11111111111111111111111111

9 780415625661
Political Regimes in the Arab W orld

One of rhe implications of Orientalisl11 is rhar rhe Arab world, as a homogenous

enriry, is ofren analyzed as Jn anomaly wirhin rhe intemational sysrem. This book
argues mar, despite their differences, societies across che globe ultimarely constnlce
their o\Vn history according to very similar dynamics and tensions.
The merhodological approach of rhis book, l1sing differenr counrries wirhin
dle Arab \Vo rld as models, offers che reader ao analysis of relations berween rhe
elites and eheir opposition in a variery of settings. A definiran of rhe politica1
senIeNre of each counny is draw ll frO I11 chis analysis befare potencial [mure
scenarios, as according ro counrry-specific e:\.l'ens, are proposed. This model
provides a useful contribution ca scuclents and schoJars of political scie nce and
internacional relarions.
Through providing a compararive study of the politica! regimes curremly
operacing in rhe Arab world, rheir elites, civil sociery, power resources and
political resistance, this book ilIusrf::Ires chat, despice che image of homogeneity
so me times porrrayed by che Arab world, ir is the mulriplicity of l110dels and
heeerogeneiry of regimes thae constitute realiry.

Ferran Izquierdo Brichs is Lectllrer in Inrernatio nal Relations, Auconomolls

U niversity of Barcelona.

Routledge Studies in Middle Eastero Politics
1 Algeria in Transition
Refon11S and development
prospeces
Ahlllcd Ag/rolfl !/Jitll Redha
i\tl, BOl/ghcrira
2 Palestinian Refugee
Repatriation
Global perspectives
Edited by Mirhael DUlllper
3 The International Politics of
the Persian Gulf
A cultural genealogy
Arshill Adib-iVIoghaddalll
4 Israeli Politics and the First
Palestinian Intifada
Palirica! opportuniries, framing
processes and contentious poJicies
EfmI Y. Alillli
5 Democratization in MoroccD
The poltical elite and
scruggles for power in che
post-independence state
Lise Sto/m
6 Secular and Islalluc Politics
in Turkey
The making of th e justice and
Developmen[ Pany
III;( Cizrc
7 The Unted Sta tes and Iran
Sanctions, wars and the poliey of
dual eomainmem
Sasan Fayazlllallcsh
8 Civil Society in A1geria
The policical flll1Ctions of
associanonal Jife
Alldrca LilJcralli
9 ]ordanian-Israeli Relations
The peacebuildi ng experience
lVIwa)'yam al O'rall
10 Kemalism in Turkish
Politics
The Republcan People's
Parry. seculansI11 and
nationalisl11
Silltlll Cidrli
11 Islatnism, Democracy and
LiberaJism in Turkey
The case of the AKP
vVillimll Hale nl/d ElglIlI Ozul/dl/u
12 Politics and Violence in
Israel/Palestine
Democracy versus military rule
Le,! L/lis Grillbc/;g
13 Intra-Jewish Conflict
in Israel
White jews, black jews
Sa/lli Slwlolll CJlCrrit
14 Holy Places in the
Israel-Palestinian Conflict
Confronta non and
eo-existenee
Editcd by Marslta/l J. Brcger,
Yitz}ak R citcr alld Lcol/ard
Hall/lIJe/"
15 Plurality and Citizenship in
Israel
Moving beyond the jewish/
Palestinian civil divide
Editcd by Dml AII/lOII alld Yotmll
B CIIZiJ/J(/1I
16 Ethnic Politics in Israel
The margins and rhe Ashkenasi
Cenrer
AS'(fd G/lClllelll
17 Islatnists and Secularists in
Egypt
Opposition. conAict and
cooperation
Di/la Slteltata
18 Political Succession in the
Arab World
Constimtions, f.1mily loyalties
and Islam
A utllOII)' Billi"gslcy
19 Turkey's Entente with Israel
and Azerbaijan
Stace identit)' and secunty in rhe
Middle East and Caucasus
Alc'\"{TIldcr lll[I/I";1I5011
20 Europe and Tunisia
Democranzanon va association
Blieg PO/Pe! atld Larbi Sadiki
21 Turkish Politics and the Rise
ofthe AKP
Dilemmas of institutionalizanon
and leadership strategy
Arda Cnu KIIIIIIJlfmcibas;
22 Civil Society and
Democratization in the
Arab World
The dynarnies of aenvism
Fmllccsco eavatona ami flillCCIIf DI/me
23 Politics in Maraceo
Executive monarchy and
enligh tened authoritarianism
Al/ollar BOl/klll11'5
24 The Second Palestinian
Intifada
Civil resistance
julie VI. l'vorfllall
25 Dell10cracy in Turkey
The impact of EU political
condirionaliry
Ali ReslI/ USII/
26 NationalistTI and Politics in
Turkey
Policical Islam, Kemalism and che
Turkisb issue
Edircd by AJadies Casier rllld j oost
JOllgcrdclI
27 Democracy in the Arab World
Explaining the deficit
Ediren by Salllir l\4akdisi (",d
Ibmhilll Elbadawi
28 Public Management in Israel
Development, structure,
fUI1ctions and refonm
ltz/lak Ga/lloor
29 Israel Nationalism
Social confliees and the poliries of
knowledge
Uri Ralll
30 NATO and the Middle East
The geopoltical context pose-9/ t!
JVlol/lJ/l/lllcd Aifo/lstq{a Oifjl
31 The Kurds and US Foreign
Policy
Intemational relations in the
Middle East sinee 1945
lV/miml11a C'arolJll tal

