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MARCOS MENDOZA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FRANCISCO DE LEON ET AL.

, DEFENDANTS AND interest of the municipality, but for the benefit of the public at large, such acts by the agents and servants
APPELLANTS. [ G.R. No. 9596, February 15, 1916 ] are deemed to be acts by public or state officers, and for the public benefit."
TRENT, J.: The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work on Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) sections 38 and
This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal council of the municipality 39.
of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive ferry privilege duly awarded to the As is indicated in some of the above quoted cases, the municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers
plaintiff under the provisions of Act No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. After user of a little more or agents in the performance of its governmental functions. Governmental affairs do not lose their
than one year, the plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the governmental character by being delegated to the municipal governments. Nor does the fact that such
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person. duties are performed by officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state allows the
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code have both governmental and municipality to select, change their character. To preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of
corporate or business functions. Of the first class are the adoption of regulations against fire and disease, the community and so on is to administer government, whether it be done by the central government
preservation of the public peace, maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of primary schools and itself or is shifted to a local organization. And the state being immune for injuries suffered by private
post-offices, etc. Of the latter class are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the individuals in the administration of strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the
inhabitants, the construction and maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute.
establishments, wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1634 provides that the use of each fishery, fish- "The state cannot, without its consent expressed through legislation, be sued for injuries resulting from
breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or township shall an act done in the exercise of its lawful governmental powers and pertaining to the administration of
be let to the highest bidder annually or for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been government. * * * Municipal corporations are agents of the state in the exercise of certain governmental
previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which the municipality or township is powers. The preservation of the health and peace of its inhabitants and fire protection afforded the
located. property owner, are governmental functions." (Burke vs. City of South Omaha, 79 Neb., 793.)
The twofold character of the powers of a municipality under our Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is so apparent In Nicholson vs. Detroit (129 Mich., 246; 56 L. R. A., 601), it was said:
and its private or corporate powers so numerous and important that we find no difficulty in reaching the "It is the well-settled rule that the state is not liable to private persons who suffer injuries through the
conclusion that the general principles governing the liability of such entities to private individuals as negligence of its officers and the rule extends to townships and cities while in the performance of state
enunciated in the United States are applicable to it. The distinction between governmental powers on the functions, imposed upon them by law. This subject is fully discussed in Detroit vs. Blackeby (21 Mich., 84;
one hand, and corporate or proprietary or business powers on the other, as the latter class is variously 4 Am. Rep., 450). It was there held that cities are governmental agencies, and that their 'officers are in no
described in the reported cases, has been long recognized in the United States and there is no dissent from such sense municipal agents; that their negligence is the neglect of the municipality; nor will their
the doctrine. misconduct be chargeable against them, unless the act complained of be either authorized or ratified.'
In Wilcox vs. City of Rochester (190 N. Y., 137), it was said: And in a large number of cases it has been held that there is no such liability on the part of such
"The broad general doctrine of the Maxmilian case (Maxmilian vs. Mayor, etc., New York, 62 N. Y., 160), governmental agency unless it has been imposed by statute, and in such case it is necessarily limited by
which is certainly not now open to question in the courts of this State, is that 'two kinds of duties are the statute."
imposed on municipal corporations, the one governmental and a branch of the general administration of In Claussen vs. City of Luverne (103 Minn., 491; 15 L. R. A., N. S., 698), it was said:
the state, the other quasi private or corporate;' and 'that in the exercise of the latter duties the "It is elementary that neither the state nor any of the subdivisions, like a municipality, through which it
municipality is liable for the acts of its officers and agents, while in the former it is not.' (Cullen, J., in operates, is liable for torts committed by public officers, save in definitely excepted classes of cases. The
Lefrois vs. Co. of Monroe, 162 N. Y., 563, 567.)" exemption is based upon the sovereign character of the state and its agencies, and upon the absence of
The Maxmilian case is quoted with approval in Bond vs. Royston (130 Ga., 646). obligation, and not on the ground that no means for remedy have been provided. 'The government,' said
In Co. Comm's of Anne Arundel Co. vs. Duckett (20 Md., 468, 476; 83 Am. Dec., 557), it was said: Mr. Justice Story, 'does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
"With regard to the liability of a public municipal corporation for the acts of its officers, the distinction is whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties
between an exercise of those legislative powers which it holds for public purposes, and as part of the and losses, which would be subversive of the public interest.' (U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat., 720; 6 L. ed.,
government of the country, and those private franchises which belong to it, as a creation of the law; within 199; Beers vs. Arkansas, 20 How., 527; 15 L. ed., 991.) This general exemption has been applied to
the sphere of the former, it enjoys the exemption of the government, from responsibility for its own acts, municipal corporations in so far as the acts complained of were, in the language of the memorandum of
and for the acts of those who are independent corporate officers, deriving their rights and duties from the the trial court, 'done in exercising powers for the public at large as a governing agency.' While so acting,
sovereign power. But in regard to the latter, it is responsible for the acts of those who are in law its agents, the city cannot be held liable for misfeasance; and * * * the rule of respondeat superior has no
though they may not be appointed by itself." application."
This case was quoted with approval in Trammell vs. Russellville (34 Ark., 105; 36 Am. Rep., 1); and in Nor are officers or agents of the Government charged with the performance of governmental duties which
Mcllhenney vs. Wilmington (127 N. C, 146; 50 L. R. A., 470). are in their nature legislative, or quasi judicial, liable for the consequences of their official acts, unless it
In Cummings vs. Lobsitz (42 Okla., 704; L. R. A., N. S., B, p. 415), it was said: be shown that they act willfully and maliciously, and with the express purpose of inflicting injury upon the
"A distinction is made between the liability of a municipal corporation for the acts of its officers in the plaintiff. If they exercise their honest judgment in the performance of their duties, their errors cannot be
exercise of powers which it possesses for public purpose and which it holds as agent of the state, and those charged against them. (People vs. May, 251 111., 54; Salt Lake County vs. Clinton [Utah, 1911], 117 Pac.,
powers which embrace private or corporate duties and are exercised for the advantage of the municipality 1075; Comanche County vs. Burks (Tex. Civ. App., 1914), 166 S. W., 470; Monnier vs. Godbold, 116 La.,
and its inhabitants. When the acts of its. officers come within the powers which it has as agent of the state, 165; 5 L. R. A., N. S., 463; Ray vs. Dodd, 132 Mo. App., 444; Johnson vs. Marsh, 82 N. J. L., 4;
it is exempt from liability for its own acts and the acts of its officers; if the acts of the officer or agent of Gregory vs. Brooks, 37 Conn., 365; Lecourt vs. Gaster, 50 La. Ann., 521.) So it may be said that in so far as
the city are for the special benefit of the corporation in its private or corporate interest, such officer is its governmental functions are concerned, a municipality is not liable at all, unless expressly made so by
deemed the agent or servant of the city, but where the act is not in relation to a private or corporate statute; nor are its officers, so long as they perform their duties honestly and in good faith. The most
common illustration of both phases of this rule is the action for false imprisonment so often brought either by the grantee, contracts protected by the prohibition of the Federal Constitution against the enactment
against a municipality or s municipal police officer. (Bartlett vs. City of Columbus, 101 Ga., 300; 44 L. R. A., of any State law impairing the obligation of contracts."
795; Peters vs. City of Lindsborg, 40 Kan., 654.) So, in Field vs. City of Des Moines (39 Iowa, 575), it was Again, this author, adopting the language of the court in In re Fay (15 Pick. [Mass.], 243), says, in section
held that a municipality, acting under authority given it by the central government to destroy houses in 277:
the path of a conflagration, was not liable in damages in the absence of a statute expressly making it so. "If a municipal corporation, seized of a ferry, lease the same, through the agency of the mayor and
From what has already been said, it should be clear that 4 municipality is not exempt from liability for the aldermen, with a covenant of quiet enjoyment, this covenant will not restrain the mayor and aldermen
negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its from exercising the powers vested in them by statute, to license another ferry over the same waters, if in
patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third their judgment (which cannot be reviewed by the courts) the public necessity and convenience require it
persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and On such a covenant the city may be liable to the covenantees; but the powers vested in the city officers as
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their trustees for the public cannot be thus abrogated. If, however, the city in its corporate capacity is the legal
employment in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or owner, of an exclusive franchise, its grantees or lessees would hold it, notwithstanding any license to
individuals. As to such matters the principles of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that others, whether granted by the mayor and aldermen or any other tribunal."
the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts. It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of the Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, above referred
"Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort. In a previous chapter we have to, the plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his
considered at length the authority of such corporations to make contracts, the mode of exercising, and lease. Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a judgment for damages against
the effect of transcending the power. This leaves but little to add in this place respecting their liability in it for the rescission of the contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of exacting
actions ex contractu. Upon an authorized contract that is, upon a contract within the scope of the charter damages, either ex contractu or ex delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of municipalities.
or legislative powers of the corporation and duly made by the proper officers or agents they are liable in But the present action is against the members of the municipal council personally, and the question arises:
the same manner and to the same extent as private corporations or natural persons." (Dillon on Municipal Are they liable? In administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal council
Corporations, 5th ed., sec. 1610.) occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of a private corporation. In disposing of
The same author says in section 1647: the local public utilities, if the term may be used, such as the fishing and ferry rights, etc., they must
"The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or exercise considerable judgment. It requires some considerable amount of business acumen to compel
want of skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his employment, by which another, who is free performance on the part of lessees of these privileges in accordance with the terms of their leases and in
from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations, under the conditions herein stated, fall within a manner which will not cause the property to deteriorate. Questions must continually arise which are not
the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite expressly provided for in the contracts and which must be settled, if possible, in a manner that will
elements of liability coexist. To create such liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the act done which preserve the just claims of the municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that on occasion the
is injurious to others must be within the scope of the corporate powers as prescribed by charter or positive councilors may have reason to believe that a particular contract has been rescinded by the other party or
enactment (the extent of which powers all persons are bound, at their peril, to know); in other words, it has never been legally entered into, in both of which cases, decisive steps must be taken to safeguard the
must not be ultra vires in the sense that it is not within the power or authority of the corporation to act in interest of the municipality. Thus, in Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan (21 Phil. Rep., 184), the lessee
reference to it under any circumstances. If the act complained of necessarily lies wholly outside of the of a municipal fishery was evicted for failing to pay his quarterly rents. The municipal authorities rightly
general or special powers of the corporation as conferred in its charter or by statute, the corporation can held that the contract was rescinded but forcibly evicted the lessee instead of resorting to the courts.
in no event be liable to an action for damages, whether it directly commanded the performance of the act Hence, in an action by the municipality against the lessee and his bondsmen to recover rent arrears,
or whether it be done by its officers without its express command; for a corporation cannot, of course, be damages were allowed the lessee on his counterclaim for the loss caused by the forcible eviction.
impliedly liable to a greater extent than it could make itself by express corporate vote or action." Nevertheless, we do not think the councilors could have been held personally liable for their error in
It often happens that the same agent or agency has both a governmental and a corporate character. Such, resorting to forcible eviction of the lessee. Theirs was an error of judgment, and honest mistake on their
for instance, are a municipal water system designed both for protection against fire (a governmental part as to the rights of the municipality in the premises. We think the rule of personal liability should be
function) and to supply water to the inhabitants for profit (a corporate function). (Omaha Water with municipal councilors in such matters as it is with the directors or managers of an ordinary private
Co. vs. Omaha, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 736; 77 C. C. A., 267; 147 Fed., 1; Judson vs. Borough of Winsted, 80 Conn., corporation.
384; 15 L. R. A., N. S., 91); a municipal light plant both for lighting the streets (a governmental function) "Under the rule that directors are not liable for mistakes of judgment, it follows naturally that they are not
and for furnishing light to the inhabitants at a profit (a corporate function) (Fisher vs. New Bern, 140 N. C, liable for the mismanagement of the corporate affairs where such mismanagement is a mistake of
506; 111 Am. St. Rep., 867); an agent who is at the same time a police officer and a caretaker of a municipal judgment. The wisdom of this rule is not only approved by common experience but by law writers and all
toll bridge (Woodhull vs. Mayor, etc., of New York, 150 N. Y., 450). It is, also, sometimes the case that courts. A rule so rigid as to hold directors personally liable for honest mistakes in corporate management
considerable difficulty is experienced in determining whether a particular municipal duty is governmental would deter all prudent business men from accepting such positions. The remedy of stockholders in all
or corporate. such cases is by a change in the directory. * * * The rule is that courts will not interfere even in doubtful
But questions such as these do not arise in the case at bar. Here it is clear that the leasing of a municipal cases. But directors and managing officers may be liable for mismanagement to warrant the interposition
ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a governmental but a corporate function. of a court either as against the contemplated action of the directors, or a majority of the stockholders, or
Such a lease, when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the municipality is to give relief by way of damages after the action has been taken; a case must be made out which plainly
bound to respect. The matter is thus summed up by Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th ed., sec. 1306): shows that such action is so far opposed to the true interests of the corporation itself as to lead to the
"Ordinances made by municipalities under charter or legislative authority, containing grants to water and clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such
light companies and other public service corporations of the right to use the streets for pipes, mains, etc., interests, but that he must have acted with an intent to subserve some outside purpose, regardless of the
upon the condition of the performance of service by the grantee, are, after acceptance and performance
consequences to the corporation, and in a manner inconsistent with its interests." (Thompson on
Corporations, sec. 1298.) PREVIOUSLY -> The charter contains no reference to the obligations or contracts of theold city.
In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any justifiable reason for forcibly Ifweunderstandtheargumentagainsttheliabilityhereasserted,itproceedsmainlyuponthetheory thatinasmuch as thepredecessorofthepresentcity,the
evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he had leased. On the contrary, the defendant councilors ayuntamientoofManila,was acorporateentitycreated bytheSpanishgovernment,when thesovereigntyofSpain in theislands was
attempted to justify their action on the ground that the ferry which he was operating was not the one terminated bythetreaty ofcession,ifnotbythecapitulation ofAugust13,1898,themunicipality ipsofactodisappearedfor allpurposes.
leased to him; this, in spite of the fact that the vice-president had personally placed him in possession of Thisconclusion isreached uponthesupposedanalogy tothedoctrineofprincipaland agent, thedeath oftheprincipalendingtheagency.
it more than a year before, and the fact that he had operated this ferry for over a year, evidently with the Socompleteisthesupposeddeath and annihilationofamunicipalentity by extinctionofsovereignty ofthecreatingstatethatitwassaid in
knowledge of the defendants. The evidence is so clear that the ferry of which the plaintiff was oneoftheopinionsbelowthatallofthepublic property ofManilapassedtotheUnitedStates,'for aconsideration,whichwas paid,'
dispossessed was the one which he had leased that no reasonable man would entertain any doubt andthattheUnitedStateswasthereforejustifiedincreatinganabsolutely new municipality,andendowing itwithalloftheassets ofthe
whatever upon the question. Hence, we cannot say that in rescinding the contract with the plaintiff, defunctcity,freefromany obligationtothecreditorsofthatcity.Andsothematter wasdismissedin theTrigasCaseby thecourtoffirst
thereby making the municipality liable to an action for damages for no valid reason at all, the defendant instance, bythesuggestionthat'theplaintiffmayhaveaclaimagainsttheCrown ofSpain, which hasreceived fromtheUnitedStates
councilors were honestly acting for the interests of the municipality. We are, therefore, of the opinion that payment for thatdonebytheplaintiff.' [220 U.S.345,356]Weareunabletoagreewith theargument.It losessightofthedualcharacter of
the defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission municipalcorporations.They exercisepowers whicharegovernmentaland powers which areofaprivateor businesscharacter.Intheone
of his contract of lease of the ferry privilege in question. In reaching this conclusion, we have not failed to character amunicipalcorporationis agovernmentalsubdivision, and forthatpurposeexercisesby delegationapartofthesovereignty of
take into consideration the rule enunciated in Dennison vs. The Moro Province (R. G. No. 8173, March 28, thestate.Intheothercharacter it isamerelegalentity or juristic person.In thelattercharacter itstandsforthecommunityin the
1914; not reported), nor the distinction made by the courts in the United States between the liability of a administration oflocalaffairswhollybeyondthesphereofthepublicpurposes forwhich itsgovernmentalpowers areconferred.
municipal corporation, made such by acceptance of a village or city charter, and the involuntary quasi
corporations Known as counties, towns, school districts, and especially the townships of New England. Municipality of Catbalogan v Director of Lands (1910) Land that is absolutely required by a
Upon the question of the amount of damages sustained, we accept the findings of the lower court.
municipality for its formation, such as a lot meant for the construction of a courthouse, is considered
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
patrimonial property of the municipality and not of the national government.
Vilas v. City of Manila, 42 Phil 953 FACTS:
Facts: 1. The municipal president of Catbalogan, Samar applied to register a parcel of land with the
PriortotheincorporationoftheCity ofManilaundertheRepublicActNo.183, petitionerVilas is thecreditor oftheCity. Afterthe Court of Land Registration. The parcel was 666.60 square meters. The Catbalogan courthouse
incorporation,Vilas broughtan action torecoverthesumofmoneyowed to himby thecity.TheCityofManilathatincurredthedebtshas was built on the land.
changed itssovereignty afterthecessionofthePhilippines totheUSby theTreaty ofParis and itscontentionnow is foundedonthetheory 2. The Director of Lands opposed the registration because the land was property of the United
thatby virtueoftheActNo.183 its liability hasbeenextinguished. States and not property of Catbalogan.
3. The lower court ruled in favor of Catbalogan. The Director of Lands, represented by the
Issue: Whether ornotthechangeofthesovereigntyextinguishes theprevious liability oftheCity ofManilatoitscreditor Attorney- General, appealed to the Supreme Court.
Petitioners (Municipality of Catbalogan) arguments:
Held:
1. The parcel of land was acquired through possession and material occupation for several years
No.Themerechangeofsovereigntyofacountrydoes notnecessarily dissolvethemunicipalcorporationorganizedundertheformer
sovereign.ThenewCityofManilais in alegalsensethesuccessor oftheoldcity.Thusthenewcity is entitled toallpropertyandproperty 2. The parcel was being occupied by Catbalogan as a duly organized municipal corporation.
rights ofthepredecessorcorporationincluding its liabilities.Thecourtheldthat onlythegovernmentalfunctions thatarenotcompatible 3. The parcel should be its property by virtue of Chapter 6 of Act 926, since it
withthepresentsovereigntyaresuspended. BecausethenewCity ofManilaretainsitscharacter as thepredecessoroftheoldcity it isstill a. Possessed the land
liabletothecreditors oftheoldCity ofManila.
To quote: b. Enclosed it with a fence
'It isageneralruleofpubliclaw,recognizedandacteduponbytheUnitedStates, thatwhenever politicaljurisdictionandlegislativepower c. Cultivated it for many years (around 40 to 45 years)
over any territoryaretransferredfromonenationorsovereigntoanother, themunicipallaws ofthecountry,thatis, lawswhich
areintended fortheprotectionofprivaterights,continueinforceuntilabrogatedorchangedbythenewgovernmentorsovereign. Bythe d. Constructed a courthouse, an important municipal building, on it
cession, public propertypasses fromonegovernmenttotheother, butprivatepropertyremains as before, andwith it thosemunicipal
laws which aredesignedtosecureits peacefuluseand enjoyment.Asamatter ofcourse, alllaws, ordinances,andregulationsinconflict The municipal president of Catbalogan, Samar applied to register a parcel of land with the Court of Land
withthepoliticalcharacter, institutions,andconstitutionofthenewgovernment areat oncedisplaced.Thus, uponacessionofpolitical Registration. The parcel was 666.60 square meters. The Catbalogan courthouse was built on the
jurisdiction andlegislativepower-and thelatter is involved in theformer-totheUnitedStates,thelaws ofthecountry insupportofan land. The Director of Lands opposed the registration because the land was property of the United
established religion,orabridging thefreedomofthe[220 U.S.345,358]press,or authorizingcruelandunusualpunishments,and thelike, States and not property of Catbalogan.
would atonceceasetobeofobligatory forcewithoutany declarationtothateffect; andthelaws ofthecountry onothersubjectswould The lower court ruled in favor of Catbalogan. The Director of Lands, represented by the Attorney-
necessarily besupersededby existing lawsofthenewgovernmentuponthesamematters. But withrespecttoother laws affectingthe General, appealed to the Supreme Court.
possession,use,and transfer ofproperty, and designedtosecuregoodorder andpeacein thecommunity, and promoteitshealth and Respondents (Director of Lands) arguments:
prosperity,which arestrictly ofamunicipalcharacter,theruleisgeneral, thata changeofgovernmentleaves themin forceuntil,by direct 1. The land was not municipal property; it was property of the Insular Government. (i.e. the land was
action ofthenewgovernment, theyarealteredorrepealed.'Theabovelanguagewas quotedwithapprovalinDownes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
State property)
298,45S.L.ed.1088,1110,21Sup.Ct.Rep.770.
2. The evidence that Catbalogan presented was insufficient and did not satisfy its claims. within the plaza mayor of Catbalogan and cannot be considered a common area or a pasture.
The parcel of land is part of the municipal assets of Catbalogan. It is patrimonial property.
Issue/s: To whom does the parcel of land belong to, the municipality of Catbalogan or the Insular
Civil Law Basis
Government? Municipality of Catbalogan Held/Ratio: The parcel of land belongs to Catbalogan 1. That Catbalogan has possession and ownership of the parcel further weakens the Director of
because it is part of its patrimonial property. Historical Basis Lands position.
1. During the beginning of the Spanish occupation, the policy was to seek out a nucleus of inhabitants 2. According to pertinent laws, a municipal corporation such as Catbalogan may validly own land:
and establish pueblos, and later barrios, with the nucleus of inhabitants at the center. a. Article 343, Civil Code: property of provinces or towns is divided into property for
2. The administrative authority of a province, representing the Governor-general, had the authority to public use and patrimonial property
designate the territory of new pueblos. b. Article 344, Civil Code: property for public use in provinces and towns comprises
3. The Spanish officials tasked to colonize the Philippines observed the Laws of the Indies in layouting provincial and town roads, squares, streets, fountains, public waters,
new towns: promenades, and public works of general sercives supported by said towns or
a. Law 6, Title 5, Book 4: within the boundaries of a town, there must be at least 30 provinces. All other property is patrimonial
residents, and each resident must have a house c. Section 2 of the Municipal Code:
b. Law 7, Title 5, Book 4: whoever wishes to establish a new town of only 10-30 residents 3. (a) Pueblos incorporated under this Act shall be designated as municipalities (municipios), and
shall be granted the time and territory necessary for the purpose and under the shall be known respectively by the names heretofore adopted. Under such names they
same conditions may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with, acquire and hold real and personal
property for the general interest of the municipality, and exercise all the powers
c. Law 7, Title 7, book 4: manner of allotment of territory by the provincial government
hereinafter conferred upon them. (b) All property and property rights vested in any
i. Allotment of territory for the entire pueblo itself ii. Allotment of territory for public lands, pastures,
pueblo under its former organization shall continue to be vested in the same
common areas within the pueblo iii.The remaining area will be divided into 4 parts, 1 for the principal
financier of the pueblo, municipality after its incorporation under this Act.
and 3 for the rest of the settlers 4. Thus, based on these laws, municipalities like Catbalogan have the right to acquire real and personal
d. Law 8, Title 7, Book 4: casas reales (municipal buildings), the cabildo, the concejo, customs property.
buildings, and the like shall be constructed between the main square and the church 5. Catbalogan should be considered the owner of the parcel because
e. Law 14, Title 7, Book 4: viceroys have the authority to designate common lands, pastures, and a. upon its founding, it was given the land by the provincial government. It acquired
exclusive ownership of the parcel for the purposes of erecting a courthouse. The
public lands for those pueblos which have none (BUT THEY CANNOT DESIGNATE AREAS
MEANT FOR CHURCHES OR COURTHOUSES BECAUSE THAT AUTHORITY ONLY LIES WITH THE records of the case show no contrary proof.
b. It had been occupying the property far longer than the period required for extraordinary
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT)
prescription based on article 1959 of the Civil Code (occupation period: 40-45
f. Law 1, Title 13, Book 4: viceroys have the authority to designate to each villa and lugar additional
lands and lots which they may need, but the territory must not be detrimental to a third years)

party and they must send statements of the designations to the government c. The presumption that it had been holding the land as an owner had not been rebutted
4. The municipality of Catbalogan is the provincial seat of Samar. It is possibly the first and oldest pueblo Other Opinions of the Court
in the province. 1. Catbalogan is the owner regardless of the fact that a document representing the record of the
5. The inhabitants of a pueblo, being required to build decent and habitable municipal buildings by concession and award of the parcel was not presented because
paragraph 92 of the royal ordinances of February 26, 1768, may be assumed to have built it
a. As a very old municipality, it has undergone many changes in staff
on their own ground AFTER the provincial government had designated territory for it
b. While the original capitan pedaneo may have held the document, it would not be a
according to the Laws of the Indies.
surprise if through the course of his many successors, the document may
6. The land designated for a church and the land designated for a courthouse is considered property of
the municipality because no pueblo can exist administratively without having a church and a have been lost
courthouse which represents the seat of its local authority and municipal government. The c. It would actually be more of a surprise if the document still existed
area meant for a church or a courthouse is granted by the provincial government, following
2. Despite the lack of the document, Catbalogans peaceful occupation of the parcel is more than
the Laws of the Indies. Thus in this case, the parcel of land in question is patrimonial property
enough to represent its title.
of Catbalogan.
3. Inapplicable laws and jurisprudence:
7. The courthouse and the church of a pueblo were always built on opposite sides of the plaza mayor
(the main square). The plaza mayor was always within the inhabited area of the pueblo while a. Law 8, Title 3, Book 6 and Article 53 of the ordinances of good government
the common areas or pastures were not. In this case, the parcel of land in question is well
b. Royal decrees of February 28, 1883, August 1, 1883, and January 17, 1885 Departments, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive."
c. Doctrine of City of Manila v Insular Government: the parcel in this case is a building lot
Issue/s: WON the investigation conducted and the suspension imposed by the provincial board were
absolutely required by Catbalogan at the beginning of its organization; that valid and legal: NO.
case involved a common area Held/Ratio:
d. Doctrine of Aguado v City of Manila: Catbalogan, in the exercise of the right of Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution
ownership over its own property, has a legally recognized independent "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
personality of its own and is not a mere deligate of the central authority
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed."
LOCGOV - #4 Mondano v. Silvosa (1955) Doctrine: Local governments are only under the
supervision (not control) of the executive department. Investigations and any other actions to be taken The President has been invested with the power of control of all the
against any municipal official shall be made in conformity with the law. executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local governments over which he
Facts: has been granted only the power of general supervision. Section 79 (c) of the Revised

The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Administrative Code

Mainit, province of Surigao. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction, but he does not have the same
Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the Presidential
control of local governments as that exercised by him over bureaus and offices under his
Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter jurisdiction.
Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other His authority to order the investigation of any act or conduct of any person
than the conjugal dwelling. in the service of any bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices
The Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the provincial under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over which, as already
stated, the President exercises only general supervision. Paragraph 1, section 10, Article
governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report.
VII, of the Constitution
The petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his
summons.
The provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the "general supervision over all local governments"
petitioner from office. Petitioners arguments: Supervision v. Control
Supervision overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform
The petitioner prays for: their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
1. a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents from further proceeding prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control the power of an officer to alter or
with the hearing of the administrative case against him and modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
2. a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
Section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code
without legal effect.
Provincial supervision over municipal officials belongs to the provincial
Respondents arguments:
Section 79 (c)of the Revised Administrative Code governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
clothes the department head with "direct control, direction, and supervision over all bureaus and maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
offices under his jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may order the investigation of any act or conduct of
turpitude.
any person in the service of any bureau or office under his Department and in connection therewith may
appoint a committee or designate an official or person who shall conduct such investigations; . . ." if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the
Villena vs. Secretary of Interior matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either
upheld "the power of the Secretary of Interior to conduct at its own initiative investigation of charges personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
against local elective municipal officials and to suspend them preventively," on the board proposition municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the
"that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the officer in question."
departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary requested immediate
our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive investigation, appropriate action and report on the complaint indorsed to him, and called his attention
to section 2193 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for the institution of judicial
proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial governor. If the indorsement of the The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being
Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial governor to investigate the also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the
petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but the investigation to be conducted annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A
The charges preferred against the respondent are not malfeasances or any dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of
of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, o the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine
Rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to
do they constitute or involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other form of fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for
PAGCOR to fully attain this objective.
maladministration of office."
Yes, the charges may involve moral turpitude, but before the provincial Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to
governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under
the following declared policy -
Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by
the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. "Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in
[ GR No. 91649, May 14, 1991 ] order to attain the following objectives:
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS +
DECISION "(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one
274 Phil. 323 corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.

