VILLABER vs.
COMELEC it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
369 SCRA 126
Facts: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent
Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a
congressional seat in the First District of Davao del
Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated
petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the
latters certificate of candidacy, alleging that Villaber
was convicted for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves
moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for
any public office.
COMELEC issued the resolution declaring Villaber
disqualified as a candidate. The latter filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude, which would disqualify
Villaber as a candidate for and from holding any
public office.
Held: COMELEC believed it is, applying Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code that any person who
has been sentenced by final judgment for any offense
for which he has been sentenced for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office.
Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts
and circumstances surrounding the commission of the
crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the
crime for which he was convicted. There was no
grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent
COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions.
RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY [G.R. No. 147387. December 10,
2003]
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the
main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as
is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every
law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section
14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed
rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter
of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep.
Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda and
the elimination of unfair election practices, while
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office
other than the one they are holding in a permanent
capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to
the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the
Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66
thereof which imposes a similar limitation to
appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or
position. Any person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
discriminates against appointive officials. By the
repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for
office other than the one which he is holding is no
longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon
filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials
continue in public office even as they campaign for
reelection or election for another elective position.
On the other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus,
the limitation on appointive officials remains - they
are still considered ipso facto resigned from their
offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null
and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14
thereof, should be declared null and void. Even
Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act
shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of
the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as
jurisprudence, which require publication of the law
before it becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should
not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the
ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on
the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of
Public Officers:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary
General of the House of Representatives acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction for not considering those members of
the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the
May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned
therefrom, upon the filing of their respective
certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that
[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a
violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been compliance
with the constitutional requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid
down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject
matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of
legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not
be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index
of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices.
The Court is convinced that the title and the
objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive
enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To
require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code
be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the
ban on the use of media for election propaganda,
does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This
Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they
may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered
in furtherance of such subject by providing for the
method and means of carrying out the general
subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and
repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines
signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors
of society and in government may believe that the
repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would
encourage political adventurism. But policy matters
are not the concern of the Court. Government policy
is within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this Court to
look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative
determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise
or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic
theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the
desired results, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be
exercised in a particular manner are matters for the
judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict
of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the
range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not
precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of
the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the
validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in
the same case that the provision has a laudable
purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative
to repeal the law on its belief that the election process
is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of
truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective
officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
They are elected to an office for a definite term and
may be removed therefrom only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto
by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep.
Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect
immediately upon its approval, is defective.
However, the same does not render the entire law
invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the
rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator
may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect
fifteen days after its publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the
firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is
that the courts do not involve themselves with nor
delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is
the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the
government. When the validity of a statute is
challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole
function of the court is to determine whether it
transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. No such transgression has been
shown in this case.
Bantay vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 177271
May 4, 2007
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated
petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and
set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups
which have manifested their intention to participate
in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary
manifestations and subsequently were accredited by
the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections.
Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban
Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the
Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to
disqualify the nominees of certain party-list
organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case
No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314,
addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelecs
Law Department requesting a list of that groups
nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms.
Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc
Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007
virtually declaring the nominees names confidential
and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic
disclosure request. Comelecs reason for keeping the
names of the party list nominees away from the
public is deducible from the excerpts of the news
report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the
Manila Bulletin, is that there is nothing in R.A. 7941
that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of
nominees, and that party list elections must not be
personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et
al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections without simultaneously determining
whether or not their respective nominees possess the
requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or
the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks
to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners
Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the
Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in
the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the
additional prayers that the 33 private respondents
named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections and that the
Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent
groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by
the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these
groups and their respective nominees do not appear
to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to
reveal the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups, has violated the right to information
and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the
Constitution to disclose to the public the names of
said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as
it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents
named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to
compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names
of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14,
2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to
immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of
petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation
of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their
petition. The exercise would require the Court to
make a factual determination, a matter which is
outside the office of judicial review by way of special
civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings,
the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues
and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts
on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is
to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion and does not include a review of
the tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that
nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that
the qualification of a party-list nominee be
determined simultaneously with the accreditation of
an organization. )
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed
by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the
names of the nominees of subject party-list groups,
Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads:
"[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a
justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No.
7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or
even publishing through mediums other than the
"Certified List" of the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that
the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote
cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees,
who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon
any interpretation of the law or rules that would
hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of
the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-
list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to
information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise,
but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access
to official records are not absolute. The peoples right
to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and
is further subject to such limitation as may be
provided by law. But no national security or like
concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question.
Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO versus
FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for
presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her
Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995,
reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of
the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed
that the revision in the remaining precincts of the
pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision process
in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and
required, instead, the protestant and protestee to
submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-
Santiago is moot and academic by her election as a
Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption
of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by
Santiago has been abandoned or considered
withdrawn as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of
the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her determination to
protest and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve
public interest as it would dissipate the aura of
uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential
elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial
political stability of the nation during this period of
national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the
protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after
the completion of the revision of the ballots from her
pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since
DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such
intention, such is a manifest indication that she no
longer intends to do so.
QUINTO versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 189698)
Facts:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A.
Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a
resolution declaring appointive officials who filed
their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned
from their government offices because at such time
they are not yet treated by the law as candidates.
They should be considered resigned from their
respective offices only at the start of the campaign
period when they are, by law, already considered
candidates.
In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only
copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
Issue:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was
valid.
Held:
NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged
Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue
benefit to elective officials in comparison with
appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld
the substantial distinctions between the two and
pronounced that there was no violation of the equal
protection clause. However in the present case, the
Court held that the discussion on the equal protection
clause was an obiter dictum since the issue raised
therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt
squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive
and elective officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a
valid classification, the proviso does not comply with
the second requirement that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to
prevent the use of a governmental position to
promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a
dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate. The
measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency,
integrity, and discipline of the public service by
eliminating the danger that the discharge of official
duty would be motivated by political considerations
rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction
is also justified by the proposition that the entry of
civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending
to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Penera vs. Commission on Elections, et al.
G.R. No. 181613
25 November 2009
(motion for reconsideration)
Facts:

On 11 September 2009, the Supreme Court affirmed
the COMELECs decision to
disqualify petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as
mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del
Norte, for engaging in election campaign outside the
campaign period, in violation of Section 80 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (the Omnibus Election Code).
Penera moved for reconsideration, arguing that she
was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed
premature campaigning, since under Section 15 of
Republic Act No. 8436 (the law authorizing the
COMELEC to use an automated election system for
the process of voting, counting of votes, and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national
and local elections), as amended by Republic Act No.
9369, one is not officially a candidate until the start
of the campaign period.
Issue:
Whether or not Peneras disqualification for engaging
in premature campaigning should be reconsidered.
Holding:
Granting Peneras motion for reconsideration, the
Supreme Court En Banc held that
Penera did not engage in premature campaigning and
should, thus, not be disqualified as a mayoralty
candidate. The Court said
(A) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision (or
the assailed Decision) considered a
person who files a certificate of candidacy already a
candidate even before the start of the campaign
period. This is contrary to the clear intent and letter
of Section 15 of Republic Act 8436, as amended,
which states that a person who files his certificate of
candidacy will only be considered a candidate at the
start of the campaign period, and unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of such campaign period.
Thus, applying said law:
(1) The effective date when partisan political acts
become unlawful as to a
candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before
the start of the campaign
period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.
(2) Accordingly, a candidate is liable for an election
offense only for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. In
other words, election
offenses can be committed by a candidate only upon
the start of the campaign
period. Before the start of the campaign period, such
election offenses cannot be
so committed. Since the law is clear, the Court has no
recourse but to apply it. The forum for examining the
wisdom of the law, and enacting remedial measures,
is not the Court but the Legislature.
(B) Contrary to the assailed Decision, Section 15 of
R.A. 8436, as amended, does not
provide that partisan political acts done by a
candidate before the campaign period are unlawful,
but may be prosecuted only upon the start of the
campaign period. Neither does the law state that
partisan political acts done by a candidate before the
campaign period are temporarily lawful, but becomes
unlawful upon the start of the campaign period.
Besides, such a law as envisioned in the Decision,
which defines a criminal act and curtails freedom of
expression and speech, would be void for vagueness.
(C) That Section 15 of R.A. 8436 does not expressly
state that campaigning before the start of the
campaign period is lawful, as the assailed Decision
asserted, is of no moment. It is a basic principle of
law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared
unlawful by law. The mere fact that the law does not
declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that the act
is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to
declare in Section 15 of R.A. 8436 that partisan
political activities before the start of the campaign
period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress to state
that any unlawful act or omission applicable to a
candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the
campaign period. The only inescapable and logical
result is that the same acts, if done before the start of
the campaign period, are lawful.
(D) The Courts 11 September 2009 Decision also
reversed Lanot vs. COMELEC (G.R.
No. 164858; 16 November 2006). Lanot was decided
on the ground that one who files a
certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the
start of the campaign period. This ground was based
on the deliberations of the legislators who explained
that the early deadline for filing certificates of
candidacy under R.A. 8436 was set only to afford
time to prepare the machine-readable ballots, and
they intended to preserve the existing election
periods, such that one who files his certificate of
candidacy to meet the early deadline will still not be
considered as a candidate.
When Congress amended R.A. 8436, Congress
decided to expressly incorporate the
Lanot doctrine into law, thus, the provision in Section
15 of R.A. 8436 that a person who files his certificate
of candidacy shall be considered a candidate only at
the start of the campaign period. Congress wanted to
insure that no person filing a certificate of candidacy
under the early deadline required by the automated
election system would be disqualified or penalized
for any partisan political act done before the start of
the campaign period. This provision cannot be
annulled by the Court except on the sole ground of its
unconstitutionality.
The assailed Decision, however, did not claim that
this provision is unconstitutional. In fact, the assailed
Decision considered the entire Section 15 good law.
Thus, the Decision was self-contradictory
reversing Lanot but maintaining the constitutionality
of the said provision.
H. HARRY L. ROQUE v. COMELEC, GR No.
188456, 2009-09-10
Facts:
Harry L. Roque... uing as taxpayers and concerned
citizens, seek to nullify respondent Comelec's award
of the2010 Elections Automation Project (automation
project) to the joint venture of Total Information
Management Corporation (TIM) and Smartmatic
International Corporation (Smartmatic)... and to
permanently prohibit the Comelec, TIM and
Smartmatic from signing... and/or implementing the
corresponding contract-award. Congress enacted
Republic Act No. (RA) 8436 authorizing the
adoption of an automated election system (AES)... in
the May 11, 1998 national and local elections and
onwards on January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA
9369... ssed authorizing anew the Comelec to use an
AES in 2008 Comelec managed to automate the
regional polls in the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM),... hailed as successful
automated ARMM 2008 elections paved the way for
Comelec,... to prepare for a nationwide computerized
run for the 2010 national/local polls Comelec and
Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a
contract... for the lease of goods and services...
petitioners interposed the instant recourse which, for