32 The lran-Iraq War
Antecedents and canRict
escalarian
Jerolllc DOl/OIJatl
33 Surveillance and Control in
Israel/Palestine
Population, cenitary and power
Edited by Elia ZI/reik, Dmdd Lyoll
alld YasmceJJ Ablf-Lava/l
34 Conflict and Peacemaldng in
Israel-Palestine
Theory aud application
Sapir HmldellllCl/l
35 Arab Minority Nationalism in
Israel
The politics of indigeneiry
Ama! Jama!
36 The Contradictions of IsraeH
Citizenship
Land, religion and seate
Edited by Gil}' Be/l -Porat a/ld
BI)'atl S. dumer
37 The Arab State and Women's
Rights
The trap of authorirarian
governance
Elhal1l VIallea
38 Saudi Maritime Poliey
Imegrated govemance
Hatill/ Al-Bisher, Selilla Stcad alld
Til1l Cra)'
39 The Arab State
Dilernmas of late fOn11atio n Political Regimes in the
Adham Saol/li
40 Regime Stabilty in Sauru
Arab World
Arabia Society and the Exercise of Power
The challenge of succession
Stig Stcl/S/ie
41 Sacred Space in Israel and
Palestine
Religion and politics
Editcd by Mars!wllj. Brcgcr,
Yitz/ak Reiter alld Lcollard HallJ/lla
42 The UN and the Arab-Israel
Edited by
Conflict Ferran Izquierdo Brichs
American hegemony and UN
intervenoon since 1947
D{lIli!o Di k!a/lfO
43 Sectarian Conflict in Egypt
Coptic media, identiry and
representation
Elizabeth lskal/dcr
44 Contemporary Moroeeo
Sta te, politi cs and sociery under
Mohammed VI
Editcd by Bmcc lHadd)'- H1eitzlllall
O/Id Da/liel ZiSCl/!uillC
45 Poltical Regimes in the
Arab World
Sociery and the exercise of
power
Editcd by Fermll Bric/s
I~ ~~a~;~~n~~~up
LONDON AND NEW YORK
 First publishcd 2013
by Rouclcdge
Contents
2 Park Squarc, Miltan Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultancously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, Ne\v York, NY 10017
Rourledgc js fUI impn"1lI of lile Taylor & FwucJS Group, f!JI irifon/la Imsiucss
2013 Ferr.m Izquierdo Brichs for selection and editorial marrer; individua]
chapters, the comriburors
The righr ofFerran Izquierdo Brichs to be identified as the aurhor oftlte editorial
material. and of tite aurhors for tlteir individual chaptcrs, has bcctl asserted in
accordance wirh sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Acr
1988 .
All rights reserved. No part of dtis book may be reprinted or reproduced or List 01 cO/ltrivurors IX
miJised in any fotm or by any dectronic, mechanical, or orher means, now Ackl101 /llcdgclIIC/I ts Xl
known or hereafter invented, induding photocopying and recording, or in an}'
infornlatiotl starage or rerrieval system, withour permsion in writing from the
publshcrs, Introduction 1
Tmdcmark Ilatice: Product or corporate llames may be tr;demarks or regisrcred FERRAN IZQUIERDO BRICHS
rr;demarks, and are used only for identificarion and explanarion ",ithom iment to
infringe,
1 Sociology of power in today's Arab world 6
Bn'lis/! Librar)' Carnlogllil!g il! P"blicmioll Dala
A catalogue record (or rhis book is available from the British Library FERRAN IZQUIERDO BRICHS AND ATHINA LAMPR.IDI - KEMOU

Librar' (1 COllgrcss Catrlloging iu Publicaliou DI/m

Political regimes in [he Arab ",orld: sociery and rhe exercise oC po\Ver / edited by 2 Algeria: post-colonial power structure and reproduction
Ferran Brichs, of elites without renewal 38
p. cm. - (Routledge studies in Middle Eastem polities; 45)
RAFEl BUSTOS AND AVltEUA MA
Ind udes bibliographicaj referenccs and index, '
l. Arab eountries - Politie5 and government - 1945-2, Comparative
govemmem, 1. Izquierdo, Ferran. 3 Whither Algeria? Two normalizations, three unresolved
JQI850,A58P6620 12
320.917'4927 - de23
crises and two crucial unknowns 65
:W12006095 IVN MARTN

ISDN 978-0-41 5-62566-1 (hbk)

ISDN 978-0-:W3-10262-6 (ebk)
4 Morocco: the reinvention of an authoritarian systelTI 70
LAURA FEUV ANO M' ANGUSTIAS PAREJO
Typcset in Bembo
By Taylor & Franeis Dooks
5 Moroceo: regime and fuses 100
BERNAB lPEZ GARcA

6 E pur si muove? Logies of power and the process

of transition in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania 104
RAQUEl OJEDA GARCA ANO ALBErt TO lPEZ BARGADOS

