VACANCIES AND SUCCESSION

JAIME T. PANIS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION & BELLA V. VELOSO

G.R. No. 102948, 2 Febuuary 1994, EN BANC, (Quiason, J.)

Panis was employed as Administrative Officer of the Hospital, while Veloso was Administrative Officer of the City
Health Department detailed at the said hospital Cebu City Medical Center (CCMC), formerly known as the Cebu City
Hospital.

The Mayor of Cebu City appointed Veloso to the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration of CCMC.
Panis, a candidate for the said position, promptly protested the appointment before the Regional Office of the CSC.
The CSC Regional Office indorsed the matter to the Office of the City Mayor, which in turn referred it to the Office of
the City Attorney.

In a decision dated July 26, 1988, the City Attorney, with the approval of the City Mayor, dismissed Panis protest and
upheld the appointment of private respondent. This dismissal was affirmed by the CSC Regional Office and later on
appeal, by CSC. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Was the appointment of Veloso made in violation of law, existing civil service rules and established
jurisprudence because:
(1) the position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration was not legally created;
(2) assuming that it was, there was no qualification standard nor valid screening procedure; and
(3) the seniority and next-in-rank rules were disregarded?

RULING:
NO. Ordinance No. 1216, passed by the Cebu City Sangguniang Panglunsod on June 17, 1986, amended the
charter of the Cebu City Hospital for the purpose of correcting the deficiencies and improving the performance of said
institution. The hospital's name was changed to CCMC, and the departments and offices therein were reorganized. The
Office of Hospital Administrator was created and granted such powers as were deemed in line with the objectives of
the Ordinance.

The City Mayor withdrew Veloso's appointment. The title of Hospital Administrator was later found to be a
misnomer and thus was properly classified by the Joint Commission on Local Government Personnel Administration as
one of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration. This classification was subsequently approved by the
Department of Budget Management.

The position of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration is the very same position of Hospital
Administrator created by Ordinance No. 1216. The Office of Hospital Administrator was not extinguished, but the
designation thereof merely corrected to reflect the proper classification of the position under existing rules. The Office
of Assistant Chief of Hospital for Administration therefore was created and existed in accordance with law.

As a result of the reclassification, candidates to the position, among whom were Panis and Veloso, were
notified by the Personnel Selection Board. Petitioner however never appeared before the Board. Neither did he appear,
despite due notice, at the final selection process. The determination, however, who among the qualified candidates
should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority. The Mayor of Cebu City, in the instant case, chose to appoint
Veloso.
The "next in rank" rule specifically applies only in cases of promotion. The instant controversy, however,
involves a new office and a position created in the course of a valid reorganization. Under the law, a vacancy not filled
by promotion may be filled by transfer of present employees in the government service, by reinstatement, by
reemployment of those separated from the service, and appointment of outsiders who have appropriate civil service
eligibility, but not necessarily in this order.

In other words, one who is "next in rank" to a vacancy is given preferential consideration for
promotion to the vacant position, but it does not necessarily follow that he alone and no one else can be
appointed. There is no vested right granted the next in rank nor a ministerial duty imposed on the appointing authority
to promote the holder to the vacant position. An appointment, whether to a vacancy or to a newly created
position, is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested. Once a candidate possesses the
minimum qualities required by law, sufficient discretion, if not plenary, is granted to the appointing authority. After all,
the appointing authority is the officer primarily responsible for the administration of the office, and is likewise
in the best position to determine who among the qualified candidates can efficiently discharge the functions
of the position. Indeed, whom to appoint among those qualified is an administrative question involving
considerations of wisdom for the best interest of the service which only the administrative question involving
considerations of wisdom for the best interest of the service which only the appointing authority can decide.
 LEYTE ACTING VICE-GOVERNOR AURELIO D. MENZON vs. LEYTE ACTING GOVERNOR,
LEOPOLDO E. PETILLA in his capacity as Chief Executive of the Province of Leyte and Head of
SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN and Leyte Provincial Treasurer FLORENCIO LUNA

FACTS.
On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, the
Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos designated the Vice-Governor, Leopoldo E. Petilla as Acting Governor of
Leyte.

On March 25, 1988 the petitioner Aurelio D. Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also
designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte.

On May 29, 1989, the Provincial Administrator, Tente U. Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Local Government, Jacinto T. Rubillar, Jr., as to the legality of the appointment of the petitioner to act
as the Vice-Governor of Leyte.

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in a special session held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid
the appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.

ISSUE.
1) Whether or not there was a vacancy?
2) Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments?

HELD.
YES. The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied
by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and
exercise at present the duties of the office. (see Stocking v. State, 7 Ind. 326, cited in Mechem. A Treatise on the Law on Public
Offices and Officers, at p. 61)

Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that the office of the Vice-Governor was left
vacant when the duly elected Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of the law,
the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the
Vice-Governor.

YES. The Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in the event of a temporary vacancy in
the Office of the Vice-Governor. However, the silence of the law must not be understood to convey that a remedy in
law is wanting.

The circumstances of the case reveal that there is indeed a necessity for the appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
For about two years after the governatorial elections, there had been no de jure permanent Governor for the province of
Leyte, Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been proclaimed due to a pending election case before the
Commission on Elections.

Under the circumstances of this case and considering the silence of the Local Government Code, the Court rules that,
in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her
alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. We declare valid the temporary appointment
extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor. The exigencies of public service demanded nothing less than the
immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.

A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under the law for it deprives the constituents of
their right of representation and governance in their own local government.
In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or
absent, etc., the management of governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered. Necessarily, there will be a
consequent delay in the delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is
missing.
 SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF SAN ANDRES, CATANDUANES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
AUGUSTO T. ANTONIO

Private Respondent Augusto T. Antonio was elected barangay captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres, Catanduanes in
March 1989. He was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) for the Municipality of San
Andres, Catanduanes. In that capacity and pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1983, he was appointed by the
President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres.

Meanwhile, then Secretary Luis T. Santos of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) declared the
election for the president of the Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) of the same province, in
which private respondent was a voting member, void for want of a quorum. Hence, a reorganization of the provincial
council became necessary. Conformably, the DILG secretary designated private respondent as a temporary member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Catanduanes, effective June 15, 1990.

In view of his designation, private respondent resigned as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan. He tendered his
resignation to Mayor Lydia T. Romano of San Andres, Catanduanes, with copies furnished to the provincial governor,
the DILG and the municipal treasurer. Pursuant to Section 50 of the 1983 Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
Nenito F. Aquino, then vice president of the ABC, was subsequently appointed by the provincial governor as member
of the Sangguniang Bayan in place of private respondent. Aquino assumed office after taking his oath.

Subsequently, the ruling of DILG Secretary Santos annulling the election of the FABC president was reversed by the
Supreme Court in Taule vs. Santos. In the same case, the appointment of Private Respondent Antonio as sectoral
representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was declared void, because he did not possess the basic qualification that
he should be president of the federation of barangay councils. This ruling of the Court became final and executory on
December 9, 1991.

On March 31, 1992, private respondent wrote to the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, advising them of
his re-assumption of his "original position, duties and responsibilities as sectoral representative" therein. In response
thereto, the Sanggunian issued Resolution No. 6, Series of 1992, declaring that Antonio had no legal basis to resume
office as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent's resignation as ex-officio member of Petitioner Sangguniang Bayan ng San Andres,
Catanduanes is deemed complete so as to terminate his official relation thereto?

HELD:
NO. In Ortiz vs. COMELEC, defined Resignation as the "act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he
declines his office and renounces the further right to use it. It is an expression of the incumbent in some form, express
or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and
lawful authority." To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention
to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority. The last one
is required by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.

