Professional Documents
Culture Documents
RELATIONS
Submitted to:
Submitted by:
DIMAL, JohanesHenrik M.
BERGONIA, Elira Jane S.
MELEGRITO, Ma. Alexia R.
MAHINAY, Marian Gizelle M.
REYNES, Abigail C.
TORRALBA, Roanna Angelica G.
TANGHAL, Noelle Christine P.
HINGAN, John Renan G.
1
Interpretation and Application of Laws
Social Justice
2
where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Where the reason for the valid dismissal is, for example, habitual
intoxication or an offense involving moral turpitude, like theft or
illicit sexual relations with a fellow worker, the employer may not
be required to give the dismissed employee separation pay, or
financial assistance, or whatever other name it is called, on the
ground of social justice.
Police Power
Purpose of Self-Organization
4
right to self-organization. It is not, however, regarded as existing
or available for purposes of collective bargaining, but simply for
the furtherance and protection of their interests.
5
unions of their choice for purposes of collective bargaining. Since
private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by
law for calling a certification election, it was incumbent upon
respondent Director to conduct such certification election to
ascertain the bargaining representative of petitioner's employees
(SamahangManggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel, 134
SCRA 152).
6
considerable interest in the determination of who shall represent
him in negotiating the terms and conditions of his employment.
Meralco vs. Sec. of Labor, G.R. No. 91902, May 20, 1991
8
warranting a separate category. Excluding confidential employees
from the rank and file bargaining unit, therefore, is not
tantamount to discrimination.
10
While above-quoted Article 245 expressly prohibits supervisory
employees from joining a rank-and-file union, it does not provide
what would be the effect if a rank-and-file union counts
supervisory employees among its members, or vice-versa.
Cooperative members
12
representation cases is the power to determine who the eligible
voters are. In so doing, it is axiomatic that the med-arbiter should
determine the legality of the employees' membership in the
union. In the case at bar, it obviously becomes necessary to
consider first the propriety of the employees' membership
withdrawal from the cooperative before a certification election
can be had.
14
to feel offended by the fact that, while they will be paid their
salaries in the meanwhile they would not be considered as fit
persons to perform the duties pertaining to the positions held by
them. Far from being generous such an offer could rightfully, be
considered insulting.
15
employee shall be considered as such, beginning on his first day
of service, for purposes of membership in a labor union.
16
B. Labor Organizations
1. Definition
This Court reverses the finding of the appellate court and BLR on
this ground, and rules that PDMP cannot directly create a local or
chapter. After an exhaustive study of the governing labor law
provisions, both statutory and regulatory, we find no legal
justification to support the conclusion that a trade union center is
allowed to directly create a local or chapter through chartering.
Apropos, we take this occasion to reiterate the first and
17
fundamental duty of this Court, which is to apply the law. The
solemn power and duty of the Court to interpret and apply the
law does not include the power to correct by reading into the law
what is not written therein.
2. Registration
PAFLU vs. Sec. of Labor, G.R. No. L-22228, February 27, 1969, En
Banc
The theory to the effect that section 23 of Republic Act No. 875
unduly curtails the freedom of assembly and association
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of factual basis. The
registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section is not a
limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be
exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a
condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by
labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of
the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
18
organizations. The Constitution does not guarantee these rights
and privileges, much less said personality, which are mere
statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which
registration is required to protect both labor and the public
against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers,
although not truly accredited agents of the union they purport to
represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police
power, because the activities in which labor organizations,
associations and unions of workers are engaged affect public
interest, which should be protected.
19
separate and distinct voluntary association owing its creation to
the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local
union of its own personality, neither does it give the mother
federation the license to act independently of the local union. It
only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in
representation of the latter. Hence, local unions are considered
principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their
agent. As such principals, the unions are entitled to exercise the
rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization, including
the right to seek certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent in the appropriate employer unit.
20
certificate, along with the names of the local/chapters officers,
constitution and bylaws to the Regional Office or Bureau. It is the
submission of these documents, certified under oath by the
Secretary or Treasurer of the local/chapter and attested by the
President, which vests legal personality in the local/chapter,
which is then free to file on its own a petition for certification
election. In this case, the federation in question, the FFW, did not
submit any of these documentary requirements to the Regional
Office or Bureau. It did however issue a charter certificate to the
putative local/chapter (herein respondent). Respondent then
submitted the charter certificate along with the other
documentary requirements to the Regional Office, but not for the
specific purpose of creating the local/chapter, but for filing the
petition for certification election.
21
the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the
circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239
of above-quoted Article 239 of the Labor Code. THEU, having
been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be
considered to have already acquired juridical personality which
may not be assailed collaterally. As for petitioners allegation that
some of the signatures in the petition for certification election
were obtained through fraud, false statement and
misrepresentation, the proper procedure is, as reflected above,
for it to file a petition for cancellation of the certificate of
registration, and not to intervene in a petition for certification
election.
22
of any person to join an organization also includes the right to
leave that organization and join another one. Besides, HHE union
is dead. It had ceased to exist and its certificate of registration
had already been cancelled. Thus, petitioners arguments on this
point may also be now regarded as moot and academic.
