JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her G.R. No.
170220 hectares was considered by LBP and valued the same at
capacity as Assignee of FEDERICO
C. SUNTAY, NENITA SUNTAY
TAEDO and EMILIO A.M.
SUNTAY III,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 20, 2006
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assails the October 27, 2005 Amended
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530,
which vacated its May 26, 2004 Decision affirming (a) the Order
of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro,
Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court, in Agrarian Case
Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, dated March 31, 2003 directing
respondent Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to deposit the
provisional compensation as determined by the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD); (b) the May 26, 2003
Resolution denying LBPs motion for reconsideration; and (c)
the May 27, 2003 Order requiring Teresita V. Tengco, LBPs
Land Compensation Department Manager, to comply with the
March 31, 2003 Order.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Josefina S. Lubrica is the assignee[2] of Federico C.
Suntay over certain parcels of agricultural land located at Sta.
Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, with an area of
3,682.0285 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-31 (T-1326)[3] of the Registry of Deeds of
Occidental Mindoro. In 1972, a portion of the said property with
an area of 311.7682 hectares, was placed under the land reform
program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 (1972)[4] and
Executive Order No. 228 (1987).[5] The land was thereafter
subdivided and distributed to farmer beneficiaries. The
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the LBP fixed the
value of the land at P5,056,833.54 which amount was deposited
in cash and bonds in favor of Lubrica.
On the other hand, petitioners Nenita Suntay-Taedo and Emilio
A.M. Suntay III inherited from Federico Suntay a parcel of
agricultural land located at Balansay, Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro covered by TCT No. T-128[6] of the Register of Deeds
of Occidental Mindoro, consisting of two lots, namely, Lot 1
with an area of 45.0760 hectares and Lot 2 containing an area of
165.1571 hectares or a total of 210.2331 hectares. Lot 2 was
placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27 but only 128.7161
P1,512,575.05.
Petitioners rejected the valuation of their properties, hence the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) conducted summary administrative proceedings for
determination of just compensation. On January 29, 2003, the
PARAD fixed the preliminary just compensation at
P51,800,286.43 for the 311.7682 hectares (TCT No. T-31) and
P21,608,215.28 for the 128.7161 hectares (TCT No. T-128).[7]
Not satisfied with the valuation, LBP filed on February 17,
2003, two separate petitions[8] for judicial determination of just
compensation before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, acting as a Special Agrarian Court,
docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1339 for TCT No. T-31 and
Agrarian Case No. R-1340 for TCT No. T-128, and raffled to
Branch 46 thereof.
Petitioners filed separate Motions to Deposit the Preliminary
Valuation Under Section 16(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657
(1988)[9] and Ad Cautelam Answer praying among others that
LBP deposit the preliminary compensation determined by the
PARAD.
On March 31, 2003, the trial court issued an Order[10] granting
petitioners motion, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Ms. Teresita V. Tengco, of
the Land Compensation Department I (LCD
I), Land Bank of the Philippines, is hereby
ordered pursuant to Section 16 (e) of RA 6657
in relation to Section 2, Administrative Order
No. 8, Series of 1991, to deposit the
provisional compensation as determined by
the PARAD in cash and bonds, as follows:
1. In Agrarian Case No. R-1339, the amount
of P 51,800,286.43, minus the
amount received by the Landowner;
2. In Agrarian Case No. R-1340, the amount
of P 21,608,215.28, less the amount
of P 1,512,575.16, the amount
already deposited.
Such deposit must be made with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, Manila within five
(5) days from receipt of a copy of this order
and to notify this court of her compliance
within such period.
Let this order be served by the Sheriff of this
Court at the expense of the movants.
SO ORDERED.[11]
LBPs motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution[12] dated May 26, 2003. The following day, May 27,
2003, the trial court issued an Order[13]directing Ms. Teresita V.
Tengco, LBPs Land Compensation Department Manager, to
deposit the amounts.

Thus, on June 17, 2003, LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 77530.[14]
On June 27, 2003, the appellate court issued a 60-day temporary
restraining order[15] and on October 6, 2003, a writ of
preliminary injunction.[16]
On May 26, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[17] in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there
being no grave abuse of discretion, the instant
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is
DENIED. Accordingly, the Order
dated March 31, 2003, Resolution dated May
26, 2003, and Order dated May 27, 2003 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The preliminary
injunction We previously issued is hereby
LIFTED and DISSOLVED.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court correctly ordered
LBP to deposit the amounts provisionally determined by the
PARAD as there is no law which prohibits LBP to make a
deposit pending the fixing of the final amount of just
compensation. It also noted that there is no reason for LBP to
further delay the deposit considering that the DAR already took
possession of the properties and distributed the same to farmer-
beneficiaries as early as 1972.
LBP moved for reconsideration which was granted. On October
27, 2005, the appellate court rendered the assailed Amended
Decision,[19] the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the prescription of a
different formula in the case of Gabatin which
We hold as cogent and compelling
justification necessitating Us to effect the
reversal of Our judgment herein sought to be
reconsidered, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED, and Our May
26, 2004 Decision is hereby VACATED and
ABANDONED with the end in view of giving
way to and acting in harmony and in
congruence with the tenor of the ruling in the
case of Gabatin. Accordingly, the assailed
rulings of the Special Agrarian Court is (sic)
commanded to compute and fix the just
compensation for the expropriated
agricultural lands strictly in accordance with
the mode of computation prescribed (sic) Our
May 26, 2004 judgment in the case of
Gabatin.
SO ORDERED.[20]
In the Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals held that the
immediate deposit of the preliminary value of the expropriated
properties is improper because it was erroneously
computed. Citing Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines,[21] it
held that the formula to compute the just compensation should
be: Land Value = 2.5 x Average Gross Production x
Government Support Price. Specifically, it held that the value of
the government support price for the corresponding agricultural
produce (rice and corn) should be computed at the time of the
legal taking of the subject agricultural land, that is, on October
21, 1972 when landowners were effectively deprived of
ownership over their properties by virtue of P.D. No.
27. According to the Court of Appeals, the PARAD incorrectly
used the amounts of P500 and P300 which are the prevailing
government support price for palay and corn, respectively, at the
time of payment, instead of P35 and P31, the prevailing
government support price at the time of the taking in 1972.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
A. THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED
THE CASE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD
WITH THE LATEST DECISION OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
HON. ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD, ET AL., G.R.
NO. 127198, PROM. MAY 16, 2005; and[22]
B. THE COURT A QUO HAS, WITH
GRAVE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, SO FAR DEPARTED FROM
THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS,
DECIDING ISSUES THAT HAVE NOT
BEEN RAISED, AS TO CALL FOR AN
EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
SUPERVISION.[23]
Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation
should be based on the value of the expropriated properties at
the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims
that the value of the realties should be computed as of October
21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,[24] the
Court ruled thus:
Land Banks contention that the
property was acquired for purposes of
agrarian reform on October 21, 1972, the time
of the effectivity of PD 27, ergo just
compensation should be based on the value of
the property as of that time and not at the time
of possession in 1993, is likewise
erroneous. In Office of the President,
Malacaang, Manila v. Court of Appeals, we
ruled that the seizure of the landholding did
 not take place on the date of effectivity of PD
27 but would take effect on the payment of
just compensation.
The Natividad case reiterated the Courts ruling
in Office of the President v. Court of Appeals[25] that the
expropriation of the landholding did not take place on the
effectivity of P.D. No. 27 on October 21, 1972 but seizure
would take effect on the payment of just compensation judicially
determined.
Likewise, in the recent case of Heirs of Francisco R.
Tantoco, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,[26] we held that expropriation
of landholdings covered by R.A. No. 6657 take place, not on the
effectivity of the Act on June 15, 1988, but on the payment of
just compensation.
In the instant case, petitioners were deprived of their
properties in 1972 but have yet to receive the just compensation
therefor. The parcels of land were already subdivided and
distributed to the farmer-beneficiaries thereby immediately
depriving petitioners of their use. Under the circumstances, it
would be highly inequitable on the part of the petitioners to
compute the just compensation using the values at the time of
the taking in 1972, and not at the time of the payment,
considering that the government and the farmer-beneficiaries
have already benefited from the land although ownership thereof
have not yet been transferred in their names. Petitioners were
deprived of their properties without payment of just
compensation which, under the law, is a prerequisite before the
property can be taken away from its owners.[27] The transfer of
possession and ownership of the land to the government are
conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the
compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains
with the landowner.[28]
Our ruling in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform[29] is
instructive, thus:
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly
ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as
October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall be
deemed the owner of a portion of land
consisting of a family-sized farm except that
no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had
become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers cooperative. It was
understood, however, that full payment of the
just compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional
requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically
stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-
beneficiaries are now
deemed full owners as
of October 21, 1972 of the
land they acquired by
virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27 (Emphasis
supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already
validly acquired under the said decree, after
proof of full-fledged membership in the
farmers cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. x x x
The CARP Law, for its part,
conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding
payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.
We also note that the expropriation proceedings in the
instant case was initiated under P.D. No. 27 but the agrarian
reform process is still incomplete considering that the just
compensation to be paid to petitioners has yet to be
settled. Considering the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before the
completion of this process, the just compensation should be
determined and the process concluded under the said
law. Indeed, R.A. No. 6657 is the applicable law, with P.D. No.
27 and E.O. No. 228 having only suppletory effect. [30]
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,[31] we held that:
RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands
among the properties which the DAR shall
acquire and distribute to the landless. And to
facilitate the acquisition and distribution
thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act should
be adhered to.
Section 18 of R.A. No. 6657 mandates that the LBP
shall compensate the landowner in such amount as may be
agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP or as
may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation
for the land. In determining just compensation, the cost of the
acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner,
the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits
contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes
or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation.[32]
Corollarily, we held in Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Celada[33] that the above provision was converted into a formula
by the DAR through Administrative Order No. 05, S. 1998, to
wit:
Land Value (LV) = (Capitalized Net Income x 0.6) +
(Comparable Sales x
0.3) + (Market Value
per Tax Declaration x
0.1)
Petitioners were deprived of their properties way back in 1972,
yet to date, they have not yet received just compensation. Thus,
it would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by P.D. No. 227 and E.O. No.
228 considering the failure to determine just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordance with R.A. No. 6657 and not P.D. No.
227 or E.O. No. 228, is important considering that just
compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.[34]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October
27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26,
2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003
Order of the Special Agrarian Court ordering the respondent
Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation
provisionally determined by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003
Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration;
and (c) the May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco,
respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to
comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The
Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, Branch
46, acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed
with dispatch in the trial of Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-
1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties
based on the aforementioned formula.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118712 October 6, 1995
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT
CORP., respondents.