The records are bereft of any evidence that private respondent's resignation was accepted by the proper authority. From
the time that he was elected as punong barangay up to the time he resigned as a member of Sangguniang Bayan, the
governing law was B.P. 337 or the Local Government Code of 1983. While said law was silent as to who specifically
should accept the resignation of an appointive member of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sec. 6 of Rule XIX of its implementing
rules states that the "[r]esignation of sanggunian members shall be acted upon by the sanggunian concerned, and a copy of
the action taken shall be furnished the official responsible for appointing a replacement and the Ministry of Local
Government. The position shall be deemed vacated only upon acceptance of the resignation."

It is not disputed that private respondent's resignation letter was addressed only to the municipal mayor of San Andres,
Catanduanes. It is indicated thereon that copies were furnished the provincial governor, the municipal treasurer and the
DILG. Neither the mayor nor the officers who had been furnished copies of said letter expressly acted on it.
Section 146 of B.P. Blg. 337 states: Sec. 146. Composition. (1) The sangguniang bayan shall be the legislative body of the
municipality and shall be composed of the municipal mayor, who shall be the presiding officer, the vice-mayor, who
shall be the presiding officer pro tempore, eight members elected at large, and the members appointed by the President consisting of
the resident of the katipunang bayan and the president of the kabataang barangay municipal federation. . . .

Under established jurisprudence, resignations, in the absence of statutory provisions as to whom they should be
submitted, should be tendered to the appointing person or body. Private respondent, therefore, should have submitted
his letter of resignation to the President or to his alter ego, the DILG secretary. Although he supposedly furnished the
latter a copy of his letter, there is no showing that it was duly received, much less, that it was acted upon. The third
requisite being absent, there was therefore no valid and complete resignation.
 GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS AND AL NACINO, PETITIONERS, VS. MAYOR ANGELO M.
ARBA, VICE MAYOR MANUEL S. HERNANDO, AND EDWARD PALAFOX, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996, EN BANC, MENDOZA, J.

Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On March 24, 1994, he
resigned after going without leave to the United States. To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, the mayor,
respondent Angelo M. Barba, recommended to the Governor of the province, petitioner Rodolfo C. Farias, the
appointment of respondent Edward Palafox. A similar recommendation for the appointment of Edward Palafox was
made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was made to Mayor Barba.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the LGC, disapproved the resolution "for the
reason that the authority and power to appoint Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor, and therefore,
the Resolution should be addressed to the Provincial Governor." Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June 8, 1994, the Governor appointed
Nacino while the mayor appointed Palafox.

On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the RTC of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo warranto and prohibition. The RTC
ruled in favor of the respondents based on Sec. 45(c) of the LGC1. The RTC interpreted that the term local chief
executive shall mean the mayor of the respective LGU where the member of the sanggunian (who is not politically
affiliated) vacated his position who shall appoint a new sanggunian member. Hence this petition.

ISSUE. WON the term local chief executive pertains to the mayor.

DECISION.
NO, the court agrees with the lower court that the applicable provision of the LGC is Sec. 45(c), contrary to
the claim of the petitioners. This notwithstanding however, the power to appoint is vested with the governor subject to
the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned (in this case, the Sangguniang Bayan). The former LGC sheds light
into the case because implicit in these provisions is a policy to vest in the President, the governor and the mayor in
descending order the exercise of an executive power whether to appoint in order to fill vacancies in local councils or to
suspend local officials. Further the meaning of the Sanggunian concerned shall mean in sec. 45(c) should more
properly he understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created.

With the exception of the Sangguniang Barangay pars. (a) and (b) must be read as providing for the filling of vacancies
in the various Sanggunians when these vacancies are created as a result of the cessation from office (other than
expiration of term) of members who belong to political parties. On the other hand, Sec.45(c) must be understood as
providing for the filling of vacancies created by members who do not belong to any political party. Consequently, 45
must be construed to mean that

I. Where the Permanent Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member belonging to a Political Party
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities - The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon the nomination and certification of the
political party to which the member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in 45(b).
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan - The Governor upon the nomination
and certification of the political party to which the member who caused the vacancy belonged, as provided in Sec. 45(b).

1
(c) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian Member who does not belong to any political party, the Local
Chief Executive shall upon the recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
II. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Sanggunian Member Not Belonging to a Political Party
A. Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized and independent
component cities - The President, through the Executive Secretary, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod as the case may be.
B. Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and Sangguniang Bayan - The Governor upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan as the case may be.

III. Where the Vacancy is Caused by a Member of the Sangguniang Barangay - City or Municipal Mayor upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent Edward Palafox was
appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding discussion, neither is entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was
appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the
other hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the mayor and not the
provincial governor who appointed him.
 MIRANDA, PETITIONER, V. CARREON, et al., RESPONDENTS.

Vice Mayor Navarro, while serving as Acting Mayor of the City of Santiago because of the suspension of
Mayor Miranda, appointed the respondents to various positions in the city government. Their appointments were with
permanent status and based on the evaluation made by the City Personnel Selection and Promotion Board (PSPB). The
Civil Service Commission (CSC) approved the appointments.

When Mayor Miranda reassumed his post he considered the composition of the PSPB irregular since the
majority party, to which he belongs, was not properly represented. He then formed a three-man special performance
audit team to conduct a personnel evaluation audit of those who were previously screened by the PSPB and those on
probation. The audit team found the respondents wanting in their performance. Mayor Mrianda then issued an order
terminating respondents services because they performed poorly during the probationary period.

Respondents appealed to the CSC, contending that being employees on probation, they can be dismissed from
the service on the ground of poor performance only after their probationary period of 6 months, not after 3 months.
They also denied that an evaluation on their performance was conducted, hence, their dismissal from the service
violated their right to due process. Subsequently, the CSC issued a resolution reversing the order of Mayor Miranda and
ordering that respondents be reinstated to their former positions with payment of backwages.

ISSUE. WON the respondents were illegally dismissed terminated by Mayor Miranda

RULING.
YES. The 1987 Constitution provides that no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause provided by law.[10] Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a government
officer or employee may be removed from the service on two (2) grounds: (1) unsatisfactory conduct and (2)
want of capacity. While the Code does not define and delineate the concepts of these two grounds, however, the Civil
Service Law provides specific grounds for dismissing a government officer or employee from the service. Among
these grounds are inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties. In the case at bar,
respondents were dismissed on the ground of poor performance. Poor performance falls within the concept of
inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties which, as earlier mentioned, are grounds for
dismissing a government official or employee from the service.

But inefficiency or incompetence can only be determined after the passage of sufficient time, hence, the
probationary period of six (6) months for the respondents. Indeed, to be able to gauge whether a subordinate is
inefficient or incompetent requires enough time on the part of his immediate superior within which to
observe his performance. This condition, however, was not observed in this case. As aptly stated by the CSC, it is
quite improbable that Mayor Jose Miranda could finally determine the performance of respondents for only the first
three months of the probationary period.

Not only that, we find merit in respondents claim that they were denied due process. They cited Item 2.2 (b), Section
VI of the Omnibus Guidelines on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38,
Series of 1993, as amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 12, Series of 1994) which provides:
2.2. Unsatisfactory or Poor Performance
xxx
An official or employee who, for one evaluation period, is rated poor in performance, may be dropped from
the rolls after due notice. Due notice shall mean that the officer or employee is informed in writing of the status
of his performance not later than the fourth month of that rating period with sufficient warning that failure to
improve his performance within the remaining period of the semester shall warrant his separation from the
service. Such notice shall also contain sufficient information which shall enable the employee to prepare an
explanation.

