1. PEOPLE V.

TAYAG
G.R. No. 40512, [March 3, 1934], 59 PHIL 606-609)

DOCTRINE: In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by means
of competent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere inferences,
however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains, as in this case, a
sufficient indication of the existence of an intention different from that of committing robbery.

FACTS: On September 12, 1933, a little after two o'clock on the morning, of the said two
appellants, armed with a bolo and a screw driver, went to Juan Nicasio Go Cuay's
store/dwelling (with a little more than P40 in cash and merchandise valued at around
P1,000) at No. 325-A, San Marcelino Street, Manila. Believing that they were unnoticed,
they proceeded to open one of the doors of the said store with the tools bolo and screw
driver which they then carried and which, of course, were not the proper means for that
purpose. After they had succeeded in loosening one of the bars of the door and upon
becoming aware that the inhabitants of the store had been awakened, they tried to escape
but policemen A. Santos, J. Rubic and G. Malap, who up to that time had been watching
them, detained and placed them under arrest. The lower court convicted the accused with
attempted robbery.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is attempted robbery.

HELD: No. The act committed by the appellants simply constitutes the crime of trespass
committed by means of violence, as defined in article 280 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.

In the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay there were, at that time, a little more than P40 in
cash, which represented the proceeds of his sales the day before, and merchandise valued
at around P1,000. However, there is absolutely nothing of record to show that the said
appellants' intention on that occasion was to commit robbery, or that they somehow knew
that they would find money amounting to P40 therein.

In every criminal proceeding, the guilt of the accused must be proven by means of
competent and conclusive evidence and should never be based on mere inferences,
however reasonable these may be, particularly when there still remains, as in this case, a
sufficient indication of the existence of an intention different from that of committing robbery.
It would be arbitrary, not to say absurd, to suppose that had the appellants succeeded in
entering the store of said Juan Nicasio Go Cuay, they would have carried away all the goods
therein, because they would not have been able to do so by themselves, not having any
vehicle at their disposal.

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2. ONG V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119858, [April 29, 2003], 449 PHIL 691-711)

DOCTRINE: MERE FAILURE BY ENTRUSTEE TO ACCOUNT FOR GOODS RECEIVED

IN TRUST CONSTITUTES ESTAFA. It is a well-settled doctrine that the failure to
account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence of conversion or
misappropriation. The mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods if not sold
constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to the creditor, but also to the
public interest.

FACTS: The City of Manila charged petitioner and Benito Ong with two counts of estafa for
allegedly defrauding the SOLIDBANK Corporation by Ongs failure to comply with his
obligation to remit the proceeds of the sale of the 10, 000 bags of urea, valued at Php 2,
050, 000. 00 as specified in a Trust Receipt Agreement.

The Court of Appeals held that although petitioner is neither a director nor an officer of
ARMAGRI International Corporation, he certainly comes within the term "employees or other
. . . persons therein responsible for the offense" in Section 13 of the Trust Receipts Law.
Petitioner asserted that nowhere in the trust receipts did he assume personal responsibility
for the undertakings of ARMAGRI which was the entrustee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of estafa.

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's conviction. It is a well-settled doctrine that
the failure to account, upon demand, for funds or property held in trust is evidence of
conversion or misappropriation. The mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the
goods if not sold constitutes a criminal offense that causes prejudice not only to the creditor,
but also to the public interest. Evidently, the Bank suffered prejudice for neither money nor
the goods were turned over to the Bank.

The Court ruled that petitioner is the person responsible for the offense. First, petitioner is
the signatory to the trust receipts, the loan applications and the letters of credit. Second,
despite being the signatory to the trust receipts and the other documents, petitioner did not
explain or show why he is not responsible for the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale
or account for the goods covered by the trust receipts. The Court also held that there
is no need to allege in the Information in what capacity petitioner participated to hold him
responsible for the offense. Under the Trust Receipts Law, it is sufficient to allege and
establish the failure of ARMAGRI, whom petitioner represented, to remit the proceeds or to
return the goods to the Bank.

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3. U.S. V. ADIAO
G.R. No. 13785, [October 8, 1918], 38 PHIL 754-756

DOCTRINE: THEFT; WHEN CONSUMMATED OR FRUSTRATED. One A., a Customs'

inspector, abstracted a leather belt valued at eighty centavos from the baggage of a
Japanese and secreted the belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by
other Customs employees.

FACTS: The defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector, abstracted a leather belt
valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a Japanese named T. Murakami, and secreted the
belt in his desk in the Custom House, where it was found by other customs employee.
Thereafter, the defendant was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Manila with the
crime of theft. He was found guilty of the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He appealed to the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and again he was found guilty of the crime of
frustrated theft, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

ISSUE; Whether or not the lower court erred in holding that the defendant was guilty of the
crime of theft.

