Villena vs interior

Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended
the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the same. The Secretary then suspended
Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is
lodged in the local government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code. Further, even if the
respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local governments, that power, according to the
constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of
charges against elective municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended.
In other words, the Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that
power under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter
provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials while sec 79 (C) of
the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation.
HELD: Yes.
There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under
investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative
Code which provides that The provincial governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the
provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior
from exercising a similar power. For instance, Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of the
Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as
amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner
prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser
power of suspension. And the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to
remove a provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to suspend
a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive suspension may be issued
to give way for an impartial investigation.

Planas vs gil
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal board member of Manila, published a statement criticizing the
acts of certain government officials including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The following morning, she
received a letter from Jorge Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the president directing her to report
before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that as an
elective official, she is accountable for her political acts to her constituency alone, unless such acts constitute
offenses punishable under our penal laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a party opposed to that to which
petitioner is affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement in the newspaper was made by her as a private
citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss freely political questions and cannot properly be the subject of an
administrative investigation; that the issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case the contents of said
statement infringe any provision of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through Commissioner Jose Gil, however took
cognizance of the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC
arguing that under the separation of powers marked by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to review the
orders of the Chief Executive which are of purely administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to review orders issued by the President.
HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will
neither direct nor restrain executive action in such cases. The rule is non-interference. But from this legal premise, it
does not necessarily follow that the SC is precluded from making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his
acts when these are properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers viewed in the light of political philosophy is a relative theory of government. There is more
truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor restrained to act in a
particular way. The CSC is the party respondent and the theory is advanced by the Sol-Gen that because an
investigation undertaken by him is directed by authority of the President of the Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction
over the present proceedings instituted by Planas. The argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a subordinate officer
of the government is acting under orders from the Chief Executive may be an important averment, but is neither
decisive nor conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his high office, the relative immunity of the Chief Executive
from judicial interference is not in the nature of a sovereign passport for all the subordinate official and employees of
the executive Department to the extent that at the mere invocation of the authority that it purports the jurisdiction of
this court to inquire into the validity or legality of an executive order is necessarily abated or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the right to voice out
her opinion but since she made allegations against the administration it is but right for her to prove those allegations.
The CSC has the right to elicit the truth.

LACSON VS ROQUE

The then mayor of Manila, Arsenio Lacson, broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous utterances against
a certain judge (Judge Montesa). Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson. A special prosecutor was assigned
to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension of Lacson to the President. The President, through
acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order against Lacson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post.
HELD: No. There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove
municipal officials. It is true that the President shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments, but
supervision does not contemplate control.
The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is not well taken.
Removal and suspension of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
construction subject to constitutional limitations
The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code must be done conformably to law; and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he
may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the Philippines.
Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the allege libelous act of Lacson
cannot be considered as disloyalty.

Mondano vs silvosa

Jose Mondano was the mayor of Mainit, Surigao. A complaint was filed against him for rape and concubinage. The
information reached the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered the governor to investigate the matter.
Consequently, Governor Fernando Silvosa then summoned Mondano and the latter appeared before him. Thereafter
Silvosa suspended Mondano. Mondano filed a petition for prohibition enjoining the governor from further proceeding.
In his defense, Silvosa invoked the Revised Administrative Code which provided that he, as part of the executive and
by virtue o the order given by the Assistant Executive Secretary, is with direct control, direction, and supervision over
all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . . and to that end may order the investigation of any act or conduct of
any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may appoint a
committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Governor, as agent of the Executive, can exercise the power of control over a mayor.
HELD: No. (Note that Silvosa was asking as the agent of the Assistant Executive Secretary who ordered him to
investigate Mondano).
The Constitution provides:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the power of control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all localgovernments over which he has been granted only the power of
general supervision as may be provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control
and supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction.
Likewise, his authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or
office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may be provided by
law.
If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision over all local governments and that for that
reason he may order the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such
interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of par 1, sec 10, Article 7, of the 1935 Constitution.
In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal officials in the
provincial governor who is authorized to receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. And if the charges are serious, he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer) pending action by
the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question. Sec 86 of the
Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over
the administration of municipalities.
In this case, the governor can only investigate Mondano for crimes relating to Mondanos office. If the issue is not
related to his office but involves a rime of moral turpitude (such as rape or concubinage as in this case), there must
first be a final conviction before a suspension may be issued. The point is, the governor must suspend a mayor not
because hes acting as an agent of the Executive but because of the power granted him by the Revised
Administrative Code.