all intents and purposes, impugns the validity and
seeks to nullify the Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM
Corporation automation contract adverted to...
petitioners would have the Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM
Corporation automation contract nullified since, in
violation of the Constitution, it constitutes a
wholesale abdication of the poll body's constitutional
mandate for election law enforcement. the
mechanism of the PCOS machines would infringe the
constitutional right of the people to the secrecy of the
ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided
in Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution.
Issues:
(1) the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) of
Smartmatic and TIM; and (2) the PCOS machines to
be used... constitutionality and statutory flaw of the
automation contract itself.
Ruling:
contention is not well taken.
The first function of the Comelec under the
Constitution... and the Omnibus Election Code for
that matter--relates to the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relating to
the conduct of elections to public office to ensure a
free,... orderly and honest electoral exercise.
By acceding to Art. 3.3 of the automation contract...
upervision and control of the system to be used for
the... automated elections. To a more specific point,
the loss of control, as may be deduced from the
ensuing exchanges, arose from the fact that Comelec
would not be holding possession of what in IT jargon
are the public and private keys pair.
The Court is not convinced.
3.3
SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the
greater track record in automated elections, shall be
in charge of the technical aspects of the counting and
canvassing software and hardware
The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint
venture partner in charge of the technical aspect of
the counting and canvassing wares does not to us
translate, without more, to ceding control of the
electoral process to Smartmatic.
Art. 6.7 of the automation contract
, providing:... the entire processes of voting,
counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing
of votes shall be conducted by COMELEC's
personnel and officials,... With the view we take of
the automation contract, the role of Smartmatic TIM
Corporation is basically to supply the goods
necessary for the automation project, such as but not
limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic
transmission devices and related equipment, both
hardware... and software, and the technical services
pertaining to their operation.
As lessees of the goods and the back-up equipment,
the corporation and its operators would provide
assistance with respect to the machines to be used by
the Comelec which, at the end of the day, will be...
conducting the election thru its personnel and
whoever it deputizes.
Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would
infringe on the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot
because... the voter would be confronted with a "three
feet" long ballot
Surely,... the Comelec can put up such infrastructure
as to insure that the voter can write his preference in
relative privacy. And as demonstrated during the oral
arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the
ballot into the machine. A voter, if so minded to
preserve the secrecy... of his ballot, will always
devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with
least regard for secrecy will likewise have a way to
make his vote known.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body
with a distinct and pivotal role in our scheme of
government. In the discharge of its awesome
functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator
and lead implementor of laws relative to the conduct
of elections, it should not... be stymied with
restrictions that would perhaps be justified in the case
of an organization of lesser responsibility.[103] It
should be afforded ample elbow room and enough
wherewithal in devising means and initiatives that
would enable it to accomplish the great objective
for... which it was created--to promote free, orderly,
honest and peaceful elections. This is as it should be
for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under
difficult conditions to address unforeseen events to
preserve the integrity of the election and in the
process the voice of... the people
This independent constitutional commission,... it is
true, possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a
considerable latitude in the discharge of its functions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents
the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It
filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to
moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical
and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated
that since their ways are immoral and contrary to
public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact,
their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner
filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65
of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against
the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed
that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well
as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based
on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector
is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its
national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment
clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners
application on moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang
Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only
those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or
related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The
crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5

that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have
a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are

sought to be prevented, or why special protection is
required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioners
admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of
society.

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported

violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best;
disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code
defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance,
a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that
mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and
a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without

more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more
to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.