Respondents vehemently assert that they were never notified in writing regarding the status of their performance,
neither were they warned that they will be dismissed from the service should they fail to improve their performance.
Significantly, petitioner did not refute respondents assertion. The records show that what respondents received was
only the termination order from Mayor Jose Miranda. Obviously, respondents right to due process was violated.

Moreover, respondents contend that the only reason behind their arbitrary dismissal was Mayor Jose Mirandas
perception that they were not loyal to him, being appointees of then Acting Mayor Navarro. This contention appears to
be true considering that all those who were accepted and screened by the PSPB during the incumbency of Acting
Mayor Navarro were rated to have performed poorly by an audit team whose three members were personally picked by
Mayor Jose Miranda.
 DOCENA VS. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN NG EASTERN SAMAR
Luis Capito, who had been elected to and was serving as a member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of Eastern Samar
(SPES), died in office. Petitioner Agustin Docena then was appointed to succeed him through an appointment letter
from Luis Santos (Secretary of the Department of Local Government) dated November 19, 1990. Docena then took his
oath on November 22, 1990 and assumed member of the SPES. On November 27, 1990, respondent Alar through an
appointment by the same Luis Santos was appointed to the position where Docena was appointed.
On December 18, 1990, the SPES passed Resolution No. 75 recognizing Alar rather than Docena as thelegitimate
successor of the late Board Capito. The following day, December 19, 1990, the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary
Luis Santos when head dressed a letter to Alar recalling the appointment. This action was affirmed by the Department
of Local Government. The SPES then reacted by passing resolution 1, where it reiterated its previous recognition of
Alar and declared that the recall letter of Santos is void and has no legal basis and was issued by Santos because of his
whimsical, capricious, and wishy-washy desires to the detriment of decency and due process of law. Santos then issued
another recall letter. However, this time, it was addressed to Docena. Docena then instituted a case to recognize him as
a lawfully appointed member of the SPES.
ISSUE: Should the appointment of Alar supersede that of Docena?
HELD:
The SC ruled that the appointment of Alar cannot supersede that of Docena. It stated that the appointment extended to
Docena on November 19, 1990 was intended to be permanent. The appointment being permanent in nature and for the
unexpired portion of the late Capitos term, Docena acquired security of tenure in the position and could be removed
only for any of the causes and conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the Local Government Code. Therefore,
where the Sanggunian members appointment has been issued and accepted, and he has already assumed office, his
appointment cannot be recalled anymore to accommodate Alar. There is no way that the requirements of the Local
Government Code shall be circumvented by a simple letter of recalling the appointment.
 NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA v. COMELEC & MALIK BOBBY ALINGAN
G.R. No. 181097, June 25, 2008, EN BANC (Ynares-Santiago, J.)

Norlainie Mitmug Limbona, her husband, Mohammad Limbona, and Malik "Bobby" Alingan were mayoralty
candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte during the 2007 Synchronized National and Local Elections. After the
aforementioned filed their respective certificates of candidacy (CoC), Alingan filed a petition to disqualify Mohammad
for failure to comply with the residency requirement. Subsequently, Alingan filed another petition to disqualify
Norlainie with the same ground. Norlainie filed for withdrawal of candidacy which the COMELEC granted.

Meanwhile, COMELEC granted Alingans petition to disqualify for failing to satisfy the 1 year residency requirement
and for not being a registered voter of Pantar. Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute
candidate for Mohammad which was approved by COMELEC. Relentless, Alingan sought again Norlainies
disqualification. Norlainie subsequently won and assumed office. But her victory was short-lived, for the COMELEC
disqualified her for lack of residency, for not being a registered voter of the place, and nullity of her CoC for having
been filed at a place other than the Office of the Election Officer.

Norlainie argued that the COMELEC had approved the withdrawal of her first CoC and had given due course to her
new CoC as a substitute candidate for Mohammad. As regards Norlainies residency requirement, her domicile of origin
was in Maguing, Lanao del Norte. When she got married, by operation of law pursuant to the Family Code, her
domicile became Marawi City, Barangay Rapasun. Norlainie claimed that she "has been staying, sleeping and doing business in
her house for more than 20 months" in Lower Kalanganan. There was, however, no competent evidence that would support
such statement. Further, there was no other act that would indicate Norlainies intention to stay in Pantar for an
indefinite period of time.

ISSUE: Will Alingan succeed Norlainie as mayor after being disqualified?

HELD:
NO. Considering that Norlainie failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and
as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in
consonance with human experience. Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, Norlainie is
disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, Norlainie's disqualification would not
result in Alingan's proclamation who came in second during the special election.

The rules on succession under the Local Government Code shall apply, to wit:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. - If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned shall become the xxx mayor.

For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. x x x x

Considering the disqualification of Norlainie to run as mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor
shall then succeed as mayor.
 RECALL
ENRIQUE GARCIA, et al. v. COMELEC and LUCILA PAYUMO
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal
initiation of the recall proceedings. Then COMELEC scheduled the recall election for the gubernatorial position of
Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the
Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement"
laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They pointed out the most fatal defect of the
proceeding followed by the PRAC in passing the Resolution: the deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to 65
members of the assembly.

ISSUE.
1) WON the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.
2) WON the procedure for recall violated the right of elected local public officials belonging to the political
minority to equal protection of the law.

HELD.
1) NO. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive
right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let
alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution
is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall
elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative records reveal
there were two principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted,
viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to cut down on its
expenses.

2) NO. Under the Sec. 70 of the LGC, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities and
component cities are made members of the preparatory recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is
not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its members. Secondly,
the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected officials in the province concerned.
Considering their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, Sec.
69 of the Code provides that the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of
the people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as
representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences
in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party system for the existence of opposition
parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be
faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the minority.
Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly
will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members of the recall assembly is a
condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also requires a qualified majority of all the
preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with
these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by
the COMELEC.
 FELIPE EVARDONE v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. No. 94010, 2 December 1991, EN BANC, (Padilla, J.)

Felipe Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, elected to the position during the 1988 local
elections. Alexander R. Apelado, Victorino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival filed a petition for the recall of Evardone.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 90-0557, approving to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall
against Mayor Evardone.

On 12 July 1990, this Court resolved to issue a TRO. On the same day 12 July 1990, the notice of TRO was received by
the Central Office of COMELEC. But it was only on 15 July 1990 that the field agent of the COMELEC received the
telegraphic notice of the TRO - a day after the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by
the TRO. COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order (the
TRO) of this Court.

ISSUES:
1. Is COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 (which embodies the general rules and regulations on the recall of elective
provincial, city and municipal officials) within the powers vested by the Constitution and Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 (Old Local Government Code)?
2. Does the TRO issued by the Court render nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant
to Resolution No. 2272?

RULING:
1. YES.
Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized
in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism for recall of local elective officials.
Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and
election on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary rules and regulations.
The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a
local official. Any such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections, unless
otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent
COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272.

2. NO.
The Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the
scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was undertaken by the
constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the
TRO.
Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a
political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge. "Loss of confidence is the
formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him
by the same electorate." The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall the incumbent mayor
(Evardone) has already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last
14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has
legal effect.
However, recall at this time [of the decisions promulgation] is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg. 337. The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior
to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 - on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of
the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337).
 DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

FACTS.
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular
barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the
barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to
approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995.

Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13,
1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the
first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v.
Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election.

ISSUE. WON the SK election is considered as a regular local election.

HELD.
NO. The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during
his term of office for loss of confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election.