HELD: Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime cannot properly be
classified as frustrated, as this word is defined in article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since
the offender performed all of the acts of execution necessary for the accomplishment of the
felony, he is guilty of the consummated crime of theft. The fact that the defendant was under
observation during the entire transaction and that he was unable to get the merchandise out
of the Custom House, is not decisive; all the elements of the completed crime of theft are
present. The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain are in point:

"The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of
another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit he was seen by a
policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the
policeman but sometime later. The court said: ". . . The trial court did not
err . . . in considering the crime as that of consummated theft instead of
frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that the
policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land
arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking full possession
of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of time."
(Decision of the supreme court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)

There exists the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken by the offender of his
public position. Wherefore, in view of the provisions of articles 517 and 518, No. 5, of the
Penal Code, and there being present one aggravating circumstance compensated
by no mitigating circumstance, the penalty must be imposed in the maximum degree.

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4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO REYES y BATAC

[G.R. No. 135682. March 26, 2003.]

DOCTRINE: conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements:
(a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force
upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus
lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof,
homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes a special complex crime
of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery.

FACTS: The amended information charged accused-appellant and accused Arnel

Cergontes y Hadegero with Robbery with Homicide because he feloniously take and carry
away one (1) gold necklace, one (1) gold ring, one wristwatch, all of an undetermined value,
and a wallet containing unspecified amount of cash and stabbing DONALDO SALMORIN,
JR. Y SOLIS.

The lower court rendered a judgment of conviction. Accused-appellant argued that his guilt
was not established beyond reasonable doubt for failure of the prosecution to prove the
essential requisites of the crime charged. According to him, the vital element of animus
lucrandi was not sufficiently established as the taking of the watch could have been a mere
afterthought and the real intent of the malefactors was to inflict injuries upon the victim.
Moreover, there was no evidence of ownership of the wristwatch, as it may have belonged to
the two persons who attacked the victim. Lastly, there was no evidence of conspiracy.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant's contention that the animus lucrandi was not
sufficiently established by the prosecution is meritous.

HELD: No. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established
through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the crime is essential
when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial, intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be
presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining to another, unless special
circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain may
be presumed from the proven unlawful taking.

In the case at bar, the act of taking the victim's wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes
while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave rise to the
presumption. So long as there is apoderamiento of personal property from another against
the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro, robbery is the offense
imputable to the offender. If the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery,
the offense is converted into the composite crime of robbery with homicide.

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5. CARINO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-14752, [April 30, 1963], 117 PHIL 909-916)

DOCTRINE: In the crime of treason any act of giving comfort or moral aid may be criminal,
but such is not the case with rebellion or insurrection where the Code expressly declares
that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of arms in rebellion or insurrection.

FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of rebellion with murders, arson, robberies
and kidnappings, for conspiring, helping, and sympathizing with his close friend Dr. Jesus
Lava (a top leader of the Communists and a wanted man with a price on his head) who was
his classmate in the high school, and who later on became the godfather of the first child of
the accused.

It was established that one night in the year 1946, Dr. Lava arrived in the house of the
accused asking for shelter, stating that he was being persecuted by certain politicians from
Bulacan, on suspicion that he had something to do with the killing of Mayor Roxas of
Bulacan, Bulacan. Appellant gave Lava accommodation for the night, and early the following
morning Lava left. The next time that the appellant heard from Dr. Lava was in May, 1949,
when he received a note from the latter asking for some cigarettes, powdered milk and
canned goods. The note was brought by a boy of 12 or 15 years, named Totoy, and through
him the accused sent the needed supplies. This exchange of notes between them and the
furnishing of supplies and foodstuffs by appellant to Dr. Lava lasted from 1949 until April,
1952, when the accused was arrested and detained.

The lower court and Court of Appeals convicted the accused because the acts of appellant
constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of the acts of overthrowing the government.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty if rebellion.

HELD: No. In the crime of treason any act of giving comfort or moral aid may be criminal,
but such is not the case with rebellion or insurrection where the Code expressly declares
that there must be a public uprising and the taking up of arms in rebellion or insurrection.
The acts of sending or furnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk does not
prove intention to help him in committing rebellion or insurrection. Neither is the act of having
$6,000 changed to Philippine money or in helping Huks to open accounts, by themselves
show an intent or desire to participate or help in an uprising or rebellion. Appellant's work
was as a public relation of officer of the bank of which he was an employee, and the work
above indicated performed by him was a part of his functions as an employee of the bank.
These acts by themselves do not and cannot carry or prove any criminal intent of helping the
Huks in committing the crime of insurrection or rebellion. The law is to the effect that good
faith is to be presumed.

No presumption of the existence of a criminal intent can arise from the above acts which are
in themselves legitimate and legal. Said acts are by law presumed to be innocent acts while
the opposite has not been proved. Appellant is therefore absolved from the charge.

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6. LYDIA C. GELIG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
||| (Gelig v. People, G.R. No. 173150, [July 28, 2010], 640 PHIL 109-120)

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school
teachers at the Nailon Elementary School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia's son, Roseller, was
a student of Gemma at the time material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called
him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby
causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma
suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate issued by a
doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal
pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was
admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have
suffered incomplete abortion.

RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion. However, the CA vacated the trial court's judgment. It ruled that Lydia
cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma descended from being a person in
authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the principal of
the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia. CA convicted Lydia of slight physical injuries.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Lydia should be convicted of mere slight physical injuries instead
of direct assault.

RULING. No. CA erred in declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault
since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time of the assault because she
allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains
that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official
functions as a teacher.

Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly
mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in
the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the
past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.