Ople vs torres
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as Adoption of a National Computerized Identification
Reference System was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition
to invalidate the said order for violating the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizens right to
privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of
the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. Oples concern that the Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is
understandable. The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power of
executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.

Banda v. Ermita
G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010
FACTS:
President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285by, inter
alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing services
requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government
agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through
competitive bidding, subject to the condition that theservices offered by the private supplier be of
superior quality and lower in cost compared to what wasoffered by the NPO. Executive Order
No. 378 also l imi ted NPO s appropriation i n the General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving
Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO,petitioners now
challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or
repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when thelatter still exercised legislative powers;
and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual
abolition of the NPO.
ISSUE:
Whether EO 378 is constitutional.
HELD
:YES
J. Leonardo-de Castro
. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the pow er toreorganize the offices
and agencies in the executive department in line with the Presidents constitutionallygranted power of control over
executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President
continuing authority toreorganize and redefine the functions of the Office of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10,
Title III, BookIII of the said Code, is explicit: The President
, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall
have continuing authority to reorganize theadministrative structure of the Office of the President
.It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in varioustimes
has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under thePhilippine
Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to
reorganize pertains only to the Office of the Presidentand the departments, offices and agencies of the executive
branch and does not include the Judiciary, theLegislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated
bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that theexercise by the President of the power to reorganize the
executive department must be in accordance withthe Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence.
J. Carpio:
RA 9184 mandates the conduct of competitive bidding in all the procurement activities of the government
including the acquisition of items, supplies, materials, and general support services x x x whichmay be needed in the
transaction of the public businesses or in the pursuit of any government x x x activitysave for limited transactions. By
opening governments procurement of standard and accountable forms tocompetitive bidding (except for documents
crucial to the conduct of clean elections which has to be printedsolely by government), EO 378 merely implements
RA 9184s principle of promoting competitiveness byextending equal opportunity to enable private contracting
parties who are eligible and qualified to participatein public bidding.

PICHAY VS EXEC SEC.

In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-
Graft Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of
the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA). Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed
before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay),
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for the purchase by the LWUA
of shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. In defense, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to the
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13.

ISSUES:
1.Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional

HELD:
E.O. 13 is constitutional
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.

The Office of the President must, in order to remain effective and efficient, be capable of being shaped and reshaped
by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC
and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of
the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own office. Since both of these
offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and
transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

SARMIENTO VS MISON

This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being
members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it
appears that Misons appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval.
Sarmiento insists that uner the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Misons appointment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of heads of bureaus needed confirmation by the Commission on
Appointment.
HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed heads of bureaus as one of those officers needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers
whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group above are the only public officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA.
The second, third, and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of the
Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence he does not need to be confirmed by the COA.

CALDERON VS CARALE

FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides that the Chairman,
the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC] shall all be appointed by the
President, subject to confirmation by the CoA. Appointments to any vacancy shall come from the nominees of the
sector which nominated the predecessor. Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the
Commissioners respectively3 of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.
Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an appointment is in
violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment on the appointing power of the
executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of other officers appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec 16 of Article 7 of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended by the President to
government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution
whose appointments require confirmation by the CoA.

RULING:
The SC agreed with the Sol-Gen, confirmation by the CoA is required exclusively for the heads of executive
departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members
of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments is required.

Jurisprudence established the following in interpreting Sec 16, Art 7 of the Constitution
1. Confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required only for presidential appointees mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Congress and members of the constitutional
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election).

2. Confirmation is not required when the President appoints other government officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law or those officers whom he may be authorized by law to appoint (like the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Human Rights).

GUVERA VS INOCENTES
Posted by kaye lee on 11:51 PM

16 Scra 379 1996 [Ad Interim Appointments]

FACTS:

On November 25, 1965, Onofre Guevara took his oath as an Undersecretary of Labor after his appointment was
extended ad interim on November 22, 1965. The appointment was questioned by Rauol Inocentes on the ground that
Guevaras appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress. At around midnight of January 22, 1966, the
Senate adjourned its session. The House of Representatives continued its session and adjourned upon learning the
Senates adjournment. In the case of Guevaras appointment, Congress, through the Commission on appointments
has not acted on it while the special session is being conducted.

