CASE #:1

NITTO ENTERPRISES, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ROBERTO CAPILI, respondents.
G.R. No. 114337 September 29, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a company engaged in the sale of glass and aluminum products, hired
Roberto Capili sometime in May 1990 as an apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an
apprenticeship agreement for a period of six (6) months from May 28, 1990 to November 28, 1990 with a daily
wage rate of P66.75 which was 75% of the applicable minimum wage.
At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 1990, Roberto Capili who was handling a piece of glass which he was
working on, accidentally hit and injured the leg of an office secretary who was treated at a nearby hospital.
Later that same day, after office hours, private respondent entered a workshop within the office premises which
was not his work station. There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority and in the
process injured his left thumb. Petitioner spent the amount of P1,023.04 to cover the medication of private
respondent.
The following day, Roberto Capili was asked to resign in a letter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent was a regular employee.

RULING:
Yes. The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent was executed on May
28, 1990 allegedly employing the latter as an apprentice in the trade of "care maker/molder." On the same
date, an apprenticeship program was prepared by petitioner and submitted to the Department of Labor and
Employment. However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7, 1990. Notwithstanding the
absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the apprenticeship agreement was
enforced the day it was signed.
Based on the evidence before us, petitioner did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is
mandated that apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be entered only
in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the Minister of Labor and Employment.
Prior approval by the Department of Labor and Employment of the proposed apprenticeship program is,
therefore, a condition sine quo non before an apprenticeship agreement can be validly entered into.
The act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor and Employment is
a preliminary step towards its final approval and does not instantaneously give rise to an employer-apprentice
relationship.
The apprenticeship agreement between petitioner and private respondent has no force and effect in the
absence of a valid apprenticeship program duly approved by the DOLE, private respondent's assertion that he
was hired not as an apprentice but as a delivery boy ("kargador" or "pahinante") deserves credence. He should
rightly be considered as a regular employee of petitioner as defined by Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
Page | 1
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists.

Page | 2
CASE #:2
MARITES BERNARDO, ELVIRA GO DIAMANTE, REBECCA E. DAVID, DAVID P. PASCUAL, RAQUEL
ESTILLER, ALBERT HALLARE, EDMUND M. CORTEZ, JOSELITO O. AGDON GEORGE P. LIGUTAN JR.,
CELSO M. YAZAR, ALEX G. CORPUZ, RONALD M. DELFIN, ROWENA M. TABAQUERO, CORAZON C.
DELOS REYES, ROBERT G. NOORA, MILAGROS O. LEQUIGAN, ADRIANA F. TATLONGHARI, IKE
CABANDUCOS, COCOY NOBELLO, DORENDA CANTIMBUHAN, ROBERT MARCELO, LILIBETH Q.
MARMOLEJO, JOSE E. SALES, ISABEL MAMAUAG, VIOLETA G. MONTES, ALBINO TECSON, MELODY
V. GRUELA, BERNADETH D. AGERO, CYNTHIA DE VERA, LANI R. CORTEZ, MA. ISABEL B.
CONCEPCION, DINDO VALERIO, ZENAIDA MATA, ARIEL DEL PILAR, MARGARET CECILIA CANOZA,
THELMA SEBASTIAN, MA. JEANETTE CERVANTES, JEANNIE RAMIL, ROZAIDA PASCUAL, PINKY
BALOLOA, ELIZABETH VENTURA, GRACE S. PARDO & RICO TIMOSA, petitioners vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondents.
G.R. No. 122917. July 12, 1999

FACTS:
Petitioners numbering 43 are deafmutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded
agreement called Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers. Subsequently, they are dismissed.
Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters
and counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their
contracts served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular
employees.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as special workers and
should not in any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank. Rather, they were
special workers under Article 80 of the Labor Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have become regular employees.

RULING:
Yes. Petition granted.
The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of
one month, after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-
month term of the contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and
reasonable cause. Unless renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the
end of the term.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the
contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were
beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the
tasks assigned to them.
In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee should
be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5 of the
Magna Carta provides:
Page | 3
Section 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities
for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of
employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a
qualified able bodied person.
The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment
contracts from the ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied
persons, they are thus covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the
contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, x x x
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or
business of the employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the
work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if
the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the
employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and
renewed the contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the
contracts of the handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were
beneficial and necessary to the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the
responsibilities of their positions. In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the
tasks assigned to them.
Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of
respondent bank. With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six
months.

