4: Arts. 74-162, FC Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642 (2012) - Facts

4: Arts.
74-162, FC
Additional Cases:
Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642 (2012).

Facts:
Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). RTC
rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor children in
favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.
Brigidos share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period 270 days later or after more
than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
RTC held that the phrase NET PROFIT EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after
deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts. It further held that after determining
the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the offending
spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43,
No. (2) of the Family Code.
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of
Article 102. He confusingly argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.
Issues:
1. Whether Art 102 on dissolution of absolute community or Art 129 on dissolution of conjugal partnership
of gains is applicable in this case. Art 129 will govern.
2. Whether the offending spouse acquired vested rights overof the properties in the conjugal partnership
NO.
3. Is the computation of net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? NO.
Ratio:
1. First, since the spouses were married prior to the promulgation of the current family code, the default rule
is that In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the spouses marriage the operative law is already the Family
Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code.
2. The petitioner is saying that since the property relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of
Conjugal Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested rights over half of the
properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All
property of the conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife.
While one may not be deprived of his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
Mary Michelle Ong 68

In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due process. First, he was well-aware that the
respondent prayed in her complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. In fact, in his
Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community assets between the petitioner and the
respondent as circumstances and evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community
properties of the parties. Second, when the decision for legal separation was promulgated, the petitioner
never questioned the trial courts ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to
Article 129(7) of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right to due process.
3. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint owners
of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those
acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common
mass of the couples properties. And when the couples marriage or community is dissolved, that common
mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have
established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses have
no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the net profits. And since the
legal separationshare decision of Brigido states that the in the net profits shall be awarded to the children,
Brigido will still be left with nothing.
On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article142 of
the Civil Code, the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. From
the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend
to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a
complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common
children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute
community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because
there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty partys favor.
Pana vs. Heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr., 687 SCRA 414 (2012)
Facts:
Efren Pana (Efren), herein petitioner, his wife Melecia, and another person, were charged with murder before
the RTC of Surigao City. On July 9, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision acquitting Efren of the charge but
finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC
also ordered those found guilty to pay civil indemnity and damages to the heirs of the victim.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it affirmed the conviction of both accused but modified the penalty to
reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also affirmed the award of civil
indemnity and damages with modification.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in
the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melecia.
Hence, Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia. The RTC denied the motion. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, the CA dismissed the petition.

Thus, Efren filed the instant petition arguing that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, given that they were married prior to the enactment of the Family Code and that they
did not execute any prenuptial agreement.
On the other hand, the heirs argued that the regime of absolute community of property governs the marriage
of Efren and Melecia since the transitory provision of the Family Code gave its provisions retroactive effect if
no vested or acquired rights are impaired, and that the property relation between the couple was changed
when the Family Code took effect in 1988.
Issue: Whether or not the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon
for the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case?
Held: Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification.
Civil Law: conjugal partnership of gains (CPG); fines and pecuniary indemnities chargeable to CPG
While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear prior to
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have acquired
vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back
and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships of gains
that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements.
The Family Code itself provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to
marriage. Clearly, therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and
Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or
conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who
were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime; (c) judicial separation
of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to
comply with his obligations to the family; (d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e)
the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia.
What is more, under the conjugal partnership of gains established by Article 142 of the Civil Code, the
husband and the wife place only the fruits of their separate property and incomes from their work or industry
in the common fund. This means that they continue under such property regime to enjoy rights of ownership
over their separate properties. Consequently, to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples
who got married under the Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code
took effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties.
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on Melecia may be enforced against their
conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Article 121 allows payment of the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership
assets even before these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been covered. No prior
liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article 122 states that at the time of
liquidation of the partnership, such offending spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the
purposes above-mentioned.
CA affirmed with modification. The RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30, shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the
writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of the
indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in Criminal Cases 4232 and 4233, the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Hapitan v. Lagradilla, 780 SCRA 288 (2016)

Facts:

Esmeralda Blacer Hapitan (Esmeralda) issued thirty-one (31) United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) checks in
various amounts in the total amount of P510,463.98, payable to the order of respondent Warlily Lagradilla
(Warlily). The checks were dishonored by UCPB for reasons of "account closed" when presented for payment
by Warlily. On January 6, 1995, Warlily, with her husband Jimmy, filed a civil case for sum of money against
Nolan and Esmeralda, Ilona, and Spouses Jessie and Ruth Terosa, with a prayer that a writ for preliminary
attachment be issued against the real property of Esmeralda and Nolan, consisting of a house and lot, as
security for the satisfaction of any judgment that might be recovered. In their complaint, Jimmy and Warlily
alleged that they made several demands on Nolan and Esmeralda for the latter to settle their outstanding
obligations. The latter spouses promised to convey and transfer to Jimmy and Warlily the title of their house
and lot, located at Barangay M. V. Hechanova, Jaro, Iloilo City.
Esmeralda alleged that due to the failure of Nolan, who was a seaman at that time, to send her substantial
amounts and on account of the losses she sustained in her jewelry business, she failed to fund the checks she
issued. Also, although she executed an SPA in favor of Ilona authorizing the latter to sell the house and lot
owned by her and Nolan, she subsequently revoked the said SPA.
Nolan and Ilona denied the allegations of Jimmy and Warlily. They argued that the debts were incurred solely
by Esmeralda and were not intended to benefit the conjugal partnership.
Issue:
Whether or not Nolan can waive his and Esmeraldas rights over the house and lot sold to spouses Terosa.
Held:
Such disposal or waiver by Nolan is not allowed by law. Article 124 of the Family Code requires that any
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property must have the written consent of the other spouse;
otherwise, such disposition is void. Further, under Article 89 of the Family Code, no waiver of rights, interests,
shares, and effects of the conjugal partnership of gains (FAMILY CODE, Art. 107. The rules provided in
Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains)during the marriage can be made
except in case of judicial separation of property. Clearly, Esmeralda did not consent to Nolan disposing or
waiving their rights over the house and lot through the Amicable Settlement.
Aggabao vs. Parulan, 629 SCRA 562 (2010)

Facts:
Respondent Ma. Elena allegedly made a sale of two parcels of land with their improvements considered as
conjugal property by presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by
respondent husband Dionisio in her favor. The sale by Ma. Elena was made in favor of the spouses
vendees/petitioners, who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price, despite the showing
by the husband that his signature on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his
absence from the country and while he and Ma. Elena have been estranged from one another. When Dionisio
learned about the alleged sale, he filed for an action for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute
sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. The
RTC ruled in his favor and declared that the SPA was forged. The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA.
Hence the present case filed by petitioners imputing error to the CA for not applying the ordinary prudent
mans standard in determining their status as buyers in good faith. The petitioners submit that Article 173 of
the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the property relations of the respondents because
they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article
124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal
property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration
of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming
that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulans
counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting.
Issue: WON Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the
conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio.
Held: NO

To start with, Article 254 the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among
them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife, Article
173 included, are found. Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is
settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family
Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the
conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not
include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Thirdly, according to Article 256 of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply
retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez, the Court rejected the
petitioners argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested property
had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the
Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights
existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested
right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive
application of the Family Code.
Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the
administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the
property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the
administration.
Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance,
which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to
administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions
on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).
Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the
property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property.
Lastly, the petitioners insistence that Atty. Parulans making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991
meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction
executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not
occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.
On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and
Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or
both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family
Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouses consent, the transaction should be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be

perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Flores v. Lindo, Jr., 648 SCRA 772

Mortgage of property within the community or the conjugal partnership is void if done without the consent of
the other spouse. Nevertheless, the execution of special powers of attorney perfects the contract of mortgage.
In other words, the SPA cures the defect of the mortgage.
Facts:
On the 31st day of October in the year 1995, the woman was able to obtain a loan secured by a Real Estate
Mortgage over a real proper under her and his husband's name but without the consent of the former. Partial
payments were made by her through checks but the same were dishonored. As a result, the creditor filed a
complaint against her for foreclosure of the mortgage with damages.
The second-level court dismissed the case as the mortgage was, in the eyes of the court a quo, void for having
been executed without the necessary consent of the husband, despite the SPA executed later by the husband
for the wife. It must be noted that the SPA was executed only a few days after the wife entered into the
contract of loan with mortgage.
The second-level court however ruled that the subsequent execution of the SPA cannot be made to retroact to
the date of the execution of the real estate mortgage.
Issue:
Did the court commit any error in dismissing the case for foreclosure against the wife for the mortgage
entered into without the husband's consent despite the fact that a subsequent SPA was executed in her favor?
Ruling:
Yes, the court acted in error.
The execution of the SPA can be considered as acceptance of the mortgage by the other spouse that perfected
the contract or continuing offer.
Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers of the administration do not
include disposition or encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Nobleza v. Nuega, 752 SCRA 602 (2015)

Sale of Property without Marital Consent
Facts:
Rogelio and Shirley Nuega were married on September 1, 1990. Before their marriage, they have acquired for
themselves a parcel of land (TCT 171963) the title of which was issued by the Registry of Deeds under the
sole name of Rogelio.
Two years thereafter, Shirley filed two cases against Rogelio: one for Concubinage and another for Legal
Separation and Liquidation of Property. In between the filing of these cases, however, Rogelio was able to sell
the land covered by TCT 171963 to Josefina Nobleza without Shirleys consent. Josefina relied on the title
reflecting Rogelio as the registered and sole owner of the lot.
Issue: Whether or not the Sale of Property without Marital Consent is valid
Held:
When the validity of the sale between Rogelio and Josefina was questioned by Shirley, the Supreme Court
declared the sale to be VOID. It reasoned that the subject property forms part of Rogelio and Shirley's
absolute community of property which makes the husband and the wife joint owners of all properties owned
before and after marriage. Consequently, the consent of both the husband and the wife is required for any
disposition. Thus, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells (their) property, such sale

is VOID in its entirety including the portion of the subject property pertaining to the other spouse who
contracted the sale. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
(Article 96, Family Code)
Further, a buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller
while ignoring all the other surrounding circumstances relevant to the sale.
To successfully invoke and be considered as a buyer in good faith, it presupposes that the buyer did
everything that an ordinary person would do for the protection and defense of his/her rights and interests
against prejudicial or injurious concerns when placed in such a situation. The prudence required can be
shown by making an ocular inspection of the property, checking the title/ownership with the proper Register
of Deeds alongside the payment of taxes therefor, or inquiring into the minutiae such as the parameters or lot
area, the type of ownership, and the capacity of the seller to dispose of the property, which capacity
necessarily includes an inquiry into the civil status of the seller to ensure that if married, marital consent is
secured when necessary. In fine, for a purchaser of a property in the possession of another to be in good faith,
he must exercise due diligence, conduct an investigation, and weigh the surrounding facts and circumstances
like what any prudent man in a similar situation would do.
Heirs of Patricio Go, Sr. v. Servacio, 657 SCRA 10 (2011)

Facts:
Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. entered into a contract ofsale of a parcel of land. 23 years later, Protacio, Jr executed
an Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver affirming under oath that it was his father Protacio Go, Sr.(Married to
Marta Go) who purchased the said property. Subsequently, Protacio Go together with his son Rito Go sold a
portion of the property to herein respondent Ester Servacio. On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the
return of the property, but Servacio refused to heed their demand; hence this case for the annulment of sale
of the property. The contention of the petitioner was that following Protacio, Jr.s renunciation, the property
became conjugal property; and that the sale of the property to Servacio without the prior liquidation of the
community property between Protacio, Sr. and Marta was null and void pursuant to Article 130 of the Family
Code. Servacio and Rito countered that Article 130 of the Family Code was inapplicable; that the want of the
liquidation prior to the sale did not render the sale invalid, because the sale was valid to the extent of the
portion that was finally allotted to the vendors as his share; and that the sale did not also prejudice any rights
of the petitioners as heirs, considering that what the sale disposed of was within the aliquot portion of the
property that the vendors were entitled to as heirs.
The RTC declared that the property was the conjugal property of Protacio, Sr. and Marta, not the exclusive
property of Protacio, Sr. Nonetheless, the RTC affirmed the validity of the sale of the property. Aggrieved, the
petitioners went all the way up to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
Held: The appeal lacks merit.