7 Mauritania's challenges 122

I\.'IIGUEL HERNANDO DE LARRAMENOI

8 Contemporary Egypt: between refonn and continuity 125

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
ATHINA LAMPRIDI-KEMOU ANO BRBARA AZ!\OLA
TJ International Ud, Padstow, Cornwall
Vl1l COlltellts
9 Egypt from yesterday to the present
GEMA MAR TiN MUOZ
10 Saudi Arabia: family, religion, army and oil
EDUARD SOLER I LECHA ANO LUClANO ZACCAR.A
11 The future of Saudi Arabia
FREO HALLlDA Y
12 The Syrian ruling elite and the failure of the repressive
trend
IGNACIO LVAREZ-OSSORIO AND IGNACIO GUTIRREZ DE TERN
13 What do es the future hold?
SALlVvI KA WAKIBI
14 Elites. power and political change in post-war Lebanon
AMAIA GOENAGA AND ELVIRA SNCHEZ MATEOS
15 Lebanon: temporary or lasting peace?
GEORGE E. lRANI
16 Jordan: the survival of the monarchy
GRALDINE BARR AND LUIG! MASCIULLI
17 Jordan: a delicate domes tic and regional equilibrium
HAIZAM AivllRAH-FERNNDEZ
18 PaIestine: elites and power under occupation
SALVADOR MARTNEZ MS ANDJAVIER TRAVN
19 Palestine: what do es the future hold?
JEAN-FRAN<;OIS LEGRAIN
l/lde.\:
153
Contributors
155
183
186
Perran Izquierdo Brichs, Autonol11ous University of Barcelona
216
Athina Lampridi-Kemou, Autonol11ollS University of Barcelona
Rafel Bustos, The Complutense Universiey of Madrid
220
Aurelia Ma, Universiry ofBarcelona
Ivn Martn, Complutense Inscitute of Internacional Studies
246
Laura Feliu, Autonol11ous University of Barcelona
Mil Angustias Parejo, Universiry of Granada
249
Bemab Lpez Garca, Mediterranean Intemational Studies Workshop -
Autonol11ous University of Madrid
276 Raquel Ojeda Garca, Universiey of Jan
Alberto Lpez Bargados, Universiey of Barcelona
279 Miguel Hemando de Larratnendi, University of Castilla-La Mancha
Brbara Azaola, University of Castilla-La Mancha
303 Gema Martn Muoz, Director of Casa rabe and its Inscituce for Arab and
Muslim World Studies
Eduard Soler i Lecha, Research fello\\', Barcelona Cemer for International
J08 AJf.1irs, ClDOB
Ludano Zaccara, Director of che Observatorio Electoral TEIM-VAM,
post-doctoral researcher, VAB
Fred Halliday (1946-2010) \Vas Professor of Intemational Relations at the
Londan School of Econonlics for many years, and when he recired in 2008
became an ICREA research professor at che Insrituc Barcelona d'Estudis Inter-
nacionals. He \Vas one of che best specialiscs on the Middle Easc and his baoks
and anieles are essentiaJ reading for aIl researchers. His parcicipation in chis
project was a great privilege for all of uso
x Lisr rlj co/ltriblltors
Ignacio lvarez-Ossorio, University of Alicante
Ignacio Gutirrez de Tern, Amo nomous University of Madrid
Acknowledgements
Salam Kawakibi, Arab Reforn1 Initiative

Amaia Goenaga, lnternarional MediteITanean Studies Workshop (TElM),

Auronomous University of Madrid
Elvira Snchez Mateos, Open University of Caralonia (UOC)
George E. Irani, University of San Pablo, Spain
Graldine Barr, Amonomous University ofBarcelona
Luigi Masciulli, Autonol11ous University ofBarcelona
The contenrs of this publicarion are rhe resu lr of rhe research projecr and
Haizam Atnirah-Fernndez, Senior AnalyS[ for rhe Mediterranean an d [he international seminar Power alld political regil/lcs i,l tlIe comcmpoml}' Amb "'!orld,
Arab World at the Eleano Royal lnsritute funded and organi zed by CIDOB (www.cidob.org)onApril7and8.2008.in
Barcelona, Spa in.
Jean-Fran~ois Legrain, CNRS/GREMMO researcher, Maison de I'Orient
The original rexr has been rranslared from Spanish ro English by: Carherine
er de la Mdirerrane-Lyon
Am erte, Susanna Eas[\Vood and Anunda Down Blacklay.
Salvador Martnez Ms, University Carlos III The conrent of chis work has been ed ited by Professor Ferran Izquierdo
Brichs.
Javier Travin, Auronol11ous University of Barcelona