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CASE #:3
MANILA TERMINAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and MANILA TERMINAL RELIEF AND MUTUAL AID
ASSOCIATION, respondents.
91 PHIL 625PARAS; July 16, 1952

FACTS:
Manila Terminal Company, Inc. hereinafter to be referred as to the petitioner, undertook the arrastre
service in some of the piers in Manila's Port Area at the request and under the control of the United States
Army. The petitioner hired some thirty men as watchmen on twelve-hour shifts at a compensation of P3
per day for the day shift and P6 per day for the night shift. The watchmen of the petitioner continued in the
service with a number of substitutions and additions, their salaries having been raised during the month of
February to P4 per day for the day shift and P6.25 per day for the nightshift. The private respondent sent a
letter to Department of Labor requesting that the matter of overtime pay be investigated. But nothing was done
by the Dept of Labor. Later on, the petitioner instituted the system of strict eight-hour shifts. The private
respondent filed an amended petition with the Court of Industrial Relations praying, among others, that the
petitioner be ordered to pay its watchmen or police force overtime pay from the commencement of their
employment. By virtue of Customs Administrative Order No. 81 and Executive Order No. 228 of the President
of the Philippines, the entire police force of the petitioner was consolidated with the Manila Harbor Police of the
Customs Patrol Service, a Government agency under the exclusive control of the Commissioner of Customs
and the Secretary of Finance The Manila Terminal Relief and Mutual Aid Association will hereafter be referred
to as the Association.
Judge V. Jimenez Yanson of the Court of Industrial Relations in his decision ordered the petitioner to
pay to its police force but regards to overtime service after the watchmen had been integrated into the Manila
Harbor Police, the Court has no jurisdiction because it affects the Bureau of Customs, an instrumentality of the
Government having no independent personality and which cannot be sued without the consent of the State.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The Association also filed a motion for reconsideration
in so far its other demands were dismissed. Both resolutions were denied. The public respondent decision was
to pay the private respondents their overtime on regular days at the regular rate and additional amount of 25
percent, overtime on Sundays and legal holidays at the regular rate only, and watchmen are not entitled to
night differential pay for past services. The petitioner has filed a present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not overtime pay should be granted to the workers.

RULING:
Yes. Petitioner stressed that the contract between it and the Association stipulates 12 hrs a day at
certain rates including overtime, but the record does not bear out these allegations. In times of acute
employment, people go from office to office to search for work, and the workers here found themselves
required to render12 hrs a day. True, there was an agreement, but did the workers have freedom to bargain
much less insist in the observance of the Eight Hour Labor Law? The Court note that after petitioner instituted
8-hr shifts, no reduction was made in salaries which its watchmen received under the 12-hr agreement.
Petitioners allegation that the Association had acquiesced in the 12-hr shifts for more than 18 months is not
Page | 5
accurate. Only one of the members entered in September 1945. The rest followed during the next few months.
The Association cant be said to have impliedly waived the right to overtime pay, for the obvious reason that it
could not have expressly waived it.
Estoppel and laches cant also be invoked against Association. First, it is contrary to spirit of the Eight
Hour Labor Law. Second, law obligates employer to observe it. Third, employee is at a disadvantage as to be
reluctant in asserting any claim. The argument that the nullity of the employment contract precludes recovery
by the Association of overtime pay is untenable. The employer may not be heard to plead its own neglect as
exemption or defense. Also, Commonwealth Act 444 expressly provides for payment of extra compensation in
cases where overtime services are required. The point that payment of overtime pay may lead to ruin of the
petitioner cant be accepted. It is significant that not all watchmen should receive back overtime pay for
the whole period, since the members entered the firm in different times. The Eight-Hour Labor Law was
designed not only to safeguard the health and welfare of the laborer or employee, but in a way to minimize
unemployment by forcing employers, in cases where more than 8-hour operation is necessary, to utilize
different shifts of laborers or employees working only for eight hours each.

Page | 6
CASE #:4
ASIA PACIFIC CHARTERING (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, vs. MARIA LINDA R. FAROLAN, respondent.
G.R. No.151370. December 4, 2002

FACTS:
Petitioner Asia Pacific Chartering (Phils.) Inc. (Asia) is tasked with the selling of passenger and cargo
spaces for Scandinavian Airlines System. Petitioner Asia, through its Vice President Catalino Bondoc
(Bondoc), offered Respondent Maria Linda R. Farolan (Farolan) the sales manager position to which Farolan
accepted.
Upon Vice President Bondocs request, Farolan submitted a detailed report attributing the drop of sales
revenue to market forces beyond her control. Consequently, Asia directed Roberto Zozobrado (Zozobrado) to
implement solutions. Zozobrado informally took over Farolans marketing and sales responsibilities but she
continued to receive her salary. Asia claims that the increase in sales revenue was due to Zozobrados
management.
Asia then sent a letter of termination to Farolan on the ground of loss of confidence, forcing Farolan
to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter found that the dismissal was illegal for lack of just
cause, however, such decision was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) stating that
the termination of employment due to loss of confidence is within management prerogative. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals upheld the labor arbiters decision. Hence, the filing of this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Farolans dismissal was illegal.