"(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming
PARAS, J.: pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including
A TV ad proudly announces: games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and
which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects,
"The new PAGCOR --- responding through responsible gaming." such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter - PD 1869, because it is allegedly recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist
contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because - attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct
"A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It government involvement." (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its
Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent
"B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly
"C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR - conducted remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other
and other vices; socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies,
and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present
"C. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989,
and toward free enterprise and privatization." (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo) PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and
12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward
3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo). "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for
running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the
(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that 'the transcendental importance to the public
(Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must
technicalities of procedure.' We have since then applied the exception in many other cases." (Association
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government."
(State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323). Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling
does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote
constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or
clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact
under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra). embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).

In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et. al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it
underscored the - could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
". . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of
constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as
negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323,
expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection, and is most aptly
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted." (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is
Spurbeck v.Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a
[1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of the winds of change.
SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board,
162 SCRA 521, 540) What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of
petitioners to file the instant petition. P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations
duty, under the 1987 Constituion, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have in one corporate entity - the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and
cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct
SCRA 371) intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be
minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
"With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before Us, We hold
that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes
danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local
strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the
to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges
constitutional questions raised. or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local."

"In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the "(2) Income and other taxes. - (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and
collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local
payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, government.
provincial or national government authority". (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons: "The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control
the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard the federal government." (MC Culloch v.Maryland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or
the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore "Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate
445). a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or
even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them." (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2,
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that p. 140, underscoring supplied)
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National polices thru extermination of what local
1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for
powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc
exemptions or even take back the power. Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity
which has the inherent power to wield it.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as
1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or (e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D.
permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus: 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:

"Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and "Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked. consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local government." (underscoring supplied)
"Section 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or
application and verification of the qualification of the applicant x x x." revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative
of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign
are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
also exercises regulatory powers, thus:
"Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
"Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. - The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the
exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign
Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a
limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (underscoring
capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the supplied)
Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation." As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units
remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power."
for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539). (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State
concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments. "Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed." (Art. XII, National Economy
"As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is and Patrimony)
generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. x x x In the absence of It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the
express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated
state laws are void." (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllian
Vol. 3 ibid, p. 548, underscorings supplied) On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of
"it legalized PAGCOR - conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo). and policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress
to clearly define and effectuate such principles.
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-
accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude "In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available
have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989). executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot" (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387;
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA
objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does 287). Therefore, for PD. 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for
same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this
Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge
clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D. 449) the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the
horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by presumption. The dismissal of his petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains
B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as
applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for
Congress to determine.
"If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are
other instances to which it might have been applied." (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521
-
"The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the
same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as "Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the
evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not
public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact." (Dominican overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they
Hotel v. Arizana, 249 US 2651). claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court
from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and
that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and
government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the
amendment. political departments of government: the President and the Congress."
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the
"The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on
life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control,
physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms
gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the of gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the
same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even better it will be for the nation.
sex. Facts:
Petitioner is seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter --
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because it constitutes a
waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila Cit
SO ORDERED. governments right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law. For the same reason,
the law has intruded into the local governments right to impose local taxes and license fees. This is in
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grino-Aquino, contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy.
Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in the result with Justice Padilla. Issue:
Padilla, J., see separate concurring opinion. Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1869 is valid.

Ruling:
1. The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Their
charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality cannot
assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been
CONCURRING IN THE RESULT passed upon by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax.

PADILLA, J.: The Charter of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal
corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which has the power to create and abolish municipal
I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire the Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it
activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political departments of can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should
do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. 2. The City of Manilas power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked by P.D. No. 771
and vested exclusively on the National Government. Therefore, only the National Government has the
The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or expediency of policies power to issue license or permits for the operation of gambling.
adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall within their authority, except
only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. 3. Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is
This case does not involve such a factual situation. government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, P.D. No. 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans the gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or
human personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's self-respect, which in the long run will instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be
corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or
wreck families and homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal subjected to control by a mere Local Government.
industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national development.
4. Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. No.
Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by 1869.
the government out of "legalized" gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated by the
irreparable damage to the people's moral values. Article 10, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution:
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes,
Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is fatally fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate. consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local government.
One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein
as gambling, which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the
activity known as prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by SC said this is a pointless argument. The power of the local government to impose taxes and fees is
law, franchised, and "regulated" by the government, in return for the substantial revenues it would yield always subject to limitations which Congress may provide by law. Besides, the principle of local
the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The
autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make local No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB
governments sovereign within the state. No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB
No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of
Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible
[G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996] under the circumstances attending the instant controversy.
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, SENATOR JOSE D. LINA, JR., MR. NICASIO B. BAUTISTA, MR. JESUS P. 7. ID.; ID.; FILING IN THE SENATE OF A SUBSTITUTE BILL IN ANTICIPATION OF ITS RECEIPT OF THE HOUSE
GONZAGA, MR. SOLOMON D. MAYLEM, LEONORA C. MEDINA, CASIANO S. BILL WITHOUT ACTING THEREON DOES NOT CONTRAVENE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT.
ALIPON, petitioners, vs. HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive - Petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading
Secretary, HON. RAFAEL ALUNAN, in his capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted
SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December
HON. JOSE MIRANDA, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Santiago and HON. CHARITO 17, 1993and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter,
MANUBAY, HON. VICTORINO MIRANDA, JR., HON. ARTEMIO ALVAREZ, HON. DANILO or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings
VERGARA, HON. PETER DE JESUS, HON. NELIA NATIVIDAD, HON. CELSO CALEON and HON. on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB
ABEL MUSNGI, in their capacity as SANGGUNIANG BAYAN MEMBERS, MR. RODRIGO L. No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in
SANTOS, in his capacity as Municipal Treasurer, and ATTY. ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, in his capacity the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not
as Municipal Administrator, respondents. contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
SYLLABUS House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERN-MENT CODE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT, CONSTRUED. - A local House bill.
Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed 8. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PRESUMPTIONS; EVERY LAW IS PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL;
of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one CONSTITUTIONALITY OF R.A. 7720 NOT OVERCOME IN CASE AT BAR. - It is a well-entrenched
sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
resources. clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other
2. ID.; ID.; INCOME; DEFINED. - Income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this
receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT (IRA) ARE ITEMS OF INCOME. - The IRAs are items of justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the
income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge
The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to
on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
can invariabley rely upon as the source of much needed funds.. HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
4. ID.; ID.; ANNUAL INCOME; DEFINED. - Department of Finance Order No. 35-93 correctly encapsulizes Of main concern to the petitioners is whether Republic Act No. 7720, just recently passed by
the full import of the above disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and Congress and signed by the President into law, is constitutionally infirm.
receipts realized by provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Indeed, in this Petition for Prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 Prohibitory Injunction, petitioners assail the validity of Republic Act No. 7720, entitled, An Act Converting
and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants, the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of
financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar others Santiago, mainly because the Act allegedly did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
5. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; ORDER CONSTITUTING EXECUTIVE OR CONTEMPORANEOUS mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
CONSTRUCTION OF A STATUTE BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CHARGED WITH THE TASK OF Also, petitioners claim that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual
INTERPRETING THE SAME, ENTITLED TO FULL RESPECT. - Such order, constituting executive or income required under Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 in order to be converted into a
contemporaneous construction of a statute by an administrative agency charged with the task of component city.
interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full respect and should be accorded great weight Undisputed is the following chronicle of the metamorphosis of House Bill No. 8817 into Republic
by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, Act No. 7720:
the governing statute, or other laws. On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; BILL CONVERTING MUNICIPALITY TO CITY MUST an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of
ORIGINATE FROM THE HOUSE; PASSING OF SUBSEQUENT BILL COVERING THE SAME Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. Other sponsors included
MUNICIPALITY, NO ADVERSE EFFECT. - Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, Representatives Ciriaco Alfelor, Rodolfo Albano, Santiago Respicio and Faustino Dy. The bill was referred
by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of to the House Committee on Local Government and the House Committee on Appropriations
petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives on May 5, 1993.
because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it On May 19, 1993, June 1, 1993, November 28, 1993, and December 1, 1993, public hearings on HB
cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. No. 8817 were conducted by the House Committee on Local Government. The committee submitted to
1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB the House a favorable report, with amendments, on December 9, 1993.
On December 13, 1993, HB No. 8817 was passed by the House of Representatives on Second It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have
Reading and was approved on Third Reading on December 17, 1993. On January 28, 1994, HB No. 8817 an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
was transmitted to the Senate. 1991 constant prices.1 Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance.2
Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, entitled, An Act Converting the Resolution of the controversy regarding compliance by the Municipality of Santiago with the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent] Component City to be Known as the City of Santiago, was aforecited income requirement hinges on a correlative and contextual explication of the meaning of
filed in the Senate. It was introduced by Senator Vicente Sotto III, as principal sponsor, on May 19, 1993. internal revenue allotments (IRAs) vis-a-vis the notion of income of a local government unit and the
This was just after the House of Representatives had conducted its first public hearing on HB No. 8817. principles of local autonomy and decentralization underlying the institutionalization and intensified
On February 23, 1994, or a little less than a month after HB No. 8817 was transmitted to the Senate, empowerment of the local government system.
the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. On March 1, 1994, A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and
the said committee submitted Committee Report No. 378 on HB No. 8817, with the recommendation that possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.3 Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of
it be approved without amendment, taking into consideration the reality that H.B. No. 8817 was on all one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio,4 the local government
fours with SB No. 1243. Senator Heherson T. Alvarez, one of the herein petitioners, indicated his approval unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and
thereto by signing said report as member of the Committee on Local Government. resources.5 Power which used to be highly centralized in Manila, is thereby deconcentrated, enabling
On March 3, 1994, Committee Report No. 378 was passed by the Senate on Second Reading and especially the peripheral local government units to develop not only at their own pace and discretion but
was approved on Third Reading on March 14, 1994. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, also with their oWn resources and assets.6
upon being apprised of the action of the Senate, approved the amendments proposed by the Senate. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly
The enrolled bill, submitted to the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a
on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No. 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail
majority of the registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city. more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local
The question as to the validity of Republic Act No. 7720 hinges on the following twin issues: (I) government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its
Whether or not the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) are to be included in the computation of the powers and effectively carry out its functions.7 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the
average annual income of a municipality for purposes of its conversion into an independent component vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue;
city, and (II) Whether or not, considering that the Senate passed SB No. 1243, its own version of HB No. (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue
8817, Republic Act No. 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives. allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and
I development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries.8.
The annual income of a local The funds generated from local taxes, IRAs and national wealth utilization proceeds accrue to the
government unit includes the IRAs general fund of the local government and are used to finance its operations subject to specified modes of
----------------------------------------------------------- spending the same as provided for in the Local Government Code and its implementing rules and
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual regulations. For instance, not less than twenty percent (20%) of the IRAs must be set aside for local
income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required development projects.9 As such, for purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the
annual income of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) for its conversion into a city, petitioners having estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national
computed Santiagos average annual income in the following manner: wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1991 P20,379,057.07 in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross
Total income (at 1991 constant prices) for 1992 P21,570,106.87 accretions of funds of the local government unit.10
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P41,949,163.94 The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local
Minus: government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
IRAs for 1991 and 1992 P15,730,043.00 further action on the part of the local government unit.11 They thus constitute income which the local
Total income for 1991 and 1992 P26,219,120.94 government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
Average Annual Income P13,109,960.47 For purposes of converting the Municipality of Santiago into a city, the Department of Finance
By dividing the total income of Santiago for calendar years 1991 and 1992, after deducting the IRAs, certified, among others, that the municipality had an average annual income of at least Twenty Million
the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. This, the Department of
Thus, petitioners claim that Santiagos income is far below the aforesaid Twenty Million Pesos average Finance did after including the IRAs in its computation of said average annual income.
annual income requirement. Furthermore, Section 450 (c) of the Local Government Code provides that the average annual
The certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance, income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and
which indicates Santiagos average annual income to be P20,974,581.97, is allegedly not accurate as the non-recurring income. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too,
Internal Revenue Allotments were not excluded from the computation. Petitioners asseverate that the to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its
IRAs are not actually income but transfers and! or budgetary aid from the national government and that own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or
they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government, its
In this regard, we hold that petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.12
Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. Thus, Department of Finance Order No. 359313 correctly encapsulizes the full import of the above
disquisition when it defined ANNUAL INCOME to be revenues and receipts realized by provinces, cities and
municipalities from regular sources of the Local General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the result are two bills on the same
other shares provided for in Sections 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but exclusive of non-recurring receipts, subject.
such as other national aids, grants, financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills
others (Italics ours).14 Such order, constituting executive or contemporaneous construction of a statute by authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the
an administrative agency charged with the task of interpreting and applying the same, is entitled to full House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts, unless such construction is clearly shown to House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
be in sharp conflict with the Constitution, the governing statute, or other laws.15 senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from the national
II perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
In the enactment of RA No. 7720, Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
there was compliance with Section 24, of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution House bill. x x x18
----------------------------------------------------------- III
Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional Every law, including RA No. 7720,
prescription,16 originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that Republic has in its favor the presumption
Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same of constitutionality
import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 --------------------------------------------------------------------
was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of
themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. constitutionality.19 Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear
1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the
question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.20 Those who petition this court to declare
culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration;
Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy. otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the
Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the
Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of
its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 this petition is, therefore, inevitable.
and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against petitioners.
23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, SO ORDERED.
the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on Facts:
the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago, was filed in the House of
that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate Representatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill No. 1243, was filed in the Senate.
does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. On March 22, 1994, the House of Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Senate,
We have already addressed this issue in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance.17 There, on approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
the matter of the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law, which, as a revenue bill, is nonetheless Issue:
constitutionally required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, we explained: Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senates own version of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be
x x x To begin with, it is not the law-but the revenue bill-which is required by the Constitution to said to have originated in the House of Representatives as required?
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. It is important to emphasize this, because a bill Held:
originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the
rewriting of the whole. x x x as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that claim of petitioners that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of
a revenue statute-and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable
enactment of the law-must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB
power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. It would be to violate the No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.
coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does
Senate. not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
xxx xxx xxx House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House
It is insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No. 11197 but of another bill.
Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the Senate did was merely to take [H. No. 11197] into Lidasan vs COMELEC (1967)
consideration in enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate preserving H. No. Sanchez, J. FACTS:
11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own version following the enacting clause (which, it The Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247, known as RA 4790, Sec1 of which provides:
would seem petitioners admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
Matimos and Magolatung, (21 in total) in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of Lanao and vice versa.
del Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent o Hume vs. Village of Fruitport: Very similar case, the title of the act is An act to Incorporate the Village
municipality of the same province to be known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del of Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon. It creates the impression that the law affects only the County
Sur. The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Togaig. of Muskegon when Sec 1 of the law included territories of both Muskegon and Ottawa Michigan. The law
Apparently, 12 of the said barrios are part of Municipalities in Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. was declared void.
Prompted by the coming elections, COMELEC adopted a resolution implementing RA 4790 for purposes 2. NO, the law is null and void in its entirety.
of establishment of precints, registration of voters and for other election purposes. We are not to assume that the Congress would still have intended to create a new town with only the 9
o In effect, 12 barrios in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur; thus, barrios, excluding the 12 as stated in the bill.
changing the boundaries in thee 2 provinces. Municipal Corporations perform twin functions:
The office of the President, through the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to COMELEC that o They serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of gvernment
the operation of the statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation. o They act as an agency of the community in the administration of local affairs It is in this character that
o COMELEC, however, issued another resolution declaring that the statute should be implemented they are a separate entity acting in their own purposes and not a subdivision of the State. Thus, several
unless declared unconstitutional by the SC. factors (population, territory and income) come to the fore in the consideration whether a group is
Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of a detached portion of Cotabato and a qualified voter, filed the capable of maintaining itself as an independent municipality.
original action for certiorari and prohibition praying that RA 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that The bill, having in view the 21 barrios, stated that the territory has become a progressive community;
the COMELEC resolutions be nullified. that the average population is large; and that the collective income is sufficient to maintain an
Petitioners Argument: independent municipality. Thus, it cannot be said that the Congress intended to create Dianaton with
Constitutional requirement violated: that no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than only 9 barrios instead of the 21.
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
LOCGOV - #9 Republic v City of Davao (2002)
o 2 subjects allegedly effected by RA 4790: Creation of the Municipality of Dianaton and the separation
Doctrine: The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political
of several barrios from Cotabato.
subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Therefore, LGUs are not excluded
o The title of the bill An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur
provides no implication of the effect of the law to the Province of Cotabato. from the coverage of PD 1586.
Respondents Argument: Facts:
That the change in the two boundaries of the 2 provinces resulting in the substantial diminution of
The City of Davao filed an application with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), for a
territorial limits of Cotabato province is merely the incidental results of the definition of the boundary of
the Municipality of Dianaton and that therefore, reference to the fact that portions of Cotabato are Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome. The
taken away need not be expressed in the title of the law. EMB Region XI denied the application, finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally
That in case RA 4790 is found erroneous, the law may still be salvaged with reference to the 9 barrios in critical area.
the municipalities of Lanao del Sur that the nullification shall take effect merely on the 12 portions taken - The City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact assessment process to secure an
away from Cotabato because the title of the law will anyway cover the 9 barrios actually in the province Environmental Compliance Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement
of Lanao del Sur. System) in relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine Environment Policy), before it can proceed with the
ISSUES: construction of its project.
4. Is RA 4790 unconstitutional? 3. Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC, alleging that 1.Its proposed
project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an environmentally critical
5. Can the law be salvaged as to the 9 barrios actually in the province of Lanao del Sur?
RULING: area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system. 2.It was the ministerial duty of the
1. YES, RA 4790 is unconstitutional. DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission
Compliance with the requirement [Art VI, Sec 21 (1), 1987 Consitution] that the title of the bill is to be
of the required documents.
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject there of, is imperative. The constitution does not exact of the Congress to 4. RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. 3.There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD
read the entire text of the bill, thus, the title must be stated in such a way as to sufficiently express the 1151 and Letter of Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA
subject of the statute. system), which requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities
o It does not require that the Congress employ such precision as to mirror even the minute details of the of the national government, including government owned or controlled corporations, as well
bill. It suffices if the title informs the legislators and persons interested of the nature, scope and as private corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. The test of sufficiency is whether or not the title is their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. An
misleading. LGU, not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed
In this case, not a slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are
incorporated in the new town in Lanao del Sur. It is not acceptable to say that the dismembering of the excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 4.The site for the
12 barrios is a necessary incident of the creation of a new town that it may be reasonable inferred from Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical area. Neither was the project
the title of the law. Change of boundaries may be made without necessarily creating a new municipality an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the DENR, through the
EMB Region XI, to approve respondents application for CNC after it has satisfied all the right to a balanced ecology. An LGU, like the City of Davao, can not claim exemption from the
requirements for its issuance. coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an LGU has
4. Petitioner filed MR, which was denied. Petitioner then filed the petition for review. the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD
5. Upon change of administration, respondent filed a manifestation expressing its agreement with 1586.
petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project. 5. Section 4 of PD 1586 states that no person, partnership or corporation shall undertake or operate
any such declared environmentally critical project or area without first securing an
6. While the petition has been rendered moot, the court decided to address the issue raised, for the
Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized
guidance of the implementors of the EIS law. Petitioners arguments:
representative. - The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state
g. Petitioner: Republic, represented by (1) DENR Secretary Alvarez, (2) DENR-Region XI Regional Exec
and its political subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons.
Director Baguilat, and (3) DENR-EMB-Region XI Regional Derector, Engr. Lipayon Undoubtedly therefore, local government units are not excluded from the coverage of PD
h. Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the RTC, which granted the writ of
1586. Environmentally Critical Area
mandamus and injunction in favor of the City of Davao The arguments, however, presuppose that a project is environmentally critical or within an
i. The proposed project was within an environmentally critical area. The City of Davao must undergo
environmentally critical area. Respondent has sufficiently shown that the Artica Sports
the environmental impact assessment process to secure an Environmental Compliance Dome will not have a significant negative environmental impact because it is not an
Certificate, pursuant to Sec2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement System) in environmentally critical project and it is not located in an environmentally critical area.
relation to Sec4 of PD 1151 (Philippine Environment Policy), before it can proceed with the The trial court found that the Artica Sports Dome is not within an environmentally critical area.
construction of its project Respondents arguments: Neither is it an environmentally critical project.
8. Respondent: City of Davao, represented by Mayor De Guzman The Environmental Impact Statement System, which ensures environmental protection and regulates
9. Arguments in the RTC: Its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within certain government activities affecting the environment, was established by Presidential
an environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system. Decree No. 1586.
10. It was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of Proclamation No. 2146 was later issued, proclaiming the areas and types of projects which are
regarded as environmentally critical and within the scope of the Environmental Impact
respondent upon submission of the required documents.
11. (RTC in favor of Respondent) There is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Statement System established under PD 1586.
The Artica Sports Dome in Langub is not among the projects or areas enumerated above. Neither is it
Instruction No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which
analogous to any of them. Therefore, the project is not classified as environmentally critical,
requires LGUs to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national or within an environmentally critical area. It is therefore the ministerial duty of the DENR to
government, including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private issue the Certificate of Non-Coverage.
corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for their
proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the environment. An LGU, San Juan v. Civil Service Commission (1991)
not being an agency or instrumentality of the National Government, is deemed excluded Doctrine: Following the principle of local autonomy, the DBM may only appoint a Provincial Budget
Officer from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Provincial Governor. If none are
under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Issue/s: W/N LGUs are
qualified among them, the DBM must explain to the Governor why no one met the legal requirements
required to comply with the EIS law (YES) W/N the site was within an environmentally and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications. Facts:
critical area (NO) Held/Ratio: Nature of LGUs Section 15 of the Local Government 6. - Following the vacancy of the position of Provincial Budget Officer (PBO) of
Code, defines a local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with the Province of Rizal, petitioner Rizal Governor Reynaldo San Juan wrote Director Abella of
DBM-Region IV, asking for his endorsement of the appointment of a certain Dalisay Santos as
powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law. - It performs dual functions,
PBO of Rizal. She had been acting as PBO for two (2) months.
governmental and proprietary.
7. - Not heeding the request, Director Abella instead recommended to the DBM
6. - Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and the
the appointment of private respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO, on the finding that she was
advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally. the most qualified (she was the only CPA among the nominees) following a comparative
7. - Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits study of all Municipal Budget Officers in Rizal.
or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. o DBM Undersecretary Cabaquit agreed, and signed her appointment papers as PBO of Rizal.
8. - When exercising governmental powers and performing governmental duties, 5. - Not knowing of the appointment, petitioner reiterated his request for the
an LGU is an agency of the national government. When engaged in corporate activities, it appointment of Dalisay Santos. To this DBM Regional Director Galvez replied that Santos and
acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs. petitioners other recommendees did not meet the minimum requirements under a Local
4. Section 16 of the Local Government Code provides for the duty of the LGUs to promote the peoples Budget Circular and required petitioner to submit at least three (3) other qualified nominees
for PBO. prescribed requirements. Issue/s:
6. - Petitioner finally learned of private respondents appointment and filed a - WoN the Department Head is free to appoint anyone in the event the persons recommended by the
letter-protest with the DBM. Governor are unqualified.
7. - The DBM Bureau of Legal and Legislative Affairs ruled that DBM validly Held/Ratio:
6. - NO. THE RECOMMENDATORY POWER OF THE GOVERNOR IS DIRECTORY, AND
exercised its prerogative in appointing private respondent as PBO since none of the THE DBM MAY NOT APPOINT PERSONS OTHER THAN THOSE RECOMMENDED BY GOVERNOR
petitioners nominees met the prescribed requirements, per Local Budget Circular No. 31. SHOULD THEY BE UNQUALIFIED.
The DBM Secretary denied petitioners MR. 7. - Constitutional policy of local autonomy
8. - Petitioner protested the appointment before the Civil Service Commission, o Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power and the other
which upheld private respondents appointment. beneficial to local autonomy, it must be interpreted in favor of autonomy. o The exercise by local
9. - Hence, this petition. Petitioners arguments: governments of meaningful power and the establishment of local
7. - Petitioner prays for the nullification of the CSC resolutions which upheld governments which manage their own affairs to the fullest extent possible with the least degree of
th
private respondents appointment as PBO of Rizal supervision has been a national goal since the beginning of the 20 century as can be gleaned from
8. - As Governor, petitioner has the sole right and privilege to recommend the constitutional provisions and legislation.
nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only from his 1987 Const., Art. II, Sec. 25. The state shall ensure the autonomy of local
nominees. governments.
9. - Before the promulgation of EO 112, BP 337 (the old Local Government Code) 1987 Const., Art. X, Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
vested upon the governor the power to appoint the PBO. As such, petitioner assumes that local autonomy.
the intent behind the grant of recommendatory powers in EO 112 with regard to o Executive intervention in local government affairs is limited to supervision which goes no further
appointments of PBOs is to make his recommendation part and parcel of the appointment than overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
process. duties, and taking actions to make them perform their duties should they fail or neglect to do the same.
10. - Further, in light of the state policy of local autonomy, his recommendatory (Tecson v. Salas)
power should be given mandatory application. Such power cannot be validly defeated by a 3. - Interpreting the recommendatory power of the Governor as purely directory
mere DBM administrative issuance reserving upon itself the right to fill-up vacancies in case goes against the spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy, and ignores the
the governors nominees do not meet DBM requirements. right of local governments to develop self- reliance and resoluteness in the management of
their own funds.
11. - E.O. 112, Section 1: All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities
4. - As such, Local Budget Circular No. 31, Sec. 6.0 is ultra vires and must be set
shall be appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon
aside. The DBM may only appoint A PBO from the list of qualified recommendees nominated
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and
by the Provincial Governor. If none are qualified among them, the DBM must explain to the
regulations and they shall be placed under the administrative control and technical
Governor why no one met the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have
supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management. Respondents arguments:
the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
j. - Respondent argues that in the event the local chief executives recommendees
5. - The judicial appointment process may be look at by way of analogy. A
do not meet the qualifications for the position of PBO, it may validly exercise its prerogative
president, in appointing justices and judges, cannot apply the procedure advanced by the
to fill-in such position. In doing so, it should not be restricted to the list of recommendees in
DBM by rejecting all JBC nominees and appoint another person whom she feels is better
the final selection of the appointee, and may consider other nominees for the position. qualified. There can be no reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the
k. - The recommendation of the local chief executive is thus merely directory, and appointing powers personal choice.
not a condition sine qua non to the exercise of the DBM of its appointing prerogative.
Pimentel v. Aguirre (2000)
Doctrine: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local
9. - It must be considered that the PBO is a nationalized position under the control government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their
and supervision of the DBM Secretary, and appointees are primarily the choice of the tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving
national appointing official. This is necessary to preserve and maintain the independence of economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources
said officer from the LGU. to achieve their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus,
the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by
10. - Local Budget Circular No. 31, Sec. 6.0 The DBM reserves the right to fill up administrative fiat.
any existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the Facts:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking: officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or
To annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
To enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a
of the former for that of the latter.
portion of their internal revenue allotments. The Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local
On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. The pertinent provisions are governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
as follows: SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so
universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local long as they act within the scope of their authority.
governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total iii. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior
expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non- body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"we said.
personal services items... SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the iv.Drilon v. Lim:. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not
withheld.
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
On December 10, 1998, Pres. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see
LGUs. to it that the rules are followed.
Petitioners Arguments: Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of
exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of
power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and
further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section decisions changed, suspended or reversed.In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by
286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for thea the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly
utomatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so
Respondents Arguments: The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the
that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does b. Extent of Local Autonomy: Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power
not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to identify measures that over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the Ganzon v. Court of Appeals: local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is
of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments
pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging not to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
fiscal situation." government units ." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for
the purpose of enhancing self-government
Issue/s: WON whether Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local
25 percent and Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide.
allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
(NO) relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative
powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make
Held/Ratio: governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and
a. Scope of Presidents Power of Supervision over LGUs social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected
one of general supervision. It reads as follows: "Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the
exercise general supervision over local governments. " entire country still lies in the President and Congress
c. Fiscal Autonomy of LGUs
This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the
Supervision and control are different: exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well.
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region
priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation
work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous regions.
imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or
not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NATURE THEREOF. After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No.
from both local and national officials, who in any case are partners in 220, we find that it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing
ones into a larger subdivision. 1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial
Sec. 1 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis. However, Section 4 of AO 372
cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the and political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces,
cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of
Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made
directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was
created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in
not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for
the covered areas. 2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the
whatever purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a
President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further
compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative. the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, may be considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National
Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create
the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well- intentioned in under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government
issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives
intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative
laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the
[G.R. No. 79956. January 29, 1990.] economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise,
the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent. council.