However, the prosecution's success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct
assault does not necessarily mean that the same physical force she employed on Gemma
also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence on record to prove
that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the
proximate cause of the abortion.

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7. [G.R. No. 113685. June 19, 1997.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . THEODORE
BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.

DOCTRINE: In kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure,
and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from
prosecution therefor.

FACTS: Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and
whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Bienvenido
Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with his friends at Bolton Isla, Davao City.

The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito Enriquez,
tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife Naty and this was
the motive behind the former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda, Jr. is still missing. The
defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by the police hence, was never
kidnapped. The court a quo rendered judgment finding Bernal "guilty of the crime of
kidnapping for the abduction and disappearance of Openda..

ISSUE: Whether or not there is compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.

RULING: No. The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been
found. This, however, does not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In
kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the
subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from prosecution
therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of
disposing of their victims' bodies.

For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty, which is the
essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably
acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals "as shown by their concerted
acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose." Proof of conspiracy is
perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances only. The
circumstances present in this case sufficiently indicate the participation of Bernal in the
disappearance of Openda, Jr.

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8. [G.R. No. 151978. July 14, 2004.]
ARTURO ROMERA, petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that if sufficient provocation and the circumstance of
passion or obfuscation are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one
mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both
circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be
treated as two separate mitigating circumstances

FACTS: Petitioner Arturo Romera was convicted by RTC and CA of frustrated homicide for
killing Roy Mangaya-ay. According to the petitioner, Roy went to their house and thrust his
bolo at him. Roy rushed to him and hacked him, but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled
for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for
forgiveness. According to petitioner, he ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.

The trial court and CA discounted petitioner's story of self-defense. It found that when
petitioner got hold of the bolo, there was no more danger to his life. Petitioner was convicted
of frustrated homicide but appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the sole ground that lower courts failed to
appreciate two more mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and the circumstance
of passion or obfuscation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA correctly lowered the imposable penalty by one
degree when there are still two mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation.

RULING: Yes. Well-settled is the rule that if these two circumstances are based on the same
facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts
established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts
aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating
circumstances.

Nonetheless, we hold that since the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is alson
present, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code should be applied. The penalty for
consummated homicide is reclusion temporal, hence the penalty next lower in degree is
prision mayor. There being two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance,
pursuant to Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code, the next lower penalty, prision
correccional, is the next statutory penalty, subject to Indeterminate Sentence Law.

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9. [G.R. No. 6219. March 16, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs . MARTIN DOMINGO, ET AL.,
defendants-appellants.

DOCTRINE: In imposing a penalty for a breach of the peace in assemblies, , marchings and
conduct of campaigns, it must not be forgotten that the reprehensible conduct of the
partisans does not consist in their assembling together and making public demonstrations,
but in exceeding those limits of public order and good behavior beyond which, under the
circumstances, the citizen may not pass.

FACTS:
One of the candidates for the of office of president of the municipality of Santa Maria,
Province of Ilocos Sur, at the last municipal elections held a public meeting for the purpose
of furthering his candidacy on the evening of the day before the election. The meeting was
well attended, from 150 to 250 persons being present, most of whom were partisans of the
candidate who organized it. One of the candidates for the office of president of the
municipality of Santa
Maria, Province of Ilocos Sur, at the last municipal elections held a public meeting for the
purpose of furthering his candidacy on the evening of the day before the election.

The last speech having come to an end, the people inside the house crowded down the
stairs and out on to the street. The single exception to the peaceable dispersal of the crowd
on that occasion was an altercation which arose between two individuals, members
respectively of the different parties, both of whom were arrested by the police and taken to
jail.

The trial judge was of opinion that each and all of the members of the party who stopped
outside of the house where the meeting was being held were guilty of the crime of "gravely"
disturbing the public order on the occasion of a largely attended reunion or meeting, as
defined and penalized in article 258 of the Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the guilty of the crime of "gravely" disturbing the public order on the
occasion of a largely attended reunion or meeting, as defined and penalized in article 258 of
the Penal Code.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the assembling of the people together, marching
and countermarching in bands from place to place, endeavoring by speeches and debate,
both public and private, to hold together the partisans of one set of policies or candidates
and to draw away the partisans of opposing policies and candidates, while it undoubtedly
tends to disturb the peace and quiet which ordinarily reigns in the community, does not
necessarily involve a criminal breach of the peace or disturbance of public order.

Under the provisions of Chapter VI [Title III, Book II] of the Penal Code we would be entirely
agreed with the trial judge in his characterization of the disturbance of which the defendants
were guilty, as a "grave" or a "gross" disturbance of public order, had it taken place in
connection with the actual holding of an election; for instance, in or about a voting booth, or
the place where the votes were being counted, or, perhaps on the public highway along
which voters on their way to exercise their right to vote must necessarily pass. But we think
that under all the circumstances of this case, the fact that numerous meetings were being
held at which the citizens and voters called together in public by contending candidates and
their partisans for the purpose of inducing or persuading them to support one candidate or
the other at the forthcoming election, tends to justify a lenient rather than a severe judgment
of the nature, object, and conduct of the gathering of which the defendants formed a part.