23
members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining
agreement. Provided, That the individual authorization required
under Article 241, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to
the non-members of recognized collective bargaining agent.
When so stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement or
authorized in writing by the employees concerned, the Labor
Code and its Implementing Rules recognize it to be the duty of
the employer to deduct the sum equivalent to the amount of
union dues, as agency fees, from the employees wages for direct
remittance to the union. The system is referred to as check off.
No requirement of written authorization from the non-union
employees is necessary if the non-union employees accept the
benefits resulting from the CBA.
Moreover, no requirement of written authorization from the non-
union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article
248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring
written authorization is inapplicable to non-union members,
especially in this case where the non-union employees receive
several benefits under the CBA.
2. Financial Reporting
24
3. Election Officers and Qualifications
4. Method of Election
5. Intra-Union Disputes
6. Admission of Members & Retention of Membership
7. Disbursement of Union Funds
8. Compensation of Officers
9. Reporting
10. Assessments and Check-Offs
25
A check-off is a process or device whereby the employer, on
agreement with the Union, recognized as the proper bargaining
representative, or on prior authorization from its employees,
deducts union dues or agency fees from the latters wages and
remits them directly to the union. Its desirability in a labor
organization is quite evident. It is assured thereby of continuous
funding. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off
is primarily for the benefit of the Union and only indirectly, for the
individual employees.
26
E. Appropriate Bargaining Unit
27
primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms
and conditions of employment.
28
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial
and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the
judgments of courts having general judicial powers x xx" (B.F.
Goodrich Philippines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission and Leandro M. Castro, 159 SCRA 355 [1988]).
29
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees (Globe
Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such
as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity or
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual
Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
similarity of employment status.
30
relating to labor relations is a principal objective sought to be
accomplished by the confidential employee rule. A confidential
employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate, or with
the custody, handling or care and protection of the employers
property. Confidential employees, such as accounting personnel,
should be excluded from the bargaining unit, as their access to
confidential information may become the source of undue
advantage. However, such fact does not apply to the position of
Payroll Master and the whole gamut of employees who, as
perceived by petitioner, has access to salary and compensation
data. The CA correctly held that the position of Payroll Master
does not involve dealing with confidential labor relations
information in the course of the performance of his functions.
Since the nature of his work does not pertain to company rules
and regulations and confidential labor relations, it follows that he
cannot be excluded from the subject bargaining unit. The
rationale for their separate category and disqualification to join
any labor organization is similar to the inhibition for managerial
employees, because if allowed to be affiliated with a union, the
latter might not be assured of their loyalty in view of evident
conflict of interests and the union can also become company-
denominated with the presence of managerial employees in the
31
union membership. Having access to confidential information,
confidential employees may also become the source of undue
advantage. Said employees may act as a spy or spies of either
party to a collective bargaining agreement.
32
. . as employees. This was, of course, amplified by Republic Act
No. 6715 when it decreed the participation of workers in decision
and policy making processes affecting their rights, duties and
welfare. PALs position that it cannot be saddled with the
obligation of sharing management prerogatives as during the
formulation of the Code, Republic Act No. 6715 had not yet been
enacted (Petitioners Memorandum, p. 44; Rollo, p. 212), cannot
thus be sustained. While such obligation was not yet founded in
law when the Code was formulated, the attainment of a
harmonious labor-management relationship and the then already
existing state policy of enlightening workers concerning their
rights as employees demand no less than the observance of
transparency in managerial moves affecting employees rights.
33
Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a certification
election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain
concerning the choice of the labor organization to represent the
workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic
concept, this Court recognized that the Bureau of Labor Relations
in the exercise of sound discretion, may order a certification
election notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30%
requirement.
the
34
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of
their rights and interests.
EMPLOYER CERTIFICATION
35
appropriate bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative
of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective
bargaining. Collective bargaining covers all aspects of the
employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the
certified union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence,
all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining
representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their
employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the
petition for certification election. The law refers to all the
employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to
support the petition is to belong to the bargaining unit.
36
The provision in the CBA disqualifying probationary employees
from voting cannot override the Constitutionally-protected right of
workers to self-organization, as well as the provisions of the
Labor Code and its Implementing Rules on certification elections
and jurisprudence thereon.
NO DIRECT CERTIFICATION
37
refusing to negotiate with a union whose right to bargaining
status has not been legally established."
38
of collective bargaining. It is not enough that a union has the
support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important
that everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to
express himself.
UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENT
39
Sugbuanon Rural bank v. Laguesma
Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential
employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of
managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees.
The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of confidential
employees because in the normal course of their duties they
become aware of management policies relating to labor relations.
It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not
have access to confidential labor relations information, there is no
legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming,
assisting, or joining a union.