[G.R. No. 82217. January 29, 1990.] 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE THEREOF. The CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that
would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap
LILIA YARANON and BONA BAUTISTA, assisted by their spouses, BRAULIO D. RAYANON and in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions
DEMETRIO D. BAUTISTA, JR., respectively;JAMES BRETT and SINAI C. HAMADA, Petitioner, already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with
v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, Executive Secretary, HON. political autonomy.
GUILLERMO N. CARAGUE, Secretary of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA S.
CAJUCOM, OIC National Treasurer, Respondent. 5. ID.; ID.; AS DISTINGUISHED FROM CONCEPT OF LOCAL AUTONOMY. The constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization
SYLLABUS of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1].
Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the
1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee under the 1935
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE BODY; STATUTES PRESUMED CONSTITUTIONAL. It is well- Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the
settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march towards further
prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of enlargement of local autonomy in the country. On the other hand, the creation of
separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987
constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of Constitution, contemplates the grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger. autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an autonomous
Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge. regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a
legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; AUTONOMOUS REGIONS; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 220 each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
(CORDILLERA ADMINISTRATIVE REGION); NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION. A
reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the consolidation GUTIERREZ, JR., J, concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 220; CREATED MERELY A "DE FACTO" consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
OFFICE. I have grave doubts about the authority of the President to create such an office elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise
as the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by mere executive fiat. The office has to be provide for special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction consistent with
created by statute. To me, the functions of CAR go beyond ordinary planning and the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
preparation for the real office. In fact, Congress had to pass Republic Act 6658 for this
purpose. CAR was an agency which accelerated economic and social growth in the The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
Cordilleras, coordinated the implementation of programs, accepted projects and activities in votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
the Cordilleras, and discharged basic administrative functions. It was a de facto agency provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in
whose acts are valid but not a de jure or fully valid creation. the autonomous region.

2. ID.; ID.; SUPERSEDED BY REPUBLIC ACTS NO. 6658 AND NO. 6766. By the enactments of Sec. 19. The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from
Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766, the questioned Executive Order No. 220 has been the time of organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in
superseded. The basic issues have become moot and academic. The Cordillera Regional Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Consultative Commission and the Cordillera Autonomous Region have taken over the
functions of the Cordillera Administrative Region. The latter office has become functus oficio. Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers
over:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
DECISION
(1) Administrative organization;

CORTES, J.: (2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;


In these consolidated petitions, the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 220, dated July
15, 1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region, is assailed on the primary (4) Personal, family and property relations;
ground that it pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation
of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras conditional on the approval of the act through a (5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
plebiscite.
(6) Economic, social and tourism development;
Relative to the creation of autonomous regions, the Constitution, in Article X,
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library (7) Educational policies;

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the (9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing of the people of the region.
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.chanrobles the local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in
lawlibrary : rednad accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SEC. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed. A study of E.O. No. 220 would be incomplete without reference to its historical background.

Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law In April 1986, just after the EDSA Revolution, Fr. Conrado M. Balweg, S.V.D., broke off on
to the autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government. ideological grounds from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm
the New Peoples Army (NPA).
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the
assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of After President Aquino was installed into office by People Power, she advocated a policy of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral national reconciliation. She called on all revolutionary forces to a peace dialogue. The CPLA
bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure of government for the region heeded this call of the President. After the preliminary negotiations, President Aquino and
some members of her Cabinet flew to Mt. Data in the Mountain Province on September 13, administrative structure in the Cordilleras to suit it to the existing political realities therein
1986 and signed with Fr. Conrado M. Balweg (As Commander of the CPLA) and Ama Mario and the Governments legitimate concerns in the areas, without attempting to pre-empt the
Yag-ao (as President of Cordillera Bodong Administration, the civil government of the CPLA) a constitutional duty of the first Congress to undertake the creation of an autonomous region
ceasefire agreement that signified the cessation of hostilities (WHEREAS No. 7, E.O. on a permanent basis.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
220).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an
The parties arrived at an agreement in principle: the Cordillera people shall not undertake Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The
their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as political Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
negotiations. The negotiations shall be a continuing process until the demands of the transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
Cordillera people shall have been substantially granted. library

On March 27, 1987, Ambassador Pelaez [Acting as Chief Negotiator of the government], in SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Regional Assembly, as well as all offices
pursuance of the September 13, 1986 agreement, flew to the Mansion House, Baguio City, and agencies created under Executive Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately upon
and signed with Fr. Balweg (as Chairman of the Cordillera panel) a joint agreement, the ratification of this Organic Act.
paragraphs 2 and 3 of which state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional
Par. 2 Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that Assembly shall automatically be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous Government.
could perform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and I
studies leading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.

Par. 3 Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that respect for the inherent and stated powers and
Panel in drafting the Executive Order. prerogatives of the law-making body, as well as faithful adherence to the principle of
separation of powers, require that its enactment be accorded the presumption of
Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine constitutionality. Thus, in any challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the burden of
government and of the representatives of the Cordillera people. clearly and unequivocally proving its unconstitutionality always rests upon the challenger.
Conversely, failure to so prove will necessarily defeat the challenge.chanrobles law library
On July 15, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed the joint draft into law, known now as
E.O. 220. [Rejoinder, G.R. No. 82217, pp. 2-3]. We shall be guided by these principles in considering these consolidated petitions.

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative powers In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing E.O. No. 220 the President, in the
under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region exercise of her legislative powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the 1987
(CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an
Province and the City of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate economic and organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras. We have carefully studied
social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Constitution and E.O. No. 220 and we have come to the conclusion that petitioners
the Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of assertions are unfounded. Events subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220 also bear out
programs and services in the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government this conclusion.
units as well as with the executive departments of the National Government in the
supervision of field offices and in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects 1. A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it actually envisions is the
and activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies
national and local government projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step
Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous
as an implementing arm [secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive Board region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in
shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In
organized [sec. 17]. short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions, as we shall show later.
Explaining the rationale for the issuance of E.O. No. 220, its last "Whereas" clause
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in
the Cordilleras. A regional consultative commission shall first be created. The President shall
WHEREAS, pending the convening of the first Congress and the enactment of the organic act then appoint the members of a regional consultative commission from a list of nominees
for a Cordillera autonomous region, there is an urgent need, in the interest of national from multisectoral bodies. The commission shall assist the Congress in preparing the organic
security and public order, for the President to reorganize immediately the existing act for the autonomous region. The organic act shall be passed by the first Congress under
the 1987 Constitution within eighteen months from the time of its organization and enacted which was signed into law on October 23, 1989. A plebiscite for the approval of the organic
into law. Thereafter there shall be held a plebiscite for the approval of the organic act [Art. X, act, to be conducted shortly, shall complete the process outlined in the Constitution.
sec. 18]. Only then, after its approval in the plebiscite, shall the autonomous region be
created. In the meantime, E.O. No. 220 had been in force and effect for more than two years and we
find that, despite E.O. No. 220, the autonomous region in the Cordilleras is still to be created,
Undoubtedly, all of these will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative showing the lack of basis of petitioners assertion. Events have shown that petitioners fear
powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures that E.O. No. 220 was a "shortcut" for the creation of the autonomous region in the
to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not Cordilleras was totally unfounded.
yet been passed and the autonomous region created. These measures we find in E.O. No.
220. The steps taken by the President are obviously perceived by petitioners, particularly Clearly, petitioners principal challenge has failed.
petitioner Yaranon who views E.O. No. 220 as capitulation to the Cordillera Peoples II
Liberation Army (CPLA) of Balweg, as unsound, but the Court cannot inquire into the wisdom
of the measures taken by the President. We can only inquire into whether or not the
measures violate the Constitution. But as we have seen earlier, they do A collateral issue raised by petitioners is the nature of the CAR: whether or not it is a
not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary territorial and political subdivision.

2. Moreover, the transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean that it is, as The Constitution provides in Article X:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the interim autonomous region in the
Cordilleras" [Petition, G.R. No. 79956, p. 25]. Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family x x x
and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a guide, we find that E.O. No. 220
did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a
specified area, for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
it created a representative assembly, to convene yearly only for a five-day regular session, established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
tasked with, among others, identifying priority projects and development programs [sec. 9]. cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the
Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong We have seen earlier that the CAR is not the autonomous region in the Cordilleras
Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular contemplated by the Constitution. Thus, we now address petitioners assertion that E.O. No.
members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as 220 contravenes the Constitution by creating a new territorial and political
ex-officio members and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11]. The bodies subdivision.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are
they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an After carefully considering the provisions of E.O. No. 220, we find that it did not create a new
"umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.
Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a
concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red 1. Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does
not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither
The creation of the CAR for purposes of administrative coordination is underscored by the is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power
mandate of E.O. No. 220 for the President and appropriate national departments and to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own
agencies to make available sources of funds for priority development programs and projects sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the
recommended by the CAR [sec. 21] and the power given to the President to call upon the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.
appropriate executive departments and agencies of the National Government to assist the
CAR [sec. 24]. The creation of administrative regions for the purpose of expediting the delivery of services
is nothing new. The Integrated Reorganization Plan of 1972, which was made as part of the
3. Subsequent to the issuance of E.O. No. 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted law of the land by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1, established eleven (11) regions, later
Republic Act No. 6658 which created the Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission. The increased to twelve (12), with definite regional centers and required departments and
President then appointed its members. The commission prepared a draft organic act which agencies of the Executive Branch of the National Government to set up field offices therein.
became the basis for the deliberations of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The The functions of the regional offices to be established pursuant to the Reorganization Plan
result was Republic Act No. 6766, the organic act for the Cordillera autonomous region, are: (1) to implement laws, policies, plans, programs, rules and regulations of the
department or agency in the regional areas; (2) to provide economical, efficient and effective
service to the people in the area; (3) to coordinate with regional offices of other As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare
departments, bureaus and agencies in the area; (4) to coordinate with local government the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process
units in the area; and (5) to perform such other functions as may be provided by law. [See of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying
Part II, chap. III, art. I, of the Reorganization Plan]. local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
We can readily see that the CAR is in the same genre as the administrative regions created
under the Reorganization Plan, albeit under E.O. No. 220 the operation of the CAR requires Anent petitioners objection, we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the
the participation not only of the line departments and agencies of the National Government CAR has actually diminished the local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot
but also the local governments, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations be over-emphasized that pure speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to
in bringing about the desired objectives and the appropriation of funds solely for that cause the invalidation of E.O. No. 220.
purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
2. Then, considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and
the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable SO ORDERED.
participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be
considered more than anything else as a regional coordinating agency of the National Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Government, similar to the regional development councils which the President may create Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government Separate Opinions
officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives
from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative
decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise,
the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development I concur in the result because with the enactments of Republic Acts No. 6658 and No. 6766,
council.chanrobles law library : red the questioned Executive Order No. 220 has been superseded. The basic issues have become
III moot and academic. The Cordillera Regional Consultative Commission and the Cordillera
Autonomous Region have taken over the functions of the Cordillera Administrative Region.
The latter office has become functus oficio. Moreover, there can be no question about the
Finally, petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the validity of its acts because if it is not de jure, at the very least it is a de facto office.chanrobles
constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, law library
Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR.
I make these observations because I have grave doubts about the authority of the President
We find first a need to clear up petitioners apparent misconception of the concept of local to create such an office as the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) by mere executive fiat.
autonomy. The office has to be created by statute. To me, the functions of CAR go beyond ordinary
planning and preparation for the real office. In fact, Congress had to pass Republic Act 6658
It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution for this purpose. CAR was an agency which accelerated economic and social growth in the
[Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in Cordilleras, coordinated the implementation of programs, accepted projects and activities in
more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, the Cordilleras, and discharged basic administrative functions. It was a de facto agency
G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 whose acts are valid but not a de jure or fully valid creation.
Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II, sec. 10]. And while
there was no express guarantee under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local [ GR No. 80391, Feb 28, 1989 ]
Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act (R.A. No. 5185), which ushered SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA v. CONTE MANGELIN +
the irreversible march towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the country DECISION
[Villegas v. Subido, supra.] 252 Phil. 813

On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political SARMIENTO, J.:
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an as follows:
executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18]. 1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the
Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. 6. Ortiz, Jesus
7. Palomares, Diego
2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). 9. Tomawis, Acmad
10. Tomawis, Jerry
3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the
Tomawis and Rakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in
respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.
del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions
as members of the Assembly. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen
present:
4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim
Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, 1. Mangelen Conte -- Presiding Officer
Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter 2. Ali Salic
which reads: 3. Ali Salindatu
4. Aratuc, Malik
The Committee on Muslim Affairs will undertake Consultations and dialogues with local government 5. Cajelo, Rene
officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and present political 6. Conding Pilipinas (sic)
developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII.
7. Dagalangit, Rakal
The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous
governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the 8. Dela Fuente, Antonio
Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission. 9. Ortiz, Jesus
10. Palamares, Diego
You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on 11. Quijano, Jesus
November 1 to 15, 1987; with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. 12. Sinsuat, Bimbo
13. Tomawis, Acmad
Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable. 14. Tomawis, Jerry
5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao
of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads:
the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook x x x." HON. DALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues
who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers 'in order for
6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But
members of the Assembly the following telegram: before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker ProTempore as the Presiding Officer and
Mr. Johnny Evangelista as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in
TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER today's session.
LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions.
AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WIRE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO
SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? The Chair hears none
PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS and the said motions are approved. x x x.
UNQUOTE REGARDS.
7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one
following assemblymen present: abstained and none voted against.[1]

1. Sali, Salic Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows:


2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic)
3. Dagalangit, Rakil WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that -
4. Dela Fuente, Antonio
5. Mangelen, Conte (a) This Petition be given due course;
and corruption before his colleagues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity
(b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that
respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day cannot warrant expulsion.
thereafter;
In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other
(c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be obduracy on the part of
on November 2, 1987 as null and void; the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the
Supreme Court ... on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly --
(d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, an act which some members claimed unnecesarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as
Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting; and representative of the people,"[13] an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial
remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution,[14] and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious
(e) Making the injunction permanent. prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts.

Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable.[2] We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed
warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper
Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is
Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPELLING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are
SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK, AUTONOMOUS REGION XII,"[3] on the grounds, among other things, that the nonetheless subject to the moderating hand of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised
petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of with grave abuse.
Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for
the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections ... and nothing in the record of the It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous", the courts
Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made ..."[4] and that "such may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the
action of Mr. Limbona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted,
Assembly ... constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly,"[5] that the petitioner "had recently subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government
caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the given to the two autonomous governments of Regions IX and XII?
salaries and emoluments of some Assembly (sic) ,"[6] and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme
Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree
confines of the Assembly,"[7] for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot No. 1618[15] promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal
and academic".[8] autonomy"[16] in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,"[17] "with legislative and executive
The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities"[18] specified therein.
made the case moot and academic.
It required the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for
We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion the respective regions,"[19] except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of
resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot the National Government,"[20] "which include, but are not limited to, the following:
and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic.
(1) National defense and security;
On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is (2) Foreign relations;
of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an (3) Foreign trade;
investigation and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was (4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing;
an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the (5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources;
records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to (6) Air and sea transport;
this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook."[9] To be sure, the private (7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato (8) Customs and quarantine;
City,"[10] but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled."[11] Certainly, that (9) Immigration and deportation;
avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be, cannot be a (10) Citizenship and naturalization;
substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. (11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing."[21]
While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general
require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard,[12] it does not appear supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions xxx."[22]
herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the
decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,
political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over
governments "more responsive and accountable",[23] and "ensure their fullest development as self- Autonomous Regions."[33] In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:
social progress."[24] At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. - The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative
supervision"[25] over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in
law."[26] He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his the following areas:
own.[27]
(1) Organization of regional administrative system;
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in favor of local
government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart (2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region;
its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation", since in that event, the (3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region;
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.[28]
(4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region;
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a (5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region;
question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted
prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy (6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree;
now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the
proper case. (7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region;

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus: (8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs
and facilities;
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the (9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.[29] Autonomous Region; and

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.[30] (10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law, including the enactment of such measures as may
be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region.

xxx xxx xxx The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the
Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree,
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras national legislation, policies, plans and programs.
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.[34]
the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.[31] Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in
question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15]
is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the
limits of "autonomy". On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the
noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was
Department of Local Government).[32] If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of
in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that quorum.
the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that
under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook,"[35] but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on
[sic] his discretion, declare a recess of short intervals."[36] Of course, there is disagreement between the case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have
protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the
1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution.
insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules
only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions.
out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity."[37] The Court agrees with the respondents on What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII?
this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals". Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that
the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is
1, the date session opens under the same Rules.[38] Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to
possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess", it was not a governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government
settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered
intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in
themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.
It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to
forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec.
us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects
and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we
In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the
as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in
the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that
the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof. the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of
Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they
lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that the petitioner should were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618,
initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control
them.[39] over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity
of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum.
This case involves the application of a most
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is
ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear
REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs. mandate on local autonomy.

SO ORDERED. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the
other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.
Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or
Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that
Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned
petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the
government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called
the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the
house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a
defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead,
Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the
expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a
circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of direct supervision of the Department of the Interior, so should Carmona, Cavite.
good faith.
13. Respondent cited Villena v. Roque, where the Presidents power of supervision was invoked to cause
MONDANO V. SILVOSA SUPRA charges to be filed against Mayor Villena.

