Venice and the Uskoks of Senj: 1537-1618

Author(s): Gunther E. Rothenberg

Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1961), pp. 148-156
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1875016
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 VENICE AND THE USKOKS OF SENJ: 1537-1618
GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG
D URING THE YEARS 1615-18 the
Uskok War was waged in north-
eastern Italy between the Re-
public of Venice, supported by mercen-
ary troops from England, Holland, and
the Protestant regions of the empire,
and the Catholic forces mustered in sup-
port of Archduke Ferdinand of Styria,
soon to become king of Bohemia and
second German emperor of that name.
The immediate occasion, providing the
name for this conflict, was the activity
of the piratical Uskoks, descendants of
the military colonists settled in Croatia
by the first emperor Ferdinand. It is to
the history of these men and their rela-
tions with Venice that this article is
devoted.
The Uskoks, a name commonly used
during the sixteenth century for the
hardy and warlike Christian refugees
fronm the Tuikish occupied areas of the
Balkans, originally were settled in Cro-
atia-Slavonia to provide the Hapsburg
lands with a cheap but effective screen
against Turkish incursions.' Freed by
special charters from the usual manorial
obligations, the Uskoks were liable to
continuous military service as frontier
guards and light troops. Starting with a
1 Minuccio Minucci, Historia degli Uscochi
(hereafter cited as Spomenici Hrvatske Kraiine).
... Co i Progressi di quella Gente sino all'Anno
MDCII e continuata dal P. M. Paolo dell'Ordine
de'Servi, . . . sino all'Anno MDC VI (Venice, 1676),
p. 5. The term "Uskok" was of Serbian origin
and meant escapee. It was of no special ethno-
graphic significance during that period, but was
used interchangeably with other terms such as
pribeg or predawetz to identify Christian refugees
from Serbia and Bosnia. Cf. Karl v. Czoernig,
Ethnographie der osterreichischen Monarchie (3
vols.; Vienna, 1857), II, 168, n. 6.
148
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small nucleus taken into service in the
years 1522-37, the settlements eventually
became a distinct military organization,
the Militar Granitz or Confin, extend-
ing from the upper reaches of the Drave
and Save southeast to the Adriatic
coast.2 The formal organization may be
dated from 1553, when Ferdinand I
commissioned Hans Ungnad as the first
"Colonel of the entire Border," to com-
mand in Croatia and Slavonia, as well
as in the coastal littoral called the Meer
Granitz.3
The principal base of the Meer Gran-
itz was Senj (Z.engg, Segna), an ancient
port on the Gulf of Quarnero.4 Here in
1537 settled a band of Uskoks which
had been evacuated from Dalmatia
where they had defended for several
years a Christian enclave in the moun-
tains behind Split (Spalato) against the
Turkish advance.5 During the next ten
years the Hapsburgs were engaged in
hostilities against the Turks, and the
refugees were therefore readily absorbed
2 G. E. Rothenberg, The Austrian military
border in Croatia, 1522-1747 (Urbana, Ill., 1960),
pp. 13-75. Documents in Radoslav Lopasic (ed.),
Spomenici Hrvatske Krajine, vols. XV, XVI, and
XX of Monumenta spectantia historiam Sla-
vorum meridionalum (Zagrab, 1884-89), passim.
3 Instructions and letter of appointment, ibid.,
XX, 420-26.
4 For the early history of Senj see Milan
Turkovic, Die Geschichte der ehemaligen croat-
isch-slawonischen Militdrgrenze (Susak, 1936), pp.
10-14, and Ivan Magdic, Topografija i poviest
grada Senja (Senj, 1877), passim, and Jugosla-
vcnska Akademija Znanosti; Umjetnosti, Senj,
Vol. I of Hrvatski kulturni spomenici (Zagreb,
1940), pp. 1-25.
5 Minucci, pp. 6-13.
 VENICE AND THE USKOKS OF SENT 149
into the frontier establishment. Contin-
uing their fight against the Turks, they
undertook repeated and profitable raids
into Bosnia and Dalmatia. But in time
Turkish countermeasures made such ex-
peditions unprofitable and moreover
Ferdinand and the Porte signed an
armistice in 1547 which, among other
provisions, explicitly prohibited such in-
cursions by either side.6 To be sure, the
clause was ill-enforced, but for the time
being at least the Uskoks were forced to
find other means of support. Since the
stony soil around Senj was unsuitable
for agriculture and the subsidies prom-
ised by Austria failed to materialize, the
Uskoks soon returned to raiding as a
means of gaining a livelihood. But sur-
prisingly, these inland men turned to
the sea and within a short time became
lawless and feared sea-rovers.