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code,any disposition of the conjugal property after
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition
is void. Upon Martas death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved, pursuant to Article 175 (1) of the
Civil Code, and an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta
with respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a liquidation following its
liquidation.
Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Martas share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had
was an ideal or abstract quota in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share;
hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest of his
co-owners. Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively transferred,
making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share. Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly

provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession of
the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated
their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the
co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio would be
a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion that might not be validly sold
to her.
Domingo v. Molina, 791 SCRA 47 (2016)

Facts:
On June 15, 1951, the spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting
of a one-half undivided portion over an 18, 164 square meter parcel of land which was annotated on the
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 16354.
Anastacio has been borrowing money from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina all throughout
his life. Ten years after the death of Flora in 1978, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses
Molina to answer for his debts. It was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2729677 and
the entire one-half undivided portion of the land was transferred to the them.
One of the children of Anastacio and Flora filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Ownership against the spouses Molina when he learned of the transfer on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims that
it is only to serve as collateral for the money that his father has borrowed. He alleges that Anastacio could not
have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Floras consent, as she was already dead at
the time of the sale.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for his
debts and told them that they already own half of the land. They have been in possession of the subject
property before the title was registered under their names and have religiously paid the propertys real estate
taxes.
The adopted son of the spouses Molina, Cornelio Molina, substituted them when they died during the
pendency of the case.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that his father
did not sell the property to the spouses Molina considering that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property
to answer for conjugal liabilities. Furthermore, it denied Melecios motion for reconsideration of the RTC
ruling and so he proceeded with his appeal to the CA.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling in toto. It held that Melecio failed to prove by preponderant evidence that
there was fraud in the conveyance of the property to the spouses Molina. It gave credence to the OCT
annotation of the disputed property sale. It also held that Floras death is immaterial because Anastacio only
sold his rights over the lot to the spouses Molina, excluding Floras interest. Finally, the CA held that Melecios
action has prescribed because he failed to file the action within one year after entry of the decree of
registration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Floras consent is valid and
legal; and
2. Whether or not fraud attended the transfer of the subject property to the spouses Molina.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses
Molina is void without Floras consent. However, this argument is unmeritorious.

Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Codes effectivity which was on August 3, 1988 and
so their property relation is a conjugal partnership. It dissolved when Flora died in 1968, pursuant to now
Article 126 (1) of the Family Code.
The heirs of Flora were governed by an implied co-ownership among the conjugal properties pending
liquidation and partition. This will also include Anastacio with respect to Floras share of the conjugal
partnership. Anastacio being a co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties
without having done an actual partition first, either by agreement or by judicial decree. On the other hand,
Anastacio owns one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided
interest. As a consequence, he had the right to freely sell and dispose his undivided interest in the subject
property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacios interest.
Anastactios sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for
his rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred. The spouses Molina would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after
liquidation and partition. Melecios recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
On the issue of fraud, the lower courts found that there was no fraud in the sale of the disputed property to
the spouses Molina. The notarized deed of conveyance annotated on the OCT executed between Anastacio
and the spouses Molina negated Melecios argument that no document was executed for the sale of the
disputed property. Furthermore, the petitioners belief that his father, Anastacio, could not have sold the
property without his knowledge cannot be considered as proof of fraud to invalidate the spouses Molina's
registered title over the subject property.
PNB vs. Garcia, 724 SCRA 280 (2014).

Facts:
Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent of his children executed SPAs authorizing spouses Garcia to
convey a property covered with TCT No. T-44422 to secure a loan from PNB by way of mortgage and an
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB which were inscribed in the title.
The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said Amendment against spouses Garcia and PNB
alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr. to Ligaya and they
became owners pro indivisio upon the death of Ligaya on 1987.
PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described in the as a
widower.
During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996 authorizing Jose
Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
Issue: Whether the subject property was a conjugal or was acquired during marriage or thereafter.
Ruling: Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with Article 160 applies.
All properties acquired during marriage are conjugal and the registration of it in the name of one spouse does
not destroy the presumption that it is conjugal. What is material is the time when the property was acquired.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya thus
governed by Article 493 of Civil Code.
The effect of the mortgage with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted
to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, Jose Sr. cannot mortgage the entire
property.

Lim vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 713 SCRA 555 (2014)
Doctrine: Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property All property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is
not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and
that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. [T]his
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one
spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in
order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in
1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.
Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to
get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor of his brother.
Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that
his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to
the presumption that his signature was forged.
The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioners mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage
contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.
2. Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without the
signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract.
Held:
1. NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to
prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was never compared with the genuine signatures of
petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.
2. NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an issue. Hence,
the absence of his wifes signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case.
All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the
husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the
name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal
property may be mortgaged. However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially
since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even
before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in
nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

"Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it
appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by [one spouse]. When the property is
registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said
spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under

Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved.
Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)

Facts:
Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to inquire about a
condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang
(Kang), a Korean national.
Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 covered by CCT No. 18186 and Parking Slot No. 42 covered by CCT
No. 9118 were for sale and likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean.
After payment of the price of the unit and parking slot, Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Suzuki
took possession of the condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties, which were
then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orions Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several
verbal demands. Kang failed to deliver the documents.
Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties.
He learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42 contained no annotations
although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage to Orion,
the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez, however, refused to surrender the
titles, and cited the need to consult Orions legal counsel as its reason.
Issue:
Whether or not Korean Lawshould be applied in conveying the conjugal property of the spouses Kang.
Held:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located.
xxxx (A)ll matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as
the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another,
or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This general principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.
xxx
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign
law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial
notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum. To prove a foreign
law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
xxx
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of
property. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
property for there is no showing that it was properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or
processual presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not
proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Matthews vs. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584 , June 22, 2009.

Facts:
On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin, a British subject, married Joselyn, a 17-year old Filipina.

On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a lot (Boracay
property). The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin.
Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latters funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually
converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required
permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyns
sister.
However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen.
On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a SPA in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease,
and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.
On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of
Lease involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00.
Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort.
Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without Benjamins
consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against
Joselyn and the petitioner.
Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and
coupled with the fact that he was Joselyns husband, any transaction involving said property required his
consent.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the
consent of her British husband is valid
2. Whether or not Benjamin is the actual owner of the property since he provided the funds used in
purchasing the same
Ruling:
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring
private lands.
The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. Our
fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to
Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.
The rule is clear and inflexible: aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the
Philippines, save only in constitutionally recognized exceptions. There is no rule more settled than this
constitutional prohibition, as more and more aliens attempt to circumvent the provision by trying to own
lands through another.
Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an
alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that
Joselyn appeared to be the designated "vendee" in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole
ownership thereto.
This is true even if we sustain Benjamins claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering
into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for
his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to
question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory
would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be

declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he
would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not
permit him to have.
Buado vs. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 397 (2009)

Facts:
Spouses Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, which originated from Erlinda Nicols civil liability arising from the criminal offense
of slander filed against her by petitioners. RTC rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. It
became final and executory and later on issued a a writ of execution. Finding Erlinda Nicols personal
properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on
execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Eventually, a notice of sheriffs sale was issued. Two
(2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo
F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The
auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of
petitioners.
Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for
annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy
sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly
levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol.
Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore,
respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a very low price
of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. The case was assigned
to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite. In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. Citing De Leon v.
Salvador, petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where the judgment
originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriffs
sale. RTC dismissed respondents complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the
complaint filed by appellant. Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Court of Appeals.
Issue: WON the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership
Held:
No.There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly
provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime
or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency
of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal
partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the
liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil
obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse,
unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.
Dewara vs. Lamela, 647 SCRA 483 (2011)

DOCTRINE:
Even after having classified a property as a conjugal it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be
levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the

spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, itmust be shown
that the same were contracted for, or the debtsand obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of
theconjugal partnership.
FACTS:
Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus,
the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because
Elenita went to work in California, United States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City.
On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit
respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence against Eduardo before the MTCC in Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo
guilty of the charge and to pay civil indemnity P62,598.70 as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) as moral damages. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision and it became final and executory.
The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied
because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd.
26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre in the name of ELENITA M. DEWARA. Ronnie then caused the
consolidation of title in a Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT
No. T-80054 inthe name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate oftitle in the name of respondent
spouses.
The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in the
name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in California. Thus, Elenita, represented by
her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages.
On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of
petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her
marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the
acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was
registered in the name of petitioner.
RTCs RULING: The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this
conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary
evidence submitted, Elenitas grandfather originally owned LotNo. 234-C.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the price
alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or
that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.
RULING:
Conjugal property. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband
or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and the
wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner
in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential
requirement for the presumption to arise.
However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and
Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer
for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations

may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the
debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, 604 SCRA 120 (2009)

Facts:
In 1982, during the marriage of respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro, Villa Abrille, they
acquired a parcel of land in Davao City (Lot 7) registered in their names. This lot is adjacent to another land
(Lot 8), Pedros separate property. When Pedro had a mistress in 1991 and neglected his family, Mary Ann
sold/mortgaged their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. Pedro, by himself,
offered to sell the house and the two lots to petitioners Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the
petitioners of such objection, but in June 1991, Pedro still sold the house and lots without her consent. Later,
Pedro, with armed members of the CAFGU and in connivance with the petitioners, surreptitiously transferred
all their (Mary Ann+children) belongings from the house to an apartment. Mary Ann and her children were
also stopped from entering the house. Mary Ann and her children (respondents) filed a complaint for
Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction against Pedro and the Ravinas. During trial Pedro claimed that the house was built with his own
money. Petitioners assert that Lot 7 was Pedros exclusive property, acquired by him through barter or
exchange. They also claim that Wilfredo Ravina examined the titles when they bought the property from
Pedro.
TC ruled that the sale of the house and the lots 7 & 8 were valid as to the half of the share of Pedro and void as
to the other half of the share of Mary Ann.
CA modified, ruling that the sale of lot 8 is valid, while the sale of lot 7 is void. CA also ordered Pedro to
return the value of the consideration for lot 7 and the house to Sps Ravina. Respondents were also given the
option to exercise their rights under Art. 450 NCC with respect to the improvements introduced by Sps
Ravina.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Lot 7 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal property
(2) Whether the sale of Lot 7 was valid considering the absence of Mary Anns consent
(3) Whether the petitioners are buyers in good faith, hence, entitled to reimbursement of their payment
RULING:
1. Conjugal
Lot 7 was acquired in 1982 during Pedro and Mary Anns marriage. No evidence was adduced to show that
the property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the
property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Likewise, the house built on Lot 7 is
conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had obtained a loan
from DBP to construct the house.
2.) Sale was VOID

Under Art. 124 of the FC, disposition of a conjugal property is void if done a) without the consent of both the
husband and wife, or b) in case of one spouses inability, the authority of the court. Here, Mary Ann timely
filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.
However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot
covered by Lot 8, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary
Anns consent.
3.) Buyers in bad faith; no reimbursement