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e.,
that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.[4] The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election
once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,
subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly
circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by
initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held
every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
Local Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. [5] An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.[6]

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution.[7] Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.
Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a
case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat
the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x
x x[8]

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read
according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating
additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding
the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local
elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in the said election who certainly has
a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with
the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the
office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
 JOSE M. MERCADO VS. BOARD OF ELECTION SUPERVISORS OF THE MUNICIPALITY OF
IBAAN, PROVINCE OF BATANGAS

Jose Mercado was proclaimed SK chairman of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan Batangas during the 1992 elections.
Immediately after Mercado's proclamation as the winner by the BET, Pangilinan filed a formal protest with the Board
of Election Supervisor (BES) questioning the results of the election. He alleged that the Board of Election Tellers
(BET) Chairman, drinking gin and Coke during the counting, had invalidated some votes without consulting the other
board members. The BES ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The
recount reversed the earlier tally in favor of Pangilinan, who was thereupon proclaimed the duly elected SK Chairman
by the BES, which issued for that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation.

The petitioner contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is illegal and unconstitutional because it makes the BES
the final arbiter of election contests involving the SK in contravention of Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code
which vests in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial court original jurisdiction over such contests and, on a more
fundamental ground; in contravention of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution which lodges on such courts
exclusive original jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials.

Issue: Whether or not Boards of Election Supervisors (BES) have jurisdiction to act on the protest involving
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)?

Held:
YES. Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX--C of
the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials
refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was
enacted and upon the ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the six sangguniang
bayan members. They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. They are also the same
officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines on election of barangay
officials. Metropolitan and municipal trial courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their
election. The decisions of these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts.

Elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2,
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had
made the SK chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay does
not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the punong barangay and the
seven regular sangguniang barangay members who are elected at large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage under Article V of the Constitution and who are duly registered voters of the barangay.
 JOVITO O. CLAUDIO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND RICHARD ADVINCULA,
RESPONDENTS.

Petitioner Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11, 1998 elections and assumed office on July 1,
1998. During the second week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss the
possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence
of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr. several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of convening
the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). Richard Advincula was designated chair. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of
the PRA composed of barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution
No. 01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO AS MAYOR
OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. The petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied by
an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor2.

On October 18, 1999, the COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it. On the
issue of whether the PRA was constituted by a majority of its members, the COMELEC held that the 1,073 members
who attended the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to constitute the PRA, considering that its records
showed the total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of the (DILG) showed that the total
membership of the PRA was 1,876. On the case filed by Trinidad, it ruled that it does not constitute a prejudicial
question. Further, the proceedings does not violate the 1 year prohibitive period for recall is a process which starts with
the filing of the petition for recall. Since the petition was filed on July 2, 1999, exactly one year and a day after petitioner
Claudio's assumption of office, it was held that the petition was filed on time.

ISSUE. WON the COMELEC erred in granting the petition for recall for as contended by the petitioner, the PRA
was held within the 1 year prohibitive period as provided for Sec. 74 of the LGC

HELD.
NO, The bone of contention in this case is Sec. 74 of the LCG which provides:
Limitations on Recall. - (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term
of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.
Coverage of the word "recall" in paragraph (b) (whether it covers a process which includes the convening of
the Preparatory Recall Assembly and its approval of the recall resolution).

Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the
signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the
recall election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of Sec. 74,
"recall" refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their local official or
elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this conclusion.

The term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall
1. Because Sec. 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which, according to Sec. 69, is a power which shall be exercised by
the registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters do not exercise such right except in an election, it is
clear that the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within the one-year period provided in paragraph (b).
There may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number

2
Claudio alleged procedural and substantive defects in the petition: (1) the signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to show attendance at the PRA
meeting; (2) most of the signatories were only representatives of the parties concerned who were sent there merely to observe the proceedings; (3) the convening of
the PRA took place within the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, filed by Wenceslao Trinidad, seeking the annulment of the proclamation of
petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City, should first be decided before recall proceedings against petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to
obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA, considering that 10 were actually double entries, 14 were not duly accredited members of the barangays, 40
sangguniang kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60 barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.
of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The
limitations in Sec. 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this -
and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of Sec. 74 seeks to
limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of an elective
local official (as PRA is not recall itself).

2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b) is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an
elective local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the election. Hence, in this case, as long as the
election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be held even before the
end of the first year in office of a local official.

3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly
curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the Constitution. The crystallization and formation of an
informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of
assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights
in a free society.

As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor
of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that date.
Coverage of "regular local election" in the last clause of paragraph (b) (whether it includes the election period
for that regular election or simply the date of such election).

Petitioner argues that in the same paragraph (b), Regular local election shall also include the election period as well. This
contention is untenable. The law is unambiguous in providing that "no recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to the campaign period,
which period is defined in the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so.

Moreover, petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held.
Actually, because no recall election may be held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the following year to
about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or less. To
construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period would reduce this period to eight
months. Such an interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to
make local government units" more responsive and accountable."

Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless
otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election and
ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of the people.

PETITION DENIED.
MANUEL H. AFIADO, JASMINIO B. QUEMADO, JR. AND GLESIE L. TANGONAN, PETITIONERS,
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), RESPONDENT.

During the May 11,1998 elections in Santiago City, Joel Miranda won as Mayor while Amelita Navarro won as
vice-mayor. The defeated candidate, Antonio Abaya, filed before the COMELEC against Joel Miranda a Petition for the
declaration of the certificate of candidacy of Jose Miranda, the father of Joel, as null and void. Miranda was removed
from office after it was held that the certificate of candidacy of his father Antonio Abaya (whom Joel substituted) was
not valid thus Joel Miranda could not be validly proclaimed as the winner in the mayoralty elections. By virtue of the
law on succession, Navarro became the new mayor. On the other hand when she was still a vice-mayor, petitioners
convened the barangay officials of Santiago City who compose the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) which then
passed and adopted Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 1 for the recall of Vice- Mayor Navarro by invoking
the rescission of her electoral mandate as vice-mayor for loss of confidence, through a recall election.

ISSUE. WON an elective official who became City Mayor by legal succession can be the subject of a recall election by
virtue of a PRA Resolution which was passed when the said elective official was still the Vice-Mayor

RULING
NO. On March 31, 2000 respondent COMELEC issued and promulgated a Resolution which denied due
course to the subject PRA Resolution No. 1. This development therefore rendered the present petition for mandamus
moot and academic. The record shows that herein petitioners' counsel of record was furnished copies of the
COMELEC's Resolution.

Anent the corollary issue as to whether or not Mayor Navarro can be the subject of recall election by virtue of
Resolution No. 1 of the PRA which was passed when she was still the elected City Vice-Mayor, the same has become
moot and academic. We quote below the pertinent portion of the COMELEC's Resolution to which we agree, to wit:
The assumption by legal succession of the petitioner as the new Mayor of Santiago City is a supervening event which
rendered the recall proceeding against her moot and academic. A perusal of the said Resolution reveals that the person
subject of the recall process is a specific elective official in relation to her specific office. The said resolution is replete
with statements, which leave no doubt that the purpose of the assembly was to recall petitioner as Vice Mayor for her
official acts as Vice Mayor. The title itself suggests that the recall is intended for the incumbent Vice Mayor of Santiago
City. The third paragraph of the resolution recounted "the official acts of City Vice Mayor Navarro that brought forth
the loss of confidence in her capacity and fitness to discharge the duties and to perform the functions of her public
office." And because of such acts, the assembly "RESOLVED to invoke the rescission of the electoral mandate of the
incumbent City Vice Mayor." Clearly, the intent of the PRA as expressed in the said Resolution is to remove the
petitioner as Vice Mayor for they already lost their confidence in her by reason of her official acts as such. To
recall, then, the petitioner when she is already the incumbent City Mayor is to deviate from the expressed will
of the PRA. Having, thus, succeeded to the position of City Mayor, the petitioner was placed beyond the reach of the
effects of the PRA Resolution.