Senj provided an excellent base for
corsair operations. On the land side the
place was protected by dense forests and
rugged mountains, while toward the sea
shallows and jagged cliffs prevented the
approach of heavily gunned warships.7
Moreover the seas in the Gulf of Quar-
nero are extremely rough, and the Us-
koks used the navigational hazards as
further protection against their ene-
mies.8 They devised special craft to suit
6 Magyar Tudomanyas Akademia, Magyar
Tdrte'nelmi Okmanytar, vols. I-IV, 1st ser.
of Monumenta Hungariae historica (Budapest,
1857-59), II, 144.
7 T. G. Jackson, Dalmatia, the Quarnero, and
Istria (3 vols.; Oxford, 1887), III, 175, and John
G. Wilkinson, Dalmatia and Montenegro (2 vols.;
London, 1848), I, 74, and B. Poparic, Pavijest
Seniskih Uskoka (Zagreb, 1936), pp. 12-16.
8 "The 'Bora,' a sudden storm which has sent
many a ship to the bottom, makes navigation of
the gulf hazardous. Sometimes it blows so, hard
that no one can leave the house for several
days" (Johann W. v. Valvasor, Die Ehre desz
Herzogthums Crain: das ist . . . Belegen- und
Beschaffenheit dieses . . . Romisch-Keyserlichen
herrlichen Erblandes ... [4 vols.; Laibach, 1689],
IV, 79).
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their special needs; boats large enough
to carry between thirty and fifty armed
men but light enough to run before the
wind and to be drawn ashore for con-
cealment when pressed hard by superior
forces.9
The Uskoks became a serious menace
to shipping in the Adriatic. At first they
limited themselves to attacks upon Tur-
kish vessels, but soon they began to
despoil ships belonging to Ragusa (Du-
brovnik), a Christian city-state tributary
to the sultan, and after 1561 they openly
attacked Christian shipping.'0 Consid-
ering that their total fighting strength
never exceeded 2,000 their success was
astonishing." By 1564 the Uskoks were
regarded as a major problem in Venice12
and the matter became even more seri-
ous after 1573, for that year the Signory
decided on a policy of appeasement and
undertook to provide for the security of
Turkish shipping in the Adriatic.13
Angry complaints from the Porte about
the ineffectiveness of this protection
against Uskok attacks caused considera-
ble concern in Venice.14
9 Friedrich Hurter, Geschichte Kaiser Ferdi-
nands II und seiner Eltern, bis zu dessen Kro-
nung in Frankfurt (11 vols.; Schaffhausen, 1850-
54), II, 136-37; Jackson, II, 176-81.
10 Karlo Horvat (ed.), Monumenta historiam
Uscocchorum illustrantia, ex archivis Romanis
praecipue el secreto vaticano desumpta, vols.
XXXII and XXXIV of Monumenta spectantia
historiam Slavorum Meridionalum (Zagreb, 1910-
13), XXXII, 1-4 (hereafter cited as Monumenta
Uscocchorum).
11 Minucci, pp. 20-21; Hurter, II, 133-71.
'12 Joseph Fiedler (ed.), Relationen tvenetian
ischer Botschafter uiber Deutschland und 6ster-
reich im 16. Jahrhundert, vol. XXX, 2d ser. of
Fontes rerum Austriacarum (Vienna, 1870), p.
265 (hereafter cited as Relationen, XXX).
13 Treaty printed in Jean Du Mont, Corps
universel diplomatique du droit des gens, 800-
1731 (8 vols.; Amsterdam and The Hague, 1726-
1731), V, Part I, 218-19.