Bernardo Hebron v. Eulalio Reyes (1958) Issue: W/N a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be
Facts: removed or suspended directly by the President of the Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth
8. In the general elections of 1951, Bernardo Hebron (petitioner), Liberal Party member was elected in sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code.
mayor, and Eulalio Reyes, Nacionalista Party member, was elected vice mayor of the municipality of
Held/Ratio:
Carmona, Cavite. (Term was then for 4 years).
1. The Presidents power to remove or suspend local elective officers is controlled by certain provisions
9. In May 22 or 24, 1954, Mayor Hebron received a communication from the Office of the President
of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC)
that he will be investigated for administrative charges against him for alleged oppression, grave abuse of
a. Lacson v. Roque President has no inherent power to remove or suspend local elective officers. Such
authority and serious misconduct in office, and suspending him from office until the termination of the
removal and suspension are always controlled by the particular law applicable and its proper
administrative proceedings against him. The vice mayor was made to assume the office of acting mayor. construction subject to constitutional limitation. The president is not empowered by any law nor by the
10. Mayor Hebron filed an action for quo warranto alleging that Reyes was illegally holding the office of
constitution with sweeping authority to remove municipal officials.
mayor of Carmona since no decision from the Office of the President seemed to be forthcoming despite
i. Const. 1935, Art. 7, Sec. 10, par. 1: Presidents exercise of general supervision over all local
the termination of the hearings on the said charges against Hebron and because of the fact that his term governments does not contemplate control. Also, the said supervisory authority is qualified by the
was about to expire yet he remained suspended. proviso as may be provided by law, meaning that the provision requires legislative implementation
Respondents Arguments: (i.e., is not self-executing).
10. Respondent argues that the President has control over the administration of political subdivisions, ii. Revised Administrative Code, Sec. 64 (b) states that the power to remove should conform to law (i.e.,
such as municipalities by citing Sec. 79 (C ) of the RAC, which gives the department head direct control for any of the causes and in the manner prescribed by law and procedure) . Such causes are in Sections
over all offices under his jurisdiction and may repeal or modify the decisions of the chief of said bureaus 1
2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC).
or offices when advisable in the public interest, AND Sec. 86 of the said Code gives the Department of
iii.Villena v. Roque, on Sec. 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC): Sections 2188 to 2190 of the
the Interior executive supervision over the administration of provinces, municipalities, chartered cities,
Revised Administrative Code must govern investigations against and suspensions of municipal officials,
and other local political subdivisions. designed precisely to curb the ordering of indefinite temporary suspension of municipal officials
11. The President has an unqualified authority to order an investigation of any action or conduct of any l. Laws governing the suspension or removal of public officers must be strictly construed in their favor.
person in the government services, per Sec. 64 (c) of the RAC. Also, the procedure for suspension of an officer, when specified by law, is deemed
12. The president has the power to remove officials conformably to law from office and to declare vacant mandatory and must be strictly complied with.
the offices held by such removed officials, and for disloyalty, the president may remove a person at any m. The language of Sections 2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code frowns upon prolonged
time from any position of trust or authority in the government, per par. b of Sec. 64.
or indefinite suspension of local elective officials.
13. Under the Jones Law, the governor general had both control and supervision over all local
12. RAC 2188 policy mandates speedy termination of a case decreeing suspension in the interest of
governments and as successor to the governor general, the President likewise has both control and
the public (i.e., determination of guilt or innocence of the official w/in the shortest time
supervision over the local governments.
possible). Consequently, this requires special proceedings alone plus the right of appeal,
14. Authority of the president over the municipal corporations is not identical to that of state governors
in the US because the president is executive, with more comprehensive powers, than those of the without technicalities of pleading, practice and procedure.
governors who are merely chief executives 13. In this case, Hebron was suspended in May 1954, the records of the investigation was forwarded to
the Executive Secretary in July 1954, but the decision has not been rendered on May 31,
15. Municipal corporations in the U.S. have the power of local self-government not given to our own
1955 (when the complaint was filed) or before the expiration of Hebrons term (December
political subdivisions and as such, our political subdivisions only have autonomy if granted by
31, 1955). Hebrons indefinite suspension was not in accordance with the provisions of the
the central government, such autonomy being subject to government control.
RAC.
16. The limitation imposed on the President (i.e., non interference in purely corporate affairs of the local
2. [On Respondent Argument 1] The president has control over all executive departments, bureaus and
governments) by the general supervision granted it does not apply to the said governments political
offices but not of all local local governments. As stated in RAC Sec. 79 C, the head of the Department of
affairs. Basis: Art. I, Sec. 2, RAC, stating that The Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a term
the Interior has direct control and supervision over all executive bureaus and offices but does not have
which refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are
the same control over local governments. governments, over which he only has supervision.
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the
a. Mondano v. Silvosa Const. 1935, Art. 7, Sec. 10, par. 1, gives the president control over all executive
various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to
departments, bureaus or offices but only the exercise of general supervision over all
the central Government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of local government.
1
12. Respondent cited the case of Planas v. Gil to show that if the City of Manila was placed under the SEC. 2188. Supervisory authority of provincial governor over municipal officers. The provincial
governor shall receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal necessitating only the taking of actions to make them perform their duties) and control
officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and (power to alter or modify or set aside the action of a subordinate officer and to substitute
conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral turpitude. For minor delinquency, he may ones judgment for the latters).
reprimand the offender; and if a more severe punishment seems to be desirable, he shall submit written
12. Sec. 79 (C) of the RAC and Sec. 37 of Act 4007 shows that Congress lodged the provincial supervision
charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused
over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to investigate
either personally or by registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the
complaints against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption,
municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official
maladministration of office and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
integrity of the officer in question. Where suspension is thus effected the written charges against the
turpitude. Sec. 86 of the RAC does not add to the power of supervision of the head of the
officer shall be filed with the board within five days.
SEC. 2189. Trial of municipal officer by provincial board. When written charges are preferred by a department of the interior over the administration of municipalities.
provincial governor against a municipal officer, the provincial board shall, at its next meeting, regular or 13. Gabriel v. Govt of Pampanga President cannot even disapprove any ordinance or resolution of
special, set a day, hour, and place for the trial of the same and notify the respondent thereof; and at the provincial boards (except when the same is illegal). The SC used it to reason that if he cannot
to and place appointed, the board shall proceed to hear and investigate the truth or falsity of said even disapprove ordinances of provincial boards, then moreso can he not substitute his
charges, giving the accused official full opportunity to be heard in his defense. The hearing shall occur as judgment in lieu of the judgment of municipal councils or provincial boards.
soon as may be practicable, and in case suspension has been effected, not later than ten days from the 14. THUS, the word offices used in Sec. 79 (C ), over which the President has control, cannot be
date the accused is furnished or has sent to him a copy of the charges, unless the suspended official
deemed to include local governments.
shall, on sufficient grounds, request an extension of time to prepare his defense.
The preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than thirty days. At the expiration 8. [On Respondents Argument 2] Despite what seems to be an unqualified grant of authority to
of the thirty days, the suspended officer shall be reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation investigate officials of the government, Sec. 64 (c) of the RAC cannot be construed literally
of the proceedings against him until their completion, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due w/o violating the constitution, as the president does not have an unqualified power to
to the fault, neglect, or request of the accused, in which case the time of the delay shall not be counted investigate officials of co-equal branches of government. The Presidents power to
in computing the time of the suspension: Provided, That the suspension of the accused may continue investigate is only in addition to his general supervisory authority and as such, its application
after the expiration of the thirty days above mentioned in case of conviction until the Secretary of the to municipal corporations would violate the constitutional provision restricting the authority
Interior shall otherwise direct or the case shall finally be decided by said Secretary. of the president over local governments to general supervision
SEC. 2190. Action by provincial board. If, upon due consideration, the provincial board shall adjudge 9. [On Respondent Argument 3] Power of removal of the president must be exercised conformably to
that the charges are not sustained, the proceedings shall be dismissed; if it shall adjudge that the law (i.e., based on RAC 2188 to 2191)
accused has been guilty of misconduct which would be sufficiently punished by reprimand or further
a. Lacson v. Roque: President does not have the inherent power to remove or suspend
reprimand, it shall direct the provincial governor to deliver such reprimand in pursuance of its judgment;
and in either case the official, if suspended, shall be reinstated. municipal officers, for removal and suspension of public officers are always
If in the opinion of the board the case is one requiring more severe discipline, and in case of appeal, it controlled by the particular law applicable and its construction is subject to
shall without unnecessary delay forward to the Secretary of the Interior, within eight days after the date
of the decision of the provincial board, certified copies of the record in the case, including the charges, constitutional limitations.
the evidence, and the findings of the board, to which shall be added the recommendation of the board b. Alejandrino v. Quezon: Power of removal does not imply the authority to suspend for a
as to whether the official ought to be suspended, further suspended, or finally dismissed from office; and substantial period of time (e.g., 1 year). The SC used this to buttress its point
in such case the board may exercise its direction to reinstate the official, if suspended. that Hebrons suspension for more than 1 year and 7 mos. as beyond what is
The trial of a suspended municipal official and the proceedings incident thereto shall be given preference
concomitant with the power of removal
over the current and routine business of the board.
10. Any conflict between Secs. 64 and 79 of the RAC and Secs. 2188 to 2191 of the RAC must be resolved
SEC. 2191. Action by Secretary of the Interior. Upon receiving the papers in any such proceedings, the
in a way that Secs. 2188 to 2191 of the RAC (being specific provisions setting forth the
Secretary of the Interior shall review the case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for
the reinstatement, dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts shall warrant procedure for disciplinary actions over municipal officials) must prevail over the former (w/c
deals with powers of the president and department heads over government officers).
and shall render his final decision upon the matter within thirty days after the date on which the case
was received. Disciplinary suspension made upon order of the Secretary of the Interior shall be without Laxamana v. Baltazar adopted this view.
pay. No final dismissal hereinunder shall take effect until recommended by the Department Head and 11. The opportunity of the provincial governor and provincial board to exercise the administrative
approved by the President of the Philippines. powers of both under Secs. 2188 to 2190 of the RAC cannot be subject to repeal or
suspension by the president, without legislation to that effect, since such repeal is
11. The argument that Section 79(C) of the RAC confers upon the department head the power to order tantamount to control over local governments by the president, which power is not granted
the investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office contravenes to the president by the constitution.
the provisions ofparagraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution, since the President Rodriguez vs. Montinola - the power of general supervision granted the President, in the absence of
(and thus, his agents like the head of the department of the interior) only has supervision any express provision of law, may not generally be interpreted to mean that he, or his alter-
and not control of local governments. The argument would do away with the distinction ego, the Secretary of Finance, may direct the form and manner in which local officials shall
between supervision (overseeing subordinate officers performance of their duties,
perform or comply with their duties. Interior had authority to suspend a municipal mayor since the power to suspend is a
governmental power over which the secretary has control (basically, it rejected the
Since neither the secretary of the interior nor the president may disapprove the resolution of a
provincial board (because such is tantamount to control) then neither could also suspend distinction made as to which function exercised by local governments governmental or
corporate cannot be controlled by the executive)
municipal officials without the administrative proceedings in Sec. 2188 to 2190 of the RAC.
11. [On Respondent Argument 8] Planas v. Gil is not in point because Manila also has the status of a
province and as such, was under the direct supervision of the department of the interior, unlike regular
6. [On Respondent Argument 4] The principle or philosophy governing the system of local governments municipalities like Carmona, Cavite (w/c is under the immediate supervision of the provincial governor).
necessitate that the power of the president over local governments is limited to general As such, Sections 2188 to 2191 of the RAC are not applicable to Manila, since its charter does not contain
supervision as may be provided by law. counterparts of the said sections
Dean Sinco: Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere 12.[On respondent Argument 9] Villena v. Roque is different from the case here because in Villena, the
oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over Presidents power of supervision was invoked to cause the investigation to be made against Villena
the supervised party. Hence, the power of general supervision over local because the Provincial Board failed to act on charges against him for an unreasonable length of time. The
governments should exclude, in the strict sense, the authority to appoint and invocation of the Presidents supervisory power was reasonable to ensure that the laws [will] be
remove local officials.The Congress of the Philippines may pass laws which shall faithfully executed. Here, the Provincial Board of Cavite never had a chance to investigate the charges
guide the President in the exercise of his power of supervision over provinces against Hebron since the office of the Executive, from the beginning, assumed authority to act on said
and municipalities; but it may not pass laws enlarging the extent of his charges.Such assumption cannot be justified under the power of general supervision or the duty
supervisory authority to the power of control. To do so would be assuming the imposed on the executive to take care that laws be faithfully executed.
right to amend the Constitution which expressly limits the power of the President When the Executive Department acted in lieu of the Provincial Board of Cavite, it sought to control
over local governments to general supervision. the said board, prohibiting it from performing its duties under RAC Secs. 2188 to 2191.
Deliberations of the committee on provincial and municipal governments of the Villena v. Sec. of the Interior, J. Villareal Concurrence Sec. of the Interior is not given the power to
Constitutional Convention held in Manila in 1934 show that there was practical suspend a municipal elective officer pending charges. The power to suspend cannot be
unanimity of opinion among the delegates that provincial and municipal implied even from an arbitrary power to remove except where the power to remove is
governments should enjoy a certain degree of autonomy. It is, therefore, logical limited to cause. Provincial governors alone are expressly empowered to suspend municipal
to conclude that the Constitution in limiting expressly the power of the President officers
over local governments to mere general supervision expresses a concession to J. Imperial concurrence The Pres. under Secs. 64 (6) and 2191 of the RAC and Sec. 11
the general demand for some local autonomy. (1), Art. 7, 1935 Const. is vested with the power to expel and suspend municipal
7. [On Respondent Argument 5] The argument is immaterial as the case at bar deals with the president officials for grave misconduct
not as akin to an American Governor-General (and thus also possessing the power of control The majority opinion in this case cited Sec. 2191 of the RAC as the source of the
over local governments) but as President of the Philippines, the Philippines being a full Executives power to suspend and remove municipal officials, but the
sovereign state, over local governments created by Philippine laws. Based on the 1935 provisions deals with the said powers on appeal from a decision of the
Constitution, the president has less powers over municipal corporations (only general Provincial Board in proceedings held under Secs. 2188 and 2190 of the Code.
supervision) compared to those possessed by fomer governors-general. THUS, it does not serve as authority to justify a claimed grant of an original
8. [On Respondent Argument 6] The local governments are subject to the control NOT of the executive, power to suspend either w/o an appeal from a decision of the provincial board,
but of Congress, which has the authority to prescribe the procedure by which the President or w/o proceedings before the said board calling for the exercise of its
may exercise general supervision over the said local governments. Congress has control since disciplinary functions under the provisions of the RAC.
it has the authority to create or abolish municipal corporations, define its jurisdiction and13. IN SUM, the procedure in RAC Secs. 2188 to 2191 for suspension and removal of municipal officials is
functions. mandatory. The national govt executive department may conduct investigations in exercise of its
9. [ On Respondent Argument 7] The constitutional provision limiting the authority of the President over general supervision over local governments but only as a means to ascertain whether the provincial
local governments to General supervision is unqualified and, hence, it applies to all powers governor and the provincial board should take action
of municipal corporations, corporate and political alike. E.g., municipal ordinances, enacted a. The executive may take measures to compel the gov. and board to take such action but the executive
under the police power delegated to municipal corporations, involve the exercise of not may not deprive them of the authority conferred them in RAC Secs. 2188 to 2190, for the assumption of
corporate, but political authority but, admittedly, such ordinances are not subject to those powers by the executive violates RAC 2191 since the executives authority is only appellate in
character.
presidential control. a. The corporate functions of local governments have never been
Paras Dissent: RAC declares that in addition to the Presidents general supervisory authority, the Pres.
under the control even of Congress, for, in the exercise of corporate, non-governmental or shall have specific powers and duties expressly conferred or imposed on him by law, including the power
non-political functions, municipal corporations stand practically on the same level,vis-a-vis to remove officials from office conformably to law and to order the investigation of any action or
the National Government or the State as private corporations. Ergo, the limit of the conduct of any person in the government service. The president has concurrent supervisory authority
Presidents power was created specifically over the local governments political with the provincial governor to order an investigation of charges against an elective municipal official.
functions. b. Villena v. Sec. of the Interior: rejected the argument that the Sec. of the The limit on the presidents power of removal is that it must be conformable to law, ie. For a cause
provided by law (such as in Sec. 2188 of the RAC). In Planas v. Gil, the presidents power of supervision On September 13, 1956, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, designated respondent
and his power of control in relation to ordering the investigation of an elective municipal official was to conduct the investigation of said complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section 64 (c) of the Revised
distinguished. Paras argued that the supervisory authority to suspend and remove a subordinate official Administrative Code granting said respondent all the powers given to an investigating officer by Sections
prescribed the administrative code refers to disciplinary action on account of his misconduct or 71 and 580 of the same Code.
malfeasance in office.The act complained of in Mondano vs. Silvosa , has no reference to the
performance of duty on the part of the Mayor and is therefore not included even under the power of On September 18, 1956, respondent served a copy of the complaint on petitioner and set the
supervision of the Chief Executive. Thus, Paras argued that the ruling in Planas v. Gil, Villena v. Sec. of investigation of the charges on September 20, 1956. Petitioner, having filed a motion for postponement,
Interior, Lacson v. Roque and Villena v. Roque upholds the explicit supervisory authority of the President respondent definitely set the investigation for September 25 and 26, 1956. On September 24,1956,
under Sec. 64 of the Revised Administrative Code to include that of ordering the investigation of elective petitioner instituted in the Court of First Instance of Uoilo an action for prohibition with preliminary
municipal officials, and to remove or suspend them conformably to law, and must not be disturbed. injunction questioning the authority of the President to order his investigation and praying that
104 Phil. 483 respondent be enjoined to suspend and desist from proceeding with the investigation and that, pending
decision of the case on the merits, a preliminary injunction be issued against respondent. On September
26, 1956, the lower court declined to issue the writ and instead set the case for hearing on the merits on
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: September 28, 1956. At the hearing, both parties agreed to admit all the facts Bet forth in the pleadings
On August 25, 1956, Ernesto V. Rosales lodged a verified complaint against petitioner with the President and submitted the case for decision. And on October 2, 1956, the lower court rendered decision
reading as follows: dismissing the petition. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner took the present
appeal.
"Complainant Ernesto V. Rosales most humbly and respectfully submits to the President of the
Philippines, Ramon Magsaysay, for investigation and appropriate action, the following administrative The issues posed by petitioner are:
charges against the respondent Rodolfo Ganzon incumbent Mayor of Iloilo City, which charges are:
"1. That the President of the Philippines has no authority under the Constitution or under any law to
Count 1. That on August 22, 1956 the respondent taking advantage of his public position as Mayor of order the investigation of petitioner-appellant on the charges averred in the administrative complaint for
Iloilo City and accompanied by his armed body-guards and henchmen, stormed into the broadcasting the purpose of suspension and/or removal.
station of DYRI of Iloilo City, and with violence and intimidation, unjustifiably and unlawfully stopped the
radio-press interview program People's Forum' of said station, thus, suppressing and curtailing for about 2. That the charges averred in the administrative complaint are penal in nature and the remedies sought
a quarter hour the complainant's right to free speech, the radio station's right to broadcast, and the for are punitive and/or disciplinary in character;
people's right to listen to a radio-press interviews, which acts constitute oppression or unjust exercise of
authority or power and/or grave misconduct in office. 3. That the charges against petitioner-appellant do not allege acts constituting disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines as provided for in Section 64(6) of the Revised Administrative Code which is the only
Count 2. That during the occurrenae of the acts mentioned in Count 1, the respondent Mayor of Iloilo ground for the suspension and/or removal of an elective city mayor, and
City arrogantly took the law in his Own hands by personally pushing away the microphones and hitting
on the back of the neck the complainant, who is a radio commentator and program director of Station 4. That granting arguendo that the grounds enumerated in Section 2078 of the Revised Administrative
DYRI of Iloilo City, and a member of the panel of interrogators of the 'People's Forum', a public service Code for the removal of provincial officials are applicable by analogy and/or implication to an elective
press interview program of said nature, constitutive of oppression and shameful misconduct in office. city mayor, the administrative complaint in question does not allege facts constituting oppression or
misconduct in office and dishonesty, much less disloyalty."
Count 3. That during the occurrence of the acts above-stated in Counts 1 and 2, the respondent Mayor of The present appeal involves the paramount issue of whether the President of the Philippines has the
Iloilo City, in a fit of devouring fury, unrestrainedly hurled invectives at the complainant, calling the latter power and authority under our Constitution and the laws at present in force in this jurisdiction to
indecent bad-mannered, dammed-no-good-Cebuano who should evacuate to Cebu and other similar investigate the mayor of a city and, if found guilty, to take disciplinary action against him as the evidence
names, which verbal acts constituted oppression and oral defamation, highly unbecoming of Iloilo City's and law may warrant.
supposedly No. 1 public official and model citizen.
In view of the foregoing, the complainant most respectfully prays: At the outset, it should be stated that petitioner is the duly elected mayor of the City of Iloilo whose
charter, speaking of his removal, merely provides that he "shall hold office for six years unless removed"
1. That an investigation of the administrative charges above specified be ordered by the (Section 8, Commonwealth Act No. 158, as amended). The charter does not contain any provision as
President of the Philippines, after which the corresponding and proper action be taken regards the procedure by which he may be removed. Nevertheless, as this Court ,has once said, "the
against the respondent who has demonstrated his unfitness to continue exercising rights, duties, and privileges of municipal officers (including city officials) do not have to be embodied in
governmental power; and, the charter, but may be regulated by provisions of general application specially if these are incorporated
in the same code of which the city organic law forms a part" (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49 Off.
2. That in the interest of public welfare and safety, the respondent be immediately suspended Gaz., No. 1, pp. 93, 97). The code herein referred to is the Revised Administrative Code.
from office, so as to prevent the further misuse of authority and power pending such
investigation, particularly on witnesses to the above-specified charges." Now, the charter of Iloilo City, as we have already stated, says that the mayor "shall hold office for six
years unless removed." It does not say that he shall hold office at the pleasure of the President unlike
similar provisions appearing in other city charters. The idea is to give the mayor a definite tenure of administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
office not dependent upon the pleasure of the President. If this were the case, he could be separated subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
from the service regardless of the cause or motive. But when he was given a definite tenure, the such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
implication is that he can only be removed for cause. means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
"'An inferential authority to remove at pleasure can not be deduced, since the existence of a defined latter." But from this pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of
term, ipao facto, negatives such an inference, and implies a contrary presumption, i.e. that the the President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his
incumbent shall hold office to the end of his term subject to removal for cause.' (State ex rel opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated in Section 64 (e) of the Revised
Gallaghar vs. Brown, 57 Mo. Ap., 203, expressly adopted by the Supreme Court in States ex Administrative Code. In fact, this matter has been clarified when, in a subsequent case, this Court made
ret. vs. Maroney, 191 Mo. 648; 90 S. W., 141; States vs. Crandell, 269 Mo., 44; 190 S. W., 889; the following pronouncement:
State vs. Salval, 450, 2d, 995; 62 C. J., S., 947,)" (Lacson vs. Roque, supra)
The question that now arises is: Does the President have power and authority to investigate petitioner "In conclusion, we hold that, under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191
with a view to his removal under the above provision of the charter of Iloilo City? If so, for what causes of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of municipal officials therein
may he authorize such investigation? referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear and explicit provision to the contrary, relative
particularly to municipal corporations- and none has been cited to us said procedure is exclusive; that
The pertinent provisions governing the power of the President over local officials, be they provincial, city the executive department of the national government, in the exercise of its general supervision over
or municipal, are embodied in Section 64(6) and (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, in connection local government, may conduct investigations with a view to determining whether municipal officials are
with the provisions of Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII of the Constitution. For ready reference, we guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative action referred to in said sections, as a means
will hereunder quote said provisions: only to ascertain whether the provincial governor and the provincial board should take such action; that
the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial governor and the provincial
"(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such board to take said action, if the same is warranted, and they failed to do so; that the provincial governor
removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States), the Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor- and the provincial board may not be deprived by the Executive of the power to exercise the authority
General) President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code; that such would be
authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines. the effect of the assumption of those powers by the Executive; that said assumption of powers would
further violate section 2191 of the same Code, for the authority therein vested in the Executive is merely
(c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an investigation of any action appellate in character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those of the
or the conduct of any person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in whom original jurisdiction is vested by said sections 2188 to
official, committee, or person by whom such investigation shall be conducted." 2190, for, pursuant thereto, 'the preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more than
thirty (30) days, at the expiration of which he shall be reinstated, unless the delay in the decision of the
"SEC. 10. (1) The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, case is due to his fault, neglect or request, or unless he shall have meanwhile been convicted, whereas
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that petitioner herein was suspended 'until the final determination of the proceedings' against him,
the laws be faithfully executed." regardless of the duration thereof and the cause of the delay in its disposition; and that so much of the
It may clearly be inferred from the above that the President may remove any official in the government rule laid down in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451) and Villena vs. Roque (93 PhiL, 363),
service "conformably to law" and to declare vacant the office held by the removed official. And to this as may be inconsistent with the foregoing views, should be deemed, and are hereby reversed or
end, the President may order "an investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the modified accordingly." (Hebron vs. Reyes, supra, p. 175; Italics supplied)
Government service, and in connection therewith to designate the official committee, or person by The final question to be determined is: For what cause or causes may the President order the
whom such investigation shall be conducted." Note that the provision refers to any official in the investigation of petitioner "conformably to law?
government service, which must necessarily include the mayor of a chartered city. It cannot therefore be
disputed that in the particular case under consideration the President is vested with the authority to For this, suffice it to quote hereunder what we have said in Lacson vs. Rogue, supra:
order the investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, and
such being the case, petitioner cannot now contend that the designation of respondent as the official to "Four Justices who join in this decision do not share the view that the only ground upon which the Mayor
investigate him in connection with the charges lodged against him by Rosales has been done without the may be expelled is disloyalty. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Jugo, three of the
authority of law. This of course is upon the premise that the charges involved in the investigation refer to Justices referred to, reason that, as the office of provincial executive is at least as important as the office
those for which petitioner may be suspended or removed under the law, a question which we will take of mayor of the City of Manila, the latter officer, by analogy, ought to be amenable to removal and
up later in this decision. suspension for the same causes as provincial executives, who under Section 2078 of the Revised,
Administrative Code, may be discharged for dishonesty, oppression, or misconduct in office, besides
It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa,* 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 2884, this Court had occasion to disloyalty."
discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the President over local government officials And Chief Justice Paras, in concurring in the foregoing opinion, made the following interesting
in contrast to the power of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it observation:
was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which differ one
from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in that case the Court made the following digression: "In
"It is hard and illogical to believe that, while there are express legal provisions for the suspension and specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision
removal of provincial governors and municipal mayors, it could have been intended that the mayor of over local governments.[2]
Manila should enjoy an over-all immunity or sacrosanct position, considering that a provincial governor The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section
or municipal mayor may fairly be considered in parity with the city mayor insofar as they are all 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
executive heads of political subdivisions. Counsel for petitioner calls attention to the fact that the specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
peculiarly elevated standard of the City of Manila and its populace might have prompted the lawmakers Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular 1-88,
to exempt the city mayor from removal or suspension. Much can be said about the desirability of making the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision.[3] However,
the executive head of Manila as strong and independent as possible but there should not be any doubt on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the petition
that awareness of the insistence of some sort of disciplinary measures has a neutralizing and deterring was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
influence against any tendency toward officials' misfeasance, excesses or omission." We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section
Considering that the position of mayor of a chartered city may be fairly compared in category and 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are
stature with that of a provincial governor, we are of the opinion that the former, by analogy, may also be the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP
amenable to removal and suspension for the same causes as the latter, which causes, under Section 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is
2078 of the Revised Administrative Code, are: disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct in incapable of pecuniary estimation,[4] even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in
office. And considering the allegations in the complaint to the effect that petitioner took advantage of his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken
his public position as mayor of Iloilo City in committing the acts of violence and intimidation upon against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5 (2), of the
respondent in order to stop the radio program he was then conducting in his station thus suppressing Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower
and curtailing his right to free speech, we are of the opinion that said acts constitute misconduct in office courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
for which he may be ordered investigated by the President within the meaning of the law. There is agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
therefore no plausible reason to disturb the decision rendered by the lower court which we find to be in question.
accordance with law. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection,
bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a
becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity,
G.R. No. 112497 which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence
of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.[5]
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful
CRUZ, J.: hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance
reading as follows: with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of
Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and,
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the second
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance
sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file with law."[6] His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power of control
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction. and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof,[7] and of Section 5 on the taxing
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non- powers of local governments,[8] and the policy of local autonomy in general.
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.
provisions contrary to law and public policy.[1] Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural requirements or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment
had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce
governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it
was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was disseminated among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the Code.
prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been observed in
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such
supervision. compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called for
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits and agree
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings
to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were
has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the published in the Balitaand the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993
control but of mere supervision. issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The case of Taule v. Santos[9] cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its
claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation
was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated
jurisdiction, not supervision or control. and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in its investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.
Section 2 as follows: We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has not
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall been raised in issue in the present petition.
provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional Trial
effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING
if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been
or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this observed. No pronouncement as to costs.
authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period SO ORDERED.
of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet
the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The
ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, Secretary of Justice (on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794
the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax
suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist. ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these RTCs Ruling:
flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or
not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control 1. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the
Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his
opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Petitioners Argument:
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of
certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These 1. The annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it
Code is another matter. anyway.)
In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on the 2. Grounds of non-compliance of procedure
proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the a. No written notices as required by Art 276 of Rules of Local Government Code
Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published b. Not published
in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No minutes were c. Not translated to tagalog
submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the Supreme Courts Argument:
measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local 1. Section 187 authorizes the petitioner to review only the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinance. What
Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and he found only was that it was illegal. That act is not control but supervision.
2. Control lays down the rules in the doing of act and if not followed order the act undone or re-done. In support of his petition, Onon argues that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Synchronized
Supervision sees to it that the rules are followed. Election of the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters and for the Election of the National Chapter of the
3. Two grounds of declaring Manila Revenue Code null and void (1) inclusion of certain ultra vires provisions Liga ng mga Barangay contradicts the Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections
(2) non-compliance with prescribed procedure in its enactment but were followed. of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and Directors and is therefore invalid. Onon alleges that the Liga ng
The requirements are upon approval of local development plans and public investment programs of LGU mga Barangay (LIGA) is not a local government unit considering that a local government unit must have its
not to tax ordinances. own source of income, a certain number of population, and a specific land area in order to exist or be
created as such. Consequently, the DILG only has a limited supervisory authority over the LIGA. Moreover,
[G.R. No. 139813. January 31, 2001] Onon argues that even if the DILG has supervisory authority over the LIGA, the act of the DILG in issuing
JOELBITO-ONON, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE NELIA YAP FERNANDEZ, R.T.C. Br. 50 Puerto Princesa City Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 or the supplemental rules and guidelines for the conduct of the 1997
and Palawan, and ELEGIO QUEJANO, JR., respondents. LIGA elections had the effect of modifying, altering and nullifying the rules prescribed by the National Liga
DECISION Board. Onon posits that the issuance of said guidelines allowing an appeal of the decision of the BES to the
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: regular courts rather than to the National Liga Board is no longer an exercise of supervision but an exercise
This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining of control.[8]
order and writ of injunction seeks the reversal of the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and In his comment to the petition, private respondent Quejano argues that the Secretary of the DILG
Puerto Princesa City,[1] Branch 50 in SPL. PROC. NO. 1056 entitled Elegio F. Quejano, Jr., petitioner vs. Joel has competent authority to issue rules and regulations like Memorandum Circular No. 97-893. The
Bito-Onon, et. al., respondents which denied herein petitioners motion to dismiss the Petition for Review Secretary of DILGs rule-making power is conferred by the Administrative Code. Considering that the
of the Resolution of the Board of Election Supervisors dated August 25, 1997 in case number L-10-97 filed Memorandum Circular was issued pursuant to his rule making power, Quejano insists that the lower court
by herein private respondent with said court. did not commit any reversible error when it denied Onons motion to dismiss.[9]
It appears from the records that the petitioner, Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay On the other hand, the public respondent represented herein by the Solicitor General, filed a
Chairman of Barangay Tacras, Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the separate Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment agreeing with the position of petitioner Onon.The
Municipality of Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is the duly Solicitor General affirms Onons claim that in issuing the questioned Memorandum Circular, the Secretary
elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter of the DILG effectively amended the rules and guidelines promulgated by National Liga Board. This act was
President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan. Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the no longer a mere act of supervision but one of control. The Solicitor General submits that the RTC
position of Executive Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the petition for review of the BES decision filed
Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in the said election before it for failure of the petitioner to exhaust the rightful remedy which was to appeal to the National
prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which Liga Board.[10]
was decided against him on August 25, 1997. On October 27, 1999, this Court denied petitioner Onons motion for the issuance of restraining
Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the order for lack of merit.
BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed After a careful review of the case, we sustain the position of the petitioner.
a motion to dismiss the Petition for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had The resolution of the present controversy requires an examination of the questioned provision of
no jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation electoral protest in Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and the Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General
connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and Directors (GUIDELINES). The memorandum circular
Onon claimed that the Supplemental Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the reads, insofar as pertinent, as follows:
DILG on August 11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions or Any post-proclamation protest must be filed with the BES within twenty-four (24) hours from the closing
resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void for being issued without of the election. The BES shall decide the same within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.The
or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of supervision but rather an exercise of control decision of the BES shall be final and immediately executory without prejudice to the filing of a Petition
over the Ligas internal organization. for Review with the regular courts of law.[11] (emphasis supplied)
On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onons motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC ratiocinated that On the other hand, the GUIDELINES provides that the BES shall have the following among its duties:
the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government[2] is vested with the power to establish To resolve any post-proclamation electoral protest which must be submitted in writing to this Board
and prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of within twenty-four (24) hours from the close of election; provided said Board shall render its decision
local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof; and provided further that the decision must be
units.[3] The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his submitted to the National Liga Headquarters within twenty-four (24) hours from the said decision. The
rule-making power as provided for under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative decision of the Board of Election Supervisors in this respect shall be subject to review by the National
Code.[4] Consequently, the RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by Quejada.[5] Liga Board the decision of which shall be final and executory.[12] (emphasis supplied)
Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied[6] prompting the petitioner to file Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to the power of
the present petition wherein the following issues are raised: general supervision of the President over all local government units which was delegated to the DILG
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED PROVISION IN MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR 97-193 Secretary by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992.[13] The Presidents power of
WAS ISSUED BY THE DILG SECRETARY IN EXCESS OF HIS AUTHORITY. general supervision over local government units is conferred upon him by the Constitution.[14]The power
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED ORDERS.[7] functions in accordance with law.[15] This is distinguished from the power of control or the power of an
officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties enactments.[28] Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs
and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.[16] should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.[29]
On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to distinguish the power of The public respondent judge therefore committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs. Santos,[17] we held that the Chief Executive wielded no excess of jurisdiction in not dismissing the respondents Petition for Review for failure to exhaust all
more authority than that of checking whether a local government or the officers thereof perform their administrative remedies and for lack of jurisdiction.
duties as provided by statutory enactments. He cannot interfere with local governments provided that the WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court dated
same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with June 22, 1999 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition for Review filed by the private respondent
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority docketed as SPL. PROC. NO. 1056 is DISMISSED.
over such body.[18] Officers in control lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it SO ORDERED.
is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide
to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the [G.R. No. 139813.September 5, 2001]
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify JOEL BITO-ONON, vs. HON. JUDGE NELIA YAP FERNANDEZ et al.
or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the THIRD DIVISION
prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act.[19] Gentlemen:
Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga barangay, which is not Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated SEPT 5 2001.
a local government unit?[20] G.R. No. 139813(Joel Bito-Onon, petitioner vs. Hon. Judge Nelia Yap Fernadez, R.T.C. Br. 50 - Puerto
We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice ruled that Princesa City and Palawan, and Elegio Quejano, Jr., respondents.)
the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an association, federation, league or union Before this Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 Rollo, 194. filed by herein respondent Elegio Quejano,
created by law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government Jr. of our Decision dated January 31, 2001. Petitioner Joel Bito-Onon was required to file comment to
officials. The Local Government Code[21] defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all thereto but has failed to do the same.2 See Order dated April 18, 2001; Rollo, 223. The filing of comment
barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and is therefore deemed waived.
for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and In his motion, the respondent raises new factual matters which were not but could have been
securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.[22] The liga shall have chapters at the raised in either his comment to the petition or in his memorandum. An examination of these new matters
municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of however will show that our questioned decision will not be affected thereby. The basic issue raised by the
the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays parties, i.e. whether Article II, par. 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 issued by the Department of
respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute Interior and Local Government Secretary which authorized the filing of a Petition for Review of the decision
the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of of the Board of election Supervisors with the regular courts is valid, was already passed upon in our January
highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political 31, 2001 Decision. More importantly, had the respondent believed that these facts were pertinent to the
subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.[23] resolution of the case, he should have raised them at the earliest possible time and not through the
The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels present motion for reconsideration.
directly elect a president, a vice-president and five (5) members of the board of directors. The board shall WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the [ G. R. No. L-23825, December 24, 1965 ]
management of the chapter.[24] EMMANUEL PELAEZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.
The ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code.[25] However, their
respective constitution and by-laws shall govern all other matters affecting the internal organization of DECISION
the liga not otherwise provided for in the Local Government Code provided that the constitution and by- CONCEPCION, J.:
laws shall be suppletory to the provisions of Book III, Title VI of the Local Government Code and shall During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines, purporting to
always conform to the provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.[26] act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive Orders Nos, 93 to 121,
Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG 124 and 126 to 129, creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in the margin.[1] Soon after the
insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in date last mentioned, or on
a post proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree with both the petitioner 1
Municipality Province Date of Annex
and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES Executive
with the regular courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES promulgated Order
Promulgation
by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which provides that the decision of the BES shall be No.
subject to review by the National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise
of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not have Zamboanga A
93 Nilo Sept. 4, 1964
over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, del Sur (original
the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely monitoring compliance by local government units of Zaraboanga B
94 Midsalip Sept. 4, 1964
such issuances.[27] To monitor means to watch, observe or check and is compatible with the power of del Sur Petition)
supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local Zamhoanga
95 Pitog-o Sept. 4, 1964 C"
government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as per statutory del Sur
Zamboanga from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or
96 Maruing Sept. 4, 1964 D"
del Sur any disbursement by said municipalities.
Zamboanga Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
97 Naga Sept. 4, 1964 E"
del Sur been impliedly repealed by Republic Act 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
99 Sebaste Antique Sept. 26, 1964 F" Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is premature and that not all
Misamis G" proper parties referring to the officials of the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded.
100 Molugan Sept. 26, 1964
Oriental Subsequently, the mayors of several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive
H" orders because the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political
101 Malixi Surigao del Sur Sept. 28, 1964 H" subdivision intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisunibing-
Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae.
November 10, 1964, petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice-President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the "Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress."
agents, Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
102 Roxas Davao Sept. 28, 1964 I "All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.
103 Magsaysay Davao Sept. 28, 1964 J "Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name
104 Sta. Maria Davao Sept. 28, 1964 K of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the
105 Badiangan Iloilo Sept. 28, 1964 council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed, barrio is situated. The
106 Mina Iloilo Oct. 1, 1964 M recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-
107 Andong Lanao del Sur Oct. 1, 1964 N thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created
108 Sultan Alonto Lanao del Sur Oct. 1, 1964 O if its population is less than five hundred persons.
109 Maguing Lanao del Sur Oct. 1, 1964 P Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created
110 Dianaton Lanao del Sur Oct. 1, 1964 Q or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding
Elpidio provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation
111 Mt. Province Oct. 1, 1964 E
Quirino of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner
Zamboanga S argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a
112 Bayog Oct. 1, 1964
del Sur municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"
Oriental Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created without
113 Gloria Oct. 1, 1964 GG
Mindoro creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
T theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which is that the statutory
(Attached denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
hereto) municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too
114 Maasin Cotabato Oct. 1, 1964 obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except
Zamboanga by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent
115 Siayan Oct. 1, 1964 U
del Norte to the passage of Republic Act No. 2370, has been brought to our attention.
Zamboanga Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders are
116 Roxas Oct. 1, 1964 V
del Norte based, provides :
Zamboanga "The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or
117 Panganuran Oct. 1, 1964 W
del boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political
118 Kalilangan Bukidnon Oct. 1, 1964 X subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or
119 Lantapan Bukidnon Oct. 1, 1964 Y more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions as may be
Zamboanga required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created,
120 Libertad Oct. 1, 1964 Z
del Sur and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
General Zamboanga may require: Provided,That the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines
121 Oct. 1, 1964 AA
Aguinaldo del Sur shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined or any
Surigao del province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President
124 Rizal Oct. 3, 1964 BB
Norte of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction
126 Tigao Surigao del Sur Oct. 23, 1964 CC of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines,
127 Tampakan Cotabato Oct. 26, 1964 PD with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control of such
128 Maco Davao Oct. 29, 1964 BE officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign such officers to the new
129 New Corella Davao Oct. 29, 1964 FF districts so formed.
"Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we assumed
distribution of the funds, and obligations of the divisions thereby affected shall be made in such manner that the phrase "as the public welfare may require", in said Section 68, qualifies all other clauses thereof.
as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) It is true that in Calalang vs. William (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had
President of the Philippines." upheld "public welfare" and "public interest", respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements
amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do
of Binangonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.[4] The law construed in the Calalang case conferred
involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binangonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads
said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binangonan [34 Phil. and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer,
518, 519-520], in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both
boundaries of two municipalities. cases involved grants to admmistraitive officers of powers related to the exercise of
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid Or settle their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of fact.
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities, is not an administrativefunction, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in
municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the character. The question whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of such power is not one
language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, of fact. It is purely a legislative question" (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike
January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, Authority, 74 S.E. 2d., 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As
1938, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is
February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes." for the best interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft"
Although [1-a] Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N. W. 1033, 1035-1037).
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative powers,
principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy state laws granting the judicial department the power to determine whether certain territories should be
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the [2] and fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra,358-359); or vesting in a Commission the right
determinate or determinate to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[2- to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed villages and what functions shall be exercised
a] Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such by the same, although the powers and functions of the village are specifically limited by statute (In re
policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308) or conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the village incorporated, and designate its meter and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable
scope of his authority.[2-b] Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex
law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and
attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of population, to be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on
checks and balances, and, consequently undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. certain determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in
delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to
be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of
avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine
clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and
"* * * may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the Board shall enter an order
welfare may require." creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S. E. 2d. 310).
require" qualifies, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat of Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case of
the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that said Section Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U. S. (79 L. ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The Schechter
68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,[3] which provided, that "whenever in the judgment of the case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act authorizing the
Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order", effect the changes President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to him by one or more
enumerated therein (as well as in said Section 68), including the change of the seat of the government "to trade or industrial associations or corporations (which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission
such place * * * as the public interest requires". The opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to
which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code governed the time at which, or promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate
the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
first sentence of said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to "To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without precedent. It supplies
be transferred. no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be
applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of
proscribing [rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of rehabilitation, he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and cf the In short, even if it did not entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Section
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved or March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed
codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country,, is by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent
virtually unfettered. We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional with said statutory enactment.[7]
delegation of legislative power." There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not all the
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually proper parties"" referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities "have been impleaded in this
unfettered", and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that "public case", and (b) that "the present petition is premature".
welfare", which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of the As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim, that
delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At any rate,
a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by the Solicitor-General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the officer authorized
public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, Its offices and agents, in any official
Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total collapse of the democratic system investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised
established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold. Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which
It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills for involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives
the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the of the national government. Their interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly
fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions can hardly represented.[8]
be given.
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the executive
"The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general order in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is however, a matter
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President has, for many years,
executed." issued executive orders creating" municipal corporations and that the same have "been organized and in
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There
of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new
Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the municipalities involved in this case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local by him.
governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the Wherefore the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to Executive
pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he veto, set Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how
patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take
any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial
board.[5] [1-a] Except to local governments, to which legislative powers, with respect to matters of local concern,
Upon the other hand, if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its may be delegated.
officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned [2] Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil., 726; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 70 Phil., 221;

resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.[6] Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil., 234; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; Mulford vs. Smith, 307
new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his U.S., 38.
dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution. [2-a] People vs. Lim Ho, L-12091-2, January 28, 1960; People vs. Jolliffe, L-9553, May 13, 1959;

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices implies no People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; Compaa. General de Tabacos vs. Board of
more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the exercise of Public Utility, 34 Phil., 136; Mutual Film Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 247, 59 L. ed. 561, Mutual
discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to abolish an Film Corp. vs. Industrial Commission, 236 U.S. 230, 59 L. ed. 552; Pamana Refining Co. vs. Ryan, 293 U.S.
executive department or bureaus, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the 383; 79 L. ed. 446; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. vs. U.S. 295 U.S. 495, 79 L. ed. 1570; U.S. vs. Rock Royal
President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 83 L. ed. 1448; Bowles vs. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 8S L. ed. 892;
even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In Araneta vs. Gatmaitan, L-8895, April 30, 1957; Cervantes vs. Auditor General, L-4043, May 26, 1952; Phil.
other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the Association of Colleges vs. Sec. of Education, 51 Off. Gaz., 6230; People vs. Arnault, 48 Off. Gaz., 4805;
constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments Antamok Gold Fields vs. CIR, 68 Phil. 340; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327; Yakus vs. White, 321 U.S. 414;
than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and Ammann vs. Mailonce, 332 U.S., 245.
[2-b]Vigan Electric Light Company, Inc., vs. The Public Service Commission, L-19850, January 30, 1964. any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation
[3] Whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive of the executive orders aforementioned.
order, enlarge, contract, or otherwise change the boundary of any province, subprovince, municipality, or Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order. It is
township or other political subdivision, or separate any such subdivision into such portions as may be argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to grant any such
required as aforesaid, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another divide any province into power, is invalid or, at least, already repealed in the light of the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act
one or more subprovinces as may be required as aforesaid, name any new subdivision so created, change 2370 (The Barrio Charter).
the seat of government within any subdivision, existing or created hereunder, to such place therein as the Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
public interests require, and shall fix in such executive order the date when the change, merger, "Sec. 68. General authority of [Governor-General] President of the Philippines to fix boundaries and make
separation, or other action shall take effect. Whenever such action as aforesaid creates a new political new subdivisions. The [Governor-General] President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
subdivision the Governor-General shall appoint such officers for the new subdivision with such powers boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or
and duties as may be required by the existing provisions of law applicable to the case and fix their salaries; other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
such appointees shall hold office until their successors are elected or appointed and qualified. Successors province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division, other than a province, into such
to the elective offices shall be elected at the next general elections following such appointment. Such portions as may be required,, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
equitable distribution of the funds of changed subdivisions between the subdivisions affected shall be subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
made as is recommended by the Insular Auditor and approved by the Governor-General. therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the [Philippine Legislature]
[4] McGirr vs. Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563; Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9124, July 28, 1958; U.S. vs. More, 3 Cranch 159, Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince
172; U.S. vs. Sanges, U.S. 310, 319; Cross vs. Burke, 146 U.S. 82; Louisville Trust vs. Knott, 191 U.S. 225. is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the
See, also, 15 C.J. 929-940; 21 C.J.S., 299: 14 Am. Jur. 345. [Governor-General] President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the
[5] Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9124, July 28, 1958; Mondano vs. Silvosa, 5l Off. Gaz., 2884; territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the [Governor-General]
Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820; Querubin vs. Castro, L-9779, July 31, 1958. President of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having
[6] Pursuant to section 2179 of the Revised Administrative Code: executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign
"When a part of a barrio is detached from a municipality to a new municipality or to be added to an existing such officers to the new districts so formed.
municipality, officer of the old municipality living in the detached territory continue to hold this office and "Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing authority, an equitable
exert the functions thereof or the remainder of his term; but if he is resident of a barrio the whole of which distribution of the funds and obligations of the division thereby affected shall be made in such manner as
is detached, his office shall be deemed to be vacated." may be recommended by the [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved by the [Governor-General]
[7] De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 298-299. President of the Philippines."
[8] Mangubat vs. Osmena, Jr., L-12837, April 30, 1959; City of Cebu vs. Judge Piccio, L-13012 & L-14876, From such wording I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any political
December 31, 1960. division other than a province, Into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or
portions with another, name any new subdivision so created". The issue, however, is whether the
Legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have therefore favored
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to create municipalities but
only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation of a municipality will result (37
BENGZON, J. P. J, Am. Jur. 628).
A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid growth has The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether the
long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our Government. municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted deligation of legislative power and
So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the legislature the statute is invalid (Ibid). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such discretion, since it says that
(Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to said local governments, such as fixing of the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein granted. Furthermore, Section 5 of
boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the framework of the Jones Law, the same Code states:
ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such details, did not entail abdication oi legislative "SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion. The exercise of the permissive powers of all executive or
power (Government vs. Municipality of Binangonan, 34 Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality administrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, and when such officer or body is given
of Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently, Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory authorization was authority to do any act but not required to do such act, the doing of the same shall be dependent on a
embodied in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the sound discretion to be exercised for the good of the service and benefit of the public, whether so
present continued to avail of said provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive orders providing expressed in the statute giving the authority or not."
for the creation of municipalities. Under the prevailing rule in the United States and Section 68 is of American origin the provision in question
From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary to the principle of separation
create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public funds of powers.
thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders. It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A proper
Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a petition for knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was adopted half a
prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain the respondent or century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our independence and rightful place in
the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones Law.
And under the set-up ordained therein no strict separation of powers was adhered to Consequently, downwards. The national government, in such a case, could still exercise power over the supposedly
Section 63 was not constitutionally objectionable at the time of its enactment. autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was barrios. A realistic program of decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so
separation of power strictly ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the power of that it is not surprising for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios without
the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction. denying it over municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that because the President
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general supervision could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a municipality.
and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine Islands". Now Section It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of the
10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The president shall have control of all the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local governments. And
executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive orders in question are null
be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." and void.
In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief Executive, In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and independent
Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its development and growth. under a republican form of government, and exercising a function derived from the very sovereignty that
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the Second it upholds. .
Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be "subject to the I concur in declaring null and void the Executive Orders in questions. Petition granted.
least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government. Said supervision and Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as "may be necessary to secure Petition granted.
and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers". And the national government "shall
have no direct administration except of matters of purely general concern". (See Hebron vs. Reyes, L-9158, Facts:
July 28, 1958.) The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government, with the Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management and control of the administration of municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10(1), Article VII of the Constitution Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
(Rodriguez vs. Montinola, 50 Off. Gaz., 4820). preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of control agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
(Hebron vs. Reyes, supra). And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law hereby became Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution. been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue
It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local governments. delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Said relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in (Hebron vs. Reyes, supra). In said case, it Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to create or abolish municipalities. provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and controlling their local governments are Issues:
"two worlds apart", is untenable. And since, as stated, the power to control local governments can no Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
longer be conferred on or exercised by the President, it follows a fortiori that the power to create them, power.
all the more cannot be so conferred or exercised.
I am impelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10(1) of Article VII of the Constitution has repealed Discussions:
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the President to create local Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent with it has already been sustained The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
in De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289; And it was there held that such repeal differs from a declaration supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
of unconstitutionally of a posterior legislation, so much so that only a majority vote of the Court is needed faithfully executed.
to sustain a finding of repeal. The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of
Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether Republic Act such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices
2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it to state, at any rate, of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the
that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not. in my opinion, warrant the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For although municipalities consist of barrios, fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of new municipalities out of pre-existing governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence,
barrios. the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the
It is not contrary, to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and unable to scope of their authority.
create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two political units.[*] The smaller
the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national government's intervention in its
political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local autonomy cannot be given from the top Rulings:
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create library
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than
that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section From portions of the Municipality of Kapalong, President Carlos P. Garcia created respondent
68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. Municipality of Santo Tomas, and the latter now asserts jurisdiction over eight (8) barrios of petitioner.
Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the For many years and on several occasions, this conflict of boundaries between the two municipalities was
executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by brought, at the instance of private respondent, to the Provincial Board of Davao for it to consider and
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive decide. However, it appears that no action was taken on the same. Private respondent then filed a
departments, bureaus or offices. complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Davao, presided over by herein public respondent
Judge Felix L. Moya against the Municipality of Kapalong, for settlement of the municipal boundary
[G.R. No. L-41322. September 29, 1988.] dispute, recovery of collected taxes and damages, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 475.chanrobles law
library
MUNICIPALITY OF KAPALONG, thru its Mayor, PORFIRIO F. ROYO, Vice Mayor, TOMAS D. MANZANO,
Municipal Councilors VALERIANO CLARO, CARIDAD A. DORONIO, FELICULO ESTRADA, GEORGE EXALA, On March 7, 1974, petitioner filed its Answer (Rollo, pp. 14-17).
PEDRO JAIN, LIDO E. MONOY, SALVADOR PASPE and AGUEDO ROTOL, Petitioners, v. HON. FELIX L.
MOYA, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IX, and the MUNICIPALITY OF STO. On November 22, 1974, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
TOMAS, thru its Mayor, ANICETO SOLIS, Vice-Mayor LEOPOLDO RECTO, Municipal Councilors lower court and lack of legal personality of the Municipality of Santo Tomas (Ibid., pp. 18-22), which was
DOMINGO CAGADAS, WENCESLAO CASTRO, WILDA ESPIRITU, PASTOR FERNANDEZ, MACROSQUE opposed by private respondent (Ibid., pp. 23-26). On December 12, 1974, petitioner filed its reply to the
PIMENTEL, DOMINADOR SOLIS, JOSE TAGHOY and ALFONSO VALDEZ, and Municipal Treasurer JOSE opposition (Ibid., pp. 27-30), after which respondent Judge, in an Order dated February 17, 1975, denied
AVENIDO, Respondents. the motion to dismiss (Ibid., pp. 34-36).

Martin V. Delgra, Jr., for Petitioners. On March 3, 1975, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 37-40), but in an Order dated
March 17, 1975, the same was denied by respondent Judge and so was the Second Motion for
Simeon N. Millan, Jr. for respondent Santo Tomas. Reconsideration (Ibid., pp. 42-43), in an Order dated July 10, 1975 (Ibid., p. 44). Hence, the instant
petition (Ibid., pp. 1-10)

SYLLABUS The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated September 10, 1975, resolved to require the
respondents to answer and to issue a temporary restraining order (Ibid., p. 49). In compliance therewith,
private respondent filed its Answer on October 28, 1975 (Ibid., pp. 53-57). In the Resolution dated
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CREATION OF MUNICIPALITIES; PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO CREATE November 3, 1975, the parties were required to file their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 65). Petitioner
MUNICIPALITIES. Pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General (15 SCRA 569) the filed its Memorandum on December 10, 1975 (Ibid., pp. 68-76), and private respondent on January 5,
President has no power to create municipalities. 1975 (Ibid., pp. 77-85).

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PARTIES TO CIVIL ACTIONS; ONLY ENTITIES AUTHORIZED BY LAW Petitioner raised four (4) issues, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
MAY BE PARTIES IN A CIVIL ACTION. Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
only "entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case 1. WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LEGAL PERSONALITY TO SUE;
supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal
personality, it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, respondent Judge should have 2. WHETHER OR NOT THE MATTER OF SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTE IS A POLITICAL QUESTION;
dismissed the case, since further proceedings would be pointless.
3. WHETHER OR NOT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 242 SUPERSEDED REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6128; AND

DECISION 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTION HAS ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

The instant petition is impressed with merit.