41
But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the
automatic conduct of a certification election in an unorganized
establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification
election must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. Article
242 enumerates the exclusive rights of a legitimate labor
organization among which is the right to be certified as the
exclusive representative of all the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
42
said law is definitely not without exceptions. Settled is the rule
that a local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother
union when circumstances warrant.[5] Generally, a labor union
may disaffiliate from the mother union to form a local or
independent union only during the 60-day freedom period
immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA. However, even
before the onset of the freedom period, disaffiliation may be
carried out when there is a shift of allegiance on the part of the
majority of the members of the union.[6]
43
doctrine only provides that the employees cannot revoke the
validly executed collective bargaining contract with their employer
by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. And
it is in the light of this that the phrase said new agent would
have to respect said contract must be understood. It only means
that the employees, thru their new bargaining agent, cannot
renege on their collective bargaining contract, except of course to
negotiate with management for the shortening thereof.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NATURE
44
Collegio de San Juan De Letranvs Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran
Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-54334, January 22, 1986
46
PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division
Workers Organization v. PNCC Skyway Corp
47
statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to
apply and interpret the constitution and CEDAW is within the
jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general jurisdiction.
Effect of EXPIRY
48
se and those which affect the rights of the workers. Employers
must see to it that that employees are properly informed of its
decisions to attain harmonious labor relations and enlighten the
worker as to their rights.
49
the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties.
Until a new CBA is executed by and between the parties, they are
duty-bound to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement.
The law does not provide for any exception nor qualification on
which economic provisions of the existing agreement are to retain
its force and effect. Therefore, it must be understood as
encompassing all the terms and conditions in the said agreement.
CONTRACT BENEFICIARIES
New Pacific Timber Supply Co. vs. NLRC
It is clear from Art. 253 that until a new CBA has been executed
by and between the parties; they are duly bound to keep the
status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement. In the case at bar, no new
agreement was entered between the parties pending appeal of
the decision in the NLRC. Consequently, the employees from to
the year 1985 (after expiration of the CBA) onwards would be
deprived of a substantial amount of monetary benefits if the
terms and conditions of the CBA were not to remain in force and
50
effect which runs counter to the intent of the Labor Cod to curb
labor unrest and promote industrial peace.
51
security. The closed shop, the union shop, the maintenance of
membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance of
treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union
security and strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice
nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the
Constitution. There is no showing in these petitions of any
arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguards enunciated in the
decisions of this Court interpreting union security arrangements
brought to us for review.
52
level, it shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators
designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently only
disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to
the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
53
grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the
same to voluntary arbitration.
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
55
3. Santuyo vs. Remerco Garments Manufacturing, Inc.
Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be
referred first to the grievance machinery and, if unresolved within
seven days, they shall automatically be referred to voluntary
arbitration. Thus, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, voluntary
arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters,
which have not been resolved by the grievance
machinery. Pursuant to Articles 217 in relation to Articles 260
and 261 of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter should have referred
the matter to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA.
Because the labor arbiter clearly did not have jurisdiction over the
subject matter, his decision was void.
56
4. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association vs.
Insular Life Assurance
57
are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the
concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are
entitled free from the employer's molestation.
59
G.R. No. 114974, June 16, 2004
60
of interference on the alleged suggestions of Diokno to exclude
Umali from the Unions negotiating panel.
61
Section 4(a) (5) of Republic Act No. 875, provides that :
Although the cited law pertains to the specific employee who filed
a case or given a testimony against the employer, it should be
construed in line with the spirit and purpose of said Section 4 and
of the legislation of which it forms part namely, to assure
absolute freedom of the employees and laborers to establish
labor organizations and unions, as well as to prefer charges
before the proper organs of the Government for violations of our
labor laws.
62
If the dismissal of an employee due to the filing by him of said
charges would be and is an undue restraint upon said freedom,
the dismissal of his brother owing to the non-withdrawal of the
charges of the former, would be and constitute as much a
restraint upon the same freedom. In fact, it may be greater and
more effective restraint thereto. Indeed, a complainant may be
willing to risk the hazards of a possible and even probable
retaliatory action by the employer in the form of a dismissal or
another discriminatory act against him personally, considering
that nobody is perfect, that everybody commits mistakes and that
there is always a possibility that the employer may find in the
records of any employee, particularly if he has long been in the
service, some act or omission constituting a fault or negligence
which may be an excuse for such dismissal or discrimination. Yet,
such complainant may not withstand the pressure that would
result if his brother or another member of his immediate family
were threatened with such action unless the charges in question
were withdrawn.
63
G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974
64
SERIOUS MISCONDUCT AND DISOBEDIENCE
65
Bascon vs. CA, G.R. No. 144899, February 5, 2004
66
intent and not mere error in judgment. For serious misconduct to
justify dismissal under the law, (a) it must be serious, (b) must
relate to the performance of the employees duties; and (c) must
show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for
the employer.
SEXUAL HARRASMENT
67
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation,
and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.
68
compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt
that she suffered, petitioners should also be made to pay her
moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive
manner with which petitioners effected her dismissal from the
service, and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and
employers who take undue advantage of their ascendancy over
their employees.
69
or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said
Act.
a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
70
other person has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
another;
2) The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a
working environment;
3) The employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, or any other
person having authority, influence or moral ascendancy makes a
demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.