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has
a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase,
or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. To establish his status as

a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller
need only show that he relied on the face of the sellers certificate of title.
For a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity is
restricted, such as Arts. 166/173 /124 of the FC, to establish status as a buyer in GF, he must show that he
inquired into the latters capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith. Here,
the property is registered in Pedro and Mary Anns names.
Also, petitioners were apprised by Mary Anns lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded
to purchase the property without Mary Anns written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in
actual, visible and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the
time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they
failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection
accorded to purchasers in good faith.
Fuentes vs. Roca, 618 SCRA 702

Facts:
On, Oct 11, 1982, Tarciano Roca bought a 358-square meter lot in Zambales from his mother. Six years later in
1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to the petitioners Fuentes spouses through the help of Atty. Plagata who
would prepare the documents and requirements to complete the sale. In the agreement between Tarciano
and Fuentes spouses there will be a Php 60,000 down payment and Php 140,000 will be paid upon the
removal of Tarciano of certain structures on the land and after the consent of the estranged wife of Tarciano,
Rosario, would be attained. Atty. Plagata went to Manila to get the signature of Rosario but notarized the
document at Zamboanga . The deed of sale was executed January 11, 1989. As time passed, Tarciano and
Rosario died while the Fuentes spouses and possession and control over the lot. Eight years later in 1997, the
children of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to annul the sale and reconvey the property on the ground that
the sale was void since the consent of Rosario was not attained and that Rosarios signature was a mere
forgery. The Fuentes spouses claim that the action has prescribed since an action to annul a sale on the
ground of fraud is 4 years from discovery. The RTC ruled in favor of the Fuentes spouses. CA reversed this
ruling stating that the action has not prescribed since the applicable law is the 1950 Civil Code which
provided that the sale of Conjugal Property without the consent of the other spouse is voidable and the action
must be brought within 10 years. Given that the transaction was in 1989 and the action was brought in 1997
hence it was well within the prescriptive period.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their
conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged.
2. Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed;
Held:
1. The SC ruled that there was forgery due to the difference in the signatures of Rosario in the document
giving consent and another document executed at the same time period.
2. Although Tarciano and Rosario was married during the 1950 civil code, the sale was done in 1989, after the
effectivity of the Family Code. The Family Code applies to Conjugal Partnerships already established at the
enactment of the Family Code. The sale of conjugal property done by Tarciano without the consent of Rosario
is completely void under Art 124 of the family code.
Bautista vs. Silva, 502 SCRA 334 (2006)

FACTS:
That Transfer Certificate of Title was registered in the names of Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M.
Silva.
Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva, thru a Special Power of
Attorney purportedly executed by Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the said parcel of land in favor of defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista.

Transfer certificate was cancelled and issued in the names of spouses Bautista.
The RTC also found that the signature appearing on the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina
Silva is a forgery, and that consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses
Bautista is not authorized by Berlina.
RTC rendered judgment nullifying the deed of absolute sale, in favor of respondent.
CA affirmed RTC.
Thus the instant petition.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith and for value having relied
upon a Special Power of Attorney which appears legal, valid and genuine on its face.
(2) Whether or not the nullity of the deed of absolute sale will only pertain to the one half share of the wife.
HELD/RATIO:
(1) There is no merit to petitioners claim that they are purchasers in good faith.
- That the SPA is a forgery is a finding of the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive
upon the Court, especially as it is based on the expert opinion of the NBI which constitutes more than
clear, positive and convincing evidence that respondent did not sign the SPA.
- Absent such marital consent, the deed of sale was a nullity.
- Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question of fact not cognizable by us in a
petition for review.
- A holder of registered title may invoke the status of a buyer for value in good faith as a defense against
any action questioning his title. Such status, however, is never presumed but must be proven by the
person invoking it.
- He buys the property with the well-founded belief that the person from whom he receives the thing had
title to the property and capacity to convey it.
- Such degree of proof of good faith, however, is sufficient only when the following conditions concur: first,
the seller is the registered owner of the land; second, the latter is in possession thereof; and third, at the
time of the sale, the buyer was not aware of any claim or interest of some other person in the property, or
of any defect or restriction in the title of the seller or in his capacity to convey title to the property.
- In the present case, petitioners were dealing with a seller (Pedro) who had title to and possession of the
land but, as indicated on the face of his title, whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the marital
consent of respondent is required before he could convey the property. To prove good faith then,
petitioners must show that they inquired not only into the title of Pedro but also into his capacity to sell.
- When the document under scrutiny is a special power of attorney that is duly notarized, we know it to be
a public document where the notarial acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the fact of its due
execution. A buyer presented with such a document would have no choice between knowing and finding
out whether a forger lurks beneath the signature on it.
- In sum, all things being equal, a person dealing with a seller who has possession and title to the property
but whose capacity to sell is restricted, qualifies as a buyer in good faith if he proves that he inquired into
the title of the seller as well as into the latters capacity to sell; and that in his inquiry, he relied on the
notarial acknowledgment found in the sellers duly notarized special power of attorney.
- Note that we expressly made the foregoing rule applicable only under the operative words duly
notarized and all things being equal. Thus, said rule should not apply when there is an apparent flaw
afflicting the notarial acknowledgment of the special power of attorney as would cast doubt on the due
execution and authenticity of the document; or when the buyer has actual notice of circumstances
outside the document that would render suspect its genuineness.
- In the present case, petitioners knew that Berlina was in Germany at the time they were buying the
property and the SPA relied upon by petitioners has a defective notarial acknowledgment.
- All told, it was not sufficient evidence of good faith that petitioners merely relied on the photocopy of the
SPA as this turned out to be a mere private document. They should have adduced more evidence that
they looked beyond it.
(2) That said, we come to the issue on whether petitioners may retain the portion of Pedro Silva in the subject
property. Certainly not. It is well-settled that the nullity of the sale of conjugal property contracted by the

husband without the marital consent of the wife affects the entire property, not just the share of the wife. We
see no reason to deviate from this rule.
Ventura, Jr. vs. Abuda, 708 SCRA 640 (2013)

FACTS:
In 1952, Socorro and Crispin were married where they had a son Edilberto Sr. who was married to Leonora.
Edilberto Sr. and Leonora are the parents of herein petitioner Edilberto Jr. (Edilberto). In 1980, Socorro
married Esteban even if she had a subsisting marriage with Crispin. Esteban on the other hand was also
married before but the same was dissolved by virtue of the death of his previous wife. Esteban had a daughter
named Evangeline.
Sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of lot in Tondo, Manila, while the remaining portion was
purchased by Evangeline on her fathers behalf (Vitas Property). In 1978, Esteban and Evangeline also had
small business establishments located in Delpan st. Tondo (Delpan Property). When Esteban was diagnosed
with colon cancer, he decided to sell the properties to Evangeline.
Esteban passed away on September 1997, while Socorro on July 1999. When Leonora, petitioners mother
discovered the sale sometime in 2000, they filed a petition for annulment of the sale, claiming that petitioner
is entitled to a right or interest over the properties purchased by Esteban. . Respondents, on the other hand,
argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and
void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the properties purchased by
Esteban and respondents.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents, ruling that Vitas and Delpan properties were not conjugal properties of
Socorro and Esteban. CA affirmed the decision, applying Article 148 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to any right or interest over the subject properties
HELD: No. CA decision sustained

Civil Law -in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the ownership
over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties
It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in
order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not
apply.
This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:
Art 148. In cases of cohabitation wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
Applying the foregoing provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1)
these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the parties actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-
owned by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980,
or several months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of
legal age, married to Socorro Torres."

The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to Socorro
Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property.The
evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage
to Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage. Registration under
the Torrens title system merely confirms, and does not vest title.
Edilberto claims that Esteban s actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations.Thus, the law presumes that
Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.
Civil Law - Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is
deemed to be a donation, which requires the debtor s consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the
creditor who has accepted it.
Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property
would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban.
Borromeo v. Descallar, 580 SCRA 175 (2009)

Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was assigned by his employer to work here in the Philippines where he met
respondent Antonietta Descallar, a separated mother of two boys, with whom he had a livein relationship
with. During the course of their relationship, a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in their favor by Agro-Macro
Subdivision respecting a house and lot where they transferred and lived together. When the deed was
presented before the Registry of Deeds for registration, a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued only in the
name of respondent and the registration was refused on the part of Jambrich on the ground that he was an
alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased
from the deed of sale. In the meantime, Jambrich adopted the sons of respondent. However, not long after,
the couple broke up and lived separately without settlement of their properties. While still in the Philippines,
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo Borromeo with whom he was indebted in the amount of P150,000 relative to
the purchases he made from the latter which he was not able to pay. Believing that his interest in his property
with the AgroMacro Subdivision still exist, he sold the same by way of Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment to
petitioner. When petitioner was about to register the deed, he discovered, however, that the property was
already transferred in the name of respondent and had already been mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a
complaint for recovery of the real property. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the
parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it
was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and
absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of
Absolute Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On
the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for
the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to
acquire or own real property in the Philippines. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The
decision was however reversed by CA on appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner as the successor-in-interest of Jambrich, who is a resident alien, has validly obtained the
right over the subject property without violating the prohibition under the Constitution.
HELD:
YES. As the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits nonFilipinos from acquiring or holding
title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
natural-born citizen.29

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich,
who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties
to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court
reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World
Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were]
void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the
acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino
citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases,32 is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who
became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the
property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more
public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands
has been achieved.
Josef vs. Santos, 572 SCRA 57 (2008)

FACTS:
Respondent, Otelio Santos, filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner, Albino Josef, for
failure to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent which the Marikina RTC and CA
decided in favour of respondent. The SC dismissed the petition for review and the judgment became final and
executory. A writ of execution was issued and some personal properties and a real property was sold on
public auction with the respondent as winning bidder. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
claiming that the real property sold was his family home, thus, exempt from execution. The CA denied for
failure to file a MR on the trial courts order granting the motion for execution, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the sale on public auction of petitioners family home to satisfy judgment award is legal.
RULING:
No. The trial courts Order of Execution did not resolve nor take into account petitioners allegations in his
Opposition, which are material and relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution.
It should have made an earnest determination of the truth to petitioners claim that the house and lot in
which he and his children resided was their duly constituted family home and that the personal properties
belonged to the children. The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from
attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular
family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.
Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioners family home, the
trial court should have observed the following procedure:
1. Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Article 155 of
the Family Code;
2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that the property was his family home; conduct an
ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an interview of members of the community
where the alleged family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner actually resided within the
premises of the claimed family home; order a submission of photographs of the premises, depositions, and/or
affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the petitioner, his children and other

witnesses. At the same time, the respondent is given the opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence
to the contrary;
3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioners family home, the court should determine: a) if
the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family Code; b) if
petitioners spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries of the family home; c) if the
petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his family
home; and d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157 and 160
of the Family Code. The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family
love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union
which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union.
It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms
the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of
the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family
shall be recognized or given effect, the trial courts failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the
veracity of petitioners allegations, is unjustified.
Indeed, petitioners resort to the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals was belated and
without benefit of the requisite motion for reconsideration, however, considering the gravity of the issue,
involving as it does matters that strike at the very heart of that basic social institution which the State has a
constitutional and moral duty to preserve and protect, as well as petitioners constitutional right to abode, all
procedural infirmities occasioned upon this case must take a back seat to the substantive questions which
deserve to be answered in full.
The trial courts order of execution was nullified and it was directed to conduct an inquiry as to the nature of
the properties as to whether or not exempt from execution.
Ramos vs. Pangilinan, 625 SCRA 181 (2010)

[See Articles 225, 229-231, 233; 240, 242 NCC] v. Article 154 FC
Facts:
Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint1 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company
owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners in which the Labor Arbiter ruled in
their favor. To satisfy their claims the Labor Arbiter levied properties of Ramos. Ramos moved for the
exemption of a property which they alleged to be a family home. Respondents contend that Pandacan
property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact
served as the companys business address as borne by the companys letterhead. Labor Arbiter denied the
motion to quash of the petitioners in which the NLRC affirmed. As to petitioners claim that the property was
covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos share can be levied upon, the
NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim.
Issue: WON the said property is a family home.
Ruling: Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free
from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon
a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and
his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. No doubt, a family home is generally
exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family
home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the
house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be
part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual
value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban
areas and P200,000 in rural areas.