RULING:
A statement of the requisites for a valid dismissal of an employee is thus in order, to wit: (a) the
employee must be afforded due process, i.e., he must be given opportunity to be heard and to defend himself;
and (b) dismissal must be for a valid cause. The manner by which Respondent Farolan was dismissed violated
the basic precepts of fairness and due process - Respondent Farolan was dismissed, without being afforded
the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in her defense. She was never given a written notice
stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for her dismissal as required by law.
With respect to rank and file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal
requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and
accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a
basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal.
Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for an employees dismissal must be based on a willful
breach and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse.
It is not disputed that Farolans job description, and the terms and conditions of her employment, with
the exception of her salary and allowances, were never reduced to writing. Even assuming, however, that
Farolan was a managerial employee, the stated ground (in the letter of termination) for her dismissal, loss of
confidence, should have a basis and determination thereof cannot be left entirely to the employer.

Page | 7
CASE #:5
CHARLITO PEARANDA, Petitioner,
vs.
BAGANGA PLYWOOD CORPORATION and HUDSON CHUA, Respondents
G.R. No. 159577 May 3, 2006

FACTS:
Charlito Pearanda was hired as an employee of Baganga Corporation with a monthly salary of P5,000
as Foreman/Boiler Head/ Shift Engineer to take charge of the operations and maintenance of its steam plant
boiler. He alleges that he was illegally terminated and that his termination was without due process and valid
grounds. Furthermore, he was not paid his OT pay, premium pay for working during holidays, and night shift
differentials. So he filed an action for illegal dismissal.
Hudson Chua, the General Manager of Baganga alleges that Pearandas separation was done
pursuant to Art. 238 of the Labor Code. The company was on temporary closure due to repair and general
maintenance and it applied for clearance with the DOLE to shut down and dismiss employees. He claims that
due to the insistence of complainant, he was paid his separation benefits but when the company partially re-
opened, Pearanda faild to reapply.
Chua also alleges that since he is a managerial employee, he is not entitled to OT pay and if ever he
rendered services beyond the normal hours of work, there was no office order/authorization for him to do so.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no illegal dismissal and that Pearandas complaint was
premature because he was still employed with Baganga. As regards the benefits, the Labor Arbiter found
petitioner entitled to OT pay, premium pay for working on rest days and attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Pearanda is a regular employee entitled to monetary benefits under Art. 82 of the
Labor Code.

RULING:
No. Pearanda is part of the managerial staff which takes him out of the coverage of labor standards.
The Implementing Rules define members of a managerial staff as those with the ff. responsibilities:

(1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies of the
employer;
(2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
(3) (i) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee whose primary duty consists of the
management of the establishment in which he is employed or subdivision thereof; or (ii) execute under general
supervision work along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or knowledge; or
(iii) execute under general supervision special assignments and tasks; and
(4) who do not devote more than 20 percent of their hours worked in a workweek to activities which are not
directly and closely related to the performance of the work described in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) above."
Petitioner supervised the engineering section of the steam plant boiler. His work involved overseeing
the operation of the machines and the performance of the workers in the engineering section. This work
necessarily required the use of discretion and independent judgment to ensure the proper functioning of the
steam plant boiler. As supervisor, petitioner is deemed a member of the managerial staff.
Page | 8
 Even Pearanda admitted that he was a supervisor. In his Position Paper, he stated that he was the
foreman responsible for the operation of the boiler. The term foreman implies that he was the representative of
management over the workers and the operation of the department. His classification as supervisor is further
evident from the manner his salary was paid. He belonged to the 10% of respondents 354 employees who
were paid on a monthly basis; the others were paid only on a daily basis.

Page | 9
CASE #:6
MERCIDAR FISHING CORPORATION represented by its President DOMINGO B. NAVAL, petitioner, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FERMIN AGAO, JR., respondents.
297 SCRA 440 (1998)

FACTS:
Private respondent employed as a bodegero or ships quartermaster complained of being
constructively dismissed by petitioner corporation when the latter refused him assignments aboard its boats
after he had reported to work.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent who actually abandoned his work.
It claimed that the latter failed to report for work after his leave had expired and was, in fact, absent without
leave for three months .
The Larbor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering petitioner corporation to reinstate complainant with
back wages, pay him his 13th month pay and incentive leave. Petitioner claims that it cannot be held liable for
service incentive leave pay by fishermen in its employ as the latter supposedly are field personnel and thus
not entitled to such pay under the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent, being a fisherman, is considered field personnel.

RULING:
No. Agao is not a field employee.
Although fishermen perform non-agricultural work away from their employers business offices, the fact
remains that throughout the duration of their work they are under the effective control and supervision of the
employer through the vessels patron or master.
Art. 82 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title [Working Conditions and Rest Periods] shall
apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are dependent on
him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another, and workers who are
paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.
Field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from
the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field
cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Petitioner argues essentially that since the work of private respondent is performed away from its
principal place of business, it has no way of verifying his actual hours of work on the vessel. It contends that
private respondent and other fishermen in its employ should be classified as field personnel who have no
statutory right to SIL pay.
In the case of of Union of Filipro Employees (UFE) v. Vicar, the Court explained the meaning of the phrase
whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty in Art. 82 of the Labor
Code, as follows:
Moreover, the requirement that actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing Rules
which provides:
Page | 10
 Rule IV Holidays with Pay
Sec. 1. Coverage This rule shall apply to all employees except:
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
employer . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner in said case is contending that such rule added another element not found in the law.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the aforementioned rule did not add another
element to the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause whose time and performance is
unsupervised by the employer did not amplify but merely interpreted and expounded the clause whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty. The former clause is still within the
scope and purview of Article 82 which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an
employees actual working hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made
as to whether or not such employees time and performance is constantly supervised by the employer
In the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, fishermen employed by petitioner
have no choice but to remain on board its vessel. Although they perform non-agricultural work away from
petitioners business offices, the fact remains that throughout the duration of their work they are under the
effective control and supervision of petitioner through the vessels patron or master as the NLRC correctly held.