71
CSC v. Belagan, G. R. No. 132164, October 19, 2004, En
Banc
72
and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.1 Thus,
on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of
assault - character for peaceableness or violence, and on a
charge of embezzlement - character for honesty.17 In one rape
case, where it was established that the alleged victim was morally
loose and apparently uncaring about her chastity, we found the
conviction of the accused doubtful.18
Credibility means the disposition and intention to tell the truth in
the testimony given. It refers to a person's integrity, and to the
fact that he is worthy of belief.19 A witness may be discredited by
evidence attacking his general reputation for truth,20 honesty21 or
integrity.22 Section 11, Rule 132 of the same Revised Rules on
Evidence reads:
"SEC. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. 'A
witness may be impeached by the party against whom
he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence
that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at
other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, but not by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the
73
judgment, that he has been convicted of an
offense."
74
breach of duty committed by the employee which must be
established by substantial evidence.
EXCESSIVE ABSENCES
75
"Misconduct" has been defined as "the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment." On the other hand,
"willful disobedience" envisages the concurrence of at least two
(2) requisites: the employees assailed conduct has been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and
perverse attitude;" and the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must
pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.Even assuming that the respondents absenteeism
constitutes willful disobedience, such offense does not warrant
the respondents dismissal. Not every case of insubordination or
willful disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the
penalty of dismissal. There must be a reasonable proportionality
between the offense and the penalty.
76
doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code
which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on
account of the latter's pregnancy.
Article 137 of the Labor Code provides:Art. 137.
Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any
employer:(2) To discharge such woman on
account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in
confinement due to her pregnancy.
77
inherent economic inequality between labor and management.
The intent is to balance the scale of justice; to put the two parties
on relatively equal positions. There may be cases where the
circumstances warrant favoring labor over the interest of
management but never should the scale be so titled if the result
is an injustice to the employer. Justicianemininegandaest (Justice
is to be denied to none).
78
The employer is required to furnish an employee who is to be
dismissed two (2) written notices before such termination. The
first is the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought. This may be loosely
considered as the proper charge. The second is the notice
informing the employee of the employers decision to dismiss him
This decision, however, must come only after the employee is
given a reasonable period from receipt of the first notice within
which to answer the charge, and ample opportunity to be heard
and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires. Noncompliance by private respondent with these
requirements is a violation of the petitioners right to due process.
79
sever the employer-employee relationship. The second element is
the more determinative factor and must be evinced by overt acts.
Likewise, the burden of proof is on the employer to show the
employees clear and deliberate intent to discontinue his
employment without any intention of returning, mere absence is
not sufficient. These elements are not present here. First, as held
above, complainants absence was justified under the
circumstances. As to the second requisite, we are not convinced
that complainant ever intended to sever the employer-employee
relationship. Complainant immediately complied with the memo
requiring him to explain his absence, and upon knowledge of his
termination, immediately sued for illegal dismissal. These plainly
refuted any claim that he was no longer interested in returning to
work. Without doubt, the intention is lacking.
ABANDONMENT OF DUTIES
80
duty and is a just cause for termination of employment under
paragraph (b) of Article 282 of the Labor Code. To constitute
abandonment, however, there must be a clear and deliberate
intent to discontinue one's employment without any intention of
returning. In this regard, two elements must concur: (1) failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship,
with the second element as the more determinative factor and
being manifested by some overt acts. Otherwise stated, absence
must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact
that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. It has
been ruled that the employer has the burden of proof to show a
deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment without any intention of returning.
81
be a concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt
acts from which an employee may be deduced as having no more
intention to work. The contemplation to discontinue the
employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate
and unjustified. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot
lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. There must be
clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the
employment relationship. Certainly, the operative act is still the
employees decisive act of putting an end to his employment.
Additionally, it must be stressed that the burden of proving the
existence of just cause for dismissing an employee, such as
abandonment, rests on the employer, a burden private
respondent failed to discharge. Jurisprudence is replete with
rulings that for abandonment of work to exist, it is essential that
(1) the employee must have failed to report for work or must
have been absent without valid and justifiable reason; and (2)
there must have been an indisputable intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts,
with the second element as the more determinative factor.
82
Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be
presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute
abandonment, there must be clear proof of deliberate and
unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee
relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the
employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his
employment.Settled is the rule that mere absence or failure to
report for work is not tantamount to abandonment of work.
83
employee, such prerogative cannot be exercised wantonly, but
must be controlled by substantive due process and tempered by
the fundamental policy of protection to labor enshrined in the
Constitution. Infractions committed by an employee should merit
only the corresponding sanction demanded by the circumstances.
The penalty must be commensurate with the act, conduct or
omission imputed to the employee and imposed in connection
with the employers disciplinary authority
P.J. Lhuillier Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 158758, April 29,
2005
84
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not needed to justify the loss.
It is sufficient that there be some basis for the same, or that the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein
renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded of
his position.Nonetheless, the right of an employer to dismiss
employees on the ground of loss of trust and confidence,
however, must not be exercised arbitrarily and without just
cause. Unsupported by sufficient proof, loss of confidence is
without basis and may not be successfully invoked as a ground
for dismissal. Loss of confidence as a ground for dismissal has
never been intended to afford an occasion for abuse by the
employer of its prerogative, as it can easily be subject to abuse
because of its subjective nature, as in the case at bar, and the
loss must be founded on clearly established facts sufficient to
warrant the employee's separation from work.
