BENJAMIN G.
TING, Petitioner, Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed
the January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met
in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed
on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City. 6 When their
second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu
City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter
proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology
after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said
field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as
member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer.11
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis,
born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on
July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16,
1991.12
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their
youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of
Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the
time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends. 14 But after they were
married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or
sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult
respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also
instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his
drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had
to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the
latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16
family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children.
Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling
and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even
neglected his obligation to his children.19
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling. 20 He would gamble two or
three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wifes own jewelry to
finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family
car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off
his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was
banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed
so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments. 23
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary
to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
give regular financial support to his family.24
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he
is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of
social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure.
He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances. 25 As for his
alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself
who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there
as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his
family financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at
respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also
pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen
played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling habits and
violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the
spouses children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed
instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children. 30
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of
the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamins deposition because the latter had
already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the
transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking,
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner
suffers from a personality disorder.32
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center,
as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the
transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr.
A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras)
interview with Benjamins brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed
that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good
relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist. 35
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oates findings and
the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler,
someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent
tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his
marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the
Family Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.37
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38 reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no
proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates conclusion was based only
on theories and not on established fact, 39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v.
Court of Appeals40and in Rep. of the Phils. Vs. Court of Appeals and Molina.41
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines
should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on
February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the
RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it
would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter
filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was
likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari 43 with
this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed
the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to
reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended
Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts decision. 47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by
the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of
the Family Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established
by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50necessary for
two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code.51
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts
and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato
S. Punos discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting
opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections 52 is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at
the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents
where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its
application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2)
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of
the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words
or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof.
Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy
considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas
"reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the
flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has
attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation
although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis
have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the
duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same
facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its
own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been
viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing
choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in
our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional
stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare
decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine
in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare
decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not
inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the
discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In
the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the
application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice
Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent
course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should
be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance
reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited
resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its
application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate
changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad
constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the
policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule
and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v.
Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy
upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is
inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine
setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order
to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed
our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are
agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are
workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition,
courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior
decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test.
The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would
lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether
facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca
v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties
who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight,
it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as
a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving
psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the
intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity,
no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. 59The
trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to
justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a partys
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of
marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected
of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial courts and the appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent
as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she is about to assume.621avvphi1.zw+
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners "defects" were present at the time of
the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already
knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part
of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a
positive indication of a personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing
wrong with petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr.
Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar
to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation
report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin,
as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview with Benjamins brothers. 64 Logically, therefore,
the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems,
or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as
the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as
well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare
him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been
amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
MARIETA C. AZCUETA Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86162 dated August 31,
2007,1 and its Resolution dated November 20, 2007.2
Petitioner Marietta C. Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta met in 1993. Less than two months after
their first meeting, they got married on July 24, 1993 at St. Anthony of Padua Church,
Antipolo City. At the time of their marriage, petitioner was 23 years old while respondent was
28. They separated in 1997 after four years of marriage. They have no children.
On March 2, 2002, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch
72, a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 02-6428.
Meanwhile, respondent failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons upon
him. Because of this, the trial court directed the City Prosecutor to conduct an investigation
whether there was collusion between the parties. In a report dated August 16, 2002,
Prosecutor Wilfredo G. Oca found that there was no collusion between the parties.
On August 21, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance for the
Republic of the Philippines and submitted a written authority for the City Prosecutor to appear
in the case on the States behalf under the supervision and control of the Solicitor General.
In her petition and during her testimony, petitioner claimed that her husband Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. According
to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature, irresponsible and continually failed to adapt
himself to married life and perform the essential responsibilities and duties of a husband.
Petitioner complained that Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and instead always asked
his mother for financial assistance. When they were married it was Rodolfos mother who
found them a room near the Azcueta home and it was also his mother who paid the monthly
rental.
Petitioner also testified that she constantly encouraged her husband to find employment.
She even bought him a newspaper every Sunday but Rodolfo told her that he was too old
and most jobs have an age limit and that he had no clothes to wear to job interviews. To
inspire him, petitioner bought him new clothes and a pair of shoes and even gave him money.
Sometime later, her husband told petitioner that he already found a job and petitioner was
overjoyed. However, some weeks after, petitioner was informed that her husband had been
seen at the house of his parents when he was supposed to be at work. Petitioner discovered
that her husband didnt actually get a job and the money he gave her (which was supposedly
his salary) came from his mother. When she confronted him about the matter, Rodolfo
allegedly cried like a child and told her that he pretended to have a job so that petitioner
would stop nagging him about applying for a job. He also told her that his parents can support
their needs. Petitioner claimed that Rodolfo was so dependent on his mother and that all his
decisions and attitudes in life should be in conformity with those of his mother.
Apart from the foregoing, petitioner complained that every time Rodolfo would get drunk he
became physically violent towards her. Their sexual relationship was also unsatisfactory.
They only had sex once a month and petitioner never enjoyed it. When they discussed this
problem, Rodolfo would always say that sex was sacred and it should not be enjoyed nor
abused. He did not even want to have a child yet because he claimed he was not ready.
Additionally, when petitioner requested that they move to another place and rent a small
room rather than live near his parents, Rodolfo did not agree. Because of this, she was forced
to leave their residence and see if he will follow her. But he did not.
During the trial of the case, petitioner presented Rodolfos first cousin, Florida de Ramos, as
a witness. In 1993, Ramos, the niece of Rodolfos father, was living with Rodolfos family.
She corroborated petitioners testimony that Rodolfo was indeed not gainfully employed
when he married petitioner and he merely relied on the allowance given by his mother. This
witness also confirmed that it was respondents mother who was paying the rentals for the
room where the couple lived. She also testified that at one time, she saw respondent going
to his mothers house in business attire. She learned later that Rodolfo told petitioner that he
has a job but in truth he had none. She also stated that respondent was still residing at the
house of his mother and not living together with petitioner.
Petitioner likewise presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas, a psychiatrist. Dr. Villegas testified that
after examining petitioner for her psychological evaluation, she found petitioner to be mature,
independent, and very responsible, focused and has direction and ambition in life. She also
observed that petitioner works hard for what she wanted and therefore, she was not
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Dr.
Villegas added that based on the information gathered from petitioner, she found that
Rodolfo showed that he was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and
responsibilities. Dr. Villegas concluded that he was suffering from Dependent Personality
Disorder associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings.
She explained that persons suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder were those
whose response to ordinary way of life was ineffectual and inept, characterized by loss of
self-confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on
other people. She added that the root cause of this psychological problem was a cross-
identification with the mother who was the dominant figure in the family considering that
respondents father was a seaman and always out of the house. She stated that this problem
began during the early stages in his life but manifested only after the celebration of his
marriage. According to Dr. Villegas, this kind of problem was also severe because he will not
be able to make and to carry on the responsibilities expected of a married person. It was
incurable because it started in early development and therefore deeply ingrained into his
personality.
Based on petitioners evidence, the RTC rendered a Decision dated October 25, 2004,
declaring the marriage between petitioner and Rodolfo as null and void ab initio, thus:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent
totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed
likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious
guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother
and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make
his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the
respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to
comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on
the account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore premises considered, the marriage between Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo B.
Azcuata is hereby declared null and void abinitio pursuant to Article 36 fo the Family Code.
The National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Antipolo City are ordered to
make proper entries into the records of the parties pursuant to judgment of the court.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Public Prosecutor and the Solicitor General.
SO ORDERED.3
On July 19, 2005, the RTC rendered an Amended Decision 4 to correct the first name of
Rodolfo which was erroneously typewritten as "Gerardo" in the caption of the original
Decision.
The Solicitor General appealed the RTC Decision objecting that (a) the psychiatric report of
Dr. Villegas was based solely on the information provided by petitioner and was not based
on an examination of Rodolfo; and (b) there was no showing that the alleged psychological
defects were present at the inception of marriage or that such defects were grave, permanent
and incurable.
Resolving the appeal, the CA reversed the RTC and essentially ruled that petitioner failed to
sufficiently prove the psychological incapacity of Rodolfo or that his alleged psychological
disorder existed prior to the marriage and was grave and incurable. In setting aside the
factual findings of the RTC, the CA reasoned that:
The evidence on record failed to demonstrate that respondents alleged irresponsibility and
over-dependence on his mother is symptomatic of psychological incapacity as above
explained.
xxx xxx xxx
Also worthy of note is petitioner-appellees failure to prove that respondents supposed
psychological malady existed even before the marriage. Records however show that the
parties were living in harmony in the first few years of their marriage and were living on their
own in a rented apartment. That respondent often times asks his mother for financial support
may be brought about by his feeling of embarrassment that he cannot contribute at all to the
family coffers, considering that it was his wife who is working for the family. Petitioner-
appellee likewise stated that respondent does not like to have a child on the pretense that
respondent is not yet ready to have one. However this is not at all a manifestation of
irresponsibility. On the contrary, respondent has shown that he has a full grasp of reality and
completely understands the implication of having a child especially that he is unemployed.
The only problem besetting the union is respondents alleged irresponsibility and
unwillingness to leave her (sic) mother, which was not proven in this case to be
psychological-rooted.
The behavior displayed by respondent was caused only by his youth and emotional
immaturity which by themselves, do not constitute psychological incapacity (Deldel vs. Court
of Appeals, 421 SCRA 461, 466 [2004]). At all events, petitioner-appellee has utterly failed,
both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of
psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of
the contract, so immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity (Pesca vs. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001]). As held by the
Supreme Court:
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to be
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. (Navarro, Jr. vs. Cecilio-Navarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007).
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated July 19, 2005 fo the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo City, Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage berween petitioner-appellee Marietta C.
Azcueta and respondent Rodolfo B. Azcueta remains VALID.5 (emphasis ours)
The basic issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with his essential marital obligations.
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, submits that the appellate court correctly
ruled that the "totality of evidence presented by petitioner" failed to prove her spouses
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and settled jurisprudence.
We grant the petition.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family.6 Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
than on good, solid and happy families. The breakup of families weakens our social and
moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members. 7
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and
Molina8 stringent guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100,
108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against every one of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.9 (Emphasis supplied)
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 the Court declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 11 It should refer to
"no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage."12 The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.13
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed that notwithstanding the
guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. 14 Each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.15 With the advent of Te v. Te,16 the Court encourages a reexamination of
jurisprudential trends on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major
deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient
compliance with Molina to warrant the annulment of the parties marriage under Article 36.
First, petitioner successfully discharged her burden to prove the psychological incapacity of
her husband.
The Solicitor General, in discrediting Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, highlights the lack of
personal examination of Rodolfo by said doctor and the doctors reliance on petitioners
version of events. In Marcos v. Marcos,17 it was held that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.
It should be noted that, apart from her interview with the psychologist, petitioner testified in
court on the facts upon which the psychiatric report was based. When a witness testified
under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined, she thereby presented evidence
in the form of testimony.18 Significantly, petitioners narration of facts was corroborated in
material points by the testimony of a close relative of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified
in court to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between the manifestations of
Rodolfos psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled
principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had
an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may
indicate their candor or lack thereof.19 Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of
petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witness. 20
Second, the root cause of Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the petition, sufficiently proven by expert testimony, and clearly
explained in the trial courts decision.
The petition alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully
employed and, despite pleas from petitioner, he could not be persuaded to even attempt to
find employment; that from the choice of the family abode to the couples daily sustenance,
Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that the couples inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfos
refusal to have a child stemmed from a psychological condition linked to his relationship to
his mother.1avvphi1
These manifestations of incapacity to comply or assume his marital obligations were linked
to medical or clinical causes by an expert witness with more than forty years experience
from the field of psychology in general and psychological incapacity, in particular. In a portion
of her psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Villegas elucidated the psychodynamics of the case of