Two sets of rules are applicable: 1. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family
Code or before August 3, 1988 a) Constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles
225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. b) Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a
verified petition before the courts and the registration of the courts order with the Registry of Deeds of the
area where the property is located. c) Extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil
Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of
Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor
from availing of the privilege. 2. Family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988 a. There is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the
time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. b.
The family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one
spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain
amounts depending upon the area where it is located. c. The debts incurred for which the exemption does not
apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred
after August 3, 1988.
Olivia-De Mesa vs. Acero, Jr., 663 SCRA 40 (2012)

DOCTRINE:
Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution:
First, family residences constructed before theeffectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be
constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of
law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by
the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming
exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS:
Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became their family home. A year after, Arceli
contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000 from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the
said parcel of land and house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Acero presented the
check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already closed. Acero demanded
payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the
RTC. The RTC acquitted the Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of
execution was issued to levy on the said property.
The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the highest bidder. Acero leased the property
to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the
owners of the property.
The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Aceros complaint and ordering the Spouses De
Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of
the property. The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in
Claudios name up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the validity

of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was conducted thereafter and the
legitimacy of Aceros Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa contend that the subject
property is a family home, which is exempt from execution under the Family Code and, thus, could not have
been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA
affirmed RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in this case.
HELD:
YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general, the family home is exempt
from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege must assert it at the time it was levied or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
RATIO:
For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on
when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege.
The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be
summarized as follows:
First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must
be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;
Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are
automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted
and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;
Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of
law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when Spouses De Mesa got
married. There was no showing, however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a
family home in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988, the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively
exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family
home.
Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have been exempt from
execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject property being a family home and its being
exempted from execution at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped
from claiming the exemption of the property from execution.
Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., 557 SCRA 499 (2008)

Facts:
Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from Planters Products, Inc.
(PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against
him. PPI was able to secure judgment in its favor. Pursuant thereto, the alleged family home of spouses
Kelley, covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City, was sold on execution. Subsequently, spouses Kelley
filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the said property with damages in RTC Naga City,

Branch 19. They anchor their action on the contention that the subject property was their family home which
was exempt from execution.
Issue: Whether spouses Kelley were correct in arguing that a family home is exempt from execution.
Held:
Yes. No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such.
There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an
unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on
which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the
property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time
of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.
Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family
homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by
operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The exemption is
effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable
must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988),
the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant
to the Civil Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the
following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3)
For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to
laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building. xxx xxx xxx Article 160. When a creditor
whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has
reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed
in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the
property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds
the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds
the maximum amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or
by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. xxx xxx xxx
The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 for determination whether or not
the property covered by TCT No. 15079 is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from
execution.
Patricio vs. Dario III, 507 SCRA 438 (2006)

FACTS:
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and
their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he
left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a pre-school building.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition
the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the property
hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for partition before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is the family home duly constituted by spouses
Marcelino and Perla Dario cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his
12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUE:
W/N the family home cannot be partitioned on the grounds that a minor-beneficiary is still residing therein.
HELD:
No. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV satisfied the first two requisites. However, on the third requisite, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother. Thus, the obligation to support
under Art. 199 which outlines the order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the
closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on. It is his
father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate
and distinct from that of his parents, being of legal age.
Arriola v. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666 (2008)

Facts:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John Nabor Arriola (respondent), his son with his first
wife , and Vilma G. Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioners). On Feb.
16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering the partition of the parcel of land covered by TCT No 383714
(84191) left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola
and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of
creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any. However, the parties failed to agree on how to divide the above
mentioned property and so the respondent proposed to sell it though public auction. The petitioners initially
agreed but refused to include in the auction the house standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed
an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit. When
a motion of reconsideration was still denied by the RTC, the respondent elevated the case to the CA with a
petition for certiorari and prayed that he be allowed to push through with the auction of the subject land
including the house built on it. The CA granted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of the subject
lot including the house built on it. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said
motion. Hence this petition for review on Certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the subject house is covered by the judgement of partition
Ruling:
The Supreme Court agree that the subject house is covered by the judgment of partition but in view of the
suspended proscription imposed under Article 159 of the family code, the subject house immediately
partitioned to the heirs. Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by
an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on
which it is situated. Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (Emphasis
supplied.)Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land
on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the
moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. Article 159. The family home
shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of
ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the
court finds compelling reasons therefore. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Cabang v. Basay, 582 SCRA 172 (2009)

CASE SUMMARY: In this case, Cabang has been occupying the Lot 7777owned by Basay. Cabang believed that
the said property is Lot 7778 that they rightfully owned. SC ruled in favor Basay filed a complaint for recovery
of the said lot. RTC ruled in favor of Cabang. CA ruled in favor of Basay. Case was elevated to the SC. Cabang
argued that the said lot cannot be be subject of Motion for Execution as it is a family home. However, the SC
held that it is not a family home but a residential house because a family home cannot be established on

property held in co-ownership with third persons. It must be established on the properties of ACP, CPG, or
exclusive property of either spouse.
DOCTRINES: A family home cannot be established on property held in coownership with third persons. The
family home must be established on the properties of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal
partnership,or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other
FACTS:
Simeon had established his family home over the property of registered owner Felix Odong and he had been
in continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land since 1956 up to present. Mr.
& Mrs. Guillermo Basay bought the subject property from the heirs of Felix Odong and upon discovery that
Simeon was actually occupying the lot, they filed a complaint for recovery of property.
ISSUE: Whether the property subject of the controversy is a duly constituted family home.
HELD: NO. Under Article 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot
from the time it is occupied as a family residence. It is likewise a given fact that the family home must be
constructed on property owned by the persons constituting it. Since the property on which the alleged family
home stands is owned by the Odongs, their continued stay on the subject land is by mere tolerance of the late
Felix Odong.
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103 (2015)

Facts:
Respondents the Bell siblings are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia
Calingasan-Bell (Sps. Bell). In 1995, the Bell siblings lodged a Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the
(RTC) of Batangas City for annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against
petitioners Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). The Complaint sought the annulment of
the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their residential house and lot, as well as the cancellation of
the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed. The RTC granted respondents' prayers and ordered the
Register of Deeds of Batangas City to cancel TCT in the name of defendants the Eulogios and to reconstitute
TCT as "family home" of the plaintiffs the Bell siblings and Sps. Bell. However RTC declared Spouses Bell liable
to petitioners in the amount of PI million plus 12% interest per annum. On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ
of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property covered by the newly reconstituted TCT was levied
on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ
of execution on the ground that the property was a family home. RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an Order
directing the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently, respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental
Petition with an urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Injunction before the CA docketed as 87531. CA eventually
enjoined the execution. On 09 February 2009, the CA denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
this Petition.
Issue:
Whether respondents' family home may be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Held:
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment under the Family Code is limited
to 300,000 in urban areas and 200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. []
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or
any of its beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following
conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to
fall below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its
value exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced sale, and any
amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160

5: Arts. 163-182; DAA and ICAA
Additional Readings & Cases:
R.A. No. 9858

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW MARRYING AGE,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS AMENDED
Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because
either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated."
"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation."
Section 2. Implementing Rules. The civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with the chairpersons of the
Committee on Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Youth, Women and
Family Relations of the Senate, the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine
Association of Civil Registrars (PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary rules/regulations for the
effective implementation of this Act not later than one (1) month from its effectivity.
Section 3. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations and/or
administrative regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended,
modified, superseded or repealed accordingly.
Section 4. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the
Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.
Approved: DEC 20, 2009
R.A. No. 9523 March 12, 2009

AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
(DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 603, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE CHILD AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that alternative protection and
assistance shall be afforded to every child who is abandoned, surrendered, or neglected. In this regard, the
State shall extend such assistance in the most expeditious manner in the interest of full emotional and social
development of the abandoned, surrendered, or neglected child.
It is hereby recognized that administrative processes under the jurisdiction of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development for the declaration of a child legally available for adoption of abandoned,
surrendered, or neglected children are the most expeditious proceedings for the best interest and welfare of
the child.
Section. 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(1) Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) is the agency charged to implement the
provisions of this Act and shall have the sole authority to issue the certification declaring a child legally
available for adoption.

(2) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or a person over eighteen (18) years of age
but is unable to fully take care of him/herself or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of physical or mental disability or condition.
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no proper parental care or guardianship, or whose
parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at least three (3) continuous months, which includes a
founding.
(4) Neglected Child refers to a child whose basic needs have been deliberately unattended or
inadequately attended within a period of three (3) continuous months. Neglect may occur in two (2)
ways:
(a) There is physical neglect when the child is malnourished, ill-clad, and without proper shelter. A
child is unattended when left by himself/herself without proper provisions and/or without proper
supervision.
(b) There is emotional neglect when the child is maltreated, raped, seduced, exploited, overworked,
or made to work under conditions not conducive to good health; or is made to beg in the streets or
public places; or when children are in moral danger, or exposed to gambling, prostitution, and other
vices.
(5) Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a child in whose favor a certification was issued by the
DSWD that he/she is legally available for adoption after the fact of abandonment or neglect has been
proven through the submission of pertinent documents, or one who was voluntarily committed by
his/her parent(s) or legal guardian.
(6) Voluntarily Committed Child is one whose parent(s) or legal guardian knowingly and willingly
relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any duly accredited child-placement or child-caring
agency or institution.
(7) Child-caring agency or institution refers to a private non-profit or government agency duly accredited
by the DSWD that provides twenty-four (24) hour residential care services for abandoned, neglected, or
voluntarily committed children.
(8) Child-placing agency or institution refers to a private non-profit institution or government agency
duly accredited by the DWSD that receives and processes applicants to become foster or adoptive parents
and facilitate placement of children eligible for foster care or adoption.
(9) Petitioner refers to the head or executive director of a licensed or accredited child-caring or child-
placing agency or institution managed by the government, local government unit, non-governmental
organization, or provincial, city, or municipal Social Welfare Development Officer who has actual custody
of the minor and who files a certification to declare such child legally available for adoption, or, if the
child is under the custody of any other individual, the agency or institution does so with the consent of
the child's custodian.
(10) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the DSWD or his duly authorized representative.
(11) Conspicuous Place shall refer to a place frequented by the public, where by notice of the petition
shall be posted for information of any interested person.
(12) Social Case Study Report (SCSR) shall refer to a written report of the result of an assessment
conducted by a licensed social worker as to the social-cultural economic condition, psychosocial
background, current functioning and facts of abandonment or neglect of the child. The report shall also
state the efforts of social worker to locate the child's biological parents/relatives.
Section 3. Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. It shall contain facts necessary to establish the merits of the
petition and shall state the circumstances surrounding the abandonment or neglect of the child.
The petition shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Social Case Study Report made by the DSWD, local government unit, licensed or accredited child-
caring or child-placing agency or institution charged with the custody of the child;
(2) Proof that efforts were made to locate the parent(s) or any known relatives of the child. The following
shall be considered sufficient:

(a) Written certification from a local or national radio or television station that the case was aired on
three (3) different occasions;
(b) Publication in one (1) newspaper of general circulation;
(c) Police report or barangay certification from the locality where the child was found or a certified
copy of a tracing report issued by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), National Headquarters
(NHQ), Social Service Division, which states that despite due diligence, the child's parents could not
be found; and
(d) Returned registered mail to the last known address of the parent(s) or known relatives, if any.
(3) Birth certificate, if available; and
(4) Recent photograph of the child and photograph of the child upon abandonment or admission to the
agency or institution.
Section 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. The petition shall be filed in the regional office of the
DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.
The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its supporting documents, if sufficient in form and
substance and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the petition conspicuous place for five (5)
consecutive days in the locality where the child was found.
The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render a recommendation not later than five (5)
working days after the completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of his/her recommendation
and records to the Office of the Secretary within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of the recommendation.
Section 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption. Upon finding merit in the petition, the Secretary shall
issue a certification declaring the child legally available for adoption within seven (7) working days from
receipt of the recommendation.
Said certification, by itself shall be the sole basis for the immediate issuance by the local civil registrar of a
foundling certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil registrar shall transmit the founding
certificate to the National Statistic Office (NSO).
Section 6. Appeal. The decision of the Secretary shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals within five (5)
days from receipt of the decision by the petitioner, otherwise the same shall be final and executory.
Section 7. Declaration of Availability for Adoption of Involuntarily Committed Child and Voluntarily
Committed Child. The certificate declaring a child legally available for adoption in case of an involuntarily
committed child under Article 141, paragraph 4(a) and Article 142 of Presidential Decree No. 603 shall be
issued by the DSWD within three (3) months following such involuntary commitment.
In case of voluntary commitment as contemplated in Article 154 of Presidential Decree No. 603, the
certification declaring the child legally available for adoption shall be issued by the Secretary within three (3)
months following the filing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment, as signed by the parent(s) with the DSWD.
Upon petition filed with the DSWD, the parent(s) or legal guardian who voluntarily committed a child may
recover legal custody and parental authority over him/her from the agency or institution to which such child
was voluntarily committed when it is shown to the satisfaction of the DSWD that the parent(s) or legal
guardian is in a position to adequately provide for the needs of the child: Provided, That, the petition for
restoration is filed within (3) months after the signing of the Deed of Voluntary Commitment.
Section 8. Certification. The certification that a child is legally available for adoption shall be issued by the
DSWD in lieu of a judicial order, thus making the entire process administrative in nature.
The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the primary evidence that the child is legally available
in a domestic adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8552 and in an inter-country adoption
proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8043.

Section. 9. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DSWD, together with the Council for Welfare of
Children, Inter-Country Adoption Board, two (2) representatives from licensed or accredited child-placing
and child-caring agencies or institution, National Statistics Office and Office of the Civil Registrar, is hereby
tasked to draft the implementing rules and regulations of this Act within sixty (60) days following its
complete publication.
Upon effectivity of this Act and pending the completion of the drafting of the implementing rules and
regulations, petitions for the issuance of a certification declaring a child legally available for adoption may be
filled with the regional office of the DSWD where the child was found or abandoned.
Section 10. Penalty. The penalty of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person, institution, or agency who shall place a child for
adoption without the certification that the child is legally available for adoption issued by the DSWD. Any
agency or institution found violating any provision of this Act shall have its license to operate revoked
without prejudice to the criminal prosecution of its officers and employees.
Violation of any provision of this Act shall subject the government official or employee concerned to
appropriate administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, including suspension and/or dismissal from the
government service and forfeiture of benefits.
Section 11. Repealing Clause. Sections 2(c)(iii), 3(b), (e) and 8(a) of Republic Act No. 8552, Section 3(f) of
Republic Act No. 8043, Chapter 1 of Title VII, and VIII of Presidential Decree No. 603 and any law, presidential
decree, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to or
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby reprealed, modified or amended accordingly.
Section 12. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other
provisions not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 13. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its complete publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
R.A. No. 10165 June 11, 2012

AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN AND PROPAGATE FOSTER CARE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Foster Care Act of 2012."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. Article XV of the Constitution provides that the State shall defend the right
of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation or other conditions prejudicial to their development.
It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide every child who is neglected, abused, surrendered,
dependent, abandoned, under sociocultural difficulties, or with special needs with an alternative family that
will provide love and care as well as opportunities for growth and development.
The State shall guarantee that all the lights of the child enumerated under Article 3 of Presidential Decree No.
603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth Welfare Code", as amended, and the rights found under Article
20 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child shall be observed.
The State recognizes that in most cases, a child will benefit more from foster care than institutional care.
Towards this end, the State shall systematize and enhance the foster care program in the country. It shall
ensure that the foster family shall provide a wholesome atmosphere to the foster child. Further to this end,
the State recognizes that foster care is an important step towards the childs return and reintegration to his
biological parents or placement with an adoptive family.

The State shall also protect the rights of the biological child of the foster family and ensure that in no case
shall the child be disadvantaged as a result of the placement of a foster child.
In all cases, the childs right to health shall be upheld and protected.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms are defined:
(a) Agency refers to any child-caring or child-placing institution licensed and accredited by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to implement the foster care program.
(b) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age, or one who is over eighteen (18) but is
unable to fully take care of or protect oneself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or condition.
(c) Child Case Study Report refers to a written report prepared by a social worker containing all the
necessary information about a child.
(d) Child with Special Needs refers to a child with developmental or physical disability.
(e) Family refers to the parents or brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood, of the child.
(f) Foster Care refers to the provision of planned temporary substitute parental care to a child by a foster
parent.
(g) Foster Child refers to a child placed under foster care.
(h) Foster Family Care License refers to the document issued by the DSWD authorizing the foster parent
to provide foster care.
(i) Foster Parent refers to a person, duly licensed by the DSWD, to provide foster care.
(j) Foster Placement Authority (FPA) refers to the document issued by the DSWD authorizing the
placement of a particular child with the foster parent.
(k) Home Study Report refers to a written report prepared by a social worker containing the necessary
information on a prospective parent or family member.
(l) Matching refers to the judicious pairing of a child with foster parent and family members based on the
capacity and commitment of the foster parent to meet the individual needs of the particular child and the
capacity of the child to benefit from the placement.
(m) Parent refers to the biological or adoptive parent or legal guardian of a child.
(n) Placement refers to the physical transfer of the child with the foster parent.
(o) Relatives refer to the relatives of a child, other than family members, within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity.
(p) Social Worker refers to the registered and licensed social worker of the DSWD, local government unit
(LGU) or agency.
ARTICLE II
ELIGIBILITY
Section 4. Who May Be Placed Under Foster Care. The following may be placed in foster care:
(a) A child who is abandoned, surrendered, neglected, dependent or orphaned;

(b) A child who is a victim of sexual, physical, or any other form of abuse or exploitation;
(c) A child with special needs;
(d) A child whose family members are temporarily or permanently unable or unwilling to provide the
child with adequate care;
(e) A child awaiting adoptive placement and who would have to be prepared for family life;
(f) A child who needs long-term care and close family ties but who cannot be placed for domestic
adoption;
(g) A child whose adoption has been disrupted;
(h) A child who is under socially difficult circumstances such as, but not limited to, a street child, a child
in armed conflict or a victim of child labor or trafficking;
(i) A child who committed a minor offense but is released on recognizance, or who is in custody
supervision or whose case is dismissed; and
(j) A child who is in need of special protection as assessed by a social worker, an agency or the DSWD.

Provided, That in the case of (b), (c), (f), (h), (i), and (j), the child must have no family willing and capable of
caring and providing for him.
Section 5. Who May Be a Foster Parent. An applicant who meets all of the following qualifications may be a
foster parent:
(a) Must be of legal age;
(b) Must be at least sixteen (16) years older than the child unless the foster parent is a relative;
(c) Must have a genuine interest, capacity and commitment in parenting and is able to provide a familial
atmosphere for the child;
(d) Must have a healthy and harmonious relationship with each family member living with him or her;
(e) Must be of good moral character;
(f) Must be physically and mentally capable and emotionally mature;
(g) Must have sufficient resources to be able to provide for the familys needs;
(h) Must be willing to further hone or be trained on knowledge, attitudes and skills in caring for a child;
and
(i) Must not already have the maximum number of children under his foster care at the time of
application or award, as may be provided in the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of this Act.
Provided, That in determining who is the best suited foster parent, the relatives of the child shall be given
priority, so long as they meet the above qualifications: Provided, further, That an alien possessing the above
qualifications and who has resided in the Philippines for at least twelve (12) continuous months and
maintains such residence until the termination of placement by the DSWD or expiration of the foster family
license, may qualify as a foster parent.
ARTICLE III
PARENTAL AUTHORITY OF FOSTER PARENTS
Section 6. Parental Authority of a Foster Parent. Foster parents shall have the rights, duties and liabilities of
persons exercising substitute parental authority, as may be provided under the Family Code over the children
under their foster care.
Section 7. Limitations on Parental Authority of Foster Parents. Foster parents shall only have the rights of a
person with special parental authority to discipline the foster children as defined under Section 233 of the
Family Code, insofar as it prohibits the infliction of corporal punishment upon the child.
ARTICLE IV
PROCEDURE
Section 8. Recruitment and Development of Foster Parents. To recruit applications for foster care, the
DSWD shall reach out to various communities and LGUs and work preferably with the Local Council for the
Protection of Children (LCPC).
Section 9. Submission of Home Study Report. The social worker shall make a detailed Home Study Report of
an applicants background and circumstances, carried out in a series of planned visits and interviews, in order
to determine if the applicant meets the basic requirements for foster care and is suitable to become a foster
parent.
Section 10. Issuance of License. The DSWD shall issue a Foster Family Care License based on the Home
Study Report submitted by the agency to determine the motivations, capacities and potentials for
development of applicants. The license is renewable every three (3) years unless earlier revoked by the
DSWD.
Section 11. Matching. Matching shall be done by the agency only after the child case study and the home
study have been conducted, save for exceptions to be determined by the DSWD, taking into consideration the
best interests of the child.