PARAS, J.:
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Municipality of Santo Tomas legally exists.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking: (a) the reversal Petitioner contends that the ruling of this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General (15 SCRA 569) is clear that
(annulment) of the February 17, 1975 Order of the then Court of First Instance of Davao denying the the President has no power to create municipalities. Thus, there is no Municipality of Santo Tomas to
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 475; and the March 17, 1975 and July 10, 1975 Orders of the same Court speak of. It has no right to assert, no cause of action, no corporate existence at all, and it must perforce
denying petitioners motions for reconsideration; and (b) the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing remain part and parcel of Kapalong. Based on this premise, it submits that respondent Judge should have
respondent Judge to desist from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 475.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law dismissed the case.
not the proper party to bring the action, that prerogative being reserved to the State acting through the
On the ground of jurisdiction, petitioner argues that the settlement of boundary disputes is Solicitor General.[6]
administrative in nature and should originate in the political or administrative agencies of the On 18 July 1991, after the parties had submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, the trial court resolved
government, and not in the courts whose power is limited to judicial review on appropriate occasions to defer action on the motion to dismiss and to deny a judgment on the pleadings.
(Ibid., pp. 73-74). On 27 November 1991, the Municipality of San Andres filed anew a motion to dismiss alleging that the
case had become moot and academic with the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
Rule 3, Section 1 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that only "entities authorized by law may be the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 01 January 1991. The movant municipality
parties in a civil action." Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to cited Section 442(d) of the law, reading thusly:
create a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil Sec. 442. Requisites for Creation. - x x x.
action, and as such, respondent Judge should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would "(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and
be pointless. operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED; the Orders of February 17, 1975, March 17, 1975 and effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
July 10, 1975 of respondent Judge are SET ASIDE; and Civil Case No. 475 is DISMISSED. The restraining The motion was opposed by petitioner municipality, contending that the above provision of law was
order previously issued by this Court is made permanent. inapplicable to the Municipality of San Andres since the enactment referred to legally existing
municipalities and not to those whose mode of creation had been void ab initio.[7]
SO ORDERED. In its Order of 02 December 1991, the lower court[8] finally dismissed the petition[9] for lack of cause of
action on what it felt was a matter that belonged to the State, adding that "whatever defects (were)
G.R. No. 103702 present in the creation of municipal districts by the President pursuant to presidential issuances and
executive orders, (were) cured by the enactment of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as Local Government
Code of 1991." In an order, dated 17 January 1992, the same court denied petitioner municipality's
VITUG, J.: motion for reconsideration.
On 20 August 1959, President Carlos P. Garcia, issued, pursuant to the then Sections 68 and 2630 of the Hence, this petition "for review on certiorari." Petitioners[10] argue that in issuing the orders of 02
Revised Administrative Code, as amended, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San December 1991 and 17 January 1992, the lower court has "acted with grave abuse of discretion
Andres, Quezon, by segregating from the municipality of San Narciso of the same province, the barrios of amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction." Petitioners assert that the existence of a municipality
San Andres, Mangero, Alibijaban, Pansoy, Camflora and Tala along with their respective sitios. created by a null and void presidential order may be attacked either directly or even collaterally by
Executive Order No. 353 was issued upon the request, addressed to the President and coursed through anyone whose interests or rights are affected, and that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creates no
the Provincial Board of Quezon, of the municipal council of San Narciso, Quezon, in its Resolution No. 8 office and is inoperative such as though it has never been passed.[11]
of 24 May 1959.[1] Petitioners consider the instant petition to be one for "review on certiorari" under Rules 42 and 45 of the
By virtue of Executive Order No. 174, dated 05 October 1965, issued by President Diosdado Macapagal, Rules of Court; at the same time, however, they question the orders of the lower court for having been
the municipal district of San Andres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth issued with "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction, and that there is
class municipality beginning 01 July 1963 by operation of Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1515.[2] The no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law available to petitioners to
executive order added that "(t)he conversion of this municipal district into (a) municipality as proposed correct said Orders, to protect their rights and to secure a final and definitive interpretation of the legal
in House Bill No. 4864 was approved by the House of Representatives." issues involved."[12] Evidently, then, the petitioners intend to submit their case in this instance under
On 05 June 1989, the Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Rule 65. We shall disregard the procedural incongruence.
Court, Branch 62, in Gumaca, Quezon, against the officials of the Municipality of San Andres. Docketed The special civil action of quo warranto is a "prerogative writ by which the Government can call upon any
Special Civil Action No. 2014-G, the petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No. 353 person to show by what warrant he holds a public office or exercises a public franchise."[13] When the
and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres be permanently ordered inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a
to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respective offices.[3] Invoking the ruling of proceeding for quo warranto or any other direct proceeding.[14] It must be brought "in the name of the
this Court in Pelaez v. Auditor General,[4] the petitioning municipality contended that Executive Order Republic of the Philippines"[15] and commenced by the Solicitor General or the fiscal "when directed by
No. 353, a presidential act, was a clear usurpation of the inherent powers of the legislature and in the President of the Philippines x x x."[16] Such officers may, under certain circumstances, bring such an
violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Hence, petitioner municipality argued, action "at the request and upon the relation of another person" with the permission of the court.[17] The
the officials of the Municipality or Municipal District of San Andres had no right to exercise the duties Rules of Court also allows an individual to commence an action for quo warranto in his own name but
and functions of their respective offices that rightfully belonged to the corresponding officials of the this initiative can be done when he claims to be "entitled to a public office or position usurped or
Municipality of San Narciso. unlawfully held or exercised by another."[18] While the quo warranto proceedings filed below by
In their answer, respondents asked for the dismissal of the petition, averring, by way of affirmative and petitioner municipality has so named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents,
special defenses, that since it was at the instance of petitioner municipality that the Municipality of San it is virtually, however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal District of San
Andres was given life with the issuance of Executive Order No. 353, it (petitioner municipality) should be Andres to exist and to act in that capacity.
deemed estopped from questioning the creation of the new municipality;[5] that because the At any rate, in the interest of resolving any further doubt on the legal status of the Municipality of San
Municipality of San Andres had been in existence since 1959, its corporate personality could no longer Andres, the Court shall delve into the merits of the petition.
be assailed; and that, considering the petition to be one for quo warranto, petitioner municipality was
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 may have converted the
Municipality of San Andres into a defacto municipality, they, however, contend that since the petition [G.R. No. 161414. January 17, 2005]
for quo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
vested right to seek the nullification of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT
Republic Act 7160 to the petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and
clause of the Constitution. the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND
Petitioners' theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably brought. SENATE), respondents.
Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but DECISION
it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally TINGA, J.:
decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime, the Municipal District, and This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon[1]the
later the Municipality, of San Andres, began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a municipality of Andong, Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not
duly created local government unit. In the same manner that the failure of a public officer to question supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies,
his ouster or the right of another to hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of
belatedly filed,[19] so also, if not indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades
assailing the lawful authority of a political subdivision be timely raised.[20] Public interest demands it. ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and
Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree.
delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this case hardly could offer a The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General[2] in
choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely 1965. As discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders[3] creating
of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de facto municipal corporation. thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created
Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.[4]
353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved
December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a in that case had failed to pass Congress.[5] President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these
similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then Vice-President
the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive
of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,[6] and said orders
Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.[7]
surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null
129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion,
the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country, certain municipalities that comprised ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a
the municipal circuits organized under Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,[8] while three justices opined that the nullity
Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the
Andres had been covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the power of the Chief Executive over local governments.[9] Pelaez was disposed in this wise:
province of Quezon. WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said
Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.[10]
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been considered to be one of the Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality
twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally significant is of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the
Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong.
to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as Andong,[11] suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi is of public and paramount interest
regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur.[12] He alleges that
Government Code is proferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to
power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents,[13] even though he concedes that since
incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective,[21] and aimed 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government
at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have positions of Andong.[14] Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts,
been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) barangay units with their
impairment of vested rights.[22] own respective chairmen.[15] From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong have
All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and
be conceded. recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal. Since the time of Martial
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners. Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the Interim
SO ORDERED. Officials serving their constituents in their own little ways and means.[16]
In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised
a Certification issued by the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.[26] These municipal corporations have
Municipality of Andong, created under Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964. [17] He also exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although
submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the population no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their
of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list charters had been lost.[27] They are especially common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed
of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the development of that rule in England is
municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate understandable, since that country was settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes,
implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.[18] which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal
The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local authority.
Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held
(DILG).[19]The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certified as existing, per DILG records. that when no charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and
Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose exercised the powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection
creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog or interruption for so long a period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.[28]
in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal
and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of
Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.[20] the state. Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those
Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG in not classifying [Andong] as a circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camids plaint should have
regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done, should have been filed first with
[an] existing regular municipality.[21] He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual
detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities determinations. Camids seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
similarly annulled by reason of Pelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be
DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a regular existing countenanced.
municipality; all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camids present action. The assailed issuance
Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue is the Certification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to
allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the Interim Local create or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to
Officials of Andong.[22] serve Camids ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly
Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues refute the claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present
that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and status of Andong. Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual
jurisprudence. Particularly cited is our Decision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,[23] wherein issuance, rather than a long-standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special
the Court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a de facto municipal civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of the Certification to Camids central argument is forlornly
corporation.[24] Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, strained.
precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by
Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or
for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The provision reads: reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its
Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx kindred cases pertaining as they did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were
(d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate never judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such
as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that
which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity their town still exists, much less those who may comport themselves as the municipalitys Interim
of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.[25] Government, would be well served by a rude awakening.
There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition,
examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the merely by pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.[29] Executive Order No. 107, which
recognition of just any municipality. This point shall be further explained further on. established Andong, was declared null and void ab initio in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-
Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General three (33) other executive orders. The phrase ab initiomeans from the beginning,[30] at first,[31] from the
(OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to inception.[32] Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases
the de novo appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camids of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,[33] Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,[34] and Municipality of
astonishing factual allegations pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades Kapalong v. Moya.[35] No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No
since it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts,
factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts. there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.
The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed
principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the
Local Government Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility municipality, who challenged Santo Tomass legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not
of de facto municipal corporations. been expressly nullified by prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The
To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local blunt but simple ruling: Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create
Government Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action.[48]
decision in Pelaez. Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso[49] in 1995, it indicated a shift in
The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not the jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned
empowered to create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized that the municipality of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by
President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled
have been organized and in actual operation . . . .[36] However, the Court ultimately nullified only those by Pelaez in 1965. The legal status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989,
thirty-three (33) municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 through a petition for quo warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did
October 1964 whose existence petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. cite Pelaez as authority.[50] The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners
No pronouncement was made as to the other municipalities which had been previously created by the therein elevated the matter to this Court.
President in the exercise of power the Court deemed unlawful. In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further
Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. doubt on the legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at barthat
Siva.[37] The Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did
was not one of the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting not declare the executive order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said
the legality of the executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code executive order was a complete nullity, the Court noted peculiar circumstances that led to the conclusion
was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling that San Andres had attained the unique status of a de facto municipal corporation.[51] It noted
and entered a new decision declaring Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically challenged therein,
elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the despite the fact that the Court then could have very well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres
argument posed by the challengers to Lawigans validity.[38] as well.[52] This statement squarely contradicts Camids reading of San Narciso that the creation of San
In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,[39] what was challenged is the validity of Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional
the constitution of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.[53]
order,[40] and which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)[54] of the Local Government Code of
the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court 1991. It clarified the implication of the provision as follows:
from nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts
but should be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be
existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the
municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.[41] Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would
Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just
had been organized prior to the Courts decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are
creating Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing
functions.[42] It cited conflicting American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the
the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional.[43] But the Courts final conclusion was unequivocal usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)[55]
that Balabagan was not a de factocorporation. The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of
In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the Appeals[56] and Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz[57] In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality
statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration of Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked
that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at in support of the challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at
bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated length. The Court noted that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San
cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code Narciso; hence, the town should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local
provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.[44] Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de jure municipality. [58]
The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the
its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.[45] Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing issues raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the
this point,[46] yet the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity evolution of the rule.
of any corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the
in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a legislative
create municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of
Revised Administrative Code. Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we
This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.[47] The have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly
municipality of Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned.
In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national
having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and
created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the
fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town.
executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can
fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify
district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that they were issued upon the request of Camid, to support the restoration or re-operation of the
that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,[61] thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present
have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides inoperative.
that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had
their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various
Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as
municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter.[62] On the other hand,
and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of
decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Quezon,[63] Bohol,[64] and Misamis Occidental[65] respectively.
Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in
claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under the DILG Certification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling
Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.[66] It is thus not surprising that the
must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the
On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly
corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by
by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal
municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities.
part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not
their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been
Misamis Occidental. previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal
Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been
Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled.
of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San
Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as
cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.[59] done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal
From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from
offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.
effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has
promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was
similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the
as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran.[67] These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of
Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Lanao del Sur,[68] and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once
Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are belonged to Andong.
eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban. Most If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the
prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these
Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de factostatus by reason of its alleged continued existence years, been governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag Interim Government,
despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court then an expedient political and legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the
decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved. retention of Andongs legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed
It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist
forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave
municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must have their respective set of in Platos famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code. minded persons to awaken to legal reality.
Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.[60] This incapacity ties in with the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. a becoming courtesy for each others acts.[7] The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature
and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. [8] This
ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA SUPRA Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional, where a petitioner has shown a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one.[9] In other
[G.R. No. 146319. October 26, 2001] words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, [10] for to doubt is to sustain.[11]
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and Rep. Petitioner initially rejects R.A. No. 8806 because it violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
Francis Joseph G. Escudero, respondents. which provides, inter alia:
[G.R. No. 146342. October 26, 2001] Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
BENJAMIN E. CAWALING, JR., petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, SECRETARY OF THE code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT affected. (Emphasis ours)
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PROVINCE OF The criteria for the creation of a city is prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code of
SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF SORSOGON, MUNICIPALITY OF 1991 (the Code), thus:
BACON, respondents. Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into
DECISION a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and
Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806 if it has either of the following requisites:
which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Lands Management Bureau; or
Creating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified
Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.[1] by the National Statistics Office:
Pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,[2] the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original
on December 16, 2000, conducted a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
the matter for ratification. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes
On December 17, 2000, the Plebiscite City Board of Canvassers (PCBC) proclaimed[3] the creation and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
of the City of Sorsogon as having been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if
plebiscite.[4] it comprises two (2) or more islands.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon, Benjamin E. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 146319) seeking the exclusive of specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. (Emphasis ours)
annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds: Petitioner is not concerned whether the creation of Sorsogon City through R.A. No. 8806 complied
A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period with the criteria set by the Code as to income, population and land area. What he is assailing is its mode of
from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and creation. He contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by
B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day converting a municipality or a cluster of barangays, not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No.
extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before 8806 has done.
conducting the plebiscite. This contention is devoid of merit.
Two days after filing the said action, or on January 4, 2001, petitioner instituted another petition Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase A municipality
(G.R. No. 146342), this time for prohibition, seeking to enjoin the further implementation of R.A. No. 8806 or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of
for being unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that: the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and
1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of which petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of local government units to create a
the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. Thus,
Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:
converted into a component city; and Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government units shall comply
2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon with the same requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided, however, That such
and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the division shall not reduce the income, population, or land area of the local government unit or units
one subject-one bill rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. concerned to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the
Hence, the present petitions which were later consolidated.[5] income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income
Significantly, during the pendency of these cases, specifically during the May 14, 2001 elections, classification prior to such division. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
the newly-created Sorsogon City had the first election of its officials. Since then, the City Government of Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of
Sorsogon has been regularly discharging its corporate and political powers pursuant to its charter, R.A. No. existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or
8806. division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.
We shall first delve on petitioners constitutional challenge against R.A. No. 8806 in G.R. No. Petitioner further submits that, in any case, there is no compelling reason for merging the
146342. Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon considering that the
Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. [6] This presumption is rooted in Municipality of Sorsogon alone already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. This argument goes
the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,[12] this Court, through Justice Jose P. Laurel, made it clear that the judiciary does not pass the landmark case of Taada vs. Tuvera,[19] it could only schedule the plebiscite after the Act took
upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. In the exercise of judicial power, we are effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day
allowed only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and period from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000.
enforceable,[13] and may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or The COMELEC is correct.
impractical.[14] In addition, Section 10 of the Code provides:
Next, petitioner assails R.A. No. 8806 since it contravenes the one subject-one bill rule enunciated Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of
in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, to wit: boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
Section 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be
expressed in the title thereof. (emphasis ours) conducted by the Commission on Elections within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two principal subjects which are: (1) the effectivity of the law or ordinance affecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another
creation of the City of Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.While date. (Emphasis ours)
the title of the Act sufficiently informs the public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that Quite plainly, the last sentence of Section 10 mandates that the plebiscite shall be conducted within
no such information has been provided on the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon. 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the same provision allows
The argument is far from persuasive. Contrary to petitioners assertion, there is only one subject a law or ordinance to fix another date for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from the
embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the date of the effectivity of the law.
corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate Consequently, the word approval in Section 54 of R.A. No. 8806, which should be read together
and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and with Section 65 (effectivity of the Act) thereof, could only mean effectivity as used and contemplated in
inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the
Sorsogon was created. Hence, the title of the law, An Act Creating the City of Sorsogon by Merging the laws relating to the same subject should be read together and reconciled to avoid inconsistency or
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor, repugnancy to established jurisprudence. As we stated in Taada:
cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the two municipalities, nor can it be considered Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
to have deprived the public of fair information on this consequence. Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
It is well-settled that the one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to employ in the publication.
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition and
the minute details therein.[15] The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause unless it is otherwise
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect,[16] and where, as here, the persons interested provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.[17] Moreover, this any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. (Emphasis
impede legislation.[18] supplied)
Consequently, we hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the To give section 54 a literal and strict interpretation would in effect make the Act effective even
presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806. before its publication, which scenario is precisely abhorred in Taada.
We now turn to G.R. No. 146319 wherein petitioner assails the validity of the plebiscite conducted Lastly, petitioner alleges that the COMELEC failed to conduct an extensive information campaign
by the COMELEC for the ratification of the creation of Sorsogon City. on the proposed Sorsogon cityhood 20 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite as required by Article 11
Petitioner asserts that the plebiscite required by R.A. No. 8806 should be conducted within 120 days (b.4.ii), Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code. However, no proof whatsoever was
from the approval of said Act per express provision of its Section 54, viz: presented by petitioner to substantiate his allegation. Consequently, we sustain the presumption[20] that the
Sec. 54. Plebiscite. The City of Sorsogon shall acquire corporate existence upon the ratification of its COMELEC regularly performed or complied with its duty under the law in conducting the plebiscite.
creation by a majority of the votes cast by the qualified voters in a plebiscite to be conducted in the WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
present municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon within one hundred twenty (120) days from SO ORDERED.
the approval of this Act. x x x. (Emphasis ours) ALVAREZ v. GUINGONA SUPRA
The Act was approved on August 16, 2000 by former President Joseph E. Estrada. Thus, petitioner
claims, the December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted one (1) day late from the expiration of the 120- G.R. No. 176951 June 28, 2011
day period after the approval of the Act. This 120-day period having expired without a plebiscite being League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
conducted, the Act itself expired and could no longer be ratified and approved in the plebiscite held on Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P.
December 16, 2000. Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that it scheduled the plebiscite on December 16, 2000 based vs.
on the date of the effectivity of the Act. Section 65 of the Act states: Commission on Elections; Municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte; Municipality of
Sec. 65. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) newspapers of Bogo, Province of Cebu; Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Western Samar;
general and local circulation. Municipality of Tandag, Province of Surigao del Sur; Municipality of Borongan, Province
The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of TODAY, a newspaper of general of Eastern Samar; and Municipality of Tayabas, Province of Quezon, Respondents.
circulation. Then on September 01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in the Province x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according G.R. No. 177499
to the COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P.
published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs.
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Lamitan, Province of Basilan; Municipality of
Tabuk, Province of Kalinga; Municipality of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur;
Municipality of Batac, Province of Ilocos Norte; Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao III. Contrary to the Assailed Resolution of the Honorable Court, the IV. The Resolution Erroneously R
Oriental; and Municipality of Guihulngan, Province of Negros Oriental, Respondents. sixteen (16) Cityhood laws neither repealed nor amended the Local Bills Do Not Violate Article X, Se
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Government Code. The Honorable Court committed an error when it Constitution.
G.R. No. 178056 failed to rule in the Assailed Resolution that the Sixteen (16) V. The Sixteen (16) Cityhood La
League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P. Cityhood Laws violated Article X, Sections 6 and 10 of the Of The Constitution And The Rig
Treas; City of Calbayog, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and Jerry P. Constitution. Share In The National Taxes.
Treas, in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, Petitioners,
vs. IV. With due respect, the constitutionality of R.A. 9009 is not an issue
Commission on Elections; Municipality of Cabadbaran, Province of Agusan del Norte; in this case. It was error on the part of the Honorable Court to consider
Municipality of Carcar, Province of Cebu; Municipality of El Salvador, Province of the law arbitrary.
Misamis Oriental; Municipality of Naga, Cebu; and Department of Budget and
That Issue No. IV (i.e., the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9009) appears in the Motion for
Management, Respondents.
Reconsideration but is not found in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision
RESOLUTION
dated 15 February 2011) is of no consequence, for the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9009 is
BERSAMIN, J.:
neither relevant nor decisive in this case, the reference to said legislative enactment being only
We hereby consider and resolve: (a) the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion for
for purposes of discussion.
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011, attached to which is a Motion for
The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration, cannot be
Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 dated April 29, 2011 (Motion For
entertained. As to that, Section 24 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is unqualified. The Court has
Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside;
firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, 5 and only for
and (b) the respondents Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been first obtained may
After thorough consideration of the incidents, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration and grant
a second motion for reconsideration be entertained.6 The restrictive policy against a second
the Motion for Entry of Judgment.
motion for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the recently promulgated Internal Rules
As its prayer for relief shows, the Motion for Reconsideration seeks the reconsideration,
of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:
reversal, or setting aside of the resolution of April 12, 2011.1 In turn, the resolution of April 12,
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. The Court shall not entertain a second
2011 denied the petitioners Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15
motion for reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the
February 2011).2 Clearly, the Motion for Reconsideration is really a second motion for
higher interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its
reconsideration in relation to the resolution dated February 15, 2011.3
actual membership. There is reconsideration "in the higher interest of justice" when the
Another indicium of its being a second motion for reconsideration is the fact that the Motion for
assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and potentially
Reconsiderationraises issues entirely identical to those the petitioners already raised in their Ad
capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the parties. A second
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011). The following
motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
tabulation demonstrates the sameness of issues between the motions, to wit:
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Courts declaration.
Motion for Reconsideration In theMotion
Ad Cautelam Division,
for a vote of three Members
Reconsideration shall be dated
(of the Decision required
15 to elevate a second motion for
of April 29, 2011 reconsideration to the dated
February 2011) Court March
En Banc.8, 2011
We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration "can only be
entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by
the Courts declaration" even renders the denial of the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
I. With due respect, neither the Rules of Court nor jurisprudence more compelling.
II. The Resolution Contravenes AsThe
the 1997
resolution
Rules ofOf
April 2011 bears out,7the ruling sought to be
12,Procedure
Civil
allows the Honorable Court to take cognizance of Respondent And Relevant reconsidered
Supreme Courtbecame final by the Courts express declaration. Consequently, the denial
Issuances.
Municipalities multiple motions. By doing so, the Honorable Court ofthe Motion for Reconsideration is immediately warranted.
therefore acted contrary to the Rules of Court and its internal Still, the petitioners seem to contend that the Court had earlier entertained and granted the
procedures. respondents own second motion for reconsideration. There is no similarity between then and
now, however, for the Court en banc itself unanimously declared in the resolution of June 2,
2009 that the respondents second motion for reconsideration was "no longer a prohibited
pleading."8 No similar declaration favors the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Finally, considering that the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes the issues
II. Contrary to the ruling of the Honorable Court in the Assailed I. The Honorable Court put
previously Hasforward,
No Jurisdiction To Promulgate
particularly The
in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the
Resolution, the controversy involving the Sixteen (16) Cityhood Resolution Of 15 February
Decision dated2011, Because
15 February Therethe
2011), is No Longer
Court, Any
having already passed upon such issues with
laws had long been resolved with finality;thus, the principles Actual Casefinality,
Or Controversy To Settle.
finds no need to discuss the issues again to avoid repetition and redundancy.
of immutability of judgment and res judicata are applicable and III. The Resolution Undermines
Accordingly, The of
the finality Judicial System Inupholding
the resolutions Its Disregard Of
the constitutionality of the 16 Cityhood Laws
operate to deprive the Honorable Court of jurisdiction. The Principles
nowOfabsolutely
Res Judicata And the
warrants Thegranting
Doctrine of of Immutability
respondents of for Entry of Judgment.
Motion
Final Judgments.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners Motion for Leave to File Motion for for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress
Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011 and the attached Motion for Reconsideration does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending
of the Resolution of 12 April 2011; grants the respondents Motion for Entry of Judgment dated cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities
May 9, 2011; and directs the Clerk of Court to forthwith issue the Entry of Judgment in this case. that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of
No further pleadings or submissions by any party shall be entertained. a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is
SO ORDERED. to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.
The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific
DISSENTING OPINION condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen
CARPIO, J.: again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
The majority decision upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws because (1) of the conditions only.
pendency of the conversion bills during the 11th Congress; and (2) compliance with the In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a
requirements of the Local Government Code prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 9009. unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of
I reiterate my dissent. the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the
I. effectivity of RA 9009.
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Further, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in
local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, is unconstitutional for violation of the equal
the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) protection clause.
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria III.
established in the Local Government Code itself and not in any other law. There is only one Respondent municipalities must comply with the
Local Government Code.1 To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, the 100 million income requirement under the prevailing LGC.
Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself all the RA No. 9009 amended the Local Government Code precisely because the criteria in the old
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a Local Government Code were no longer sufficient. In short, RA No. 9009 repealed the old
city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. income requirement of 20 million, a requirement that no longer exists in our statute books.
Notably, each Cityhood Law provides in its Separability Clause that if any of its provisions is Compliance with the old income requirement is compliance with a repealed, dead, and non-
"inconsistent with the Local Government Code," the other consistent provisions existent law a totally useless, futile, and empty act. Worse, compliance with the old
"shall continue to be in full force and effect." The clear and inescapable implication is that requirement is an outright violation of the Constitution which expressly commands that "no x x
any provision in each Cityhood Law that is "inconsistent with the Local Government x city x x x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the
Code" has no force and effect in short, void and ineffective. Each Cityhood Law expressly local government code." Therefore, respondent municipalities in order to validly convert into
and unequivocally acknowledges the superiority of the Local Government Code, and that in cities must comply with the 100 million income requirement under the prevailing Local
case of conflict, the Local Government Code shall prevail over the Cityhood Law. The Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, and not with the old 20 million income
clear intent and express language of the Cityhood Laws is for these laws to conform to the Local requirement. Otherwise, such compliance with the old 20 million income requirement is void for
Government Code and not the other way around. being unconstitutional.
Moreover, Congress, in providing in the Separability Clause that the Local Government Code There must be strict compliance with the express command of the Constitution that "no city x x
shall prevail over the Cityhood Laws, treats the Cityhood Laws as separate and distinct from the x shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
Local Government Code. In other words, the Cityhood Laws do not form integral parts of the government code." Substantial compliance is insufficient because it will discriminate against all
Local Government Code but are separate and distinct laws. There is therefore no question other cities that were created before and after the enactmentof the Cityhood Laws in strict
that the Cityhood Laws are laws other than the Local Government Code. As such, the Cityhood compliance with the criteria in the Local Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. The
Laws cannot stipulate an exception from the requirements for the creation of cities, prescribed in conversion of municipalities into new cities means an increase in the Internal Revenue Allotment
the Local Government Code, without running afoul of the explicit mandate of Section 10, Article of the former municipalities and a corresponding decrease in the Internal Revenue Allotment
X of the 1987 Constitution. of all other existing cities. There must be strict, not only substantial, compliance with the
Contrary to the faulty conclusion of the majority, the Cityhood Laws do not amend the Local constitutional requirement because the economic lifeline of existing cities may be seriously
Government Code. The Legislature never intended the Cityhood Laws to amend the Local affected.
Government Code. Nowhere in the plain language of the Cityhood Laws can this interpretation IV.
be discerned. Neither the title nor the body of the Cityhood Laws sustains such conclusion. The increased income requirement of 100 million
Simply put, there is absolutely nothing in the Cityhood Laws to support the majority decision that is neither arbitrary nor difficult to comply.
the Cityhood Laws amended the Local Government Code. According to the majority, "the imposition of the income requirement of 100 million from local
II. sources under R.A. No. 9009 was arbitrary. x x x no research or empirical data buttressed the
The Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. figure. Nor was there proof that the proposal took into account the after-effects that were likely to
There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th arise."
Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood This is glaring error.
bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another
The Legislature, in enacting RA No. 9009, is not required by the Constitution to show the courts municipalities (4,019,776,072) is more than double that for Davao City (1,874,175,271). x x x
data like inflation figures to support the increased income requirement. As long as the increased As a result, the per capita IRA alloted for the individual denizen of Davao is even less than half
income requirement is not impossible to comply, such increase is a policy determination of the average per capita IRA of the inhabitants of the sixteen (16) municipalities (1,374.70
involving the wisdom of the law, which exclusively lies within the province of the Legislature. divided by 3,117.24)."
When the Legislature enacts laws increasing taxes, tax rates, or capital requirements for This indisputable fact vividly reveals the economic inequity that will inevitably result from the
businesses, the Court cannot refuse to apply such laws on the ground that there is no economic unjust allocation of the IRA as a consequence of the conversion of respondent municipalities
justification for such increases. Economic, political or social justifications for the enactment of into cities. Clearly, if the existing cities share in the Internal Revenue Allotment is unreasonably
laws go into the wisdom of the law, outside the purview of judicial review. This Court cannot reduced, it is possible, even expected, that these cities may have to lay-off workers and
refuse to apply the law unless the law violates a specific provision of the Constitution. There is abandon projects, greatly hampering, or worse paralyzing, the delivery of much needed public
plainly nothing unconstitutional in increasing the income requirement from 20 million to 100 services in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
million because such increase does not violate any express or implied provision of the VII.
Constitution. Conclusion
V. The Constitution expressly requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code itself
Failure of 59 existing cities to post 100 million annual income all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into
does not render the 100 million income requirement a city. To avoid discrimination and ensure uniformity and equality, such criteria cannot be
difficult to comply. embodied in any other law except the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws,
Suffice it to state that there is no Constitutional or statutory requirement for the 59 existing cities which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provide an exemption from
to comply with the 100 million income requirement. Obviously, these cities were already the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local
cities prior to the amendment of the Local Government Code providing for the increased Government Code, as amended by RA No. 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the
income requirement of 100 million. In other words, at the time of their creation, these cities letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. In addition, the Cityhood Laws
have complied with the criteria prescribed under the old Local Government Code for the creation violate the equal protection clause and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution on the fair and
of cities, and thus are not required to comply with the 100 million income requirement of the equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Without any doubt, the