Page | 11
CASE #:7
AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner, vs. ANTONIO BAUTISTA, respondent.
458 SCRA 578 (2005)

FACTS:
Antonio Bautista was employed by Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. in May 1995. He was assigned to
the Isabela-Manila route and he was paid by commission (7% of gross income per travel for twice a month).
In January 2000, while he was driving his bus he bumped another bus owned by Auto Bus. He claimed that he
bumped the he accidentally bumped the bus as he was so tired and that he has not slept for more than 24
hours because Auto Bus required him to return to Isabela immediately after arriving at Manila. Damages were
computed and 30% or P75,551.50 of it was being charged to Bautista. Bautista refused payment.
Auto Bus terminated Bautista after due hearing as part of Auto Bus management prerogative. Bautista
sued Auto Bus for Illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter Monroe Tabingan dismissed Bautistas petition but ruled
that Bautista is entitled to P78,117.87 13th month pay payments and P13,788.05 for his unpaid service
incentive leave pay.
The case was appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission. NLRC modified the LAs
ruling. It deleted the award for 13th Month pay. The court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave.

HELD:
Yes, Bautista is entitled to Service Incentive Leave. The Supreme Court emphasized that it does not
mean that just because an employee is paid on commission basis he is already barred to receive service
incentive leave pay.
The question actually boils down to whether or not Bautista is a field employee.
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural employees who
regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and
whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by
the employer or his representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and
days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for
rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times,
employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work
away from the principal office of the employee.
Certainly, Bautista is not a field employee. He has a specific route to traverse as a bus driver and that is
a specific place that he needs to be at work. There are inspectors hired by Auto Bus to constantly
check him. There are inspectors in bus stops who inspects the passengers, the punched tickets, and
the driver. Therefore he is definitely supervised though he is away from the Auto Bus main office.
On the other hand, the 3 year prescriptive period ran but Bautista was able to file his suit in time before
the prescriptive period expired. It was only upon his filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, one month from
the time of his dismissal, that Bautista demanded from his former employer commutation of his accumulated
leave credits. His cause of action to claim the payment of his accumulated service incentive leave thus accrued
from the time when his employer dismissed him and failed to pay his accumulated leave credits.
Page | 12
 Therefore, the prescriptive period with respect to his claim for service incentive leave pay only
commenced from the time the employer failed to compensate his accumulated service incentive leave pay at
the time of his dismissal. Since Bautista had filed his money claim after only one month from the time of his
dismissal, necessarily, his money claim was filed within the prescriptive period provided for by Article 291 of
the Labor Code.
Definition of Service Incentive Leave
Service incentive leave is a right which accrues to every employee who has served within 12 months,
whether continuous or broken reckoned from the date the employee started working, including authorized
absences and paid regular holidays unless the working days in the establishment as a matter of practice or
policy, or that provided in the employment contracts, is less than 12 months, in which case said period shall be
considered as one year. It is also commutable to its money equivalent if not used or exhausted at the end of
the year. In other words, an employee who has served for one year is entitled to it. He may use it as leave
days or he may collect its monetary value.