The child case study report shall establish the needs of the child for consideration in the selection of the
foster parent. Likewise, the Home Study Report shall establish said foster parents capacity and resources to
provide a safe, secure and losing home to the child.
Section 12. Placement. The physical transfer of the child to the foster parent shall be allowed only after the
FPA has been issued, save for exceptions to be determined by the DSWD, taking into consideration the best
interest of the child.
Section 13. Supervision of Foster Placement. Supervised foster placement begins as soon as the foster
parent receives the child into his care. During the foster placement, the social worker shall conduct regular
home visits to monitor the childs adjustment in the foster home and shall submit progress reports to the
DSWD.
In case of incident, injury or death of a foster child, or if he runs away or gets lost, such case shall be reported
immediately to the agency, which, in turn, shall immediately report the same to the DSWD.
Section 14. Termination of Placement. Termination of placement shall be done by the DSWD, upon
recommendation of the agency, on the following grounds:
(a) Return of the child to biological parents;
(b) Placement for adoption of the child;
(c) Death of the child;
(d) Death of both foster parents;
(e) Expiration of the FPA; and
(f) In all cases where placement becomes prejudicial to the welfare of the child, such as, but not limited
to, abandonment, maltreatment, sexual assault, violence or other forms of abuse.
Provided, That in the case of (f), the foster child, with the assistance of a registered social worker, shall have
the option to apply for termination of placement.
ARTICLE V
LONG-TERM FOSTER PLACEMENT
Section 15. Long-Term Foster Placement Authority. If a child has been under the care of a foster parent for a
period of at least seven (7) years, the said foster parent may apply for Long-Term Foster Placement Authority
(LTFPA), subject to the following conditions:
(a) The childs return to his biological parents or placement in an adoptive family is not imminent;
(b) The foster parent continues to possess the qualifications required under tins Act and a valid foster
family care license for the entire duration of the foster care;
(c) The child, if ten (10) years of age or over, duly assisted by a social worker, gives written consent for
long-term stay with the foster parent; and
(d) Aside from the regular monitoring visits, the DSWD shall reassess and reevaluate the foster home
situation every three (3) years, to determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to continue
living in the foster home on a long-term basis.
LTFPA grants the foster parent custody over the foster child without the requirement of the eventuality of
adoption of the latter by the former. During this period, the foster child shall enjoy the rights of a child under
Article 3 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, and under other laws: Provided, That there shall be no
mandatory rights of succession in favor of the foster child.
Section 16. Long-Term Foster Care Commitment. Taking into consideration the stability and best interest of
the foster child, a foster parent, who unilaterally terminates the LTFPA before the foster child reaches the age
of majority or finishes tertiary education, shall make provisions for the education and basic needs of the
foster child, in accordance with the standards in which the child has been raised or has become accustomed
to, within the said period: Provided, That the faster parent has the means to support the foster child in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

ARTICLE VI
ADOPTION OF A FOSTER CHILD
Section 17. Conditions. A foster parent may adopt his foster child subject to the following conditions:
(a) The foster parent must have all the qualifications as provided for by Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 or Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995, as the case may be;
(b) The trial custody, as required in adoption, may be waived: Provided, That a harmonious relationship
exists between the child and his foster parent and family members; and
(c) The procedures for adoption, for purposes of this Act, shall be governed by Domestic Adoption Act of
1998 or Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, as the case may be.
ARTICLE VII
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
Section 18. Role of Local Government Units (LGUs). LGUs shall promote the foster care system in their
respective territorial jurisdictions.
Section 19. Funding. In accordance with the Local Government Code, LGUs shall primarily be responsible for
social welfare services which include foster care programs. However, the national government shall provide
financial support, priority given to third (3 rd), fourth (4 th) and fifth (5 th) class municipalities.1wphi1
Section 20. Seminars and Trainings. The DSWD, in coordination with the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG), is hereby mandated to develop and provide programs to ensure the awareness and
responsiveness of local government officials in the promotion and development of the foster care system in
every city, municipality or barangay.
ARTICLE VIII
ASSISTANCE AND INCENTIVES
Section 21. Assistance to a Foster Child.
(a) Foster Child Subsidy. A foster child, through the agency, shall be entitled to a monthly subsidy from
the DSWD, subject to existing government auditing rules and regulations. The subsidy is primarily aimed
at supporting the expenses of the child to lessen the financial burden on the foster parent: Provided, That
support may be waived if the foster parent is capable of supporting the foster child.
(b) Health Insurance. A foster child shall automatically be a PhilHealth beneficiary of the foster parent
and as such, entitled to health insurance benefits. If the foster parent is not a PhilHealth member, he must
seek enrollment with PhilHealth. LGUs and agencies shall provide assistance to the foster parents to
ensure enrollment.
Section 22. Assistance and Incentives to Foster Parent.

(a) Support Care Services. The DSWD, the social service units of LGUs and agencies shall provide
support care services to include, but not limited to, counseling, visits, training on child care and
development, respite care, skills training and livelihood assistance.
(b) Additional Exemption for Dependents. For purposes of claiming the Twenty-five thousand pesos
(PhP 25,000.00) additional exemption for foster parents for each dependent not exceeding four (4) as
provided for by Republic Act No. 9504, the definition of the term "dependent" under Section 35(B) of the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 shall be amended to include "foster child": Provided, That
all other conditions provided for under the aforesaid section of the NIRC of 1997 must be complied with:
Provided, further. That this additional exemption shall be allowed only if the period of foster care is at
least a continuous period of one (1) taxable year.
For purposes of this section, only one (1) foster parent can treat the foster child as a dependent for a
particular taxable year. As such, no other parent or foster parent can claim the said child as a dependent for
that period.
Section 23. Incentives to Agencies. Agencies shall be entitled to the following tax incentives:

(a) Exemption from Income Tax. Agencies shall be exempt from income tax on the income derived by it
as such organization pursuant to Section 30 of the NIRC of 1997, as implemented by Revenue Regulation
(RR) No. 13-98; and
(b) Qualification as a Donee Institution. Agencies can also apply for qualification as a donee institution.
Section 24. Incentives to Donors. Donors of an agency shall be entitled to the following:
(a) Allowable Deductions. Donors shall be granted allowable deductions from its gross income to the
extent of the amount donated to agencies in accordance with Section 34(H) of the NIRC of 1997; and
(b) Exemption from Donors Tax. Donors shall be exempted from donors tax under Section 101 of the
NIRC of 1997: Provided, That not more than thirty percent (30%) of the amount of donations shall be
spent for administrative expenses.
ARTICLE IX
PENALTIES
Section 25. Penalties.
(a) Any foster parent, found to be committing any act of neglect, abuse, cruelty, or exploitation and other
similar acts prejudicial to the childs development, shall be penalized in accordance with Republic Act No.
7610, otherwise known as "An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, Providing For Its Violation, and For Other Purposes", and
other applicable laws.
(b) An agency which violates Sections 11, 12, 13 or any other provision of this Act and its IRR shall suffer
the following penalties:
(1) For the first violation, a fine of not less than Twenty-five thousand pesos (PhP 25,000.00) but not
exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000.00); and
(2) For any subsequent violation, a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000.00) but not
exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000.00), and revocation of license to operate.
(c) Any person, natural or juridical, other than the foster parent or any agency, violating any provision of
this Act and its IRR shall be penalized with imprisonment of one (1) month to six (6) years, depending on
the gravity of the offense or a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (Php 10,000.00) but not more than
One hundred thousand pesos (PhP 100,000.00), or both, at the discretion of the court.
(d) If the offender is a public official, the court may impose the additional penalty of disqualification from
office in addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraph.
ARTICLE X
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 26. Foster Care Committee. The Regional Child Welfare Specialist Group of the DSWD shall serve as
the Foster Care Committee, which shall have the following functions:
(a) Review and deliberate issues affecting the placement of a particular child;
(b) Make recommendations to resolve any dispute between and among the agency, the parents, the foster
parents and the child;
(c) Monitor the implementation, review, and recommend changes in policies concerning foster care and
other matters related to the childs welfare;
(d) Submit to the Secretary of the DSWD and to Congress an annual report of the policies, programs and
activities relative to the implementation of this Act; and
(e) Perform such other functions and duties as may be prescribed by the DSWD.
Section 27. Appropriation. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in
the General Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment into law and thereafter. An initial amount
of Twenty-five million pesos (PhP 25,000,000.00) shall be allocated for the first year of its operation. Such
sum shall be intended to support the foster care programs of the DSWD and agencies.
Section 28. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The DSWD, as lead agency, the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Department of Health (DOH), the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the Council on Welfare of
Children (CWC), the DILG and other concerned government agencies, in consultation with agencies are

hereby mandated to prepare and draft the IRR to operationalize the provisions of this Act within (3) months
from its effectivity.
Section 29. Suppletory Clause. The provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application to this Act.
Section 30. Repealing Clause. Any law, presidential decree, issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule and regulation contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act is hereby
repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
Section 31. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other
provisions not affected hereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 32. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
Aguilar v. Siasat, 748 SCRA 555 (2015)

Doctrine/s:
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, liation may be proved by an admission of legitimate liation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, and such due
recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required.
Facts:
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar died intestate without debts leaving two parcels of
land. Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar led a case for mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Siasat
alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Thus, he was entitled to the said
parcels of land. Respondent on the other hand claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of
the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and
kindness of heart. That petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the Aguilar spouses and since Alfredo
Aguilar predeceased his wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal share of the former.
RTC ruled that petitioner is not deemed vested with sucient interest in this action for failure to support
evidentiary evidence to show his liation to the spouses. The decision of the RTC was armed in toto with
stating that the use of a family surname certainly does not establish pedigree. Hence, plainti-appellants
evidence failed to hurdle the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish ones
legitimate liation when relying upon the provisions regarding open and continuous possession or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Issue:
Whether or not SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G) satises the requirement for proof of liation and relationship
under Article 172 of the Family Code particularly[paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19 and
Section 23, Rule 132 o fthe Rules of Court.
Held:
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2)
any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in
a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. It must be concluded that Rodolfo who was
born during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar and before their respective deaths
has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. He correctly argues, Alfredo
Aguilars SSS satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under
Article 172 of the Family Code; by itself, said document constitutes an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

Braza vs. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, 607 SCRA 638 (2009)
Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married. In 2002, Pablo died in a vehicular accident.
During the wake, respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced
themselves as the wife and son, respectively, of Pablo. Cristina made inquiries in the course of which she
obtained Patricks birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which stated that: (1)
Pablo is the father of Patrick having acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; and, (2) Patrick was
legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents; hence, his name was changed to Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were
married in 1998.
Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a
petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They
contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between
Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between
her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the:

1. Correction of the entries in Patricks birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father
and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name BRAZA;
2. A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;
3. The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose,
the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
The trial court dismissed the petition holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court,
which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test, and that the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Issue:
May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct entries in
the civil registrar?
Held:
No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in
the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error
is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber;
a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled
or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly
observed.
The petitioners cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for
being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively;
hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize
that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before
the court a quo.