petitioner and Rodolfo, thus:
Marietta is the eldest of 5 siblings, whose parents has very limited education. Being the
eldest, she is expected to be the role model of younger siblings. In so doing, she has been
restricted and physically punished, in order to tow the line. But on the other hand, she
developed growing resentments towards her father and promised herself that with the first
opportunity, shell get out of the family. When Rodolfo came along, they were married 1
months after they met, without really knowing anything about him. Her obsession to leave
her family was her primary reason at that time and she did not exercise good judgment in
her decision making in marriage. During their 4 years marital relationship, she came to realize
that Rodolfo cannot be responsible in his duties and responsibilities, in terms of loving,
caring, protection, financial support and sex.
On the other hand, Rodolfo is the 3rd among 5 boys. The father, who was perceived to be
weak, and his two elder brothers were all working as seaman. Rodolfo who was always
available to his mothers needs, became an easy prey, easily engulfed into her system. The
relationship became symbiotic, that led to a prolonged and abnormal dependence to his
mother. The mother, being the stronger and dominant parent, is a convenient role model, but
the reversal of roles became confusing that led to ambivalence of his identity and grave
dependency. Apparently, all the boys were hooked up to his complexities, producing so much
doubts in their capabilities in a heterosexual setting. Specifically, Rodolfo tried, but failed.
His inhibitions in a sexual relationship, is preferable to an unconscious guilt feelings of
defying the mothers love. At this point, he has difficulty in delineating between the wife and
the mother, so that his continuous relationship with his wife produces considerable anxiety,
which he is unable to handle, and crippled him psychologically.
Based on the above clinical data, family background and outcome of their marriage, it is the
opinion of the examiner, that Mrs. Marietta Cruz-Azcueta is mature, independent and
responsible and is psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and obligations of
marriage. Due to her numerous personal problems she has difficulty in handling her
considerable anxiety, at present. There are strong clinical evidences that Mr. Rodolfo
Azcueta is suffering from a Dependent Personality Disorder associated with severe
inadequacy that renders him psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
The root cause of the above clinical condition is due to a strong and prolonged dependence
with a parent of the opposite sex, to a period when it becomes no longer appropriate. This
situation crippled his psychological functioning related to sex, self-confidence,
independence, responsibility and maturity. It existed prior to marriage, but became manifest
only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. It is considered as permanent
and incurable in nature, because it started early in his life and therefore became so deeply
ingrained into his personality structure. It is severe or grave in degree, because it hampered
and interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustment. 21
These findings were reiterated and further explained by Dr. Villegas during her testimony,
the relevant portion of which we quote below:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, Madame Witness, after examining the petitioner, what was your
psychological evaluation?
A: Ive found the petitioner in this case, Mrs. Marietta Azcueta as matured,
independent, very responsible, focused, she has direction and ambition in life and
she work hard for what she wanted, maam, and therefore, I concluded that she is
psychologically capacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
marriage, maam.
Q: How about the respondent, Madame Witness, what was your psychological
evaluation with regards to the respondent?
A: Based on my interview, Ive found out that the husband Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage
suffering from a psychiatric classification as Dependent Personality Disorder
associated with severe inadequacy related to masculine strivings, maam.
Q: In laymans language, Madame Witness, can you please explain to us what do
you mean by Dependent Personality Disorder?
A: Dependent Personality Disorder are (sic) those persons in which their response
to ordinary way of life are ineffectual and inept characterized by loss of self-
confidence, always in doubt with himself and inability to make his own decision,
quite dependent on other people, and in this case, on his mother, maam.
Q: And do you consider this, Madame Witness, as a psychological problem of
respondent, Rodolfo Azcueta?
A: Very much, maam.
Q: Why?
A: Because it will always interfered, hampered and disrupt his duties and
responsibilities as a husband and as a father, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, what is the root cause of this
psychological problem?
A: The root cause of this psychological problem is a cross identification with the
mother who is the dominant figure in the family, the mother has the last say and the
authority in the family while the father was a seaman and always out of the house,
and if present is very shy, quiet and he himself has been very submissive and
passive to the authority of the wife, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us, Madame Witness, under what circumstance this kind
of psychological problem manifested?
A: This manifested starting his personality development and therefore, during his
early stages in life, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, this kind of problem existed to Rodolfo
Azcueta, the respondent in this case, before the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And it became manifested only after the celebration of the marriage?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: And can you please tell us the reason why it became manifested with thethat
the manifestation came too late?
A: The manifestation came too late because the history of Mr. Rodolfo Azcueta was
very mild, no stresses, no demand on his life, at 24 years old despite the fact that
he already finished college degree of Computer Science, there is no demand on
himself at least to establish his own, and the mother always would make the
decision for him, maam.
Q: Okay, Madame Witness, is this kind of psychological problem severe?
A: Yes maam.
Q: Why do you consider this psychological problem severe, Madame Witness?
A: Because he will not be able to make and to carry on the responsibility that is
expected of a married person, maam.
Q: Is it incurable, Madame Witness?
A: It is incurable because it started early in development and therefore it became
so deeply ingrained into his personality, and therefore, it cannot be changed nor
cured at this stage, maam.
Q: So, you mean to say, Madame Witness, that it is Permanent?
A: It is permanent in nature, sir.
 Q: And last question as an expert witness, what is the effect of the psychological
problem as far as the marriage relationship of Rodolfo Azcueta is concerned?
A: The effect of this will really be a turbulent marriage relationship because standard
expectation is, the husband has to work, to feed, to protect, to love, and of course,
to function on (sic) the sexual duties of a husband to the wife, but in this case, early
in their marriage, they had only according to the wife, experienced once sexual
relationship every month and this is due to the fact that because husband was so
closely attached to the mother, it is a result of the unconscious guilt feeling of the
husband in defying the mothers love when they will be having heterosexual
relationship and therefore, at that point, he will not be able to distinguish between
the mother and the wife and therefore, sex relationship will not be satisfactory
according to expectation, maam.22
In Te v. Te, we held that "[b]y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the
parties."23
Based on the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly explained the basis for its decision,
which we reproduce here for emphasis:
With the preponderant evidence presented by the petitioner, the court finds that respondent
totally failed in his commitments and obligations as a husband. Respondents emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility is grave and he has no showing of improvement. He failed
likewise to have sexual intercourse with the wife because it is a result of the unconscious
guilt felling of having sexual relationship since he could not distinguish between the mother
and the wife and therefore sex relationship will not be satisfactory as expected.
The respondent is suffering from dependent personality disorder and therefore cannot make
his own decision and cannot carry on his responsibilities as a husband. The marital
obligations to live together, observe mutual love, respect, support was not fulfilled by the
respondent.
Considering the totality of evidence of the petitioner clearly show that respondent failed to
comply with his marital obligations.
Thus the marriage between petitioner and respondent should be declared null and void on
the account of respondents severe and incurable psychological incapacity.
Third, Rodolfos psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time
of and even before the celebration of marriage. Contrary to the CAs finding that the parties
lived harmoniously and independently in the first few years of marriage, witnesses were
united in testifying that from inception of the marriage, Rodolfos irresponsibility,
overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. To be
sure, these manifestations of Rodolfos dependent personality disorder must have existed
even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and a byproduct of his
upbringing and family life.
Fourth, Rodolfos psychological incapacity has been shown to be sufficiently grave, so as to
render him unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
The Court is wary of the CAs bases for overturning factual findings of the trial court on this
point. The CAs reasoning that Rodolfos requests for financial assistance from his mother
might have been due to his embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and
that his motive for not wanting a child was his "responsible" realization that he should not
have a child since he is unemployed are all purely speculative. There is no evidence on
record to support these views. Again, we must point out that appellate courts should not
substitute their discretion with that of the trial court or the expert witnesses, save only in
instance where the findings of the trial court or the experts are contradicted by evidence.
We likewise cannot agree with the CA that Rodolfos irresponsibility and overdependence on
his mother can be attributed to his immaturity or youth. We cannot overlook the fact that at
the time of his marriage to petitioner, he was nearly 29 years old or the fact that the expert
testimony has identified a grave clinical or medical cause for his abnormal behavior.
In Te, the Court has had the occasion to expound on the nature of a dependent personality
disorder and how one afflicted with such a disorder would be incapacitated from complying
with marital obligations, to wit:
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the
essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and
rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from
others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends
to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on
his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of
being abandoned. As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to
him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity
as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.24
Of course, this is not to say that anyone diagnosed with dependent personality disorder is
automatically deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply with the obligations of
marriage. We realize that psychology is by no means an exact science and the medical
cases of patients, even though suffering from the same disorder, may be different in their
symptoms or manifestations and in the degree of severity. It is the duty of the court in its
evaluation of the facts, as guided by expert opinion, to carefully scrutinize the type of disorder
and the gravity of the same before declaring the nullity of a marriage under Article 36.
Fifth, Rodolfo is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations embodied
in Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code.25 As noted by the trial court, as a result of Rodolfos
dependent personality disorder, he cannot make his own decisions and cannot fulfill his
responsibilities as a husband. Rodolfo plainly failed to fulfill the marital obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect, and support under Article 68. Indeed, one who is
unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions
regarding even the most basic and ordinary matters that spouses face every day; one who
cannot contribute to the material, physical and emotional well-being of his spouse is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the meaning of
Article 36.
Sixth, the incurability of Rodolfos condition which has been deeply ingrained in his system
since his early years was supported by evidence and duly explained by the expert witness.
At this point, the Court is not unmindful of the sometimes peculiar predicament it finds itself
in those instances when it is tasked to interpret static statutes formulated in a particular point
in time and apply them to situations and people in a society in flux. With respect to the
concept of psychological incapacity, courts must take into account not only developments in
science and medicine but also changing social and cultural mores, including the blurring of
traditional gender roles. In this day and age, women have taken on increasingly important
roles in the financial and material support of their families. This, however, does not change
the ideal that the family should be an "autonomous" social institution, wherein the spouses
cooperate and are equally responsible for the support and well-being of the family. In the
case at bar, the spouses from the outset failed to form themselves into a family, a cohesive
unit based on mutual love, respect and support, due to the failure of one to perform the
essential duties of marriage.
This brings to mind the following pronouncement in Te:
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity, the Court is
not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.26 (emphasis ours)
In all, we agree with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision dated July 19, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City in Civil Case No. 02-6428 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI, Petitioner,
vs.
CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court
denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court).
The petition sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision 1 and September 24, 2004
resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent
Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, and
Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rights thinking that it was a "joke." After the
ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to
stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received
prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was
only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not "fake."
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder,
particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert
witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was
serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital
obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void. 3
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that
the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the
CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage
to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity.
He stressed that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness,
was more than enough to sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was
and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,4 this Court reiterated
that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church
tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion
on the psychological and mental disposition of the parties. 5
In this case, the testimony6 of petitioners expert witness revealed that petitioner was
suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you conducted,
can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent]
personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that
petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his marriage
with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage, sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological
incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It was
a very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to really be
married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there was no sexual
intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three months he refused
to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess the relationship died a
natural death, and he never thought it was a really serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent
suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had undergone.
[It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get married xx xx I dont
think they truly considered themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to conclude
xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together [.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never
consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there were
frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect [for] each
other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder7 as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior.
Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear
criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times they actually bring about
dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this
disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from
others, may allow others to make most of their important decisions (such as where to live),
tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting
projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to
get approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.1avvphil
In her psychological report,8 Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality
disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and
depended on them for decisions.9 Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to
seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage
to respondent was for real.10
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent
personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a
self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take advantage
of him.11 This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by
his father who treated his family like robots 12 and, later, by respondent who was as
domineering as his father.13 When petitioner could no longer take respondents domineering
ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that he
wanted to end their marriage.14
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life, to wit:15
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned a while ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father was
very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and the
children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial support
because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an intact family. x
x x the wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I would say Lester
 grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and somehow not truly
understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it] meant to have a real
family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and
incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent. 16
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was
grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case,
recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.17 Particularly, personality disorders are "long-
standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as
dysfunctional styles of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning
in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others." 18
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological
incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and
void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16, 2008
resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, Petitioner,
vs.
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the July 14, 2004
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which reversed the
January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, Pasay City in
Civil Case No. 97-1282.2 The reversed RTC decision nullified Jocelyns marriage with
respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were residents
of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went to Manila with Angelito and
some friends. Having been gone for three days, their parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito
and after finding them, brought them back to Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and
Angelitos marriage was arranged and they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony
officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with Angelitos parents
after their marriage. They had by this time stopped schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and
worked for Angelitos relatives as household help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to
work and was most of the time drunk. Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels
often resulted because of Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found another woman with
whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. She
claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage. In addition to the above historical narrative of their relationship, she
alleged in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their relationship
had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and emotional pains
on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries upon her every time
they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work or
his indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the plaintiff
causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their
marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous, permanent
and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably hired by
Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no collusion existed
between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the psychologist testified at
the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition, including the
alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On cross-examination, she
remained firm on these declarations but significantly declared that Angelito had not treated
her violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:
Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before you
got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).3
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his
behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of the
marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a
serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-
standing before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying when
I examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, and
relevant to marital relationship with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit "E" which is your report there is a statement rather
on the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the
undersigned that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even
before the actual celebration of marriage. Respondent (s) immature, irresponsible
and callous emotionality practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful
relationship. His general behavior fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person
suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder. Such disorder is serious and severe
and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love, caring, concern and
responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing in proportion
and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the wedding and
became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic
mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long
before he entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic)
Basic trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because
psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this
(sic) because the person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have
this kind of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.
Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or
at the time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, maam."
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social
Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment
exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social
Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)? Court:

A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they are Q. Why did you know?
suffering that kind of disorder (sic).
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the respondent
Court: is not aware that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).

Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)? Court:

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
respondent (sic).
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is under
Court: the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during
the less than one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)? work as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never
receive and enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the
petitioner who took sustainance of the vices. (sic)
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often
than not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the petitioner?
Court:
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital
relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
Court:
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What are the vices?
Court:
A. Alcohol and gambling.
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
Court:
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
Court:
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality
Q. How was the petitioner tortured? Disorder, he is good for nothing person.4

A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
(sic). pertinently states:5

Court: Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for "Nullity of
Marriage" versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
GENERAL DATA
A. Yes, sir.
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part time tricycle
driver, and eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to be an
alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a common
knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit relationship. Familial
relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whos bickering and squabbles were part
and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately suppressed so
much so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully equipped in terms of
drives and motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-emotional image but was as
her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of containing the effect of such sensitiveness;
in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future in spite of
difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external realities of life that
she set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her capabilities and limitations.
However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct her energy toward specific
goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with her coping mechanism that she
is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS:
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above]6
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of the Philippines strongly
opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage. Through a Certification filed
with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what
she said about him was purely hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be considered
as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that would render a
person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as "immaturity, i.e., lack of an
effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to infants (like
refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence on parents or peer
group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by which a person lives for the next
drink and the next drinks" (The Family Code of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag,
points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious family life with
the respondent. On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and respect to the
petitioner manifested by the formers being irresponsible, immature, jobless, gambler,
drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear any longer the
misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and four months of
messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her married life with
the respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to physical injuries inflicted
upon her and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid of a relative of her husband
to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were living with her husbands family, she
was obliged to do the household chores an indication that she is a battered wife coupled
with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic) husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact that at the time
of their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced only to said marriage
by her relatives. The petitioner and the respondent had never developed the feeling of love
and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners family for said early marriage
and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by this
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony quoted
above] would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from
psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and
Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the petitioner and Dr.
Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar]
attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to comply with
the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and clearly proven and, therefore,
petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the respondent
is a speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will enhanced (sic) a greater
tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the surname of the respondent,
although they are now separated, and a grim and sad reminder of her husband who made
here a slave and a punching bag during the short span of her marriage with him. The law on
annulment should be liberally construed in favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise
said law will be an instrument to protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-
social behavior of herein respondent.8
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC decision,
ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs Court
of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician personally
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The Supreme Court
adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of psychological incapacity
to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify the root causes of the illness.
If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. Applied in
Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and
the social worker were not found to be sufficient to prove psychological incapacity, in the
absence of any evaluation of the respondent himself, the person whos mental and
psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent was
psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the essential
duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave first-hand
testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed by the Court
in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and has
resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations of
a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of the
psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at
the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation.
The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the
behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which
are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure
or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt
that he had been forced into a loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under
a permanent compulsion because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive
work and more stable relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability
that is one of the defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof, the married
life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the marriage cannot for
this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates in Pesca, our strict handling of
Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the marriage institution in our country and
the foundation of the family that the law seeks to protect. The concept of psychological
incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in reality are convenient excuses of parties
to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal of the
CA ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally disregarded
the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and void Tuason v.
Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court of Appeals)
holds that "the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-existence of
petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final and binding
on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that the trial courts
factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private respondents witnesses
vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly erroneous";
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this
omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term
without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that
would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as follows:
"1095. they are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) Who lack the sufficient use of reason?
(2) Who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted?
(3) Who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony due to
causes of a psychic nature?"
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these criteria. The RTC,
being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of psychological incapacity
based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which gave lower court magistrates enough
latitude to define what constitutes psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further
claims, the OSG relied on generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the
dissolution of a marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with
Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of law in setting
aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns marriage with Angelito a
nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it merely introduced
an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables compliance with the contractual
obligations of marriage without any concrete definition or, at the very least, an illustrative
example. We must therefore apply the law based on how the concept of psychological
incapacity was shaped and developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals9 declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage." It must be confined to "the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage."10
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of the law
in Republic v. Court of Appeals11 (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties
or one of them was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against every one of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.12
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic requirements of
Santos.13
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,14 further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition
under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.15
Pesca v. Pesca16 clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then already
pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the
new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the
old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of
"lex prospicit, non respicit."
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules) promulgated by the Court
took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege
the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated
from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration
of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of
psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion
need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence presented,
including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature and purpose of these
pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to consider during the pre-trial
conference the advisability of receiving expert testimony and such other matters as may aid
in the prompt disposition of the petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the
declaration of the absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came to us were
invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was the state of law and
jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-Te17 (Te) which revisited the
Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family Code did not give
any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing, it would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis; that the Committee
desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, by the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals that, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from the Canon Law. 18 Te thus
assumes it a basic premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its
application.19
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is consistent with that
of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that should
determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the Court, in
sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of Appeals, ruled that
the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not a judgment
on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained that when private
respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was cross-examined by the
adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of testimony. Importantly, the
Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating
children is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency with which
the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be
interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the
imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a straight-jacket,
forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. Courts should
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the abandonment of
Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at other perspectives that
should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. The
subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting20 follows Tes lead when it reiterated that Te did not abandon
Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the
Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages:21
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological
incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to
justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not
available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement
enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be
determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina, 22 merely stands for a more
flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on
psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its evidentiary approach in these cases,
which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony
to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos asserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of
expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity.23 [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.24
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of cases on Article 36
of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the intention of the law to confine the
application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders, clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage; that the psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. 25 It is not
enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in
complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of
a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential
marital obligations must be shown.26Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in
some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may
only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.27
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations of Santos juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability requisites. This is proof of Santos continuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological
incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude based on our own
examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled to undertake because of
the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts appreciation and evaluation of
Jocelyns presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not conclusively show the
root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence the
psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological
condition only in an indirect manner she derived all her conclusions from information
coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the
source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must
evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the
more rigid and stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough
and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination
is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that it
may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between the
parties. For a determination though of a partys complete personality profile, information
coming from persons intimately related to him (such as the partys close relatives and friends)
may be helpful. This is an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at
the same time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by
supposedly expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager information
coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile
and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyns psychological condition, this is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed
simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to
evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological
incapacity exists.1avvphi1
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and testimony
simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social personality disorder,
supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic, grave and incurable. The
psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the bases for her conclusion or the
particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave. These particulars are simply not
in the Report, and neither can they be found in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic or
incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage with Jocelyn
or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not developed. However,
she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In her Report, she based her
conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family.
Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own equivocation on this point she was not
firm in her conclusion for she herself may have realized that it was simply conjectural. The
veracity, too, of this finding is highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed
knowledge of Angelitos family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and to what extent
was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the effects of the disorder
on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important concerns or
requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the success of Jocelyns
cause.
b. Jocelyns Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and the
psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns testimony, to find
out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support a finding of Angelitos
psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely testified on
Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment and the physical
beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the marriage. Significantly, she
declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs of violent behavior, assuming this
to be indicative of a personality disorder, during the courtship stage or at the earliest stages
of her relationship with him. She testified on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage,
not before or at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these
beatings exactly took place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage
or months or years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as
the law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist at
the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply indicate
difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations that, as the cited
jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological incapacity in
the absence of proof that these are manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different treatment. While we
may concede that physical violence on women indicates abnormal behavioral or personality
patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not constitute psychological incapacity.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The
evidence of this nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the
opinion of the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns
account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence does
not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence, specifically the Santos
requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual bases we now
find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling in Tuason recognizing the finality of
the factual findings of the trial court in Article 36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in
her present appeal with us) does not therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the
contrary, the CA correctly applied Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the
evidence of the present case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM
the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAMON REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before making a finding
of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing personality disorders in spouses where
there are none. On the other hand, blind adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution1 and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
Institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing proof of
psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage that is doomed from
its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA -G.R. CV No. 897612which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89,
Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.3
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University
of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They
were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent cross-enrolled from
the UP Los Baos campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-
girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought was
free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. 4 Since both
resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from
the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which included dining
out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a university students budget. At
that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners
good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes,
not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree in AB
Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on his third year,
and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers death,
petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was already five (5) months
pregnant and employed at the Population Center Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family in Mandaluyong City. All living
expenses were shouldered by respondents parents, and the couples respective salaries
were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly
allowance of 1,500.00 from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a
child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of 1,500.00 from
respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When
petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that
he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents game
plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants,
including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from
his young family for days on end without any communication. Petitioner simply endured the
setup, hoping that the situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live
separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further
financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner
of the household, respondents business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at
business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to
petitioner sporadically. Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the
parties relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his
business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert
any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in
with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the
parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a
family not just financially, but in most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son.
At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either
the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly
while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped operations.
Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for
the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap
paper and carton trading. As with all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed
and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well.
Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair.
She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone
inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent
was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly,
remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a surgical operation
on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on,
respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and
played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the
operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents
lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of "final" attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage.
Petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that
