Tiburcio et al. vs.

Peoples Homesite & Housing Corporation

Reconveyance

Facts: Marcelino Tiburcio filed this action before the CFI of Quezon City alleging that his ancestors have
been in actual, adverse, open, public, exclusive, and continuous possession since prior to 1877 to 1957
the piece of land under dispute. On 1955, the defendants together with the University of the Philippines
claimed that they have title covering the land of the plaintiff. The plaintiff said that the UP cannot be
innocent purchaser for value because they received a notice of the plaintiffs possession of the land. The
UP raised the defense that the plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitations there being a want in
jurisdiction of the court. It appears, however, that the land in litigation was registered to the defendants
in 1914.

Held: The plaintiffs are barred by laches for not having taken the action seasonably after title to the
property had been issued under the Torrens system in 1914. It appears' that the property in question
was originally registered on May 3, 1914 and it was only on October 11,1957 that appellants asserted
their claim thereto when they brought the present action.
Leticia Ligon vs. CA

Doctrine: Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to them be it
with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the property.

Facts: The respondent INK bought two parcels of land from IDP located at Barrio Cuilat, Quezon City. The
properties are registered under the name of IDP. The parties stipulated that the IDP shall, within 45 days
from the execution of the contract, clear the land of the illegal settlers, an obligation which the IDP
failed to perform with their defense that the INK failed to perform its obligation to pay the purchase
price of the land. The INK prayed to the court to order the IDP to perform their obligation and pay for
damages and the IDP prayed for the contract to be rescinded and revoked. The court ruled in favor of
the INK but only required the IDP to perform its obligation. The INK then went after the mortgagee of
IDP, Leticia Ligon as she was in possession of the certificates of title over the land in litigation. Ligon
refused but nevertheless ordered by the court to surrender the titles to the RD of QC.

Issue: Whether Leticia has the right to withhold the title by reason of mortgage.

Held: The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of petitioner appears in the
certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521. Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of
the certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in favor of INK can be registered,
cannot in any way prejudice her rights and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on
the previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or carried over to the new
transfer certificates of title. This is true even in the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to
Art. 2126 of the Civil Code it directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
It is inseparable from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem - a lien on the property whoever its
owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner
is disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the mortgage whether the transfer to
them be it with or without the consent of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the
property. It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the certificates of title to the Register of
Deeds as ordered by the trial court will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition
and compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it asked in the motion before the
trial court is to encourage litigations where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be
avoided. Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the proper
administration of justice. The rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of
the higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive rights.
Escueta vs. Director of Lands

Doctrine: It is a mere question of law that is raised in this case, through the appeal filed by the Attorney-
General, in representation of the Director of Lands, against two decisions of the Court of Land
Registration, and is, whether or not new notifications and publications are necessary in cases where,
after they once have been made and the registration of the realty has been decreed, the applicant
requests an amendment of the description of the land and of its plan, with an increase in area and the
statement of the name of a new adjacent property owner not mentioned in the previous notifications
and publications, or substituting the same by other names.

Facts: The petitioner herein, Mariano Escueta, applied for registration his parcel of land under the Land
Registration Act in 1908. He noted therein the metes and bounds of his property together with his
knowledge that there is no encumbrance and no other person claiming the land besides him. On
February 15, 1909, Escueta went to court for the hearing of his application and his presentation of
proofs of his ownership over the land. The court granted his petition and issued an order decreeing the
adjudication and registration of the said property in accordance with the petition of Escueta. After 8
days or on the 23rd of the same month, Escueta informed the court that he has some amendments with
regards to the true owners of the adjacent land of his property.

Issue: Whether another publication is needed due to the amendment

Held: If amendments or alterations were permitted in the description of land sought to be registered,
after the publication of the application in the newspapers and the issuance of the decree for the
registration of the property, on the petition of the interested party, without new notifications and
advertisement whereby to make known to all persons the said alterations and amendments concerning
the situation, boundaries, and area of the land, the mandate of the law would be violated relative to the
publicity of the proceedings prescribed for the registration of real estate, a publicity which permeates
the whole system of special trial established for the registration of landed properties. Moreover, third
parties who have not had an opportunity to present their claims might be seriously affected in their
rights by not being notified, it being natural and just that they be not injured in consequence of the
rectification that is sought.
Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque vs. Ebio

Doctrine: It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is not the acquisition of lands,
but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed over the land. Registration was
never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of registration merely confirms, but does
not confer, ownership.

Nemo dat quod dat non habet. No one can give what he does not have. Such principle is equally
applicable even against a sovereign entity that is the State.

Facts: The respondents, Mario Ebio and his children, claims that they are the absolute owners of a parcel
of land located in Paraaque City. They provided Tax Declaration No. 01027 and 01472 in the name of
Mario D. Ebio as proof of ownership. The said parcel of land was an accretion of Cut-cut creek and was
originally occupied and possessed by their great grandfather. On 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang
Barangay of Vitalez in Paraaque sought the help of the City Government of Paraaque for the
construction of an access road which, unfortunately, traverses the property of the respondents herein.
The respondents opposed and the road project was temporarily suspended. Surprisingly, on January
2003, several officials from the barangay proceeded to cut 8 coconut trees planted on the said lot. The
respondents filed letter-complaints to which the SB of Vitalez answered by meeting with the parties but
no agreement was reached. The City Administrator of Paraaque then ordered the respondents to
vacate the premises or be forcibly evicted from it.