ISSUE:

Whether the ad interim appointment of Onofre P. Guevara is valid.

RULING:

Art. VII, Sec. 10, Subsection 4 of the 1935 Constitution: "the President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointment shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress"

The validity of an ad interim appointment shall be allowed when (a) until disapproval of the Commission on
Appointments and (b) adjournment of Congress, whether special or regular session. In this case, the second mode of
termination took effect when the Congress adjourned sine die at about midnight of January 22, 1966 which made the
appointment of petitioner Guevara ineffective. The contention that the Commission on Appointments should be first
organized before the second mode can be made effective is untenable because they are two different and separate
modes of termination.

Since the termination of ad interim appointment cannot be separated, the well-known maxim in statutory construction
applies. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.

PLM VS IAC

In 1973, Dr. Hernani Esteban was appointed by Dr. Consuelo Blanco as the Vice-President for Administration in the
Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM). Estebans appointment was ad interim in nature (because at that time
the PLM Board of Regents was not in session). His appointment was extended in 1975. However, he later discovered
that his name was not included among those recommended for permanent appointment. He then requested Blanco
to make him a permanent appointee. Blanco, however, appointed Esteban as Professor III instead and his
appointment as VP for Admin was terminated. Esteban brought the case before the Civil Service Commission where
he got a favorable judgment. The trial court reversed the CSC. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed the trial
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esteban is a permanent appointee.
HELD: Yes. Hence, he enjoys security of tenure. The Supreme Court explains that the term ad interim as used in
the Philippines does not literally translate to temporary. In this jurisdiction an ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment. This was explained in the landmark case of Summers vs Ozaeta:
an ad interim appointment is one made in pursuance of paragraph (4), section 10, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides that the President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, but
such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress. It is an appointment permanent in nature, and the circumstance that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. An ad interim appointment
is disapproved certainly for a reason other than that its provisional period has expired. Said appointment is of course
distinguishable from an acting appointment which is merely temporary, good until another permanent appointment is
issued.
In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the PLM President merely nominates while the Board issues the
appointment. But when the Board is not in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments.
Such appointments are permanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the
appointees term is converted into the regular term inherent in the position. In the case at bar, apparently, Esteban
was confirmed by the Board of Regents in 1975. Blanco however did not relay this confirmation to Esteban. The latter
was made to believe (due to souring relationship with Blanco) that his appointment was extended but only as an
extension of temporary appointment.

JAVIER V. REYES

FACTS:

Javier was appointed chief of police in Malolos by Mayor Aldaba. He already took oath and discharged his functions
as chief of police. However, the municipal mayor was assumed by Reyes, who recalled his appointed. Reyes
even illegally ousted Javier and replaced him with Clements. Javier took this up in CSC. It appears that there were
already 2 appointments for the chief of police Javier and Bernardo. The CSC ruled that Javier should be the one
appointed, as Bernardo was not confirmed by the counsel of Malolos. But Reyes still refused to instill Javier in the
position.

ISSUE:

Whether Javier should prevail as chief of police?

HELD:

YES. Javier should be chief of police. He already took oath and performed the functions of his office. This amounts to
acceptance by Javier. Javier acted immediately when his position was taken and filed a mandamus suit, this also
amounts to acceptance. On the other hand, Bernardo never assumed office. He did not even contested Javiers right
to the position. His motion to intervene in court was way too late. It seems that there was no acceptance of
appointment for his part. Acceptance is important in appointments. It is what makes the appointments complete.

AYTONA VS CASTILLO

FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador Aytona as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same day, at noon, President-elect
Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350
midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal
appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto)
against Castillo, contending that he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new
President, should be considered void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were valid.

RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcia administration was no
more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of authority the incoming
President, and he should not do acts which he ought to know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his
successor. It was not for him to use powers as incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended
or to avail himself of presidential prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important
positions, if few, and so spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need
for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350
appointments in one night and planned induction of almost all of them a few hours before the inauguration of the new
President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken
being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and
thereby deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.

