#1
, Army-Air Force Exchange
[G.R. NO. 116123.MARCH 13, 1997]
SERGIO F. NAGUIAT, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND
STYLE SERGIO F. NAGUIAT ENT., INC., & CLARK FIELD TAXI,
INC.,PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION), NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF
WORKINGMEN AND ITS MEMBERS, LEONARDO T. GALANG,ET
AL.,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN,J.:
Are private respondent-employees of petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc., who
were separated from service due to the closure of Clark Air Base, entitled
to separation pay and, if so, in what amount? Are ocers of
corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies
they represent for the payment of separation pay?
working sixteen (16) days a month.
These questions are answered by the Court in resolving this petition
forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions
of the National Labor Relations Commission (Third Division)
[1] promulgated on February 28, 1994,[2] and May 31, 1994.[3] The
February 28, 1994 Resolution armed with modifications the
decision[4] of Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos in NLRC Case No. RAB-
III-12-2477-91. The second Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners.
authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to grant its
The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting
separation pay to herein individual respondents in the increased amount
of US$120.00 for every year of service or its peso equivalent, and holding
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat, jointly and severally liable with Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI").
of service "for humanitarian consideration," setting aside the earlier
The Facts
The following facts are derived from the records of the case:
forced to close business due to "great financial losses and lost business
Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force
Exchange Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within
Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president, while Antolin T.
Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises,
Incorporated ("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned
corporation.
separation pay would be inhuman to complainants but to impose a
Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab
drivers. During their employment, they were required to pay a daily
"boundary fee" in the amount of US$26.50 for those working from 1:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon, and US$27.00 for those working from 12:00 noon to
12:00 midnight. All incidental expenses for the maintenance of the
vehicles they were driving were accounted against them, including
gasoline expenses.
Resolution, the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the
availability of taxicabs. They earned not less than US$15.00 daily. In
excess of that amount, however, they were required to make cash
deposits to the company, which they could later withdraw every fifteen
days.
commenting on Art. 1249 of the New Civil Code, defines legal tender as
Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from
which Clark Air Base was not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the
services of individual respondents were ocially terminated on November
26, 1991.
which case, the table of conversion (exchange rate) at the time of
The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local
president, Eduardo Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards
separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They
arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be givenP500.00
for every year of service as severance pay.Most of the drivers accepted
said amount in December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual
respondents herein refused to accept theirs.
same time the President and Vice-President and General Manager,
Instead, after disaliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual
respondents, through the National Organization of Workingmen
("NOWM"), a labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a
complaint[5] against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the name
and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.
Services (AAFES) with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific
Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association with Eduardo Castillo as
President," for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-
out.Said complaint was later amended[6]to include additional taxi drivers
who were similarly situated as complainants, and CFTI with Antolin T.
Naguiat as vice president and general manager, as party respondent.
In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were
regular employees of Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual
applications for employment were approved by CFTI. They claimed to
have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by
CFTI, and that the former thence managed, controlled and supervised
their employment. They averred further that they were entitled to
separation pay based on their latest daily earnings of US$15.00 for
In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners
claimed that the cessation of business of CFTI on November 26, 1991,
was due to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity"
resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases
agreement. They admitted that CFTI had agreed with the drivers' union,
through its President Eduardo Castillo who claimed to have had blanket
taxi driver-employees separation pay equivalent toP500.00 for every year
of service.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular
workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to pay themP1,200.00 for every year
agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union ofP500.00 for every year
of service. The labor arbiter rejected the allegation of CFTI that it was
opportunity" since, at the time it ceased operations, CFTI was profitably
earning and the cessation of its business was due to the untimely closure
of Clark Air Base.In not awarding separation pay in accordance with the
Labor Code, the labor-arbiter explained:
"To allow respondents exemption from its (sic) obligation to pay
monetary obligation to an employer whose profitable business was
abruptly shot (sic) down by force majeure would be unfair and unjust to
say the least."[7]
and thus, simply awarded an amount for "humanitarian consideration.
Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC. In its
granting separation pay to the private respondents. The concluding
paragraphs of the NLRC Resolution read:
"The contention of complainant is partly correct. One-half month salary
should be US$120.00 but this amount can not be paid to the complainant
in U.S. Dollar which is not the legal tender in the Philippines.Paras, in
'that which a debtor may compel a creditor to accept in payment of the
debt. The complainants who are the creditors in this instance can be
compelled to accept the Philippine peso which is the legal tender, in
payment or satisfaction of the judgment should be used.However, since
the choice is left to the debtor, (respondents) they may choose to pay in
US dollar.' (Phoenix Assurance Co. vs. Macondray & Co. Inc., L-25048,
May 13, 1975)
In discharging the above obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which
is headed by Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the
respectively, should be joined as indispensable party whose liability is
joint and several.(Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court)"[8]
As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners
was denied by the NLRC.Hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of First Issue:Amount of Separation Pay

a temporary restraining order.Upon posting by the petitioners of a surety Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to
bond, a temporary restraining order[9] was issued by this Court enjoining Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is the only way a labor case may
execution of the assailed Resolutions.
reach the Supreme Court, the petitioner/s must clearly show that the
NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
Issues
discretion.[12]

The petitioners raise the following issues before this Court for resolution:

"I. Whether or not public respondent NLRC (3rd Div.) committed grave Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the dictum that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
appealed resolution;
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great
II. Whether or not Messrs. Teofilo Rafols and Romeo N. Lopez could respect but even finality; and are binding upon this Court unless there is a
validly represent herein private respondents; and,
showing of grave abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that
they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record.
III.Whether or not the resolution issued by public respondent is contrary [13]

to law."[10]

Petitioners also submit two additional issues by way of a
supplement[11] to their petition, to Wit: that Petitioners Sergio F. Naguiat
and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process; and that petitioners were
not furnished copies of private respondents' appeal to the NLRC. As to
the procedural lapse of insucient copies of the appeal, the proper forum
Nevertheless, this Court carefully perused the records of the instant case
if only to determine whether public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in granting the clamor of
private respondents that their separation pay should be based on the
amount of $240.00, allegedly their minimum monthly earnings as taxi
drivers of petitioners.

before which petitioners should have raised it is the NLRC. They,

however, failed to question this in their motion for reconsideration. As a
consequence, they are deemed to have waived the same and voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the appellate body.
work schedule and financial arrangement they had with their
Anent the first issue raised in their original petition, petitioners contend
that NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in unilaterally increasing the amount of severance
pay granted by the labor arbiter.They claim that this was not supported
by substantial evidence since it was based simply on the self-serving
allegation of respondents that their monthly take-home pay was not lower
than $240.00.
they had all opportunity to do so. Private respondents, like petitioners,
On the second issue, petitioners aver that NOWM cannot make legal
In their amended complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in San
Fernando, Pampanga, herein private respondents set forth in detail the
employer. Therefrom they inferred that their monthly take-home pay
amounted to not less than $240.00. Herein petitioners did not bother to
refute nor oer any evidence to controvert said allegations. Remaining
undisputed, the labor arbiter adopted such facts in his
decision. Petitioners did not even appeal from the decision of the labor
arbiter nor manifest any error in his findings and conclusions. Thus,
petitioners are in estoppel for not having questioned such facts when
are bound by the factual findings of Respondent Commission.

representations in behalf of individual respondents who should, instead,

be bound by the decision of the union (AAFES Taxi Drivers Association) of Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was due to
which they were members.
great financial losses brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo
which made the roads practically impassable to their taxicabs. Likewise
As to the third issue, petitioners incessantly insist that Sergio F. Naguiat well-settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in order
Enterprises, Inc. is a separate and distinct juridical entity which cannot be to sustain retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant
held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of CFTI.And similarly, exemption from payment of separation pay, must be proved with clear
Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were merely ocers and and satisfactory evidence.[14] The records, however, are devoid of such
stockholders of CFTI and, thus, could not be held personally accountable evidence.

for corporate debts.

The labor arbiter; as armed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners

Lastly, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat assail the Resolution of NLRC holding stopped their taxi business within Clark Air Base because of the phase-
them solidarily liable despite not having been impleaded as parties to the out of U.S. military presence thereat.It was not due to any great financial
complaint.
loss because petitioners' taxi business was earning profitably at the time
of its closure.

Individual respondents filed a comment separate from that of NOWM.In With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted,
sum, both aver that petitioners had the opportunity but failed to refute, Article 283 of the Labor Code provides:

the taxi drivers' claim of having an average monthly earning of

$240.00; that individual respondents became members of NOWM after
disaliating themselves from the AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which,
through the manipulations of its President Eduardo Castillo,
unconscionably compromised their separation pay; and that Naguiat
Enterprises, being their indirect employer, is solidarily liable under the law
for violation of the Labor Code, in this case, for nonpayment of their
"x x x In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures
or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to
serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half () month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months
shall be considered one (1 ) whole year.

separation pay.

Considering the above, we find that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
The Solicitor General unqualifiedly supports the allegations of private discretion in ruling that individual respondents were entitled to separation
respondents. In addition, he submits that the separate personalities of pay[15] in the amount $120.00 (one-half of $240.00 monthly pay) or its
respondent corporations and their ocers should be disregarded and peso equivalent for every year of service.

considered one and the same as these were used to perpetrate injustice Second Issue:NOWM's Personality to

to their employees.
Represent Individual Respondents-Employees

The Court's Ruling

On the question of NOWM's authority to represent private respondents,
As will be discussed below, the petition is partially meritorious.
we hold petitioners in estoppel for not having seasonably raised this issue
before the labor arbiter or the NLRC.NOWM was already a party-litigant
as the organization representing the taxi driver-complainants before the
labor arbiter. But petitioners who were party-respondents in said
complaint did not assail the juridical personality of NOWM and the validity
of its representations in behalf of the complaining taxi drivers before the
quasi-judicial bodies.Therefore, they are now estopped from raising such
question before this Court.In any event, petitioners acknowledged before
this Court that the taxi drivers allegedly represented by NOWM, are
themselves parties in this case.[16]
Witness
Third Issue:Liability of Petitioner-
Atty. Suarez
Corporations and Their Respective Ocers
Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual or the corporation?
The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat
Enterprises actually managed, supervised and controlled employment
terms of the taxi drivers, making it their indirect employer.As adverted to
earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding upon the court
in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Witness
Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for
holding Naguiat Enterprises and its ocers jointly and severally liable in
discharging CFTI's liability for payment of separation pay. We again
remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written, must
distinctly and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are
based.[17] This rule applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies.
He is the owner, sir.
Naguiat Enterprises Not Liable
How about with Clark Field Taxi Incorporated what is the position of Mr.
In impleading Naguiat Enterprises as solidarily liable for the obligations of
CFTI, respondents rely on Articles 106,[18]107[19]and 109[20]of the Labor Witness
Code.
What I know is that he is a concessionaire.
Based on factual submissions of the parties, the labor arbiter, however,
found that individual respondents were regular employees of CFTI who
received wages on a boundary or commission basis.
But do you also know that Sergio F. Naguiat is the President of Clark Field
We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only contracting
exists where: (1) the person supplying workers to an employer does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are
directly related to the principal business of the employer.[21]Independent
contractors, meanwhile, are those who exercise independent
employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own
methods without being subject to control of their employer except as to
the result of their work.[22]
employer, he could not deny that he received his salary from the oce of
From the evidence proered by both parties, there is no substantial basis
to hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an indirect employer of individual
respondents much less a labor only contractor. On the contrary,
petitioners submitted documents such as the drivers' applications for
employment with CFTI,[23] and social security remittances[24] and
payroll[25] of Naguiat Enterprises showing that none of the individual
respondents were its employees. Moreover, in the contract[26] between
CFTI and AAFES, the former, as concessionaire, agreed to purchase from
AAFES for a certain amount within a specified period a fleet of vehicles to
be "ke(pt) on the road" by CFTI, pursuant to their concessionaire's
contract. This indicates that CFTI became the owner of the taxicabs
which became the principal investment and asset of the company.
Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor labor-only
Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat
Enterprises managed, supervised and controlled their employment. It
appears that they were confused on the personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat
as an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate
business. They presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same
time a stockholder and director[27] of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc.,
was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of the latter.A
closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of
the matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the-taxi drivers and
determining their employment terms, was rather carrying out his
responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a
separate corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi
business.
To illustrate further, we refer to the testimony of a driver-claimant on cross
examination.
"Atty. Suarez
Is it not true that you applied not with Sergio F. Naguiat but with Clark
Field Taxi?
I applied for (sic) Sergio F. Naguiat
Witness
'Sergio F. Naguiat na tao.'
Atty. Suarez
Who is Sergio F. Naguiat?
He is the one managing the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises and he is the
one whom we believe as our employer.
Atty. Suarez
What is exactly the position of Sergio F. Naguiat with the Sergio F. Naguiat
Enterprises?
Witness
Atty. Suarez
Naguiat?
xxxxxxxxx
Atty. Suarez
Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
Yes. sir.
Atty. Suarez
How about Mr. Antolin Naguiat what is his role in the taxi services, the
operation of the Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?
Witness
He is the vice president."[28]
And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was his
CFTI inside the base.[29]
Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel for the
corporations, that Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while
CFTI was in taxi services.[30]
In addition, the Constitution[31] of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association
which, admittedly, was the union of individual respondents while still
working at Clark Air Base, states that members thereof are the employees
of CFTI and "(f)or collective bargaining purposes, the definite employer is
theClark Field Taxi Inc.
From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the actual
and direct employer of individual respondents, and that Naguiat
contractor.It was not involved at all in the taxi business.
CFTI president solidarily liable
Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability
of their ocers.To bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat specifically aver that they were denied due process since they
were not parties to the complaint below.[32] In the broader interest of
justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as
president of CFTI, cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability in
the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC[33] is the case in point. A.C.
Ransom Corporation was a family corporation, the stockholders of which
were members of the Hernandez family.In 1973, it filed an application for
clearance to close or cease operations, which was duly granted by the Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably
Ministry of Labor and Employment, without prejudice to the right of adequate liability insurance;" thus, what remains is to determine whether
employees to seek redress of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22 there was corporate tort.

employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure, were
subsequently computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the
union filed about ten (10) motions for execution against the corporation,
but none could be implemented, presumably for failure to find leviable
assets of said corporation. In its last motion for execution, the union
asked that ocers and agents of the company be held personally liable
for payment of the backwages.This was granted by the labor arbiter.In
the corporation's appeal to the NLRC, one of the issues raised was: "Is
the judgment against a corporation to reinstate its dismissed employees
with backwages, enforceable against its ocer and agents, in their
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate
tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation of a right given or the
omission of a duty imposed by law.[35]Simply stated, tort is a breach of a
legal duty.[36] Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer to
grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses, which is the condition obtaining at bar.CFTI
failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation.Consequently,
its stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or
operation of the business should be held personally liable.

individual, private and personal capacities, who were not parties in the Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC,[37] the Court
case where the judgment was rendered?" The NLRC answered in the recognized that a director or ocer may still be held solidarily liable with a
negative, on the ground that ocers of a corporation are not liable corporation by specific provision of law.

personally for ocial acts unless they exceeded the scope of their
authority.
Thus:

"x x x A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its
On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor directors, ocers and employees. Obligations incurred by them, acting as
arbiter.In imposing joint and several liability upon the company president, such corporate agents, are not theirs but the direct accountabilities of the
the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at times be
ratiocinated this wise:
incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as,
generally, in the following cases:Scl-aw

"(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the Labor Code) xxxxxxxxx

provisions be implemented when the employer is a corporation? The

answer is found in Article 212(c) of the Labor Code which provides:
4.When a director, trustee or ocer is made, by specific provision of law,
personally liable for his corporate action." (footnotes omitted)

'(c)'Employer' includesany person acting in the interest of an employer, As pointed out earlier, the fifth paragraph of Section 100 of the
directly or indirectly.The term shall not include any labor organization or Corporation Code specifically imposes personal liability upon the
any of its ocers or agents except when acting as employer.
stockholder actively managing or operating the business and aairs of
the close corporation.

The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage
Law. Since RANSOM is an artificial person, it must have an ocer who In fact, in posting the surety bond required by this Court for the issuance
can be presumed to be the employer, being the 'person acting in the of a temporary restraining order enjoining the execution of the assailed
interest of (the) employer' RANSOM. The corporation, only in the NLRC Resolutions, only Sergio F. Naguiat, in his individual and personal
technical sense, is the employer.
capacity, principally bound himself to comply with the obligation
thereunder, i.e., "to guarantee the payment to private respondents of any
The responsible ocer of an employer corporation can be held damages which they may incur by reason of the issuance of a temporary
personally, not to say even criminally, liable for nonpayment of back restraining order sought, if it should be finally adjudged that said
wages.That is the policy of the law. x x x
principals were not entitled thereto."[38]

(c)If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can
have devious ways for evading payment of back wages. x x x
The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate ocer
(d)The record does not clearly identify 'the ocer or ocers' of RANSOM cannot be held solidarily liable with a corporation in the absence of
directly responsible for failure to pay the back wages of the 22 strikers.In evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice.[39]In the present
the absence of definite proof in that regard, we believe it should be case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because he
presumed that the responsible ocer is the President of the corporation had actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close
who can be deemed the chief operation ocer thereof.Thus, in RA 602, corporation.

criminal responsibility is with the 'Manager or in his default, the person

acting as such.' In RANSOM, the President appears to be the Antolin Naguiat not personally liable

Manager."(Underscoring supplied.)
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI.Although he carried
the title of "general manager" as well, it had not been shown that he had
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence on the extent of his
managed the business.Thus, applying the ruling inA. C. Ransom, he falls participation in the management or operation of the business was
within the meaning of an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, proered. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for the
who may be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private respondents.

corporation to its dismissed employees.

Fourth Issue: No Denial of Due Process

Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they assail the
Enterprises were "close family corporations"[34] owned by the Naguiat NLRC Resolution holding Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat jointly
family.Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on Close Corporations) and severally liable with petitioner-corporations in the payment of
of the Corporation Code, states:
separation pay, averring denial of due process since the individual
Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the complaint.

"(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in the
management or operation of the business and aairs of a close We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The ocers of the
corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict fiduciary duties to corporation were not parties to the case when the judgment in favor of
each other and among themselves.Said stockholders shall bepersonally the employees was rendered. The corporate ocers raised this issue
liable for corporate tortsunless the corporation has obtained reasonably when the labor arbiter granted the motion of the employees to enforce
adequate liability insurance." (underscoring supplied)
the judgment against them.In spite of this, the Court held the corporation
president solidarily liable with the corporation.

Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted themselves #2

to the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter when they, in their individual
capacities, filed a position paper[40] together with CFTI, before the G.R. NO. 141309

arbiter. They cannot now claim to have been denied due process since LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,

they availed of the opportunity to present their positions.

PETITIONER,
- VERSUS -
WHEREFORE,the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION,

GRANTED. The assailed February 28, 1994 Resolution of the NLRC is RESPONDENT.
hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------x
(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, RESOLUTION
president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and

severally, the individual respondents their separation pay computed at NACHURA,J.:

US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso equivalent at the time of

payment or satisfaction of the judgment;

(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T. It is a fundamental principle in the law of public ocers that a duty owing
Naguiat areABSOLVEDfrom liability in the payment of separation pay to to the public in general cannot give rise to a liability in favor of particular
individual respondents.
individuals.[1] The failure to perform a public duty can constitute an
SO ORDERED.
individual wrong only when a person can show that, in the public duty, a
duty to himself as an individual is also involved, and that he has suered
a special and peculiar injury by reason of its improper performance or
non-performance.[2]

By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision[3] in this
case.

As culled from the said decision, the facts, in brief, are as follows:

On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654 (RA
7654), which took eect onJuly 3, 1993.Prior to its eectivity, cigarette
brands Champion, Hope, and More were considered local brands
subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%.However, on July 1,
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took eect, petitioner issued RMC
37-93 reclassifying Champion, Hope, and More as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valoremtax.RMC 37-93 in eect subjected Hope, More, andChampion
cigarettes to the provisions of RA 7654, specifically, to Sec. 142, (c)(1) on
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed
at 55%, and which imposes anadvaloremtax of 55% provided that the
minimum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos (P5.00) per pack.

OnJuly 2, 1993, at about5:50 p.m., BIR Deputy Commissioner Victor A.

Deoferio, Jr. sentviatelefaxa copy of RMC 37-93 to Fortune Tobacco but
it was addressed to no one in particular. On July 15, 1993, Fortune
Tobacco received, by ordinary mail, a certified xerox copy of RMC
37-93. On July 20, 1993, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter datedJuly
30, 1993. The same letter assessed respondent for ad valorem tax
deficiency amounting to P9,598,334.00 (computed on the basis of RMC
37-93) and demanded payment within 10 days from receipt thereof.
OnAugust 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction
enjoining the implementation ofRMC 37-93. In its decision datedAugust
10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and
unenforceable and further enjoined petitioner from collecting the
deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93.This ruling
was armed by the Court of Appeals, and finally by this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals. It was held,
among others, that RMC 37-93, has fallen short of the requirements for a
valid administrative issuance.

On April 10, 1997, respondent filed before the RTC a complaint for
damages against petitioner in her private capacity. Respondent
contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code considering that the issuance ofRMC 37-93 violated
its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process
of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending that: (1) respondent has

no cause of action against her because she issued RMC 37-93 in the
performance of her ocial function and within the scope of her
authority.She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic
and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her acts; (2) the
complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad
faith; and (3) the certification against forum shopping was signed by
respondents counsel in violation of the rule that it is the plainti or the
principal party who should sign the same.
owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out
On September 29, 1997, the RTC denied petitioners motion to dismiss
holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to
prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to
present evidence.It further held that the defect in the certification against
forum shopping was cured by respondents submission of the corporate
secretarys certificate authorizing its counsel to execute the certification
against forum shopping.x x x x
x x x x
are sucient to define the general doctrine.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appealsviaa petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.However, same was dismissed on the ground that under
Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did
not act with malice or bad faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that
Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on the
civil liability of public ocers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the
special law that governs the instant case. Consequently, malice or bad
faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages.It also sustained
the ruling of the RTC that the defect of the certification against forum
shopping was cured by the submission of the corporate secretarys
certificate giving authority to its counsel to execute the same.[4][Citations
and underscoring omitted.]
protesting negotiable paper, an inspector of elections in passing upon the
In the aforesaid June 19, 2007 Decision, we armed the disposition of
the Court of Appeals (CA) and directed the trial court to continue with the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK.[5]
Petitioner, onJuly 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration
of the said decision.[6] After respondent filed its comment, the Court, in
its April 14, 2008 Resolution,[7] denied with finality petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
or the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the
Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the
case] to the Honorable Court En Banc.[8] She contends that the petition
raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount importance. The
earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling eect to public
ocers, and will adversely aect the performance of duties of superior
public ocers in departments or agencies with rule-making and quasi-
judicial powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue will have reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her
ocial duties despite the due process safeguards in Section 228 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.[9] Petitioner hence moves for the
reconsideration of theJune 19, 2007Decision.[10]
In itsJune 25, 2008Resolution,[11]the Court referred the case to theEn
Banc. Respondent consequently moved for the reconsideration of this
resolution.
never be suered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the
We now resolve both motions.
damage alone does not constitute a wrong.[16]A contrary precept (that an
There are two kinds of duties exercised by public ocers: the duty owing
to the public collectively (the body politic), and the duty owing to
particular individuals, thus:
deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might have
1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those
ocers whose duty is owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the
body politic --- and not to any particular individual; who act for the public
at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public treasury.
The ocers whose duties fall wholly or partially within this class are
numerous and the distinction will be readily recognized. Thus, the
governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly
executed, that fit and competent ocials are appointed by him, that
unworthy and ill-considered acts of the legislature do not receive his
approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are duties which he
and assert that they were duties owing to him alone.So, members of the
legislature owe a duty to the public to pass only wise and proper laws,
but no one person could pretend that the duty was owing to himself
rather than to another.Highway commissioners owe a duty that they will
be governed only by considerations of the public good in deciding upon
the opening or closing of highways, but it is not a duty to any particular
individual of the community.
These illustrations might be greatly extended, but it is believed that they
2. Of Duties to Individuals.The second class above referred to includes
those who, while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper
administration of their respective oces, yet become, by reason of their
employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in an ocial
capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an
individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive their
compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them.
A sheri or constable in serving civil process for a private suitor, a
recorder of deeds in recording the deed or mortgage of an individual, a
clerk of court in entering up a private judgment, a notary public in
qualifications of an elector, each owes a general duty of ocial good
conduct to the public, but he is also under a special duty to the particular
individual concerned which gives the latter a peculiar interest in his due
performance.[12]
In determining whether a public ocer is liable for an improper
performance or non-performance of a duty, it must first be determined
which of the two classes of duties is involved.For, indeed, as the eminent
Floyd R. Mechem instructs, [t]heliabilityof a public ocer to an individual
individual or the public.If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that
one he can incur no liability.[13]
Stated dierently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in
general, an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against
the public ocer, even though he may have been injured by the action or
inaction of the ocer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual
but no wrong to him.In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the
ocer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the ocer owes no
duty to him as an individual.[14]The remedy in this case is not judicial but
political.[15]
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suers
a particular or special injury on account of the public ocers improper
performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can
public only; he must show a wrong which he specially suers, and
individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute
an action against a public ocer on account of an improper performance
or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a
the likethe complaining individual has no better right than anybody else.
[17]If such were the case, no one will serve a public oce.Thus, the rule
restated is that an individual cannot have a particular action against a
public ocerwithout a particular injury, or a particular right,which are the
grounds upon which all actions are founded.[18]