G.R. No. 118745 October 6, 1995
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented
by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF
EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL
MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET
AL., respondents.
FRANCISCO, R., J.:
It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the
weak and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such
an extent as deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and
justice happen to be on his side. 1 As eloquently stated by
Justice Isagani Cruz:
. . . social justice or any justice for that
matter is for the deserving, whether he be
a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in
his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable
doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance
in favor of the poor, to whom the
Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to
prefer the poor simply because they are poor,
or to reject the rich simply because they are
rich, for justice must always be served, for
poor and rich alike, according to the mandate
of the law. 2
In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the
aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and
Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the
adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
33465. However, upon motion filed by private respondents, the
petitions were ordered consolidated.3
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents' Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is
hereby GRANTED:
a) DAR Administrative
Order No. 9, Series of
1990 is
declared null and void inso
far as it provides for the
opening of trust accounts
in lieu of deposits in cash
or bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is
ordered
to immediately deposit
not merely "earmark",
"reserve" or "deposit in
trust" with an accessible
bank designated by
respondent DAR in the
names of the following
petitioners the following
amounts in cash and in
government financial
instruments within the
parameters of Sec. 18 (1)
of RA 6657:
P 1,455,207.31 Pedro L.
Yap
P 135,482.12 Heirs of
Emiliano Santiago
P 15,914,127.77
AMADCOR;
c) The DAR-designated
bank is ordered to allow
the petitioners to
withdraw the above-
deposited amounts without
prejudice to the final
determination of just
compensation by the
proper authorities; and
d) Respondent DAR is
ordered to
1) immediately conduct su
mmary administrative
proceedings to determine
the just compensation for
the lands of the petitioners
giving the petitioners 15
days from notice within
which to submit evidence
and to 2) decide the
cases within 30 days after
they are submitted for
decision. 4
Likewise, petitioners seek the reversal of the
Resolution dated January 18, 1995, 5 denying their
motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to
qualified beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the
Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment
of compensation for their land pursuant to the
provisions of RA 6657, private respondents filed with
this Court a Petition
for Certiorari and Mandamus with prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction. Private
respondents questioned the validity of DAR
Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992 6 and
DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990, 7 and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the
pending summary administrative proceedings to
finally determine the just compensation of their
properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and
bonds the amounts respectively "earmarked",
"reserved" and "deposited in trust accounts" for
private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw
the same.
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9,
1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of
Appeals for proper determination and disposition.
As found by respondent court , the following are undisputed:
Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "(o)n 4
September 1992 the transfer certificates of
title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally
cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte
and were transferred in the names of farmer
beneficiaries collectively, based on the
request of the DAR together with a
certification of the Landbank that the sum of
P735,337.77 and P719,869.54 have been
earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for
the parcels of lands covered by TCT Nos.
6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in
lieu thereof TC-563 and TC-562,
respectively, in the names of listed
beneficiaries (ANNEXES "C" & "D")
without notice to petitioner Yap and without
complying with the requirement of Section
16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the
compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in
an accessible bank. (Rollo, p. 6).
The above allegations are not disputed by
any of the respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege
that the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the
owners of a parcel of land located at Laur,
NUEVA ECIJA with an area of 18.5615
hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of
the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of the late Emiliano F.
Santiago; that in November and December
1990, without notice to the petitioners, the
Landbank required and the beneficiaries
executed Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking
(ANNEX "B") to pay rentals to the
LandBank for the use of their farmlots
equivalent to at least 25% of the net harvest;
that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional
Director issued an order directing the
Landbank to pay the landowner directly or
through the establishment of a trust fund in
the amount of P135,482.12, that on 24
February 1992, the Landbank reserved in
trust P135,482.12 in the name of Emiliano F.
Santiago. (ANNEX "E"; Rollo,
p. 7); that the beneficiaries stopped paying
rentals to the landowners after they signed
the Actual Tiller's Deed of Undertaking
committing themselves to pay rentals to the
LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
The above allegations are not disputed by the
respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent
DAR, not Landbank which required the
execution of Actual Tillers Deed of
Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with
the ATDU, did not collect any amount as
rental from the substituting beneficiaries
(Rollo, p. 99).
Petitioner Agricultural Management and
Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for
brevity) alleges with respect to its
properties located in San Francisco, Quezon
that the properties of AMADCOR in San
Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares and another parcel
covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of
163.6189 hectares; that a summary
administrative proceeding to determine
compensation of the property covered by
TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the
DARAB in Quezon City without notice to
the landowner; that a decision was rendered
on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX "F") fixing
the compensation for the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and
ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a
trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the
amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the
decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account
established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX
"G"). With respect to petitioner
AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it
is alleged that the property of AMADCOR in
Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-
2466 of the Register of Deeds of Albay with
an area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that
emancipation patents were issued covering
an area of 701.8999 hectares which were
registered on 15 February 1988 but no action
was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the
compensation for said land; that on 21 April
1993, a trust account in the name of
AMADCOR was established in the amount
of P12,247,217.83', three notices of
acquisition having been previously rejected
by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
The above allegations are not disputed by the
respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims that petitioner failed to
participate in the DARAB proceedings (land
valuation case) despite due notice to it
(Rollo, p. 100). 8
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9,
Series of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion because it permits the opening of trust
accounts by the Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or
bonds in an accessible bank designated by the DAR, the
compensation for the land before it is taken and the titles are
cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of RA
6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR
and the Landbank merely "earmarked", "deposited in trust" or
"reserved" the compensation in their names as landowners
despite the clear mandate that before taking possession of the
property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or in
bonds. 10
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative
Order No. 9 is a valid exercise of its rule-making power
pursuant to Section 49 of RA 6657. 11 Moreover, the DAR
maintained that the issuance of the "Certificate of Deposit" by
the Landbank was a substantial compliance with Section 16(e)
of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al. vs. Hon. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14, 1989 (175 SCRA
343). 12
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of
the Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 of the Land Registration Authority where
the words "reserved/deposited" were also used. 13
On October 20, 1994, the respondent court rendered the
assailed decision in favor of private respondents. 14Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but respondent court denied
the same. 15
Hence, the instant petitions.
On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the
appeal has no merit and is merely intended to delay the finality
of the appealed decision. 16 The Court, however, denied the
motion and instead required the respondents to file their
comments. 17
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring
as null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990, insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in
lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that
private respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the
immediate and provisional release of the amounts deposited in
trust pending the final resolution of the cases it has filed for
just compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that
the word "deposit" as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657
referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded
the opening of a trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in
opting for the opening of a trust account as the acceptable form
of deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner
DAR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion since it
merely exercised its power to promulgate rules and regulations
in implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657
provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of
rejection or no response from the landowner,
upon the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with
this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only
in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". Nowhere does it appear nor can it
be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it
were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid
modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it
can be fairly deduced that a "trust account" is allowed. In sum,
there is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant
an expanded construction of the term "deposit".
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed
or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of
law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or
the spirit of a legislative enactment. 18 In this regard, it must be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations
may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying
the provisions of the law into effect. The power of
administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the
law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend
the law and amend a legislative enactment, 19 for settled is the
rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation,
it is the former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of
its power to enact rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing
the opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In the
same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29,
29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court
therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private
respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in
trust in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases
involving the final valuation of their properties, petitioners
assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between
the deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657
and payment of final compensation as provided under Section
18 21 of the same law. According to petitioners, the right of the
landowner to withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf
pertains only to the final valuation as agreed upon by the
landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that adjudged by the
court. It has no reference to amount deposited in the trust
account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection by the
landowner because the latter amount is only provisional and
intended merely to secure possession of the property pending
final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners
cite the following pronouncements in the case of "Association
of Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform". 22
The last major challenge to CARP is that the
landowner is divested of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation, in contravention of a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or
the deposit by the DAR of the compensation
in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible
bank. Until then, title also remains with the
landowner. No outright change of ownership
is contemplated either.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence the argument that the assailed
measures violate due process by arbitrarily
transferring title before the land is fully paid
for must also be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent
court in discarding petitioners' assertion as it found that:
. . . despite the "revolutionary" character of
the expropriation envisioned under RA 6657
which led the Supreme Court, in the case of
Association of Small Landowners in the Phil.
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform (175
SCRA 343), to conclude that "payments of
the just compensation is not always required
to be made fully in money" even as the
Supreme Court admits in the same case "that
the traditional medium for the payment of
just compensation is money and no other"
the Supreme Court in said case did not
abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to
the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just
compensation." 23(Emphasis supplied)
We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling
in the "Association" case merely recognized the extraordinary
nature of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657
thereby allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of
payment of compensation and recognized payment other than
in cash. It did not, however, dispense with the settled rule that
there must be full payment of just compensation before the title
to the expropriated property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and
determination of just compensation under Section 18 is
unacceptable. To withhold the right of the landowners to
appropriate the amounts already deposited in their behalf as
compensation for their properties simply because they rejected
the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding that they have
already been deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The
irresistible expropriation of private respondents' properties was
painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all
the more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to
private respondents in exchange for the taking, under an
authority (the "Association" case) that is, however, misplaced.
This is misery twice bestowed on private respondents, which
the Court must rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between
provisional compensation under Section 16(e) and final
compensation under Section 18 for purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the same. The immediate
effect in both situations is the same, the landowner is deprived
of the use and possession of his property for which he should
be fairly and immediately compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate
the cardinal rule that:
. . . within the context of the State's inherent
power of eminent domain, just compensation
means not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also the payment of the land within
a reasonable time from its taking. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is
made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
The promulgation of the "Association" decision endeavored to
remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear the way
for the true freedom of the farmer. 25 But despite this, cases
involving its implementation continue to multiply and clog the
courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the
goal of totally emancipating the farmers from their bondage
will be attained in due time. It must be stressed, however, that
in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because social justice cannot
be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who
under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection. 26
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition
is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
GR No. 152154
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL
FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS
(REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS:
IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE]
MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R.
MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-
ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ
MARCOS, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January
31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of the
Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the
Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its
earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the
amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January
31, 2002.
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as
Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and
Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 1379[1] in relation to
Executive Order Nos. 1,[2] 2,[3] 14[4] and 14-A.[5]
In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the
aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more
than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow
in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held
by the following five account groups, using various foreign
foundations in certain Swiss banks:
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-
Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25
million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the
Marcos couples salaries, other lawful income as well as income
from legitimately acquired property. The treasury
notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued
by the PCGG.