Calimag v. Heirs of Silvestra N. Macapaz, 791 SCRA 620 (2016)
Facts:
Virginia D. Calimag (petitioner) co-owned the property, the subject matter of this case, with Silvestra N.
Macapaz (Silvestra).
On the other hand, Anastacio P. Macapaz, Jr. (Anastacio, Jr.) and Alicia Macapaz-Ritua (Alicia) (respondents)
are the children of Silvestra's brother, Anastacio Macapaz, Sr. (Anastacio, Sr.) and Fidela O. Poblete Vda. de
Macapaz (Fidela).
The subject property, duly registered in the names of the petitioner (married to Demetrio Calimag) and
Silvestra under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 183088.5 In said certificate of title, appearing as Entry
No. 02671 is an annotation of an Adverse Claim of Fidela asserting rights and interests over a portion of the
said property measuring 49.5 sq m.
On November 11, 2002, Silvestra died without issue. On July 7, 2005, TCT No. 183088 was cancelled and a
new certificate of title, TCT No. 221466,7 was issued in the name of the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Sale
dated January 18, 2005 whereby Silvestra allegedly sold her 99-sq-m portion to the petitioner for
P300,000.00. Included among the documents submitted for the purpose of cancelling TCT No. 183088 was an
Affidavit dated July 12, 2005 purportedly executed by both the petitioner and Silvestra. It was stated therein
that the affidavit of adverse claim filed by Fidela was not signed by the Deputy Register of Deeds of Makati
City, making the same legally ineffective. On September 16, 2005, Fidela passed away.
On December 15, 2005, Anastacio, Jr. filed a criminal complaint for two counts of falsification of public
documents under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code against the petitioner. However, said
criminal charges were eventually dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the respondents, asserting that they are the heirs of Silvestra, instituted the action for
Annulment of Deed of Sale and Cancellation of TCT No. 221466 with Damages against the petitioner and the
Register of Deeds of Makati City.
In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,13 the petitioner averred that the respondents have no legal
capacity to institute said civil action on the ground that they are illegitimate children of Anastacio, Sr. As such,
they have no right over Silvestra's estate pursuant to Article 992 of the Civil Code which prohibits illegitimate
children from inheriting intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of their father and mother.
The RTC found that the Deed of Sale dated January 18, 2005 presented for the cancellation of TCT No. 183088
was a forgery considering that Silvestra, who purportedly executed said deed of sale died on November 11,
2002, about three years before the execution of the said Deed of Sale.16 Respecting the respondents' legal
capacity to sue, the RTC favorably ruled in this wise:
Demetrio Calimag, Jr. sought, but failed, to impugn the personality of the [respondents] to initiate this action
as the alleged heirs of [Silvestra]. The marriage between [Anastacio Sr.J and [FidclaJ is evidenced by the
Certificate of (canonical) Marriage (Exh. "M"). The name 'Fidela Obera Poblete' is indicated in [the
respondents'] respective birth certificates as the mother's maiden name but Fidela signed the same as the
informant as "Fidela P. Macapaz". In both birth certificates, "Anastacio Nator Macapaz" is indicated as the
name of the father.
SC held that photocopy of marriage license which did not met the validity requirements and certificate of
canonical marriage, a private document are not enough to prove the marriage of the parents of the heirs of
Macapaz. However, their birth certificates are prima facie evidence of marriage without evidence to the
contrary. Also, AlWAYS ASSUME MARRIAGE.
Uy v. Chua, 600 SCRA 806 (2009)

Doctrine: A compromise agreement which denies filiation and has the effect of waiving any action for future
support and succession is void.

Facts:
Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 a Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation
against JOSE NGO CHUA. Jose filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the instant petition is barred by
res judicata as the issues involve was already resolve in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB wherein Joanie
filed a similar petition in 2000 which ended up in a compromise agreement duly approved by the court. In the
said compromise agreement, Joanie admitted that she is not an illegitimate child of Jose Chua. Joanie opposed
the Demurrer and argued that the question on the civil status, future support and future legitime cannot be
subject to compromise. Issue:
Whether or not a judicially approved compromise agreement denying filiation may serve as proof to deny
filiation and consequently bar any future action for recognition, support or succession.
Held:
No. Article 2035 of the Civil Code provides that no compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts; and
(6) Future legitime.
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent obviously intended to settle the question of
petitioners status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimate child of respondent. It is settled, then, in law
and jurisprudence, that the status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy demands that
there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child. Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is
a relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights
and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot be rendered
operative even by the parties' alleged performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations. Neither can
it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the Compromise Agreement, already made said contract valid and
legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent is void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission petitioner made therein may
still be appreciated against her in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only reminded that
while petitioners admission may have evidentiary value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack
of filiation.
Puno v. Puno Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 177066, Sep. 11, 2009
FACTS:
Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On
March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint
for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the
latters common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges
of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to
inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give
petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue
because his birth certificate names him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial
declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and the same. After submitting his
corrected birth certificate, the court ordered Jesusa Puno and/or Felicidad Fermin to allow the plaintiff to
inspect the corporate books and records of the company from 1962 up to the present including the financial
statements of the corporation. CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11,
2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L.
Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory
acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to
demand that he be allowed to examine respondents books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the
corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation.

His action for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to
prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the
latter.
ISSUE: WON petitioner automatically became stockholder of the corporation and acquire the rights and
privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation.
HELD: No. Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The
stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be
recorded in the books of the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall
be valid, except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During
such interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly
appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock.
Until a settlement and division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the
administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled
to exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in
this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondents
books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that
some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner
has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Corollary
to this is the doctrine that a determination of whether a person, claiming proprietary rights over the estate of
a deceased person, is an heir of the deceased must be ventilated in a special proceeding instituted precisely
for the purpose of settling the estate of the latter. The status of an illegitimate child who claims to be an heir
to a decedents estate cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action, as in a case for the recovery of
property. The doctrine applies to the instant case, which is one for specific performance to direct
respondent corporation to allow petitioner to exercise rights that pertain only to the deceased and his
representatives. Petition denied.
Geronimo v. Santos, 771 SCRA 508 (2015)

In her complaint for annulment of document and recovery of possession, Karen alleged that she is the only
child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo; with the death of her parents, one half of a
parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219 passd on to her by intestacy; lately, she
discovered that defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, Rufinos brothers, executed a document entitled
as Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman where they declared themselves the only heirs of spouses Rufino and
Caridad and adjudicated unto themselves the property, took possession of the same and transferred the tax
declaration in their names. In answer, the defendants denied the allegation that Karen was the only child of
Rufino and Caridad; the spouses were in fact childless, and took in Karen, Caridads sisters child, as their
ward. Karens birth certificate was merely a simulated document, as it was impossible for Rufino and Caridad
to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur as they never lived or sojourned in the place. Caridad was an
elementary teacher in Bulacan who never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service from
August, 1963 to October, 1984.
During trial, Karen took the stand and testified for herself. She testified that the lot in question was co-owned
by Rufino and Carmen San Juan, Eugenio and Emilianos mother. On her death in 1980, Rufinos share in the
property devolved upon his heirs. In 1988, she and Caridad executed an instrument entitled Pagmamanahan
Sa Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, where Caridad waived all her rights to Rufinos share
in the land in question. In 1985, guardianship proceedings were instituted where it was established that
Caridad was the minor child of Caridad with her late husband Rufino. In their defense, Eugenio testified that
Caridad and Rufino could not bear a child, hence they decided to adopt Caridads niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos
Sur, who joined the adoptive household in 1972, 13 years after the marriage. In the belief that the spouses
had no direct heir, he and his brother executed the questioned document. Karens birth certificates, he
alleged, contained irregular features. It was written in pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was
erased, and the word and figure April 6, 1972 written, and the name Emma Dano superimposed on the entry
in the box intended for the informants signaure. Two other witnesses testified. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal
consultant of the DECSA brought the service record of Caridad to show that she did not avail of maternity

leave during her tenure; Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, confirmed the alteration in the birth
certificate, and considered the document questionable.
The Mere Registration Of A Child In His Or Her Birth Certificate As The Child Of The Supposed Parents Is Not
A Valid Adoption, Does Not Confer Upon The Child The Status Of An Adopted Child And The Legal Rights Of
Such Child, And Even Amounts To Simulation Of The Childs Birth Or Falsification Of His Or Her Birth
Certificate, Which Is A Public Document.
Arado v. Alcoran, 762 SCRA 37 (2015)

Facts:
Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and their marriage produced a son named Nicolas
Alcoran. In turn, Nicolas married Florencia, but their union had no offspring. Nicolas had an extramarital
affair with Francisca Sarita, who gave birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran on July 13, 1951 during the
subsistence of Nicolas marriage to Florencia.
Raymundo died leaving properties to Nicolas and his wife. Nicolas died subsequently leaving the properties
to his illegitimate son. Joaquina died shortly thereafter with a will. Anacleto claims entitlement to the
properties as the heir of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina
ISSUE: Whether or not an illegitimate child has a right to inherit from his father.
HELD:
No, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother, as provided for under Article 992 of the Civil Code; in the same manner, such children or
relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the
right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of
a legitimate grandparent. Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the latters last
will and testament. Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass either real or personal
property unless the same is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. In Gallanosa v.
Arcangel that in order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory.
Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, 594 SCRA 648 (2009)

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father,
and because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child.
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial
court held that even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the
same does not contain any express recognition of paternity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be
considered as a recognition of paternity.
RULING: Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of
his/her father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in
a pubic of private handwritten instrument.
Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the
private handwritten instrument.
The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging
parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it
suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging
parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Perla vs. Baring, 685 SCRA 101 (2012)

Establishing Filiation Of Legitimate Children [ART. 172 FC]
Facts:
Mirasol Baring and her minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC a Complaint for support against Antonio
Perla.
Petitioners allege that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as common-law spouses for 2 years and as a
result, Randy was born. Antonio subsequently abandoned them to become a seaman.
However, Antonio, who had a family of his own, denied having fathered Randy.
During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth and Baptismal Certificate and claimed
that Antonio supplied the information in the said certificates. Randy, on his part, claimed that he knew
Antonio to be his father, calling Antonio Papa during their first meeting. Also, it was alleged that Randy
lived with Aunt Lelita (Antonios relative) for one week who treated Randy as a relative.
On the other hand, Antonio admitted to having sexual intercourse with Mirasol, but denied having
supplied the information in the certificates.
Issue: WON Randy is entitled to support from Antonio.

Held: No.
The lower courts failed to establish the illegitimate filiation between Randy and Antonio since they based
their decisions on the certificates of Live Birth and Baptism, despite the absence of Antonios signature on
the said documents.
In Cabatania v. CA, it was held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is
not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of said certificate.
Randys testimony of having met his father for the first time and his living with Aunt Lelita cannot be
considered as indications of open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child under
Article 172 and 174 of the Family Code.
Lastly, nothing from Mirasols testimonies sufficiently prove that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio
prior to the usual period of pregnancy or 9 months before the birth of Randy.
Makati Shangri-la Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Harper, 679 SCRA 444 (2012)
Establishing Filiation Of Legitimate Children [ART. 172 FC]
Facts:
The alleged widow and the son of the Christian Harpers death in Shangrilla premises wants to prove in court
filiation with the deceased for standing in court. Documents presented were Birth Certificates of father and
son and Marriage Certificate.
Issue:
W/N the Plaintiffs-Appellees were able to prove with competent evidence the affirmative allegations in the
complain that they are the widow and son of Mr. Christian Harper?
Held:
In this case, the respondents were able to present the mentioned documents, all of which were presumably
regarded as public documents under the laws of Norway. Such documentary evidence sufficed to competently
establish the relationship and filiation under the standards of our Rules of Court.
Montefalcon v. Vasquez, 554 SCRA 513 (2008)