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10. [G.R. No. 45186. September 30, 1936.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEFINA
BANDIAN
||| (People v. Bandian, G.R. No. 45186, [September 30, 1936], 63 PHIL 530-539)

DOCTRINE: INFANTICIDE AND ABANDONMENT OF A MINOR; WHEN PUNISHABLE.

Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable, must be committed willfully or
consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or
omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through mere imprudence, the
person who commits them, under said circumstance, must be in the full enjoyment of his
mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may be held liable.

FACTS: At about 7 o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1936, Valentin Aguilar, the
appellant's neighbor, saw the appellant go to a thicket about four or five brazas from her
house, apparently to respond to a call of nature because it was there that the people of the
place used to go for that purpose. A few minutes later, he again saw her emerge from the
thicket with her clothes stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. He ran to her aid and helped her go up to
her house and placed her in her own bed. Upon being asked before Aguilar brought her to
her house, what had happened to her, the appellant merely answered that she was very
dizzy. Not wishing to be alone with the appellant in such circumstances, Valentin Aguilar
called Adriano Comcom, who lived nearby, to help them, and later requested him to take
bamboo leaves to stop the hemorrhage which had come upon the appellant. Comcom had
scarcely gone about five brazas when he saw the body of newborn babe near a path
adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a few moments before. Comcom
informed Aguilar of it and the latter told him to bring the body to the appellant's house. Upon
being asked whether the baby which had just been shown to her was hers or not, the
appellant answered in the affirmative.

Dr. Emilio Nepomuceno, president of the sanitary division of Talisayan, Oriental Misamis,
declared that the appellant gave birth in her house and in her own bed; that after giving birth
she threw her child into the thicket to kill it for the purpose of concealing her dishonor from
the man, Luis Kirol, with whom she had theretofore been living maritally, because the child
was not but of another man with whom she had previously had amorous relations.

The lower court convicted the accused of infanticide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of infanticide.

HELD: No. The Court held that infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable,
must be committed wilfully or consciously, or at least it must be the result of a voluntary,
conscious and free act or omission. Even in cases where said crimes are committed through
mere imprudence, the person who commits them, under said circumstance, must be in the
full enjoyment of his mental faculties, or must be conscious of his acts, in order that he may
be held liable.

The evidence certainly does not show that the appellant, in causing her child's death in one
way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so wilfully, consciously or imprudently.
She had no cause to kill or abandon it, to expose it to death, Luis Kirol she considers him
her husband as he considers her his wife believed from the beginning, that the child
carried by the appellant in her womb was his, and he testified that he and she had been
eagerly waiting for the birth of the child. The appellant, therefore, had no cause to be
ashamed of her pregnancy to Kirol.

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The act performed by the appellant in the morning in question, by going into the thicket,
according to her, to respond to call of nature, notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for
a long time, was perfectly lawful. If by doing so she caused a wrong as that of giving birth to
her child in that same place and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other
reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme debility, she should not
be blamed therefor because it all happened by mere accident, with no fault or intention on
her part. The law exempts from liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (art. 12, subsection 4, Revised Penal Code).

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11. G.R. No. 131923. December 5, 2002.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NIEL PIEDAD y CONSOLACION,
LITO GARCIA y FRANCISCO and RICHARD PALMA y IDER, accused.
||| (People v. Piedad y Consolacion, G.R. No. 131923, [December 5, 2002], 441 PHIL
818-840)

DOCTRINE: For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough that the prosecution
proves beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused
committed it. Production of the weapon used in committing the crime is not a condition sine
qua non for the discharge of that burden. It is not vital to the cause of the prosecution,
especially where other evidence is available to support sufficiently the charges.

FACTS: Accused Niel Piedad, Lito Garcia and Richard Palma were arrested and charged
with the crime of murder for feloniously stabbing to death Mateo Lactawan on April 10, 1996.
Accused denied the charges against them, but the trial court gave credence to the
prosecution's version of the incident and eventually convicted accused Niel Piedad and Lito
Garcia of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. However, accused
Richard Palma was acquitted by the trial court on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants questioned their conviction arguing that that
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Niel Piedad assails the
admissibility of the alleged murder weapon for lack of proper authentication. Lito Garcia for
his part impugns the non-presentation of the knife used in stabbing the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD: Yes. The weapon used in the killing, after all, is not an element of the either the
crimes of homicide or murder. Verily, the non-presentation by the prosecution of the items
which the accused-appellants used in stoning and stabbing the victim is not fatal considering
that the accused has been positively identified. The case of People v. Bagcal 35 is in point:

. . . For conviction of an accused in criminal cases, it is enough that the

prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and
that the accused committed it. Production of the weapon used in committing
the crime is not a condition sine qua non for the discharge of that burden. It is
not vital to the cause of the prosecution, especially where other evidence is
available to support sufficiently the charges. . . .

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12. [G.R. No. L-17958. February 27, 1922.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. LOL-LO and
SARAW,
||| (People v. Lol-lo, G.R. No. L-17958, [February 27, 1922], 43 PHIL 19-27)

DOCTRINE: Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but against all mankind. It may
be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or
into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crime has no territorial
limits.

FACTS: On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta,
another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in
the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a
number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was
surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for
food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the
persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed
on it and holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored. Taking the
two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a
Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the
women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
with the crime of piracy. The CFI convicted the accused of the crime of piracy. The
defendants interposed the defense that the CFI nor any the Philipines in genral has no
jurisdiction over the offense charge.