Juxtaposed with Article 32[19] of the Civil Code, the principle may now
translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public ocer
personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that
violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury
to the former. This is consistent with this Courts pronouncement in
its June 19, 2007 Decision (subject of petitioners motion for
reconsideration) that Article 32, in fact, allows a damage suit for tort for
impairment of rights and liberties.[20]
The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plainti to maintain an action for
damages for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed
the plainti, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plainti and legal
responsibility by the person causing it.Indeed, central to an award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of
law.[21]Thus, inLim v. Ponce de Leon,[22]we granted the petitioners claim
for damages because he, in fact, suered the loss of his motor launch
due to the illegal seizure thereof. In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
[23]we upheld the right of petitioner to the recovery of damages as there
was an injury sustained by him on account of the illegal withholding of his
horserace prize winnings.
complaint (specifically, paragraph 2.02 thereof) for damages under Article
In the instant case, what is involved is a public ocers duty owing to the
public in general. The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice,
hearing and publication, and which, inCommissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Court of Appeals,[24] we declared as having fallen short of a valid and
eective administrative issuance.[25] A public ocer, such as the
petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty
to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the
requirements of valid administrative regulations.But it is a duty owed not
to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be
aected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.
certainly not from either the due process of law or equal protection of the
Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages
against the petitioner, respondent must allege that it suered aparticular
or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the
public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court
reveals that noparticular injuryis alleged to have been sustained by the
respondent.The phrase financial and business diculties[26]mentioned in
the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot
translate into a particular injury. In contrast, the facts of the case
eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took nothing from the
respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax
assessment levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.
VInot Section 1, Article IIIof the Constitution.
With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no
delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would
violate the primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or
tortious act or omission, the complaint then fails to state a cause of
action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.[27]
the complaintas suggestive of a violation of due process and equal
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in
favor of the plainti by whatever means and under whatever law it arises
or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part
of such defendant violative of the right of the plainti or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to plainti for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages.[28]
The remedy of a party whenever the complaint does not allege a cause of
action is to set up this defense in a motion to dismiss, or in the answer.A
motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action in the
complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
therein.However, the hypothetical admission is limited to the relevant and
material facts well-pleaded in the complaint and inferences deducible
therefrom. The admission does not extend to conclusions or
interpretations of law; nor does it cover allegations of fact the falsity of
which is subject to judicial notice.[29]
The complaint may also be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is
obvious from the complaint and its annexes that the plainti is not
entitled to any relief.[30]
Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public ocer may accrue
even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of
constitutional rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[31] where
we said:
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public ocer
acted with malice or bad faith.To be liable, it is enough that there was a
violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of duties.[32]
The complaint in this case does not impute bad faith on the petitioner.
Without any allegation of bad faith, the cause of action in the respondents
32 of the Civil Code would be premised on the findings of this Court
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals (CIR v. CA),
[33] where we ruled that RMC No. 37-93, issued by petitioner in her
capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, hadfallen short of a valid
and eective administrative issuance.This is a logical inference. Without
the decision in CIR v. CA, the bare allegations in the complaint that
respondents rights to due process of law and to equal protection of the
laws were violated by the petitioners administrative issuance would be
conclusions of law, hence not hypothetically admitted by petitioner in her
motion to dismiss.
But inCIR v. CA,this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional;
laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that
RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring prior notice before RMCs could
become operative.However, this Court did not make an express finding
of violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal
protection, CIR v. CA said: Not insignificantly, RMC 37-93 might have
likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation; a statement that does not
amount to a positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondents
constitutional right. Even if one were to ascribe a constitutional
infringement by RMC 37-93 on the non-uniformity of tax provisions, the
nature of the constitutional transgression falls under Section 28, Article
This Courts own summation in CIR v. CA: All taken, the Court is
convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a
valid and eective administrative issuance, does not lend itself to an
interpretation that the RMC is unconstitutional. Thus, the complaints
reliance onCIR v. CAwhich iscited in, and a copy of which is annexed to,
protection, must fail.
Accordingly, from the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that paragraph
2.02 of respondents complaint loses the needed crutch to sustain a valid
cause of action against the petitioner, for what is left of the paragraph is
merely the allegation that only respondents Champion, Hope and More
cigarettes were reclassified.
If we divest the complaint of its reliance on CIR v. CA, what remains of
respondents cause of action for violation of constitutional rights would be
paragraph 2.01, which reads:
2.01. On or about July 1, 1993, defendant issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular No. 37-93 (hereinafter referred to as RMC No. 37-93)
reclassifying specifically Champion, Hope and More as locally
manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand.A copy of the aforesaid
circular is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof as ANNEX
A. The issuance of a circular and its implementation resulted in the
deprivation of property of plainti. They were done without due process
of law and in violation of the right of plainti to the equal protection of the
laws.(Italics supplied.)
But, as intimated above, the bare allegations, done without due process
of law and in violation of the right of plainti to the equal protection of the
laws are conclusions of law. They are not hypothetically admitted in
petitioners motion to dismiss and, for purposes of the motion to dismiss,
are not deemed as facts.
InFluor Daniel, Inc.Philippinesv. EB. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.,[34]this
Court declared that the test of suciency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not, admitting
the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance
with the prayer of the complaint. In the instant case, since what remains
of the complaint which is hypothetically admitted, is only the allegation on
the reclassification of respondents cigarettes, there will not be enough
facts for the court to render a valid judgment according to the prayer in
the complaint.
Furthermore, in an action for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
premised on violation of due process, it may be necessary to harmonize
the Civil Code provision with subsequent legislative enactments,
particularly those related to taxation and tax collection. Judicial notice
may be taken of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as
amended, and of the law creating the Court of Tax Appeals.Both statutes
provide ample remedies to aggrieved taxpayers; remedies which, in fact,
were availed of by the respondentwithout even having to pay the
assessment under protestas recounted by this Court inCIR v. CA,viz.:
In a letter, dated19 July 1993, addressed to the appellate division of the
BIR, Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and recall
of RMC 37-93. The request was denied on 29 July 1993. The following
day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed Fortune Tobacco for ad
valoremtax deficiency amounting toP9,598,334.00.
On 03 August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the
CTA.[35]
The availability of the remedies against the assailed administrative action,
the opportunity to avail of the same, and actual recourse to these
remedies, contradict the respondents claim of due process infringement.
At this point, a brief examination of relevant American jurisprudence may
be instructive.
42U.S.Code 1983, a provision incorporated into the Civil Rights Act of
1871, presents a parallel to our own Article 32 of the Civil Code, as it
states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, usage, or any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or other proper proceeding
for redress.
This provision has been employed as the basis of tort suits by many
petitioners intending to win liability cases against government ocials
when they violate the constitutional rights of citizens.
Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Investigation,[36] has emerged as the leading case on the victims
entitlement to recover money damages for any injuries suered as a
result of flagrant and unconstitutional abuses of administrative power.In
this case, federal narcotics ocers broke into Bivens home at 6:30
a.m.without a search warrant and in the absence of probable cause. The
agents handcued Bivens, searched his premises, employed excessive
force, threatened to arrest his family, subjected him to a visual strip
search in the federal court house, fingerprinted, photographed,
interrogated and booked him.When Bivens was brought before a United
States Commissioner, however, charges against him were dismissed.On
the issue of whether violation of the Fourth Amendment by a federal
agent acting under color of authority gives rise to a cause of action for
damages consequent upon his constitutional conduct, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover damages for injuries he
suered as a result of the agents violation of the Fourth Amendment.
A number of subsequent decisions have upheld Bivens. For instance,
in Scheuer v. Rhodes,[37] a liability suit for money damages was allowed
against Ohio Governor James Rhodes by petitioners who represented
three students who had been killed by Ohio National Guard troops
at Kent State University as they protested against U.S. involvement
in Vietnam. In Wood v. Strickland,[38] local school board members were
sued by high school students who argued that they had been deprived of
constitutional due process rights when they were expelled from school for
having spiked a punch bowl at a school function without the benefit of a
full hearing. In Butz v. Economou,[39] Economou, whose registration
privilege as a commodities futures trader was suspended, without prior
warning, by Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, sued on a Bivens action,
alleging that the suspension was aimed at chilling his freedom of
expression right under the First Amendment. A number of other
cases[40]with virtually the same conclusion followed.
However, it is extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against
government tax ocials and employees may prosper, if we consider the
pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky,
[41] that a Bivens remedy will not be allowed when other meaningful
safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the
plainti) are available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not
appropriate in the civil service system[42]or in the military justice system.
[43]
In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the
United States of America,[44] petitioner Vennes instituted a Bivens action
against agents of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who alleged that he
(Vennes) owed $250,000 in tax liability, instituted a jeopardy assessment,
confiscated Vennes business, forced a total asset sale, and put Vennes
out of business, when in fact he owed not a dime. The U.S. Court of
Appeals, Eighth Circuit, ruled:
The district court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayers
remedies under the Inter nal Revenue Code preclude such
a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have
found none. Though the Supreme Court has not addressed this precise
question, it has strongly suggested that the district court correctly
appliedBivens:
When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has
provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration,
we have not created additionalBivensremedies.
xxxx
Congress has provided specific and meaningful remedies for taxpayers
who challenge overzealous tax assessment and collection activities. A
taxpayer may challenge a jeopardy assessment both administratively and
judicially, and may sue the government for a tax refund, and have
authorized taxpayer actions against the United States to recover limited
damages resulting from specific types of misconduct by IRS
employees. These carefully crafted legislative remedies confirm that, in
the politically sensitive realm of taxation, Congresss refusal to permit
unrestricted damage action by taxpayers has not been inadvertent.Thus,
the district court correctly dismissed Venness Bivens claims against IRS
agents for their tax assessment and collection activities.


In still another Bivens action, instituted by a taxpayer against IRS

employees for alleged violation of due process rights concerning a tax
dispute, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota said:

In addition, the (Tax) Code provides taxpayers with remedies, judicial

andotherwise, for correcting and redressing wrongful acts taken by IRS
employees in connection with any collection activities.Although these
provisions do not provide taxpayers with an all-encompassing remedy for
wrongful acts of IRS personnel, the rights established under the Code
illustrate that it provides all sorts of rights against the overzealous
ocialdom, including, most fundamentally, the right to sue the
government for a refund if forced to overpay taxes, and it would make the
collection of taxes chaotic if a taxpayer could bypass the remedies
provided by Congress simply by bringing a damage suit against IRS
employees.[45]

American jurisprudence obviously validates the contention of the

petitioner.

Finally, we invite attention to Section 227, Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax
Reform Act of 1997), which provides:

Section 227. Satisfaction of Judgment Recovered Against any Internal

Revenue Ocer.When an action is brought against any Internal Revenue
ocer to recover damages by reason of any act done in the performance
of ocial duty, and the Commissioner is notified of such action in time to
make defense against the same, through the Solicitor General, any
judgment, damages or costs recovered in such action shall be satisfied
by the Commissioner, upon approval of the Secretary of Finance, or if the
same be paid by the person sued shall be repaid or reimbursed to him.

No such judgment, damages or costs shall be paid or reimbursed in

behalf of a person who has acted negligently or in bad faith, or with willful
oppression.

Because the respondents complaint does not impute negligence or bad

faith to the petitioner, any money judgment by the trial court against her
will have to be assumed by the Republic of thePhilippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.[46]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT petitioners motion for

reconsideration of the June 19, 2007 Decision and DENY respondents
motion for reconsideration of the June 25, 2008 Resolution. Civil Case
No. CV-97-341-MK, pending with
theRegionalTrialCourtofMarikinaCity, isDISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

#3 pneumonia or some other complications due to lack of adequate facilities

G.R. NO. 150898 at the hospital, the same cannot be attributed to Hao.

OCEAN BUILDERS CONSTRUCTION CORP., AND/OR DENNIS HAO,

On respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of June 22,
PETITIONERS, 2001, reversed the trial courts decision, holding that by Haos failure to

bring Bladimir to a better-equipped hospital, he violated Article 161 of the

- VERSUS -
Labor Code. It went on to state that Hao should have foreseen that

Bladimir, an adult, could suer complications from chicken pox and, had
SPOUSES ANTONIO AND ANICIA CUBACUB,
he been brought to hospitals like St. Lukes, Capitol Medical Center,
Philippine General Hospital and the like, Bladimir could have been saved.

RESPONDENTS.

Thus the appellate court disposed:

X-----------------------------------------------
- - -X WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66 in Civil Case No. 349 dated April 14, 1997 is hereby
D E C I S I O N
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one rendered holding the

defendants solidarily liable to plaintis-appellants for the following:

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

1.P50,000.00 for the life of Bladimir Cubacub;

Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by

petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its oce in 2.P584,630.00 for loss of Bladimirs earning capacity;

Caloocan City.

3. P4,834.60 as reimbursement of expenses incurred at Quezon City

On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was aicted with chicken pox. He was thus General Hospital as evidenced by Exhibits E to E-14 inclusive;

advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the companys general manager,

to rest for three days which he did at the companys barracks where he 4. P18,107.75 as reimbursement of expenses for the 5-day wake
lives free of charge.
covered by Exhibits F to F-17;

Three days later or on April 12, 1995, Bladimir went about his usual 5. P30,000.00 as funeral expenses at Prudential Funeral Homes
chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned covered by Exhibit I;

the company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a co- 6. P6,700.00 for acquisition of memorial lot at Sto.RosarioMemorial
worker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his house in Parkcovered by Exhibit J;

Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimirs

intention, Hao gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead 7.P50,000.00 as moral damages;

bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital.

8.P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;

Along with co-workers Narding and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought

Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a 9.P15,000.00 as attorneys fees and

primary-care hospital around one kilometer away from the oce of the

company.
10.Cost of suit.

The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then SO ORDERED.[2]

confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. The next day, April 13,

1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed to talk

to Bladimirs parents, hence, on Silanggas request, their co-workers June The motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution[3]of November
Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimirs parents from Tarlac.
26, 2001, hence this petition.

At about 8 oclock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Petitioners maintain that Hao exercised the diligence more than what the
Bladimirs parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their friend Dr. law requires, hence, they are not liable for damages.

Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred

Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) where he was The petition is meritorious.

placed in the intensive care unit and died the following day, April 14,

1995.
At the onset, the Court notes that the present case is one for damages

based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimirs immediate incidental. To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three
cause of death as cardio-respiratory arrest and the antecedent cause as elements must be present,viz:(1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate
pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was
recorded the causes of death as cardiac arrest, multiple organ system the duty of petitioners to provide adequate medical assistance to the
failure, septicemia and chicken pox.
employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is

committed.

