PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee vs.

ABELARDO SALONGA,
Appellant.
G.R. No. 131131
June 21, 2001
Facts:
That on or before the 23rd day of October, 1986, in the Municipality of
Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another
and mutually helping and aiding one another, and as such had access to the
preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company, with grave abuse
of confidence, intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner
thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers
authorized to sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account
of Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact there
is no such transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the
preparation and use of a simulated check described as Check No. 013702 in the
amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through which
they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total
sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust Company
in the total amount of P36,480.30.
Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in finding accused Abelardo Salonga guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft through falsification of
commercial document with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Held:
The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of Commercial
Document. The information alleged that the accused took P36,480.30 with grave
abuse of confidence by forging the signature of officers authorized to sign the
subject check and had the check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and
Services, a fictitious payee without any legitimate transaction with Metrobank.
Theft is qualified if it is committed with grave abuse of confidence. The fact that
accused-appellant as assistant cashier of Metrobank had custody of the aforesaid
checks and had access not only in the preparation but also in the release of
Metrobank cashiers checks suffices to designate the crime as qualified theft as he
gravely abused the confidence reposed in him by the bank as assistant cashier.
Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the imposable penalty for the felony of
theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and one year of each
additional ten thousand pesos in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the
crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two (2) degrees
than that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two (2) degrees
higher than prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures
of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in
order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. As correctly
held by the courts a quo, falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary
means to commit the crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime.
 SANTIAGO PAERA, Appellee vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellants.
G.R. No. 181626
May 30, 2011

Facts:
As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner
Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his constituents use of communal water
coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas,
Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas,
Valencia and owned by complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of
complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite petitioners scheme, Indalecio
continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded
Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecios access.
The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents
complained of water supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main
line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing
leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this
point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by the parties.
According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his
bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!).
Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong
(Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner,
Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted
Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw! (I dont spare anyone, even if you
are a woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in
the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his
attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and,
recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting Bisag
gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo! (Even if you are old, I will crack open your
skull!).
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with
a bolo, angrily inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left
petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo,
prompting Indalecio to scamper.
Issue:
Whether or not Santiago Paera is guilty of three (3) counts of Grave threats
resulting to continued crime.
Held:
He threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the
same time. Had this been true, then petitioners liability for one count of Grave
Threats would have rested on the same basis grounding our rulings that the taking
of six roosters or 13 cows found at the same place and taken at the same time
results in the commission of only one count of theft because
There is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different
purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which determines the
existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters [and heads of cattle] in
the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an
independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct
appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes.
TEOFILO EVANGELISTA, Appellee vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellant
G.R. No. 163267
May 5, 2010
Facts:
In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a
Customs Police assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
District Command, was informed by his superior that a certain passenger of
Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No. 657 would be arriving from Dubai bringing
with him firearms and ammunitions. Shortly after lunch, Acierto, together with
Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella, proceeded to the tube area where they were met
by a crewmember who introduced to them herein petitioner. Acierto asked
petitioner if he brought firearms with him and the latter answered in the affirmative
adding that the same were bought in Angola. Thereupon, Acierto was summoned
to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the
firearms and ammunitions were turned over to him. Petitioner was then escorted to
the arrival area to get his luggage and thereafter proceeded to the examination
room where the luggage was examined and petitioner was investigated. In open
court, Acierto identified the firearms and ammunitions.
During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio
Bustos (Bustos) that he bought the subject items in Angola but the same were
confiscated by the Dubai authorities, which turned over the same to a PAL
personnel in Dubai. Upon inquiry, the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) in
Camp Crame certified that petitioner is neither registered with said office nor
licensed holder of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions. Bustos likewise verified
from the Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no record to show that the
firearms were legally purchased. Among the documents Bustos had gathered
during his investigation were the Arrival Endorsement Form and Customs
Declaration Form. A referral letter was prepared endorsing the matter to the
Department of Justice. Bustos admitted that petitioner was not assisted by counsel
when the latter admitted that he bought the firearms in Angola.
SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) and representative of the FEO, upon verification, found that
petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder.
Issue:
Whether or not The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that
Evangelista was never in possession of any firearm or ammunition within
Philippine jurisdiction and he therefore could not have committed the continuing
crime charged against him.