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CASE #:8
LABOR CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) for and in behalf of its members, ANA MARIE
OCAMPO, MARY INTAL, ANNABEL CARESO, MARLENE MELQIADES, IRENE JACINTO, NANCY
GARCIA, IMELDA SARMIENTO, LENITA VIRAY, GINA JACINTO, ROSEMARIE DEL ROSARIO,
CATHERINE ASPURNA, WINNIE PENA, VIVIAN BAA, EMILY LAGMAN, LILIAN MARFIL, NANCY
DERACO, JANET DERACO, MELODY JACINTO, CAROLYN DIZON, IMELDA MANALOTO, NORY VIRAY,
ELIZA SALAZAR, GIGI MANALOTO, JOSEFINA BASILIO, MARY ANN MAYATI, ZENAIDA GARCIA,
MERLY CANLAS, ERLINDA MANALANG, ANGELINA QUIAMBAO, LANIE GARCIA, ELVIRA PIEDRA,
LOURDES PANLILIO, LUISA PANLILIO, LERIZA PANLILIO, ALMA CASTRO, ALDA DAVID, MYRA T.
OLALIA, MARIFE PINLAC, NENITA DE GUZMAN, JULIE GACAD, EVELYN MANALO, NORA PATIO,
JANETH CARREON, ROWENA MENDOZA, ROWENA MANALO, LENY GARCIA, FELISISIMA PATIO,
SUSANA SALOMON, JOYDEE LANSANGAN, REMEDIOS AGUAS, JEANIE LANSANGAN, ELIZABETH
MERCADO, JOSELYN MANALESE, BERNADETH RALAR, LOLITA ESPIRITU, AGNES SALAS, VIRGINIA
MENDIOLA, GLENDA SALITA, JANETH RALAR, ERLINDA BASILIO, CORA PATIO, ANTONIA CALMA,
AGNES CARESO, GEMMA BONUS, MARITESS OCAMPO, LIBERTY GELISANGA, JANETH MANARANG,
AMALIA DELA CRUZ, EVA CUEVAS, TERESA MANIAGO, ARCELY PEREZ, LOIDA BIE, ROSITA
CANLAS, ANALIZA ESGUERRA, LAILA MANIAGO, JOSIE MANABAT, ROSARIO DIMATULAC, NYMPA
TUAZON, DAIZY TUASON, ERLINDA NAVARRO, EMILY MANARANG, EMELITA CAYANAN, MERCY
CAYANAN, LUZVIMINDA CAYANAN, ANABEL MANALO, SONIA DIZON, ERNA CANLAS, MARIAN
BENEDICTA, DOLORES DOLETIN, JULIE DAVID, GRACE VILLANUEVA, VIRGINIA MAGBAG, CORAZON
RILLION, PRECY MANALILI, ELENA RONOZ, IMELDA MENDOZA, EDNA CANLAS and ANGELA
CANLAS, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, EMPIRE FOOD PRODUCTS, its
Proprietor/President & Manager, MR. GONZALO KEHYENG and MRS. EVELYN KEHYENG, respondents.
290 SCRA 509 (1998)

FACTS:
The 99 persons named as petitioners in this proceeding were rank-and-file employees of respondent
Empire Food Products, which hired them on various dates. On January 21, 1991, complainants refused and
failed to report for work, hence guilty of abandoning their post without permission from respondents. As a result
of complainants failure to report for work, the cheese curls ready for repacking were all spoiled to the prejudice
of respondents. Under cross-examination, complainants failed to rebut the authenticity of respondents witness
testimony.
Complainants admitted that they are piece workers or paid on a pakiao [basis] i.e. a certain amount for
every thousand pieces of cheese curls or other products repacked. On cross-examination, complainants failed
to rebut or deny Gonzalo Kehyengs testimony that complainants have been even receiving more than the
minimum wage for an average workers.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, filed the instant special civil
action for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally eased out or constructively dismissed from their only means of
livelihood.

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HELD:
Yes. Petitioners were illegally eased out or constructively dismissed from their only means of livelihood.
The failure to work for one day, which resulted in the spoilage of cheese curls does not amount to
abandonment of work. In fact two (2) days after the reported abandonment of work or on January 23, 1991,
petitioners filed a complaint for, among others, unfair labor practice, illegal lockout and/or illegal dismissal. In
several cases, the Court held that one could not possibly abandon his work and shortly thereafter vigorously
pursue his complaint for illegal dismissal.
That petitioner employees are pakyao or piece workers does not imply that they are not regular
employees entitled to reinstatement. Private respondent Empire Food Products, Inc. is a food and fruit
processing company. In Tabas v. California Manufacturing Co., Inc. (169 SCRA 497), the Court held that the
work of merchandisers of processed food, who coordinate with grocery stores and other outlets for the sale of
the processed food is necessary in the day-to-day operations of the company. With more reason, the work of
processed food repackers is necessary in the day-to-day operations of respondent Empire Food Products.
It may likewise be stressed that the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing an
employee, such as abandonment, rests on the employer, a burden private respondents failed to discharge.
Private respondents, moreover, in considering petitioners employment to have been terminated by
abandonment, violated their rights to security of tenure and constitutional right to due process in not even
serving them with a written notice of such termination. Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code provides:
SEC. 2. Notice of Dismissal. - Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a
written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases
of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the workers last known address.
Petitioners are therefore entitled to reinstatement with full back wages pursuant to Article 279 of the
Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715. Nevertheless, the records disclose that taking into account the
number of employees involved, the length of time that has lapsed since their dismissal, and the perceptible
resentment and enmity between petitioners and private respondents which necessarily strained their
relationship, reinstatement would be impractical and hardly promotive of the best interests of the parties. In lieu
of reinstatement then, separation pay at the rate of one month for every year of service, with a fraction of at
least six (6) months of service considered as one (1) year, is in order.