clQ@)H
Introduction
FCITan Izqllierdo Brichs

The rwenry-first cenrury got under way \Virh a11 eyes 011 rhe Arab \Vorld and
rhe Middle East. However, chis \Vas ciue nor to rhe power and influence of che
region's seaees and societies bur, 011 rhe contrary, ro their weakness.
The weakness of Middle Eastem societies, including [har of km, has rraI1sfonned
(he area into rhe ideal stage for global compecitian Qver power.
In 2011, rhe Arab \Vorld surprised everyone \Virh es protests against aurhorirar-
ian and dictatorial regimes. This is, moreover, a novelty given thar for decades and
right up te (he presenr rhe region has mainly been undergoing violent
dynamics reflecring global tensions, whose main cause is related to oi1. There
are, however, other factors ae (he roor of rhe difficult living condirions endured
for generations by Arab and Middle Eastern popularions, su eh as the author-
itarian systems as well as foreign interference.
The Arab worId's recenr hisrory is an accurate reflecrion of rensions caused
firsr by European colonialism and later by globalized capitalismo Failure of various
artempcs ro l110demize rhe region is epitom.ized by rhe defear of Muhanm1ad Ali,
in bis endeavors ro generate economic development in Egypt ar rhe beginning
of the nineteenth centmy. Following the modernizing methods of European
elites, Muhammad Ali transformed Egypt inro a military, polirical and eco-
nomic power. However, borh London and rhe Orroman Sulranare saw in this
developmenr a threar ro their own power and interests, and consequently
joined forces to reassert their conrrol over Egypr. Their victory was sealed \Vith
the prohibition ofEgypr's indusrnalizing process and rhe order ro dismanrle any
faetories thar might represenr eompetition with British production, thus bringing
Egypt's modemizing experience ro a complete standstill.
Muhammad Ali's capitulario n is undoubtedly one of rhe grearesr examples of
European colonial hypocrisy. London and Paris' elites jusrified their expansion
as a 'civilizing mission' that was ro bring political and economic modemiry to
rhe developing world. Nevertheless, \Vhen a sociery from the south succeeded
in setting out on the path to industrializarion, these same powers did not hesi-
tate in using force ro prevenr its progression. Developmenr was a route to
independence; it was rherefore inadmissible for the imperialist powers and
unsuitable for capital which was already being globalized.
2 Ferrall Izquierdo Bncl15
The European colonial period was one of rhe mosr rurbulent eras in rhe
hiscory of rhe Arab \VorId. Brirish and French colanialism gained prominence,
while claims far independence increased in many Arab cOtlntries. In addirian,
although ir was the Great Arab Uprising for independence rhar had rriggered
rhe Onoman Empire's defear by Grear Erirain and France in rh e Firse Warld
War, neither Paris nor Londan was prepared co grane che Arab people the same
self-decenninarion ehar rhey gramed rhe European popularion during rhe peace
following rhe Grear War. In f.1CC, on rhe comrary, both powers maintained
rheir control over an imporranr area ofNorth Africa, shared ou( Middle Eascem
ntle between rhemselves and imposed a sysrem of mandares on rhe popularion.
However, rh e fi ghr for independence did not cease and the uprisings in Egypr
in 1919, lrag in 1920, Syria in 1925, the Rif from 1920 to 1925 and Palestine
from 1936 to 1939 wete bloodily repressed. In some cases, rhis resulred in a
huge number of civilian casualties and signaled rhe dawl1 of a new pracrice rhar
connnues roday: rh e bombiog of rhe civilian popu]atioo.
If, during rhar era, insrability io rhe Middle East and Norrh Mrica was du e
mainly ro external actors, then, in rhe middle of the rwenrieth cenrury, inde-
penden ce wouJd invire new actors ro make their enrrance. In facr, rhe crearion
of new sra res and rhe consolidaran of soveregnry in exisring sra tes led rhe elires
from each couorry ro srarr competing for power. Genera11y speaking, these new
elites \vete weak and barely homogeneous; hence, rhe fight between rhem for
a dominant posirion \Vas fierce. This power srruggle coincided \Virh rhe crea-
tion and strengthening of rhe srare apparatl1s and che elires' efforcs to addtess rhe
needs of a popularion - still in possession of rhe claim-making ca pacty inhet-
ited from rimes of an ti-colonialisr opposition - in order ro aehieve legitimacy.
Both dynamics conrribured ro a concentranon of power resources in rhe hands
of rhe sraee and of rhe elites who had managed to achieve powet. Bur rhey also
fosrered an image of instabiliry in rhe wider region, due to eoups, repression
and aces of depll ratiOl1, as \Vell as ideological, political and even military ineer-