The specific purpose of the PRA was to remove Amelita S. Navarro as the elected Vice-Mayor of Santiago City.
However, the said PRA Resolution No. 1 is no longer applicable to her inasmuch as she has already vacated the office
of Vice-Mayor on October 11, 1999 when she assumed the position of City Mayor of Santiago City.

Even if the PRA were to reconvene to adopt another resolution for the recall of Amelita Navarro, this time as Mayor of
Santiago City, the same would still not prosper in view of Section 74 (b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 which
provides that "No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption of office
or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election." There is no more allowable time in the light of that law
within which to hold recall elections for that purpose. The then Vice- Mayor Amelita S. Navarro assumed office as
Mayor of Santiago City on October 11, 1999. One year after her assumption of office as Mayor will be October 11,
2000 which is already within the one (1) year prohibited period immediately preceding the next regular election in May
2001.
 FRANCIS ONG v. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMELEC.
Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of candidacy
for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course
and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Francis. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule,
Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have
assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those
elections.
In the May 1998 elections, Francis was proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently
filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in
that 1998 mayoralty contest, albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served
the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. The First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing
the said petition of Alegre. Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration. COMELEC en banc revered the decision
and declared Francis as disqualified to run in the May 2004 elections. Rommel Ong (Rommel) became the substitute
candidate but was not approved by the Comelec. Alegre was proclaimed winner of the 2004 May elections. Francis filed
before the Court a petition for certiorari and his brother Rommel's petition were consolidated.
ISSUE: Is petitioner Francis's assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule?
HELD.
YES. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to
wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post,
and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term", and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra,
barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same
position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis' opponent
(Alegre) who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However,
that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the
term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis' contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the
1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of
the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that
Alegre would under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless
electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an
election.
 VICTORINO DENNIS SOCRATES v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

312 out of 528 members of the incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into
a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA). The PRA was convened to initiate the recall of Socrates who assumed office as
Puerto Princesas mayor. The PRA passed a Recall Resolution which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates and
called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from
receipt of the Recall Resolution. Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify and deny due course to the
Recall Resolution but was dismissed. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period for 10 days for the recall election.
Edward Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election but disqualifications were filed
against him on the ground that he has served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms immediately prior to the recall election
for the same post. Later, COMELEC declared that he is qualified to run. Meanwhile, Socrates argues that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to
130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members.

ISSUE:
1. Is the Recall Resolution valid?
2. Is Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election?

HELD:
1. YES. The Court does not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELECs findings of fact are patently
erroneous.
Socrates claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a
majority of PRA members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002.
This argument deserves scant consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution
their terms of office had not yet expired. They were all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal
disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Thus, the Court
rules that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution
and in scheduling the recall election.

2. YES. In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate
reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek
reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for 3 consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his 3 consecutive
terms as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the LGC, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in
the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the LGC disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term
limit, from running for a 4th consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.
Socrates ran and won as mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June
30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.

From June 30, 2001 until the recall election, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period,
Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as
mayor, not because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive
terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless
continuation of his previous consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-terms
with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary
interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of
Hagedorns service as mayor.

In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years,
constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption
or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the
cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials continuity of service.
 LA CARLOTA CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL v. ATTY. REX ROJO

On March 18, 2004, Vice Mayor Rex Jalandoon appointed Atty. Rex Rojo as Sangguniang Panlungsod
Secretary. The day preceding such appointment, Atty. Rojo had just tendered his resignation as member during their
session where Vice-Mayor Rex Jalandoon (Jalandoon), as presiding officer, and six members of a twelve-member
sanggunian were present. The status of the appointment was permanent. Then the Vice-Mayor
submitted Rojos appointment papers to the Civil Service Commission Negros Occidental Field Office (CSCFO-
Negros Occidental) for attestation. The said CSCFO wrote to Jalandoon to inform him of the infirmities the office
found on the appointment documents, i.e. the Chairman of the Personnel Selection Board and the Human Resource
Management Officer did not sign the certifications, the latter relative to the completeness of the documents as well as
to the publication requirement. In view of the failure of the appointing authority to comply with the directive, the said
CSCFO considered the appointment of Rojo permanently recalled or withdrawn, in a subsequent Letter to Jalandoon.

ISSUE. To whom does the LGC vests the power to accept the resignation of a member of the sanggunian?

HELD.
The resolution of this case requires the application and interpretation of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7160
(RA 7160), otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. The pertinent provisions read: Section
82. Resignation of Elective Local Officials.
(a) Resignations by elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance by the following
authorities:
(1) The President, in the case of governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized
cities and independent component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of municipal mayors, municipal vice-mayors, city mayors and city vice-mayors of
component cities;
(3) The sanggunian concerned, in case of sanggunian members; and
(4) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of barangay officials.
(b) Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials, together with the action taken by the aforesaid
authorities, shall be furnished the Department of Interior and Local Government.
(c) The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon by the authority concerned within fifteen (15)
working days from receipt thereof.
(d) Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be deemed accepted upon presentation before
an open session of the sanggunianconcerned and duly entered in its records: Provided, however,That this
subsection does not apply to sanggunian members who are subject to recall elections or to cases where existing
laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such resignations.

Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan; the
city vice-mayor, of the sangguniang panlungsod; the municipal vice-mayor, of the sangguniang bayan; and
the punong barangay, of the sangguniang barangay. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
(b) In the event of the inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session, the members present
and consisting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. He shall certify within ten
(10) days from the passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions adopted by the sanggunian in the session over which
he temporarily presided.

Under RA 7160, the city vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. It clearly states
that the Sangguniang Panlungsod shall be composed of the city vice-mayor as presiding officer, the regular
sanggunian members, the president of the city chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, the president of
the panlungsod na pederasyon ngmga sangguniang kabataan, and the sectoral representatives, as members. Blacks Law
Dictionary defines composed of as formed of or consisting of. As the presiding officer, the vice-mayor can
vote only to break a tie. In effect, the presiding officer votes when it matters the most, that is, to break a deadlock in
the votes. Clearly, the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, is a member of theSangguniang Panlungsod considering that he is
mandated under Section 49 of RA 7160 to vote to break a tie. To construe otherwise would create an anomalous and
absurd situation where the presiding officer who votes to break a tie during a Sanggunian session is not considered a
member of the Sanggunian.

In the same manner, a quorum of the Sangguniang Panlungsod should be computed based on the total composition of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental is composed of
the presiding officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of thirteen (13) members. A
majority of the 13 members of theSangguniang Panlungsod, or at least seven (7) members, is needed to constitute a
quorum to transact official business. Since seven (7) members (including the presiding officer) were present on the 17
March 2004 regular session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, clearly there was a quorum such that the irrevocable
resignation of respondent was validly accepted.
 LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, et al. v. COMELEC & SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MORONG

G.R. No. 111230, 30 September 1994, EN BANC, (Puno, J.)

In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of
the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with Republic Act No. 7227.

The municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition to annul by Garcia, et al. Garcia, et al. then resorted
to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They started to solicit the required number of
signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the Garcia, et al., the Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice Mayor
and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC
requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum because the exercise will just promote
divisiveness, counter productiveness and futility.

The COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a
resolution and not an ordinance." and to direct Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of
signatures being gathered by Garcia, et al.

ISSUE: Can Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan be proper
subject of an initiative?

RULING:
YES. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative.

The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by
Congress when it enacted R.A. 6735 (An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor). Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local
legislations.

Resolutions are not normally subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary to the successful
administration of the business affairs of a city.

In the case at bench, however, it cannot be argued that the subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of
Morong merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a permanent rule of conduct or government.
The inclusion of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far reaching implications in the governance
of its people.

Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of
Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice
on the matter via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the municipality of Morong for the inclusion came
in the form of a resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare of the people of Morong.

Worse, respondent COMELEC granted the petition without affording Garcia, et al. any fair opportunity to oppose it.
This procedural lapse is fatal for at stake is not an ordinary right but the sanctity of the sovereignty of the people, their
original power to legislate through the process of initiative.
 SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS.
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which
created the Subic EconomicZone. RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declared national policy of
converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong , Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10 , Serye 1993 ,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic
Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.

Respondents Garcia filed a petition with theSangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10,
Serye 1993 .The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify Pambayang Kapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the
Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met. Not satisfied, respondents
resorted to their power initiative under the LGC of 1991.

Comelec denied the petition for local initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a resolution and not
an ordinance. Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848 , adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local referendum
and providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of thereferendum. SBMA instituted a petition for
certiorari contestingthe validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that public respondents intent on proceeding with a
local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law.

ISSUE. Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its
Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan;" and

HELD.
YES. To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
COMELEC made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution[11] as reproduced in
the footnote below the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The
Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee";
the documents were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots
themselves bore the description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of
Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In enacting the "Initiative and
Referendum Act,[12] Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.

There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:

a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the
purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof, passed
by Congress; and
 c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.

Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz[13] defines initiative as the "power of the people to propose
bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly." On the other hand, he
explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been
passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law."

Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either
because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because
they want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the
opportunity to enact the proposal. If its refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the
proponents through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative, giving
notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the number of signed
conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for the
initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local government
unit concerned x x x".

On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of its territorial
jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or approved by such law-
making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control and direction of the Commission on
Elections.[15]

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-
making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the
wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what
has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are
understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No"
in the ballot.
 RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals,
commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters,
with each legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group
also claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.

The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due publication of their petition, the
COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?

On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating modifications in
the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law
governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
ISSUE. Does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute a valid amendment of the Constitution?
HELD.
NO. Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention.
The third mode is through a people's initiative.
The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the
Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose
revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only
amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people
the power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to
propose amendments.
The very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained
therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well
as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the
significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as
will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.

Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of
separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other
hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the
specific provision being amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our
Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative extensive in its provisions
as to change directly the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions." The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main
inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan
as to amount to a revision." Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.
Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change in its fundamental framework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that
"jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not merely an
amendment. A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal
branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in
the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a
revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of
government.
Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative
to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
 DISCIPLINARY ACTION

RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, PETITIONER, VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS AND

MARIANO UN OCAMPO III, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991, EN BANC, PARAS, J.

In August 1988, respondent governor, as Provincial Governor of Tarlac, entered into and executed a Loan Agreement
with the Lingkod Tarlac Foundation, Inc., a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by the governor himself as
chairman and controlled by his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee, and secretary; that the said Loan
Agreement was never authorized and approved by the Provincial Board, in direct contravention of the provisions of the
LGC. Thereafter the Secretary of the Department of Local Government (DLG) rendered a decision finding the
respondent guilty of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and suspended him for a period of 90 days. The
office of the president through the executive secretary, likewise affirmed the decision

Thereafter, on March 1, 1991, took his oath of office as acting governor. Under the administrative suspension order,
petitioner had up to May 31, 1991 as acting governor. On May 15, 1991, the executive secretary issued a resolution
granting executive clemency to the respondent governor3. By virtue of the aforequoted Resolution, respondent
governor reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any notification made to the petitioner.

ISSUES.
(1) WON the grant of executive clemency and the reason therefor, are political questions beyond judicial review,
(2) WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in administrative cases.

HELD.
(1) No, the court my exercise its power of judicial review. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in
which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a settled rule that
when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits
prescribed by the Constitution, the court will not decline to exercise the power of judicial review. What is generally
meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act.

Besides, under the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the
bounds of the Constitution (Art. VIII, Sec. 1). Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not
the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view.

(2) Yes, applying the doctrine Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos (Where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we distinguish. The court cannot sustain the view of the petitioner that the grant of executive clemency
applies only to criminal cases. Based on Article VII, Section 194 of the constitution, it does not distinguish between
which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By
the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to
provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. In the
same vein, the court does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that if the President can grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

3 In his letter petition to the Exec. Secretary, petitioner submitted documents and letters from his constituents tending to show the
relative success of his livelihood loan program pursued under the aegis of the LTFI and/or the Foundation's credible loan
repayment record. Petitioner (governor) submitted documents and letters from his constituents tending to show the relative success
of his livelihood loan program pursued under the aegis of the LTFI and/or the Foundation's credible loan repayment record.
4 Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,

commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judment.
Note:
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission, therefore, that the President's executive
clemency powers may not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in the Constitution, that
is, "no pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the COMELEC5
The court also made a discussion on supervision and control. Under the administrative code of 1987,
Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law
or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the
execution of plans and programs.
Implicit in this authority, however, is the "supervision and control" power of the President to reduce, if
circumstances so warrant, the imposable penalty or to modify the suspension or removal order, even "in the
sense" of granting executive clemency. "Control," within the meaning of the Constitution, is the power to
substitute one's own judgment for that of a subordinate. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency,
the different executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of
the President until countermanded or reprobated by her (Aquino).
President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may
substitute her decision for that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve
the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive
clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where
a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive
clemency was granted, after adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. "the relative success of . . .
livelihood loan program
The court made a qualification that when it ruled the President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, it refers only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative
branches of the government.
In the dissenting opinion of Justice Padilla, the appellate jurisdiction of the President to review, reverse or
modify the decision of the Sec. of DILG does not carry with it the power to grant executive clemency. Neither
does the Local Government Code expressly vest upon the President the power to commute or lift the
administrative sanctions imposed upon erring, local elective officials after the decision has become final.
o Further he disagrees that executive clemency cannot apply to administrative cases for the reason that
the philosophy behind the grant of power to the President to grant executive clemency is founded on
the recognition that human institutions are imperfect and that there are infirmities, deficiencies or
flaws in the administration of justice. The power exists as an instrument or means for correcting these
infirmities and also for mitigating whatever harshness might be generated by a too strict an application
of the law. Such principle applies to all criminal offenses committed against the state.

5 Although originally intended to prevent the President from protecting his cronies, the ConCom opted to do away with the
provision the power to grant executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws may be limited by legislation for it will
chip away the power of the president
 RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUIS SANTOS, AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND MELVIN VARGAS, AS ACTING GOVERNOR OF
CAGAYAN,

FACTS.
Petitioner was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to said position
during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a term of 4 years therefrom. On December 7, 1989, a
sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Mayor Agatep
of Gattaran, Mayor Mamba of Tuao and Mayor Agatep of Lasam, all in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter
committed during the coup. In response, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.

On the basis of his reply, respondent Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from notice, pending
the outcome of the formal investigation into the charges against him. During the hearing conducted on the charges
against petitioner, complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner
neither presented evidence nor even cross-examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to move that
respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case, which motion was denied. Thereafter, respondent
Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from
office.