On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos,
Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand
R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement
and the Supplemental Agreements[6] dated December 28, 1993
were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG
Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos
children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval
of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought
to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all
assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the
conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General
Agreement specified in one of its premises or whereas clauses
the fact that petitioner obtained a judgment from the Swiss
Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred
Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in
principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain
conditionalities are met x x x. The said decision of the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District
Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioners request for legal
assistance.[7] Consandey declared the various deposits in the
name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance
and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor
of the parties entitled to restitution.
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the
motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements.
Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the
purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said
agreements.
On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs.
Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by
respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for summary
judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
the motion to approve the compromise agreement (took)
precedence over the motion for summary judgment.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26,
1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of
the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the
funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.
Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the
District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request
for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account
in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the
Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated
December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney
of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In
1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow.
Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds
be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the
PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The
Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998,
granted the motion.
After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order
and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and
January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After
several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another
motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the
US$356 million, based on the following grounds:
I Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE
FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE
PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER
SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE
PROCEEDING.
II
RESPONDENTS ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-
TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR
OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE
ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE
ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL
FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING
THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.[8]
Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference,
certain facts were established, warranting a summary judgment
on the funds sought to be forfeited.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the
petitioners motion for summary judgment, which opposition
was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs.
Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr.
On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary
judgment was conducted.
In a decision[9] dated September 19, 2000, the
Sandiganbayan granted petitioners motion for summary
judgment:
CONCLUSION
There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of
evidence.
The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.
The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in
escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-
gotten wealth.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines and against the respondents,
declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to and
now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the
total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of
August 31, 2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited
in favor of the State.[10]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for
reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs.
reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a
manifestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for
reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand,
Jr.
Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto.
In a resolution[11] dated January 31, 2002, the
Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus
denying petitioners motion for summary judgment:
CONCLUSION
In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case
did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to
the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record
as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow
from the Swiss Banks.
The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot
be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon,
perforce, must also have been without basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19,
2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being
set for further proceedings.[12]
Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner
argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19,
2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that --
I
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2
AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT
ONLY THE PERSONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E.
 MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS
PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE
EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH
PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED
FROM ENGAGING IN THE
MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS.
B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED
THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS
DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP
THEREOF:
1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ANSWER;
2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL /
SUPPLEMENTAL
AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED
AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT;
3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENT
IMELDA R. MARCOS AND IN
THE MOTION TO PLACE
THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS;
AND
4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING
TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS
VICTIMS.
C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT
OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA
R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS.
D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA
FACIE PRESUMPTION OF
UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH.
II
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE
ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DEFENSE THAT
SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY
ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO
TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A
SHAM; AND
B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING
OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS,
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED
THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE
ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER
JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
III
THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE
IMPLEADED.
IV
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING
HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES
OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND
THEIR AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS HAVE NOT
BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER
THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY
A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE
SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS PONENCIA DATED JULY 29,
1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS
($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS.
V
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE
WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY
OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS.[13]
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the
respondents motions for reconsideration and supplemental
motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and
admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise
stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of
lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court as the basis for reversing itself because
respondents themselves never raised this issue in their motions
for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the
translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected
anymore because said decisions had been previously utilized by
the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a decisive issue before it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the
non-production of the authenticated translations of the Swiss
Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and
technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the
conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and
admitted before the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds
deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus
belonged to the Filipino people.
In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos
filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After several
motions for extension which were all granted, the comment of
Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of
Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.
 Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on
the following grounds:
A.
PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE
REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
B.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS.[14]
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of
the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000
directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of
the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy,
petitioner now elevates the matter to this Court. According to
Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not comply
with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since
petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to
proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of the
Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must be dismissed.
Corollarily, the Sandiganbayans ruling to set the case for further
proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment.
Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their
comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds
that:
(A)
BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS
ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO.
(1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based
on private respondents Answer and other
documents that had long been in the records
of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was
filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches
had already set in against petitioner.
(2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior
to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment
on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally
bound itself to go to trial on the basis of
existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived
whatever right it had to move for summary
judgment.
(B)
EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT
LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS
CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT
YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS.
(1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a
penal statute. As such, its provisions,
particularly the essential elements stated in
section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature.
These should be strictly construed against
petitioner and liberally in favor of private
respondents.
(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and
fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A.
1379 with respect to the identification,
ownership, and approximate amount of the
property which the Marcos couple allegedly
acquired during their incumbency.
(a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the
Marcos couple acquired or own the
Swiss funds.
(b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument,
that the fact of acquisition has been
proven, petitioner has categorically
admitted that it has no evidence
showing how much of the Swiss
funds was acquired during the
incumbency of the Marcos couple
from 31 December 1965 to 25
February 1986.
(3) In contravention of the essential element stated
in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has
failed to establish the other proper earnings
and income from legitimately acquired
property of the Marcos couple over and
above their government salaries.
(4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three
essential elements provided in paragraphs
(c)[15] (d),[16] and (e)[17] of Section 3, R.A.
1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the
prima facie presumption of unlawful
acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet
attached. There can, therefore, be no
premature forfeiture of the funds.
(C)
IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND
THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT
PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A
PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE
CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS
FUNDS.
(1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, the General and Supplemental
Agreements, as well as the other written and
testimonial statements submitted in relation
thereto, are expressly barred from being
admissible in evidence against private
respondents.
(2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged
admissions together with the other statements
on record, there would be a demonstrable
showing that no such judicial admissions
were made by private respondents.
(D)
SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA
FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL
ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE,
ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF
FACTS.[18]
For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition,
claims that obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a very
plain requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant
petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court matters,
issues and incidents which should be properly threshed out at
the Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other
matters, save that pertaining to the authentication of the
translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and impertinent
as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta
manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or
any interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions
officially translated in our known language. She says the
authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court
decisions should be presented. This should stop all speculations
on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs.
Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit and
for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent
and improper before this Court.
PROPRIETY OF PETITIONERS
ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues,
the question regarding the propriety of petitioner Republic's
action for certiorari under Rule 65[19] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated
January 21, 2002 should be threshed out.
At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating
this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions
for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are
brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule
65.[20] But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense
public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions,
certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and
availability of the remedy of appeal.[21]
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government
in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-
gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs.
Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business
associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by
then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office
after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on
February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of
assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities
owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly
or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking
was tersely described by this Court in Republic vs. Lobregat[22]:
surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was
attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not only out
of considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer
necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so.
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG,
this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities
that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This
Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the
Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people
and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of
form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost
two decades have passed since the government initiated its
search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive
resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If
there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation,
misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out
now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally
determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the
delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.[23]
We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with
finality all the issues therein.
ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT
 The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1)
whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact
which would either justify or negate summary judgment; and (2)
whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for
forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379.
(1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any
genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of
petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a
matter of right.
In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo[24], summary
judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render
before trial but after both parties have pleaded.It is ordered by
the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits,
depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse
party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by
affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court
summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and
finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary
judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party
seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim
or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. [25]
Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no
genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.[26] The theory
of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face
appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by
affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not
genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in
dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for
petitioner Republic.
The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation
of its case for forfeiture:
xxx
4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and
represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several
decades continuously and without interruption as
Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the
Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his
ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-
25, 1986.
5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short)
the former First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year
martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of
Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful
revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once
as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the
early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro
Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human
Settlements. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on
the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries
of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976
was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year;
while that of the former First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as
Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February
22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx.
ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS
LEGITIMATE INCOME
xxx
12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses
for the years 1965-1975 were filed under Tax Identification
No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns
were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9.
13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by
the Marcoses are summarized and attached to the reports in the
following schedules:
Schedule A:
Schedule of Income (Annex T hereof);
Schedule B:
Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex T-1 hereof);
Schedule C:
Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex T-2
hereof);
Schedule D:
Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex T-3
hereof).
14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex T hereof), the
Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total
income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The
sources of income are as follows:
Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 - 16.01%
Legal Practice - 11,109,836.00 - 67.71%
Farm Income - 149,700.00 - .91%
Others - 2,521,325.00 - 15.37%
Total P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
15. FMs official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate
President in 1965 in the amount of P15,935.00
and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the
period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported
salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the
amount of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the
reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of
Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc.,
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food
Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home
Development Mutual Fund.
16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal
practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents
receivables from prior years during the period 1967 up to 1984.
17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method
under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM
made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal
practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law
from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency)
and that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20
years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet
attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his
ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables
from client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to
later recognize as income. There are no documents showing
any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on
record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no
known law office. As previously stated, his networth was a
mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax
returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the
skeletons of their kleptocracy.
18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for
the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referred to in his return as
Miscellaneous Items and Various Corporations. There is no
indication of any payor of the dividends or earnings.
19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income
from any deposits and placements which are subject to a 5%
withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that
after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with the
Records Division, they did not find any records involving the
tax transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue
Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila,
Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8,
Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue
Collector of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were
found on any filing of capital gains tax return involving
spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965.
20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the
twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents 88%
of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes
totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business
expenses in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses
incurred for subscription, postage, stationeries and
contributions while the other deductions in the amount of
P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes
and licenses. The total deductions in the amount
of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income.
21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income
amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the
amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income
that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The
amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax
the personal and additional exemptions for the years 1965-
1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the President for the
years 1966 until 1972.
22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the
total accumulated networth of spouses, Ferdinand and
Imelda. Respondents Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR,
covering the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to
the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00
which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In
computing for the networth, the income approach was
utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is increased
or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income
earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total
networth of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965
until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the
income from legal practice is real and valid x x x.
G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS
IN SWISS BANKS
23. The following presentation very clearly and
overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland
and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and
other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those
foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden,
the following presentation is confined to five identified
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-
M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or
separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.
H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order
to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of Schweizeresche
Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for
him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date,
Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S.
Benedicto empowering him to transact business in behalf of
the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate,
AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in
Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal
Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were
designated as members of the Board of Trustees of the said
foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and
the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On
November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order
naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the
foundations first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on
December 14, 1971.
25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole
beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was
recorded on December 4, 1972.
26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was
renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees
remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a
written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to
transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY
at Bank Hofman in Zurich under the account Reference OSER.
The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on
June 25, 1981.
27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits
beneath the thick layers of corporate entities, FM effected the
establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in
Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members
of the Board of Trustees. The account was officially opened
with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was
not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted
as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the
securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO
FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR
FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that
exactly the same securities were listed.
28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the
VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial successor of VERSO
FOUNDATION.