14 Report from the Venetian envoy at the
Porte, in Great Britain, Public Record Office,
Calendar of state Papers and manuscribts relat-
150 GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG
Diplomatic means were used first, and
the Signory made repeated protests to
the Austrian authorities. Since the divi-
sion of the Austrian lands in 1564 the
defense of Croatia-Slavonia had become
the responsibility of Archduke Charles,
ruler of Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, and
Gorizia-the so-called Inner-Austria. In
1578 this arrangement was formally rec-
ognized by the emperor, and until 1747
the Inner-Austrian authorities at Graz
remained in control of the Militar Gran-
itz, with the imperial government at
Vienna merely retaining the ultimate
decision over war and peace.15 At the
archducal court, however, Venetia's am-
bitions in northeastern Italy and its
pretensions to supremacy in the Adriatic
were much resented. Here the Uskoks
were regarded as a convenient means to
exert pressure against the Venetians.16
On the other hand, the republic found
a more ready hearing at the imperial
court. After 1568, officially at least, there
was peace between the Hapsburgs and
the Porte. Although this meant little in
the border regions where a small war
conltinued unabated, Emperor Maximil-
ian II, and after his death in 1576 his
successor Rudolf II, remained firm in
their decision to prevent any extension
of the hostilities. Therefore the emperor
repeatedly advised the Inner-Austrian
authorities to restrain the Uskoks in
ing to English affairs in the archives and collec-
tions of Venice and in other libraries in northern
Italy (38 vols. in 40; London, 1864-1947), IX,
33-34 (hereafter cited as CSP/Venet.). Cf. Mon-
umenta Uscocchorum, XXXII, 33-34, and Johann
W. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen
Reiches in Europa (7 vols.; Hamburg, 1840-63),
III, 447-48.
15 Instructions and letter of appointment, Vi-
enna, Feb. 25, 1578, in Spomenici Hrvatske
Kraiine, XV, 56-60.
16 Hurter, II, 85-88; Fernand Braudel, La
Me'diterranee et le monde me'diterrane'en ai
I'e'poque de Philippe II (Paris, 1949), pp. 94-95.
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order to placate the Venetians and the
Turks.'7
But this was not done. To put down
the Uskoks, so the archduke informed
the emperor, was not practical. The con-
tinued Turkish threat, he argued, made
a garrison at Senj essential and there
was no money to replace the freebooters
with regular troops.18 To be sure, in
1578 the Inner-Austrian estates had
promised to provide subsidies for the
upkeep of the frontier establishment,
including of course Senj, in return for
far-reaching religious concessions, but in
practice they paid irregularly and never
in full.19 When some years later Arch-
duke Charles did send a small force of
Landsknechte to police the port, the
unpaid and unsupplied troopers de-
serted or made common cause with the
pirates.20 These by then comprised prac-
tically the entire population. Indeed,
regular expeditions were launched twice
a year, financed by officials, priests, and
private families alike.21 The reputation
of Senj spread far and it became the
resort of refugees and outlaws of all
kinds and of all nations.22 So reinforced,
17 Correspondence regarding these activities in
Monumenta Uscocchorum, XXXII, 16-26; a let-
ter from Rudolf II to Charles, Prague, Mar. 14,
1580, in Spomenici Hrvatske Kraiine, XV, 96-97,
as well as correspondence in Austria, Kriegsar-
chiv Wien, Alte Feldakten, Memoires, "Chrono-
logischer Acten Auszug fiber die Organisierung
der Militar-Granze," passim.
18 Hurter, II, 146-47.
19 For this agreement, the "Brucker Libell,"
consult Johann Loserth, Die Reformation und
Gegenreformation in den inner6sterreichischen
Landern im XVI. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1898),
pp. 247-84, and the documents in Spomenici
Hrvatske Kraiine, XV, 60-65. For the failure of
the estates to make proper payment see docu-
ments, ibid., pp. 138-40, 146-52, and Hurter, I,
374-77, 438, 444, 447-49.
20 Report, Senj, Mar. 1580, Spomenici Hrvatske
Kraiine, XV, 97-98.
21 Valvasor, IV, 75-87.
22 Wilkinson, IL, 389; Hurter, II, 133, and
Vladimir Lamansky, Secrets d 'Etat de Venise,
 VENICE AND THE USKOKS OF SEN T 151
the Uskoks became even more daring
and did not hesitate to "vexe the Vene-
tian commerce in their own domesticke
waters." 23
This, in the end, goaded the Vene-
tians into action. In 1576 they had made
certain dispositions to patrol the Gulf
of Quarnero, but had not pressed a
complete blockade.24 Of course, the re-
public could have mounted a full-scale
offensive and eliminated the corsairs,
but it was reluctant to proceed that far.
In the first place this might have led to
open war with Austria, and in the sec-
ond place it might have provided the
Turks with an opportunity for interven-
tion, a prospect eagerly awaited by the
Porte and much dreaded by the Sig-
nory.25 In this uneasy balance, affairs
remained for several years.