85
Where the employee has access to the employer's property in
the form of merchandise and articles for sale, the relationship of
the employer and the employee necessarily involves trust and
confidence Termination of an employee on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence is allowed so long as there is basis for the
loss of trust or that the employer has reasonable ground to
believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct that
rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by
his position.22 In this regard, the employer must establish clearly
and convincingly by substantial evidence the facts and incidents
upon which the loss of trust and confidence in the employee may
fairly be made to rest.
86
(a) The employee must hold a position of trust and
confidence.
(b) There must be a willful ad that would justify the loss of
trust and confidence.56
As a rule, loss of confidence may only be invoked by the
employer against an employee occupying a position of
responsibility, trust and confidence57 hence, the first
requisite.Confidentiality is not a matter of official rank, it is a
matter of job content and authority. It is not measured by
closeness to or distance from top management but by the
significance of the jobholder's role in the pursuit of corporate
objectives and strategy. In principle, every managerial position is
confidential one does not become a manager without having
gained the confidence of the appointing authority. But not every
confidential employee is managerial; lie may be a supervisory or
even a rank-and-file employee. Confidentiality, in other words,
cuts across the pyramid of jobs from the base to the apex, from
messengerial to managerial.63
chanrobleslaw
87
care and protection of the employer's property.64 For all intents
and purposes, the terms "confidential employee" and "employee
holding a position of trust and confidence" are synonymous.
Fundamentally, the two categories mentioned in Mabeza are
simply subcategories of the broader category of confidential
employeesThe essence of the second requisite is that the loss of
confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust founded on
clearly established facts.
88
nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the
Constitution.
89
employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will
be upheld.
90
exhibit undesirable behavior onboard. Indeed, the employer
cannot be compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one
who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It has the right to
dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-
protection.
ANALOGOUS CASES
91
Article 282(e) of the Labor Code talks of other analogous
causes or those which are susceptible of comparison to another in
general or in specific detail. For an employee to be validly
dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article
282, the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or
omission of the employee. A cause analogous to serious
misconduct is a voluntary and/or willful act or omission attesting
to an employees moral depravity. Theft committed by an
employee against a person other than his employer, if proven by
substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.
92
discretion; arbitrariness, or maliciousness on the part of
management, as in this case. Nonetheless, this did not excuse
petitioner from complying with the required written notice to the
employee and to the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) at least one month before the intended date of
termination. This procedure enables an employee to contest the
reality or good faith character of the asserted ground for the
termination of his services before the DOLE.
REDUNDANCY
93
Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of
retrenchment; 25 (3) that the employer pays the retrenched
employees separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at
least month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher;
26 (4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench
employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and
not to defeat or circumvent the employees right to security of
tenure; 27 and (5) that the employer used fair and reasonable
criteria 28 in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would
be retained among the employees, such as status (i.e., whether
they are temporary, casual, regular or managerial employees),
efficiency, seniority, 29 physical fitness, age, and financial
hardship for certain workers.
Wiltshire File Co., Inc., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 82249 February
7, 1991
94
does not show that his position had not become redundant.
Indeed, in any well-organized business enterprise, it would be
surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) or more people
doing the work of one person. We believe that redundancy, for
purposes of our Labor Code, exists where the services of an
employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the
actual requirements of the enterprise. Succinctly put, a position is
redundant where it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or
positions may be the outcome of a number of factors, such as
overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping
of a particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. The employer has
no legal obligation to keep in its payroll more employees than are
necessary for the operation of its business.
95
officer or position in a business corporation is managements
prerogative, and the courts will not interfere with the exercise of
such so long as no abuse of discretion or merely arbitrary or
malicious action on the part of management is shown.
96
the employee may wish to make that need to be heard before
dismissal is effected. Thus, Section 5 may be seen to envisage
charges against an employee constituting one or more of the just
causes for dismissal listed in Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Where, as in the instant case, the ground for dismissal or
termination of services does not relate to a blameworthy act or
omission on the part of the employee, there appears to us no
need for an investigation and hearing to be conducted by the
employer who does not, to begin with, allege any malfeasance or
non-feasanceon the part of the employee. In such case, there are
no allegations which the employee should refute and defend
himself from. Thus, to require petitioner Wiltshire to hold a
hearing, at which private respondent would have had the right to
be present, on the business and financial circumstances
compelling retrenchment and resulting in redundancy, would be
to impose upon the employer an unnecessary and inutile hearing
as a condition for legality of termination. This is not to say that
the employee may not contest the reality or good faith character
of the retrenchment or redundancy asserted as grounds for
termination of services. The appropriate forum for such
controversion would, however, be the Department of Labor and
Employment and not an investigation or hearing to be held by the
97
employer itself It is precisely for this reason that an employer
seeking to terminate services of an employee or employees
because of "closure of establishment and reduction of personnel",
is legally required to give a written notice not only to the
employee but also to the Department of Labor and Employment
at least one month before effectivity date of the termination. In
the instant case, private respondent did controvert before the
appropriate labor authorities the grounds for termination of
services set out in petitioners letter to him dated 17 June 1985.
98
Smart Communications, Inc., vs. Astorga, G.R. No.