ISSUE: Whether or not the the defendants can be convicted of the crime of privacy despite
the fact that the crime was committed in the Dutch East Indies, beyond the Philippine
territory.

HELD: The Court held in affirmative. Piracy is a crime not against any particular State but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the
offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all
other crime has no territorial limits.

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state
but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where
the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike
all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor
does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes.

Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done
animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostile

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13. [G.R. No. 189326. November 24, 2010.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FRANCISCO RELOS, SR., appellant.

||| (People v. Relos, Sr., G.R. No. 189326 (Resolution), [November 24, 2010], 650 PHIL
619-626)

DOCTRINE: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit
an unlawful act. 8 It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime. 9 Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.

FACTS: On December 26, 2005, the victim and his son, Ramon Relos, Jr. (Ramon, Jr.),
was on their way towards the house of his Feliciano Roles when Oliver approached him and
greeted him, "Merry Christmas, insan!" while drawing his knife. Appellant approached the
victim from behind and suddenly hacked him with a bolo on the right shoulder. Francisco, Jr.
followed it with hack to the victim's left shoulder. Oliver then placed his arm over the victim's
shoulders and stabbed the victim several times on the front portion of his body. Ramon Jr.
tried was chased by Francisco Jr who was holding a bolo and hacked him, but the former
was able to jump over a drainage canal and run away.

Meanwhile, the victim fell on the ground after he was stabbed by Oliver. Regie and Steve
pushed the victim's body towards a canal. Thereafter, Oliver cut off the victim's head,
showed it to passersby, and then dropped it on the road. He then went to his house and
brought out a gun and a hand grenade. He tried to shoot Gloria and Rogelio, Jr., but the gun
would not fire. Instead, he threw the hand grenade at them, but it hit a tree near him and
exploded.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered a decision finding appellant, Oliver, and
Francisco, Jr. guilty of murder while the other accused were acquitted for lack of evidence.
The CA affirmed the trial court's findings of conspiracy and the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.

ISSUE: Whether or not conspiracy and the qualifying circumstance of treachery are present.

RULING: Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to
commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during,
and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
interest.

The presence of conspiracy was definitely established by the synchronized acts of appellant,
Oliver, and Francisco, Jr. in carrying out their common objective of killing the victim. The
three assailants simultaneously approached the victim and delivered successive blows that
seriously injured the latter. Though it was not clear who delivered the fatal blow, it does not
make any difference in light of the finding of conspiracy. Where conspiracy is shown, the
precise modality or extent of participation of each accused becomes secondary, and the act
of one may be imputed to all the conspirators.

There is treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and
forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without
danger to his person. What is decisive in an appreciation of treachery is that the execution of

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the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself. The essence of treachery is
the swift and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting and unarmed victim who does not give
the slightest provocation.

The victim was not prepared to meet the initial attack made by appellant as he was
distracted by Oliver who greeted him, "Merry Christmas, insan!" He was then caught off
guard by the subsequent blows delivered by the other assailants, which were successive
and gave him no opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, he did not have the means to
defend himself as he was unarmed. Hence, treachery was clearly present.

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14. [G.R. No. L-11847. February 1, 1918.]
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GELASIO TABIANA and JULIAN
CANILLAS
||| (U.S. v. Tabiana, G.R. No. L-11847, [February 1, 1918], 37 PHIL 515-544)

DOCTRINE: The question whether an offense consists of simple resistance or to grave

resistance is to be determined with a view to the gravity of the act proved and the particular
conditions under which committed. In considering this question reference should also be had
to the nature and extend of the penalties attached by the authors of the Code to the different
offenses.

FACTS: Gelasio Tabian, a well-respected citizen of the municipality of Leon, Ilo-Ilo, resisted
the arrest of the police authorities in several instances. When the policemen announced their
errand Tabiana showed resentment over the idea of being arrested but yielded and started
to the municipal building with the two policemen. In the municipal building, Tabian inquired
for the municipal president, the chief of police, and the )ustice of the peace but upon learning
that these officials are not around, he wen away to look for the justice of peace, the idea
being to find somebody who could set the defendant at liberty on bail.

The Police Officers found Tabiana in his house , when he was requested to give up the
warrant and go to the police station he denied having taken the warrant; and one of
Tabiana's friends upstairs called out, "If he has no warrant send him up for a beating."
Tabiana then approached the policeman, Callado, and hit him in the breast with his hand or
fist, at which instant the policeman seized him by the wrist and resistance ceased.

As the policeman started to carry the prisoner away two bystanders interfered and took him
away from the policeman. By this time Julian Canillas, the justice of the peace, had arrived
on the scene and being evidently excited, he hit Callado on the back, when he too was
stopped by another policeman.

ISSUE: Whether or not the offense committed by Tabiana consists of simple resistance or
grave resistance.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that the defendant Tabiana is guilty of resistance and
serious disobedience to public authority under article 252, Penal Code, and not of the more
serious offense indicated in subsection 2 of article 249, Penal Code, which was applied by
the Court of First Instance. The question whether an offense consists of simple resistance or
to grave resistance is to be determined with a view to the gravity of the act proved and the
particular conditions under which committed. In considering this question reference should
also be had to the nature and extend of the penalties attached by the authors of the Code to
the different offenses. Tabiana shouldnot be held responsible for these menaces, nor for
anything that occurred after he was taken in hand by the policeman, as his active resistance
had then ceased.