Bladimirs parents-herein respondents later filed on August 17, 1995

before the Tarlac Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Capas a complaint for Art. 161 of the Labor Code provides:

damages against petitioners, alleging that Hao was guilty of negligence

which resulted in the deterioration of Bladimirs condition leading to his ART. 161.Assistance of employer. It shall be the duty of any employer to
death.
provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and

immediate medicaland dental attendance and treatment to an injured or

By Decision of April 14, 1997,[1] Branch 66 of the Tarlac RTC at Capas sick employee in case of emergency. (emphasis and underscoring
dismissed the complaint, holding that Hao was not negligent.It ruled that supplied)

Hao was not under any obligation to bring Bladimir to better tertiary The Implementing Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase
hospitals, and assuming that Bladimir died of chicken pox aggravated by adequate and immediate medical attendance means in relation to an
emergency.It would thus appear that the determination of what it means finding that Bladimir contracted chicken pox from a co-worker. At best,
is left to the employer, except when a full-time registered nurse or the only allusion to another employee being aicted with chicken pox
physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code, was when Hao testified that he knew it to heal within three days as was
specifically Art. 157 which provides:
the case of another worker, without reference, however, as to when it

happened.[7]

Article 157. Emergency Medical and Dental Services. It shall be the

duty of every employer to furnish his employees in any locality with free On the issue of which of the two death certificates is more credible, the
medical and dental attendance and facilitiesconsisting of:
dissent, noting that Dr. Frias attended to Bladimir during his last illness,

holds that the certificate which he issued citing chicken pox as

(a)The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of antecedent cause deserves more credence.

employees exceedsfifty (50)but not more than two hundred (200) except

when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which
case, the services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the
protection of workers, where no registered nurse is available. The
Secretary of Labor and Employment shall provide by appropriate
regulations, the services that shall be required where the number of
There appears, however, to be no conflict in the two death certificates on
the immediate cause of Bladimirs death since both cite cardio-respiratory
arrest due to complications from pneumonia per QCGH, septicemia
and chicken pox per Dr. Frias.In fact, Dr. Frias admitted that the causes
of death in both certificates were the same.[8]

employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate

order, hazardous workplaces for purposes of this Article;

Be that as it may, Dr. Frias could not be considered as Bladimirs

attending physician, he having merely ordered Bladimirs transfer to the

(b)The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician QCGH after seeing him at theCaybigaHospital.He thereafter left Bladimir
and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when the number of employees to the care of doctors at QCGH, returning to Capas, Tarlac at 4 oclock the
exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and
following morning or eight hours after seeing Bladimir. As he himself

testified upon cross-examination, he didnotpersonally attend to Bladimir

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and a full-time anymore once the latter was brought to the ICU at QCGH.[9]

registered nurse as well as a dental clinic and an infirmary or emergency

hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees It bears emphasis that a duly-registered death certificate is considered a
when the number of employees exceeds three hundred (300).(emphasis public document and the entries therein are presumed correct, unless the
and underscoring supplied)
party who contests its accuracy can produce positive evidence

establishing otherwise.[10] The QCGH death certificate was received by

the City Civil Registrar on April 17, 1995. Not only was the certificate

shown by positive evidence to be inaccurate. Its credibility, more than

In the present case, there is no allegation that the company premises are that issued by Dr. Frias, becomes more pronounced as note is taken of
hazardous. Neither is there any allegation on the number of employees the fact that he was not around at the time of death.

the company has. If Haos testimony[4]would be believed, the company

had only seven regular employees and 20 contractualemployees still IN FINE, petitioner company and its co-petitioner manager Dennis Hao
short of the minimum 50 workers that an establishment must have for it are not guilty of negligence.

to be required to have a full-time registered nurse.

The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by WHEREFORE, the petition isGRANTED.The challenged Decision of the
petitioners when Bladimir became ill amounted to the necessary C o u r t o f A p p e a l s i s R E V E R S E D , a n d t h e c o m p l a i n t i s
assistance to ensure adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance to herebyDISMISSED.

Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.

As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Haos
advice forBladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to later have him
brought to the nearest hospital constituted adequate and immediate
medical attendance that he is mandated, under Art. 161, to provide to a
sick employee in an emergency.

Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical

background.He may not be thus expected to have known that Bladimir
needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga
Hospital, contrary to appellate courts ruling.

AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as

the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir. Proximate cause is that
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an ecient
intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would
not have occurred.[5]An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act
or failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case
that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or
actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was
either adirect resultor areasonably probable consequenceof the act or
omission.[6]

Verily, the issue in this case is essentially factual in nature. The dissent,
apart from adopting the appellate courts findings, finds that Bladimir
contracted chicken pox from a co-worker and Hao was negligent in not
bringing that co-worker to the nearest physician, or isolating him as
well. This finding is not, however, borne by the records. Nowhere in the
appellate courts or even the trial courts decision is there any such definite
#4 The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintis may bring this
G.R. NO. L-48006 JULY 8, 1942
separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily
FAUSTO BARREDO,PETITIONER, and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
VS. employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
SEVERINO GARCIA AND TIMOTEA ALMARIO,RESPONDENTS.
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability
as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but
CELEDONIO P. GLORIA AND ANTONIO BARREDO FOR PETITIONER. Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not
JOSE G. ADVINCULA FOR RESPONDENTS. been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the
BOCOBO,J.: tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This
herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless
caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are
said Fausto Barredo.
aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.

and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned,

and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suered
injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed
against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was
convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal
case granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording
and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

reserved. The Court of Appeals armed the sentence of the lower court The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as
in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the follows:

deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First CIVIL CODE

Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts,
Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the fault or negligence intervenes.

plaintis for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages x x x x x x x x x

to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.

he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault
Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:
or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.

... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof x x x x x x x x x

that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.

in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be persons for whom another is responsible.

public and to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintis under the The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only persons subject to their authority and living with them.

subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla,
the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for
case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of
the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his duties.

failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the

selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special
suered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the ocial upon
on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which
Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.

fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case
at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages
in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody.

only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons
commission notpunishable by law.
mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.

The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:

ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to may recover from the latter what he may have paid.

be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a
felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an REVISED PENAL CODE

obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person
negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

ART. 101.Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption

from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code
12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions
rules:
"not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal
First.In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or
acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code
nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having such "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows that such
person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the
was no fault or negligence on their part.
distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same
his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil forcuasi-delitoorculpa extra-contractualunder articles 1902-1910 of the
law.
Civil Code.

Second.In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for The individuality ofcuasi-delitoorculpa extra-contractuallooms clear and
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana.
amount for which each one shall be liable.
The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."

the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code.
the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this
agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . .
special laws or regulations.
en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article
1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the
persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution ofculpa aquiliana.

secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be
liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from Some of the dierences between crimes under the Penal Code and
execution.
theculpa aquilianaorcuasi-delitounder the Civil Code are:

ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and 1. That crimes aect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of
proprietors of establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, private concern.

innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall 2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal
be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special damage.

police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or
the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may rules of trac when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso
have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)

goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or

intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of
innkeeper's employees.
quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article
1903 of the Civil Code.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:

employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of

industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, El concepto juridico de laresponsabilidad civilabarca diversos aspectos
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil
x x x x x x x x x
propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would nace de todo delito o falta.

constitute a grave felony, shall suer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its comprises dierent persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a
act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suer the result of every felony or misdemeanor.

penalty ofarresto mayorin its medium and maximum periods; if it would

have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty ofarresto mayorin its Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case:
minimum period shall be imposed.
There had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to
the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of
the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company
had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the
Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was
whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for
damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
armative, stating in part (Maura,Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de
los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa
juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y
menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se
funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse
con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en
este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas agravatorias que
motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones
o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por
tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y
claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos,
el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta
eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de
las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpascontractuales, que no
vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o
perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones
semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente,
sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los
articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los
fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia
de responsabilidades civilesnacidas de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos delCorpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un
paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar
a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las
diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render service,
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo
las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos
culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los
establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero
con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los
que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil,
cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anteriores
exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de
aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la
enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion
de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia,
que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el
caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son
demandadas y condenadasdirecta y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la
obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
judicial system, so that they have dierent fundamental norms in dierent
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando
verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre
justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros
normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de
proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio
criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar
sus acciones, parece innegable que la de indemnizacion por los daos y
perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal
del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al
pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese
sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba
legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse
que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito,
materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se
redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y
mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume,
extraa a lacosa juzgada.
As things are,aproposof the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems
less tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to the civil
of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is based
cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime,
because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature,
a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise to penal
measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or
indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, aect public order; for this
reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the oce of the prosecuting
attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are
repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this
coincidence of eects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil
actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual
faults which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived,
according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission
unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121
to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and
political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under
common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to
make a detailed comparison between the former provisions and that
regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is
pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such dierences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way
the civil responsibilities among those who, for dierent reasons, are guilty
of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to
but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of
the Penal Code,in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this
regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The
obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for
acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this
reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the
companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because
of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenceddirectlyandseparatelywith regard to theobligation, before the
civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is dierent, and the separation
between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our
codes, as well as dierent modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the
Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems
undeniable that the action for indemnification for the losses and damages
caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del
Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when
the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been
that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been
legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the
declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-existence of
the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject
matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is
greater reason for the civil obligationex lege, and it becomes clearer that
the action for its enforcement remain intact and is notres judicata.


Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil
Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose
provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those
of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French
Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. The action against the
principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a
prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the
sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the
author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the
action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
(Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp.
734-735.)
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429,
430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not
subsidiary. He writes:
that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las
acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe
responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta
es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es
que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi
parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la
justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y
cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o
culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto
es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o
director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las
personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley
presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta
de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley
castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la
apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio.
La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,
completamente inadmisible.
dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts
or omissions of those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or
principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the
first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a
responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but
such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim
that all faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that
can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the
occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of
thecuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father,
guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc.
Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to
(minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes any
damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the
damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only
apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such
responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia,
Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
the same act in its dierent aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su
propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde
de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo
o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad,
es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa
la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero
en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa,
por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por
los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one
is liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but,
by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there
direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code
distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one
hand, and other persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for
the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20
and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the
responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of
that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those
persons for whom one should be responsible."
court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-
delictorculpa extra-contractualis a separate and distinct legal institution,
independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and
directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October
21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been
run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de
Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was
acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The
lower court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme
Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code
because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had
been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal,
saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el
equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la
compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de
Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la
sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el
mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos
jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao
era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia
graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo
absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente
de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan,
segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos
o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en
determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del
mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia
recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus
empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el
articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido
estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion
propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken
supposition that the trial court, in sentencing theCompaia Madrileato
the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente
Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical eects of the sentence of
act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of
declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did not
constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or
negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude
the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a
source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
aecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the
managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages
caused by employees under certain conditions, it is manifest thatthe civil
jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and
in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del
damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371
are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the del Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo
decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y
perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya
with the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del
present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada como
either alone or with his employer.
ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico
y de jurarquia administrativa.

Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal
negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not
exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on
the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the
present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so
that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime,
he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo
would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintis
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his
own presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article
1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one
because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the
facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the
invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plainti
contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that
when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the
consignee was refused by the station agent without justification and
with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods
when they were demanded by the plainti caused him losses and
damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of
wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable
to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:

criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an

employer under article 1903. The plaintis were free to choose which
course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they
were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the
plainti choose the more expeditious and eective method of relief,
because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in
enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
is not applicable; but it limits to asking for reparation for losses and
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the
employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for
damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been
convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case
cited was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four
assignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any cause
of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation,
because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any
contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371
of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based,
damages produced on the patrimony of the plainti on account of the
unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods
consigned to the plainti as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's
responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which
binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because the
latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations
of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis
supplied.)

was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may
guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
sentence of one year and one day to two years ofprision correccional.
action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could
have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
above quoted.)
also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, being sued.

an action was brought against a railroad company for damages because

the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the

plainti. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly In the leading case of Rakesvs.Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359,
under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plainti, a
laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid o while iron was
hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las being transported, and caught the plainti whose leg was broken. This
expediciones facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del Court held:

actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin
el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho
consignatario por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con
intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al
tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y perjuicios en
cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que
era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse
privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes
en los envases:
secondarily by his employer.
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the
necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for
injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the
ocial criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his
employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the
plainti should have procured the arrest of the representative of the
company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his prosecution
a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and

Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this
motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from
faults or negligencenot punished by the law, subject to the provisions of interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not
Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of oenses
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is the oender is not to be regarded as derived from negligence punished
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this,
of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the the law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and
damages caused by the minors who live with them.
1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the
x x x x x x x x x
parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches
for the damages caused by their employees in the service of the of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same
branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
their duties.
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied
by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the
x x x x x x x x x
contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good negligent act itself.

father of a family to avoid the damage.

InManzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of
9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run
sucient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial
penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plainti the
workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in arming the judgment, said in
falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be part:

a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a

forced construction of these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the
defendant, that would rob some of these articles of eect, would shut out
litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion
of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal oender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict
rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had
always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear
light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of
Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which,
though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory eect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the
civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the
party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for
the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime
that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action
thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with
those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the
citation of these articles suces to show that the civil liability was not
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of
Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because
he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were
coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be
believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real
Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should
have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was operating until he had
fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the
entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the
auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the
defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana
Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of
crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left,
and if the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile
had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been
stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance
of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile
entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the
the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the
child would not have occurred.

intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby,

except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly
liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured
party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution
must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may
be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his
employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as
they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises,
and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil
courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person.
Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death
of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a
crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can not aect Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same
this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice
here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child,
laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the
and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of
the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday
The diculty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her
case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to
attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with
two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the oces
of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V.
House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The
little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died
that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintis. But this Court
held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed
the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the
tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant.
This Court said in part:
automobile struck and damaged the plainti's motorcycle. This Court,
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined,
he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action because of
the contributory negligence of the plaintis. It is from this point that a
majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The
mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held.
There was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few
paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the coincidence of
an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into
a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still
rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The
contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages.
of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
(Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila
InBahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes(30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was
for damages for the death of the plainti's daughter alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the
child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the
steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the
International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers
during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court
to pay P1,000 as damages to the plainti. On appeal this Court reversed
the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the
exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:
against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the machine
from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good
condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and
apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few
hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that
the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of
negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons
mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to avoid the damage.
through reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises
a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter
or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court inCerf vs.
Medel(33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged
that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile,
which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said
applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the
owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are
committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as
such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930).
The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the
death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to
school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a
truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths,
Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an
employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the
relationship ofpater familias. This theory bases the liability of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil.,
517 (year 1930) the plainti brought an action for damages for the
demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C
belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plainti's wharf
collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a
vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services
because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader.
This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in
accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases cited
above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary
liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the
authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages
under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman,
was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries
a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the
indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the
Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant
was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plainti. This
Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code,
saying:
failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code
in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of
subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by providing
that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be
governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the
motorman was a misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal
Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation
connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil
Code. In other words, the Penal Code arms its jurisdiction while the
Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence
out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence
x x x x x x x x x
authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and
not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any
dierent ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply
alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in the
selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would
be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a
civil action either as a part of or predicated on conviction for a crime or
misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the
statements here made are oered to meet the argument advanced during
our deliberations to the eect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should
be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's
proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the
present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903
of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from
Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila
vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely dierent theory,
which is the subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act
of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper
and independent remedy.
Spanish Civil Code.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co.(55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by
the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company
had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced,
among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000.
An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted
to show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption from civil
liability. But this Court held:
remedium.
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1)
that the exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil
Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a
family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article
20 of the Penal Code.
remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the
instant case, because the action there had for its purpose the
enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code,
while in the case at bar, the plainti's cause of action is based on the
defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention
because that decision illustrates the principle that the employer's primary
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is dierent in character
from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant
has failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a
crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility
forcuasi-delitoorculpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code, and has likewise
The defendant-petitioner also citesFrancisco vs. Onrubia(46 Phil., 327).
That case need not be set forth. Suce it to say that the question
involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as
inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality
ofcuasi-delitosorculpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code. Specifically they
show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal
negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the
same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the
employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and
directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily
be sucient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.
In such a state of aairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development asculpa aquilianaorcuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
of evidence is sucient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability
eective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plainti to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyance usually do not have sucient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plainti be required in all cases to go
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility
of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to
protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee
the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of
others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and
just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who
could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the
injured person who could not exercise such selection and who used such
employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12,
p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent.
Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before
third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le
emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All
these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it
comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and
accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and ecacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and eective remedy based onculpa aquilianaorculpa extra- level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this
usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it
re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by
the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
ecacious redress.
where the plainti alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
and is hereby armed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained in
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ.,concur.
numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon
#5
G.R. NO. L-12191 OCTOBER 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
VS.
MANILA RAILROAD CO.,DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
RAMON SOTELO FOR APPELLANT.
KINCAID & HARTIGAN FOR APPELLEE.
FISHER,J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plainti,
Jose Cangco, was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of
San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the
company's oce in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass,
supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's
trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915,
the plainti arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was
riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the
support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station
there is a cement platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient
some distance away from the company's oce and extends along in
front of said oce for a distance sucient to cover the length of several
coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio
Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got o the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the
plainti Jose Cangco stepped o also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped
from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once
rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his
right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the
plainti alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as
the railroad station was lighted dimly by a single light located some
distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were
dicult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform
season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to
another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of
melons and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plainti
was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the
moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to
see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plainti was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition,
and it appeared that the injuries which he had received were very serious.
He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of
Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The
result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plainti was then
carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and
the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears
in evidence that the plainti expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of
medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the
process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila to recover damages of the defendant
company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of
passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the
Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the
eect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by
reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plainti between the master and the person injured.

himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection
therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered and control of the servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's
in favor of the defendant company, and the plainti appealed.
acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-
guilty of negligence in piling these sacks on the platform in the manner contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission
above stated; that their presence caused the plainti to fall as he alighted which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has
from the train; and that they therefore constituted an eective legal cause caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in
of the injuries sustained by the plainti. It necessarily follows that the the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his
recovery is barred by the plainti's own contributory negligence. In purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence,
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no
liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the
the contributory negligence of the plainti should be separately negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment,
examined.
such third person suer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in
defendant is the contract of carriage, and that the obligation to respond the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable
for the damage which plainti has suered arises, if at all, from the and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.

breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise

due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as
immediate, diering essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive found in the Porto Rico Code, has held that these articles are applicable
responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 to cases of extra-contractualculpaexclusively. (Carmonavs.Cuesta, 20
of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due Porto Rico Reports, 215.)

care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra- This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the
contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that case of Bahiavs.Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an
article relates only toculpaaquiliana and not toculpa contractual.
action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the
defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court,
of the Civil Code, clearly points out this distinction, which was also after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:

recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakesvs.Atlantic,

Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
Manresa clearly points out the dierence between "culpa, substantive caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises
and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master
between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in
andculpaconsidered as an accident in the performance of an obligation supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that
already existing . . . ."
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
squarely upon the proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
contract.
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

Upon this point the Court said:

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are his own negligence and not on that of his servant. This is the notable
applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.

then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104
of the same code. (Rakesvs.Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep.,
359 at 365.)
extra-contractualculpabased upon negligence, it is necessary that there
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the
Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to
damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons to
whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English
Common Law, upon the principle ofrespondeat superior if it were, the
master would be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon the
principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the eect that in case of
shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable
presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of
Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article
1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the
special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person
called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or
omission, was the cause of it.

upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the
obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a
powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be
ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an
act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his
imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very
instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent
acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or
omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is
not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their
selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and
care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach
of his contract.

employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and
direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or
in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or
the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of
certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept
of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character,
which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of
society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or
to mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to
indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between
obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests
upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful
or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris,
whereas in contractual relations thevinculumexists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into
the contractual relation.
(Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13,
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public
policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those
person who acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others
who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them.
The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in
which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise
due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by
contract to render service to another, is wholly dierent from that to which
article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which
plainti's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rests upon plainti to prove the negligence if he does
not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plainti, and it is alleged that
plainti has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary
for plainti to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract
is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of
his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sucientprima facieto warrant a recovery.
8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a
suing creditor should assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the
only fact upon which his action is based; while on the contrary, in a case
of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual
obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken,
it is not necessary for him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71
[1907 ed., p. 76]).
damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile,
As it is not necessary for the plainti in an action for the breach of a
contract to show that the breach was due to the negligent conduct of
defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual
cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that
the negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of
the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the
negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of
discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would
be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the
performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those
acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who
contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its
destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him
from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to
exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was
his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be
accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity
from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by
negligent acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through
agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that
reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such
servants. If one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral,
and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some clerk employed by
the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve
itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon
the payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in
the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation,
andculpa contractualas a mere incident to the performance of a contract
has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain.
1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plainti's
action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of
the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish
Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused,without any pre-existing obligation,
by fault or negligence, such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil
Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to carry
out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of
employers for damage done by the negligent acts of their servants will
show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of
the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an
action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that
the owner of a carriage was not liable for the damages caused by the
negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact
that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant
had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any
knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successorsvs.Compania Maritima (6
Phil. Rep., 215), the plainti sued the defendant for damages caused by
the loss of a barge belonging to plainti which was allowed to get adrift
by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the
performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol.
contract made between it and the plainti . . . we do not think that the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case.
In the case of Chapmanvs.Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plainti sued
the defendant to recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the
negligence of defendant's chaueur while driving defendant's automobile
in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the
but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the
time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of
time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and
to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act complained of must
be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time that the
owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage &
Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion
as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts
disclosed that the injury complaint of by plainti constituted a breach of
the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express
ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with
the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the
distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to
the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the
selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the
presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated
plainti's action as though founded in tort rather than as based upon the
breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings
and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed
upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the
practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof
disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly
negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plainti's
injury. It also armatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of
negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the
servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suered by plainti,
whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constitutingculpa
aquilianaorculpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and
69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an
extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are
identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to
carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently,
when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having
failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise proper
care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is
identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred,
because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for
the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it
was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the
defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that
in such a case the court would have held that it would have been a good
defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach
of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise
care in the selection and control of the servant.
existing was dangerous? If so, the plainti should have desisted from
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the
attention to the relative spheres of contractual and extra-contractual
obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader
than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole
extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking,
concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another
by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such
person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed
between the parties.
as a public carrier to aord to its passengers facilities for safe egress
The contract of defendant to transport plainti carried with it, by
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of
entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could
not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants.
the placing of them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even
granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an
obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct
and proximate cause of the injury suered by plainti was his own
contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative
negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was
caused by plainti's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon
defendant's negligence and plainti's negligence merely contributed to
his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important
to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the
It may be admitted that had plainti waited until the train had come to a
full stop before alighting, the particular injury suered by him could not
have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in
support of the contention, that it is negligenceper sefor a passenger to
alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this
too badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life.
In this particular instance, that the train was barely moving when plainti
alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person
alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and
sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plainti would
have suered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting
place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is
that expressed in Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as
follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of
negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of
ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily
prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would
have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may
or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a
man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to
avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec.
3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in
Picartvs.Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was
there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plainti at the time
he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of
average prudence that to get o the train under the conditions then
alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.1awph!
l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a
conclusion can be drawn to the eect that plainti was guilty of
contributory negligence is that he stepped o the car without being able
to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet
slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not
be overlooked that the plainti was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that
the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty
from its trains, the plainti had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The
place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also
is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a
duty owing by it to the plainti; for if it were by any possibility concede
that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers,
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the
plainti in this case the following circumstances are to be noted: The
company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the
car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the
platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping o. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement
material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on
which to alight. Furthermore, the plainti was possessed of the vigor and
agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get
o while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in an
aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory
passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical
condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily aecting the
safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been
observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with
safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the
place was perfectly familiar to the plainti as it was his daily custom to
get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which
he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was
alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plainti in undertaking
to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized
by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.
NATURAL GUARDIAN OF SAID MINOR,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.
The evidence shows that the plainti, at the time of the accident, was
earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has
suered have permanently disabled him from continuing that
employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation
is open to plainti. His expectancy of life, according to the standard
mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion
that a fair compensation for the damage suered by him for his
permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to
recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention,
hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the
treatment of his injuries.
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintis, named Agapito
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered
plainti for the sum of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
#6
G.R. NO. L-24803 MAY 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO AND PATRICIA ELCANO, IN THEIR CAPACITY AS
ASCENDANTS OF AGAPITO ELCANO, DECEASED,PLAINTIFFS-
APPELLANTS,
VS.
REGINALD HILL, MINOR, AND MARVIN HILL, AS FATHER AND
CRUZ & AVECILLA FOR APPELLANTS.
MARVIN R. HILL & ASSOCIATES FOR APPELLEES.
BARREDO,J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintis for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald
Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the
defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake.
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule
107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or
inres-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill,
because he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above
grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on
January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby
reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record
on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintis-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY
UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION
OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT
IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW
FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF
THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION
BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintis-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically,
none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such
indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when
appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed
the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive
issues presented for Our resolution are:
Spanish Civil Code.
in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through
any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime.
In such a state of aairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
origin and such full-grown development asculpa aquilianaorcuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
reversed?
of evidence is sucient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
and further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this

jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier
jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil
liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
Thus, the opinion holds:
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
machinist. come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was
held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.).1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death
of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a
crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and ecacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only
by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and eective remedy based onculpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this
usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and ecacious
redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction,
the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and
convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617,
73 Phil.)2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically
applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence
and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent
civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p.
618, 73 Phil.)3
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily
be sucient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution ofculpa aquilianawould have very little scope and application
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts
of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force
here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are
derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of
this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized
law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that
"(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And
so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that
drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the
said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses
the term, 11 not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept ofculpa aquilianaincludes acts which are criminal in character or
in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived fromquasi-delictoshall be
governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book,
(on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,
Article 2177 of the new code provides:
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plainti cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article
2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when
we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between
criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts
of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction
that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that
killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the
same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of
the new Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime
fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules
of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the
same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language inRakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7
Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the oender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the oended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would
be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquilianaincludes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the eect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his
father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees
that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation
takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also
clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor
is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by
voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can
sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." In the instant
case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient
to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind
the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their oending child
under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third
persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or
do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II,
pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action.
Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa,supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his
son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs
against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
\

#7 trial court. 5A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied

by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986.6

G.R. NO. 74761 NOVEMBER 6, 1990 Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO AND EMMANUEL R. in accordance with Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
ANDAMO,PETITIONERS, Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
VS. dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION) Petitioners have raised a valid point.

AND MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA SALETTE,

INC.,RESPONDENTS.
LOPE E. ADRIANO FOR PETITIONERS.
PADILLA LAW OFFICE FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
FERNAN,C.J.:
The pivotal issue in this petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus
is whether a corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths,
water conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby causing
inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly liable for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it,
including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim
of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. 8The nature of an
action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading
but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial
of substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as
remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the litigants may have
ample opportunity to prove their respective claims.9

such that the resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in
Civil Case No. TG-748:

The antecedent facts are as follows:

4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang,
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a Cavite, adjacent on the right side of the aforesaid land of plaintis,
parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to defendant constructed waterpaths starting from the middle-right portion
that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by defendant,
religious corporation.
thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the
right side of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, connected by defendant to a man height inter-connected cement culverts
including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated which were also constructed and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath
and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the
the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy lower portion of the same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
the said cemented gate, which hole or opening is likewise connected by
defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also constructed by
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which
Case No. TG-907-82, before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 was also built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-
(Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo blocks fence which separates the land of plaintis from that of defendant
Mallillin, ocers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for (and which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the
destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same
Penal Code.
floodwater to the land of plaintis, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.

Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action

against respondent corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil 5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the
Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of land of plaintis, defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of
preliminary injunction before the same court.1
which is soil, which utilizes the water being channeled thereto from its
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No. 2) and
complaint and opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so
injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular inspections on the that the water below it seeps into, and the excess water above it
land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent inundates, portions of the adjoining land of plaintis.

corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an

order suspending further hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after 6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's
judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
aforementioned water conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a
young man was drowned to death, while herein plaintis suered and will
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, continue to suer, as follows:

1984, the trial court issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed a) Portions of the land of plaintis were eroded and converted to deep,
order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the wide and long canals, such that the same can no longer be planted
criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still to any crop or plant.

unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), b)

Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil b) Costly fences constructed by plaintis were, on several occasions,
actions arising from the same oense may be instituted separately, but washed away.

after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintis and their laborers
instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action."2
are always in danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate plaintis are exposed to destruction. ...10

Court.3
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil
action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages
Division, promulgated a decision 4 arming the questioned order of the suered by the plainti, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some
other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and eect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
the damages incurred by the plainti.11
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ...14

between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained In the case ofCastillo vs. Court of Appeals,15this Court held that a quasi-
by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
In the case ofSamson vs. Dionisio,12the Court applied Article 1902, now and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between
Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held that "any person who without due the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-
authority constructs a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss and damages damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
and enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event
of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal
domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately owned, liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

the fact remains that petitioners' complaint suciently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the
waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the
recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly
constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the
act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between
the parties make a clear case of aquasi delictorculpa aquiliana.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts,
"(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to
Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion
than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said
articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be
conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without

limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that "the owner of a
thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of
a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require
that each must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recognize
the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must
be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court arming the order of dismissal of the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17,
1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and
Emmanuel R. Andamo vs. Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc."
and to proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This decision
is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.

cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the SO ORDERED.

usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or

damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim
indemnification for the injury or damage suered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for
damage caused by his act or omission constituting fault or negligence,
thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only

acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the oender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
oended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary.13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil

Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding

article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plainti cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing

provision though at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The
#8
G.R. NO. 97336 FEBRUARY 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH,PETITIONER,
VS.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARILOU T.
GONZALES,RESPONDENTS.
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident
PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR PETITIONER.
CORLETO R. CASTRO FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and
This is an appeal bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to review and set aside the Decision1of the respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which armed in toto the 16 October 1939
Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or
not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of
counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand,
is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan
City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum
Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get
married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of
that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in
Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage;
sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in
the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with
him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her;
as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a
day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner
is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in
the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting
her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the
rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information
sucient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts
are those alleged as his Special and Armative Defenses. He thus
claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with
the private respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her
parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she
had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no
confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain.
Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and
unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged
into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suered mental
anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of
P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
1987, and because plainti's parents thought he was good and trusted
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a
Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had
agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plainti is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon,
(sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987
up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
3. That the plainti is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to
the plainti on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private
and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plainti and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plainti the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plainti the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00)
pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied.6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that
(a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits
to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions made
some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of
October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and
relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise
to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have oended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full
credit to the private respondent's testimony because,inter alia, she would
not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her
7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed
summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing
decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plainti, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and
that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just
a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several
times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on
August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown
of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and
inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with
members of plainti's family or with plainti, were taken that day. Also on
that occasion, defendant told plaintis parents and brothers and sisters
that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October,
him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they
likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plainti during
the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plainti and defendant
later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in
defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant would tie plainti's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this
live-in relationship, plainti became pregnant, but defendant gave her
some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plainti continued to live with
defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he
told her that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City. That was the time plainti left defendant, went home to
her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to
the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plainti, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to
talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plainti, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl
in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-
trial, is that defendant is still single.
as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
Plainti's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for
sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking
for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends
to the forthcoming wedding.8
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,
9he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for
lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral
damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.13
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged
decision 10armingin totothe trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the
following analysis:
custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage
First of all, plainti, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who
was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described
by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of
modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
lower court that plainti and defendant must have been sweethearts or so
the plainti must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted
in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore,
defendant's pretense that plainti was a nobody to him except a waitress
at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he
went to plainti's hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least
thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18,
1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsnid.), and on April
1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plainti's mother who told him to
marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plainti's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic)
some kind of special relationship between them? And this special
relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of
marriage to plainti, communicated not only to her but also to her
parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plainti was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her,
also knew of this love aair and defendant's proposal of marriage to
plainti, which she declared was the reason why plainti resigned from
her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal
(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good
moral character and must think so low and have so little respect and
regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in
Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before
he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife
in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in
Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to
plainti. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plainti, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her.11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plainti that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief
that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plainti's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a
foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking
advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of
and injury that he had caused plainti, as the lower court ordered him to
do in its decision in this case.12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21
had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good
to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes
the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture,
and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is
not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes
to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4)
wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in
ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage
had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that
even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship,
the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be
assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private
respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not be
actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable.14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment
to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which
boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is
the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial
court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
aect the result of the case.15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
alter the result of the case.
compensate the latter for the damage.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces
petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has
not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under
evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be
vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed,
exceptions:
and though the girl and family have suered incalculable moral damage,
xxx xxx xxx
she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2)

When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. statutes.21

Sosing,

(2) Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines aquasi-delictthus:

L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting
(Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the
case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate
and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called aquasi-delictand is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.

401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact asculpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept whiletortsis an Anglo-American
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional
contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of by Article 2176 of the Civil Code.22In between these opposite spectrums
the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been
findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated
And now to the legal issue.
that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has
greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of torts.23

the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only
Jesus vs. Syquia. 18The history of breach of promise suits in the United a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so- but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . .19
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however,
that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, morals, good customs or public policy.

which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this

jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
enumerate and punish in the statute books.20
plainti that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs part that made plainti's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are him preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suered material and single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the
moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted
justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished
under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because
the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral
of the seduction.
damages may be recovered:

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be

applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of
moral seduction. Thus, inHermosisima vs.Court of Appeals,25this Court
denied recovery of damages to the woman because:
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30,
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger
than the complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and
as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance
agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner,
then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance
. . . if there becriminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be
the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a
chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of
moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no
recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has
intervened). . . .

found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,

"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind"him by having a together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33
Phil. 471).

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at

possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was Senator Arturo M. Tolentino29is also of the same persuasion:

eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31in the Code. The
made in the said case:
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth wasseduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense
in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit
who had beenseduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the
more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot
it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic),
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
sucient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
It has been ruled in theBuenaventuracase (supra) that
which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sucient as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been
the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of
virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the
are calculated to have and do have that eect, and which result in her eect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to
seducer (27 Phil. 123).
him, both parties are inpari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of
the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained
persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her
intercourse is insucient to warrant a recovery.
own doing,33for:

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual

desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely aords her the . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51,
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a
by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of
662)
financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this
predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been
xxx xxx xxx
oered by the petitioner.34

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plainti-appellee, a woman of adult
age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts
of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the
deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have
again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut
short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to
fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no
other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court
of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.27
proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L.
Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It
is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior
educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a
Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proer of love and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and
brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every
person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
vs.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs
and traditions.
Court of First Instance of Cebu, HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of
intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress
not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that
she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as
she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she
left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari
delictomeans "in equal fault; in a similar oense or crime; equal in guilt or
in legal fault." 35At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in
delicto.
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where
his transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue
influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong
principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself
procured byfraud.36
pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111,
InMangayao vs.Lasud,37We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be
no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros,
40 Phil. 209).
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970,
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent,
let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in
their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
higher values of morality and dignity.
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence.2
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for
# 9
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO,petitioner-appellant,
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the
Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT, VALERIANA
PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO,respondents-appellees.
Eriberto Seno for appellant.
Jose M. Mesina for appellees.
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu rendered on November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City
Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on
driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit.
Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo
Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case,
counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action
Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising
from the same oense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be
suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the
criminal proceeding has been rendered;
ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25,
1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970,
alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in
certiorari on the ground that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as
damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil
action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the
criminal case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and,
therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective
inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus
(Annex "R"). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by
respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970 (Annex "S" and
Annex "U").
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due
course on February 25, 1971.3
Petitioner makes these: ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY,
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189
FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED
UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID
DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION
IS INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS
DEFECTIVE.4

all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance
the pendency of the criminal action.
of evidence is sucient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond
City, Cebu, it is evident that the nature and character of his action reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil
the Civil Code, which provide:
action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, otherwise, there
would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there remedium.

being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability
the parties, is caned aquasi-delictand is governed by the provisions of eective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
this Chapter. (1902a)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plainti to follow a
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such
for one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which
one is responsible.
is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under
xxx xxx xxx
article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated by the
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
xxx xxx xxx
conveyances usually do not have sucient means with which to pay
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons damages. Why, then, should the plainti be required in all cases to go
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a)
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate
the pathways of right and justice.

Thus, plainti made the essential averments that it was the fault or
negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility
owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile of employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to
and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or
damages he suered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, the latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of
that defendant, Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at least,
and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based onquasi-delict.5
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and
just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who
Liability being predicated onquasi-delictthe civil case may proceed as a could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the
separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in such employee because of his confidence in the principal or
Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary
responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol.
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee vienen a
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plainti cannot recover ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)
la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the merging
of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi- him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance
delict,which is readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and
been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

620-621,6thus:

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless
but also simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal
institution ofculpa aquilianawould have very little scope and application
in actual life. Death or injury to personsand damage to propertythrough
any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising from crime.
In such a state of aairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or
culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to
bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather
than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the
law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development asculpa aquiliana or quasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
is believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and ecacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and eective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate
this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its
full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it
re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and
ecacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31,
1973). (Emphasis supplied)
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
The separate and independent civil action for aquasi-delictis also clearly
recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action,
may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists
cases provided for inArticle 2177of the Civil Code,supra, as allowing of close down as a consequence of the big drop in its sales of soft drinks
an "independent civil action.
triggered by the discovery of foreign substances in certain beverages
Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the
City Court, in surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on
section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to
"other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just
cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the
criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the
same oense can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred
to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should
be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising
from the criminal oense not the civil action based onquasi-delict
Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it
provides:
an enterprise engaged in the sale of soft drinks (including Coke and
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.
For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an
independent source of obligation "not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code
bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based onquasi-
delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the
Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons
but also damage to property. 7It makes no distinction between "damage
to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other.
Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done
and "reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain
that it includes both injuries to person and property since "harm" is not
limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples
ofquasi-delictin the law itself include damage to property. An instance is
Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible for
damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to
personsor property.
does not involve an administrative action and that her cause of action is
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in upholding the
Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil
action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other
errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
In its Order of 23 January 1991, 6 the trial court granted the motion to
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set
aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.
not on quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation
Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
between the parties; thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to
#10
G.R. NO. 110295 OCTOBER 18, 1993
VS.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) AND MS.
LYDIA GERONIMO, RESPONDENTS.
ANGARA, ABELLO, CONCEPCION, REGALA & CRUZ LAW OFFICES
FOR PETITIONER.
ALEJANDRO M. VILLAMIL FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
DAVIDE, JR.,J.:
This case concerns the proprietress of a school canteen which had to
sold by it. The interesting issue posed is whether the subsequent action
for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer
should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden
defects or merchantability, as claimed by the manufacturer, the petitioner
herein which must therefore be filed within six months from the delivery of
the thing sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one forquasi-
delict, as held by the public respondent, which can be filed within four
years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code.
On 7 May 1990, Lydia L. Geronimo, the herein private respondent, filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City. 1 The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
D-9629. She alleges in her complaint that she was the proprietress of
Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen docketed as located in Dagupan City,
Sprite) and other goods to the students of Kindergarten Wonderland and
to the public; on or about 12 August 1989, some parents of the students
complained to her that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her
contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles; he
then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the presence of
some fiber-like substances in the contents of some unopened Coke
bottles and a plastic matter in the contents of an unopened Sprite bottle;
she brought the said bottles to the Regional Health Oce of the
Department of Health at San Fernando, La Union, for examination;
subsequently, she received a letter from the Department of Health
informing her that the samples she submitted "are adulterated;" as a
consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances in the beverages,
her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted from the usual 10 cases per
day to as low as 2 to 3 cases per day resulting in losses of from P200.00
to P300.00 per day, and not long after that she had to lose shop on 12
December 1989; she became jobless and destitute; she demanded from
the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebued by it. She prayed
for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her P5,000.00 as actual
damages, P72,000.00 as compensatory damages, P500,000.00 as moral
damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, the amount equal to 30%
of the damages awarded as attorney's fees, and the costs.2
The petitioner moved to dismiss3the complaint on the grounds of failure
to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. Anent the latter
ground, the petitioner argued that since the complaint is for breach of
warranty under Article 1561 of the said Code. In her Comment4thereto,
private respondent alleged that the complaint is one for damages which
based on an injury to plainti's right which can be brought within four
years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code; hence, the complaint
was seasonably filed. Subsequent related pleadings were thereafter filed
by the parties.5
dismiss. It ruled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply as the existing administrative remedy is not
adequate. It also stated that the complaint is based on a contract, and
Article 1562, the complaint should have been filed within six months from proportionate reduction of the price, with damages in either case. She
the delivery of the thing sold.
asserts that Civil Case No. D-9629 is neither an action for rescission nor
Her motion for the reconsideration of the order having been denied by the for proportionate reduction of the price, but for damages arising from
trial court in its Order of 17 April 1991, 7the private respondent came to a quasi-delict and that the public respondent was correct in ruling that
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari which we referred to the the existence of a contract did not preclude the action forquasi-delict. As
public respondent "for proper determination and disposition.8The public to the issue of prescription, the private respondent insists that since her
respondent docketed the case as CA-G.R. SP No. 25391.
cause of action is based onquasi-delict, the prescriptive period therefore
In a decision promulgated on 28 January 1992, 9 the public respondent is four (4) years in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code and
annulled the questioned orders of the RTC and directed it to conduct thus the filing of the complaint was well within the said period.

further proceedings in Civil Case No. D-9629. In holding for the private We find no merit in the petition. The public respondent's conclusion that
respondent, it ruled that: Petitioner's complaint being one for quasi- the cause of action in Civil Case No. D-9629 is found onquasi-delictand
delict, and not for breach of warranty as respondent contends, the that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in
applicable prescriptive period is four years.
four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more
particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless
It should be stressed that the allegations in the complaint plainly show and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold
that it is an action or damages arising from respondent's act of for public consumption.