But in 1593 the empire and the Turks
once again became involved in open war-
fare. Although the hostilities opened with
an Austrian victory at Sisak (Sissek) the
fighting soon bogged down in sieges and
countersieges in Hungary. The area of
Croatia and the Adriatic coast constituted
but a secondary theater of operations.
documents, extraits, notices et e'tudes servant d
'clairir les rapports de la seigneurie avec les
Grecs, les Slaves, et la Porte ottomane d la fin
du XV6 et au XVPIe siecle (St. Petersburg, 1884),
p. 580. The inhabitants of Senj now were di-
vided into three major groups; the casalini or
townspeople, the stipendati or those supposed
to be in the Austrian service, and finally the
venturini or banditti, composed of the foreign
recruits.
23 William Lithgow, The totall discourse of the
rare adventures & painefull peregrinations of
long ninteene yeares travayles from Scotland to
the most famous kingdomes in Europe, Asia, and
Africa (reprint of the 1636 ed.; Glasgow, 1906),
p. 41.
24 Ibid., p. 42; Braudel, pp. 91-92.
25 Minucci, pp. 41-42; Johann C. v. Engel,
Staatskunde und Geschichte von Dalmatien,
Croatien, und Slawonien (Halle, 1798), p. 568,
and Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk
(Liverpool, 1954), p. 170.
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The major developments here were an
Austro-papal scheme, based on the opti-
mistic belief that the Balkan Christians
would rise at the approach of a Christian
army, to bring about a large-scale revolt
in Bosnia, Dalmatia, and Albania26 and
a Venetian effort to exploit Austria's pre-
occupation and so impose a solution of
the Uskok problem by force.
The Turkish defeat at Sisak had been
followed by an insurrection in Moldavia
and by several smaller uprisings in Serbia
and Albania.27 Therefore, when early in
1596 a party of Uskoks, aided by some
Dalmatian insurgents, seized Klis (Clissa),
an ancient coastal stronghold, the Aus-
trian military authorities, encouraged by
the papacy, believed this to be the op-
portune time and place for the opening
of a second front against the Ottomans.2&
Also they hoped, or so the Venetians al-
leged, that the operations would involve
the Venetian garrison at nearby Split and
thus draw the neutral republic into the
war.29 In any case, Austrian reinforce-
ments from Croatia, commanded by
George Lencovich, col.onel of the border,
were hurriedly ordered to Klis. The force
was to march overland where, it was
hoped, it would attract numerous Dal-
matian recruits.30
But the enterprise failed. Dalmatiarn
26 See discussion, ibid., pp. 215-36, as well as
the documents in Lamansky, pp. 496-506.
27 N. Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen
Reiches (5 vols.; Gotha, 1908-13), III, 278-81.
28 Ibid., p. 320; documents in Monumenta
Uscocchorum, XXXII, 90-99, and in J. N.
Tomie, Gradja za istoriju pokreta na Balkanu
protiv Turaka krajem XVI; poc'etkom XVII veka
(Belgrade, 1933), passim. Cf. the account in
Nikolaus Istvanffy, Historiarum de rebus ungari-
cis libri XXXIV (Vienna, 1758), pp. 418-20.
29 This version is given in the fragment of an
unedited manuscript history of Venice by Nicolo
Contarini, friend of Paolo Sarpi and doge in
1631, printed in Lamansky, pp. 502-15, and
accepted by Braudel, p. 248.
30 A report from Laibach, Apr. 18, 1596, in
Monumenta Uscocchorum, XXXII, 97-99.
 152 GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG
support did not materialize and a plan-
ned diversionary attack in Slavonia fizzled
out. Lencovich fought his way into Klis
by May 28, 1596, but with his force so
badly mauled by the Turks that a few
days later it had to be evacuated by sea.31
The fortress was then reoccupied by the
Turks. Bitter recriminations were voiced
against the "treacherous Dalmatians,"
and against the Venetian garrison at Split
which had refused to aid the embattled
Christians.32
In fact, the Signory had instructed its
commanders at Split and at other places
along the Dalmatian coast to remain neu-
tral and had utilized the Austro-T'urkish
involvement to mount large-scale opera-
tions against the Uskoks. This time the
Venetians blockaded the Croatian coast
closely with a considerable armament.
Although they did not capture Senj or
sink the main Uskok flotilla, they landed
troops on the mainland, raided open
towns and villages and reduced isolated
strongholds, executing all prisoners on
the spot.33 Such pressure forced Arch-
duke Charles to negotiate, and late in
1600 he appointed as his plenipotentiary
Count Joseph de Rabatta, a Carniolan
nobleman with excellent connections in
Venice. In fact, these connections were
too good, for Rabatta appears to have
been secretly in the pay of the Signory.84
During the next year Rabatta, pro-
tected by a strong escort, acted as commis-
31 An analysis of the mistakes leading to the
defeat, Graz, Aug. 20, 1596, ibid., pp. 135-38;
reports by Lenkovich and other officers in
Spomenici Hrvatske Krajine, XV, 205-13, Vene-
tian reports in Tomic, pp. 129-36.