prevailing Local Government Code. It is utterly misplaced and grossly erroneous to cite the "non- Cityhood Laws must be striken down for being unconstitutional.
compliance" by the 59 existing cities with the increased income requirement of 100 million to Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the motion for reconsideration of the League of Cities of the
conclude that the 100 million income requirement is arbitrary and difficult to comply. Philippines.
Moreover, as stated, the increased income requirement of 100 million is neither ANTONIO T. CARPIO
unconstitutional nor unlawful. Unless the 100 million income requirement violates a provision of Associate Justice
the Constitution or a law, such requirement for the creation of a city must be strictly complied
with. Any local government unit applying for cityhood, whether located in or outside the
metropolis and whether within the National Capital Region or not, must meet the 100 million Footnote
income requirement prescribed by the prevailing Local Government Code. There is absolutely 1 Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.
nothing unconstitutional or unlawful if the 100 million income requirement is easily complied
with by local government units within or near the National Capital Region. The majoritys The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
groundless and unfair discrimination against these metropolis-located local government units
must necessarily fail.
VI. DISSENTING OPINION
The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution. SERENO, J.:
Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are "If changing judges changes laws, it is not even clear what law is."
essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government - Richard A. Posner1
units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied) I maintain my dissent that the sixteen Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional. In questioning the
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be Courts latest Resolution,2 petitioners have raised concerns over the "highly irregular and
no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. unprecedented" acts of entertaining several motions for reconsideration.3 In response to these
A city with an annual income of only 20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive concerns, I wish to expound on the effects of the "flip-flopping" decisions on the Courts role in
the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of 100 million or more. The our democratic system and its decision-making process, in order that it may "serve to bulwark
criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local the fortifications of an orderly government of laws."4
Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are Our system of democracy is committed irrevocably to a government of laws,5 and not of
material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the men.6 Laws give witness to societys moral values7 and are the depositories of what the
Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, sovereign as a whole has agreed to uphold as the minimum standards of conduct that will
they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section govern relationships and transactions within that society. In a representative democracy, the
6, Article X of the Constitution. Filipino people, through their elected representatives, deliberate, distill and make moral
As pointed out by petitioners, "respondent municipalities have a total population equivalent to judgments, which are crystallized into written laws that are made public, accessible and binding
that of Davao City only, or around 1.3 million people. Yet, the IRA that pertains to the 16 to all.8 Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more fundamental than
its erection and enforcement of a system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its of law, "that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages" of the
members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an same case26 and thus offers to the people some measure of conviction about the legal effects of
orderly, predictable manner.9 their actions. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances, courts should be loathe to revisit
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice.10 Once the sovereign prior decisions.27
peoples "soft" moral choices are hardened through the constitutionally mandated legislative In the instant case, the public confusion, sown by the pendulum swing of the Courts decisions,
process,11 statutory laws perform an equalizing function of imposing a knowable standard of has yielded unpredictability in the judicial decision-making process and has spawned untold
conduct or behavior to which all members of society must conform to a social contract which consequences upon the publics confidence in the enduring stability of the rule of law in our
everyone regardless of class, sex or religion is bound.12 Legislative enactments are ordinarily jurisdiction.
prospective and general in character insofar as they prescribe limitations on an individuals The Court has been entrusted by the sovereign with the duty of voicing out and sharpening with
future conduct. Under the rule of law,13 ordinary people can reasonably assume that another finality societys collective ideals in its written decisions. Yet, if cases are litigated in perpetuity,
persons future conduct will be in observance of the laws and can conceivably expect that any and judgments are clouded with continuous uncertainty, the publics confidence in the stability of
deviation therefrom will be punished accordingly by responsible authorities. Thus, written judicial precedents promulgated by the Court would be greatly diminished. In this case, the
constitutions and statutory laws allow citizens a minimum confidence in a world of uncertainty: Court has reviewed and reconsidered, no less than five times already,28 the constitutionality of
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, the sixteen Cityhood Laws.29 During this time, the public has been made to endure an inordinate
hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic, and even despotic, might now degree of indecision that has disturbed the conduct of local government affairs with respect not
become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we only to the municipalities asking to become cities, but also with respect to cities genuinely fearful
made and promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not displace governance by of the destruction of the standards for the creation of cities and the correlative diminution of the
men, it did mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their word. 14 internal revenue allotments of existing cities. The Courts commitment to provide constant and
As man-made creations, however, laws are not always entirely encompassing, as future steadfast rules on the creation of cities has been inevitably weakened by the "flip-flopping" in the
conditions may change conditions that could not have been perceived or accounted for by the case that has opened the doors to rabid criticisms of the Courts failure to abide by its own
legislators. Actual situations may arise between two conflicting claims by specific parties with internal rules and, thus, diminishing reliance on the certainty of its decisions.
differing interpretations of the law. In those instances in which a gray area or an unintended gap To be sure, the Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn
exists in the implementation or execution of laws, the judicial department is charged with the adherence to the doctrine of immutability30 would involve the sacrifice of justice for
duty of determining the limitations that the law places upon all actions of individuals. 15 Hence, technicality.31 The Court has previously provided for exceptions to the rule on immutability of
the courts primary adjudicatory function is to mark the metes and bounds of the law in specific final judgments, as follows: (1) the correction of clerical errors;32 (2) nunc pro tunc entries which
areas of application, as well as to pass judgment on the competing positions in a case properly cause no prejudice to any party;33 (3) void judgments;34 and (4) supervening events.35As
brought before it. exceptions to the general rule, their application to instances wherein a review of a final and
The Court not only functions to adjudicate rights among the parties, but also serves the purpose executory decision is called are to be strictly construed.36 No convincing argument or
of a supreme tribunal of last resort that establishes uniform rules of civil justice. 16 Jurisprudence extraordinary circumstance has been raised to justify and support the application of any of these
"narrows the field of uncertainty"17 in the application of an unclear area of the law. The certainty exceptions to warrant a reversal of the Courts First Decision. Reversing previous, final, and
of judicial pronouncement lends respect for and adherence to the rule of law "the idea that all executory decisions are to be done only under severely limited circumstances. Although new
citizens and all organs of government are bound by rules fixed in advance, which make it and unforeseen circumstances may arise in the future to justify a review of an established legal
possible to foresee how the coercive powers of government will be used, whether in its own principle in a separate and distinct case, the extension of a principle must be dealt with
interests or in aid of citizens who call on them, in particular circumstances."18 The Courts exceptionally and cautiously.
historic role of pronouncing what the law is between the parties19 is the cornerstone of a Undeniably, the Court in the past has overturned prior decisions even on a second or third
government of laws, and not of men.20Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme motion for reconsideration and recalled entries of judgment on the ground of substantial interest
Court expounded on the objectives of uniformity and predictability of judicial decisions, to wit: of justice and special and compelling reasons.37 The Court bows to "the lessons of experience
This last point suggests another obvious advantage of establishing as soon as possible a clear, and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the
general principle of decision: predictability. Even in simpler times uncertainty has been regarded physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function."38Notable reversals in recent
as incompatible with the Rule of Law. Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law memory include the cases involving the request for extradition of Mark Jimenez, 39 the
must have the means of knowing what it prescribes. It is said that one of emperor Nero's nasty constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995,40 the land title covering the Piedad Estate
practices was to post his edicts high on the columns so that they would be harder to read and in Quezon City,41the just compensation due to Apo Fruits Corporation,42 and the "deemed
easier to transgress. As laws have become more numerous, and as people have become resigned" provision for public appointive officials in the recent May 2010 election. 43 Although no
increasingly ready to punish their adversaries in the courts, we can less and less afford prohibition exists that would prevent this Court from changing its mind in the light of compelling
protracted uncertainty regarding what the law may mean. Predictability, or as Llewellyn put it, reasons and in the interest of substantial justice as abovedemonstrated, extreme retrospect and
"reckonability," is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name. There are times when caution must accompany such review.
even a bad rule is better than no rule at all.21 (Emphasis supplied) In the instant case, there is no substantial interest of justice or compelling reason that would
Certainty and "reckonability" in the law are the major objectives of the legal system, and judicial warrant the reversal of the First Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. There is
decisions serve the important purpose of providing stability to the law and to the society no injustice in preventing the conversion of the sixteen municipalities into cities at this point in
governed by that law.22 If we are to subscribe to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes theory of a bad time. In fact, justice is more equitably dispensed by the stringent application of the current
man,23 then law provides reasonable predictability in the consequences of ones actions relative legislative criteria under the Local Government Code (LGC),44 as amended by Republic Act No.
to the law, if performed in a just and orderly society. As judicial decisions form part of the law of 9009 (RA 9009), for creating cities without distinction or exception. It must be remembered that
the land,24 there is a strong public interest in stability and in the orderly conduct of our affairs, an the declaration of unconstitutionality is not an absolute ban on these municipalities prohibiting
end served by a consistent course of adjudication.25 Thus, once a court has decided upon a rule them from pursuing cityhood in the future once they are able to achieve the PhP100,000,000
income requirement under RA 9009.45Alternatively, their congressional representatives can also "The tendency of the law," observes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "must always be to narrow
press for another amendatory law of the LGC that would include an explicit exception to the the field of uncertainty." And so was the judicial process conceived to bring about the just
income requirement for municipalities with pending cityhood bills prior to the enactment of RA termination of legal disputes. The mechanisms for this objective are manifold but the essential
9009. The route purportedly chosen by Congress to indirectly amend the LGC through the precept underlying them is the immutability of final and executory judgments.
exemption of annual income requirements in the Cityhood Laws is improper. If Congress This fundamental principle in part affirms our recognition of instances when disputes are
believes that the minoritys construction of its intention in increasing the annual income inadequately presented before the courts and addresses situations when parties fail to unravel
requirement is erroneous, then the legislature can show its disapproval by directly enacting what they truly desire and thus fail to set forth all the claims which they want the courts to
amendatory legislation of the LGC. In both cases, the remedy available to the sixteen resolve. It is only when judgments have become final and executory, or even when already
municipalities is not with the Court, but with the legislature, which is constitutionally empowered deemed satisfied, that our negligent litigants belatedly come forth to pray for more relief. The
to determine the standards for the creation of a local government unit. The reasoning and distilled wisdom and genius of the ages would tell us to reject their pleas, for the loss to litigants
substantial justice arguments expounded to reverse the initial finding of the Court that the in particular and to society in general would in the long run be greater than the gain if courts and
Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional are poorly founded. judges were clothed with power to revise their final decisions at will.48 (Emphasis supplied)
The LGC is a distinctly normative law that regulates the legislative power to create cities and Unlike that of the other two political branches whose mandates are regularly renewed through
establishes the standards by which the power is exercised. Unlike other statutes that prohibit direct election, the Courts legitimacy must be painstakingly earned with every decision that puts
undesirable conduct of ordinary citizens and are ends by themselves, the LGC prescribes the voice to the cherished value judgments of the sovereign. The judicial function in an organized
means by which congressional power is to be exercised and local government units are brought and cohesive society governed by the rule of law is placed in serious peril if the people cannot
into legal existence. Its purpose is to avoid the arbitrary and random creation of provinces, cities rely on the finality of court decisions to regulate their affairs. There is no reason for the Court to
and municipalities. By encapsulating the criteria for cityhood in the LGC, Congress provided bend over backwards to accommodate the parties requests for reconsideration, yet again, of the
objective, equally applicable and fairly ascertainable standards and reduced the emphasis on unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws as borne by the First Decision, especially if the
currying political favor from its members to approvingly act on the proposed cityhood law. result would lead to the fracturing of central tenets of the justice system. The peoples sense of
Otherwise, cities chartered under a previous Congress can be unmade, at a whim, by a an orderly government will find it unacceptable if the Supreme Court, which is tasked to express
subsequent Congress, regardless of its compliance with the LGCs requirements. Fairness and enduring values through its judicial pronouncements, is founded on sand, easily shifting with the
equity demand that the criteria established by the LGC be faithfully and strictly enforced, most changing tides.
especially by Congress whose power is the actual subject of legislative delimitation. The legal process of creating cities as enacted and later amended by the legislature,
In granting it the power to fix the criteria for the creation of a city, the Constitution, of course, did implemented by the executive, and interpreted by the judiciary serves as the peoples North
not preclude Congress from revising the standards imposed under the LGC. Congress shall Star: certain, stable and predictable. Absent the three branches adherence to the rule of law,
enjoy the freedom to reconsider the minimum standards under the LGC, if future circumstances our society would denigrate into uncertainty, instability and even anarchy. Indeed, the law is the
call for it. However, the method of revising the criteria must be directly done through an only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by accepting office
amendatory law of the LGC (such as RA 9009), and not through the indirect route of creating participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy and to
cities and exempting their compliance with the established and prevailing standards. By observe the limitations it imposes upon the exercise of the authority that it gives. 49 No public
indiscriminately carving out exemptions in the charter laws themselves, Congress enfeebled the officer is held to these highest of normative standards than those whose duties are to adjudicate
normative function of the LGC on the legislative power to create cities. Taking the argument to the rights of the people and to articulate on enduring principles of law applicable to all.
the extreme, a single barangay now has the chance of being chartered as a component city As Justice Robert Jackson eloquently expressed,50 the Supreme Court is not final because it is
without compliance with the income, territorial or population requirements under the LGC, for as infallible; it is infallible because it is final. And because its decisions are final, even if faulty, there
long as enough Congressional support is mustered to push for its exemption not in a general must be every energy expended to ensure that the faulty decisions are few and far between.
amendatory law, but through its own specific legislative charter. The selective disregard of the The integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice, but
norms under the LGC in favor of some municipalities cannot be sanctioned in a system where also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system
the rule of law remains dominant. Unless prevented by the Court, Congress will now be have done justice.51
emboldened to charter new cities wholesale and arbitrarily relax the stringent standards under The determination of the correctness of a judicial decision turns on far more than its
the LGC, which it imposed on itself. outcome.52 Rather, it turns on whether its outcome evolved from principles of judicial
It must be emphasized that no inconsistency arises from the present minoritys continued methodology, since the judiciarys function is not to bring about some desired state of affairs, but
participation in the disposition of the second or subsequent motions for reconsideration of the to find objectively the right decision by adhering to the established general system of rules. 53
parties with the avowed purpose of predictability of judicial pronouncements. The reiteration of What we are dealing with in this case is no longer limited to the question of constitutionality of
the minoritys position that the Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional is an expression that none of Cityhood Laws; we are also confronted with the question of certainty and predictability in the
the "new" or rehashed arguments in the subsequent motions have merited a change in their decisions of the Court under a democratic system governed by law and rules and its ability to
stand and appreciation of the facts and the law. For the minority to abandon their involvement uphold the Constitution and normative legislation such as the LGC.
from the proceedings in a mechanical adherence to the rule that the second and subsequent The public has unduly suffered from the repeated "flip-flopping" in this case, especially since it
motions for reconsideration are prohibited pleadings that do not warrant the Courts attention is comes from the branch of government tasked to embody in a clear form enduring rules of civil
to capitulate to the sixteen municipalities abhorrent strategy of insistent prayer for review of re- justice that are to govern them. In expressing these truths, I echo the sentiment of a judicial
hashed arguments, already passed on, repeatedly. colleague from a foreign jurisdiction who once said, "I write these words, not as a jeremiad, 54 but
If stability in the Courts decisions46 is to be maintained, then parties should not be encouraged in the belief that unless the courts adhere to the guidance of fixed principles, we will soon bring
to tirelessly seek reexamination of determined principles and speculate on the fluctuation of the objective law to its sepulcher."55
law with every change of its expounders.47 In Clavano v. Housing and Land Use Regulatory MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Board, the Court explained that: Associate Justice
G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010 second legislative district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by Republic
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners, Act No. 9716:
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its District Municipalities/Cities Population
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents. 1st District Del Gallego 176,383
DECISION Ragay
PEREZ, J.: Lupi
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule Sipocot
65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III Cabusao
and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of 2nd District Libmanan San Fernando 276,777
the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and Minalabac Gainza
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners Pamplona Milaor
consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any Pasacao
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by 3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga Camaligan 439,043
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or Pili Magarao
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general Ocampo Bombon
circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of Canaman Calabanga
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a 4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan Sangay 372,548
population of 1,693,821,2distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise: Garchitorena San Jose
District Municipalities/Cities Population Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
Ragay Minalabac
Lupi Pamplona 5th District (formerly 4th District) Iriga Buhi 429,070
Sipocot Pasacao Baao Bula
Cabusao San Fernando Balatan Nabua
Bato
2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899 Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals by both parties of the
Milaor Camaligan origins of the bill that became the law show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its
Naga Magarao approval by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the process
Pili Bombon progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
Ocampo Calabanga officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as well as
argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the oppositors
3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548 of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new
Garchitorena San Jose district.4
Goa Tigaon Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the approval of the Bill by the
Lagonoy Tinamba Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former
Presentacion Siruma second district from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for inclusion in the
new second district. No other local executive joined the two; neither did the representatives of
4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070 the former third and fourth districts of the province.
Baao Bula Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
Balatan Nabua the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
Bato thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.5 The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, 250,000 or only 176,383.
the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new minimum population standard.6 The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x Republic Act No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
(2) x x x x Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to question the constitutionality of
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, Republic Act No. 9716.
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent distinction between cities
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied). concede the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the above-cited provision is the reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no application with respect to
minimum population requirement for the creation of a legislative district. 7 The petitioners theorize the creation of legislative districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is
that, save in the case of a newly created province, each legislative district created by Congress only a requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
must be supported by a minimum population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.8 Under this In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population requirement for the
view, existing legislative districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts, reapportionment of districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates
provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least 250,000. On the other an additional legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be sustained as a
hand, if the reapportionment would result in the creation of a legislative seat representing a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid We first pass upon the threshold issues.
for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement. The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is the intent of the framers of Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the
the 1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional following reasons:
legislative seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional Commission fixed the 1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents had acted
original number of district seats in the House of Representatives to two hundred (200), they took without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.1avvphi1
into account the projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the year 2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against a tribunal, board,
1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people represented by 200 district officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.
representatives translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1) representative.11 Thus, Respondents maintain that in implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not
the 250,000 population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the performance
actually based on the population constant used by the Constitutional Commission in distributing of a ministerial act.
the initial 200 legislative seats. 3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain, speedy and
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative districts independently from the adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Considering that the main thrust of
creation of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the the instant petition is the declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716,
same manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original apportionment. the same could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief, over
Verbatim, the submission is that: which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district of The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to show that they had sustained,
Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the or is in danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic
legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) Act No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners lack the required legal
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and standing to question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional representation as provided This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when confronted with issues that,
in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the Constitution.12 by reason of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of the arguments on their content
The provision subject of this case states: and substance.
Article VI The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the application of procedural
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi whenever confronted with an
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts important issue of overreaching significance to society.15
apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public importance.
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
(2) x x x x Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we
and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
section. are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seek the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that
dismissal of the present petition based on procedural and substantive grounds. tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal supplied)
technical defects: first, petitioners committed an error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city
Alyansang Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct injury on the part whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
of the party seeking judicial review may be excused when the latter is able to craft an issue of entitled to at least one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
transcendental importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so, the cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the
standing requirements may be relaxed. This liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23 representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the foregoing principles must apply. additional district.
The beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the determination of whether or not a There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation of an additional district
population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional
legislative district in a province. legislative district created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least
We deny the petition. 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional district in a
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries with it the presumption of province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
constitutionality.24Before a law may be declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a creation and regardless of its population.
clear showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision of the Constitution nor any province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus,
proof showing that there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25 Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population that certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
must compose a legislative district. based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each certified by the National Statistics Office.
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely
one representative." an alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas that ran through the
one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is deliberations on the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at least two hundred fifty
meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. thousand" may be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission which, upon
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population framing the provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be
of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned "APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE
province. 26 DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would show that the 250,000 population
city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. benchmark was used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the districts among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population figure was
subject of interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27 used to determine how many districts a province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was have. Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the
the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as an absolute
Republic Act No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that time was minimum for one legislative district. And, closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination
a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an additional district would of the precise district within the province to which, through the use of the population benchmark,
violate Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be so many districts have been apportioned, population as a factor was not the sole, though it was
supported by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a total population of among, several determinants.
only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the law and the validity of the From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission originally divided the entire
newly created district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with a country into two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to the original number of district
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit: representatives. The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10)
with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the cities with a population of at least 250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section redistributed among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance with the
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio."31 Commissioner
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the Davide, who later became a Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa City before the
turn, apportioned among provinces and cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Municipality of Aborlan.
Metropolitan Area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was approved by the Body.
uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
official enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
more or less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250, 000 apportionment and districting for the province of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
inhabitants and each province shall have at least one representative, we first allotted one seat The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure. It was decided by the
for each of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000, importance of the towns and the city that eventually composed the districts.
which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further narrates:
Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the
the number of seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of their Committee for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied). Baguio City.
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city. Differentiated from this, the REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
determination of the districts within the province had to consider "all protests and complaints Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed
formally received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than population as in one district. He stated that he was toying with the idea that, perhaps as a special
already mentioned. consideration for Baguio because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional Commission narrates: divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba could be
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO: transferred to the Second District together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
was more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be lower during certain times
and Marcos. He stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second District. He then of the year, but the transient population would increase the population substantially and,
queried whether population was the only factor considered by the Committee in redistricting. therefore, for purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond question that
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into account the standards set population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to speak of the official business matters,
in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should transactions and offices that are also there.
be apportioned among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba and Baguio City are
with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can only be reached by
district must be compact, adjacent and contiguous. passing through Baguio City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the Body.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto Princesa was included with Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that
the northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San the Body should have a say on the matter and that the considerations he had given are not on
Vicente. the demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the venue and
xxxx situs of many government offices and functions.
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population of 75,480 and based on On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body approved the reconsideration of the
the apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns would result in a combined population of earlier approval of the apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
265,000 as against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron are very Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado
important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the capital of Palawan was put to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none against, the amendment was
before its transfer to Puerto Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential approved by the Body.
candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City
are lumped together, there would be less candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are will have two seats. The First District shall comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias,
not interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the south or the Bakun, Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and
Second District. Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the period of amendments. He There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and districting of Region I. 35
requested that the COMELEC staff study said proposal.33 Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was divided into districts based on
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was explained in the interpellations the distribution of its three cities, with each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a
that District I has a total population of 265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the fishing area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area," because
Second District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that Puerto Princesa such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the standard of compactness."36 In the
be included in the Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity requirement in the districting of Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were "political stability and common
Constitution considering that said City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second interest among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and disunity" considering the
District. "accepted regional, political, traditional and sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto that municipalities in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland. For
Princesa City to the Second District, the First District would only have a total population of Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should "balance the area and population."38
190,000 while the Second District would have 262,213, and there would be no substantial Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
changes. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard Associate Justice
in gauging equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents, all that DISSENTING OPINION
the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable, CARPIO, J.:
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied). I dissent. The majority opinion wreaks havoc on the bedrock principle of our "democratic and
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the uncompromising stand of petitioner republican State"1 that all votes are equal. Instead, the majority opinion introduces the Orwellian
that an additional provincial legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 concept that some votes are more equal than others. The majority opinion allows, for the first
population is not allowed by the Constitution. time under the 1987 Constitution, voters in a legislative district created by Congress to send one
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson. representative to Congress even if the district has a population of only 176,383. In sharp
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition contrast, all other legislative districts created by Congress send one representative each
find support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, because they all meet the minimum population requirement of 250,000.
even the Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is a constitutional The assailed Republic Act No. 9716 (RA 9716) is unconstitutional for being utterly repugnant to
sine qua non for the formation of an additional legislative district in a province, whose population the clear and precise "standards" prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution for
growth has increased beyond the 1986 numbers. the creation of legislative districts. Section 5(4)2 of Article VI mandates that "Congress shall
Translated in the terms of the present case: make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards" fixed in Section 5. These
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 constitutional standards, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation;
is based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the Constitutional (2) minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the increase of
Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4) uniformity in apportionment of
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986 legislative districts "in provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." The assailed RA
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40 In other words, 9716 grossly violates these constitutional standards.
Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows and does not prohibit an additional Legislators Represent People, Not Provinces or Cities
district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act There was never any debate3 in the design of our government that the members of the House of
No. 9786; Representatives, just like the members of the Senate, represent people not provinces, cities,
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on the protests and or any other political unit.4 The only difference is that the members of the Senate represent the
complaints against strict conformity with the population standard, and more people at large while the members of the House represent the people in legislative districts.
importantly based on the final districting in the Ordinance on considerations other Thus, population or the number of inhabitants in a district is the essential measure of
than population, the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second representation in the House of Representatives.5 Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a Constitution, just like in the previous Constitutions,6 could not be any clearer:
new legislative district is valid even if the population of the new district is 176,383 and The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected
not 250,000 as insisted upon by the petitioners. from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No. 4264, were: area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities; and progressive ratio x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the regrouped Evidently, the idea of the people, as individuals, electing their representatives under the principle
municipalities; of "one person, one vote,"7 is the cardinal feature of any polity, like ours, claiming to be a
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the discussion "democratic and republican State."8 A democracy in its pure state is one where the majority of
from the reconfigured District One; and the people, under the principle of "one person, one vote," directly run the government. 9 A
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the republic is one which has no monarch, royalty or nobility,10 ruled by a representative government
redistricting of Districts One and Two.41 elected by the majority of the people under the principle of "one person, one vote," where all
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together, with the increased citizens are equally subject to the laws.11 A republic is also known as a representative
population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the utter absence of abuse of democracy. The democratic and republican ideals are intertwined, and converge on the common
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic principle of equality -- equality in voting power, and equality under the law.
Act No. 9716. The constitutional standard of proportional representation is rooted in equality in voting power --
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the reapportionment of the first and that each vote is worth the same as any other vote,
second legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting not more or less. Regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, occupation, poverty, wealth or
additional district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not the only factor but literacy, voters have an equal vote. Translated in terms of legislative redistricting, this means
is just one of several other factors in the composition of the additional district. Such settlement is equal representation for equal numbers of people12 or equal voting weight per legislative district.
in accord with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly given In constitutional parlance, this means representation for every legislative district "in accordance
form in the Constitutional debates on the exact issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1 with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act ratio" 13 or proportional representation. Thus, the principle of "one person, one vote" or equality
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the in voting power is inherent in proportional representation.
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such It was in obedience to the rule on proportional representation that this Court unanimously struck
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW. down an apportionment law which:
SO ORDERED.
(a) x x x gave Cebu seven members, while Rizal with a bigger number of inhabitants got four 50,000 or even 100, thus throwing out of the window the constitutional standards of proportional
only; (b) x x x gave Manila four members, while Cotabato with a bigger population got three only; representation and uniformity in the creation of legislative districts. To disregard the minimum
(c) [gave] Pangasinan with less inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato x x x more than both, population requirement of 250,000 in provincial legislative districts while
five members having been assigned to it; (d) [gave] Samar (with 871,857) four members while maintaining it in city legislative districts is to disregard, as a necessary consequence, the
Davao with 903,224 got three only; (e) [gave] Bulacan with 557,691 x x x two only, while Albay constitutional standards of proportional representation and uniformity in the creation of
with less inhabitants (515,691) got three, and (f) [gave] Misamis Oriental with 387,839 x x x one legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." This means that
member only, while Cavite with less inhabitants (379,904) got two.14 x x x x legislative districts in provinces can have a minimum population of anywhere from 100 (or even
for being repugnant to the constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution that the Members of less) to 250,000, while legislative districts in cities will always have a minimum population of
the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as 250,000. This will spell the end of our democratic and republican system of government as we
may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants."15 know it and as envisioned in the 1987 Constitution.
Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is even more precise by providing that the Constitutional Standards for Reapportionment:
Members of the House "shall be elected from legislative districts Population and Territory
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with The Constitution itself provides the "standards" against which reapportionment laws like RA
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x 9716 will be tested, following its command that "Congress shall make a reapportionment of
x x." The phrase "as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants" in legislative districts based on the standardsprovided in this section,"17 referring to Section 5,
the 1935 Constitution has been changed in the 1987 Constitution to the more precise "in Article VI. These standards relate to first, population, and second, territory. Section 5 admits of
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and no other standards.
progressive ratio x x x." The addition of the phrase "on the basis of a uniform and progressive On population, the standards of the 1987 Constitution have four elements. First is the rule on
ratio" was meant to stress that the rule on proportional representation shall apply uniformly in the proportional representation, which is the universal standard in direct representation in
apportionment of every legislative district. legislatures. Second is the rule on a minimum population of 250,000 per legislative district,
The phrase "in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants," which precedes the which was not present in our previous Constitutions. Third is the rule on progressive ratio, which
phrase "provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area," means that legislative districts in means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as the number of the population
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area shall be apportioned according to proportional increases in accordance with the rule on proportional representation. Fourth is the rule on
representation or equal representation for equal numbers of people. Thus, there shall be one uniformity, which requires that the first three rules shall apply uniformly in all apportionments in
legislative district for every given number of people, whether inhabiting in provinces, cities or the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area.
Metropolitan Manila area. The Constitution18 and the Ordinance19 appended to the 1987 Constitution fixes the minimum
The phrase "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio" means that the ratio of one legislative district population of a legislative district at 250,000. Although textually relating to cities, this minimum
for every given number of people shall be applied uniformly in all apportionments, whether in population requirement applies equally to legislative districts apportioned in provinces and the
provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila area. Section 5(3) of Article VI mandates that "[e]ach Metropolitan Manila area because of the constitutional command that "legislative districts [shall
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x shall have at least one be] apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
representative." Consequently, a population of 250,000 serves as the default minimum with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive
population applicable to every legislative district following the rule on uniformity in the ratio." To reiterate, the Constitution commands that this rule on uniformity shall apply to
apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or in the Metropolitan Manila legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area." Otherwise, districts
area. apportioned in provinces, if freed from the minimum population requirement, will have
The phrase "progressive ratio" means that the number of legislative districts shall increase as constituencies two, four, ten times lower than in districts apportioned in cities, violating the
the number of the population increases, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila constitutional command that apportionment shall be based on a uniform ratio in "provinces,
area. Thus, a province shall have one cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area."
legislative district if it has a population of 250,000, and two legislative districts if it has 500,000. In short, the constitutional "standards" in the apportionment of legislative districts under Section
This insures that proportional representation is maintained if there are increases in the 5 of Article VI, as far as population is concerned, are: (1) proportional representation; (2) a
population of a province, city, or the Metropolitan Manila area. This is what is meant by a minimum "population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" per legislative district; (3)
"progressive ratio" in the apportionment of legislative districts, a ratio that must also be uniformly progressive ratio in the increase of legislative districts as the population base increases; and (4)
applied. uniformity in the apportionment of legislative districts in "provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Obviously, the 1987 Constitution has laid down clear and precise standards in the Manila area."
apportionment of legislative districts compared to the 1935 Constitution. What is inescapable is For territory, the Constitution prescribes the "standards" that a legislative district must be, "as far
that the 1987 Constitution has strengthened and tightened the requirement of uniformity in the as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent."
apportionment of legislative districts, whether in provinces, cities or the Metropolitan Manila To repeat, other than population and territory, there are no other standards prescribed in Section
area. 5 of Article VI. This Court cannot add other standards not found in Section 5.
To now declare, as the majority opinion holds, that apportionment in provinces can disregard the The Malapportionment of RA 9716 Flouts
minimum population requirement because the Constitution speaks of a minimum population only the Constitutional Standards on Population
in cities is logically flawed, constitutionally repulsive, and fatally corrosive of the bedrock notion RA 9716 grossly malapportions Camarines Surs proposed five legislative districts by flouting the
that this country is a "democratic and republican State."16 This ruling of the majority strikes a standards of proportional representation among legislative districts and the minimum population
debilitating blow at the heart of our democratic and republican system of government. per legislative district.
Under the majoritys ruling, Congress can create legislative districts in provinces without regard Based on the 2007 census, the proposed First District under RA 9716 will have a population of
to any minimum population. Such legislative districts can have a population of 150,000, 100,000, only 176,383, which is 29% below the constitutional minimum population of 250,000 per
legislative district. In contrast, the remaining four proposed districts have populations way above Apportionment in the Ordinance Appended to the 1987 Constitution
the minimum with the highest at 439,043 (proposed Third District), lowest at 276,777 (proposed Distinct from Legislative Reapportionments
Second District) and an average of 379,359. Indeed, the disparity is so high that three of the It will not do to hoist the apportionment under the Ordinance appended to the Constitution or
proposed districts (Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts) have populations more than double that of Mariano v. COMELEC27 and Bagabuyo v. COMELEC28 as normative props to shore up the
the proposed First District.20 This results in wide variances among the districts populations. Still hollow proposition that reapportionment in provinces can dispense with the minimum population
using the 2007 census, the ideal per district population for Camarines Sur is 338,764.21 The of 250,000 as prescribed in Section 5 of Article VI. In the first place, the Constitutional
populations of the proposed districts swing from this ideal by a high of positive 29.6% (Third Commission, exercising constituent powers, enjoyed absolute discretion to relax the standards it
District) to a low of negative 47.9% (First District).22 This means that the smallest proposed textualized in Section 5, Article VI, in the interest of creating legislative districts en masse
district (First District) is underpopulated by nearly 50% of the ideal and the biggest proposed cognizant of legitimate concerns.29 Only the people, through the instrument of ratification,