One of the three grounds petitioner relies on for this petition is that the alleged act of disloyalty committed by
petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because
it is an act punishable as rebellion under the RPC.

While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor
of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. 3 separate petitions for his disqualification were then filed against him, all
based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of the resolution of respondent Secretary. The
Commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992 but also ruled that inasmuch
as their resolutions become final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation, petitioner may still be
voted upon as a candidate for governor pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with this
Court. Thereafter, a resolution was issued by the SC annulling the said resolution of the Commission on the ground
that the decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending review with this Court. As
petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the SCs resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.

ISSUE. WON petitioner should be removed from office on the ground of disloyalty to the Republic

RULING.
NO. Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan has rendered the administrative case
pending before us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most
number of votes among the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. As held by this Court in Aguinaldo v.
Comelec et al., supra,:
xxx
'Considering the facts narrated, the expiration of petitioner's term of office during which the acts charged were allegedly
committed, and his subsequent reelection, the petition must be dismissed for the reason that the issue has become
academic. In Pascual v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959, this Court has ruled:
'The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right to remove from office because of
misconduct during a prior term to which we fully subscribe.
'Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal
and this is especially true where the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceeding for removal shall not
extend beyond the removal from office, and disqualification from holding office for a term for which the
officer was elected or appointed.
'The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him
therefor.
'The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a
man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of
such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.'

Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed
during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal
cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Petition granted and the decision of public respondent Secretary of Local Government, dismissing petitioner as
Governor of Cagayan, is hereby reversed.

*Petitioner also contends that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government officials as
alter ego of the President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and which is
now vested in the courts. The Court do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government
officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis
is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of control
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of general supervision over local governments, and
by the doctrine that the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly
rejected by him. Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a local government code, which
provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the
1987 Constitution, then it can not be said that B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution.
Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this Court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force
despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is
approved. The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of Local Government to remove local elective
government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337.
 VICENTE SALUMBIDES, JR. & GLENDA ARAA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.
G.R. No. 180917, April 23, 2010, EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

Salumbides and Araa were appointed as Municipal Legal Officer/Administrator and Municipal Budget
Officer, respectively, of Tagkawayan, Quezon. Mayor Salumbides III saw the urgent need to construct a two-classroom
building with fence for the Tagkawayan Municipal High School (TMHS) since the public school in the poblacion area
would no longer admit high school freshmen. The mayor consulted Salumbides who suggested that the construction of
the two-classroom building be charged to the account of the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses/ Repair and
Maintenance of Facilities (MOOE/RMF) and implemented "by administration," as had been done in a previous
classroom building project of the former mayor. Upon consultation, Glenda advised Salumbides, that there were no
more available funds that could be taken from the MOOE/RMF, but the savings of the municipal government were
adequate to fund the projects. She added, however, that the approval by the Sangguniang Bayan of a proposed
supplemental budget must be secured however the members of the Sangguniang Bayan are already on recess. Glenda and
Salumbides advised the mayor to source the funds from the P1M MOOE/RMF allocation in the approved Municipal
Annual Budget. The mayor thus ordered Municipal Engr. Aquino to proceed with the construction of the projects
based on the program of work and bill of materials he prepared. The mayor included the projects in the list of local
government projects scheduled for bidding.

The construction of the projects commenced without any approved appropriation and ahead of the public
bidding. Salumbides was of the opinion that the projects were regular and legal, based on an earlier project that was
"implemented in the same manner, using the same source of fund and for the same reason of urgency" which was
allowed "because the building was considered merely temporary as the TMHS is set to be transferred to an 8-hectare lot
which the municipal government is presently negotiating to buy." Meanwhile, Aquino suggested to the Sangguniang Bayan
the adoption of "model guidelines" in the implementation of infrastructure projects to be executed "by administration,"
while Councilor Sandro sponsored a Resolution to ratify the projects and to authorize the mayor to enter into a
negotiated procurement. Both actions did not merit the approval of the Sangguniang Bayan. The petitioners were charged
with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service,
and violation of the COA Rules and the LGC.

ISSUE: Is it valid to expand the doctrine of condonation to cover coterminous appointive officials who were
administratively charged along with the reelected official/appointing authority with infractions allegedly committed
during their preceding term?

HELD:
NO. The doctrine of condonation cannot be applied to appointive officials for there lies a substantial
distinction between appointive and elective officials. Simple neglect of duty is defined as the failure to give proper
attention to a task expected from an employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference. In the present case,
petitioners fell short of the reasonable diligence required of them, for failing to exercise due care and prudence in
ascertaining the legal requirements and fiscal soundness of the projects before stamping their imprimatur and giving
their advice to their superior.
The CA correctly ruled that as municipal legal officer, petitioner Salumbides "failed to uphold the law and
provide a sound legal assistance and support to the mayor in carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions
of adequate facilities when he advised [the mayor] to proceed with the construction of the subject projects without prior
competitive bidding." As pointed out by the OSG, to absolve Salumbides is tantamount to allowing with impunity the
giving of erroneous or illegal advice, when by law he is precisely tasked to advise the mayor on "matters related to
upholding the rule of law." Indeed, a legal officer who renders a legal opinion on a course of action without any legal
basis becomes no different from a lay person who may approve the same because it appears justified.
As regards petitioner Glenda, the appellate court held that the improper use of government funds upon the
direction of the mayor and prior advice by the municipal legal officer did not relieve her of liability for willingly
cooperating rather than registering her written objection as municipal budget officer.
When a public officer takes an oath of office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully perform the duties
of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the
discharge of duties, a public officer is to use that prudence, caution, and attention which careful persons use in the
management of their affairs.
 Public service requires integrity and discipline. For this reason, public servants must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and dedication to duty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, public officers and
employees must faithfully adhere to hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional principle that a public office is a
public trust; and must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency.
 MAYOR JESUS MIGUEL YULO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, APOLONIO ELASIGUE, AND
TEOFILO MAMPLATA et al.
FACTS.
On November 24, 1986, private respondent Apolonio A. Elasigue, Officer in-Charge of the Municipality of
Calamba, Laguna terminated the services of private respondents Mamplata and 43 other employees of said municipality
based on the reorganization and approval of the new staffing pattern thereof.

Private respondents Mamplata and the other separated employees assailed the action of respondent Elasigue before the
Inter-Agency Review Committee created under EO No. 17. Since the private respondents were not removed pursuant
to Executive Order No. 17 and there is no showing that the reorganization was undertaken to circumvent the said
statute, the Committee referred the case to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) of respondent Civil Service
Commission. Pending disposition of the case by the MSPB, Elasigue lost in the mayoralty election in 1988 to petitioner
Yulo.

The MSPB, finding that there is no sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of private respondents, ordered the
reinstatement of Mamplata and 28 other employees and the payment of their backwages by the municipality.

Petitioner Yulo, as the elected mayor filed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. On appeal, respondent
Commission affirmed the decision of the MSPB. The MR filed later on by petitioner was denied by respondent
Commission which upheld its earlier ruling but reduced the number of employees to be reinstated to 21 the reason
being that during the pendency of the case before the MSPB and respondent Commission, some were re-employed
while two of the dismissed employees, Cresencia Belarmino and Marcial Manila died. Their untimely death
notwithstanding, respondent Commission ordered the payment of their backwages up to the time of their respective
demise.

ISSUE. WON the removal of private respondents Mamplata, et al. from office due to the reorganization and approval
of a new staffing pattern of the municipal government of Calamba is valid.