32 From Lenkovich's report, May 30, 1596,
ibid., p. 205; Lamansky, p. 502.
33 Venetian reports, ibid., pp. 475-77, 491-93,
548-49; Austrian reports in Spomenici Hruatske
Kraiine, XV, 273-80; Minucci, pp. 25-29.
34 Minucci, p. 52, as well as a Venetian re-
port praising Rabatta's co-operativeness in Mon-
umenta Uscocchorum, XXXII, 382-83.
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sioner extraordinary at Senj as well as
chief negotiator with the Venetians. He
maintained an extremely birutal regime
during which many Uskoks were hanged
or beheaded, while others were deported
to the interior to fight in the Turkish war.
In his reports, meanwhile, Rabatta had
revealed an extreme partiality for the
Venetian side, and so it was not surpris-
ing that he was hated in Senj and sus-
pected in Graz.35 No direct action was
taken against him, but his military sup-
port was quietly withdrawn, giving the
Uskoks their opportunity. They rose in
January 1602 and killed Rabatta. T'he
authorities at Graz were none too dis-
pleased; the negotiations were suspended
and affairs reverted to their usual state
at Senj.36
In the following years the Venetians
first relaxed and then suspended their
blockade. A treaty concluded with the
Porte in 1604 released the Signory from
responsibility for damage done to T'ur-
kish shipping in the Adriatic.37 Another
factor contributing to a relaxation of ten-
sion was the treaty of Zitva Torok in
1606 which ended the Austro-Turkish
conflict and as usual contained prohibi-
tions against raiding by both sides.38 F'in-
ally, the Venetians had drifted into a
controversy with the papacy and were
anxious to reduce their liabilities. For
all of these reasons the Uskoks remained
relatively undisturbed until 1611.
35 Hurter, VI, 537-45; correspondence between
Ferdinand and Rabatta in Spomenici Hr-atske
Kraiine, XV, 283-88; and a memorial signed by
representatives of the population of Senj detail-
ing Rabatta's alleged ill-conduct, ibid., pp.
300-5. Cf. Poparic, pp. 143-61.
36 Report from Venice, Jan. 27, 1602, in Mon-
umenta Uscocchorum, XXXIV, 5; as well as
Daniel Francol's report from Senj, Mar. 1602,
Spomenici Hrvatske Krajine, XV, 306-7.
37 Zinkeisen, III, 426.
38 Text of the treaty in Gabriel Noradoung-
hian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'empire
Ottoman (4 vols.; Paris, 1897-1903), I, 103-8.
 VENICE AND THE USKOKS OF SENJ 153
During these years the Austrian au-
thorities pursued a devious course. On
the one hand piracy was sternly forbid-
den, but on the other hand it was toler-
ated to avoid payment of subsidies owed
to Senj. From time to time Graz stirred
to make a show of force, troops were
moved in, a few culprits executed, some
loot impounded, often only to line the
pockets of the military commanders.
Then affairs went back to normal-to
piracy, robbery, and brigandage.39 It is
hard to decide who was worse, the Us-
koks or the wretched government at
Graz, or for that matter the Venetians
who did not hesitate to buy the Uskoks'
prizes and sell them at a profit in Ven-
ice.
But this phase was short lived. A more
aggressive faction gained the upper
hand in the councils of Venice and the
weakness of the Hapsburgs invited the
use of force. The republic was strength-
ened by a firm alliance with the States-
General40 and encouraged by England.
"Venice," observed James I, "was rich
and strong, whereas the archduke was
limited in forces and the emperor a
mere pauper." 41 Late in 1611 the Vene-
tians began to blockade the Croatian
coast and the Istrian harbors, Trieste
and Fiume, once again and by October
of the following year Ferdinand, who
had succeeded Charles in Inner-Austria,
was forced to come to rather unfavora-
ble terms.42 He agreed to supervise the
89 Franz VaniZek, Specialgeschichte der Mili-
tdrgrenze (4 vols.; Vienna, 1875), I, 273-82;
documents in Monumenta Uscocchorum, XXXIV,
71-91.
40 For the Venetian-Dutch alliance see J. C.
de Jonge, Nederland en Venetie (The Hague,
1852), pp. 14-15.
41 As reported by the Venetian envoy, Nov. 9,
1612, CSP/Venet., XII, 442.
