolds (New York, 1977).
15 Rafael Valladares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia (15801680) (Louvain, 2001), id., La rebellin de
Portugal (Madrid, 1998), and id., El Brasil y las Indias espaolas durante la sublevacin de Portugal
(16401668), Cuadernos de histria moderna, 14 (1993), 15172.
16 Evaldo Cabral de Mello, Rubro veio: o imaginrio da Restaurao pernambucana (Rio de Janeiro,
1986).

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THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC

148 STUART SCHWARTZ

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 149

CARIBBEAN BEGINNINGS, 14921530

150 STUART SCHWARTZ

enabled by exploiting indigenous workers. Demographic collapse, caused by disease,

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 151

152 STUART SCHWARTZ

CONQUEST AND SETTLEMENT TO 1570

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 153

154 STUART SCHWARTZ

5 Antnio Vasconcelos de Saldanha, As capitanias: o regime senhorial na expanso ultramarine

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 155

6 Manuel M. Marzal, La evangelizacin en Amrica Latina, in Historia general de Amrica Latina,

156 STUART SCHWARTZ

1550, missionaries were pressured to assign responsibility for converts to diocesan

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 157

cities or mines or on Spanish estates to avoid communal labour obligations. Such

IMPERIAL SPACES AND TRADE

8 Pierre Chaunu, Brsil et Atlantique au xvii sicle, Annales, 16 (1961), 1176207.

158 STUART SCHWARTZ

time barrier discouraged interlopers and forced European competitors to organize

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 159

160 STUART SCHWARTZ

population of European descent, the criollos, who still considered themselves to be

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 161

162 STUART SCHWARTZ

12 Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert, A Nation on the Ocean Sea (Oxford, 2007).

THE IBERIAN ATLANTIC TO 1650 163

164 STUART SCHWARTZ

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