ALAJAR VS ALBA
Republic Act No. 603 created the City of Roxas. Section 8 thereof provides that the vice mayor shall be appointed by
the president. Pursuant to the law, Vivencio Alajar was appointed as the mayor. Later on, the president sent
communication to Alajar telling him that he will be replaced by a new appointee, Juliano Alba. Alba was then declared
as the acting mayor. Alajar refused to leave his post and he filed a quo warranto case before Judge Jose Evangelista
who ruled in favor of him.
Alba appealed before the Supreme Court. Alba argued that section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code
provides:
Appointment of City Officials. The President of the Philippines shall appoint, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the Congress of the Philippines, the mayor, the vice-mayor . . . and he may REMOVE at
pleasure any of the said officers . . .
Alajar however insisted that the above provision is incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that no officer or
employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law, because the two
provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alajar, an appointed vice mayor, can be removed by the president upon displeasure.
HELD: Yes. The question is whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior, had any vested
interest or contract right in his office, of which Congress could not deprive him.
The act of Congress in creating a public office, defining its powers, functions and fixing the term or the period during
which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right and the tenure or the term during which the incumbent
actually holds the office, is a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative power. In the exercise of that power,
Congress enacted RA 603 creating the City of Roxas and providing, among others for the position of Vice-Mayor and
its tenure or period during which the incumbent Vice-Mayor holds office at the pleasure of the President, so, the
logical inference is that Congress can legally and constitutionally make the tenure of certain officials dependent upon
the pleasure of the President. Therefore, Alajar was appointed by the pleasure of the president and can also be
removed when that pleasure ceases.
Aparri vs CA GR L-30057
Facts:
On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following resolution # 13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri,
as general manager of NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on January 116,
1960.
On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved resolution # 24 which stating thereat that the incumbent general
manager shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In accordance with the provisions of
section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general manager until march
31, 1962. Petitioner file a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first instance court. The petition pray for the
annulment of the resolution of NARRA board.

Issue:

Whether or not board resolution No. 24 was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.

Held:

It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March 31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to interpret
the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office
under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law. However, the power to fix the term is
rested in the board of directors subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the
approval of the president of the philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of
office of the petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention of the legislative must be determined
from the language employed and where there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.

The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term rather, his right to hold office ceased by
the expiration on March 31, 1962, of his term to hold such office.

TIDCORP vs Manalang-Demigilio
G.R. No. 176343 September 18, 2012

Facts: Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) is a wholly owned government
corporation whose primary purpose is to guarantee foreign loans, in whole or in part, granted to any domestic entity,
enterprise or corporation organized or licensed to engage in business in the Philippines. On May 13, 2003, the Board
of Directors of TIDCORP formally charged Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo (Demigillo), then a Senior Vice-
President in TIDCORP, with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
.insubordination, and gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. Finally, and after considering Section 19 of the
same Rules, which gives authority to the disciplining body to issue an order of preventive suspension, you are hereby
preventively suspended for a period of ninety (90) days from receipt hereof.

Issue: Whether or not preventive suspension of Demigilio is valid pending the administrative investigation.

HELD: The 90-day preventive suspension order issued against Demigillo was valid.

POLITICAL LAW

Under Section 51 of the Revised Administrative Code, the imposition of preventive suspension by the proper
disciplining authority is authorized provided the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct, or
neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which
would warrant his removal from the service. Section 51 nowhere states or implies that before a preventive
suspension may issue there must be proof that the subordinate may unduly influence the witnesses against him or
may tamper the documentary evidence on file in her office.

Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the CSC promulgated the Uniform Rules on August 31, 1999. Section 19 and
Section 20 of Rule II of the Uniform Rules defined the guidelines in the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
and the duration of the suspension It is clear from Section 19, supra, that before an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation may validly issue, only two prerequisites need be shown, namely: (1) that the proper
disciplining authority has served a formal charge to the affected officer or employee; and (2) that the charge involves
either dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to
believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant her removal from the service. Proof showing
that the subordinate officer or employee may unduly influence the witnesses against her or may tamper the
documentary evidence on file in her office is not among the prerequisites.

In Gloria v. Court of Appeals, we stated that preventive suspension pending investigation is a measure intended to
enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating
or in any way influencing witnesses against him. As such, preventing the subordinate officer or employee from
intimidating the witnesses during investigation or from tampering the documentary evidence in her office is a
purpose, not a condition, for imposing preventive suspension, as shown in the use of the word intended.

RUFFY VS CHIEF OS STAFF

75 PHIL 875

FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of war on December 8, 1941.
When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February 27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and
organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for
prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further proceedings in the trial of the petitioners
on the ground that petitioners were not subject to military law at the time of offense.

ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?

HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d). The Bolo Area was a contingent
of the 6th military district which had been recognized by the United States army. The petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of 93d Article of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution
which provides that National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over all criminal
cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. The petitioners are in error for courts martial are
agencies of executive character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is
dismissed with costs.

KURODA VS JALANDONI
Shigenori Kuroda was the highest ranking Japanese officer stationed in the Philippines during the Japanese
occupation. He was then charged before the Military Commission, headed by Major General Rafael Jalandoni, due to
the atrocities that were done against non combatant civilians and prisoners during the war. His trial was in pursuant
to Executive Order No. 68 which established the National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations
governing the trial of accused war criminals. Kuroda is questioning the legality of the said EO arguing that the same
is not provided for in the Constitution. He further underscores the fact that the Philippines is not a signatory of the
Hague Convention on the Rules and Regulations Covering Land Warfare hence we cannot impose against him any
criminal charges because it has no laws to base on, national or international.
ISSUE: Whether or not Kuroda can be charged in Philippine courts?
HELD: Yes. EO No. 68 is constitutional hence the Philippine courts can take cognizance of the case at bar. EO No
68 is in pursuant to the constitutional provision that states the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation. The
Hague Convention and other similar conventions whose principles are generally accepted are hence considered as
part of the law of the land.
AQUINO VS MILITARY COMMISSION
In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under custody. He was
brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy
then questioned the validity of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the
authority of the military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being
charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court. Ninoy argued that the military court has
no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.
HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts which are authorized to
try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil courts were open and functioning. The SC
basically rejected the open court theory observed in the USA.

GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any
other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of
5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil
and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the
same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are
unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not
assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating
measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all
other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue
measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the
Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President subject to such limitations and
restrictions as [Congress] may impose to fix within specific limits tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .
In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the said EOs.
MONTENEGRO VS CASTANEDA
In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210 was
proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have his
son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied retroactively to his son for it
would then constitute a violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders. Montenegro then filed a
petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers to bring his sons body and explain his detention.
Castaeda et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter invoking the PP and the previous ruling
in Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should be granted.
HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The constitutional authority
of the President to suspend in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under Article 7 may not
correctly be placed in doubt.
BARCELON VS BAKER

In the early 1900s in Batangas, Barcelon was detained by orders of Baker. Barcelons lawyers petitioned before the
court for a writ of habeas corpus demanding Barcelon and Thompson, one of his men, to explain why Barcelon was
detained. They alleged that there is no legal authority behind Barcelons arrest and it was w/o due process. The Atty-
Gen averred that Baker et al acted only pursuant to the Gov-Gens resolution in 1905 which suspended the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in Cavite and Batangas (Sec 5 of The Philippine Bill). Barcelon argued that there is no
rebellion or invasion or insurrection during his arrest hence he should be set free.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barcelon was arrested w/ due process.
HELD: The SC held that the issue is a political question. Only the president can determine the existence of the
grounds specified in the Constitution for the suspension o the privilege o the writ of habeas corpus. This power is
discretionary and therefore not justiciable. The president has superior competence to assess the peace and order
condition of the country. Hence, the determination held by the president (GG) of the Philippines of the existence of
any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
should be conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the president (GG), with all the intelligence sources
available to him as commander-in-chief, was in a better position than the SC to ascertain the real state of peace and
order in the country.

LANSANG VS GARCIA

Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8 people, Marcos
issued PP 889 which suspended the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to
curtail the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC headed by Garcia for
interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the
suspension does not meet the constitutional requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this case where the
SC declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus by Marcos in Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Accordingly,
hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including two closed-door sessions in which relevant
classified information was divulged by the government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the
petitioners. In the end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-oriented
campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold the
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.