42 Anton Gnirs, ?sterreichs Kampf fur sein
Siidland am Isonzo, 1615-1617 (Vienna, 1916),
pp. 8-11.
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Uskoks closely and to expel the most
turbulent from Senj. He accepted se-
vere restrictions on Austrian shipping
and in return received only a vague
promise that Venice would respect le-
gitimate Austrian commerce.43
Apparently Ferdinand meant to im-
plement the agreement, for he promptly
instructed Count Niklas Frankopan
(Frangepani), then captain at Senj, to
keep a close check on the Uskoks and to
watch especially the foreign adventurers,
"Greeks, Albanians, and other such
rabble," who had joined the freebooters.
The archduke explained that he realized
that money was the basis of discipline
and he promised to do his best to secure
funds. Meanwhile, he suggested, the mo-
rale of the forces at Senj should be
raised by the reminder that they served
as the outposts of Christendom.44 Of
course, this had little effect and by the
spring of 1613 there were again com-
plants that the Uskoks were plundering
"Turk and Christian, Venetian and Aus-
trian alike."45 This time the Venetians
reacted quickly. They seized the small
port of Carlopago, some sixty miles down
the coast from Senj, which was used as
an auxiliary base by the Uskoks, and
executed all prisoners.46 A Venetian
squadron intercepted a flotilla from Senj
and, according to reports, the heads of
the sixty Uskoks were soon thereafter
displayed in St. Mark's square.47 In re-
prisal the Uskoks captured a Venetian
galley, slaughtered the crew, and al-
43Agreement printed in Spomenici Hruatske
Kraiine, XVI, 47-48.
44 Ibid., pp. 40-46.
45 A report from Laibach, Mar. 20, 1613, ibid.,
pp. 48-54.
46 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
47Vani&ek, I, 286, and a report by the papal
nuncio in Venice which speaks of Albanian
mercenaries in the Venetian service bringing
in some seventy heads, May 18, 1613, in Monu-
menta Uscocchorum, XXXIV, 123.
 154 GUNTHER E. ROTHENBERG

legedly flavored their bread with the small engagements in the Friuli and
blood of the victims.48 This incident, Istria, was of no great importance, but
whether true or not, made timely propa- it derived significance from the support
ganda and provided the Signory with a given to the contestants by the future
splendid excuse to proclaim a complete antagonists of the Thirty Years' War.52
blockade of all Austrian ports on the An ardent Catholic, Ferdinand had just
Adriatic in 1614.4 . At the same time, completed the restoration of the church
Venice began to look abroad, especially in his dominions and thus enrolled the
to England and Holland, for mercenaries support of the Catholic party. To be
and munitions. The Austrians also sure, he could count on little support
brought up some reinforcements and from the Protestant estates of Inner-
received assurances of support from Austria, or for that matter from the
Spain.50 emperor whose chief adviser, Cardinal
But both parties were not yet pre- Khlesl, was totally opposed to any mili-
pared for open war, and negotiations be- tary adventures.53 But Spain aided Ferdi-
gan between the Signory on the one side nand with arms, men, and money, and in
and the archduke and Emperor Mat- addition exerted pressure on Venice
thias on the other. "The emperor," re- through extensive military and naval
ported the Venetian envoy, "has shown preparations in Naples and Milan.54
his good intent and is willing to give Venice, at odds with the papacy, at-
us satisfaction, but implementation of tracted Protestant aid. James I had in-
any agreement rests with Archduke timated his willingness to support the
Ferdinand and his ministers." 51 Ferdi- republic openly, and although he ulti-
nand, who expected the support of Spain mately failed to carry out his promise,
which regarded the republic as the chief Venice was able to purchase arms and
obstacle to her expansion in Italy, was to recruit men in England and Holland.
not inclined to give in to the Venetian A number of German Protestants also
demands. Thus, despite the emperor's rallied to the standard of St. Mark, and
pacific inclinations the negotiations Venetian recruiters had considerable suc-
failed, and early in the summer of 1615 cess among the Protestant inhabitants of
patrol clashes along the Isonzo opened the Grisons.55
the actual hostilities. With the operations of war proper
Militarily the war, limited to rather there is little need to be concerned here.
The Venetians maintained control of
48 Ibid., p. 124, and Valvasor, IV, 83.
49 Vanicek, I, 280-81; proclamation of a block-
ade against all archducal ports, May 9, 1614, 52 Gnirs is the standard Austrian account. A
CSP/Venet., XIII, 120; and instructions to the bibliography of near contemporary writings can
Venetian envoy in England to stress the Uskok be found in Hurter, VII, 79-80. Military docu-
atrocities, ibid., XIV, 68. ments are deposited in Austria, Kriegsarchiv
50 The Signory had been hiring foreign troops Wien, Alte Feldakten, fasc. 50-52.
for several months by then (reports, ibid., XII, 53 Hurter, VII, 105-9.