she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondents siblings waved the white flag on
respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a
marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder
couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not
improve the parties relationship as respondent remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological
assessment to "determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." As with all other
attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologists
recommendation to undergo psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told respondent to
move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondents
relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,5 petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill the
essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in performing
his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella
Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in evidence), the RTC
granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null and void on the
ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioners MA. SOCORRO PERPETUA
CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on December 4, 1976 at the
Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong, Rizal, is declared null and void under
Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended. Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL CAMACHO
REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and legal rights to decide for
themselves having finished their studies, are free to decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice to the parties.
Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is
filed by any of the parties, the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding Decree if the
parties have no properties [.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe the procedure prescribed
in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM 02-11-10
SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50 & 51 of the Family
Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Property
(Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a situation where the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Mandaluyong and Quezon City.
Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of the Solicitor
General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City and the Civil Registrar General at their
respective office addresses.
SO ORDERED.6
Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The appellate court, agreeing with the
respondent, reversed the RTC and declared the parties marriage as valid and subsisting.
Significantly, a special division of five (two members dissenting from the majority decision
and voting to affirm the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 23,
2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89
in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs. 7
Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES
OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
VI
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
VII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE,
WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING MARRIAGE
AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF THE
CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE.
VIII
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED PETITION
WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.8
Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between the parties
is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological incapacity, as provided in Article
36 of the Family Code.
In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and documentary
evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas. The
RTC ratiocinated, thus:
After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds merit in the
petition.
Article 36 of the Family Code reads:
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization."
And Art. 68 of the same Code provides:
"The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support."
Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital partner towards
each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code express the duties of parents
toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the determination of
the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of psychological
incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence presented, with emphasis on the
pervasive pattern of behaviors of the respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is]
of expert witnesses, Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological
condition of the respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its
inception has a congenital infirmity termed "psychological incapacity" which pertains to the
inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally, intellectually and socially towards
each other in relation to their essential duties to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect
as well as to mutually render help and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was
already a fixed niche in the psychological constellation of respondent which created the
death of his marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness
of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings that
respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically incapacitated him to
fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals and hav[ing] solemn duties to their
profession, the Court considered their assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an
honest evaluation on the psychological status of the respondent. This psychological
incapacity of the respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is
serious, incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short, he is
weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors simply because
he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly manifested from his assertion that
nothing was wrong in his marriage with the petitioner and considered their relationship as a
normal one. In fact, with this belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to
them by his original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too
insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the feelings of
petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she finally revealed her
misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to counseling to save their marriage.
However, the hard position of the respondent finally constrained her to ask respondent to
leave the conjugal dwelling. Even the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that
separation is the remedy to the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent
confirmed this stand of his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and not a one
sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential duties to the marriage
which must naturally be observed by the parties as a consequence of their marriage.
Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of marriage between the parties did not create a
monument of marital integrity, simply because the personality disorder of the respondent
which renders him psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is
deeply entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that there
is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent. Petitioner, too,
is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted with psychological incapacity
as her personality cannot be harmonized with the personality of the respondent. They are
poles apart. Petitioner is a well-organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free
spirited or carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by the
petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder bolt or
principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life with meaning and
significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their marriage is intact for 21 years, still
it is an empty kingdom due to their psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and
has origin from unhealthy event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they are entitled to
live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy life. In fact, Article 72 of
the Family Code provides remedy to any party aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of
the parties is already a settled matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of
Dra. Magno, their marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated
differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all. The Court finds
that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by continuously sustaining a marriage that
exists in paper only. Hence, it could no longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage
remains in its crib with its boots and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional,
intellectual and social ability of the parties to sustain.9
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided decision, the
appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--vis the
totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the latter failed to sufficiently
establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband, as well as of herself. There is
thus no basis for declaring the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent] as purportedly suffering
from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder).
Further, clinical psychologist Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial
Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed
[respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with
strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely advisory in
character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such testimonies. It may even
reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with the facts of the case or are otherwise
unreasonable. In the instant case, neither clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr.
Villegas conducted a psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas are hearsay.
They are "unscientific and unreliable" as they have no personal knowledge of the
psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never personally examined the
[respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported psychological
incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner] would like this Court to think. It
bears stressing that [respondent] was referred to Dayan for "psychological evaluation to
determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning." The undeniable fact is that
based on Dayans personal examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures
used, behavioral observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of
psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the [respondent]
through individual therapy and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on [respondent], such as
his failure to give regular support, substance abuse, infidelity and "come and go" attitude are
true, the totality of the evidence presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations within the
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the [respondents] alleged
mixed personality disorder, his "come and go" attitude, failed business ventures,
inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual infidelity, insensitivity to
[petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits,
unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in connection with his failed business activities,
taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on
serious marital difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents] "Defects" were not present at the inception
of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their marriage,
which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her Amended Petition that
initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the
tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned
from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his
business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with
Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas Psychiatric
Report states that [petitioner] "manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere that made
her less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of
it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with
the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed
for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of
the celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their marriage.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity must be more than just a
"difficulty," a "refusal" or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations, it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological
illness existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity
of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the State.
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read
in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would
make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should not be confused
with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its
recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. 10
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the appellate
courts ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not sufficiently established.
We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage between the parties as valid and
subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals11 solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the principle that the
factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations
are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3) incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond
the means of the party involved.12
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent with a
personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an average
social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family values (sic). All children
were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic) which made their parents proud of them.
Father was disabled, but despite his handicap, he was able to assume his financial and
emotional responsibilities to his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic).
Despite this, he has been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home. Doing volunteer
and community services, she was not the demonstrative, affectionate and the emotional
mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and
encouragements (sic), but not the caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional
reaction (sic). Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling
or depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to subjugate
(sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any undertakings
(sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable, systematic, prudent, loyal, and
competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her
analytical resources and strong sense of objectivity predisposed her to a superficial
adjustments (sic). She acts on the dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels
(sic). The above qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of inadequacy,
insecurity, low self-esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual assets (sic). Despite this,
[petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20 years, trying to reach out and lending
a hand for better understanding and relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when
others, like her husband would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon.
But the more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the bigger was
the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end, [petitioner] felt unloved,
unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their marriage as very much lacking in
relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the second set of
brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations during his growing up stage.
Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite of his mother, and was described to have
a close relationship with her. At an early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct
disorder and was on marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials
(sic), he felt that he needed a "push" to keep him going. His being a "free spirit", attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without being bothered by
untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from other people. He presented no
guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His
studies proved too much of a pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite
his apparent high intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his worth, he quit work
from his family employment and ventured on his own. With no much planning and project
study, his businesses failed. This became the sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack
of relationships (sic) and consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic)
and sarcasm, stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which impliedly meant "you
are nothing as compared to me" were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of
inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this seemed not
coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience, maturity, direction, focus,
adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work. He complained that he did not feel the
support of his wife regarding his decision to go into his own business. But when he failed,
the more he became negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He
was too careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy, ambivalence,
doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority, for fear of rejection or loss
of pride. When things did not work out according to his plans, he suppressed his hostilities
in negative ways, such as stubbornness, sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and primitive
drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and different from others.
Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an unconscious wish for the continuance of the
gratification of his dependency needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems
his difficulties in heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic)
demands and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong masculine
strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to assume his
duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a severe psychological
deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that [petitioner]
manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the
emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage.
[Respondent], on the other hand, has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic) that he is
suffering from a Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. This is
characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms that ordinarily govern many
aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being a "free spirit" associated with no
remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged
drug intake [marijuana] and maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his
ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense mechanisms,
or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve conflicts. His prolonged
and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross identification and developed a
severe sense of inadequacy specifically along masculine strivings. He therefore has to
camouflage his weakness, in terms of authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful
decision making, aloofness and indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His
narcissistic supplies rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due to marital
demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature because it started early in
his psychological development, and therefore became so engrained into his personality
structures (sic). It is considered as severe in degree, because it hampered, interrupted and
interfered with his normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (Emphasis
supplied)13
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy [, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic. According to
them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and children. He does not seem to
have any direction in life. He seems to be full of bright ideas and good at starting things but
he never gets to accomplish anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now
[respondent] is still taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not
himself. He likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish
that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,] his wife [,] is
the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job. [Respondent]s brothers learned
from friends that [petitioner] is really disappointed with him. She has discussed things with
him but he always refused to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She
has grown tired of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he stopped taking
it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is so hard for [respondent] to
stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for the past 22 years. When [respondent]
was also asked what his problems are at the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and
distressed. He does not have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted
apart. He wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not
given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is very tolerant
of people [,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time. He wants to avoid conflict
so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause
any more pain. He wants to make other people happy.
xxxx
Interpretation of Psychological Data
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning
xxxx
B. Vocational Preference
xxxx
C. Socio Emotional Functioning
xxxx
In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof and detached
attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep feelings of inadequacy.
Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to exclude himself from association
with others. He feels that he is "different" and as a result is prone to anticipate rejections.
Because of the discomfort produced by these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social
involvement, which increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency
to withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less dominant
partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to take the lead. A self-
contained person [,] he does not really need to interact with others in order to enjoy life and
to be able to move on. He has a small need of companionship and is most comfortable alone.
He, too [,] feels uncomfortable in expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt.
Likewise, he may be very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling.
[Respondents] strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep
seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to make extra
effort to please people. Although at times [, he] already feels victimized and taken advantage
of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of interpersonal conflicts. Despite his
[dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and disapproval [of]
others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in anger and frustrations which
is likewise apt to be repressed.
There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing considerable
tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and nervousness. Likewise, he is
also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is preoccupied with negative thought. He feels
that he is up in the air but with no sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows
he will never be able to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty
concentrating and focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he
cant accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling of
hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant others.
Diagnostic Impression
Axis I : Drug Dependence
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder]
Axis III : None
Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:
Severe
He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to accomplish
anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social relationships.
Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)14
3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno
Summary and Conclusion
From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her psychological
assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent, it is possible to infer with
certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the information available about the
respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial personality disorder with narcissistic and
dependent features that renders him too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal
obligations of a marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious
person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements
in
this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of
human situations is very shallow for a woman of her academic and professional competence.
And this explains why she married RRR even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite
the abuse, took so long to do something about her situation.
Diagnosis for [petitioner]: [Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-centeredness
(e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his family in Manila); his
Axis I Partner Relational Problem grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just "come and go," without telling his wife
his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because
[petitioner] deprived him of his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his
Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features wife spend for all the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when
asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about it, etc.) The
Axis III No diagnosis aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he has physically,
emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on drugs; and his dependent
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity, drug abuse, personality features were manifested by his need for others to assume responsibility for most
and infidelity) major areas of his life, and in his difficulty in doing things on his own.