vemion berween neighboring counrries. In rhe 1950s and 1960s, rhe comperi-
tion for power \Vas regionalized in ule fight for leadership of ule Arab world,
wirh clashes ber\veen Egypr and Saudi Arabia and, ro a lesser degree, berween
Syria and [rag.
Despire rhis conRict, rhe elites who won power succeeded in cenrralizing ir
and esrablishing differenr regimes of control over their o\Vn sta tes and societies,
resulting in the repJacemem of uprisings by a conservative scabiliry sti11 present
roday. Proof may be found in rhe many examples of elites who remain in
pawer for decades. As \Ve will see, control ayer rhe sta re, foreign income and, in
some cases, ideology allowed che regimes ro come ro power. Foreign alliances also
contribmed; for example, Washington and Mosco\V's supporr during che Cold
War or rhar of the Unired Srates and European governments in rhe presenr day
was used wisely by rhe regimes to sllstain rheir power.
Even so, when \Ve looked ar rhe Middle Easr and south of rhe MedirelTdnean
region, we \Vere faced with an image of instabiliry, war and violence, which
contradices the swampy sragnation of autocraric regimes. This instability had
lwrodllctioll 3
mainly exogenous .causes such as American milita ry, political and economic
inrervenrion or rhe continuation ofIsraeli colonization ofPalesrinian and Syri:m
rerrirones. Domesric stability of allthoritarian Arab regimes is chus, aboye all,
aIre red by externaJ f..1Ctors, excepr on very few occasions when economic ctises
cause interna] uprisings (or when a rerrorisr group rhrearens rhe populanon,
al though rhis has never posed a real threar ro rhe elites in po\Ver).
In tum , \Ve wil! find that authorirarian Arab regimes and their elites developed
a grear capacity for survival and stability, which was inconsisrenr wirh rhe image
presenred ro LIS of a region in conscant agirarion. An aoalysis which examines
each dynamic in its own conrext rherefore seems ro be crucial in order ro fully
understand rhese socieries, which, alrhough geographically clase ro us, generare
mally preconceived ideas and erroneous interpretations in rhe Wesrem world.
For an understanding of che origins of rhe 20"11 uprisings and some indicarion as
to the fmure of Arab societies, ie is necessary ca analyze the po\Ver semCNres
rhat still exisr in rhe majoriry of cases.
In rhis book, \Ve aim ro carry our a srudy of rhe power relatioos rhar define
politica] regimes in today's Arab world and ca pro vide a universal approach and
merhodology thar overeome preconceived ideas. The hisrory of rhe eon-
temporary Arab world is ofren rreared as an anomaly wirhin the international
sysrem. Fo11owing an approach inherited frOI11 Orientalism, already denounced
by Edward Said, this regon and ies inhabirants eominue ro be analyzed as an
exotic, complex and surprising realiry adjudged not ro fit che 'usual' parameters.
Theoretical rools have even been specially developed for rhis purpose, when , in
reality, rhe rheories used to srudy and imerprer European societies should also
be valid for rhe srudy of easrem and southem societies - and indeed all societies
rhrough hisrory. Despite rheir peculiarities and differences, societies ultimarely
consrmct cheir own history according te very similar dynamics and tensioI1s.
Hiscary and rhe respective history of all societies are ptincipally written during
momems of great transfomution. These take place when the popuJarion needs
to fighr for ies living condirions and is capable of 1110bilizarion ro improve them.
followill g rhis kind of re volucion, societies recover rhe peace rhar charaererizes
long periods of political immobility in which only a few people - the elites -
fighr for power. These petiods continue until rhe populacion recovers irs
l110bilization capaciry and brings forrh another opporruniry for renewal, rhus
beginning rhe cycle agan.
In order te undersrand che social, polirical and eeonomic dynamies of Arab
societies, we will proceed ro analyze the causes of stagnant periods, and rhe
forces thar may be at \Vork to transfonn rhem. The announced democratiza rion
of some Arab regimes in rhe 1990s was obsrrucred by rhe elites' resisrance ro
yielding power. Analyzing rhe causes of stagnation compels us ro identify
which are rhe mosr inA ue mial elites and social movemems in each sociery and
rheir respecrive posirions within rhe polirical system. Our srudy initially presents
a theoretical and merhodologcal approach rhar conveys a general perspective
on power and polirical regimes in rhe comemporary Arab \vorld. The sub-
sequem chapters rh en analyze rhe current situation in each countIy and eheir
4 Ferran Izquierdo Bric's Illlroductioll 5