GARCIA-PADILLA VS ENRILE

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were
arrested by members of the PC. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo.
Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued but rather it was just a
warrant of arrest hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together
with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al is valid.
HELD: In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon
Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege
of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of
the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the governments
campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded
during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be
released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

AQUINO VS ENRILE

Enrile (then Minister of National Defense), pursuant to the order of Marcos issued and ordered the arrest of a number
of individuals including Benigno Aquino Jr even without any charge against them. Hence, Aquino and some others
filed for habeas corpus against Juan Ponce Enrile. Enriles answer contained a common and special affirmative
defense that the arrest is valid pursuant to Marcos declaration of Martial Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinos detention is legal in accordance to the declaration of Martial Law.
HELD: The Constitution provides that in case of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger against the
state, when public safety requires it, the President may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part therein under Martial Law. In the case at bar, the state of rebellion plaguing the country
has not yet disappeared, therefore, there is a clear and imminent danger against the state. The arrest is then a valid
exercise pursuant to the Presidents order.
PELOBELLO VS PALTINO
Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino
is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of
such conviction and imprisonment, Peleobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted
upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention.
ISSUE: Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
HELD: Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon was converted into an
absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-Gen. The pardon was already after Palatinos
election but prior to him assuming office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former
disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that Palatino is therefore eligible for
the public office in question.

China national machinery vs sta maria

FACTS: In September 2002, petitioner CNMEG entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with North
Luzon Railways Corp (Northrail) to conduct a feasibility study on a construction of a railway line from Manila to La
Union (Northrail Project) 1. Subsequently, Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and Department of Finance
entered into a MOU whereby China will extend a preferred buyers credit to the Philippines to finance the Northrail
Project. EXIM is to loan DOF $400 million payable in 20 years with a 5-year grace period at the rate of 3% per annum
2. In December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a contract for the construction of Phase I of the Northrail
Project. The contract price was pegged at $421,050,000 3. The Philippine Government then obtained a loan from
EXIM for $400,000 to finance the project 4. Respondents, filed a complaint for annulment of contract, alleging that
the contract was void for being a. Contrary to the Constitution b. Government Procurement Reform Act (RA 9184) c.
Government Auditing Code (PD 1445) d. Administrative Code

ISSUES: 1. WON CNMEG is entitled to immunity

HELD: No. CNMEG is engaged in proprietary activity. The Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002
between Northrail and CNMEG; the letter of Amb. Wang dated 1 October 2003 addressed to Sec. Camacho; and the
Loan Agreement show that CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity. 1. The Memorandum of Understanding
dated 14 September 2002 shows that CNMEG sought the construction of the Luzon Railways as a proprietary
venture. (Whereas clauses). It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The
Feasibility Study was conducted not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions by the
Chinese government, but was plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this
commercial enterprise. 2. The desire of CNMEG to secure the Northrail Project was in the ordinary or regular course
of its business as a global construction company. The implementation of the Northrail Project was intended to
generate profit for CNMEG, with the Contract Agreement placing a contract price of USD 421,050,000 for the
venture. The use of the term "state corporation" to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a
government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did not imply that it
was acting on behalf of China in the performance of the latters sovereign functions 3. The Loan agreement
specifically states that the execution of the contract agreement constitutes private and commercial acts done and
performed for commercial purposes under Philippine laws Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs
governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest it with immunity.
VARGAS VS RILLORAZA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:49 PM

G.R. No. L-1612 February 26 1948 [Composition of the Supreme Court, ]

FACTS:

Petitioner assails the validity of Sec. 14 of the The People's Court Act, Commonwealth Act 682, which provided that
the President could designate Judges of First Instance, Judges-at-large of First Instance or Cadastral Judges to sit
as substitute Justices of the Supreme Court in treason cases without them necessarily having to possess the
required constitutional qualifications of a regular Supreme Court Justice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 14 of CA 682 is constitutional

RULING:

No. Sec. 14 of CA 582 is unconstitutional.

Article VIII, sections 4 and 5, of the Constitution do not admit any composition of the Supreme Court other than the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices therein mentioned appointed as therein provided. And the infringement is
enhanced and aggravated where a majority of the members of the Court as in this case are replaced by judges
of first instance. It is distinctly another Supreme Court in addition to this. And the constitution provides for
only one Supreme Court.

Grounds for disqualification added by section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 682 to those already existing at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution and continued by it is not only arbitrary and irrational but positively violative of the
organic law.

Constitutional requirement (Art. VIII Sec 5) provides that the members of the Supreme Court should be appointed by
the President with the consent of the CoA, "Unless provided by law" in Sec 4 cannot be construed to authorize any
legislation which would alter the composition of the Supreme Court, as determined by the Constitution.