FACTS:
In 1999, petitioner Dolores P. Montefalcon filed a Complaint for acknowledgment and support against
respondent Ronnie S. Vasquez before the RTC of Naga City. Alleging that her son Laurence (co-petitioner) is

the illegitimate child of Vasquez, she prayed that Vasquez be obliged to give support to their son, whose
certificate of live birth he signed as father. According to petitioners, Vasquez only gave a total of P19,000 as
support for Laurence since Laurence was born in 1993, and allegedly refused to give him regular school
allowance despite repeated demands. Petitioner Dolores added that she and Vasquez are not legally married,
and that Vasquez has his own family.
A sheriff tried to serve the summons and complaint on Vasquez in Aro-aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Vasquez's grandfather received them as Vasquez was in Manila. Vasquez's mother returned the documents to
the clerk of court, who informed the court of the non-service of summons. Petitioners then filed a motion to
declare Vasquez in default. The court denied it for lack of proper service of summons.
An alias summon was served in 2000 at the Taguig address of Vasquez, and was received by his caretaker
Bejer but the sheriff's return incorrectly stated "Lazaro" as Vasquez's surname. Another alias summon was
served this time with the correct name of Vasquez, received by Bejer and sheriff in turn issued a certificate
that summon was duly served.
On petitioners motion, the trial court declared Vasquez in default for failure to file an answer despite the
substituted service of summons. Vasquez was furnished with court orders and notices of the proceedings at
his last known address. Noting that Vasquez is a seafarer and left the country on January 24, 2000 and came
back on October 12, 2000
Vasquez filed a petition on appeal contending that the court never acquired jurisdiction over his person and
the awarding of support as excessive. CA granted his appeal ruling on the service of summons was defective
as there was no proof of impossibility in personal service and an attempt to effect such.
Vasquez countered that because he was abroad; service of summons should have been personal or by
publication as substituted service is proper only if a defendant is in the country. Vasquez also added that the
sheriffs return did not state that he exerted efforts to personally serve the summons.
In their reply, petitioners insisted that a substituted service is the normal method if one is temporarily
away from the country as personal service abroad or by publication are not ordinary means of service.
ISSUES:
1) Whether there is a valid substituted service of summons on Vasquez to clothe the trial court with
jurisdiction over his person.
2) Whether he is obliged to give support to co-petitioner Laurence.
RULING:
1) Yes. To acquire jurisdiction over the person of a defendant, service of summons must be personal, or if
this is not feasible within a reasonable time, then by substituted service. It is of judicial notice that
overseas Filipino seafarers are contractual employees. They go back to the country once their contracts
expire, and wait for the signing of another contract with the same or new manning agency and principal if
they wish. In this case, respondent Vasquez hails from Camarines Sur but he has lived in Taguig City
when the complaint was filed. Notice may then be taken that he has established a residence in either
place. Residence is a place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service
was made, even though he was temporarily abroad at the time. As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a
Filipino resident temporarily out of the country. Section 16 of Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure is not
mandatory in nature, hence, personal service out of the country was impracticable. The substituted
service of summons was correctly diligently done by the sheriff when he ascertained first the
whereabouts of Vasquez. Adding also that, the person who received the alias summons was of suitable
age and discretion, then residing at Vasquezs dwelling. However, concluding that Vasquez had sufficient
time to argue and to file a motion for reconsideration, he was silent.
2) Yes. Laurence Montefalcon is entitled for support as provided in Article 175 of the Civil Code, provided
further in Article 172 of the same code. Laurences record of birth is an authentic, relevant and admissible
piece of evidence to prove paternity and filiation. Vasquez did not deny that Laurence is his child with
Dolores. He signed as father in Laurences certificate of live birth, a public document. He supplied the
data entered in it. Thus, it is a competent evidence of filiation as he had a hand in its preparation. In fact,
if the child had been recognized by any of the modes in the first paragraph of Article 172, there is no
further need to file any action for acknowledgment because any of said modes is by itself a consummated
act. In addition, Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his illegitimate
child and the amount is variable depending on the needs of the child.

Guy v. CA, 502 SCRA 151 (2006)
FACTS: SIma Wei (Rifino Guy Susim) died intestate on October 29,1992 leaving an estate valued at 10M. His
known heirs are his surviving spouse and their 5 children. On June 1997, minors Karen and Kamille Wei, as
represented by their mother, alleging as the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of the decedent, filed a
petition of administration before the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two alleged children of the deceased are barred by prescription from proving their
filiation.
HELD:
Citing Bernabe v Alejo that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to
4 years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired by the FC. Art 172 provides, the
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment
2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or
2) Any other means allowedby the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art 172 provides, the action claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child during minority or in a state of insanity.
In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of 5 yrs within which to institute the action.
Art 175 provides further that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription
depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. A natural
child having a right to compel acknowledgement, but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may retain
partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs; and the same person may
intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. In
neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment.
Grande vs. Antonio, 716 SCRA 698 (2014)

FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone els. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard Patrick, both minors. The children were not
expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the record of births of the children in the Civil Registry. The
parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with prayer
to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity
of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of
Antonio as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth and causing
the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth
from Grande to Antonio; granting the right of parental authority over the minors; granting the primary right

and immediate custody over the minors; and ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly
ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her
illegitimate children.
The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing the Office of the Civil Registrar General and the City
Civil
Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of the minors in their respective
certificates of live birth, and record the same in the register of births; ordering Antonio to deliver the custody
to their mother;
Antonio shall have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are directed to give and share in support of
the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by respondent
Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally protected best-interest-
of- the-child clause, compels the use by the children of the surname ANTONIO.
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to Antonio.
When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation.
Held: The petition is partially granted filiation Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255 which now reads:
Art. 176: Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother,
and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child. The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his
or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child
may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio
when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is
enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental
authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not
the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children. Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from
ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation. Respondents position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has
no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by
its words. The use of the word may in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is
under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word may is permissive and operates
to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.

In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim, 588 SCRA 98 (2009)
The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not
equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the dissolution
of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is required.
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor
children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of
DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in
1998, Primo died. She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided
to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth
of a child. In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court.
Michelle was then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.
ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife
shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly
adopts, they shall jointly exercise parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption
of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since
the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to
adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements
that he must comply as an American Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The
requirements on residency and certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and
rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and
physical character and well-being.
Castro vs. Gregorio, 738 SCRA 415 (2014)

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive
rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Facts:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to annul the
judgment of the trial court that granted Rs decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated later on due
to their incompatibilities and Joses alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage bore two daughters: Rose
Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to congenital heart disease, and Joanne
Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).
On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio
(Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosarios housekeeper). After a Home Study Report conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been remiss in
providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly raised and provided

financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and allege lover, Larry, and even
went to the extent of adopting Larrys two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and
consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he
always offered help but it was often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate
children thats why he adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.
Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of the TC
approving Jed and Reginas adoption.
Petitioner allege that Rosarios consent was not obtained and the document purporting as Rosarios affidavit
of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Reginas birth certificates shows disparity. One set shows
that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged
that Jed and Regina are not actually Joses illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and
Larry who were married at the time of their birth. CA denied the petition.
CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled that there is
no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . . should be personally
notified of the hearing.
CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was, therefore, beyond the
scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could not be classified as extrinsic fraud,
which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.
Issues:
Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is required?
Decision:
The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the
proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested party, as in
this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the trial.
Joses actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption.
Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Joses
petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other conclusion
than that because of Joses acts, the trial court granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent
circumstances.
RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of
his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides for several
exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born
out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first
obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married
despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopters children if they are 10 years old or older (ART. III,
Sec. 9, RA 8552).

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of
summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive
rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never
validly acquired jurisdiction.
Bartolome v. SSS, 740 SCRA 78 (2014)

TOPIC: Civil status of adopted upon death of adopter, biological parent of adoptee as beneficiary
FACTS:
John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the
governments Employees Compensation Program (ECP). He died due to an accident while on board the
vessel. John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits.
SSS denied the claim on the ground that Bernardina was no longer considered as the parent of John since the
latter was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. As such, it is Cornelio who qualifies as Johns primary
beneficiary, not petitioner.
According to the records, Cornelio died during Johns minority.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the death of the adopter during the adoptees minority results to the restoration of the
parental authority to the biological parents of the latter.
2) Whether or not Bernardina is considered as a legal beneficiary of John.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: Yes.
The Court ruled that Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor in the case at bar.
Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological
parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that
there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if
the adopter passed away?
The Court also applied by analogy, insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned, the provisions of law on
rescission of adoption wherein if said petition is granted, the parental authority of the adoptees biological
parents shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated.
The manner herein of terminating the adopters parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission,
justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the
consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that
the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe estate of
their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered
employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis--vis the
right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the
blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which, the Court ruled, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offsprings adoptive parent.
SECOND ISSUE: Yes.

The Court held that Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise
during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, Johns sole remaining beneficiary.
In re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541 (2005)
FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
prayed that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art.
189 of the Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she
remains to be an intestate heir of her mother.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children
To Use The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC
merely provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption,
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother.
Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1 (2016)

Facts:
Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo
Militar in 1968. Parental care and custody over her was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar and his wife. Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.
1991 Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein
2001 She became a naturalized US citizen
First quarter of 2005 she came back to the Philippines to permanently reside herein
February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to dispose family belongings
July 18, 2006 she re-acquired Filipino citizenship
According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election, she has been a resident
of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months (reckoned from year 2006 when she re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225).
Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016 elections (hence, computing from May, 2013, she has
been a resident in the Philippines for 9 years and 6 months only)
However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up to the
day before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005(when she returned
from the US to the Philippines for good).

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.
Issues/Rulings:
1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen? Yes, based on:
a) Circumstantial evidence
b) Legislation
c) Generally accepted principles of international law
Circumstantial evidence
There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
xxx. [T]here is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official Statistics
from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the
Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10 Million. On this basis,
there is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would indicate
more than ample probability that Poes parents are Filipinos.
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poes parents are the fact that:
1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo
2. She has typical Filipino features.
There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature. On
this basis, it is safer to assume that Poes parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.
Legislation
Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.
The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as natural
born citizens was not carried out, not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.
Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in
the first place to be adopted.
Recent legislation all expressly refer to Filipino children and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.
Generally accepted principles of international law

The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:
1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling is
presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)
2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found) bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.
Poes evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are
recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which it is found.
2) After renouncing her American citizenship and after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen? Yes, Poes
repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as natural
born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).
3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency requirement? Yes, she will have been a resident for 10 years
and 11 months on the day of the election.
[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently
abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on May
24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email correspondences with
freight company to arrange for the shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau; school
records of her children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on June 2005
etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that
when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.
Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC was only a mistake in good faith. As explained by
Grace Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she
submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period
when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by
her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. Such a mistake could be given in
evidence against her but it was by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming evidence submitted by
Poe.

4: Arts. 74-162, FC Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642 (2012) - Facts

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4: Arts. 74-162, FC Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642 (2012) - Facts

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4: Arts.

Quiao vs. Quiao, 675 SCRA 642 (2012).

Mary Michelle Ong 68

Mary Michelle Ong 69

Hapitan v. Lagradilla, 780 SCRA 288 (2016)

Mary Michelle Ong 70

Aggabao vs. Parulan, 629 SCRA 562 (2010)

Mary Michelle Ong 71

Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

Mary Michelle Ong 72

Flores v. Lindo, Jr., 648 SCRA 772

Nobleza v. Nuega, 752 SCRA 602 (2015)

Mary Michelle Ong 73

Heirs of Patricio Go, Sr. v. Servacio, 657 SCRA 10 (2011)

Issue: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.

Held: The appeal lacks merit.

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Domingo v. Molina, 791 SCRA 47 (2016)

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PNB vs. Garcia, 724 SCRA 280 (2014).

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Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

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Orion Savings Bank v. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)

Matthews vs. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584 , June 22, 2009.

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Buado vs. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 397 (2009)

Dewara vs. Lamela, 647 SCRA 483 (2011)

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Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, 604 SCRA 120 (2009)

2.) Sale was VOID

3.) Buyers in bad faith; no reimbursement

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Fuentes vs. Roca, 618 SCRA 702

Bautista vs. Silva, 502 SCRA 334 (2006)

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Ventura, Jr. vs. Abuda, 708 SCRA 640 (2013)

HELD: No. CA decision sustained

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Borromeo v. Descallar, 580 SCRA 175 (2009)

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Josef vs. Santos, 572 SCRA 57 (2008)

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Ramos vs. Pangilinan, 625 SCRA 181 (2010)

Issue: WON the said property is a family home.

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Olivia-De Mesa vs. Acero, Jr., 663 SCRA 40 (2012)

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Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc., 557 SCRA 499 (2008)

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Patricio vs. Dario III, 507 SCRA 438 (2006)

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Arriola v. Arriola, 542 SCRA 666 (2008)

Cabang v. Basay, 582 SCRA 172 (2009)

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Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103 (2015)

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R.A. No. 9858

R.A. No. 9523 March 12, 2009

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