highIy eonrrasting poHrieal, eeonomie and social sysrems. In rhe proeess, \Ve Spanish specialists i.n Middle Easrem and Norrh Mrican srudies ro collaborare
will presenr a detailed and compararive vision of rhe dynamics of power rela- on rhe same project, which has be en delivered by t'\Vo sentinars as well as in
rions in rhe region. Maghreb is represented by chree eounmes whose eontrasrs rhis collective work. This research has aIso been done wichin rhe fram ework of
will help us ro identify borh differences and similarities in power scmcrure: rhe research projects fin anced by rhe Minisrerio de Ciencia e Innovacin:
Algeria, Moroceo and Mauritania; a regime founded on foreign income, a 'Estabilidad, gobernabiJidad y cambio poltico en Turqua, Oliente Medio y el
monarchic regime and a regime based on milirary power and tribal strllcrures, norte de frica: impacto en la poltica espaola hacia la regin' (CS02008-
respectively, which, afrer a brief experiment with represemative democracy, 06232-C03--{)2/CPOL); 'Espaa ante las migraciones y las reformas polticas en
retumed to the old game run by itS generals. The Egyptian and Saudi regimes el Mediterrneo y el mundo musulmn' (CS02008--{)6232-C01--{)3/ C POL);
could nor be omirred &0111 rhis study. nor ooly because of rheir intrinsic weight and <Actores e inrereses en las relaciones exreriores de Espaa con el mundo
wirhil1 the Arab world bur also because of their significan ce as paradigmatic rabe y musulmn' (CS0200S-06232-C03-03/ CPOL).
models of power, concentraced in the hands of a small number of elites. In rhe
case ofEgypr, ao analysis of rhe Mubarak regime is essential for any srudy of what
may lie ahead far che cauntry. The Fertile Crescent aIso presents imparrant con-
tr.lSts; Syria and the republic inherited frOI11 che Assad; Lebano n \Vith rs
democraey based on differenc e0111municies; the uuemal diviston af Palestine;
and the stable H ashemite J(jngdom of Jordan.
The comparison of these diverse cases shaws thar, despite rhe image of
homogeneity sometimes porrrayed by the Arab world, it is the multiplicity of
models and heterogeneiry af regimes rhar constirure reality. We can nonetheless
observe several canunaI1 strategies used by a11 elites ro guaGlnree cheir pennanence
in power, which couId also be applied ro many regimes oucside the region. Once
again, this reirerares rhe importance of a merhodology an d guideline for analysis
rha[ can be of universal value, thus avoiding speeific thearies for each case.
All chaprers foUow a similar soucrure. The firsr secrion analyzes each country's
elires wirhin differenr spheres and the power resources rhey COntrol. In the
second seccion, we idencify the movements of resisrance, opposirio n ar popular
disconrenr, in order ro establish which secrors oppose rhe regime and ro define
rhe population's claims. The third section examines che relations of competition
and alliance between different elites and che influence of opposition and resisrance
movemencs, which will help us ro define the srrucrure of each country's
system. Finally, in rhe Jasr section, different furure scenarios will be proposed
and complemenced by rhe anaIysis of a counrry-specific eA-perr. We would Iike
ro cake rhe opporrunity ro rhank [hese experts for their precious collaboration
on rhis projecr.
After so many yea rs of imnlobility. it is necessary ro remember that rhis book
\Vas completed in 2009 and received its final update in April 2011. By the time
it reaches readers, changes will dOllbtless have raken place in a number of
councties. Nonetheless, it is hoped tha t the present analysis will be useful for
understanding borh rh ese rransfonnations ::md rhe resistance of che regimes.
We \Vould like to thank the Barcelona CIDOB Foundation (Fundaci
Cidob de Barcelona). The research presented in chis book, rowards which
19 researchers from differenr Spanish llniversicies have concribured, has been
carried out rhanks ro rhe funding and unpetus provided by this insticution to
rhe scudy of the Arab world and rhe Medirerranean region in Spain. The
CIDOB Foundation has granted us the opporrunity to gather so me of the best