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CASE #:9
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR
ARBITER ROMULUS PROTACIO and DR. HERMINIO A. FABROS, respondents.
302 SCRA 582 (1999)

FACTS:
Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at petitioner company. He was assigned
at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.
On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to have his dinner at his
residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A few minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call
from the PAL Cargo Services. One of its employees had suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty, Mr.
Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at
7:50 in the evening and Mr. Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the
clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the patient to the hospital. The patient
died the following day.
Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief Flight Surgeon to conduct an
investigation. In his explanation, Dr. Fabros asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he
immediately left his residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the emergency and he arrived at the
clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for
him.
Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable, the management charged private respondent
with abandonment of post while on duty. He denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said
that he only left the clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at 7:51 in the evening
upon being informed of the emergency.
After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was given a suspension for
three months effective December 16, 1994.
Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.
On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the suspension of private respondent
illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should
have received during his period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is
supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter. The NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents of leaving the company premises to take his meal at home
constituted abandonment of post.

HELD:
No. Articles 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read:
Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8)
hours a day.
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 Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in
hospitals and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight
(8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the
service require that such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be
entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the
sixth day. For purposes of this Article, health personnel shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists,
dieticians, pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists,
midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel. (emphasis supplied)
Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be
the duty of every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular
meals.
Section 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code further states:
Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. Every employer shall give his employees, regardless of sex, not less
than one (1) hour time-off for regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period of not less than
twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that such shorter meal period is credited as
compensable hours worked of the employee;
(a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve strenuous physical exertion;
(b) Where the establishment regularly operates not less than sixteen hours a day;
(c) In cases of actual or impending emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on machineries,
equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer; and
(d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods.
Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to twenty (20) minutes shall be considered as compensable
working time.
Thus, the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the law may it be
inferred that employees must take their meals within the company premises. Employees are not prohibited
from going out of the premises as long as they return to their posts on time
Private respondents act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute abandonment.

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CASE #:10
TEOFILO ARICA, petitioners
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
170 SCRA 776 (1989)

FACTS:
Teofilo Arica et al and 561 others sued Standard Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) Philippines for
allegedly not paying the workers for their assembly time which takes place every work day from 5:30am to
6am. The assembly time consists of the roll call of the workers; their getting of assignments from the foreman;
their filling out of the Laborers Daily Accomplishment Report; their getting of tools and equipments from the
stockroom; and their going to the field to work. The workers alleged that this is necessarily and primarily for
STANFILCOs benefit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the workers assembly time should be paid.

HELD:
No. The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the
parties under Article IV, Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as waiting
time within the purview of Section 5, Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor
Code . . .
Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the
proceedings attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to
other personal pursuits. In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period,
otherwise, their failure to report in the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary
measures.

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CASE #:11
UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN And
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Respondents.
(Tanopo, Serafico, Juanitez & Callanta Law Office and Hermogenes S. Decano for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents)

FACTS:
Petitioner is a labor union composed of faculty members of the respondent University of Pangasinan,
an educational institution duly organized and existing by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.
Petitioner filed a complaint against the private respondent with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC-
Dagupan City seeking: (a) the payment of Emergency Cost of Living Allowances (ECOLA) for November 7 to
December 5, 1981, a semestral break; (b) salary increases from the 60% of the incremental proceeds of
increased tuition fees; and (c) payment of salaries for suspended extra loads.
The petitioners members are full-time professors, instructors, and teachers of respondent University. The
teachers in the college level teach for a normal duration of 10 months a school year, divided into 2 semesters
of 5 months each, excluding the 2 months summer vacation. These teachers are paid their salaries on a
regular monthly basis.
During the semestral break (Nov. 7- Dec. 5, 1981), they were not paid their ECOLA. The private
respondent claims that the teachers are not entitled thereto because the semestral break is not an integral part
of the school year and there being no actual services rendered by the teachers during said period, the principle
of No work, no pay applies.
During the same school year (1981-1982), the private respondent was authorized by the Ministry of
Education and Culture to collect, from its students a 15% increase of tuition fees. Petitioners members
demanded a salary increase effective the first semester of said schoolyear to be taken from the 60% percent
incremental proceeds of the said increased tuition fees as mandated by the PD 451. Private respondent
refused.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners members are entitled to ECOLA during the semestral break from No.7
Dec. 5, 1981 of the 1981-82 School Year.