29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of
Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A
notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the Public
Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and
respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION
remained with SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an
attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundations funds to
another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely
freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest
documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is
a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating
that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of
SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the
Marcos Familie
30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts
of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the
General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00
I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARI-
VALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
31. This is the most intricate and complicated account
group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) groups under
the foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for
FMs benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1)
account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the
benefit of both FM and Imelda. This is the biggest group from
where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn
when they bought the Central Banks dollar-denominated
treasury notes with high-yielding interests.
32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency,
Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using an alias
or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his
true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady,
Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with
the same bank using an American-sounding alias, JANE
RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in
Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful
night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for
Declaration/Specimen Signatures submitted by the Marcos
couple. Under the caption signature(s) Ferdinand and Imelda
signed their real names as well as their respective aliases
underneath. These accounts were actively operated and
maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their
closure sometime in February, 1970 and the balances
transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION.
33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3,
1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller were
named as members of the Board of Trustees.
34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the
foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the
handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well
as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both
dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the
first beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second
beneficiary and the Marcos children Imee, Ferdinand, Jr.
(Bongbong) and Irene as equal third beneficiaries.
35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP
FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board of Trustees
remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980,
Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981,
Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the
Board of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all its
assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST
COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was
dissolved.
36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May
13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag
Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST
CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account
categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September
10, 1981. The beneficial owner of AVERTINA was not made
known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as
fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe deposit
register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of
December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register
of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of
December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe
deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as
of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the
register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31,
1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that the beneficial
successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA
FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of
December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while
that of Category NES as of 12-31-83 was
US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss
authorities included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating
that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are
FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA
indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the Marcos
Families.
37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined
AVERTINA were also established by FM through his
dummies, which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION.
38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ
on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller
of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo
Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in
behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated
November 12, 1971. FM himself was named the first
beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in
accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on
November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of
attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act
in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation.
39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed
Scolari Foundation but the directors remained the same. On
March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo
Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to
Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under
the account Reference OMAL. The Board of Directors decided
on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June
25, 1981.
40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13,
1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of
the Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially
opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner of the foundation was not made known to the bank since
Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of
securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as
of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those
listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of
December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that
the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the
Valamo Foundation.
41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from
Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account
and transfer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In
July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundations
German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina
Category CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M,
respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of
the Spinus Foundation as of February 3, 1982 with the safe
deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of
August 19, 1982 shows that all the securities of Spinus were
transferred to Avertina.
J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26,
1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and
Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundations directors. Imelda issued a
written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on
August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement,
both dated August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by
Imelda.Imelda was named the first beneficiary and her children
Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were
named as equal second beneficiaries.
43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in
Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members of the
board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo
Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the
foundations capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it
be debited against the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda
was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby
foundation. According to written information from SKA dated
November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in
1973 to transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to
another foundation, thus the establishment of Rayby
Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On
March 10, 1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all
the assets of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to
subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a
written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the
foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor
of Fides Trust Co. Under the account Reference Dido, Rayby
was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on
August 3, 1981.
44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13,
1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a
wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the
Foundations Board of Directors. The account was officially
opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial
owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co.
acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the listing of
securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as
of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of
December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the
same securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it is
certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of
the Trinidad Foundation.
45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank
accounts of Palmy Foundation under General Account No.
391528 is $17,214,432.00.
46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included
a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial
owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document
signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is
owned by Marcos Familie.
K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA
FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as
the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was executed on
September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This
foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank
Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where
most of the bribe monies from Japanese suppliers were hidden.
48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated
and all its assets were transferred to Aguamina Corporations
(Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by
Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by
an opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and
R.L. Rossier, First Vice-President and Senior Vice President,
respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a declaration dated
September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3,
1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law
applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They
further confirmed that no change of beneficial owner was
involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina.
Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation
Account No. 53300.
As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No.
53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00.
L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS
49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of
its rules and regulations was found among Malacaang
documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the Companys
assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM and Imelda
during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided
in equal parts among their children. Another Malacaang
document dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and
Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and
Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and as
administrator and manager of all assets held by the company.
The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said document that
they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On
the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to
Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to be
transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the word
JOHN LEWIS. This word will have the same value as the
couples own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM
and Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis.
50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts
with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents were signed
by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories.
51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform
Maler Establishment into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys
were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However,
administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of
incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17,
1981 appear to be the same articles applied to Maler
Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation
cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its
assets in favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust
Investment Co., S.A.
52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler
Foundations Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount
SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a total of
SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. This
account was opened by Maler when it was still an
establishment which was subsequently transformed into a
foundation.
53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart
have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million
Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex R-5 hereto
attached as integral part hereof.
x x x x x x.[27]
Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M.
Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their
answer, stated the following:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition.
5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in
so far as it states that summons and other court processes may
be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated
address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda R.
Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at
No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street,
Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest.
xxx xxx xxx
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition.
11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to
the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the
truth as to the matters alleged.
12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs and Balance Sheet.
13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the
Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the part of
the late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure
conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of
fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude
the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto.
17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR.
19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the
Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents
cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged
ITRs.
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it
alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys
wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers
of foundation and corporate entities for being false, the truth
being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts,
except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the
transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they
cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a
long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos
she specifically remembers that the funds involved were
lawfully acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45,
and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and
52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that
respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably
failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for
forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the
presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is
fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in
substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.
Respondents defenses of lack of knowledge for lack of privity
or (inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago or,
on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that the funds were lawfully acquired
are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent
Marcoses defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to
compound and confuse the issues.
The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are
replete with indications of a spurious defense:
(a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993;
(b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs.
Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated
October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs.
Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial
brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation
dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-
Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her
co- respondents;
(c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment
dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos
which the other respondents (Marcos
children) adopted;
(d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed
by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos
children;
(e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26,
2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000
jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand,
Jr., and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000
likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and
Ferdinand, Jr.;
(f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs.
Marcos and Memorandum dated December
17, 2000 of the Marcos children;
(g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and
(h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated
December 23, 1993.
An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order.
Respondents Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny
each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture
in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock
answers like they have no sufficient knowledge or they could
not recall because it happened a long time ago, and, as to Mrs.
Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired, without stating the
basis of such assertions.
Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides:
A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the
truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable,
shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies
to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a
part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true
and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant
is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he
shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.[28]
The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific
denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the
allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters
they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres
to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste
of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table,
thus reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained
in Alonso vs. Villamor,[29]
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more
deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and
position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in
which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly
trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the
merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapiers
thrust.
On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds
were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly state
the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of
acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated
in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were
lawfully acquired without detailing how exactly these funds
were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case
before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired
remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which
can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that
indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos
family.
Respondents denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan
were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the
petition.
It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the
rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the material averment in the complaint. The question,
however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents answer
qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not
think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,[30] this Court ruled
that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with
having done, performed or committed a particular act which the
latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and
express denial must be made.
Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against
them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of
ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was
insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have
positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant
of the facts alleged.[31]
To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in
paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated:
23. The following presentation very clearly and
overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents
clandestinely stashed away the countrys wealth to Switzerland
and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and
other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their
dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those
foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained
numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the
impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret
accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden,
the following presentation is confined to five identified
accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-
M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or
separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.[32]
Respondents lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:
22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it
alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the countrys
wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers
of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth
being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully
acquired.[33]
Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is
called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a
denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.[34] Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression
which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant
with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading.
Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are
literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances
alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.[35]
In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23
of the said petition were not specifically denied by respondents
in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in
paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in
paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that Respondents
clandestinely stashed the countrys wealth in Switzerland and hid
the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate
entities. Paragraph 22 of the respondents answer was thus a
denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial
facts:
(1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and
(2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356
million as of December, 1990.
Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on
the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about
US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by
respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them
pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure:
Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed
admitted when not specifically denied. xxx.[36]
By the same token, the following unsupported denials of
respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions of
the substantial facts alleged in the Republics petition for
forfeiture:
23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27,
28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions
regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts,
except that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions
and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot
remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long
time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she
specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully
acquired.
25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and
46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with
exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except
that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and
52 of the petition for lack of knowledge and information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such
transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with
exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except
that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically
remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired.
The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the
respondents answer pertained to the creation of five groups of
accounts as well as their respective ending balances and attached
documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republics
petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never
specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim
that the funds involved were lawfully acquired was an
acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits.
This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in
paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the
existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits.
The allegations in paragraphs 47[37] and 48[38] of the
petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the
deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the
averment in paragraph 52-a[39] of the said petition with respect
to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356
million were again not specifically denied by respondents in
their answer. The respondents did not at all respond to the issues
raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount
of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As
held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,[40] if a defendants denial is a
negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission.
Moreover, respondents denial of the allegations in the
petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since
respondents were not privy to the transactions was just a
pretense. Mrs. Marcos privity to the transactions was in fact
evident from her signatures on some of the vital
documents[41] attached to the petition for forfeiture which
Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the
rules.[42]
It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached
to the petition for forfeiture were even signed personally by
respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their
knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice
Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion:
The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms
and dummies, 3) approving regulations of the Foundations for
the distribution of capital and income of the Foundations to the
First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM and
his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations,
5) changing the names of the Foundations, 6) transferring
funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or
Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated
by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly
indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the
assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as
dummies.[43]
How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient
knowledge or information regarding the existence of the Swiss
bank deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts when
Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and
participated in the formation and control of said
foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able
to explain.
Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically
admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax
Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for
forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof.
The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and
balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents'
denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of
recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent
Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due
execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the
means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records
of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not.
When matters regarding which respondents claim to
have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are
plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged
ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a
specific denial.[44] An unexplained denial of information within
the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is
evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.[45]
The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed
of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for the
purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of
the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made
for the purpose of delay.[46] In the instant case, the Marcoses did
not only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth
attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by presenting an
obviously contrived defense.
Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is
patently and necessarily within the pleaders knowledge or
means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at
all.[47] Respondents ineffective denial thus failed to properly
tender an issue and the averments contained in the petition for
forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them.
As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries,
Inc.:
Its specific denial of the material allegation of the petition
without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon to
support its general denial, when such matters were plainly
within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend
ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on
issue.[48]
Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the
allegations in the petition for forfeiture for lack of knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the
allegations since they were not privy to the transactions cannot
rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal
heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are
therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss
funds.
PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18,
1993
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three
Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the
funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer,
they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were
acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even
a single document that would showand prove the truth of their
allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse
party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain,
among others:
xxx
(d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the
purpose thereof;
xxx
(f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance
of their respective testimonies.[49]
It is unquestionably within the courts power to require the
parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of
witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary
of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to
disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a
description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the
testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced
at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues
of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being
put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the
parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and
specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these
matters in writing and submit them to the court within the
specified period for the prompt disposition of the action.[50]
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently
adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated:
xxx
WITNESSES
4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and
reserves the right to present additional witnesses as may be
necessary in the course of the trial.
xxx
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and
introduce in evidence documents as may be necessary in the
course of the trial.
Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the
documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of
witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What
alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only
who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of
knowledge. And even then, the substance of her testimony, as
required by the rules, was not made known either. Such cunning
tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We
hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became
ripe for summary judgment.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for
summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic
was merely adopted by the Marcos children as their own
opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not
accompanied by affidavits, depositions or admissions as
required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure:
x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits,
depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before
hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions,
and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of
damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.[51]
The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and
admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republics
motion only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition
were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief.
Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;[52]
Motions for Reconsideration;[53] and
Memoranda
of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children[54]
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts
showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more,
respondents merely made general denials without alleging facts
which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing,
thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact.
Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21,
2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client
was just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner
Republics allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of
or interest in the funds.
 This is yet another indication that respondents presented a
fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and
the Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss
funds:
PJ Garchitorena:
Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned
through the statement of Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the
US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant
lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss
Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda
Marcos herself. Thats your statement of facts?
Atty. MARCELO:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Thats it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is
your point here? Does the estate of Marcos own anything of
the $360 million subject of this case.
Atty. TECSON:
We joined the Manifestation of Counsel.
PJ Garchitorena:
You do not own anything?
Atty. TECSON:
Yes, Your Honor.
PJ Garchitorena:
Counsel for Irene Araneta?
Atty. SISON:
I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your
Honor.
xxx
Atty. SISON:
Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your
Honor.[55]
We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses
was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts they would
prove or what issues they intended to pose for the court's
resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were leading
petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not
trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity.
Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS.
Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise
Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing
but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents
alleged either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the
Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything
as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she
remembered that it was lawfully acquired.
In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos
stated that:
COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R.
Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully
manifests:
That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject
matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of
the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations
alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-
entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.
In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent
Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution of the
Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits.This was, to us, an
unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the
said deposits.
But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference,
respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownership of
the Swiss funds.
Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth
no real defense. The facts pleaded by respondents, while
ostensibly raising important questions or issues of fact, in reality
comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in
substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial.
We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary
judgment is proper.
In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary
judgment is called for. Under the rules, summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact requiring
the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their
face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits,
depositions and admissions show that such issues are not
genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must
ensue as a matter of law.[56]
In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which
will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to
raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for
summary judgment.[57] A summary judgment is one granted
upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case,
it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact
posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on
the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either
because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no
genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned
by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action
where there exists no serious controversy.[58] Summary
judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of
actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a
genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of summary
judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to
tender issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits,
depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but
fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and
rendering summary judgment for petitioner.[59]
In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture,
petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of witnesses who
had personal knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the
illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts
under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn
statements substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank
deposits. In their answer and other subsequent pleadings,
however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the
allegations against them without stating facts admissible in
evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine
issues of fact.
Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no
purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus
justifying a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture.
There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn
declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to
the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the
Marcoses answer were false.
Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this
which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if the
semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is only to delay
disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of
justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate
remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good
faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the
Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of
respondents good faith should have been made to the court
below. Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this
protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago.
Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed,
up to the present, all respondents have offered are foxy
responses like lack of sufficient knowledge or lack of privity or
they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago or, as to
Mrs. Marcos, the funds were lawfully acquired. But, whenever
it suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and
allege that only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been
an incredible charade from beginning to end.
In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise,
respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R.
Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and express
admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on
March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to
trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived
whatever right it had to move for summary judgment." [60]
We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express
admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing a
motion for summary judgment.
Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Rule 35
Summary Judgment
Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to
obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading
in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting
affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment
in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party
against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted
or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with
supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis
ours)[61]
Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary
judgment at any time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e.,
in answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) has been
served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules.
How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the
answer has been served?
This issue is actually one of first impression. No local
jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this
matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws and
jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where
many of our laws and rules were copied, is in order.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim may move for summary judgment at any time after
the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the
action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim,
counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for summary
judgment at any time.
However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of
Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a motion
for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been
joined, that is, only after an answer has been served.[62] Under
said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary
judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.[63] No fixed
prescriptive period is provided.
 Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York,
our rules also provide that a motion for summary judgment may
not be made until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff
has to wait for the answer before he can move for summary
judgment.[64] And like the New York rules, ours do not provide
for a fixed reglementary period within which to move for
summary judgment.
This being so, the New York Supreme Court's
interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice can be
applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of
our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the New York rule, after the issues have been
joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any
stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any
stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,[65] the New
York Supreme Court ruled:
"PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on
the case made by the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing
to the serious illness of the trial justice, a decision was not
rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of the
term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial
justice, the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of
the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary
judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The
motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by
proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to
summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing
affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid
under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted
both motions and the defendants have appealed.
The Special Term properly held that the answer and the
opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of the
Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe no
limitation as to the time when a motion for summary
judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to
empower the court to summarily determine whether or not a
bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no
limitation on the power of the court to make such a
determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours)
On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the
litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial,
this does not preclude him from thereafter moving for summary
judgment."[66]
In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment
after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for presentation of
evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to
proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner
"waived" its right to summary judgment.
This argument must fail in the light of the New York
Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case.
In Ecker,[67] the defendant opposed the motion for summary
judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that
is, "that plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment" by
her act of proceeding to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New
York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for summary
judgment even after trial and submission of the case for
resolution, more so should we permit it in the present case where
petitioner moved for summary judgment before trial.
Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer
thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of
Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever
it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable
issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are
sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment.
A contrary interpretation would go against the very objective of
the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to "weed out sham
claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial."[68]
In cases with political undertones like the one at bar,
adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay the
proceedings in the hope that a future administration sympathetic
to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in
their favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate.
The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and
expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt
disposition of cases. That is why the law and the rules provide
for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of
cases. Summary judgment is one of them.
Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary
judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss of
time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner Republic could
validly move for summary judgment any time after the
respondents answer was filed or, for that matter, at any
subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed
to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for
summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever
validly raised by respondent Marcoses.
This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle
enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed in order
to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding." [69]
Respondents further allege that the motion for summary
judgment was based on respondents' answer and other
documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus,
by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by
laches had already set in against petitioner.
We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has
abandoned his right or declined to assert it.[70] In effect,
therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel because "it
prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing
the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the
inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-
interest".[71]
A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that
petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case against
respondent Marcoses through every remedy available to it,
including the motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary
judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied because
of the pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses
and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses
denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to
file another motion for summary judgment now under
consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent events that
transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented
petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely
not because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the
(second) motion for summary judgment years after respondents'
answer to the petition for forfeiture.
In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents
must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair
injury to them might result unless the action is barred.[72]
This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-
trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the
Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they claimed,
respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could
be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had
already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply
when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts
governmental rights.[73] Nor can estoppel validate an act that
contravenes law or public policy.[74]
As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.[75] Equity demands that petitioner Republic
should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the
Marcoses.
(2) The Propriety of Forfeiture
The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled,
the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove
its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage.
The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property
is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount
or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and
other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence,
Sections 2 and 6 of RA 1379[76] provide:
xxxxxx
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or
employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or
property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as
such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income
and the income from legitimately acquired property, said
property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired.
xxxxxx
Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property
in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of
such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the
property of the State. Provided, That no judgment shall be
rendered within six months before any general election or
within three months before any special election. The Court
may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive
Department for administrative or criminal action, or both.
From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the
following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or
seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected:
(1) ownership by the public officer of money or
property acquired during his incumbency,
whether it be in his name or otherwise, and
(2) the extent to which the amount of that money or
property exceeds, i. e., is grossly
disproportionate to, the legitimate income of
the public officer.
That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public
officials during the time material to the instant case was never
in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer
categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the
petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of
Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without
interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and
President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1,
1965 to February 25, 1986.[77] Likewise, respondents admitted
in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to
the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once
served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from
1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently
Minister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to February
1986.[78]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of
her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for
forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of
respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.[79] The
combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were
reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then
Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo.[80] The
Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the
amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total
of P2,288,750:
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President
1966-1976 at P60,000/year P660,000
1977-1984 at P100,000/year 800,000
1985 at P110,000/year 110,000
P1,570,00
Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister
June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985
are the Marcos couples combined salaries from January to
February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33.Hence, their total
accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to
U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar
exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when
said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent
value of $304,372.43.
The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official
annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US
dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of
exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for
Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[81]
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the
pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either
by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other
stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the
case.[82] Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the
case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and
respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict
them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent
with such admissions.[83]
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known
lawful income of respondents since they did not file any
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law,
from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under
the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could
not receive any other emolument from the Government or any
of its subdivisions and instrumentalities.[84] Likewise, under the
1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not
receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source.[85] In fact, his management of
businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate
funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President
shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except
when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they
practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the
management of any business, or be financially interested
directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government or any other
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly
shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with
appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government,
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof
including any government owned or controlled corporation
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the
Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article
VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or
administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any
profession, and shall also be subject to such other
disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can
therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the
existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish
a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it
failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3,
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal
statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be
construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of
respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the
Marcoses other lawful income or income from legitimately
acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as
between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better
position to know if there were such other sources of lawful
income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income,
respondents should have specifically stated the same in their
answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was
enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides
that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth,
the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other
material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos.
1 and 2
must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such
persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net
worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was
in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully
assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward
them for their violation of the law.
Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the
admissions made by them in their various pleadings and
documents were valid. It is of record that respondents judicially
admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks
belonged to them.
We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made
judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss bank
deposits in their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements,
Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999,
and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of
the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were
unanimous in holding that respondents had made judicial
admissions of their ownership of the Swiss funds.
In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the
subject funds, respondents likewise
admitted ownership thereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents'
answer stated:
22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar
as it alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the
country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers
and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false,
the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were
lawfully acquired. (emphasis supplied)
By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits
as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership
thereof.
Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the
Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under oath the
genuineness and due execution of certain actionable documents
bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed
earlier, Section 11, Rule 8[86] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that material averments in the complaint
shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied.
The General[87] and Supplemental[88] Agreements executed
by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993 further
bolstered the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for
forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of
Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General
Agreement declared that:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from
the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the
$356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the
Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even
after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a
final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY.
While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia,
that:
In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that
the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of
25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from
said $356 million Swiss deposits.
The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental
Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest intent of
respondents to enter into a compromise with petitioner.
Corollarily, respondents willingness to agree to an amicable
settlement with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of
the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would
acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he
did not in fact own them.
Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by
this Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements were
null and void.[89] They insist that nothing in those agreements
could thus be admitted in evidence against them because they
stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under
Section 27, Rule 130[90] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides that in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence
against the offeror.
We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of
nullity of said agreements was premised on the following
constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of
criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2)
the PCGGs commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the
properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the
Constitution; and (3) the governments undertaking to cause the
dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before
the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers
of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the Court never in
the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of
respondents admission with respect to their ownership of the
Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those
agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily
admitted owning the subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the
fact that the agreements themselves were later declared null and
void.
The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice
Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000
could not have been better said:
x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered
the same without legal effects but it did not detract from the
admissions of the respondents contained therein. Otherwise
stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted
above, remain binding on the respondents.[91]
A written statement is nonetheless competent as an
admission even if it is contained in a document which is not
itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, either by
reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by
reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly,
contracts have been held as competent evidence of admissions,
although they may be unenforceable.[92]
The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during
the hearing on the motion for the approval of the Compromise
Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lentcredence to the
allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted
ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient
portions of Ferdinand Jr.s formal declarations in open court:
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any
meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C.
Gunigundo?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with
Chairman.
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Would you recall when the first meeting
occurred?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
In connection with what?
ATTY. FERNANDO:
In connection with the ongoing talks to
compromise the various cases initiated by
PCGG against your family?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
The nature of our meetings was solely
concerned with negotiations towards achieving
some kind of agreement between the Philippine
government and the Marcos family. The
discussions that led up to the compromise
agreement were initiated by our then counsel
Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.[93]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina
informed you of this possibility?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
My reaction to all of these approaches is
that I am always open, we are always open, we
are very much always in search of resolution to
the problem of the family and any approach that
has been made us, we have entertained. And so
my reaction was the same as what I have always
why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally
put an end to this problem.[94]
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. FERNANDO:
Basically, what were the true amounts of
the assets in the bank?
PJ GARCHITORENA:
So, we are talking about liquid assets
here? Just Cash?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
Well, basically, any assets. Anything
that was under the Marcos name in any of the
banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be
not cash.[95]
xxx xxx xxx
PJ GARCHITORENA:
x x x What did you do in other words,
after being apprised of this contract in
connection herewith?
F. MARCOS, JR.:
I assumed that we are beginning to
implement the agreement because this was
forwarded through the Philippine government
lawyers through our lawyers and then,
subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised
because we hadnt really discussed the details of
the transfer of the funds, what the bank
accounts, what the mechanism would be. But
nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as
the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was
perfected and that we were beginning to
implement it and that was a source of
satisfaction to me because I thought that finally
it will be the end.[96]
Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in
their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents recognition of
their ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.Admissions of a
party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a party, as a
witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the
force of a judicial admission.[97] It is apparent from Ferdinand
Jr.s testimony that the Marcos family
agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope
of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos
family regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an
acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The rule is that the
testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal
judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and
unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own
knowledge.[98]
In her Manifestation[99] dated May 26, 1998, respondent
Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the following:
That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject
matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of
the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations
alleged in the case;
That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-
entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos;
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as
borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as
sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the
Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended
copies of the documents substantiating her ownership of the
funds in the name of the foundations.As already mentioned, she
failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity of such
documents, especially those involving William Saunders and
Jane Ryan which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and
Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to
specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and
due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature, was
tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due
execution of said instruments, in accordance with Section 8,
Rule 8[100] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Likewise, in her Constancia[101] dated May 6, 1999, Imelda
Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement
and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to
the rightful owner. She further made the following
manifestations:
xxx xxx xxx
2. The Republics cause of action over the full amount is its
forfeiture in favor of the government if found to be ill-
gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a
legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right
of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is
of lawful origin, the Republic may yield to the
Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the
Republic. (underscoring supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having
committed themselves to helping the less fortunate, in the
interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby,
hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release
and transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper
disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the
litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder.
Again, the above statements were indicative of Imeldas
admission of the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss deposits as
in fact the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a
legitimate (Marcos) asset.
On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-
Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-
Araneta filed a motion[102] on May 4, 1998 asking the
Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia
legis:
7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with
danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in
custodia legis or within the Courts protective mantle, its
dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a
distinct possibility.
Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from
someone who believes that he has a marked and intimate right
over the considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said
motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said
deposits.
Lastly, the Undertaking[103] entered into by the PCGG, the
PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999,
confirmed the Marcoses ownership of the Swiss bank
deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their
readiness to pay the human rights victims out of the funds held
in escrow in the PNB. It stated:
WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with
the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs in the
aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to
assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human
rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving
US$150 million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow
Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is
not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss
courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998;
WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release,
assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said
US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims-
plaintiffs.
All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of
respondents that petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or
own the Swiss funds and that it was only by arbitrarily isolating
and taking certain statements made by private respondents out
of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial
admissions. The Court is fully aware of the relevance,
materiality and implications of every pleading and document
submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the
proofs presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and
weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully
qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical
and political implications of this case, we considered and
examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties,
even if it might have bordered on factual adjudication which, by
authority of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done by
this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent
Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits.
We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him,
and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection
is interposed by the adverse party or not.[104] This doctrine is
embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the
same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.[105]
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary,
respondents judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss
deposits is definitely binding on them.
The individual and separate admissions of each respondent
bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or
declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope
of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or
agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration
of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party.[106]
SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to
property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the
latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former.[107]
The declarations of a person are admissible against a party
whenever a privity of estate exists between the declarant and the
party, the term privity of estate generally denoting a succession
in rights.[108] Consequently, an admission of one in privity with
a party to the record is competent.[109] Without doubt, privity
exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-
parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter
of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against
all.[110]
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in
ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish a prima
facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits.
We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the
Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its findings
and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous records
of this case.
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that whenever any
public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency
an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to
his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other
lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired. x x x
The elements which must concur for this prima
facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money
or property during his incumbency; and
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary
as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos
were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly
extant.
The second element deals with the amount of money or
property acquired by the public officer during his
incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and
owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five
groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by
them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these
assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second
element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such
assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the
public officers salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof
of this third element that is crucial in determining whether
a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule
indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their
incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits
beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of
five different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to
establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and
properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and
patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough
evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits
amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the
Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way
beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only
US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government
officials.
Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss
deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful
income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar
deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was
sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate
amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and
their total government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules
and Regulations states:
Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, properties,
and other material possessions of those persons covered by
Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out of
proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed
ill-gotten wealth.
Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to
dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing
evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that
they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption
is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact
thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved,
it must stand as proved.[111]
Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign
foundations should have been impleaded as they were
indispensable parties without whom no complete determination
of the issues could be made. She asserts that the failure of
petitioner Republic to implead the foundations rendered the
judgment void as the joinder of indispensable parties was a sine
qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore, the non-
inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions
prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the
funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied
them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international
law.[112]
The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not
impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,[113] taken from Rule 19b of the
American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an
indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete
determination of the suit. However, failure to join an
indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since
the rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable
considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not
divested of its power to render a decision even in the absence of
indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on
the non-joined party.[114]
An indispensable party[115] has been defined as one:
[who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this
interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the
parties to the suit, if the court cannot render justice between the
parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious effect
upon his interest, or if the final determination of the
controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with equity and
good conscience.
There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1)
can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the
other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without
prejudicing the rights of the other party?[116] There is, however,
no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party;
this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the
particular suit or litigation.
In the present case, there was an admission by respondent
Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the
Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the
subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10% belonging
to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.[117] Viewed against this
admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable
parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings did not
prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and
according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment
ordering the return of the $356 million was neither inimical to
the foundations interests nor inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only
confirmed what was already generally known: that the
foundations were established precisely to hide the money stolen
by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated
whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations
owned even a nominal part of the assets in question.
The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as
formal owners, must be given an opportunity to participate in
the proceedings hinged on the assumption that they owned
a nominal share of the assets.[118] But this was already refuted by
no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue
that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set
by the Swiss court. The directive given by the Swiss court for
the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the
purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have
had in the assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their
ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they
could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and their
participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.
In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,[119] this Court ruled that
impleading the firms which are the res of the action was
unnecessary:
And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are
not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit
conduct in other words, the companies themselves are not the
object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof there is no
need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not
proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with
ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on
their part
Such showing of having been formed with, or having received
ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, does not,
without more, warrant identifying the corporations in question
with the person who formed or made use of them to give the
color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally
amassed wealth at the least, not so as place on the Government
the onus of impleading the former with the latter in actions to
recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical
personality and legal culpability from their erring members or
stockholders, said corporations are not themselves guilty of the
sins of the latter, of the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that
gave rise to the Governments cause of action for recovery;
their creation or organization was merely the result of their
members (or stockholders) manipulations and maneuvers to
conceal the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested
therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for
the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in
principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to
implead them as defendants in said actions.
Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the
foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the illegally
acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply
the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not
have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to
implead them.
 Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were
indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them
was a curable error, as held in the previously cited case
of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:[120]
Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that
the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered
corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural abberation,
as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively
cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for
conversion of public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent
obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight
reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the
defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable
adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court
[specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize
or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing
amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting
omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set
out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in
this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the
omission to implead such parties is a mere technical defect
which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after
judgment; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable
parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the
very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be
rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead
them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even
after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that
the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character
as such indispensable parties.[121]
Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder
of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or
the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the
matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a
ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on
joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the
spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3[122] of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on
the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the
amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings,
through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. [123]
Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of
Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3[124] on
indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder
ofindispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if
such is needed to afford the moving party full relief. [125] Mere
delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in
the waiver of the right as long as the delay is
excusable.[126] Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly
argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was
void due to the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court
had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the absence
of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it
though not on the absent party.[127] If she really felt that she
could not be granted full relief due to the absence of the foreign
foundations, she should have moved for their inclusion, which
was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never
did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered.