Held:
Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case filed
against him. He claims that his alleged possession of the subject firearms
transpired while he was at the Dubai Airport and his possession thereof has ceased
when he left for the Philippines. He insists that since Dubai is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines and his situation is not one of the exceptions
provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our criminal laws are not
applicable. In short, he had not committed a crime within the Philippines.
Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction. In order for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. If the evidence
adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the
court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt
that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was
charged was committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of
the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence
that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee vs. NGANO SUGAN, NGA BEN
LATAM, FRANCING, GAGA LATAM, SALIGO KUYAN and KAMISON
AKOY, Accused, GAGA LATAM, SALIGO KUYAN and KAMISON AKOY,
Appellants.
G.R. No. 192789
March 23, 2011
Facts:
At around 6:45 p.m. of February 8, 1998, Gaga, Saligo, Ngano Sugan, Nga
Ben Latam and one alias Francing, all armed with guns, entered Fortunato Delos
Reyes residence in Purok Roxas 1, Lamsugod, Surallah, South Cotabato, and
declared a hold up. Kamison and Cosme Latam stayed outside and acted as
lookouts.
Once inside, the armed men ordered Fortunato, his wife Thelma Delos
Reyes, and their son Nestor Delos Reyes, to drop to the floor. The armed men
inquired from them where the money and other valuables were hidden; thereafter,
they took cash amounting to P10,000.00, personal belongings worth P5,000.00,
and an air gun valued at P2,800.00. Ngano then brought Nestor outside the house,
and shot him.
Reggie Delos Reyes, another son of Fortunato and Thelma, ran to his parents
house when he heard the gunshot. When he arrived, Kamison and Cosme pointed a
knife and a gun at him, respectively, and told him not to enter the house. Reggie
then heard Nestor shout that he had been hit. Thereafter, all the seven (7) armed
men left. Reggie rushed Nestor to the hospital, but the latter died due to multiple
gunshot wounds.
Issues:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of robbery with homicide.
Held:
In the present case, no doubt exists, based on the appellants and their
companions actions that their overriding intention was to rob Fortunatos house.
The following facts are established and undisputed: the armed men entered
Fortunatos house and ordered its occupants to drop to the ground; they asked for
the location of the money and other valuables; they took cash amounting to
P10,000.00, personal belongings worth P5,000.00, and an air gun valued at
P2,800.00.
While it was undisputed that only Ngano shot Nestor, the lower courts correctly
found the appellants liable for robbery with homicide. Case law establishes that
whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty
as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the
homicide, unless it appears that they sought to prevent the killing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee vs. EDMUNDO VILLAFLORES
y OLANO, Appellant.
G.R. No. 184926
April 11, 2012
Facts:
The victim was Marita, a girl who was born on October 29, 1994 based on
her certificate of live birth. When her very young life was snuffed out by
strangulation on July 2, 1999, she was only four years and eight months old. She
had been playing at the rear of their residence in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City in
the morning of July 2, 1999 when Julia, her mother, first noticed her missing from
home. By noontime, because Marita had not turned up, Julia called her husband
Manito at his workplace in Pasig City, and told him about Marita being missing.
Manito rushed home and arrived there at about 2 pm, and immediately he and Julia
went in search of their daughter until 11 pm, inquiring from house to house in the
vicinity. They did not find her. At 6 am of the next day, Manito reported to the
police that Marita was missing. In her desperation, Julia sought out a clairvoyant
(manghuhula) in an adjacent barangay, and the latter hinted that Marita might be
found only five houses away from their own. Following the clairvoyants direction,
they found Maritas lifeless body covered with a blue and yellow sack inside the
comfort room of an abandoned house about five structures away from their own
house. Her face was black and blue, and bloody. She had been tortured and
strangled till death.
The ensuing police investigation led to two witnesses, Aldrin Bautista and
Jovy Solidum, who indicated that Villaflores might be the culprit who had raped
and killed Marita. The police thus arrested Villaflores at around 5 pm of July 3,
1999 just as he was alighting from a vehicle.
Issue:
Whether or not Edmundo Villaflores is guilty of Rape with homicide.
Held:
 We have often conceded the difficulty of proving the commission of rape
when only the victim is left to testify on the circumstances of its commission. The
difficulty heightens and complicates when the crime is rape with homicide,
because there may usually be no living witnesses if the rape victim is herself killed.