HELD:
Yes. According to various Presidential Decrees on ECOLAs Allowances of Fulltime Employees . . .
that Employees shall be paid in full the required monthly allowance regardless of the number of their regular
working days if they incur no absences during the month. If they incur absences without pay, the amounts
corresponding to the absences may be deducted from the monthly allowance . . .; and on Leave of Absence
Without Pay, that All covered employees shall be entitled to the allowance provided herein when they are on
leave of absence with pay.
The petitioners members are full-time employees receiving their monthly salaries irrespective of the
number of working days or teaching hours in a month. However, they find themselves in a situation where they
are forced to go on leave during semestral breaks. These semestral breaks are in the nature of work
interruptions beyond the employees control. As such, these breaks cannot be considered as absences within
the meaning of the law for which deductions may be made from monthly allowances. The No work, no pay
principle does not apply in the instant case. The petitioners members received their regular salaries during this
Page | 19
period. It is clear from the provision of law that it contemplates a no work situation where the employees
voluntarily absent themselves. Petitioners, in the case at bar, do not voluntarily absent themselves during
semestral breaks. Rather, they are constrained to take mandatory leave from work. For this they cannot be
faulted nor can they be begrudged that which is due them under the law.
The intention of the law is to grant ECOLA upon the payment of basic wages. Hence, we have the
principle of No pay, no ECOLA the converse of which finds application in the case at bar. Petitioners cannot
be considered to be on leave without pay so as not to be entitled to ECOLA, for, as earlier stated, the
petitioners were paid their wages in full for the months of November and December of 1981, notwithstanding
the intervening semestral break.
Although said to be on forced leave, professors and teachers are, nevertheless, burdened with the task
of working during a period of time supposedly available for rest and private matters. There are papers to
correct, students to evaluate, deadlines to meet, and periods within which to submit grading reports. Although
they may be considered by the respondent to be on leave, the semestal break could not be used effectively for
the teachers own purposes for the nature of a teachers job imposes upon him further duties which must be
done during the said period of time. Arduous preparation is necessary for the delicate task of educating our
children. Teaching involves not only an application of skill and an imparting of knowledge, but a responsibility
which entails self dedication and sacrifice. It would be unfair for the private respondent to consider these
teachers as employees on leave without pay to suit its purposes and, yet, in the meantime, continue availing of
their services as they prepare for the next semester or complete all of the last semesters requirements.
Thus, the semestral break may also be considered as hours worked. For this, the teachers are paid
regular salaries and, for this, they should be entitled to ECOLA. The purpose of the law is to augment the
income of employees to enable them to cope with the harsh living conditions brought about by inflation; and to
protect employees and their wages against the ravages brought by these conditions.

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CASE #:12
HILARIO RADA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Second Division) and PHILNOR CONSULTANTS AND
PLANNERS, INC., respondents.
205 SCRA 69 (1992)

FACTS:
In 1977, Hilario Rada was contracted by Philnor Consultants and Planners, Inc as a driver. He was
assigned to a specific project in Manila. The contract he signed was for 2.3 years. His task was to drive
employees to the project from 7am to 4pm. He was allowed to bring home the company vehicle in order to
provide a timely transportation service to the other project workers. The project he was assigned to was not
completed as scheduled hence, since he has a satisfactory record, he was re-contracted for an additional 10
months. After 10 months the project was not yet completed. Several contracts thereafter were made until the
project was finished in 1985.
At the completion of the project, Rada was terminated as his employment was co-terminous with the
project. He later sued Philnor for non payment of separation pay and overtime pay. He said he is entitled to be
paid OT pay because he uses extra time to get to the project site from his home and from the project site to his
home everyday in total, he spends an average of 3 hours OT every day.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Rada is entitled to separation pay.
2. Whether or not Rada is entitled to Over Time pay.

HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court ruled that Rada was a project employee whose work was coterminous with
the project for which he was hired. Project employees, as distinguished from regular or non-project employees,
are mentioned in Section 281 of the Labor Code as those where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee.
Project employees are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the
completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the number of
projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company. Moreover, the company is
not required to obtain clearance from the Secretary of Labor in connection with such termination.

2. Yes. Rada is entitled to OT pay. The fact that he picks up employees of Philnor at certain specified
points along EDSA in going to the project site and drops them off at the same points on his way back from the
field office going home to Marikina, Metro Manila is not merely incidental to Radas job as a driver. On the
contrary, said transportation arrangement had been adopted, not so much for the convenience of the
employees, but primarily for the benefit of Philnor. As embodied in Philnors memorandum, they allowed their
drivers to bring home their transport vehicles in order for them to provide a timely transport service and to
avoid delay not really so that the drivers could enjoy the benefits of the company vehicles nor for them to
save on fair.

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CASE #:13
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCHITA
AYALDE, respondents.
348 SCRA 1 (2000)

FACTS:
Margarita Tana, widow of the late Ignacio Tana, Sr., alleged that her husband was, before his demise,
an employee of Conchita Ayalde as a farmhand in the two (2) sugarcane plantations she owned (known as
Hda. No. Audit B-70 located in Pontevedra, La Carlota City) and leased from the University of the Philippines
(known as Hda. Audit B-15-M situated in La Granja, La Carlota City). She further alleged that Tana worked
continuously six (6) days a week, four (4) weeks a month, and for twelve (12) months every year between
January 1961 to April 1979. For his labor, Tana allegedly received a regular salary according to the minimum
wage prevailing at the time. She further alleged that throughout the given period, social security contributions,
as well as medicare and employees compensation premiums were deducted from Tanas wages. It was only
after his death that Margarita discovered that Tana was never reported for coverage, nor were his
contributions/premiums remitted to the Social Security System (SSS). Consequently, she was deprived of the
burial grant and pension benefits accruing to the heirs of Tana had he been reported for coverage.
The SSS, in a petition-in-intervention, revealed that neither Hda. B-70 nor respondents Ayalde and
Maghari were registered members-employers of the SSS, and consequently, Ignacio Tana, Sr. was never
registered as a member-employee. Likewise, SSS records reflected that there was no way of verifying whether
the alleged premium contributions were remitted since the respondents were not registered members-
employers. Being the agency charged with the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of the Social
Security Law, as amended, the SSS asked the Commissions leave to intervene in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an Ignacio Tana, Sr. was hired on pakyaw basis and can be considered an employee
entitled to compulsory coverage and corresponding benefits under the Social Security Law.