Severity: 4-severe [Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked narcissistic
features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to love, respect and render support for his spouse
Diagnosis for [respondent] and children. A personality disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.

Axis I Partner Relational Problem From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage of [petitioner]
and [respondent is] null and void from the very beginning. (Emphasis supplied) 15
Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive sadistic and
dependent features Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the testimonies of
Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never personally examined and
Axis III No diagnosis interviewed the respondent.

Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife) We do not agree with the CA.

Severity: 4 (severe) The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person
diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors.
Neither do their findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion
xxxx
as evidence.

One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand the root cause
For one, marriage, by its very definition,16 necessarily involves only two persons. The totality
of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the ninth child in a brood of 11.
of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is generally and
His elder siblings were taken care of by his grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind,
genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual
quiet and blind and [respondent] was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents]
assessment of the present state of the parties marriage from the perception of one of the
mother grew up believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so she felt "api, treated
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact
like poor relations." [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was to act
with, and experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to
outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money like water, had
the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became [respondents] role model.

For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not based solely
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he learned to use
on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as
his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the weaknesses of others, to lie
respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified
convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear (esp. his deprived mother who liked
on their own observations of respondents behavior and interactions with them, spanning the
admiration and attention, his siblings from whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process,
period of time they knew him.17 These were also used as the basis of the doctors
his ability to love and to empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a
assessments.
relationship with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,18 citing The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),19 instructs us on the general diagnostic criteria
for personality disorders:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the
expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in two (2) or more of the
following areas:
(1) Cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and
events)
(2) Affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of emotional
response)
(3) Interpersonal functioning
(4) Impulse control
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of personal and
social situations.
C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in social,
occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at least to
adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a consequence of
another mental disorder.
F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (i.e., a
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., head trauma).
Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of others occurring
since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the following:
(1) Failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated
by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) Deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning others
for personal profit or pleasure
(3) Impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) Irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) Reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) Consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) Lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of schizophrenia
or a manic episode.20
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological make
up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted
with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case,
considering that a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis
by the respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does
not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general,
recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to
manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook entitled Synopsis of
Psychiatry,21 treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed
kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that
respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondents psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. 22 As aptly stated
by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court
of Appeals & Molina:23
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such
cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were
presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about a partys
mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and
premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the respective
testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent does have problems;
and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work
towards providing the needs of his family; several failed business attempts; substance
abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has personality
disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder
does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of
the parties or both parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning the supposed
psychological incapacity of a party.24 In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,25 we ruled that, even without
delving into the non-exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina, 26 the
stringent requisites provided in Santos v. Court of Appeals 27must be independently met by
the party alleging the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr. Villegas with nary
a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and the factors characterizing the
psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse testimony does not lead to the inevitable
conclusion that the parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their
marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders was not
supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical psychologists specifically
trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The supposed personality disorders of the parties,
considering that such diagnoses were made, could have been fully established by
psychometric and neurological tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of
people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial
court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion
is founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual antecedents
(narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the
inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality disorder exhibit
the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and even charming
and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of disordered life functioning.
Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts, fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities
are typical experiences that patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x their own
explanations of their antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content
reveals the complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact, they
frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress observers as having
good verbal intelligence.
x x x those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry out any task
or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable finding is a lack of remorse
for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a conscience.28
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1)
sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not connected with
the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree with the CAs
ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the complete
facts showing that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if
such incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact, what was merely
prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered "declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of
the celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was indeed
amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly suffering from an Inadequate
Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area does not amount to psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating
psychological condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage.1avvphi1 In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was found to be a
"good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best to provide for the needs
of her children. Her achievements in this regard are praiseworthy." Even in Dr. Villegas
psychiatric report, it was stated that [petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more
than 20 years "trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship." With the foregoing evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert
witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated within the
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.29
All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R. Padilla in
his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina: 30
x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another
case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court
must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition,
we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R.
CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent
NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial
court's Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from
psychological incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses
who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these
witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been
sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of
respondents constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends,
adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged
habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to
her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioners allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the
conclusions of his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary
evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected
their children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that
she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife.
Respondent refuted petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She
maintained it was only two to three times a week and always with the permission of her
husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this,
saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.
Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions
were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his
sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondents mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second
grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong,
its alleged debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioners claim about respondents alleged constant visits to the beauty
parlor, going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof
whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with
friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-
out) in order to prove that respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that
respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was
able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance
of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other
men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal separation, but it does not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors
described as constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed
psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss
and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did
the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated
that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like.
It appears that respondent made real efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her
estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever that shows
abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons,
Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing
to link their academic short comings to Malyns actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion
of psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CAs reversal of the trial courts ruling
that there was psychological incapacity. The trial courts Decision merely summarized the
allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess
the veracity of these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the
evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal
conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children.
There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that
voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals May 27,
2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough
second look into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial
court as supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find
that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their
respective essential marital obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
I Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration
of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family
Code has not defined the term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its
meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision
Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It
appeared that the members of the Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on
the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less specificity than
expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." 4 Illustrative of
the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision
Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited the
applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision
itself having been taken from the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 6 the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that
the term psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been
meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances,"
and could not be taken and construed independently of "but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the
other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to
the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." 7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties,
or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need
be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable
at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which
became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve
such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence whatis decreed as
canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family
Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive
effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent, separate
and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable
base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under
Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every
instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain
rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and
applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less
specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency in its application." Instead, every court
should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections
or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case
would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground
for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity
of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves
on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.
Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the
in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a partys
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and
evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly
and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are
sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court
should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. 13 It is not enough reason to ignore
the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal
only because the Constitution and the Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social
institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for the State to
protect marriage as an inviolable social institution 14 only relates to a valid marriage. No
protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a
marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend
and promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our
society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because
it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they
were testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence
showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded
due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by
Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions
were solely based on the petitioners version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such
expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their
value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold
that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions
reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records
and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the
veracity of the petitioners factual premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioners testimony, as
well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although
her findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to
disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration
other factors extant in the records, including the own opinions of another expert who had
analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled
that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state
of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of
Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to
properly determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the
petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person
diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings
of the experts. The Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos 19 that there is no requirement
for one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a
physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes
the partys psychological incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to." 20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence
showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed
in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court
in interpreting such other evidence on the causation. 21 Indeed, an expert opinion on
psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any
probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The experts
findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their
exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any ruling that brands the scientific and
technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it
was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties upbringing and
psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates expertopinion should be considered not in
isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was
expectedto compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the
respondents own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had
"compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent."
Based from the respondents psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in
her ways. Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance.
She, too, values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections.
Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to
minimize opportunities for rejection. To others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding
in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed.
And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that
others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on
having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person clingy and immature,
doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important
person in his life. She became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
test26 conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on
dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there
are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score
of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and
below, it will be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is
84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayans findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr.
Gates to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality
Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology
terms. So, more or less, could you please tell me in more laymans terms how you arrived at
your findings that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood
background, her fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter
she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinners role in her family. I
gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact
that her own mother was unable to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities
towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely.
And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner
that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother because she herself never
experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a precedent in her