Yet, the situation is not always hopeless for the State, for the Rules of Court also
allows circumstantial evidence to establish the commission of the crime as well as
the identity of the culprit. Direct evidence proves a fact in issue directly without
any reasoning or inferences being drawn on the part of the factfinder; in contrast,
circumstantial evidence indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the factfinder
must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence. To be clear, then,
circumstantial evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony
would ultimately lead to setting a felon free.
The Rules of Court makes no distinction between direct evidence of a fact
and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred;
hence, no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is
circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, the trier of fact must be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. Nor has the
quantity of circumstances sufficient to convict an accused been fixed as to be
reduced into some definite standard to be followed in every instance. Thus, the
Court said in People v. Modesto:
The standard postulated by this Court in the appreciation of circumstantial
evidence is well set out in the following passage from People vs. Ludday: No
general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which
in any case will suffice. All the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same
time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
Section 4, Rule 133, of the Rules of Court specifies when circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction, viz:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
 (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
In resolving to convict Villaflores, both the RTC and the CA considered
several circumstances, which when appreciated together and not piece by piece,
according to the CA, were seen as strands which create a pattern when interwoven,
and formed an unbroken chain that led to the reasonable conclusion that
Villaflores, to the exclusion of all others, was guilty of rape with homicide.
We concur with the RTC and the CA.
The duly established circumstances we have considered are the following.
Firstly, Aldrin Bautista and Jovie Solidum saw Villaflores holding Marita by the
hand (akay-akay) at around 10:00 am on July 2, 1999, leading the child through the
alley going towards the direction of his house about 6 houses away from the
victims house. Secondly, Marita went missing after that and remained missing until
the discovery of her lifeless body on the following day. Thirdly, Solidum passed by
Villaflores house at about 3:00 pm of July 2, 1999 and heard the crying and
moaning (umuungol) of a child coming from inside. Fourthly, at about 7:00 pm of
July 2, 1999 Solidum saw Villaflores coming from his house carrying a yellow
sack that appeared to be heavy and going towards the abandoned house where the
childs lifeless body was later found. Fifthly, Manito, the father of Marita, identified
the yellow sack as the same yellow sack that covered the head of his daughter
(nakapalupot sa ulo) at the time he discovered her body; Manito also mentioned
that a blue sack covered her body. Sixthly, a hidden pathway existed between the
abandoned house where Maritas body was found and Villaflores house, because
his house had a rear exit that enabled access to the abandoned house without
having to pass any other houses. This indicated Villaflores familiarity and access to
the abandoned house. Seventhly, several pieces of evidence recovered from the
abandoned house, like the white rope around the victims neck and the yellow sack,
were traced to Villaflores. The white rope was the same rope tied to the door of his
house, and the yellow sack was a wall-covering for his toilet. Eighthly, the medico-
legal findings showed that Marita had died from asphyxiation by strangulation,
which cause of death was consistent with the ligature marks on her neck and the
multiple injuries including abrasions, hematomas, contusions and punctured
wounds. Ninthly, Marita sustained multiple deep fresh hymenal lacerations, and
had fresh blood from her genitalia. The vaginal and periurethral smears taken from
her body tested positive for spermatozoa. And, tenthly, the body of Marita was
already in the second stage of flaccidity at the time of the autopsy of her cadaver at
8 pm of July 3, 1999. The medico-legal findings indicated that such stage of
flaccidity confirmed that she had been dead for more than 24 hours, or at the latest
by 9 pm of July 2, 1999.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee vs. VENANCIO ROXAS y

ARGUELLES, Appellant.
G.R. No. 172604
August 17, 2010
Facts:
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there by
means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain Agnes
Guirindola, a female, thereby depriving her of her liberty, and thereafter bring her
to an uninhabited place in Barangay Bagong Pook, San Jose, Batangas and then
and there, with intent to kill and with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse
of superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot her in the face
with a hand gun, thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce
the crime of Murder as consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the able and timely
medical assistance given to said Agnes Guirindola which prevented her death,
resulting to her utmost grief, sorrow, sufferings and sleepless night, compensable
in actual, moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be awarded to
them under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not Venancio Arguelles is guilty of Kidnapping with homicide.
Held:
Based on the foregoing testimony of Agnes, the trial court did not err in
convicting appellant of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime, thus:
 Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if
none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall
be imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659).