However temporary or brief may be the participation of a judge designated under Sec. 14 of PCA, there is no
escaping the fact the he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC, as the appellate tribunal, and
his vote would count as much as that any regular Justice of the Court. "A temporary member" therefore would be a
misnomer, as that position is not contemplated by the Constitution, where Sec.4 of Art. VIII only provides A Chief
Justice and Associate Justices who have to be thus appointed and confirmed (Sec5).

ESTRADA VS DISIERTO

Joseph Erap Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the
President. From the beginning of Eraps term, he was plagued by problems that slowly but surely eroded his
popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime friend of Estrada, went
on air and accused the Estrada, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expos
immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the
Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of Eraps surrender. On January 22, the
Monday after taking her oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. After his fall
from the pedestal of power, Eraps legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in
the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the
respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was
leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4)
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Estradas reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5)
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense. Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave
on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.

Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
Cruz, J.

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code 1. The
Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila
Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for
containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.

The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC
as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local
autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that
the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the
decision, but reinstated it anyway.)

Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional

Held:
 Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside
a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the
Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

BENGZON VS. DRILON

G.R. 103524 April 15, 1992 208 SCRA 133
Gutierrez, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving pensions
under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797. President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which
authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638
was eventually issued by Marcos which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and
enlisted men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not. RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in
1990. When her advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt to
overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law absent its publication, thus there was no
law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits
which were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President of certain provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of the
adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or valid.

HELD:
The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary ot its funds should be
utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Pursuant to constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices on the ground that there
should be no grant of distinct privileges or preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the
Constitution and in effect asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be
repealed.
The petition is granted and the questioned veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared valid and
subsisting.

MACEDA VS VASQUEZ

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner
RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate of
service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew
that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the SCs
constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious misconduct and
under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his
felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of administrative
supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power,
it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for determination whether said judge
or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.

VICTORINO C. FRANCISCO vs. WINAI PERMSKUL AND CA

GR. NO. 81006, MAY 12, 1989
CRUZ, J.

FACTS:
Permskul, lessee of an apartment, deposited Php 9,000 to lessor Francisco. After a year, and 10 days he
vacated the property and requested the refund of his deposit minus Php 1,000 for the 10 days occupancy after the
expiration of the lease. Francisco refused and alleged that Permskul still owed him for electricity and water bills and
Php 2,500 for the repainting of the leased premises. After a summary of judgement, METTC ordered Francisco to
return Php 7,750 after deducting only the water and electricity bills. RTC affirmed this by a memorandum decision
reading in full as follows: After a careful and thorough perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this case, this
Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of facts and conclusions of law in the decision of METTC of Makati, Br.
63 and finds that there is no cogent reason to disturb the same. Wherefore the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto. Francisco challenged the constitutionality of memorandum decisions.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the memorandum decisions are valid.
HELD:
1. YES. The purpose by the Constitution in requiring that decisions shall express clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, is to inform the person reading the decision especially the
parties of how it was reached by the court after consideration of the pertinent facts and examination of
the applicable laws. It will also give the losing party an opportunity to analyze the decision, then appeal
 or be persuaded to accept the decision. Third, it will serve as precedent in the resolution of future
controversies and to expedite the termination of litigations for the benefit of the parties as well as the
courts.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v Court of Appeals Case Digest

OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION v CA

FACTS:

This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in
favor of the petitioner, against the private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The
petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government of India while the private respondent is a
private corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.

The conflict between the petitioner and the private respondent rooted from the failure of the respondent to deliver
43,000 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner even it had already received payment and despite petitioners
several demands. The petitioner then informed the private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator
pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates that he venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun.
The chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra, resolved the dispute in favour of the petitioner setting forth the arbitral
award. To enable the petitioner to execute the above award, it filed a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in
Dehra Dun. India praying that the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. This was objected by
the respondent but foreign court refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay the required
filing fees. Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order and several demands by the petitioner
for compliance therewith, the private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign court as owing to
the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City for the enforcement
of the aforementioned judgment of the foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint. RTC
dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of
Appeals which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the appellate court concurred with the RTC's
ruling that the arbitrator did not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the foreign court could
not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. The petitioner filed this petition for review on certiorari,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent
under Clause 16 of the contract.

RULING:

The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions" which
adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the fact that the
procedure in the courts of the country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the
country in which the judgment is relied on. If the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court
becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot
invalidate the order of the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the
trial court's dismissal of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint before Branch 30 of the RTC of
Surigao City is REVERSED,