426-27, 461-62). Venetian reports regarding 54An informative account of this policy in
Spanish aid for Ferdinand, ibid., XIII, 118. Bohdan Chudoba, Spain and the empire, 1519-
51 The final report of H. Soranzo (1614) in 1643 (Chicago, 1952), pp. 203-18. Various Vene-
Joseph Fiedler (ed.), Die Relationen der Bot- tian intelligence reports in CSP/Venet., XIV,
schafter Venedigs iuber Deutschland und ?ster- X V, passim.
reich im 17. Jahrhundert, vol. XXVI, 2d ser. of 55 For Venetian recruiting see ibid., XIV, 157,
Fontes rerum Austriacarum (Vienna, 1886), pp. 182, 193, 461-62; De Jonge, 30-43; and Hurter,
29-30 (hereafter cited as Relationen, XXVI). VI, 589-92.

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 VENICE AND THE USKOKS OF SENJ 155

the seas. The Spanish failed in an at- tion. I'he ambitious governor of Naples,
tempt to intercept an important Dutch the Duke of Ossuna, had built up a
convoy which had sailed early in 1617 powerful fleet, ostensibly for use against
carrying a contingent of 4,000 foot, com- the Turks and corsairs, but which, so the
manded by John Ernest of Nassau.56 On Signory believed and not without cause,
land the hostilities during 1615 were was preparing to strike a blow at Ven-
limited to patrol encounters and skir- ice.59 In the opinion of the French en-
mishes. In the following year a Venetian voy, fear of a full-scale Spanish interven-
offensive into Gorizia became stalled be- tion was the main factor inducing the
fore Gradisca, a resolutely defended Signory toward a peaceful solution.60 On
fortress on the Isonzo, some twenty miles the Austrian side, the archduke was at
inland from the Gulf of Trieste. Re- the end of his limited resources and was
peated Venetian assaults were beaten becoming steadily involved in the prob-
back by the Austrian garrison, rein- lem of imperial succession. The emperor
forced by a Spanish regular regiment, and Khlesl, of course, had never been in
but the siege continued. As the months favor of the war at all.
passed the Venetian blockade around Actually communications between the
Gradisca tightened and by the summer belligerents had never completely broken
of 1617 the town was in dire straits. In down. "The negotiations at the imperial
the early fall, however, Albrecht von court are troubled," reported the Vene-
Wallenstein, until then a little-known tian senate in 1616, "new difficulties be-
Bohemian nobleman, escorted a convoy ing raised by the archduke's party who,
through the Venetian lines and repro- instead of consenting to an armistice,
visioned the town.57 simply think of breaking off negotia-
By this time both sides were weary of tions."61 But by the following year
the war. The expenses of the conflict Ferdinand was ready for peace. Emperor
were a heavy drain on Venice. The Ve- Matthias, daily growing weaker in body
netian army was decimated by casualties and lacking legitimate heirs, had selected
and disease, it had lost its ablest leaders, the archduke as his successor. In June
and the remaining troops were ill-trained, 1617 he had induced the Protestant es-
ill-equipped, and unreliable.58 Spain ap- tates of Bohemia to accept the archduke
peared ready for more active interven- as their king, and this elevation cooled
Ferdinand's desire to continue the un-
56 Although the troops were enlisted during profitable war. Moreover, in the summer
the summer of 1616 and embarked in December,
of 1617 both France and the papacy had
the convoy did not sail until March 1617 (De
Jonge, p. 69). For the Spanish attempt to inter- entered the scene urging a speedy peace
cept the convoy see R. C. Anderson, Naval wars and so, after preliminary negotiations at
in the Levant, 1559-1853 (Liverpool, 1953), p.
Paris, peace was concluded at Madrid on
90; and for its debarkation :;ee the reports from
Venice, Apr. 5 to June 15, 1617, in Monumenta September 26, 1617 between the "King
Uscocchorum, XXXIV, 408-18. A general ac- of Bohemia" and the Venetian Signory.62
count of Venetian naval operations in M. N.
Mocenigo, Storia della Marina veneziana da 59 Anderson, pp. 89-90; Vaughan, p. 239.