background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it
in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care,
lets say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life
when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what
I gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of
fourteen already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of
maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and
she is still insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one
boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as
a wife and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her
theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing
the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the
findings of the expert witnesses vis--vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the
Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision
Committee. Regarding Father Healys expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial
understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking
into account the particulars of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by
canonical thought, and by experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of
psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from
Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondents level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically
incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this
Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and
traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being
the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun
to inflate her own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an
obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle
that she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact
on the relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband
and toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong
and associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which
everybody takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before
everything else would be subordinated to the marriage withher. Its the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in
her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in
Roman history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : Its a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the
case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as
narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or .?
A : I would say its grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes
serious obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so
concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was
already existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you dont develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You
bring with you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you
accept these responsibilities. And now you show that you dont accept them and you are not
capable of fulfilling them and you dont care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was
depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustans, it began to inflate
her ego so much that this became the top priority in her life. Its her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the
marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because
she was neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this
narcissism that you mentioned?
A : Lets say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family
background situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so
important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual
situation for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual
manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in
going along with it and putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healys opinions and
findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to
the judicial determination of the parties psychological incapacity was substantive and
instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would
warrant the nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an
analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has
been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together
with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court
observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of
decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the
expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert
became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before
and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive
professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These
opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of
valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the
addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to
the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to
provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital
causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal
contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in
annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real
obligations of a mature, lifelong commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to
valid matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not
only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse
or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For
marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for
hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the
right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development
of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each
other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses must be `other oriented'
since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must
have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical
reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the obligations
ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal
relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the
relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital
capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and
partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope
with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to
the failure of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the
best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher
inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where
the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where
personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she
has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the
more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use.
Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at
the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on
the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as
promised(lack of due competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due
competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the
family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as
promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony
to establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed
at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement
that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totalityof evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of
expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence
of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which
the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership concurred in the
ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three
justices concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero-
-took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
even emphasized that "each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours
with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the
trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid
standards, without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated
differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and
was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure
in the world." The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people
who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic
social institutions. Far fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-
jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in
conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for
there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the
State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or
fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases
involving marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court
isnot demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of
marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred
bond. It may be stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to
speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery,
the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn
marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We
simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is
need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate
once more the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong
so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioners allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only
two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and without
abandoning her children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with
their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any
proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that
respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second
grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondents mahjong-playing. The least that
could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondents mahjong-playing during
the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while
there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating frequency and
adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondents mahjong playing should not have delimited our
determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the
determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities
of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties
and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender
ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices
that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondents obsessive mahjong playing surely
impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing
the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 the parties eldest son in his deposition,
whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on
playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parents separation, do you remember any habit
or activity or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I
cant remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I cant, I cant
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuzwe would go to my aunts house in White Plains and I think we
would get there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning.
ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess shed go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not
only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them
to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on
every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating
their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This
was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both
explained that the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own
childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her childrens moral and mental
development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her
children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of
their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for
and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of
their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to
their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their
means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at
all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the
RTC to the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically
incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC
would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her
answer,39 whereby she averred that it was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from
psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitionerspsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan,
as follows:
ATTY. BRETAA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of
those short temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with
him and even the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed
some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also
dependent and she was one who determined to make the relationship work, she was denying
even those kinds of problems that she had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, Im talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led
you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was
not really thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he
had to marry her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the
petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to
you that in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. Im referring specifically
to page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the
petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible
for such a person to enter into marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his
admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing
ways during the marriage?
A : Sir, its difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the
role of husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the
petitioner was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked
[sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage,
the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her
husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring
a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the
petitioner or the respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long
as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist
in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is
established, the marriage has to be deemed null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must
have already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming
it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so
much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children.
It would be a greater injustice should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and
then force them and their children to endure some more damage. This was the very same
injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes
today.1wphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of
petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman
or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by
private respondent, his wife, the companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from
her and towhich he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute
divorce but I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose
and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring
his marriage a nullity by reason of his wifes psychological incapacity to perform an essential
marital obligation. In this case, the marriage never existed from the beginning because the
respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the
marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between
the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our
society does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family
life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions
of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of
the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage
as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the
modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and
subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put
into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has
been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines
marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations
that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity
and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for
declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of
Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in
resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in
classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity,
should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the
avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under
Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they
promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not
capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.42 (Emphasis
supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision
rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological
incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
ROSALINO L. MARABLE, Petitioner,
vs.
MYRNA F. MARABLE, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed and set aside the
Decision3 dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City,
in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted petitioners prayer that his marriage to
respondent be declared null and void on the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano University. They were
classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in respondent. He only became
attracted to her after they happened to sit beside each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner
courted respondent and they eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already
had a girlfriend. Later, respondent discovered petitioners other relationship and demanded
more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he appreciated this gesture
like a child longing for love, time and attention.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in civil rites at
Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding followed on December
30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison and their marriage was blessed with
five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical quarrels
became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner became unhappy
because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when their eldest daughter
transferred from one school to another due to juvenile misconduct. It became worse still
when their daughter had an unwanted teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention
petitioner gave to his children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some
of them, but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and
respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with another
woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly terminated it. But
despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels aggravated. Also, their business
ventures failed. Any amount of respect remaining between them was further eroded by their
frequent arguments and verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was
unloved, unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards respondent.
When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family home and stayed with his
sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties which he and respondent had
accumulated during their marriage in favor of respondent and their children. Later, he
converted to Islam after dating several women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date, he filed a
petition4 for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential responsibilities of marital life.
In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was already exposed
to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father, although responsible and supportive,
was a compulsive gambler and womanizer. His father left their family to live with another
woman with whom he had seven other children. This caused petitioners mother and siblings
to suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked hard to
excel so he would be noticed.
Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked hard for the
company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and Marketing Associates, Inc.,
and became Senior Executive Vice President and Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite
his success at work, he alleged that his misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he
experienced a void in his relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report 5 of Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tayags report
stated that petitioner is suffering from "Antisocial Personality Disorder," characterized by a
pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness,
deceitfulness and lack of remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality
disorder is rooted in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr. Tayags
conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to respondent on the
ground of petitioners psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the RTC decision
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between the parties is
declared valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to establish the
existence of petitioners psychological incapacity. The CA noted that Dr. Tayag did not fully
explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she give a concrete explanation as to how she
arrived at a conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that
the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. In addition, the
incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.
Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing the trial
courts decision.
Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential marital obligations
was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial court. Petitioner relies heavily on
the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr. Tayag and quotes the latters findings:
Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family to the
present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues straight or not, just
to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence, [and] authority just so to
accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using religions to support his claim for a
much better personal and married life which is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive
as he is, emotional instability is apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with
life in general and changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.
Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and incurable nature