"recklessly and negligently manufacturing adulterated food items

intended to be sold or public consumption" (p. 25, rollo). It is truism in The vendee's remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties
legal procedure that what determines the nature of an action are the facts against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not
alleged in the complaint and those averred as a defense in the limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code which
defendant's answer (I Moran 126; Calo v. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445; Alger provides:

Electric, Inc. v. CA, 135 SCRA 340).

Art. 1567. In the case of Articles 1561, 1562, 1564, 1565 and 1566, the
Secondly, despite the literal wording of Article 2176 of the Civil code, the vendee may elect between withdrawing from the contract and demanding
existence of contractual relations between the parties does not absolutely a proportionate reduction of the price, with damages either case.13

preclude an action by one against the other forquasi-delictarising from The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon proof of
negligence in the performance of a contract.
error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be
applicable. 14 Under the law on obligations, responsibility arising from
InSingson v.Court of Appeals(23 SCRA 1117), the Supreme Court ruled:
fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an action for
It has been repeatedly held: that the existence of a contract between the future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other demandable in any obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the
and the consequent recovery of damages therefor courts, according to the circumstances. 15 Those guilty of fraud,
. . . . Thus in Air France vs. Carrascoso, . . . (it was held that) although the negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those
relation between a passenger and a carrier is "contractual both in origin who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.16

and in nature the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

The vendor could likewise be liable forquasi-delictunder Article 2176 of

Significantly, in American jurisprudence, from which Our law on Sales was the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the
taken, the authorities are one in saying that he availability of an action or vendee. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the
breach of warranty does not bar an action for torts in a sale of defective parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-
goods.10
delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise fromquasi-delict, i.e., the
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision having been denied by acts which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Thus,
the public respondent in its Resolution of 14 May 1993, 11 the petitioner inSingson vs.Bank of the Philippine Islands,17this Court stated:

took his recourse under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. It alleges We have repeatedly held, however, that the existence of a contract
in its petition that:
between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
I.
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND therefor. 18 Indeed, this view has been, in eect, reiterated in a
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT ARTICLE 2176, THE GENERAL c o m p a r a t i v e l y r e c e n t c a s e . T h u s , i n A i r F r a n c e
PROVISION ONQUASI-DELICTS, IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE WHEN vs. Carrascoso, 19 involving an airplane passenger who, despite hi first-
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY SHOW THAT class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class accommodation
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IS BASEDON BREACH and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held
OF A SELLER'S IMPLIED WARRANTIES UNDER OUR LAW ON SALES.
entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort
II.
on the latter's part, for, although the relation between the passenger and
CORROLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A a carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks
GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN OVERRULING PETITIONER'S the contract may also be a tort.

ARGUMENT THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD Otherwise put, liability forquasi-delictmay still exist despite the presence
PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLE 1571 OF THE CIVIL CODE.12
of contractual relations.20

Under American law, the liabilities of a manufacturer or seller of injury-

The petitioner insists that a cursory reading of the complaint will reveal
that the primary legal basis for private respondent's cause of action is not
Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict for the complaint does
not ascribe any tortious or wrongful conduct on its part but Articles
1561 and 1562 thereof on breach of a seller's implied warranties under
the law on sales. It contends the existence of a contractual relation
between the parties (arising from the contract of sale) bars the application
of the law on quasi-delicts and that since private respondent's cause of
causing products may be based on negligence, 21 breach of
warranty, 22 tort, 23 or other grounds such as fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. 24Quasi-delict, as defined in Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, (which is known in Spanish legal treaties asculpa aquiliana, culpa
extra-contractual or cuasi-delitos) 25 is homologous but not identical to
tort under the common law, 26 which includes not only negligence, but
also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit.27

action arose from the breach of implied warranties, the complaint should It must be made clear that our armance of the decision of the public
have been filed within six months room delivery of the soft drinks respondent should by no means be understood as suggesting that the
pursuant to Article 171 of the Civil Code.
private respondent's claims for moral damages have sucient factual and
In her Comment the private respondent argues that in case of breach of legal basis. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
the seller's implied warranties, the vendee may, under Article 1567 of the hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner. SO
Civil Code, elect between withdrawing from the contract or demanding a ORDERED.

#11
G.R. No. 158995
institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed,
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President
and General Manager,Petitioners,
In an Order datedSeptember 4, 2001,[6]the trial court denied the motion
- versus -
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and
SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA,Respondents.
Decision:
issuance:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review
oncertiorariis the Decision[1]dated April 25, 2003 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003,[2]inCA-G.R. SP No.
67600, arming an earlier Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied the petitioners motion to dismiss
in Civil Case No. 99-10845, an action for damages arising from a
vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private respondents -
the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the
petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
OnFebruary 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses
Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van
owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787,
entitledPeople of thePhilippinesv. Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver
committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On
account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998,
dismissed the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed
a complaint[3] for damages against the petitioners as employers of the
deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint
was raed to Branch 43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,[4] the petitioners as
defendants denied liability for the death of the Vallejeras 7-year old son,
claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased
driver. They thus prayed in their Answer for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal
prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required them to file within ten
days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the
defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that
the complaint is basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an
employer under the provision of Article 103[5]of the Revised Penal Code.
Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment
of conviction against their driver as a conditionsine qua nonto hold them
liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal
action, the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not
fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the part of the plaintis.
They further argue that since the plaintis did not make a reservation to
the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted with the criminal
action. which was already dismissed.
to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for pre-trial. With their motion
for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its
subsequent order[7] of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went
oncertiorarito the CA inCA-G.R. SP No. 67600,imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic
complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision[8]datedApril 25, 2003, the CA deniedthe
petition and upheld the trial court. Partly says the CA in its challenged
xxxxxxxxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the
responsibility charged was the petitioners subsidiary liability under Art.
103,Revised Penal Code.As pointed out [by the trial court] in the Order
of September 4, 2001, the complaint does not even allege the basic
elements for such a liability, like the conviction of the accused
employee and his insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action to enforce
subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even
unnecessary.
xxxxxxxxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or
n e g l i g e n c e u n d e r A r t . 2 1 7 6 , C i v i l C o d e , w h i c h i s
entirelyseparateanddistinctfrom the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability under Art.
2180,Civil Code,isdirect and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latters
insolvency. (Underscoring in the original.)
In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration buttheir motion was
denied by the CA in its resolution[9] of July 10, 2003. Hence, the
petitioners present recourse on their submission that the appellate court
committed reversible error in upholding the trial courts denial of their
motion to dismiss.
WeDENY.
As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses
Vallejeras cause of action in Civil Case No. 99-10845 is founded on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners,
or derived from Article 2180[10] of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two
courts below.
It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for
damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845.That complaint alleged,inter alia,as
follows:
xxxxxxxxx
3.That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford
Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS 881 and employer sometime February of
1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said
corporation;
4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario
St., Bacolod City, the minor son of said plaintis [now respondents],
Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped by above-described
vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of
defendants employee, who drove said vehicle, recklessly, negligently and
at a high speed without regard to trac condition and safety of other
road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of the owner
employer, herein defendants LG Food Corporation who failed to exercise
due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent
Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;
6. That as a result of said incident, plaintis son suered multiple body
injuries which led to his untimely demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendants employee,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, (earlier filed as Crim. Case No.
96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III, entitled People v. Yeneza
for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, but the same was
dismissed because pending litigation, then remorse-stricken [accused]
committed suicide;
xxxxxxxxx
8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death
suered by the late minor Charles Vallejera were due to the negligence
and imprudence of defendants employee;
9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection
and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which
diligence if exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed
words and emphasis ours.)
Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the
herein petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability
under Article 103 of theRevised Penal Code.As correctly pointed outby
the trial court in its order of September 4, 2001 denying the
petitionersMotion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic
elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the
criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plainti
Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages based
onquasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint
that quasi-delict was their choice of remedy against the petitioners. To
stress, the plainti spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and
negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as
employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are
civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their driver since they failed
to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of their employees, which diligence, if
exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to
the death of their 7-year old son.
Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of
action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of
another.Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come
from law, contracts,quasicontracts, delicts orquasi-delicts.[11]
Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise
to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the oender, i.e., 1) civil
liabilityex delicto;[12]and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a)
not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law;[13] the intentional torts;
[14]andculpa aquiliana[15]); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.
[16] Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the
oender.[17]
Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from culpa
criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action
for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil
Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plainti may
hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to
the employers defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the
family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plainti can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof ofprior
conviction of its employee.[18]
Article 1161[19]of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from
criminal oenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision
of Article 2177[20]and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary
Title on Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating
damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the
plainti may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of
arising indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/
tort.The choice is with the plainti who makes known his cause of action
in his initiatory pleading or complaint,[21]and not with the defendant who
can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintis cause of action or lack of it
based on the defendants perception that the plainti should have opted
to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct
or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee.
[22]
Here, the complaint suciently alleged that the death of the couples
minorsonwascausedbythenegligentactof the petitioners driver; and
that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of
their driver for failing to exercise the necessary diligence required of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented
said accident.
Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged that
the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that
such accused driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the
defendant petitioners as employersto pay for the damage done by their
employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable.[23]Since there was no conviction in the criminal
case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the
termination of the criminal proceedings, the spouses recourse was,
therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based
onquasi-delict.
Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with
Compulsory Counter-Claim,[24] repeatedly made mention of Article 2180
of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that they
had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of [their]
employees. The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed the
petitioners acknowledged the private respondents cause of action as one
forquasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under
Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages primarily from the
petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to
Article 2180 of theCivil Code.The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for
damages caused by his employees and household helpers acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged
in any business or industry.
Citing Maniago v. CA,[25] petitioner would argue that Civil Case No.
99-10845 should have been dismissed for failure of the respondent
spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for
damages when the criminal case against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners reliance onManiagois obviously misplaced.
There, the civil case was filed while the criminal case against the
employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee
driver was prematurely terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case
No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy
can be obtained by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the
criminal case against their driver during the pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action
for damages was made when the criminal case was filed is of no moment
for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if
there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the
petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine
qua nonto hold them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF,the instant petition isDENIEDfor lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
interests of Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the
# 12
[G.R. NO. 141910.AUGUST 6, 2002]
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION,PETITIONER, VS.G.P.
SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION AND LAMBERT M.
EROLES,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VITUG,J.:
G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18
June 1994 thirty (30) units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one
of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway in Alabang,
Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances in Dagupan City.While the
truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in
Barangay Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck,
causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes in the sum
of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and
amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the trucking company
failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach
of contract of carriage against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City.In its answer, respondents
asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion
Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in business as a
common carrier.Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage
was purely accidental.
The issues having thus been joined, FGU presented its evidence,
establishing the extent of damage to the cargoes and the amount it had
paid to the assured. GPS, instead of submitting its evidence, filed with
leave of court a motion to dismiss the complaint by way of demurrer to
evidence on the ground that petitioner had failed to prove that it was a
common carrier.
The trial court, in its order of 30 April 1996,[1] granted the motion to
dismiss, explaining thusly:
Under Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that Each
party must prove his own armative allegation, xxx.
In the instant case, plainti did not present any single evidence that
would prove that defendant is a common carrier.
x x xx x xx x x
Accordingly, the application of the law on common carriers is not
warranted and the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of a
common carrier in case of loss, damage or deterioration of goods during
transport under 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing.
Thus, the laws governing the contract between the owner of the cargo to
whom the plainti was subrogated and the owner of the vehicle which
transports the cargo are the laws on obligation and contract of the Civil
Code as well as the law on quasi delicts.
Under the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is not
presumed. The law on quasi delict provides for some presumption of
negligence but only upon the attendance of some circumstances. Thus,
Article 2185 provides:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any trac regulation.
Evidence for the plainti shows no proof that defendant was violating any
trac regulation.Hence, the presumption of negligence is not obtaining.
Considering that plainti failed to adduce evidence that defendant is a
common carrier and defendants driver was the one negligent, defendant
cannot be made liable for the damages of the subject cargoes.[2]
The subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied,[3]plainti
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial
court had erred (a) in holding that the appellee corporation was not a
common carrier defined under the law and existing jurisprudence; and (b)
in dismissing the complaint on a demurrer to evidence.