1 Sociology of power in today's
Arab world 1
Perran Izquierdo Brichs and Athina Lampridi-Kell1ol1
The end afthe Cald War and the Gulf crisis (1990-91) sparked a new dynamie
in rhe Arab world, indicative of a shifr towards democratization. In rhe 19905, a
group of authors highlighred rhe exisrence of sorne rentative processes of lib-
eralizarion in Arab councries, and even spoke of a democratizing 'mini-wJve'
(Nartan, 1993). These dynamics \Vere a result of several confluent factors. The
mast important of rhese \Vere a greater presence and effectiveness of socio-
econonllc organizations, a civil socict), in cIear expansion (in tenns ofborh mass
schooling and rhe emergence of new middle classes), and foreign polie)' acrions
driven by Wesrern states, as \Vell as by governmental and non-govemmenral
international organizations. Ar rhe beginning of rhe nineries, some experrs
rherefore turned rheir attenrion to exisring lirerarure on rhe study of transitions
towards liberal democraric systems, in an arrempr ro apply ir to rheir analyses of
rhe Arab \Vorld. Ho\Vever, \Vith rhe failure of democrarizarion, ir soon became
clear rhar che dynamics of ITansition in southem and easrem Europe or in Latin
Amenca \Vere very differenr from rhose presenr in rhe Middle East or North Amca.
The rheorencal approaches of Rusto\V, O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whirehead,
and even those ofPrzeworski and Huntingron,2 were oflittle help in analyzing
processes thar rook an alrenlative direcnon ro those they had studied.
As \Ve have previously mentioned, transitions \Vere reftected in hesiranr
refonTIs; thus, even in countries where specific liberalizarion features are cur-
rently discernible, rhe fundamental basis of a counrry's po\Ver structure remains
unchanged. What seemed at firsr to be a new wave of democratic rransirions
reverted to several partial aurocracies, whose leaders remain in power by
allowing - implicitly or explicirIy - various opposing groups to access a cenain
level of social, political or ideological power. Simultaneously, rhese autocracies
mainrain rheir capaciry to use force if rhe regime is threarened (Brumberg,
2002). In his review of conremporary polirical sysrems in rhe Arab world, the
American analyst Daniel Brumberg distinguishes berween r\Vo groups: dicra-
rorships or full aurocracies, and liberalized autocracies. Regarding rhe Jatrer, we
can observe rhat, although a specific minoriry conrrols the economic resources
of a counrry rhrough rhe use of force, rhere is still a 'partial inclusion' of other
sectors of rhe popularion. Brumberg mentions Syria, Tunisia, Libya and Saudi
Arabia among rhe dictarorships or full aurocracies and Kuwait, Moroeco,
Sociology cif powcr iI toda),'s Arab I/lorld 7
Jordan, Yernen, Algeria and Egypr Jmong rhe liberalized autocracies (I31umberg,
2003).
Transitions ro\Vards a democracic system can only be successfully iniriated
and carried Out if rhere is pressure from rhe popuJation to make rhem happen,
since ir is obvious thar elites wi11 never relinquish rheir power or privileges in
favor of democracy.
Popular pro tests started in the Arab world during the 1980s and 1990s, when
the renrier sta res grew \veak and losr their legiril11acy due ro reduced oil prices
or on reaehing eheir maximul11 debt limir. Cues in aid, social services, wages
and other mechanisms rhar aIlow foreign income ro be disrribuced caused a
significant n crease in popular mobilizarion, giving rise ro rhe so-called 'bread
riors'. Opposition groups achieved strengrh by leading these protests, subsequently
rhrearening the stabiliry of the elires in power. But rhe regimes responded in an
effecnve \Vay, through borh repression and cooprarion of sorne secrions of
the opposinon; at the same rime, rhey applied measures of conrroIled political
liberalizarion in order ro reduce popular pressure.
In roday's Arab world, eruly democratie systems have not yet been developed
and rhe transition rowards dernoeracy conrinues ro eneounrer major obstacles, even
in rhose counrries where measures ofliberalizaeion have led ro the esrablishment of
mulriparry elections. In rhese countries, a signifieant proporrion ofpowerresources
is concenrrared within rhe seate, hence \Vinning elecrions equals control over
substannal capiral, infonnation and dissemination of ideology. The breakthrough
of a demacraric process in a renrier stare implies the expulsion of many elires and
rheir replacemenr by others. Moreover, rhe regimes have been rhreatened by
growing popular supporr for lslamisr groups, which have demonsrrared on
l11any oecasions their potencial ro \Vin should free, democraric elecrions take
place. This can be observed in rhe case of Algeria al' more recentIy in the
Palesrinian Occupied Tenirories; also via several 'warnings' of possible vicrory
in Jordan, Egypr, Morocco, erc. For rhese reasons, rhe regimes rhemselves urilize
every resource at their disposal ro prevenr elUe democranzarion of rhe sysrem.
AddirionaIly, the allied counrries can rely on rhe support ofWesrem governmenrs,
\Vho also wanr ro avoid any change among rhe elires.
The previous L'lure of rransicions and 'transitology' (Camau, 1999) in this
region proved tIlar ir was nar enough to focus analysis on apparenr democratizacion
processes bur rhar ir should be extended ro rhe issues of governabiliry and
political change, which are nor limired ro rhe continuiry of regimes. While
sorne auchors questioned rhe possibility of applying Wesrern-railored conceprs
te societies \Vith su eh different traditians (Camau, 1971; Leca, 1994), it became
equally clear rhat focusing on rhe 'exceprionaliry' of Arab eountnes and crearing
specific models of analysis for rhem may not be of any grearer use. In fact, from
our perspecrive, the ehallenges of analyzing transirions in this region owe more
ro limirarions set by rhe rheorerical approaches rhat are applied ehan ro any
idiosyncrasy of the socienes rhemselves. Taking rhis imo aecounr and following
the studies ofSalam, Norron, Khader, Brynen, Noble, Korany and Perches, as
\Vell as rhe Reporrs on Human Developmenr in rhe Arab world issued by rhe
 8 Fcrmll Izquierdo Bn'c/s mld Athilla llllpridi-KclllOlf
PNUD,3 our research project (in conjuncrion wich rhe Cidob Foundation)
aims ro analyze power relations in che Arab world, in order to undersrand and
contr.lSC rhe dynamics of irs polirical regimes.
Sociology of power
The rheoretical proposition below is intended ro serve as a use fuI rool ror system-
atizing rhe ana1ysis ofpower strucrures goveming any sociery. Ifwe consider Arab
societies and their political systems as a 'nonllal' case, rhen rhe sociology of
4
po\Ver aims to develop a eheoreeical and universal frame\Vork for cornparisons
of power dynamics not only in eh ese societies, but also across the world.
ThroughoLIt history, mosr societies have generated models of hierarchical
organization wiehin eheir poHeical, social and economic relations. A hierarchical
society is a social syseem composed of several acrofS who esrablish relarions \Vith
one anorher, according to their capaciry to utilize given resources of power.
Therefore, in arder to analyze a sociery's power stmceure, ie is necessary to