HELD.
NO. In his narration of facts, petitioner himself admitted that private respondents' services were terminated pursuant to the
reorganization and approval of the new staffing pattern of Calamba on November 3, 1986 (Rollo, pp. 4-5). Petitioner's argument to
the effect that respondents were separated from the service by virtue of the Freedom Constitution or Executive Order
No. 17 is palpably an afterthought. That is why when the respondents appealed their dismissal to the Inter-Agency
Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17, said Committee refused to take cognizance of said appeal
on the ground that the dismissal was not made pursuant to the Freedom Constitution or Executive Order No. 17 and
instead referred the case on appeal to the MSPB.

It is thus crystal clear that private respondents were not separated from the service based on Section 2, Article III of the
Freedom Constitution or Executive Order No. 17 implementing the then basic law. On the contrary, their services were
terminated as a "result of the reorganization and approval of the new staffing pattern of the municipality of Calamba on
November 3, 1986" stated in the individual notices of termination served upon them by the then OIC Mayor.

Petitioner Yulo's argument that private respondents were separated by virtue of the Freedom Constitution is therefore
erroneous. Not only that. As records further indicate, the MSPB found that there was no sufficient evidence to prove
the guilt of private respondents. As to what were the charges levelled against the dismissed employees, petitioner Yulo
could merely insinuate that some of said employees were of "questionable integrity". It is glaringly obvious, therefore,
that at the time private respondents were dismissed from the service on November 24, l986, there was no evidence to
substantiate the claim of questionable integrity. Simply stated, respondents were removed without cause.

Aside from petitioner's unproven allegation of "questionable integrity", neither has he shown that respondents herein
were removed for cause much less that the supposed reorganization was undertaken on the ground of economy or
redundancy. While there may be a decrease in the number of positions, i.e., from 285 to 266 as a result of the
reorganization, the number of regular employees, on the other hand, increased from 231 to 263 brought about by the
appointment of forty-eight (48) new employees. As found by the MSPB, the separated employees were holding
permanent appointments at the time of their removal and as such, they enjoy preference in reappointment to a similar
position in the new staffing pattern (Rollo, p. 21, citing CSC MC 5, s. 1988).
Be that as it may, it is undeniable that private respondents' employment with the municipality was unlawfully
terminated. On this score alone, the dismissed employees ought to and must be reinstated. Illegal removal of career civil
service employees in violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure will not be condoned under the guise of
reorganization.
 WILMER GREGO v. COMELEC & HUMBERTO BASCO
G.R. No. 125955, 19 June 1997, EN BANC, (Romero, J.)

On 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas.

Subsequently, Basco ran for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988 local
elections. He won and assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-election in the 1992 synchronized national
elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the 6 City Councilors. However, Cenon
Ronquillo, another candidate for councilor in the same district, alleged Bascos ineligibility to be elected councilor on
the basis of the Tordesillas ruling. At about the same time, two more cases were also commenced by Honorio Lopez II
in the Office of the Ombudsman and in the Department of Interior and Local Government.[4] All these challenges
were, however, dismissed.

Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the 1995 local elections seeking a third and final term. Once
again, he emerged sixth for six councilor seats. Grego filed a petition for disqualification of Bascos disqualification due
to the Tordesillas ruling. Manila City Board of Canvassers (BOC) proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor for the
Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his
oath of office.

ISSUE: Should Basco be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been removed from office
as a result of an administrative case pursuant to Section 40 (b) of the LG Code ?

RULING:
NO. There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively. It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is not applicable to the
present case. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidates removal from
office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter us from the applying the law prospectively. The basic
tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the qualification sought
by Grego.

The issue of whether or not Bascos triple election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the
point because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first place disqualified when he
ran in the three previous elections. This assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT subject
to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code which, as we said earlier, applies only
to those removed from office on or after January 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner,
there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length.

Anent Bascos alleged circumvention of the prohibition in Tordesillas against reinstatement to any position in the
national or local government, including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as government-owned or controlled
corporations, we are of the view that petitioners contention is baseless. Neither does petitioners argument that the
term any position is broad enough to cover without distinction both appointive and local positions merit any
consideration. Contrary to Gregos assertion, the Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective
position.

In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term reinstatement. Under the former Civil Service
Decree,the law applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively dismissed from office, the term
reinstatement had a technical meaning, referring only to an appointive position.

Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 does not support Gregos contention that the COMELEC, or more properly speaking, the
Manila City BOC, should have suspended the proclamation. The use of the word may indicates that the
suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature and operates to confer discretion.
What is merely made mandatory, according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to the COMELEC, the question of whether or not
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own determination and the
Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically
and capriciously.

The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as
to warrant a different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification to hold that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion.
 MAYOR EDGARDO G. FLORES, petitioner vs. SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF PAMPANGA

On December 19, 2001, an administrative complaint for dishonesty and gross misconduct against then Mayor Edgardo
G. Flores of Minalin, Pampanga, petitioner, was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the same province, one of the
respondents herein.

The administrative complaint against petitioner alleged that on August 1, 2001, he executed Purchase Request No. 1 for
the acquisition of a communication equipment amounting to P293,000.00 without any Resolution or Ordinance enacted
by the Sangguniang Bayan of Minalin. The winning bidder was one Kai Electronics. On August 6, 2001, or while the
bidding was still being conducted, Kai Electronics delivered the communication equipment to the municipality of
Minalin. The Notice of Award of Bid to Kai Electronics states that the bidding took place also on August 1, 2001
when respondent executed the Purchase Request No. 1. The communication equipment delivered by Kai Electronics
was overpriced by more than one hundred percent (100%) or in the amount of P129,600.00.

In ruling against the petitioner, the Court of Appeals held that he failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
before going to court. Moreover, respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it issued the challenged Order considering that the allegation of overpricing is supported by
documentary evidence. There is also sufficient evidence to prove that the bidding and the awarding of the contract to
Kai Electronics were done under questionable circumstances.

ISSUE. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 72958 was prematurely
filed as petitioner failed to exhaust first all administrative remedies.

HELD.
NO. Section 61 of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) partly provides:
SEC. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall
be prepared as follows: x x x;
(b) A complaint against any elective official of a municipality shall be filed before the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan whose decision may be appealed to the Office of the President; and x x x.
The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed with respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Pampanga in
accordance with the above provision. After receiving the Order of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan preventively
suspending him from office, petitioner should have filed a motion for reconsideration in order to give the latter the
opportunity to correct itself if there was any error on its part. Such motion is a condition sine qua non before filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[5]

We must add that petitioner, before filing with the Court of Appeals his petition for certiorari, should have waited for
respondent Governor Lapids action on the recommendation of respondent Sangguniang Panlalawigan that he be
preventively suspended from office; and on his letter requesting the Governor to veto the questioned Order,
considering that the latter is the one empowered by law to impose preventive suspension upon him. Section 63 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 partly provides:
SEC 63. Preventive Suspension.
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or

Petitioner has not shown any valid and compelling reason why, without waiting for the Governors action on the
matter, he immediately filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. By doing so, petitioner effectively
deprived the Governor of his duty to take appropriate action on the controversy.

It is a well-settled rule that where, as here, the petitioner has available remedies within the administrative machinery
against the action of an administrative board, body, or officer, the intervention of the courts can be resorted to by him
only after having exhausted all such remedies.[10] The rationale of this rule rests upon the presumption that the
administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and
decide it properly. The strict application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will also prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the court.[11] We cannot countenance petitioners utter disregard of this procedural
norm and frustrate its purpose of attaining a just, speedy, inexpensive and orderly judicial proceedings.