In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche
of documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses
failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said
assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten
wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with
Section 6 of RA 1379:
SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the
satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the
property in question, then the court shall declare such property
forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment
the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x.
THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED
TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS
Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena
committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself on the
ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss
decisions and their authenticated translations were not submitted
to the court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted
extensively from the unofficial translation of one of these Swiss
decisions in his ponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied
the motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights
victims.
While we are in reality perplexed by such an
incomprehensible change of heart, there might nevertheless not
be any real need to belabor the issue. The presentation of the
authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss
decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make
findings of fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the
Sandiganbayans decision was not dependent on the
determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this
Courts.
The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB
is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said
funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our
own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in
favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In
this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated
translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts
convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31,
2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were
transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the
Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are
hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines.
 SO ORDERED. President Ferdinand E. Marcos covering the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 and restore the
victims honor and dignity. The State hereby acknowledges its
moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or provide
reparation to said victims and/or their families for the deaths,
injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10368
under the Marcos regime.

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND

Similarly, it is the obligation of the State to acknowledge the
RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS
sufferings and damages inflicted upon persons whose
VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME,
properties or businesses were forcibly taken over, sequestered
DOCUMENTATION OF SAID VIOLATIONS,
or used, or those whose professions were damaged and/or
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
impaired, or those whose freedom of movement was restricted,
OTHER PURPOSES
and/or such other victims of the violations of the Bill of Rights.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

Section 3. Definition of Terms. The following terms as used
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
in this Act shall mean:

CHAPTER I
(a) Detention refers to the act of taking a person into
custody against his will by persons acting in an
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS official capacity and/or agents of the State.

Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as the
"Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of
2013.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. Section 11 of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
declares that the State values the dignity of every human,
person and guarantees full respect for human rights. Pursuant
to this declared policy, Section 12 of Article III of the
Constitution prohibits the use of torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will and
mandates the compensation and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices and their families.
By virtue of Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution adopting
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land, the Philippines adheres to international human
rights laws and conventions, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, including the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against
Torture (CAT) and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment which imposes on each State party
the obligation to enact domestic legislation to give effect to the
rights recognized therein and to ensure that any person whose
rights or freedoms have been violated shall have an effective
remedy, even if the violation is committed by persons acting in
an official capacity. In fact, the right to a remedy is itself
guaranteed under existing human rights treaties and/or
customary international law, being peremptory in character (jus
cogens) and as such has been recognized as non-derogable.
Consistent with the foregoing, it is hereby declared the policy
of the State to recognize the heroism and sacrifices of all
Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture,
enforced or involuntary disappearance and other gross human
rights violations committed during the regime of former
(b) Human rights violation refers to any act or
omission committed during the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 by persons
acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the
State, but shall not be limited to the following:
(1) Any search, arrest and/or detention
without a valid search warrant or warrant of
arrest issued by a civilian court of law,
including any warrantless arrest or detention
carried out pursuant to the declaration of
Martial Law by former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos as well as any arrest., detention or
deprivation of liberty carried out during the
covered period on the basis of an "Arrest,
Search and Seizure Order (ASSO)", a
"Presidential Commitment Order {PCO)" or
a "Preventive Detention Action (PDA)" and
such other similar executive issuances as
defined by decrees of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, or in any manner that
the arrest, detention or deprivation, of liberty
was effected;
(2) The infliction by a person acting in an
official capacity and/or an agent of the State
of physical injury, torture, killing, or
violation of other human rights, of any
person exercising civil or political rights,
including but not limited to the freedom of
speech, assembly or organization; and/or the
right to petition the government for redress
of grievances, even if such violation took
place during or in the course of what the
authorities at the time deemed an illegal
assembly or demonstration: Provided,That
 torture in any form or under any
circumstance shall be considered a human
rights violation;
(3) Any enforced or involuntary
disappearance caused upon a person who
was arrested, detained or abducted against
ones will or otherwise deprived of ones
liberty, as defined in Republic Act No.
10350 1, otherwise known as the "Anti-
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance Act
of 2012;
(4) Any force or intimidation causing the
involuntary exile of a person from the
Philippines;
(5) Any act of force, intimidation or deceit
causing unjust or illegal takeover of a
business, confiscation of property, detention
of owner/s and or their families, deprivation
of livelihood of a person by agents of the
State, including those caused by Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his spouse Imelda R. Marcos,
their immediate relatives by consanguinity or
affinity, as well as those persons considered
as among their close relatives, associates,
cronies and subordinates under Executive
Order No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986 by
then President Corazon C. Aquino in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution;
(6) Any act or series of acts causing,
committing and/or conducting the following:
(i) Kidnapping or otherwise
exploiting children of persons
suspected of committing acts
against the Marcos regime;
(ii) Committing sexual offenses
against human rights victims who
are detained and/or in the course of
conducting military and/or police
operations; and
(iii) Other violations and/or abuses
similar or analogous to the above,
including those recognized by
international law.
(c) Human Rights Violations Victim (HRVV) refers to
a person whose human rights were violated by
persons acting in an official capacity and/or agents of
the State as defined herein. In order to qualify for
reparation under this Act, the human rights violation
must have been committed during the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986: Provided,
however, That victims of human rights violations that
were committed one (1) month before September 21,
1972 and one (1) month after February 25, 1986 shall
be entitled to reparation, under this Act if they can
establish that the violation was committed:
(1) By agents of the State and/or persons
acting in an official capacity as defined
hereunder;
(2) For the purpose of preserving,
maintaining, supporting or promoting the
said regime; or
(3) To conceal abuses during the Marcos
regime and/or the effects of Martial Law.
(d) Persons Acting in an Official Capacity and/or
Agents of the State.The following persons shall be
deemed persons acting in an official capacity and/or
agents of the State under this Act:
(1) Any member of the former Philippine
Constabulary (PC), the former Integrated
National Police (INP), the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Civilian Home
Defense Force (CHDF) from September 21,
1972 to February 25, 1986 as well as any
civilian agent attached thereto; and any
member of a paramilitary group even if one
is not organically part of the PC, the INP, the
AFP or the CHDF so long as it is shown that
the group was organized, funded, supplied
with equipment, facilities and/or resources,
and/or indoctrinated, controlled and/or
supervised by any person acting in an official
capacity and/or agent of the State as herein
defined;
(2) Any member of the civil service,
including persons who held elective or
appointive public office at any time from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986;
(3) Persons referred to in Section 2(a) of
Executive Order No. 1, creating the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), issued on February 28,
1986 and related laws by then President
Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution, including former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, spouse Imelda R.
Marcos, their immediate relatives by
consanguinity or affinity, as well as their
close relatives, associates, cronies and
subordinates; and
 (4) Any person or group/s of persons acting
with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State during the Marcos
regime.
(e) Torture refers to any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on any person under the custody of persons
acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the
State, as defined by law, jurisprudence, international
conventions and Republic Act No. 9745, otherwise
known as the "Anti-Torture Act of 2009.
Section 4. Entitlement to Monetary Reparation. Any HRVV
qualified under this Act shall receive reparation from the State,
free of tax, as herein prescribed: Provided, That for a deceased
or involuntary disappeared HRVV, the legal heirs as provided
for in the Civil Code of the Philippines, or such other person
named by the executor or administrator of the deceased or
involuntary disappeared HRVVs estate in that order, shall be
entitled to receive such reparation: Provided, further, That no
special power of attorney shall be recognized in the actual
disbursement of the award, and only the victim or the
aforestated successor(s)-in-interest shall be entitled to
personally receive said reparation form the Board, unless the
victim involved is shown to be incapacitated to the satisfaction
of the Board: Provided, furthermore, That the reparation
received under this Act shall be without prejudice to the receipt
of any other sum by the HRVV from any other person or entity
in any case involving violations of human rights as defined in
this Act.
Section 5. Nonmonetary Reparation. The Department of
Health (DOH), the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), the Department of Education
(DepED), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority
(TESDA), and such other government agencies shall render the
necessary services as nonmonetary reparation for HRVVs
and/or their families, as may be determined by the Board
pursuant to the provisions of this Act. The amount necessary
for this purpose shall be sourced from the budget of the agency
concerned in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Section 6. Amount of Reparation. The amount of reparation
under this Act shall be in proportion to the gravity of the
human rights violation committed on the HRVV and in
accordance with the number of points assigned to the
individual under Section 19 hereof.
Section 7. Source of Reparation. The amount of Ten billion
pesos (P10,000,000,000.00) plus accrued interest which form
part of the funds transferred to the government of the Republic
of the Philippines by virtue of the December 10, 1997 Order of
the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, adjudged by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines as final and executory in Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan on July 15, 2003 (G.R. No. 152154) as Marcos
ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines, shall be the principal source funds for the
implementation of this Act.
CHAPTER II
THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS CLAIMS BOARD
Section 8. Creation and Composition of the Human Rights
Victims Claims Board. There is hereby created an
independent and quasi-judicial body to be known as the
Human Rights Victims Claims Board, hereinafter referred to
as the Board. It shall be composed of nine (9) members, who
shall possess the following qualifications:
(a) Must be of known probity, competence and
integrity;
(b) Must have a deep and thorough understanding and
knowledge of human rights and involvement in efforts
against human rights violations committed during the
regime of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos;
(c) At least three (3) of them must be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten (10) years; and
(d) Must have a clear and adequate understanding and
commitment to human rights protection, promotion
and advocacy.
The Human Rights Victims Claims Board shall be attached to
but shall not be under the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR).
The Board shall organize itself within thirty (30) days from the
completion of appointment of all nine (9) members and shall
thereafter organize its Secretariat.
Section 9. Appointment to the Board. The President shall
appoint the Chairperson and the other eight (8) members of the
Board: Provided, That human rights organizations such as, but
not limited to, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
(TFDP), the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and
Nationalism (MABINI), the Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND) and the Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees
Laban sa Detensyon at Aresto (SELDA) may submit
nominations to the President.
Section 10. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board
shall have the following powers and functions:
(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate
applications for claims under this Act;
(b) Issue subpoena/s ad testificandum and
subpoena/s duces tecum;
 (c) Conduct independent administrative proceedings
and resolve disputes over claims;
(d) Approve with finality all eligible claims under this
Act;
(e) Deputize appropriate government agencies to
assist it in order to effectively perform its functions;
(f) Promulgate such rules as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act, including rules of
procedure in the conduct of its proceedings, with the
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines having
suppletory application;
(g) Exercise administrative control and supervision
over its Secretariat;
(h) The Board, at its discretion, may consult the
human rights organizations mentioned in Section 9
herein; and
(i) Perform such other duties, functions and
responsibilities as may be necessary to effectively
attain the objectives of this Act.
