37) Gonzales vs Office of the President | http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_196231_2012.

html
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY. CARLITOD. CATAYONG,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner,

vs. ATT Y. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ,
ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of the OFFICE OF
MALACAANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232 primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of R.A.
No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a
Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 196231: P/S Insp. Mendoza et al., were charged of Grave Misconduct. Upon the prolonged inaction of the
Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales in the administrative case of the accused, the latter hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on August 23, 2010 for him to be reinstated in the police service. Gonzales found committed a serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for
reconsideration without any justification. This inaction is gross, considering that there is no opposition, consequently,
precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Garcia
et al., with Plunder and Money Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan denied Major General
Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence militated against the grant of bail. However,
Barreras-Sulit sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into with
the accused. HOR conducted public hearings, thereafter, the Committee on Justice passed and adopted Committee
Resolution No. 3, recommending to the President the dismissal of Barreras-Sulit from the service and the filing of
appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants for the culpable violations under the Anti-Graft Law and
grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over a
Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the Ombudsman.
HELD: YES. The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceedadministratively against
petitionerBarreras-Sulit to determine the existence of any of the grounds forher removal from office as provided for
under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act, while the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is
extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive.
The removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment,
however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. In giving the President the power to remove the aforesaid officials, Congress
simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to
appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The petitioner Gonzales III was ordered reinstated with payment of backwages, even as the Office of the
Ombudsman was directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above case against petitioner. The
court affirmed the case against Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to
culpable violation in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act was denied.

38) Defensor-Santiago vs COMELEC | http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1997/mar1997/gr_127325_1997.html

G.R. No. 127325; March 19, 1997

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members
of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS: Atty. Delfin, President of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with
COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative
based on Sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Sen. Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground
that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners Sen. Defensor-Santiago et al., filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the petition rising the several arguments,
such as: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to
the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the
power of Peoples Initiative. The Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
ISSUES: Whether the proposed Delfin petition constitutes amendment to the constitution or does it constitute a
revision.
HELD: The Delfin proposal of lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other
provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access
to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by
express provision of Sec. 2 of Art. XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments. The prohibition against
reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local elective officials are based on the
philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the
demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a few, and to
promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and decision-making for the common good; hence,
to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
39) Teves vs Sandiganbayan | http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2004/dec2004/154182.htm
G.R. No. 154182; December 17, 2004

EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners,

vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.

FACTS: Edgar Teves, Mayor of Valencia, Negros Occidental and his wife Teresita Teves was charged of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, for unlawful intervention and conspiring with his wife in the issuance of license to
operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of Daniel Teves, in which he has a pecuniary interest
may be convicted, together with his spouse, of violation of that same provision premised on his mere possession of
such interest considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and his wife.
ISSUE: W/N Court erred in conviction of Teresita Teves as co-conspirator
HELD: Yes. Petitioner Teresita must be acquitted. Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself
and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be
established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of
criminal design. There is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a spouse or any person to be a
party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermind in a
conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed.
Edgar was convicted of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possession of pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit; and Teresita was acquitted of such offense.