 In culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being

The Court of Appeals rejected the appeal of petitioner and ruled in favor the subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the
o f G P S . T h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t , i n i t s d e c i s i o n o f 1 0 J u n e existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima
1999,[4]discoursed, among other things, that -
facie, a corresponding right of relief.[11]The law, recognizing the obligatory
"x x x in order for the presumption of negligence provided for under the force of contracts,[12]will not permit a party to be set free from liability for
law governing common carrier (Article 1735, Civil Code) to arise, the any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
appellant must first prove that the appellee is a common carrier. Should contravention of the tenor thereof.[13]A breach upon the contract confers
the appellant fail to prove that the appellee is a common carrier, the upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have
presumption would not arise; consequently, the appellant would have to been lost or suered.The remedy serves to preserve the interests of the
prove that the carrier was negligent.
promisee that may include his expectation interest, which is his interest in
"x x xx x xx x x
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he
"Because it is the appellant who insists that the appellees can still be would have been in had the contract been performed, or his reliance
considered as a common carrier, despite its `limited clientele, (assuming it interest, which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
was really a common carrier), it follows that it (appellant) has the burden reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would
of proving the same. It (plainti-appellant) `must establish his case by a have been in had the contract not been made; or his restitution interest,
preponderance of evidence, which means that the evidence as a whole which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. (Summa Insurance conferred on the other party.[14]Indeed, agreements can accomplish little,
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 175).This, unfortunately, the either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the basis for
appellant failed to do --hence, the dismissal of the plaintis complaint by action.[15]The eect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to
the trial court is justified.
make recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of
another to observe his contractual obligation[16] unless he can show
"x x xx x xx x x
extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence
"Based on the foregoing disquisitions and considering the circumstances (normally that of the diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally
that the appellee trucking corporation has been `its exclusive contractor, by stipulation or by law such as in the case of common carriers, that of
hauler since 1970, defendant has no choice but to comply with the extraordinary diligence) or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to
directive of its principal, the inevitable conclusion is that the appellee is a excuse him from his ensuing liability.

private carrier.

Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract

"x x xx x xx x x
of carriage between it and petitioners assured, and admits that the
"x x x the lower court correctly ruled that 'the application of the law on cargoes it has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its
common carriers is not warranted and the presumption of fault or custody. In such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with,
negligence on the part of a common carrier in case of loss, damage or the obligation in this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the
deterioration of good[s] during transport under [article] 1735 of the Civil place of destination - gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and
Code is not availing.' x x x.
corresponding liability on the part of the contractual obligor the burden
"Finally, We advert to the long established rule that conclusions and being on him to establish otherwise.GPS has failed to do so.

findings of fact of a trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his
should not be disturbed unless for strong and valid reasons."[5]
negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied;[6]hence, the driver, not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioners
instant petition,[7]raising the following issues:
principal and defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement. A
I
contract can only bind the parties who have entered into it or their
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A COMMON successors who have assumed their personality or their juridical position.
C A R R I E R A S D E F I N E D U N D E R T H E L AW A N D E X I S T I N G [17] Consonantly with the axiom res inter alios acta aliis neque nocet

JURISPRUDENCE.
prodest, such contract can neither favor nor prejudice a third
II
person. Petitioners civil action against the driver can only be based
WHETHER RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A on culpa aquiliana, which, unlike culpa contractual, would require the
PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT claimant for damages to prove negligence or fault on the part of the
WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE defendant.[18]

SUBSEQUENTLY DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY

AND POSSESSION.
A word in passing. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by
III
petitioner, holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the
WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OFRES IPSA LOQUITURIS APPLICABLE IN injury complained of is shown to be under the latters management and
THE INSTANT CASE.
the accident is such that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be
expected to happen if those who have its management or control use
On the first issue, the Court finds the conclusion of the trial court and the proper care.It aords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation
Court of Appeals to be amply justified. GPS, being an exclusive by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.[19]It is not a
contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc., rendering or oering rule of substantive law and, as such, it does not create an independent
its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be considered a ground of liability. Instead, it is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere
common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting the plainti of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.The
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or maxim simply places on the defendant the burden of going forward with
compensation, oering their services to the public,[8] whether to the the proof.[20]Resort to the doctrine, however, may be allowed only when
public in general or to a limited clientele in particular, but never on an (a) the event is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of
exclusive basis.[9] The true test of a common carrier is the carriage of negligence; (b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
passengers or goods, providing space for those who opt to avail plainti and third persons, are suciently eliminated by the evidence; and
themselves of its transportation service for a fee.[10] Given accepted (c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to
standards, GPS scarcely falls within the term common carrier.
the plainti.[21] Thus, it is not applicable when an unexplained accident
may be attributable to one of several causes, for some of which the
The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from defendant could not be responsible.[22]

liability.

Res ipsa loquitur generally finds relevance whether or not a contractual # 13

relationship exists between the plainti and the defendant, for the [G.R. NO. 122039. MAY 31, 2000]
inference of negligence arises from the circumstances and nature of the VICENTE CALALAS,PETITIONER, VS.COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA
occurrence and not from the nature of the relation of the parties. JUJEURCHE SUNGA AND FRANCISCO SALVA,RESPONDENTS.
[23] Nevertheless, the requirement that responsible causes other than D E C I S I ON
those due to defendants conduct must first be eliminated, for the MENDOZA,J.:
doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined only to cases
of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the presumption of This is a petition for review oncertiorariof the decision[1]of the Court of
negligence inculpa contractual, as previously so pointed out, immediately Appeals, dated March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the
attaches by a failure of the covenant or its tenor.In the case of the truck Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding damages
driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on culpa acquiliana, instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plainti in an
while he admittedly can be said to have been in control and management action for breach of contract of carriage.
of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally shown, The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical
against him.
Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
present evidence.[24] Thus, respondent corporation may no longer oer "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end
proof to establish that it has exercised due care in transporting the of the vehicle.Sclaw
cargoes of the assured so as to still warrant a remand of the case to the On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney
trial court.
stopped to let a passenger o. As she was seated at the rear of the
vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was
WHEREFORE, the order, dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by
Branch 66, of Makati City, and the decision, dated 10 June 1999, of the Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result,
Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED only insofar as respondent Lambert M. Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left
Eroles is concerned, but said assailed order of the trial court and decision tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction
of the appellate court are REVERSED as regards G.P. Sarmiento Trucking of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging were done
Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered to pay FGU Insurance under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to
Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount of September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an
P204,450.00.No costs.
orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of
SO ORDERED.
three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.

On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against

Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in
failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier.
Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco
Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.Korte

The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party

defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver
of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took
cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against
Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court
held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to
his jeepney.Rtcspped

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed on the ground that Sungas cause of action was based on a
contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed
to exercise the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate
court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and adjudged
Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente
Calalas to pay plainti-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No.
3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make
the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He
contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was acaso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages
to Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490
finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores
the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the
principle ofres judicatadoes not apply.Missdaa
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the
same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver
Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is
liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known
as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
1755? We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioners
contention.Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly
parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad
shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a
diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or
the Land Transportation and Trac Code, which provides:
Sec. 54.Obstruction of Trac.- No person shall drive his motor vehicle in
such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor,
while discharging or taking on passengers or loading or unloading freight,
obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers
than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of
the same law. It provides:Mesm

contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a

contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly
established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of
contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of
the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier,
failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.[2] In case of
death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle
shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than
its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a
peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed.
Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also,
the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers.Calrky

as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.Slxmis
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that
Sungas taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those
petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the
the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso
applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach fortuito. Acaso fortuitois an event which could not be foreseen, or which,
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person though foreseen, was inevitable.[3] This requires that the following
where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of
the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in
relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, causing the injury to the creditor.[4] Petitioner should have foreseen the
some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of the highway.Kycalr
passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it
injury to passengers. It provides:Slxsc is excessive and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:Kyle
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in Plainti-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college
the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not able to enroll in
the second semester of that school year. She testified that she had no
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further more intention of continuing with her schooling, because she could not
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the walk and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical Education
extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth "because of my leg which has a defect already."
in articles 1755 and 1756.
Plainti-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under
confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a result
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has "residual
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to further pursue
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
Physical Education as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x has a
defect already."
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers Those are her physical pains and moral suerings, the inevitable
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless bedfellows of the injuries that she suered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil
they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00,
articles 1733 and 1755.
which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items
of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.[5] As an exception, such
that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the
passengers.Scslx
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3)
of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in
bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas
contention that petitioners admission in open court that the driver of the #14
jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital cannot be G.R. NO. L-12219 MARCH 15, 1918

construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of AMADO PICART,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner VS.
was utterly indierent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is FRANK SMITH, JR.,DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the ALEJO MABANAG FOR APPELLANT.
accident.Exsm G. E. CAMPBELL FOR APPELLEE.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, STREET,J.:
1995, and its resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is DELETED. In this action the plainti, Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the
SO ORDERED. defendant, Frank Smith, jr., the sum of P31,000, as damages alleged to
have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of La Union
absolving the defendant from liability the plainti has appealed.

The occurrence which gave rise to the institution of this action took place
on December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at San Fernando, La
Union. It appears that upon the occasion in question the plainti was
riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across,
the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile,
going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the defendant
neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken
the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that
the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road.

The plainti, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the
warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the
apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up
against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the
left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not
have sucient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to
have a length of about 75 meters and a width of 4.80 meters. As the
automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the
defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The
p
pony had not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for
the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or
slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without
diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no
possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the defendant
quickly turned his car suciently to the right to escape hitting the horse
alongside of the railing where it as then standing; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the
railing. In so doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the
flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown o with some violence. From the evidence adduced in the case
we believe that when the accident occurred the free space where the
pony stood between the automobile and the railing of the bridge was
probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of its injuries the
horse died. The plainti received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

The question presented for decision is whether or not the defendant in

maneuvering his car in the manner above described was guilty of
negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage
done; and we are of the opinion that he is so liable. As the defendant
started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and
the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved toward the
center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not
be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for
the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature
of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet
some distance away; and from this moment it was not longer within the
power of the plainti to escape being run down by going to a place of
greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the
defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop
or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the
other side and pass suciently far away from the horse to avoid the
danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on
until he was almost upon the horse. He was, we think, deceived into
doing this by the fact that the horse had not yet exhibited fright. But in
view of the known nature of horses, there was an appreciable risk that, if
the animal in question was unacquainted with automobiles, he might get
exited and jump under the conditions which here confronted him. When
the defendant exposed the horse and rider to this danger he was, in our
opinion, negligent in the eye of the law.
nevertheless the amount of the damages should be reduced on account
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If
not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in eect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of
the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence
and prudence and determines liability by that.
determining cause of the accident and that the antecedent negligence of
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man
in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.
Abstract speculations cannot here be of much value but this much can be
profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the
circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not,
and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future. Hence they can be
expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If
so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that
harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by ignoring of the
suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for
determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct
is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
tortfeasor would have foreseen that an eect harmful to another was
suciently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against
its consequences.
From what has been said it results that the judgment of the lower court
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we
think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the
position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the
course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore
have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed
on the defendant the duty to guard against the threatened harm.
ordered.
It goes without saying that the plainti himself was not free from fault, for
he was guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong
side of the road. But as we have already stated, the defendant was also
negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover which
agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the
negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plainti by
an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the
person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and
fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to
the prior negligence of the other party.
when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself
The decision in the case of Rkes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil.
Rep., 359) should perhaps be mentioned in this connection. This Court
there held that while contributory negligence on the part of the person
injured did not constitute a bar to recovery, it could be received in
evidence to reduce the damages which would otherwise have been
assessed wholly against the other party. The defendant company had
there employed the plainti, as a laborer, to assist in transporting iron rails
from a barge in Manila harbor to the company's yards located not far
away. The rails were conveyed upon cars which were hauled along a
narrow track. At certain spot near the water's edge the track gave way by
reason of the combined eect of the weight of the car and the insecurity
of the road bed. The car was in consequence upset; the rails slid o; and
the plainti's leg was caught and broken. It appeared in evidence that the
accident was due to the eects of the typhoon which had dislodged one
of the supports of the track. The court found that the defendant company
was negligent in having failed to repair the bed of the track and also that
the plainti was, at the moment of the accident, guilty of contributory
negligence in walking at the side of the car instead of being in front or
behind. It was held that while the defendant was liable to the plainti by
reason of its negligence in having failed to keep the track in proper repair
of the contributory negligence in the plainti. As will be seen the
defendant's negligence in that case consisted in an omission only. The
liability of the company arose from its responsibility for the dangerous
condition of its track. In a case like the one now before us, where the
defendant was actually present and operating the automobile which
caused the damage, we do not feel constrained to attempt to weigh the
negligence of the respective parties in order to apportion the damage
according to the degree of their relative fault. It is enough to say that the
negligence of the defendant was in this case the immediate and
the plainti was a more remote factor in the case.
A point of minor importance in the case is indicated in the special
defense pleaded in the defendant's answer, to the eect that the subject
matter of the action had been previously adjudicated in the court of a
justice of the peace. In this connection it appears that soon after the
accident in question occurred, the plainti caused criminal proceedings
to be instituted before a justice of the peace charging the defendant with
the infliction of serious injuries (lesiones graves). At the preliminary
investigation the defendant was discharged by the magistrate and the
proceedings were dismissed. Conceding that the acquittal of the
defendant at the trial upon the merits in a criminal prosecution for the
oense mentioned would be res adjudicata upon the question of his civil
liability arising from negligence -- a point upon which it is unnecessary to
express an opinion -- the action of the justice of the peace in dismissing
the criminal proceeding upon the preliminary hearing can have no eect.
(See U. S. vs. Banzuela and Banzuela, 31 Phil. Rep., 564.)
must be reversed, and judgment is her rendered that the plainti recover
of the defendant the sum of two hundred pesos (P200), with costs of
other instances. The sum here awarded is estimated to include the value
of the horse, medical expenses of the plainti, the loss or damage
occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to
the date of this recovery. The other damages claimed by the plainti are
remote or otherwise of such character as not to be recoverable. So
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Carson, Araullo, Avancea, and Fisher, JJ.,concur.
Johnson, J.,reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
MALCOLM,J.,concurring:
After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to concur with the
judgment in this case. I do so because of my understanding of the "last
clear chance" rule of the law of negligence as particularly applied to
automobile accidents. This rule cannot be invoked where the negligence
of the plainti is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a traveler
and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But
Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the interval of time,
and that at the moment the plainti had no opportunity to avoid the
accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other
words, when a traveler has reached a point where he cannot extricate
himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in
reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate
cause of the injury and will not preclude a recovery. (Note especially
Aiken vs. Metcalf [1917], 102 Atl., 330.)