HELD:
No.
The Supreme Court held it is indubitable, therefore, that Tana worked continuously for Ayalde, not only
as arador on pakyawbasis, but as a regular farmhand, doing backbreaking jobs for Ayaldes business. There is
no shred of evidence to show that Tana was only a seasonal worker, much less a migrant worker. All
witnesses, including Ayalde herself, testified that Tana and his family resided in the plantation. If he was a
mere pakyaw worker or independent contractor, then there would be no reason for Ayalde to allow them to live
inside her property for free. The only logical explanation is that he was working for most part of the year
exclusively for Ayalde, in return for which the latter gratuitously allowed Tana and his family to reside in her
property.
First, Tana cannot be said to be engaged in a distinct occupation or business. His carabao and plow
may be useful in his livelihood, but he is not independently engaged in the business of farming or
plowing. Second, he had been working exclusively for Ayalde for eighteen (18) years prior to his demise. Third,
there is no dispute that Ayalde was in the business of growing sugarcane in the two plantations for commercial
purposes. There is also no question that plowing or preparing the soil for planting is a major part of the regular
business of Ayalde.
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 Under the circumstances, the relationship between Ayalde and Tana has more of the attributes of
employer-employee than that of an independent contractor hired to perform a specific project. In the case of Dy
Keh Beng v. International Labor, we cited our long-standing ruling in Sunripe Coconut Products Co. v. Court of
Industrial Relations, to wit:
When a worker possesses some attributes of an employee and others of an independent
contractor, which make him fall within an intermediate area, he may be classified under the category of
an employee when the economic facts of the relations make it more nearly one of employment than
one of independent business enterprise with respect to the ends sought to be accomplished.
The Court found the above-quoted ruling to be applicable in the case of Tana. There is preponderance
of evidence to support the conclusion that he was an employee rather than an independent contractor.
The Court of Appeals also erred when it ruled, on the alternative, that if ever Tana was an employee,
he was still ineligible for compulsory coverage because he was not paid any regular daily wage and he did not
work for an uninterrupted period of at least six months in a year in accordance with Section 8(j) (I) of the Social
Security Law. There is substantial testimonial evidence to prove that Tana was paid a daily wage, and he
worked continuously for most part of the year, even while he was also occasionally called on to plow the soil on
a pakyaw basis.
As a farm laborer who has worked exclusively for Ayalde for eighteen (18) years, Tana should be
entitled to compulsory coverage under the Social Security Law, whether his service was continuous or broken.

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CASE #:14
THE SHELL COMPANY OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR UNION, respondent.
81 PHIL. 315 (1948)

FACTS:
National Labor Union instituted this action to ask for 50% additional compensation for the employees of
Shell Company who work at night to attend to the foreign planes landing and taking off at night to supply petrol
and lubricants and perform other duties. Court of Industrial Relations held that & the
Shell Company pay its workers working at night an additional compensation of 50% over their regular salaries
by working during daytime. Shell argues that there is no legal provision empowering CIR to order payment of
additional compensation to workers who work at night and that Act No. 444 relieved the employer of such
obligation as it is provided in the Act where it made compulsory the overtime additional compensation pay for
work rendered beyond 8 hours and such cases do not include the work at night.
NLU argues decision of the CIR is part of its broad and effective powers as granted by Commonwealth
Act No. 103 - the charter of the Industrial Relations Court and that Act No. 444 has no application to this case
because it is referring only to particular and the maximum working day permitted in industrial establishments -
the 8-hour day.

ISSUE:
Whether or not those who work at night are entitled to 50% additional compensation.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court discussed a lot of issues about the pernicious effect of working at night
justifying the award of additional 50% to the compensation of affected workers affirming the decision of CIR.
The case against night work, then, may be said to rest upon several grounds. In the first place, there
are the remotely injurious effects of permanent nightwork manifested in the later years of the workers life. Of
more immediate importance to the average worker is the disarrangement of his social life including the
recreational activities of his leisure hours and the ordinary associations of normal family relations. From an
economic point of view, nightwork is to be discouraged because of its adverse effect upon efficiency and
output. A moral arument against nightwork in the case of women is that the night shift forces the workers to go
to and from the factory in darkness. Recent experiences of industrial nations have added much to the evidence
against the continuation of nightwork, except in extraordinary circumstances and unavoidable emergencies.
The immediate prohibition of night work for all laborers is hardly practicable; its discontinuance in the case
of women employees is unquestionably desirable. The night was made for rest and sleep and not for work, is
a common saying among wage-earning people and many of them dream of an industrial order in which there
will be no night shift. (Labor Problems,3rd Edition, pp.325-328, by Watkins & Dodd).

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