From the proofs of record we are convinced that everything done by Tabiana upon this
occasion is properly referable to the idea of resistance and grave disobedience. We discern
in his conduct no such aggression as accompanies the determination to defy the law and its
representative at all hazards. Upon the previous occasions of his contract with the policemen
on this day, Tabiana yielded, though with bad grace; and it is evident that he would, upon
this occasion, have gone to the police station again it had not been for the acts of others in
rescuing him, and for the intervention of the justice of the peace, who ordered the policemen
to desist.

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15. [G.R. No. 118334. February 20, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY CONSEJERO y PASCUA
and ROMMEL MALAPIT (at large), accused.
LARRY CONSEJERO y PASCUA,

DOCTRINE: It is necessary that there must have been an intent on the part of the offenders
to commit robbery from the outset and, on occasion or by reason thereof a killing takes
place. The original design must have been robbery, and the homicide, even if it precedes or
is subsequent to the robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a
view to consummate the robbery. The taking of the property should not be merely an
afterthought which arose subsequent to the killing.

FACTS: On May 26, 1989, the lifeless body of Modesto Castillo and Dionisio Usigan were
found not far from the river bank of Barangay Jurisdiccion, Lal-lo, Cagayan. The motorized
banca ridden by the two deceased was nowhere to be found

A prosecution witness, Melchor Pulido , testified that while in the sea with Usigan and
Castillo, the accused-appellant told them to accompany him and his companions to a nearby
store, however, accused-appellant said that only one should accompany them. Thus, one of
them, who turned out to be Usigan, went with accused-appellant Larry Consejero and
accused Rommel Malapit towards the northeast direction. Left behind werer Pulido and
Castillo. After ten (10) minutes, accused-appellant and accused Rommel Malapit returned
holding an armalite rifle and a ten-inch bolo, respectively. Dionisio Usigan was not with them
anymore. Upon orders of accused-appellant, Rommel Malapit tied the hands of Modesto
Castillo at his back using a portion of a fishnet and, thereafter, they brought him to the same
northeast direction where Usigan was taken. Again, only Larry Consejero and Rommel
Malapit came back; Modesto Castillo was no longer with them.

Accused-appellant then detached the engine of the motorized banca ridden by Usigan and
Castillo, while Melchor Pulido was told to stand as look-out. After they loaded the engine in
their banca, the three of them headed home. Accused-appellant threatened to kill Melchor
Pulido and his family if Pulido reveals what he knew.

The lower court convicted the accused-appelant of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is robbery with homicide.

HELD: No. The Court held that the criminal acts of accused appellant constitute not a
complex crime of robbery with homicide, but three separate offenses: two crimes for the
killing of the two deceased, and one for the taking of the Briggs and Straton engine of Jaime
Israel. From all indications, accused appellant was primarily interested in taking the life of the
two deceased and the taking of the subject engine was merely an afterthought that arose
subsequent to the killing of the victims. Clearly therefore, the criminal acts of accused
appellant constitute not a complex crime of robbery with homicide, but three separate
offenses: two crimes for the killing of the two deceased, and one for the taking of the Briggs
and Straton engine of Jaime Israel.

In People v. Basao, the Court ruled that where the taking of the personal property was
merely an afterthought and was done after the culprit has successfully carried out his
primary criminal intent to kill the victim, and hence, the use of violence or force is no longer
necessary, the crime committed is theft. Conformably, since the taking of the engine in the
present case was merely an afterthought, and was perpetrated after accused appellant had
already accomplished his original criminal purpose of killing the two deceased, the felony
committed is theft.

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16. [G.R. No. 168448. October 8, 2008.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FAJARDO NAPUDO, accused-
appellant
||| (People v. Napudo, G.R. No. 168448, [October 8, 2008], 589 PHIL 201-219)

DOCTRINE: The sweetheart defense is considered an uncommonly weak defense

because its presence does not automatically negate the commission of rape. The gravamen
of the crime of rape is sexual congress of a man with a woman without her consent.

FACTS: Napudo was prosecuted under an Information charging him with violation of Article
266-A, paragraph I (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation with Republic
Act No. 7659 and Republic Act No. 7610. He pleaded not guilty to the charge and was
thereafter tried. At the pre-trial, he admitted his sexual intercourse with AAA, but
declared these acts to be voluntary and consensual between them because they were
sweethearts.

Napudo anchored his "sweetheart" defense on the testimonies of Noli Nunag and Larry
Guzman who both declared that they saw Napudo and AAA seated beside each other
conversing while they were on their way to Malabing that fateful day; the fact that it was
unusual for AAA, a maiden, to walk home at night with Napudo unless she trusted the latter
an indication, in Napudo's view, of their relationship; Tabingalan confirmed that he saw
AAA with Napudo check in at the Yellow Bell Lodge; the fact that, except for the laceration in
her hymen, there was no other physical injury found on AAA's body to indicate that she was
forced or abused; her conduct after the alleged rape was inconsistent with the claim of rape;
and lastly, the absence of evidence showing that she tenaciously resisted the sexual assault
despite the fact that the accused-appellant was unarmed.