district (Third District) is overpopulated by nearly 30% of the ideal. possessed the greater sovereign power to overrule the Constitutional Commission. By
The resulting vote undervaluation (for voters in the disfavored districts) and vote overvaluation overwhelmingly ratifying the 1987 Constitution, the people in the exercise of their sovereign
(for voters in the First District) fails even the most liberal application of the constitutional power sanctioned the Constitutional Commissions discretionary judgments.
standards. Votes in the proposed First District are overvalued by more than 200% compared to In contrast, Congress enacted RA 9716 in the exercise of its legislative powers under the 1987
votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts and by more than 60% compared to votes in the Constitution and subject to the reapportionment standards in Section 5, Article VI of the
Second District. Conversely, votes from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts are undervalued by Constitution. Congress is strictly bound by the reapportionment standards in Section 5, unlike
more than 200% compared to votes in the First District while those in the Second District suffer the Constitutional Commission which could create one-time exceptions subject to ratification by
more than 60% undervaluation. the sovereign people. Until it enacted RA 9716, Congress never deviated from the minimum
Proportional representation in redistricting does not mean exact numbers of population, to the population requirement of 250,000 in creating a legislative district. Thus, in Republic Act No.
last digit, for every legislative district. However, under the assailed RA 9716, the variances swing 7854 (RA 7854) which doubled the legislative districts in Makati City, the Court in Mariano v.
from negative 47.9% to positive 29.6%. Under any redistricting yardstick, such variances are COMELEC took note of the certification by the National Statistics Office that at the time of the
grossly anomalous and destructive of the concept of proportional representation. In the United enactment of RA 7854, the population of Makati City was 508,174, entitling it to two
States, the Supreme Court there ruled that a variance of even less than 1% is unconstitutional in representatives.30
the absence of proof of a good faith effort to achieve a mathematically exact apportionment.23 Footnote 13 in Mariano v. COMELEC states: "As per the certificate issued by Administrator
Significantly, petitioner Senator Aquinos attempt to redraw districting lines to make all five Tomas Africa of the National Census and Statistics Office, the population of Makati as of 1994
proposed districts compliant with the minimum population requirement (and thus lessen the wide stood at 508,174; August 4, 1994, Senate Deliberations on House Bill No. 12240 (converting
variances in population among the districts) was thwarted chiefly for political expediency: his Makati into a highly urbanized city) x x x."
colleagues in the Senate deemed the existing districts in Camarines Sur "untouchable" because Similarly, in Republic Act No. 9371 (RA 9371) which also doubled the legislative districts in
"[a Congressman] is king [in his district]."24 This shows a stark absence of a good faith effort to Cagayan de Oro City, the two districts created complied with the minimum population of 250,000
achieve a more precise proportional representation in the redistricting under the assailed RA (254,644 and 299,322, respectively), as the Court noted in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC.31 Contrary
9716. Clearly, RA 9716 tinkers with vote valuation, and consequently with the constitutional to the assertion of the majority opinion, neither Mariano v. COMELEC nor Bagabuyo v.
standard of proportional representation, based solely on the whims of incumbent Congressmen, COMELEC supports the claim that Congress can create a legislative district with a population of
an invalid standard for redistricting under Section 5 of Article VI. less than 250,000. On the contrary, these cases confirm that every legislative district must have
Equally important, RA 9716 violates the minimum population requirement of 250,000 in creating a minimum population of 250,000. Only very recently, this Court in Aldaba v. COMELEC32 struck
the proposed First District, which will have a population of only 176,383. The minimum down a law creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos, which has a population just short
population of 250,000 per legislative district admits of no variance and must be complied with to of the 250,000 minimum requirement.
the last digit. The Constitution mandates a population of "at least two hundred fifty thousand" for RA 9716 Harbinger for Wave of Malapportionments
a legislative district in a city, and under the principle of "uniform and progressive ratio," for every More than 20 years after the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress has yet to comply with the
legislative district in provinces and in the Metropolitan Manila area. Constitutions mandate that "[w]ithin three years following the return of every census, the
Entitlement of "Each Province" to "at Least One Representative" Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided
No Basis to Ignore Standard of Uniform Population Ratio in this section."33 Instead, Congress has contented itself with enacting piecemeal
The directive in Section 5(3) of Article VI that "each province, shall have at least one reapportionment laws for individual areas, either for this sole purpose34 or ancillary to the
representative" means only that when a province is created, a legislative district must also be conversion35 or creation36 of a local government unit, at the behest of legislators representing
created with it.25 Can this district have a population below 250,000? To answer in the affirmative the area. As movements
is to ignore the constitutional mandate that districts in provinces be apportioned "in accordance of district lines spell doom or salvation for entrenched political interests, this process subjects
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive Congress to intense pressure to keep off certain districts.
ratio." That the Constitution never meant to exclude provinces from the requirement of Until RA 9716 came along, Congress was able to balance political exigency with constitutional
proportional representation is evident in the opening provision of Section 5(1), which states: imperatives. RA 9716 marks a tectonic shift by tilting the balance in favor of entrenched
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x x x members, x x x, who shall be elected interests, sacrificing the Constitution and ultimately, the ideals of representative democracy, at
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila the altar of political expediency. If left unchecked, laws like RA 9716 will fill the House of
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform Representatives with two breeds of legislators, one, representing districts two, four, ten times
and progressive ratio x x x." (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied) more populous than other favored districts, elected by voters holding "mickey mouse votes" and
In short, the Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of legislative districts in provinces, another, representing small, favored districts, elected by voters holding "premium votes" two,
cities and the Metropolitan Manila area must comply with proportional representation, on the four, ten times more valuable than the votes in disfavored districts.
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.26
Our oath of office as Justices of this Court forbids us from legitimizing this constitutionally Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred
abhorrent scheme, a scheme that for the first time under the 1987 Constitution creates a new fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
politically privileged class of legislators in what is supposed to be a "democratic and republican representative.5 (emphasis in the original)
State."37 To uphold RA 9716 is to uphold the blatant violation of the constitutional standards Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court disregarded the 250,000 population requirement as it
requiring proportional representation and a minimum population in the creation of legislative merely stated that Makatis legislative district may still be increased as long as the minimum
districts. This will derail our one person, one vote representative democracy from the tracks population requirement is met. The permissive declaration at that time presupposes that Makati
clearly and precisely laid down in the 1987 Constitution. must still meet the constitutional requirements before it can have another congressional district.
And for what end -- to create a special class of legislative districts represented by a new political The Local Government Code likewise is not in point since Section 461 thereof tackles
elite exercising more legislative power than their votes command? Such a grant of privileged the creation of a province and not the reapportioning of a legislative district based on increasing
political status is the modern day equivalent of a royalty or nobility title, which is banned under population. There is thus no point in asserting that population is merely an alternative addition to
the 1987 Constitution. History will not be kind to those who embark on a grotesquely anomalous the income requirement.
constitutional revision that is repulsive to our ideals of a "democratic and republican State." The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v. Comelec.6 Notably, the ponencia spliced that
The ruling of the majority today could sound the death knell for the principle of "one person, one portion of the decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its argument. Thus the ponencia quotes:
vote" that insures equality in voting power. All votes are equal, and there is no vote more equal x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The
than others. This equality in voting power is the essence of our democracy. This Court is Constitution, however, does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
supposed to be the last bulwark of our democracy. Sadly, here the Court, in ruling that there are standard in gauging equality of representation. x x x To ensure quality representation
some votes more equal than others, has failed in its primordial constitutional duty to protect the through commonality of interests and ease of access by the representative to the constituents,
essence of our democracy. all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative district should comprise, as far as
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (emphasis and underscoring in the
No. 9716 for grossly violating the standards of proportional representation and minimum original by the ponente)
population in the creation of legislative districts as prescribed in Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 It omitted that portion which specified the respective total population of the two districts
Constitution. as above 250,000. Thus the full text of the pertinent portion of the decision reads:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of Cagayan
Associate Justice de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National
Statistics
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oros first district have a total
CARPIO MORALES, J.: population of 254,644while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these figures
I concur with the ponencias discussion on the procedural issue. show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not
"Transcendental importance" doctrine aside, petitioners have the requisite locus require mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
standi. Petitioners are suing not only as lawmakers but as taxpayers and citizens as well. At the representation. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
initiative of a taxpayer, a statute may be nullified, on the supposition that expenditure of public The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject of Bagabuyo met the minimum
funds for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of population requirement at the time of reappportionment. The ponencias construal of the
such funds.1 Republic Act No. 9716 (R.A. 9716) mandates the creation of another legislative disparity in population sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly differs from the disparity
district and indubitably involves the expenditure of public funds. of population in the present case.
I DISSENT, however, on the ponencias conclusion, on the substantive issue, that a population The Record of the Constitutional Commission itself declares that the 250,000 benchmark was
of 250,000 is not an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative used in apportioning the legislative districts in the country. The sponsorship speech of
district in a province. Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr.7 reflects so.
Contrary to the ponencias assertion, petitioners do not merely rely on Article VI, Section 5 (3) x x x x. Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and
but also on Section 5 (1) of the same Article. 2 Both provisions must be read together in light of adjacent territory. Each city or each province with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at
the constitutional requirements of population and contiguity. least one Representative. This is Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative. x x x x The
Section 5 (3) of Article VI disregards the 250,000 population requirement only with respect to ordinance fixes at 200 the number of legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among the
existing provinces whose population does not exceed 250,000 or to newly created provinces provinces and cities with a population of at least 250,000 and the Metropolitan Manila area in
under the Local Government Code (as long as the income and territory requirements are met). accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.3 The actual population of the City of Makati progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official
during the Senate deliberations in 1994 on House Bill (H.B.) No. 4264 that was to be enacted enumeration as the point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or
into R.A. No. 7854 was 508,174.4 That is why the Court in Mariano declared: less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at least 250,000 inhabitants
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord and each province shall have at least one representative, we at first allotted one seat for each of
with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the the 73 provinces; and one each for all cities with a population of at least 250,000, which are the
population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty Zamboanga. Thereafter, we
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population then proceeded to increase whenever appropriate the number of seats for the provinces and
of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative cities in accordance with number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two ratio. x x x x. (capitalization, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
The framers of the Constitution intended to apply the minimum population requirement of The extraneous factors15 cited by the ponencia do not suffice to justify the redistricting,
250,000 to both cities and provinces in the initial apportionment, in proportion to the countrys particularly the inclusion of the municipality of Libmanan in the second district. Linguistic
total population at that time (56 million). difference is a weak basis to segregate the municipalities in the redistricting. To sanction that as
Yet the ponencia asserts that the 250,000 benchmark was used only for the purpose of the 1986 basis would see a wholesale redistricting of the entire country, given the hundreds of dialects
initial apportionment of the legislative districts, and now disregards the benchmarks application being spoken. Imagine Binondo being segregated from the Tagalog-speaking district of Tondo
in the present petition. It is eerily silent, however, on what the present population yardstick is. If or Sta. Cruz in Manila on the ground that Fookien is largely spoken in Binondo.
the present estimated population of 90 million is to be the dividend,8 then there would roughly be The former first district supposedly occupied 40% of the total land area of Camarines Sur. But
one legislative district representative for every 450,000. the former fourth district (which is now the fifth) comprises the same percentage of land area, if
Following the constitutional mandate, the population requirement cannot fall below 250,000. This not bigger. If land area was a factor, then the former fourth district should have been re-districted
is the average "uniform and progressive ratio" that should prevail. Thus, using the present also since it is endowed with a big area like the former first district.
population figure, the benchmark should be anywhere between 250,000-450,000 persons per The municipality of Libmanan is supposedly isolated by a body of water from the first district. But
district. Using anything less than 250,000 is illogical, for it would operate to allow more than 360 so is the municipality of Cabusao which is situated northeast of Libmanan and which is bordered
representatives of legislative districts alone on some capricious basis other than the variable of by the same body of water. Yet Cabusao is part of the new first district. Considering the similar
population. geographical location of the two municipalities, there is no compelling reason to segregate
A case in point is the congressional reapportionment done in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat Libmanan from the first district and tack it to the newly created second district.
and Zamboanga Sibugay effected through Republic Act No. 93579 and Republic Act No. The seminal case of Reynolds v. Sims16 had already ruled that these factors cannot be
9360,10 respectively. At the time of the congressional deliberations and effectivity of these laws, permissively considered in legislative reapportionment.
the population count in these provinces more than met the basic standard. Sultan Kudarat x x x Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion
already had a population of 522,187 during the 1995 census year,11 while Zamboanga Sibugay for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. x x x [We] hold that, as a basic
met the population threshold in 2001 with an estimated 503,700 headcount.12 constitutional standard, [equal protection] requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral
The ponencia sweepingly declares that "population was explicitly removed as a factor."13 Far state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. Simply stated, an individuals right
from it. Population remains the controlling factor. From the discussions in the initial to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial
apportionment and districting of Puerto Princesa, Baguio, Cavite, Laguna, Maguindanao and fashion diluted when compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the [State].
Cebu in 1986, it is clear that population and contiguity were the primary considerations, and the xxxx
extraneous factors considered were circumspectly subsumed thereto. [Equal protection] requires that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct
The ponencia harps on petitioners admission that Camarines Sur is actually entitled to SIX districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable. We
legislative districts, given its population of 1,693,821, to justify its conclusion that there is nothing realize that it is a practical impossibility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an
wrong in the creation of another legislative district in the province. This is a wrong premise. It identical number of residents, citizens, or voters. Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a
bears noting that petitioners raised the legislative entitlement to underscore the GRAVE ABUSE workable constitutional requirement. So long as the divergences from a strict population
OF DISCRETION committed in the enactment of R.A. 9716. principle are constitutionally permissible, but neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of
R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by reconfiguring the first and second districts. It did not, group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-based
however, touch the third and fourth districts which, when properly reapportioned, can easily form representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area
another district. No reasons were offered except Senator Joker Arroyos during the Senate alone provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population principle.
Plenary Debates on H.B. No. 4264, viz: "When it comes to their district, congressmen are kings. Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote. x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
We cannot touch them. He [referring to Rep. Villafuerte] does not also want it [referring to the Undoubtedly, Camarines Surs malapportionment largely partakes of gerrymandering.17
district of Rep. Villafuerte] touched... even if they have a pregnant populace or inhabitants, he A final word. By pronouncing that "other factors," aside from population, should be considered in
does not want it touched."14 the composition of additional districts, thereby adding other requisites despite the Constitutions
The resulting population distribution in the present case violates the uniform and clear limitation to population and contiguity, the ponencia effectively opens the floodgates to
progressive ratio prescribed in the Constitution. opportunistic lawmakers to reconfigure their own principalia and bantam districts. Leaving open
Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9716, the tally of population percentage per district in Section 5 of Article VI to arbitrary factors, such as economic, political, socio-cultural, racial and
Camarines Sur based on its population of 1,693,821 was as follows: even religious ones, is an invitation to a free-for-all.
District 1: 24.6% In light of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition
District 2: 28.03% and DECLARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL Republic Act No. 9716.
District 3: 21.99% CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
District 4: 25.33%
Compare now the population percentage per district after the passage of R.A. 9716: G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
District 1: 10.4% EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
District 2: 16.34% Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
District 3: 25.9% Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
District 4: 21.99% (former District 3) CONCEPCION, J.:
District 5: 25.33% (former District 4) During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
Remarkably, before R.A. No. 9716, the first district met the 250,000 minimum. After R.A. No. purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
9716, it suffered a very significant drop in its population from 416,680 to 176,157. Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities
enumerated in the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964
petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or subprovince is to be defined
present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor or any province is to be divided into one or more subprovinces. When action by the
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any (Governor-General) President of the Philippines in accordance herewith makes
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of any administrative officer
by said municipalities. or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, with the
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having executive control
Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers affected and assign
undue delegation of legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers such officers to the new districts so formed.
that the present action is premature and that not all proper parties referring to the officials of Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
the new political subdivisions in question have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions
several municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders because thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the
the latter have taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions (Insular Auditor) Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President
intervened in the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing- of the Philippines.
Fernando were allowed to and did appear as amici curiae. Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such
except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3: mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't
provisions hereof. of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be 5201) in consequence of the fixing and definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common
created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the boundaries of two municipalities.
province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid
which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal corporations is
created if its population is less than five hundred persons. essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not function" (State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely
be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of and exclusively the exercise of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-
the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas 349). As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart,
affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409), "municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this statutes."
new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must
without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and
municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which
is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.2a Indeed, without a statutory
of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
cogency and force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
upon logic and experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
Congress to the contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic scope of his authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to
Act No. 2379, has been brought to our attention. make the law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
orders are based, provides: separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order the very foundation of our Republican system.
define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements
[township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a
subprovinces, separate any political division other than a province, into such portions standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do
as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or portions with another, name not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
any new subdivision so created, and may change the seat of government within any ... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place
subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require: Provided, That therein as the public welfare may require.
the authorization of the (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare complied with, in which case the board shall enter an order creating a municipal corporation and
may require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority,
the seat of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
consider that said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748,3 which provided that, Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the
"whenever in the judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by case of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at
executive order," effect the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the bar. The Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial
change of the seat of the government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The Recovery Act authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair
opening statement of said Section 1 of Act No. 1748 which was not included in Section 68 of competition" submitted to him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations
the Revised Administrative Code governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, which "impose no inequitable restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly
the powers therein conferred could be exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of representative," provided that such codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to
said section referred exclusively to the place to which the seat of the government was to be eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to discriminate against them, and will
transferred. tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The Federal Supreme Court held:
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without
we assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial pronouncements must be undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general
construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved therein, outside of which they do aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the
not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
and Communications, the power to issue rules and regulations to promote safe transitupon enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is
national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of virtually unfettered. We think that the code making authority thus conferred is an
the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that
of fact. "public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be
of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in
and eminently legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" his opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would
demands the exercise of such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring
"(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315- about a total collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the
318), or a political question (Udall vs. Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of special duty and privilege of this Court to uphold.
Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the question as to whether incorporation is for the best It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative
interest of the community in any case is emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A
(In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1033, 1035-1037). better proof of the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative legislative functions can hardly be given.
powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains:
territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
of the village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
conferring upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
designate its metes and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
setting forth the area desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are
Pac. 405-409); or authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more
be incorporated as a town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform
determination by a court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with
court is allowed to determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be local governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their
included in the village, and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
incorporation, and to enlarge and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although
may require" (In re Villages of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary
Board of Control which shall determine whether or not the laying out, construction or operation action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council
of a toll road is in the "public interest" and whether the requirements of the law had been within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even
suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, BENGZON, J.P., J., concurring and dissenting:
except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5 A sign of progress in a developing nation is the rise of new municipalities. Fostering their rapid
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any growth has long been the aim pursued by all three branches of our Government.
of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official So it was that the Governor-General during the time of the Jones Law was given authority by the
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing Legislature (Act No. 1748) to act upon certain details with respect to said local governments,
the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel such as fixing of boundaries, subdivisions and mergers. And the Supreme Court, within the
local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of framework of the Jones Law, ruled in 1917 that the execution or implementation of such details,
control denied to him by the Constitution. did not entail abdication of legislative power (Government vs. Municipality of Binagonan, 34
Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices Phil. 518; Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan, 36 Phil. 547). Subsequently,
implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the Act No. 1748's aforesaid statutory authorization was embodied in Section 68 of the Revised
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority Administrative Code. And Chief Executives since then up to the present continued to avail of
either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, said provision, time and again invoking it to issue executive orders providing for the creation of
the alleged power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote municipalities.
the exercise by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive
executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above Code. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in implementation of said executive orders.
quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in Suing as private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed in this Court a
him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain
the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of
which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices. public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said Petitioner contends that the President has no power to create a municipality by executive order.
Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be It is argued that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, so far as it purports to
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly grant any such power, is invalid or, at the least, already repealed, in light of the Philippine
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment.7 Constitution and Republic Act 2370 (The Barrio Charter).
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not Section 68 is again reproduced hereunder for convenience:
all the proper parties" referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities "have SEC. 68. General authority of [Governor-General) President of the Philippines to fix
been impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature." boundaries and make new subdivisions. The [Governor-General] President of the
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any
claim, that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and province, subprovince, municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political
assumed office. At any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any
Auditor General, is the officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the province into one or more subprovinces, separate any political division other than a
Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the province, into such portions as may be required, merge any of such subdivisions or
services of a lawyer" (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and may change the
creation of the aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare
said local officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their may require: Provided, That the authorization of the [Philippine Legislature] Congress
interest in the case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented.8 of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any province or
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or more
executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It subprovinces. When action by the [Governor-General] President of the Philippines in
is, however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction
President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the [Governor-General] President
the same have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of of the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the
doubt, that the expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in Department having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the
audit by the General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, several officers to the new districts so formed.
that respondent would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
case, in the absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him. authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and thereby affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the
the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in [Insular Auditor] Auditor General and approved by the [Governor-General] President
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above of the Philippines.
referred to. It is so ordered. From such working I believe that power to create a municipality is included: to "separate any
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur. political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any such
Zaldivar, J., took no part. subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created." The issue,
however, is whether the legislature can validly delegate to the Executive such power.
The power to create a municipality is legislative in character. American authorities have
Separate Opinions therefore favored the view that it cannot be delegated; that what is delegable is not the power to
create municipalities but only the power to determine the existence of facts under which creation controlling their local governments are "two worlds apart," is untenable. And since as stated, the
of a municipality will result (37 Am. Jur. 628). power to control local governments can no longer be conferred on or exercised by the President,
The test is said to lie in whether the statute allows any discretion on the delegate as to whether it follows a fortiori that the power to create them, all the more cannot be so conferred or
the municipal corporation should be created. If so, there is an attempted delegation of legislative exercised.
power and the statute is invalid (Ibid.). Now Section 68 no doubt gives the President such I am compelled to conclude, therefore, that Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Constitution has
discretion, since it says that the President "may by executive order" exercise the powers therein repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code as far as the latter empowers the
granted. Furthermore, Section 5 of the same Code states: President to create local governments. Repeal by the Constitution of prior statutes inconsistent
SEC. 5. Exercise of administrative discretion The exercise of the permissive with it has already been sustained in De los Santos v. MaIlare, 87 Phil. 289. And it was there
powers of all executive or administrative officers and bodies is based upon discretion, held that such repeal differs from a declaration of unconstitutionality of a posterior legislation, so
and when such officer or body is given authority to do any act but not required to do much so that only a majority vote of the Court is needed to sustain a finding of repeal.
such act, the doing of the same shall be dependent on a sound discretion to be Since the Constitution repealed Section 68 as far back as 1935, it is academic to ask whether
exercised for the good of the service and benefit of the public, whether so expressed Republic Act 2370 likewise has provisions in conflict with Section 68 so as to repeal it. Suffice it
in the statute giving the authority or not. to state, at any rate, that statutory prohibition on the President from creating a barrio does not, in
Under the prevailing rule in the United States and Section 68 is of American origin the my opinion, warrant the inference of statutory prohibition for creating a municipality. For although
provision in question would be an invalid attempt to delegate purely legislative powers, contrary municipalities consist of barrios, there is nothing in the statute that would preclude creation of
to the principle of separation of powers. new municipalities out of pre-existing barrios.
It is very pertinent that Section 68 should be considered with the stream of history in mind. A It is not contrary to the logic of local autonomy to be able to create larger political units and
proper knowledge of the past is the only adequate background for the present. Section 68 was unable to create smaller ones. For as long ago observed in President McKinley's Instructions to
adopted half a century ago. Political change, two world wars, the recognition of our the Second Philippine Commission, greater autonomy is to be imparted to the smaller of the two
independence and rightful place in the family of nations, have since taken place. In 1917 the political units. The smaller the unit of local government, the lesser is the need for the national
Philippines had for its Organic Act the Jones Law. And under the setup ordained therein no strict government's intervention in its political affairs. Furthermore, for practical reasons, local
separation of powers was adhered to. Consequently, Section 68 was not constitutionally autonomy cannot be given from the top downwards. The national government, in such a case,
objectionable at the time of its enactment. could still exercise power over the supposedly autonomous unit, e.g., municipalities, by
The advent of the Philippine Constitution in 1935 however altered the situation. For not only was exercising it over the smaller units that comprise them, e.g., the barrios. A realistic program of
separation of powers strictly ordained, except only in specific instances therein provided, but the decentralization therefore calls for autonomy from the bottom upwards, so that it is not surprising
power of the Chief Executive over local governments suffered an explicit reduction. for Congress to deny the national government some power over barrios without denying it over
Formerly, Section 21 of the Jones Law provided that the Governor-General "shall have general municipalities. For this reason, I disagree with the majority view that because the President
supervision and control of all the departments and bureaus of the government in the Philippine could not create a barrio under Republic Act 2370, a fortiori he cannot create a municipality.
Islands." Now Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President It is my view, therefore, that the Constitution, and not Republic Act 2370, repealed Section 68 of
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general the Revised Administrative Code's provision giving the President authority to create local
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws governments. And for this reason I agree with the ruling in the majority opinion that the executive
be faithfully executed. orders in question are null and void.
In short, the power of control over local governments had now been taken away from the Chief In thus ruling, the Court is but sustaining the fulfillment of our historic desire to be free and
Executive. Again, to fully understand the significance of this provision, one must trace its independent under a republican form of government, and exercising a function derived from the
development and growth. very sovereignty that it upholds. Executive orders declared null and void.
As early as April 7, 1900 President McKinley of the United States, in his Instructions to the Makalintal and Regala, JJ., concur.
Second Philippine Commission, laid down the policy that our municipal governments should be Facts:
"subject to the least degree of supervision and control" on the part of the national government. The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative
Said supervision and control was to be confined within the "narrowest limits" or so much only as Code, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
"may be necessary to secure and enforce faithful and efficient administration by local officers." municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the
And the national government "shall have no direct administration except of matters of purely Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
general concern." (See Hebron v. Reyes, L-9158, July 28, 1958.) preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and
All this had one aim, to enable the Filipinos to acquire experience in the art of self-government, agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive orders
with the end in view of later allowing them to assume complete management and control of the and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
administration of their local affairs. Such aim is the policy now embodied in Section 10 (1), Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68 has
Article VII of the Constitution (Rodriguez v. Montinola, 50 O.G. 4820). been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an undue
It is the evident decree of the Constitution, therefore, that the President shall have no power of delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
control over local governments. Accordingly, Congress cannot by law grant him such power Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the
(Hebron v. Reyes, supra). And any such power formerly granted under the Jones Law thereby provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
became unavoidably inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution. Issues:
It remains to examine the relation of the power to create and the power to control local Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
governments. Said relationship has already been passed upon by this Court in Hebron v. power.
Reyes, supra. In said case, it was ruled that the power to control is an incident of the power to
create or abolish municipalities. Respondent's view, therefore, that creating municipalities and Discussions:
Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: barrios are undisputedly part of appellant's (Alicia) territory under Executive Order No. 265
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general creating the latter" (Decision, p. 6, rollo, p. 37).
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be The respondent Court also found, after an examination of the respective survey plans of
faithfully executed. petitioner and respondent submitted as exhibits, that "both plans are inadequate insofar as
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of identifying the monuments of the boundary line between [petitioner] and the Municipality of
such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of Mabini (which is not a party to this case) as declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither
the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution plan shows where Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong, mentioned in the
to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental aforequoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are actually located."
law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local governments or the (Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court, after weighing and considering the import of
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot certain official acts, including Executive Order No. 265 dated September 16, 1949 (which
interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios of the municipality of Mabini), and
Act No. 968 of the Philippine Commission dated October 31, 1903 (which set forth the
Rulings: respective component territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay), concluded that
Yes. It did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers. The alleged power of the President to create "Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as one of the barrios
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an authority even greater than constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio
that of control which he has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-appellant Municipality of Candijay."
of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate. On that basis, the respondent Court held that:
Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than that vested in him over the Clearly, from the foregoing, there is equiponderance of evidence. The Supreme Court has
executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by ruled:
conferring upon him more power over municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive Equiponderance of evidence rule states:
departments, bureaus or offices. When the scale shall stand upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence
which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant.
G.R. No. 116702 December 28, 1995 Under said principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL, acting through its Sanguniang Bayan and the weakness of defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff may be
Mayor, petitioner, stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of evidence on his
vs. side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his cause of action.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL, respondents. (Sapu-an, et al. v. Court of Appeals, Oct. 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 701, 705-706.)
RESOLUTION WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is reversed and set aside. Another judgment is
hereby entered dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 2402. No costs. (Decision, p.
PANGANIBAN, J.: 6, rollo, p. 37.)
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 promulgated on Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been rejected by the respondent Court, petitioner
June 28, 1994, reversing the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch I) of the City of came to this Court, alleging (i) improper application by the respondent Court of Appeals of the
Tagbilaran, Bohol. so-called principle of "equiponderance of evidence", for having based its ruling against petitioner
The lower court's decision, among other things, declared "barrio/barangay Pagahat as within the on documentary evidence which, petitioner claims, are void, (ii) the respondent municipality's
territorial jurisdiction of the plaintiff municipality of Candijay, Bohol, therefore, said barrio forms purported lack of juridical personality, as a result of having been created under a void executive
part and parcel of its territory, therefore, belonging to said plaintiff municipality", and further order, and (iii) that the challenged Decision "does not solve the problem of both towns but
permanently enjoined defendant municipality of Alicia "to respect plaintiff's control, possession throws them back again to their controversy." (Petition, p. 6, rollo, p. 21.)
and political supervision of barangay Pagahat and never to molest, disturb, harass its After deliberating on the petition, comment and reply, this Court is not persuaded to grant due
possession and ownership over the same barrio" (RTC decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 86). course to the petition.
On appeal, the respondent Court stated that "(S)crutiny of the conflicting claims and the With respect to the first and third grounds, we find that the issues of fact in this case had been
respective evidence of the parties lead to the conclusion that the trial court committed an error in adequately passed upon by respondent Court in its Decision, which is well-supported by the
declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee (municipality evidence on record. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the respondent Court
of Candijay)." Said Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner based on certain involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this
exhibits, since it would in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat . . . , part of Barrio Court unless shown to be whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing.
Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all of Barrio Mahayag In connection with the foregoing, that the assailed Decision, in dismissing the complaint in Civil
and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction of plaintiff-appellee Candijay." Added the Case No. 2402, may leave the parties where they are or may not resolve their problem one way
respondent Court, "As aptly pointed out by defendant-appellant in its appeal brief, 'the plaintiff or the other, is of no moment. The fact remains that, as correctly evaluated by the respondent
municipality will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but also of the barrios of Court, neither party was able to make out a case; neither side could establish its cause of action
Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong, and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to
Candijay will eat up a big chunk of territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the litigate, and, as a consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such
law creating her. Her claim opens the floodgate of controversies over boundaries, including with cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the complaints/petitions.
Mabini.'" (Decision p. 4; rollo, p. 35.) The respondent Court concluded that "the trial court erred On the second issue, we noted that petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical
in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for petitioner], because, in effect, it included portions personality of respondent municipality on 19 January 1984 (or some thirty five years after
of Barrios Putlongcam and La Hacienda within the jurisdiction of appellee Candijay when said respondent municipality first came into existence in 1949) during the proceedings in the court a
quo. It appears that, after presentation of its evidence, herein petitioner asked the trial court to No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code is
bar respondent municipality from presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to
personality. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by President Quirino on create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has
September 16, 1949 creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective,
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as
constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to
was therefore declared unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General.3 the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights.
In this regard, we call to mind the ruling of this Court in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon
vs. Mendez, Sr.4 , which will be found very instructive in the case at bench. Therein we stated: must now be conceded.
While petitioners would grant that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of the
Code of 1991] may have converted the Municipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, municipality of San Andres. Respondent municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive
they, however, contend that since the petition for quo warranto had been filed prior to the Order No. 265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San Andres, and therefore had
passage of said law, petitioner municipality had acquired a vested right to seek the nullification been in existence for all of sixteen years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated.
of Executive Order No. 353, and any attempt to apply Section 442 of Republic Act 7160 to the And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the State's recognition and
petition would perforce be violative of due process and the equal protection clause of the acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under Administrative Order No. 33
Constitution. above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of
Petitioner's theory might perhaps be a point to consider had the case been seasonably Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance appended to the 1987
brought. Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District
20 August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on 05 June 1989, that the of Bohol.
municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly situated as the municipality of San
the meantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and Andres, it should likewise benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government
continued to exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. In the Code, and should henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
same manner that the failure of a public officer to question his ouster or the right of another to WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against
hold a position within a one-year period can abrogate an action belatedly file, so also, if not petitioner. SO ORDERED.
indeed with greatest imperativeness, must a quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful
authority of a political subdivision be timely raised. Public interest demands it. CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT - SUPRA
Granting that Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this
case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have
at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that
of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise.
Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had
been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor
General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of
the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the
contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal
district, Executive Order No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class
municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.
Section 31 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, constituted as municipal circuits, in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in the country, certain municipalities that comprised the municipal circuits organized under
Administrative Order No. 33, dated 13 June 1978, issued by this court pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 537. Under this administrative order, the Municipality of San Andres had been
covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-San Andres for the province of
Quezon.
At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled.
Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of
Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San Andres has been
considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the
province of Quezon. Equally significant is Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code to
the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the
time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

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