of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is characterized by a pervasive pattern of
social deviancy, rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of
remorse.
The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional antecedence as it
existed even before the said marital union. It is also profoundly rooted, grave and incurable.
The root cause of which is deep feelings of rejection starting from family to peers. This
insecure feelings had made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his
marital life. Said psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the
relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of the
psychological incapacity.7
According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag declared that
his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the characteristics of juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover, petitioner asserts that his psychological
incapacity has been medically identified and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other
hand, never presented another psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags findings. Also, petitioner
maintains that the psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely
because of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioners
personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his marital obligations. To the
mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the parties to continue to live under a
"non-existent marriage."
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment8 maintaining that petitioner failed to prove
his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag failed to explain specifically
how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner suffers from an anti-social personality
disorder and that it is grave and incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that
petitioner acted responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and
respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider to his children.
Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe petitioner as a self-centered,
remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially deviant person.
Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to establish his
psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present an expert witness where the
testimony of petitioners psychologist was insufficient and inconclusive. The OSG adds that
petitioner was not able to substantiate his claim that his infidelity was due to some
psychological disorder, as the real cause of petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be his
general dissatisfaction with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part
and the existence of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities." These,
however, do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Respondent also filed her Comment9 and Memorandum10 stressing that psychological
incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should contemplate downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
The appeal has no merit.
The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of the RTC for
lack of legal and factual bases.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage.11 These are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity
or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she
has contracted.12 Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. 13
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36. The Court held,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.1avvphi1
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological examination conducted
by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological incapacity. The result of the examination
and the findings of Dr. Tayag however, are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological
incapacity. In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, the psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the report of Dr. Tayag
failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged psychological incapacity. The
evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from
an Anti-social Personality Disorder but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that
petitioner is a socially deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,15 the presentation of expert proof in cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough
and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the
evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis
to declare as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags
evaluation which became the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the actions of petitioner
which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity. More importantly, there was no
established link between petitioners acts to his alleged psychological incapacity. It is
indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.16
For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles17 and differences in handling finances and
managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to raise their children, are
not manifestations of psychological incapacity which may be a ground for declaring their
marriage void. Petitioner even admitted that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy
moments together. Also, the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during
their marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most especially
his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality disorder tantamount to
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father,
was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage.
However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful as a result of a general
dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in his personal
history. His tendency to womanize, assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be
due to causes of a psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the
records show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated it. In
short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations.
It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity.18 It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. 19 That not being the
case with petitioner, his claim of psychological incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was
incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,20 the intention of the law is to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.21
All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent
as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is insufficient to establish
petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital obligations.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution dated July 4, 2007 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINTH DIVISION), AND EDUARDO C. DE QUINTOS,
.JR., Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The State appeals the decision promulgated on July 30, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the declaration by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, in Lingayen,
Pangasinan of the nullity of the marriage between respondent Eduardo De Quintos, Jr.
(Eduardo) and Catalina Delos Santos-De Quintos (Catalina) based on the latter's
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
We find the State's appeal to be meritorious. Hence, we uphold once again the validity of a
marriage on the ground that the alleged psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
established.
Antecedents
Eduardo and Catalina were married on March 16, 1977 in civil rites solemnized by the
Municipal Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan.2 The couple was not blessed with a child due to
Catalinas hysterectomy following her second miscarriage. 3
On April 6, 1998, Eduardo filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, 4 citing
Catalinas psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations. Catalina
did not interpose any objection to the petition, but prayed to be given her share in the conjugal
house and lot located in Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan.5 After conducting an investigation,
the public prosecutor determined that there was no collusion between Eduardo and
Catalina.6
Eduardo testified that Catalina always left their house without his consent; that she engaged
in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that
she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of doing the household chores
and caring for their adopted daughter; that she squandered by gambling all his remittances
as an overseas worker in Qatar since 1993; and that she abandoned the conjugal home in
1997 to live with Bobbie Castro, her paramour.7
Eduardo presented the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr.
Annabelle L. Reyes, a psychiatrist. Based on the tests she administered on Catalina, 8 Dr.
Reyes opined that Catalina exhibited traits of Borderline Personality Disorder that was no
longer treatable. Dr. Reyes found that Catalinas disorder was mainly characterized by her
immaturity that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to meet her marital obligations. 9
Catalina did not appear during trial but submitted her Answer/Manifestation, 10 whereby she
admitted her psychological incapacity, but denied leaving the conjugal home without
Eduardos consent and flirting with different men. She insisted that she had only one live-in
partner; and that she would not give up her share in the conjugal residence because she
intended to live there or to receive her share should the residence be sold. 11
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition on August 9, 2000, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Honorable Court finds for the
plaintiff and judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between Eduardo C. de Quintos and Catalina delos
Santos de Quintos, a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
2. Ordering the Municipal Civil Registrar of Lingayen,Pangasinan to cancel the
marriage of the parties from the Civil Register of Lingayen, Pangasinan in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.12
The RTC ruled that Catalinas infidelity, her spending more time with friends rather than with
her family, and her incessant gambling constituted psychological incapacity that affected her
duty to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It held that considering that the
matter of determining whether a party was psychologically incapacitated was best left to
experts like Dr. Reyes, the results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes was the
best evidence of Catalinas psychological incapacity.13
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the State raised the lone error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE PARTIES MARRIAGE NULL AND
VOID, DEFENDANT CATALINA DELOS SANTOS-DE QUINTOS PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.
On July 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the judgment of the RTC. The
CA concluded that Eduardo proved Catalinas psychological incapacity, observing that the
results of the neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes showed that Catalina had
been "mentally or physically ill to the extent that she could not have known her marital
obligations;" and that Catalinas psychological incapacity had been medically identified,
sufficiently proven, duly alleged in the complaint and clearly explained by the trial court.
Issue
In this appeal, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges that the CA
gravely erred because:
I
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT CATALINAS ALLEGED PERSONALITY TRAITS
ARE CONSTITUTIVE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY EXISTING AT THE
TIME OF MARRIAGE CELEBRATION; NOR ARE THEY OF THE NATURE
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
MARITAL UNFAITHFULNESS OF THE [sic] CATALINA WAS NOT SHOWN TO
BE A SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
III
ABANDONMENT OF ONES FAMILY IS ONLY A GROUND FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION.
IV
GAMBLING HABIT OF CATALINA NOT LIKEWISE ESTABLISHED TO BE A
SYMPTOM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.
V
THE NEUROPSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND TESTIMONY OF DR.
ANNABELLE REYES FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF CATALINAS
INCAPACITY AND PROVE THAT IT EXISTED AT THE INCEPTION OF
MARRIAGE, IS GRAVE AND INCURABLE.14
The OSG argues that the findings and conclusions of the RTC and the CA did not conform
to the guidelines laid down by the Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals, (Molina);15 and that
Catalinas refusal to do household chores, and her failure to take care of her husband and
their adopted daughter were not "defects" of a psychological nature warranting the
declaration of nullity of their marriage, but mere indications of her difficulty, refusal or neglect
to perform her marital obligations.
The OSG further argues that Catalinas infidelity, gambling habits and abandonment of the
conjugal home were not grounds under Article 36 of the Family Code; that there was no proof
that her infidelity and gambling had occurred prior to the marriage, while her abandonment
would only be a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) of the Family Code; that the
neuro-psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Reyes did not sufficiently establish Catalinas
psychological incapacity; that Dr. Reyes was not shown to have exerted effort to look into
Catalinas past life, attitudes, habits and character as to be able to explain her alleged
psychological incapacity; that there was not even a finding of the root cause of her alleged
psychological incapacity; and that there appeared to be a collusion between the parties
inasmuch as Eduardo admitted during the trial that he had given P50,000.00 to Catalina in
exchange for her non-appearance in the trial.
The OSG postulated that Catalinas unsupportive in-laws and Eduardos overseas
deployment that had required him to be away most of the time created the strain in the
couples relationship and forced her to seek her friends emotional support and company;
and that her ambivalent attitude towards their adopted daughter was attributable to her
inability to bear children of her own.
Issue
The issue is whether there was sufficient evidence warranting the declaration of the nullity
of Catalinas marriage to Eduardo based on her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Ruling
We grant the petition for review.
Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates an incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. It consists of:
(a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer
to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the conjugal act, the community of life and
love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation and education of offspring; and (c)
the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed
to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married person is not enough; it is essential
that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.16
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,17 we decreed that psychological incapacity should refer to a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. In an effort to settle the confusion that may
arise in deciding cases involving nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity,
we then laid down the following guidelines in the later ruling in Molina,18 viz:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
xxxx
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical. x x x.
xxxx
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of
the marriage. x x x.
xxxx
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. x x x.
xxxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. x x x.
xxxx
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x.
 xxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.19
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential
guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the
Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly
on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations.20 Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence
presented during trial,21making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity.22
Eduardo defends the rulings of the RTC and the CA, insisting that they thereby explained
the gravity and severity of Catalinas psychological incapacity that had existed even prior to
the celebration of their marriage.23
We are not convinced. Both lower courts did not exact a compliance with the requirement of
sufficiently explaining the gravity, root cause and incurability of Catalinas purported
psychological incapacity. Rather, they were liberal in their appreciation of the scanty
evidence that Eduardo submitted to establish the incapacity.
To start with, Catalinas supposed behavior (i.e., her frequent gossiping with neighbors,
leaving the house without Eduardos consent, refusal to do the household chores and to take
care of their adopted daughter, and gambling), were not even established. Eduardo
presented no other witnesses to corroborate his allegations on such behavior. At best, his
testimony was self-serving and would have no serious value as evidence upon such a
serious matter that was submitted to a court of law.
Secondly, both lower courts noticeably relied heavily on the results of the neuro-
psychological evaluation by Dr. Reyes despite the paucity of factual foundation to support
the claim of Catalinas psychological incapacity. In particular, they relied on the following
portion of the report of Dr. Reyes, to wit:
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Catalina is exhibiting traits of a borderline personality. This is characterized, mainly by
immaturity in several aspects of the personality. One aspect is in the area of personal
relationships, where a person cannot really come up with what is expected in a relationship
that involves commitments. They are generally in and out of relationships, as they do not
have the patience to sustain this [sic] ties. Their behavior is like that of a child who has to be
attended to as they might end up doing things which are often regrettable. These people
however usually do not feel remorse for their wrongdoings. They do not seem to learn from
their mistakes, and they have the habit of repeating these mistakes to the detriment of their
own lives and that of their families. Owing to these characteristics, people with these pattern
of traits cannot be expected to have lasting and successful relationships as required in
marriage. It is expected that even with future relationships, things will not work out.
Families of these people usually reveal that parents relationship are not also that ideal. If this
be the background of the developing child, it is likely that his or her relationships would also
end up as such.
xxxx
With all these collateral information being considered and a longitudinal history of defendant
made, it is being concluded that she was not able to come up with the minimum expected of
her as a wife. Her behavior and attitude before and after the marriage is highly indicative of
a very immature and childish person, rendering her psychologically incapacitated to live up
and meet the responsibilities required in a commitment like marriage. Catalina miserably
failed to fulfill her role as wife and mother, rendering her incapacitated to comply with her
duties inherent in marriage. In the same vein, it cannot be expected that this attitude and
behavior of defendant will still change because her traits have developed through the years
and already ingrained within her.24
Yet, the report was ostensibly vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of
Catalinas supposed psychological incapacity. Nor was the testimony given in court by Dr.
Reyes a source of vital information that the report missed out on. Aside from rendering a
brief and general description of the symptoms of borderline personality disorder, both the
report and court testimony of Dr. Reyes tendered no explanation on the root cause that could
have brought about such behavior on the part of Catalina. They did not specify which of
Catalinas various acts or omissions typified the conduct of a person with borderline
personality, and did not also discuss the gravity of her behavior that translated to her inability
to perform her basic marital duties. Dr. Reyes only established that Catalina was childish and
immature, and that her childishness and immaturity could no longer be treated due to her
having already reached an age "beyond maturity."25
Thirdly, we have said that the expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. 26 We have explained this
need in Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,27 stating:
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7) hours of
interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie the hands of the trial
court and prevent it from making its own factual finding on what happened in this case. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts
that serve as a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion
is founded.28
But Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina, and did not personally seek out and
meet with other persons, aside from Eduardo, who could have shed light on and established
the conduct of the spouses before and during the marriage. For that reason, Dr. Reyes
report lacked depth and objectivity, a weakness that removed the necessary support for the
conclusion that the RTC and the CA reached about Catalinas psychological incapacity to
perform her marital duties.
Under the circumstances, the report and court testimony by Dr. Reyes did not present the
gravity and incurability of Catalinas psychological incapacity. There was, to start with, no
evidence showing the root cause of her alleged borderline personality disorder and that such
disorder had existed prior to her marriage. We have repeatedly pronounced that the root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, with its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented
during trial.29
What we can gather from the scant evidence that Eduardo adduced was Catalinas
immaturity and apparent refusal to perform her marital obligations. However, her immaturity
alone did not constitute psychological incapacity. 30 To rule that such immaturity amounted to
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, which inability was merely due to her youth or immaturity. 31
Q Mr. de Quintos, also during the first part of the hearing, your wife, the herein defendant,
Catalina delos Santos-de Quintos, has been religiously attending the hearing, but lately, I
noticed that she is no longer attending and represented by counsel, did you talk to your wife?
A No, sir.
Q And you find it more convenient that it would be better for both of you, if, she will not attend
the hearing of this case you filed against her, is it not?
A No, sir. I did not.
Q But, am I correct, Mr. de Quintos, that you and your wife had an agreement regarding this
case?