The RTC and CA disbelieved Napudo's "sweetheart" defense, hence, he was convitcted of
the crime of rape.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sweetheart defense shall be given credit to acquit the accused
of the crime of rape.

HELD: No. The sweetheart defense is considered an uncommonly weak defense because
its presence does not automatically negate the commission of rape. The gravamen of the
crime of rape is sexual congress of a man with a woman without her consent. Hence,
notwithstanding the existence of a romantic relationship, a woman cannot be forced to
engage in sexual intercourse against her will.

As we emphasized in People v. Apostol, 35 the "sweetheart" defense is a much-abused

defense. As an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love affair must be supported by
convincing proof other than the self-serving assertions of the accused. It cannot be given
credence in the absence of evidence, such as notes, gifts, pictures, mementos or other
tokens independently proving its existence; nor can it be given weight where no other
witness was presented to testify that the accused and the complainant were indeed
sweethearts.

The Supreme Court adopted the lower courts' findings that the carnal knowledge between
Napudo and AAA in the evening of December 3, 1998 was attended by force and
intimidation. AAA positively, consistently, and categorically testified on the manner Napudo
forced her and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will. Adding
weight to AAA's testimony are the findings of Dr. Joaquin, an expert witness on matters of
rape as the defense itself admitted, whose medico-legal report dated December 6, 1998
established a marked compatibility of the physical evidence to the charge of rape.

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17. [G.R. No. 141931. December 4, 2000.]
ANICETO RECEBIDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
||| (Recebido v. People, G.R. No. 141931, [December 4, 2000], 400 PHIL 752-762)

DOCTRINE: FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT; POSSESSOR OF FALSIFIED

DOCUMENT IS PRESUMED TO BE THE MATERIAL AUTHOR OF THE FALSIFICATION
IF HE IS THE ONLY PERSON WHO STOOD TO BE BENEFITED BY THE
FALSIFICATION.

FACTS Sometime in 1983, private complainant Caridad Dorol mortgaged an agricultural

land to her cousin, herein petitioner. Petitioner and private complainant did not execute a
document on the mortgage but the latter, instead gave petitioner a copy of the Deed of Sale
dated June 16, 1973 executed in her favor by her father, Juan Dorol. On September 9, 1990
private complainant went to petitioner to redeem her property. However, petitioner refused to
surrender the property claiming that private complainant sold it to him in 1979. Upon
verification, private respondent found that a Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1979 which she
allegedly executed in favor of petitioner, was filed in the Office of the Assessor and that the
property was registered in the latter's name. After comparison of the specimen signatures of
Caridad Dorol in other documents, with that appearing on the questioned Deed of Sale, the
National Bureau of Investigation found that the latter signature was falsified.

Petitioner was charged, tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Falsification of
Public Document and was sentenced accordingly. The conviction was affirmed by the CA.
The petitioner admitted that the Deed of Sale that was in his possession is a forged
document as found by the appellate court. Petitioner, nonetheless, argued that
notwithstanding this admission, the fact remained that there was no proof that the petitioner
authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction.

ISSUE: Whether or not proof is required that the petitioner authored the falsification despite
the fact that it is in his possession.

HELD: No. The SC held that the possessor of falsified document is presumed to be the
material author of the falsification if he is the only person who stood to be benefited by the
falsification.

Under the circumstances, there was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the
author of the forgery. The petitioner was in possession of the forged deed of sale, which
purports to sell the subject land from the private complainant to him. As keenly observed by
the Solicitor General, "the questioned document was submitted by petitioner himself when
the same was requested by the NBI for examination. Clearly in possession of the falsified
deed of sale was petitioner and not Caridad Dorol who merely verified the questioned sale
with the Provincial Assessor's Office of Sorsogon." In other words, the petitioner was in
possession of the forged deed of sale which purports to sell the subject land from the private
complainant to him. Given this factual backdrop, the petitioner is presumed to be the author
of the forged deed of sale, despite the absence of any direct evidence of his authorship of
the forgery. Since the petitioner is the only person who stood to benefit by the falsification of
the document found in his possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of the
falsification. As it stands, therefore, we are unable to discern any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Court of Appeals.

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18. [G.R. No. 18853. August 22, 1922.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EXEQUIEL ALIPIT
and VICTORIO D. ALEMUS, defendants-appellants.
||| (People v. Alipit, G.R. No. 18853, [August 22, 1922], 44 PHIL 910-916)

DOCTRINE: Nobody has the right to dissolve by means of violence the meeting of a
municipal council, under the pretext that said meeting is legally defective, when the defect is
not manifest, and requires an investigation before its existence can be determined. Where a
municipal council is holding a meeting, a presumption arises that the meeting is not legally
defective.