January 28, 2008
99
RETRENCHMENT
100
not to defeat or circumvent the employees right to security of
tenure; and,
(5) That the employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be
retained among the employees, such as status, efficiency,
seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for
certain workers.
In the absence of one element, the retrenchment scheme
becomes an irregular exercise of management prerogative.
101
Elements of a valid retrenchment:
102
meaning to the constitutional policy of providing "full
protection" to labor, the employers prerogative to bring down
labor costs by retrenching must be exercised essentially as a
measure of last resort, after less drastic means e.g.,
reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses and
salaries, going on reduced time, improving manufacturing
efficiencies, trimming of marketing and advertising costs, etc.
have been tried and found wanting.
4. Alleged losses if already realized, and the expected imminent
losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient
and convincing evidence. The reason for requiring this
quantum of proof is readily apparent: any less exacting
standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this
ground for termination of services of employees.
103
Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in
excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise. A position is redundant where
it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions may
be the outcome of a number of factors, such as over hiring of
workers, decreased volume of business, or dropping of a
particular product line or service activity previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.
Retrenchment, on the other hand, is used interchangeably with
the term "lay-off." It is the termination of employment initiated
by the employer through no fault of the employee's and
without prejudice to the latter, resorted to by management
during periods of business recession, industrial depression, or
seasonal fluctuations, or during lulls occasioned by lack of
orders, shortage of materials, conversion of the plant for a new
production program or the introduction of new methods or
more efficient machinery, or of automation. Simply put, it is an
act of the employer of dismissing employees because of losses
in the operation of a business, lack of work, and considerable
reduction on the volume of his business, a right consistently
recognized and affirmed by this Court.Thus, simply put,
redundancy exists when the number of employees is in excess
104
of what is reasonably necessary to operate the business. The
declaration of redundant positions is a management
prerogative. The determination that the employee's services
are no longer necessary or sustainable and therefore properly
terminable is an exercise of business judgment by the
employer. The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not
subject to the discretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and
NLRC.
105
fortune. Article 283 authorizes termination of employment due
to business closure, regardless of the underlying reasons and
motivations therefore, be it financial losses or not.
DISEASE OR ILLNESS
106
For a dismissal on the ground of disease to be considered
valid, two requisites must concur: (a) the employee must be
suffering from a disease which cannot be cured within six months
and his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial
to his health or to the health of his co-employees; and (b) a
certification to that effect must be issued by a competent public
health authority. The burden falls upon the employer to establish
these requisites,and in the absence of such certification, the
dismissal must necessarily be declared illegal. I is only where
there is a prior certification from a competent public authority
that the disease afflicting the employee sought to be dismissed is
of such nature or at such stage that it cannot be cured within six
(6) months even with proper medical treatment that the latter
could be validly terminated from his job."
107
employer of the gravity or extent of the employee's illness and
thus defeat the public policy in the protection of labor.
108
PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED IN JUST CAUSES
TERMINATION
109
as a due process measure. "Fire the employee, and let him
explain later" is not in accord with that expedient.
110
Reasonable opportunity under the Omnibus Rules means
every kind of assistance that management must accord to the
employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their
defense.15 This should be construed as a period of at least five
(5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the
employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them,
consult a union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and
decide on the defenses they will raise against the complaint.
Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently
prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice should contain
a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve
as basis for the charge against the employees. A general
description of the charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should
specifically mention which company rules, if any, are violated
and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged
against the employees.
IBM Philippines vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999
111
certain fundamental evidenciary rules. The computer print-outs,
which constitute only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance
of their authenticity since they are unsigned. The liberal view in
the conduct of proceedings before administrative agencies, have
nonetheless consistently required some PROOF OF
AUTHENTICITY OR RELIABILITY as condition for the
admission of documents. The procedural technicality and
concerns are more paramount principles and requirements of due
process, which may not be sacrificed to speed or expediency,
Article 22 of the Labor Code which states that DUE PROCESS
MUST NEVER BE SUBORDINATED TO EXPEDIENCY OR
DISPATCH
112
L. Management Prerogative
1. Discipline
113
than paid his due. Nevertheless, it is useless to reinstate Sagales
because he should have been retired already at the time of this
decision. So instead of reinstatement, Sagales was awarded
separation pay computed at one-month salary for every year of
service; backwages were also awarded.
114
struck him several times. But he did not, thus negating any intent
on his part to inflict fatal injuries. In fact, the victim merely
sustained a minor abrasion and has since forgiven and reconciled
with the private respondent. If the party most aggrieved --
namely, the foreman -- has already forgiven the private
respondent, then petitioner cannot be more harsh and
condemning than the victim. Besides, no criminal or civil action
has been instituted against private respondent. Furthermore, in
his twenty years of service in the company, he has not been
charged with any similar misconduct.
115
that in Villeno. Its consequences did not directly affect the
business of petitioner or the atmosphere in the work premises.
2. Transfer of Employees
116
7, 2004
119
and long enough to permit disclosure of any irregularities or
manipulations.
120
Genuino Ice Company, Inc. vs. Magpantay, G.R. No.