Section 11. Resolution, of Claims. The Board shall be
composed of three (3) divisions which shall function
simultaneously and independently of each other in the
resolution of claims for reparation. Each division shall be
composed of one (1) Chairperson, who shall be a member of
the Philippine Bar and two (2) members to be appointed by the
Board en banc.
Section 12. Emoluments. The Chairperson and members of
the Board shall have the rank, salary, emoluments and
allowances equivalent to s Presiding Justice and Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, respectively.
Section 13. Secretariat of the Board. The Board shall be
assisted by a Secretariat which may come from the existing
personnel of the CHR, without prejudice to the hiring of
additional personnel as determined by the Board to
accommodate the volume of required work. The following
shall be the functions of the Secretariat:
(a) Receive, evaluate, process and investigate
applications for claims under this Act;
(b) Recommend to the Board the approval of
applications for claims;
(c) Assist the Board in technical functions; and
(d) Perform other duties that may be assigned by the
Board.
The Chairperson of the Board shall appoint a Board Secretary
who shall head the Secretariat for the duration of the existence
of the Board. There shall be a Technical Staff Head assisted by
five (5) Legal Officers and three (3) Paralegal Officers; and an
Administrative Staff Head assisted by three (3) Administrative
Support Staff.
When necessary, the Board may hire additional contractual
employees or contract a service provider to provide services of
counselors, psychologists, social workers and public education
specialists, among others, to augment the services of the
Secretariat: Provided, That the maximum contract amount per
year shall not exceed more than fifteen percent (15%) of the
total annual operating budget of the Board.
Section 14. Operating Budget of the Board. The operating
budget of the Board shall be funded from the Ten billion peso
{P10,000,000,000.00) fund, with Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) as its initial operating budget: Provided, That
it shall not exceed Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) a year
Section 15. Proper Disposition of Funds. The Board shall
ensure that funds appropriated or those which may become
available as reparation for HRVVs are properly disbursed in
accordance with the policies stated by Congress and relevant
government rules, regulations and accounting procedures.
CHAPTER III
CLAIMANTS, REPARATION AND RECOGNITION
Section 16. Claimants. Any person who is an HRVV may
file a claim with the Board for reparation and/or recognition in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
Section 17. Conclusive Presumption That One is an HRVV
Under This Act. The claimants in the class suit and direct
action plaintiffs in the Human Rights Litigation Against the
Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos (MDL No. 840, CA No. 88-
0390) in the US Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii
wherein a favorable judgment has been rendered, shall be
extended the conclusive presumption that they are
HRVVs: Provided, That the HRVVs recognized by the
Bantayog Ng Mga Bayani Foundation shall also be accorded
the same conclusive presumption: Provided, further, That
nothing herein shall be construed to deprive the Board of its
original jurisdiction and its inherent power to determine the
extent of the human rights violations and the corresponding
reparation and/or recognition that may be granted.
Section 18. Motu Proprio Recognition. The Board may take
judicial notice motu proprio of individual persons who suffered
human rights violations as defined herein and grant such
persons recognition as HRVVs and included in the Roll of
Victims as provided for in Section 26 hereof.
Section 19. Determination of Award. (a) The Board shall
follow the point system in the determination of the award. The
range shall be one (1) to ten (10) points, as follows:
(1) Victims who died or who disappeared and are still
missing shall be given ten (10) points;
(2) Victims who were tortured and/or raped or
sexually abused shall he given six (6) to nine (9)
points:
(3) Victims who were detained shall be given three (3)
to five (5) points; and
(4) Victims whose rights were violated under Section
3, paragraph (b), nos. (4), (5) and (6) under this Act
shall be given one (1) to two (2) points.
The Board shall exercise its powers with due discretion in the
determination of points for each victim, which shall be based
on the type of violation committed against the HRVV,
frequently and duration of the violation. In each category,
HRVVs who had suffered more would receive more points. In
instances where a victim is classified in more than one
category, one shall be awarded the points in the higher
category: Provided, That in cases where there are several
eligible claims filed for reparation by or on behalf of a
particular HRVV, the Board shall award only one (1) valid
claim which corresponds to the category obtaining the highest
number of points for each eligible claimant.
(b) The Board shall proceed to determine the award for each
claimant classified under Sections 16, 17 and 18 of this Act.
(c) The Board shall then compute the final monetary value of
ones award that is equivalent to the numerical value of one
point multiplied by the number of points that a claimant is
entitled to, as previously determined by the Board.
(d) Within thirty (30) days after the Board has approved with
finality each eligible claim pending before it and after due
publication of such legitimate claim, the award of monetary
compensation shall take effect: Provided., That any pending
appeal filed by an aggrieved claimant or opposite before the
Board en banc must resolved by it sixty (60) days before the
Board becomes functus officio.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL- PROVISIONS
Section 20. Transfer of Funds. Pursuant to the judgment
mentioned in Section 7 hereof, the amount of Ten billion pesos
(P10,000,000,000.00) plus the accrued interest are hereby set
aside and appropriated to fund the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Documentation of Human Rights Violations
Committed by the Marcos Regime. In the implementation of
this Act and without prejudice to any other documentary or
other evidence that may be required for the award of any
reparation, any HRVV seeking reparation shall execute a
detailed sworn statement narrating the circumstances of the
pertinent human rights violation/s committed.
Section 22. Publication. Consistent with Section 23 herein,
the Board, after having been duly convened, shall set the
period for the commencement and termination of applications
by HRVVs and cause the publication of the
same: Provided, That such period shall only become operative
fifteen (15) days after its last publication, which shall be once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
Section 23. Period for Filing of Claims; Waiver. An HRVV
shall file an application for reparation with the Board within
six (6) months from the effectivity of the implementing rules
and regulations (IRR) of this Act: Provided, That failure to file
an application within said period is deemed a waiver of the
right to file the same: Provided, further, That for HRVVs who
are deceased, incapacitated, or missing due to enforced
disappearance, their legal heir/s or representatives, shall be
entitled to file an application for reparation on their behalf.
Any opposition to the new application/s pursuant to Section 16
hereof shall only be entertained if such is filed within fifteen
(15) days from the date of the last publication of the official list
of eligible claimants as may be determined by the Board. The
Board shall cause the publication of the official list of eligible
claimants once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Section 24 Appeal. Any aggrieved claimant or oppositor
may file an appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the
receipt of the Resolution of the Division, to the Board en
banc, whose decision shall then become final and executory.
Section 25. Penalties; Applicability of the Revised Penal Code.
Any claimant who is found by the Board, after due hearing,
to have filed a fraudulent claim, shall be referred to the
appropriate office for prosecution. If convicted, he shall suffer
the imprisonment of eight (8) to ten (10) years, shall be
disqualified from public office and employment and shall be
deprived of the right to vote and be voted for in any national or
local election, even after the service of sentence unless granted
absolute pardon.
Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer,
employee of an agency or any private individual mandated to
implement this Act, who shall misuse, embezzle or
misappropriate the funds for the reparation of HRVVs or who
shall commit fraud in the processing of documents and claims
of HRVVs, or shall conspire with any individual to commit the
same, shall also be prosecuted,
Any member of the Board and its Secretariat, public officer,
employee of an agency or any private individual mandated to
implement this Act, who may have been found guilty of
committing any or all of the prohibited acts stated in the
preceding paragraph, or those acts punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, shall be penalized under the pertinent
provisions in the Code and relevant special penal laws.
Section 26. Roll of Victims. Persons who are HRVVs,
regardless of whether they opt to seek reparation or not, shall
be given recognition by enshrining their names in a Roll of
Human Rights Victims to be prepared by the Board.
A Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established in honor and
in memory of the victims of human rights violations whose
names shall be inscribed in the Roll. A compendium of their
sacrifices shall be prepared and may be readily viewed and
accessed in the internet. The
Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium shall have an
appropriation of at least Five hundred million pesos
(P500,000,000.00) from the accrued interest of the Ten billion
peso (P10,000,000,000.00) fund.
The Roll may also be displayed in government agencies as
maybe designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission as
created hereunder.
Section 27. Human, Rights Violations Victims Memorial
Commission.. There is hereby created a Commission to be
known as the Human Rights Violations Victims Memorial
Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission,
primarily for the establishment, restoration, preservation and
conservation of the Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium
in honor of the HRVVs during the Marcos regime.
The powers and functions of the Commission shall be assumed
by the Board of Trustees which shall be composed of the
following; Chairperson of the CHR as Chairperson;
Chairperson of the National Historical Commission as Co-
Chairperson; and Chairpersons of the CHED, the National
Commission on Culture and the Arts (NCCA), the Secretary of
the Department of Education and the Head of the University of
the Philippines Diliman Main Library, as members.
The Board of Trustees shall have the authority to hire and
appoint its officials and employees, receive donations and
grants for and on its behalf, and generate revenues for the
benefit of the Commission.
The Commission shall be attached to the CHR solely for
budgetary and administrative purposes. The operating budget
of the Commission shall be appropriated from the General
Appropriations Act.
The Commission shall also coordinate and collaborate with the
DepED and the CHED to ensure that the teaching of Martial
Law atrocities, the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs in our
history are included in the basic, secondary and tertiary
education curricula.
CHAPTER V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 28. Guidelines for the Implementing Rules
and Regulations (1RR). In implementing this Act and in
formulating the corresponding rules and regulations, and to
ensure that all applications are properly screened for fraudulent
claims, the Board must provide for:
(a) Transparency in the processing of the claims;
(b) A procedure that allows any concerned party to
oppose an application or claim on the ground that it is
fraudulent, fictitious or spurious and gives that party
the opportunity to question the same and to present
evidence in support thereof; and
(c) A procedure that is speedy and expeditious
without sacrificing any of the parties fundamental
rights.
Within fifteen (15) days from the date of its organization, the
Board shall promulgate the necessary IRR and procedures for
the effective implementation of this Act. The IRR shall be
effective fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
Section 29. Work Period; Sunset Clause. The Board shall
complete its work within two (2) years from the effectivity of
the IRR promulgated by it. After such period, it shall
become functus officio.
Section 30. Separability Clause. If, for any reason, any
section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or
invalid, such other sections or provisions not affected thereby
shall remain in full force and effect.
Section 31. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
any of the provisions of this Act, including Section 63(b)
of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and Section
40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, are hereby repealed, amended or
modified accordingly.1wphi1
Section 32. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.