FACTS: 30th of May, 1920, in the municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, Philippine
Islands, the defendants Exequiel Alipit (elected municipal president of Cabuyao, Laguna)
and Victorio D. Alemus, without authority entered into the the session room of the municipal
building of Cabuyao wherein the municipal council of Cabuyao was holding a meeting
presided over the by the vice-president, Manual Basa; used vilenceand intimidation to all
those present in the meeting using a revolver; arrested VP Basa against his wil; and took
possession of all the papers concerning the meeting that was being held by the municipal
council of Cabuyao, by which acts the defendants succeeded in interrupting and dissolving
the aforesaid meeting." The trial court found the defendant guilty of coercion through illegal
detention. From this judgment the defendants appealed, assigning the illegality of that
meeting of the municipal council on the ground of lack of notice to some members of the
council.

ISSUE: Whether or not that meeting of the council in which there was a quorum and which
was presided by the vice-president on account of the absence or inability of the municipal
president (or of both causes) was a meeting the disturbance and interruption of which should
be punished.

HELD: Yes. Nobody has the right to dissolve, through violence, the meeting of a council
under the pretext of the existence of such a legal defect which was not apparent, but
required an investigation before if could be determined. Any stranger, even if he be the
municipal president himself or the chief of the municipal police, must respect the meeting of
the municipal council which for the time being, at least, raises the presumption that no defect
exists to render it illegal.

That meeting of the municipal council was entitled to this respect on the part of the
defendants and the aforesaid presumption was effective as to them. Let it not be said that
the presumption of legality did not operate as to the accused Exequiel Alipit for the reason
that he did in fact receive no notice of said meeting. The law (sec. 2220, Administrative
Code) does not require personal service of the notice; it is sufficient if the same be left in the
domicile of the member of the council. Besides, said president Alipit was personally
interested in the matter to be transacted in the meeting, and so the notice sent to him was,
according to the witness, Dominador Delfino, as if it were to a party respondent. Said
accused Alipit could not take part in the determination of the matter as a member of the
council.

Nonetheless, the crime committed by the president and the chief of police is not coercion
through arbitrary detention, but a violation of Act No. 1755, the chief of police not being
exempted by the fact that he acted in obedience to an order of the president, because said
order was unlawful.

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19. [G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT DINGLASAN y
MANGINO @ OBET, REYNALDO TAPIA y SORAO, and MANOLO BONGALOS @
MANOLO, accused, ROBERT DINGLASAN y MANGINO @ OBET,
||| (People v. Dinglasan y Mangino, G.R. No. 101312, [January 28, 1997], 334 PHIL 691-
711)

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that, "(i)n a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the
conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a
common purpose or design in bringing about the death of the victim."

FACTS: The accused, conspiring and confederating together with Reynaldo Tapia y Sorao,
Manolo Bongalos @ Manolo and alyas 'Jetlee', were convicted by the trial court of the crime
of murder for mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with double bladed weapon,
with intent to kill one Efren Lasona y Ajero, hitting him on different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds which directly caused his death.

On appeal, the it as argued that the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
the crime of murder despite his limited participation having held and restrained only the
victim Efren Lasona during the fatal stabbing.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the crime of murder despite his limited
participation.

HELD: Yes. In a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit
and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with
such closeness and coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design
in bringing about the death of the victim." Hence, the fact that the accused-appellant did not
actually stab the victim Efren Lasona does not negate the appellant's being part of a
conspiracy to kill the latter. The role of the herein accused was to hold Efren Lasona to
immobilize him and to preclude any potential resistance or fight that he may possibly put up
making it possible for his two co-conspirators to stab their victim repeatedly and with
impunity without peril to themselves.

The Revised Penal Code 32 provides that "(t)here is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make." In the case at bench, the presence
of treachery or alevosia which qualified the killing to murder was correctly appreciated by the
trial court because the manner by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the
stabbing of the victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter was totally surprised
by the attack and not afforded an opportunity to raise any defense against his attackers.
Parenthetically, the fact that the attack on deceased Efren Lasona was frontal does not
preclude the presence of treachery in this case as the same made the attack no less
unexpected and sudden.

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20. [G.R. No. 133036. January 22, 2003.]
JOY LEE RECUERDO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS
||| (Recuerdo v. People, G.R. No. 133036, [January 22, 2003], 443 PHIL 769-781)

DOCTRINE: The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of
penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

FACTS: Sometime in the first week of December 1993, Yolanda Floro (Yolanda) who is
engaged in jewelry business sold a 3-karat loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 to
petitioner who gave a downpayment of P40,000.00. In settlement of the balance of the
purchase price, petitioner issued 9 postdated checks, 8 of which in the amount of
P40,000.00, and 1 in the amount of P20,000.00, all drawn against her account at the
Prudential Bank.

However, the checks were dishonored and Yolanda advised the defendant. A demand letter
was thereupon sent to petitioner for her to settle her obligation.

The lower courts convicted the accused for violation of B.P. 22 On appeal, etitioner proffer
that he was convicted by an invalid law which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for being an
unconstitutional law because it "is in essence a resurrected form of 19th century
'imprisonment for debt'" since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat of
imprisonment even if his failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from any
criminal intent to cause damage; and that the law is a bill of attainder as it does not leave
much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already been decided
by the legislature.

ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 is unconstitutional.

HELD: No. These matters subject of petitioner's contention have long been settled in the
landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez where this Court upheld the constitutionality of B.P.
22:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes
the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

The contention that B.P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial
and the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of
guilt, 17 fails. For under B.P. 22, every element of the crime is still to be proven before the
trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof.

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