147790, June 27, 2006
121
fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of
the employee in failing to perform his job to the detriment of the
employer and the latters business. Thus, the single or isolated act
of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of
the employee.
3. Grant of Bonus
123
are paid upon the specific results achieved by a salesman-
employee. It is a percentage of the sales closed by a salesman
and operates as an integral part of such salesman's basic pay.
124
Union, G.R. No. 185665, February 8, 2012
125
Section 1, Article IV, of the CBA does not guarantee overtime
work for all the employees but merely provides that "all work
performed in excess of seven (7) hours work schedule and on
days not included within the work week shall be considered
overtime and paid as such."
5. Marital Discrimination
126
It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal
protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting
under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long
array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection
clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however,
discriminatory or wrongful. The company actually enforced the
policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the
policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an
impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of
the employee.
127
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all and Article XIII Section 14
which states that The State shall protect working women by
providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and
opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation. Since the
Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974, corrective labor and
social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more
frequency in the years. Two of these are Republic Act No. 6727
which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with
respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and
training opportunities; and Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women
in Development and Nation Building Act which, among others,
affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter
into contracts. In the Labor Code, Article 136 explicitly prohibits
discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female
employee. The private respondents act of concealing the true
nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly
characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act
the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a
permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was
128
practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into
misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified from
work
The case at bar involves Art. 136 of the Labor Code which
provides, it shall be unlawful for an employer to require
as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon
getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage. The company policy of
Star Paper, to be upheld, must clearly establish the
requirement of reasonableness. In the case at bar, there
was no reasonable business necessity. Petitioners failed
to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting
Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of
the Repacking Section could be detrimental to its
129
business operations. The questioned policy may not
facially violate Art. 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a
disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact
theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a
showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory,
albeit disproportionate effect. Lastly, the absence of a
statute to expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in
our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.
6. Post-employment ban
Hence, the policy of the law requires that the freedom of persons
to enter into contracts shall not be lightly interfered with, but if a
130
contract be not founded upon a legal consideration (causa) or if it
conflicts with the morals of the times or contravenes some
established interest of society, the courts will not aid in its
enforcement.
131
Del Castillo vs. Richmond, G.R. No. L-21127, February 9,
1924, En Banc
132
than protection to the other requires, contracts like the one we
are discussing will be sustained. The general tendency, we
believe, of modern authority, is to make the test whether the
restraint is reasonably necessary for the protection of the
contracting parties. If the contract is reasonably necessary to
protect the interest of the parties, it will be upheld.
133
Considering the nature of the business in which the defendant is
engaged, in relation with the limitation placed upon the plaintiff
both as to time and place, we are of the opinion, and so decide,
that such limitation is legal and reasonable and not contrary to
public policy.
134
reasonable from the standpoint of public policy.
7. Preventive Suspension
135
Rules and Regulations for the Implemention of the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of
the MIT Rules and Regulations provides:
136
shall take effect fifteen (15) days after publication by the
Committee. Thus, at the time of the imposition of petitioners
preventive suspension on January 11, 1999, the Mapua Rules
were not yet legally effective, and therefore the suspension had
no legal basis.
M. Termination of Employment
137
CALS Poultry Supply Corporation vs. Roco, G.R. No. 150660, July
30, 2002
Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of
years, months, and days and nights, it shall be understood that
years are of 365 days, months of 30 days, days of 24 hours and
nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is composed
of 30 days, then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed
of 180 days. And the computation of the 6- month period is
reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar
date of the 6th month following. Since, the number of days of a
particular month is irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationary
138
employee at the time of his dismissal. Wherefore, the petition is
dismissed.
139
Alcira vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of
years, months, and days and nights, it shall be understood that
years are of 365 days, months of 30 days, days of 24 hours and
nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is composed
of 30 days, then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed
of 180 days. And the computation of the 6- month period is
reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar
date of the 6th month following. Since, the number of days of a
particular month is irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationary
employee at the time of his dismissal. Wherefore, the petition is
dismissed.
Aberdeen Court, Inc. v. Agustin, Jr., G.R. No. 149371, April 13,
2005
Dela Cruz vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 145417, December 11, 2003
141
We reiterate the well-established rule that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not
generally reviewable by this Court when supported by substantial
evidence. The rationale is that this Court, not being a trier of
facts, relies in good part on the assessment and evaluation of
evidence by the lower courts. We thus subscribe to the following
findings of the Court of Appeals in affirming the NLRC decision,
that petitioners dismissal was for a just cause.
142
to the following conditions: (1) it must be exercised in accordance
with the specific requirements of the contract; (2) the
dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in
good faith, not prejudicial so as to violate the contract or the law;
and (3) there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal.
The burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer.
Espina, et. al., vs. CA, G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007
143
grounds other than business losses but it cannot be an unbridled
prerogative to suit the whims of the employer.Under Article 283
of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid
cessation of business operations, namely: (1) service of a written
notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof; (2) the cessation must be bona
fide in character; and(3) payment to the employees of
termination pay amounting to at least one half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service, or one (1) month pay, whichever is
higher. The ultimate test of the validity of closure or cessation of
establishment or undertaking is that it must be bona fide in
character. Burden of proof is upon the employer.