Issue: Whether the ancestor of the Ebios has a better right than the local government of Paraaque

Held: From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion
can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Paraaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion.
Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property through
prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to register their title
over the said lot.
Heirs of Antonio Pael vs. Court of Appeals

Doctrine: The rule is that material facts or questions which were in issue in a former action and were
there admitted or judicially determined are conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein and
that such facts or questions become res judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action
between the same parties or their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent
action, whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different form of proceedings, or whether
the second action is upon the same or a different cause of action, subject matter, claim or demand, as
the earlier action.

Facts: This is a consolidated case involving TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929 which were allegedly
obtained through illegal means to the names of Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari to the prejudice of the
Destura couple. Chin and Mallari promised Pedro Destura that they transferred their names because
they already had a buyer for the same for P100,000,000.00 which did not push through. Maria Destura
then filed a complaint against Pedro together with Chin and Mallari seeking the annulment of the MOA
between the three and the annulment of TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929 as it was illegally transferred
to the names of Chin and Mallari. The trial court granted these petitions made by Maria. Chin and
Mallari filed a motion for new trial but to no avail. Together with their new counsel, Chin and Mallari
filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA which was granted. More so, the CA also
reversed the annulment made by the trial court regarding the TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929 and the
reinstatement of TCT No. 36048 registered in the name of the Paels. The case was elevated to this Court
by the Heirs of Pael and by Maria Destura via separate petitions for review. The University of the
Philippines (UP) filed a motion for intervention, alleging that the properties covered by TCT Nos. 52928
and 52929 in the names of Chin and Mallari form part of its Diliman Campus, registered in the name of
UP under TCT No. 9462. The Court denied the motions for reconsideration of Destura and the Heirs of
Pael, but granted the motion for intervention filed by UP. The Court remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals for reception of evidence on the conflicting claims over the property in question by Chin and
Mallari as against UP. On July 2003, the Former Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals
submitted its Report recommending that this Court recognize the better rights of Chin and Mallari over
the property as against the claim of UP. It declared that OCT No. 730 which, U.P. claims, was the root of
said TCTs was registered on May 3, 1914. This date appears, however, to fall on a Sunday, which casts
doubts on U.P.s claim. This court, therefore, finds that in line with its observations on the cases cited by
U.P., the latters TCT, which overlaps that of petitioners, originated from another title - OCT No. 735 -
which was registered on July 6, 1914.

Issue: Whether the rights of UP over the property shall prevail

Held: It should be emphasized that this Court's Decision in Tiburcio, et al. vs. PHHC, as well as in the
subsequent cases upholding the validity and indefeasibility of the certificate of title covering the UP
Diliman Campus, precludes the courts from looking anew into the validity of UP's title. Thus, the
appellate court's discourse in the case at bar as regards the origin of UP's certificate of title, whether it
came from OCT 730 or OCT 735 is intolerable, to say the least. The rule is that material facts or
questions which were in issue in a former action and were there admitted or judicially determined are
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein and that such facts or questions become res
judicata and may not again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their privies,
regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent action, whether the subsequent action
involves the same or a different form of proceedings, or whether the second action is upon the same or
a different cause of action, subject matter, claim or demand, as the earlier action. In such cases, it is also
immaterial that the two actions are based on different grounds, or tried on different theories, or
instituted for different purposes, and seek different reliefs. By the same token, whatever is once
irrevocably established as the controlling legal principle or decision continues to be the law of the case
between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Manotok Realty vs CLT

Facts: The respondent CLT Development sought to recover from petitioner Manotok Realty the
possession of Lot 26 covered by aforementioned estate. Respondents claim is based on a title issued in
its name by the Register of Deeds-Caloocan, which title in turn was derived from Estelita Hipolito by
virtue of a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 Dec. 1988. Hipolitos title came from Jose
Dimsons title, which was issued pursuant to a CFI order. Dimsons title appears to have been sourced
from OCT 994. Petitioners challenged the validity of the OCT 994 relied by respondent, alleging that
Dimsons title was irregularly issued, and hence, the subsequent titles flowing therefrom are void.
Petitioners title likewise traced as its primary source OCT 994, which was transferred to Alejandro Ruiz
& Mariano Leuterio who acquired the property through an Escritura de Venta (Deed of Sale) executed
by Don Tomas Arguelles & Don Enrique Llopis. Ruiz & Leuterio then sold the property to Gonzales and
then to his heirs, wherein the lot was subdivided into 7 parcels. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents and the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue: Whether the Court can still overturn its decision in MWSS v. CA & Heirs of Gonzaga v. CA wherein
it sustained the validity of OCT 994 registered on April 19, 1917 and nullified the same OCT registered on
a later date May 3, 1917.

Held: The court acknowledged the OCT registered on May 3, 1917 as the authentic title over the land
because it is the date of registration since that was when he was able to transcribe the decree in the
registration book and such entry made in the book made it the original certificate of title. The
aforementioned case recognized an OCT 994 registered on 19 APR 1917, a title that never existed and,
even assuming that it did exist, is now acknowledged as spurious. It would be incoherent for the Court
to reiterate jurisprudence that gave effect tot OCT 994 registered on 19 APR 1917, and at the same time,
acknowledge that the same OCT never existed. Hence, the Court can certainly decline to infuse further
validity to such erroneous premise. Further, the two cases should not bind the parties in the petitions
now before us. Undisputedly, the two cases involved different parcels of land. The present petitioners
could not be bound by the decisions in the two cases, as they were not parties thereto and their
properties were not involved therein. As we very recently reaffirmed, it is basic that no man shall be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment
rendered by the court.