Fourthly, we held in Suazo v. Suazo32 that there must be proof of a natal or supervening A None, sir.
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from complying with the
basic marital obligations, viz: Q And you were telling me something about an agreement that you will pay her an amount
of P50,000.00, please tell us, what is that agreement that you have to pay her P50,000.00?
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these A Regarding our conjugal properties, sir.
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in
the respondents personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with
his essential marital obligations must be shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the Q Why, do you have conjugal properties that you both or acquired at the time of your
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from marriage?
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the A Yes, sir.
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
Q And why did you agree that you have to give her P50,000.00?
obligations of marriage.

A It is because we bought a lot and constructed a house thereat, that is why I agreed, sir.
The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted in her Answer, was her
abandonment of the conjugal home to live with another man. Yet, abandonment was not one
of the grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute Q Is it not a fact, Mr. witness, that your wife does not oppose this petition for declaration of
psychological incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10) marriage which you filed against her?
of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid ground for the
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, considering that there should be a A She does not opposed [sic], sir.
showing that such marital infidelity was a manifestation of a disordered personality that made
her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage. 33 Needless to state,
Q As a matter of fact, the only thing that she is concern [sic] about this case is the division
Eduardo did not adduce such evidence, rendering even his claim of her infidelity bereft of
of your conjugal properties?
factual and legal basis.

A Yes, sir.
Lastly, we do not concur with the assertion by the OSG that Eduardo colluded with Catalina.
The assertion was based on his admission during trial that he had paid her the amount of
P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal home in order to convince her not to oppose his Q That is why you also agreed to give her P50,000.00 as her share of your conjugal
petition or to bring any action on her part,34 to wit: properties, so that she will not pursue whatever she wanted to pursue with regards to the
case you filed against her, is that correct?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY FISCAL MUERONG
A Yes, sir.

Q And you already gave her that amount of P50,000.00, Mr. witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And because she has already gotten her share of P50,000.00 that is the reason why she
is no longer around here?

A Yes sir, it could be.35

Verily, the payment to Catalina could not be a manifest sign of a collusion between her and
Eduardo.1wphi1 To recall, she did not interpose her objection to the petition to the point of
conceding her psychological incapacity, but she nonetheless made it clear enough that she
was unwilling to forego her share in the conjugal house. The probability that Eduardo willingly
gave her the amount of P50,000.00 as her share in the conjugal asset out of his recognition
of her unquestionable legal entitlement to such share was very high, so that whether or not
he did so also to encourage her to stick to her previously announced stance of not opposing
the petition for nullity of the marriage should by no means be of any consequence in
determining the issue of collusion between the spouses.

In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological incapacity of
Catalina, we cannot but resolve in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity.36

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari; SET ASIDE the decision the
Court of Appeals promulgated on July 30, 2003; and DISMISS the petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code for lack of merit.

Costs to be paid by the respondent.

SO ORDERED.