NLRC found that the contract in question is for a fixed term. The
said contract provides for two periods. The first period was for six
months terminable at the option of private respondent, while
the second period was also for six months but probationary in
character. In both cases, the private respondent did not specify
the criteria for the termination or retention of the services of
144
petitioner. It is violative of the right of the employee against
unwarranted dismissal. By the provisions of the very contract
itself, petitioner has become a regular employee of private
respondent.As to the private respondent statement that the one-
year period stipulated in subject contract was to enable petitioner
to acquire the skill necessary for the job. In effect, what
respondent employer theorized upon is that the one-year term of
employment is probationary. If the nature of the job did actually
necessitate at least one year for the employee to acquire the
requisite training and experience, the same could not be a valid
probationary employment as it falls short of the requirement of
Article 281[10] of the Labor Code. It was not brought to light that
the petitioner was duly informed at the start of his employment,
of the reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a
regular
employee.
c) Kinds of Employment
Bernardo, et. al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 122917, July 12, 1999
145
for Employment.No disabled person shall be denied access to
opportunities for suitable employment. A qualified disabled
employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of
employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits,
fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified able bodied
person.The fact that the employees were qualified disabled
persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the
ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the
rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus covered by
Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:ART. 280. Regular
and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, x xxThe primary standard,
therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the
employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The
connection can be determined by considering the nature of the
146
work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular
business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance
is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to
the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but
only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
147
consideration. Under this test, an employment relation obtains
where work is performed or services are rendered under the
control and supervision of the party contracting for the service,
not only as to the result of the work but also as to the manner
and details of the performance desired.
2) Casual Employment
148
Fablea, et. al. vs. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. 150658, February
9, 2007
3) SeasonalEmployment
149
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or
desirable in the usual trade or business ofthe employer can be
determined by considering the nature of the work performed and
its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade if the
employee has been performing the job for at least a year even if
the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent.
Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with
respect to such activity and while such activity exists.
4) Project Employment
150
dismissed, a report must be made to the nearest employment
office, of the termination of the services of the workers every
time completes a project, pursuant to Policy Instruction No. 20.
151
overturns private respondents allegations that
petitioners were hired for a specific or fixed
undertaking for a limited period of time. The Court can
allow that, in the instant case, private respondents
may have initially been hired for specific projects or
undertaking of petitioner ETS and, hence, may be
classified as project employees. Their repeated rehiring
to perform tasks necessary to the usual trade or
business of ETS changed the legal situation altogether,
for in the later instance, their continuous rehiring took
them out from the scope of workers coterminus with
specific projects and had made them regular
employees. We said as much in Phesco,Inc. v.
NLRC that where the employment of project
employees is extended long after the supposed project
had been finished, the employees are removed from
the scope of project employees and they shall be
considered regular employees.
152
Termination of Employment
Doctrine:
The requisites of a valid dismissal for just causes are: (a) the
dismissal must be for one of the causes stated in Article 282 of
the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must have been accorded
due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and
defend himself.
153
Settled is the rule that in an illegal dismissal case, the onus
probandi is on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an
employee is for a valid cause.
Doctrine:
Doctrine:
155
The due process prescribed in Article 277 of the Labor Code are
mandatory. Two notices should be sent to the employee. The first
notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; while the second informs the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss him. The latter
must come after the employee is given a reasonable period from
receipt of the first notice within which to answer the charge, and
ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Doctrine:
Doctrine:
157
that the employer must furnish the employee with two written
notice before the termination of employment can be effected: (a)
the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and, (b) the second informs the
employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The
requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as
long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily
that an actual hearing was conducted.
Doctrine:
158
This decision, however, must come only after the employee is
given a reasonable period from receipt of the first notice within
which to answer the charge, and ample opportunity to be heard
and defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he
so desires. The requirement of notice is not a mere technicality
but a requirement of due process to which every employee is
entitled."
Development of Doctrines
Wenphil Doctrine
Doctrine:
159
Serrano Doctrine
Doctrine:
The rule on the extent of the sanction was changed. We held that
the violation by the employer of the notice requirement in
termination for just or authorized causes was not a denial of due
process that will nullify the termination. However, the dismissal is
ineffectual and the employer must pay full backwages from the
time of termination until it is judicially declared that the dismissal
was for a just or authorized cause.
Agabon Doctrine
Doctrine:
Doctrine:
Doctrine:
Doctrine :
163
LEOPARD SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION
AGENCY, Petitioner,
vs.
TOMAS QUITOY, RAUL SABANG and DIEGO
MORALES, Respondents
Doctrine:
Doctrine:
164
An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs:
backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are
separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no
longer feasible because of strained relations between the
employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In effect,
an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement,
if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable,
and backwages.
Constructive Dismissal
165
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and AMALIA
P. KAWADA, respondents.
Doctrine:
166
GLOBE TELECOM, INC., DELFIN LAZARO, JR., and
ROBERTGALANG, petitioners,
Doctrine:
Doctrine:
167
"once resignation is accepted, the employee no longer has any
right to the job. It, therefore, goes without saying that
resignation terminates the employer-employee relationship."
168
169