Lepanto alla caduta della Repubblica (Rome, 60 Report, June 20, 1617, in Monumenta Us-
1935), pp. 98-119. cocchorum, XXXIV, 424-25.
57 Gnirs, passim; an eyewitness account in 61 The Senate to its envoy in England, Feb.
Lithgow, pp. 42-43. 20, 1616, CSP/Venet., XIV, 132.
58 Hurter, VII, 143-49; De Jonge, pp. 59-63, 62 Treaty printed in Spomenici Hrvatske
76-79. Krajine, XVI, 63-65.

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 156 GUNTHER E. ROTHENRFRG

Ferdinand undertook to deport the Us- In early 1618, however, conditions in

koks, to police the Meer Grdnitz, and to Bohemia became threatening and Ferdi-
bear the cost of a regular garrison at nand now was ready for a speedy execu-
Senj; the Venetians promised to respect tion of all the provisions of the treaty.
Austrian maritime, territorial, and com- In February 1618 a supplementary agree-
mercial rights in the Adriatic. ment was reached and by April a special
But even this did not bring an im- Austro-Venetian commission reported
mediate end to hostilities, for the imple- that despite certain difficulties most of
mentation of the treaty was delayed and the treaty conditions had been carried
sporadic fighting continued along the out. The Uskoks either were expelled
Isonzo. The Inner-Austrian military au- from Austrian territory or transferred in-
thorities refused to evacuate the Uskoks land into Croatia. Only a few families
from Senj before a regular garrison were allowed to remain at Senj, after
could be moved in to secure the place.63 proving that they had gainful and peace-
Reinforcements, recruited with Spanish able employment.67
money, continued to arrive at the The removal of the Uskoks eliminated
front,64 and the Duke of Ossuna, in ap- piracy in the northern Adriatic. Venice,
parent defiance of the wishes of the however, remained sensitive to any threat
Spanish government, continued his naval of renewed Uskok activity, and in 1621
operations against Venice during the the Signory offered a reward of 20,000
winter and spring of 1617-18.65 In Ven- ducats for the assassination of a certain
ice the all-out intervention of Spain was Andreas Ferletitch, suspected of piratical
once again feared and the Signory took designs. In 1623 Venetian complaints
steps to enlist additional infantry in Hol- brought an imperial investigation, and
land and to secure Dutch and English as late as 1641 the Venetian envoy at
naval support, including the services of Vienna reported with some concern the
a fully equipped and war-ready Dutch launching of boats, much too large for
sauadron.66 ordinary purposes, at Senj.68 But the
alarm proved unfounded. Senj never re-
63 Memorandum, Graz, Apr. 7, 1618, ibid., pp.
65-68. covered, and only the shadow of its
64 Chudoba, p. 212. piratical past lingered over its crumbling
65 For Ossuna's activities see Anderson, pp.
fortifications and rusty cannons.
98-99. But the Spanish government had taken
steps to disown him and his activities, which
SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
culminated in the much debated "Conspiracy of
Venice," and have "baffled historians of all na-
tions" (Julian S. Corbett, England in the Medi-
terranean [2 vols.; London, 1904], 1, 63-64).
Documents in CSP/Venet., XV, 240-42, and in
P. Negri, "La politica veneta contro gli Uscocchi 67 Reports in Relationen, XXVI, 35-47; Spo-
in relazione alla congiura del 1618," Nuovo Ar- menici Hrvatske Krajine, XVI, 65-76; and Mon-
chivio Veneto, XVII (1909), 338-84. umenta Uscocchorum, XXXIV, 468-70.
66 For the Venetian fears see the deliberations 68 General discussion and documents in H. v.
of the Senate, Feb. 16, 1618, CSP/Venet., XV, Zwiedineck-SuIdenhorst, Die Politik der Repub-
145. Details regarding the negotiations for further
lik Venedig wahrend des Dreissigjdhrigen Krieges
Dutch aid in Richard E. J. Weber, De Beveilig- (2 vols.; Stuttgart, 1882-85), pp. 53-55, 316-22.
ing van de zee tegen europeesche en barbariische For the assassination scheme see Lamansky,
Zeeroovers, 1609-1621 (Amsterdam, 1936), p. 121, pp. 114-15; on the investigation of 1623 see
and P. Geyl, Christofforo Suriano, Resident van Spomenici Hrvatske Krajine, XVI, 121-24, and
de Serenissime Republiek van Venetie in Den on the Venetian complaints in 1641 see Rela-
Haag, 1616-1623 (The Hague, 1913), passim. tionen, XXVI, 258-59.

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