identify the rypology of irs actors and eheir relevance, che dynamics rhar govern
rheir relarionships, rhe power resources ar rheir disposal and eheir respecrive
position in sociery.
The creanon of hierarchies inevieably inlplies a division berween rhe members
of sociery who rule and rhose who are governed, or, as we choose ro describe
ir within our theorerical framework, berween elires and rhe populanon in
general. The laner is found ar rhe base of the social pyramid and generally relies
upon decisions made by rhe forrner, except at cerran times when ir becomes
an acror itself. The division becween elires and the popuJarion is founded on
the distinct objectives and interests, which drive each grollp. On rhe one hand,
rhe elites' interest muse be defined in temlS of power; their overriding objective
will always be to improve their posirion in the hierarchy, compenng against
orher elites. 5 The relarion esrablished between elires 1S one of unceasing circular
comperiron, since their aspirations are ahvays relative and consrantly measured
againsr rhe posirion of orher actors. The elites' primary interest is chus 'differential
accumulation ofpower',6 Le. ro accumulare more power than rheir competirors.
This compecition to accumulate power cakes place in aH areas of society.
Furthernlore, rhe fonnation of elites inevieably leads ro comperirion for control
over power resources, whether political, economic, infonnarive, coercive,
ideological or of any orher nature.7 In line wirh this analysis, me notion of power
is linked ro the comperirive process itself, sin ce we understand accumulared power
as an etfective type of power, insofar as ir is usefu! for rhe accumulation of
further power.
Conversely, \Ve define 'linear power relations' as relations escablished by che
population when it can consciously identify its needs and beco me mobilized ro
fulfill rhem. In chis case, the objecrives of rhe popularion as an actor are not
relaeive and, when rhey are mer, this rype of power relarion comes to an end.
The linear aspecr of rhese relations derives from rhe t:.1cr rhar a beginning can be
esrablished, Le. rhe moment from which rhe process of awareness evolves ineo a
Soci%g)' oJ pOlllrr ;'1 today's Amb !/Jorld 9
collective action; lik;;wise, \Ve can escablish an end poine, i.e. when rhe mobilization
is successful and the population's c1aims have been recognized, or when chere is
defear and the acrion is abandoned.
ConsequenrIy, rhe analysis of social systems requires us ro idenrify che circum-
srances in which a power relaron is linear or circular. In other words, ir is necessary
to derennine if actors have specific ineerest5 in OI aims ro improve rheir living
conditions, or conversely if their main objecnve is differenrial accumu laeion. In
rhis respecr, and wirhin a social analysis framework, \ve can conclude rhat,
alrhough linear rebrions shape progress and transformation, ir is the circular
relatiollS rhar prevail. These relations are ruled by elites \Vho uphold their positions
of power, rhus conrributing to long periods of continuiey and stagnation through
history.
It is also important to consider resources as anorher fundamemal elemenr in
rhe sociology ofpower. Variety exists in rhe resources available to elites in their
competition for difterenrial power accumulation or in those used by the
populacion ro fight for cheir objecrives, according ro rhe sysrern or srructure in
question. The leacling resources found in mosr contemporary sysrems are che sta re,
capital, ideology, infonnation, coercion and rhe population itseJ[ However, this list
does nor imply rhe non-existence of ocher resources, for example, polincal
pareies or corporarions, which in sorne systems may eventually play a central
role. A resource's primary or secondary status \Vill be detemuned by rhe imponance
of thar resource, according ro current circumstances and accumulation processes.
These differem elemems shape the power snucrure of a sociery, wherher in the
Arab world or any other setnng. le is therefore enIcial to srudy rhe eonfiguration of
power snucrure in more depth, in order to undersrand the dynamics of change
and cominuiry in political sysrems. Applying the sociology of power ro an
Arab-world analysis will enable us tO llndersrand and explain rhe failure and
difficlllties of political transitions in rhese couneries.
CiJ'CJJlaJ' poweJ' J'elatiolls
As we have already discussed, rhere are two principies fundamental ro rhe
sociology of power. First, the acculllu)a[ve funerion of che elites and, second,
che posinon of the actors wichin a derennined hierarchy depends on eheir
ability ro compere wirh irs other members (or wirh whoever mighr wanr eo
become pare of it). Therefore, elites' relations wirh one anocher are in penna-
nene and mutual competirion, boch of power and for po\Ver. And, as \Ve have
previously emphasized, their objectives will always be relaove and subject ro
che accumulacion capacity of rheir rivals.
Furthennore, each acror's survival as a member of rhe elite depends on their
capaciey for differemial accllmularioll of power, i.e. the accumularion of greater
power rhan che rest of che actors. Each actor's specific power is always measured
against that of rhe other elires. The resulting relarions forro a system in which
competinon never ceases, and whose logic becomes fiercer as rhe elites' power
increases. This comperitive dynamic is typical of hierarchic systems, and forces
10 Fcmlll Izq/lierdo Bliclls allri A,hilla La/J/jJlirii.Kc1ll0H
rhose in elitisr positions to compete or mherwise lose rheir power; cheir posicion
wil! be detellllined by their reso urces, capacicies and alliances in relation to the rest
of the elites. This dynamic of constant comperition and alliance can he extended
to every single power resou rce and period of rime, as well as to alllatitudes rhar have
experienced hierarchic organization. Moreover, we can see ehroughour hisrory rhar
circular relarions are factors of conservatism, since rh e dominam dynamic in
society 1S rh e actors' accumularion and ma1menance of power resources.
In rhe analysis of a society's power structtlre, ir is also importam to rake inca
acceunt power multidimensionality, the mul tiplicity of actors, as weU as ehe face
rhar we are dealing \Virh a cempecition in which all elites are involved and influ-
encing one another. Since power resources are multidimensionaJ and under
multiple actors' conerol, each actor is therefo re under rhe influence of mhers.
We must also add char, since power is nm an abstracron, rhe actors in volved
in a power relarion cannot therefore be abstract enriries such as rhe nation or
the stare, bm rather individuals or social groups. We will focus our analysis on
these individuaIs, so, whenever \Ve refer to the sra re, corporations, che Church,
poltical parties and oeher insritutions, we must bear in mind th ac we are, in
Cace, reCerring ro rhe elites w ho control rhese insrirutions. And, w hen we refer
to rhe popuJaro n as an actor, we refer to rhe alliance between individuals wirh
common objectives.
Linear pOWCI' I'clatiolls
Ar sorne srage in th e history of a11 socieries, power reb tions genera red by rhe
popularion have coe:\.; sted \Virh circular relatioos when che population takes
acrion [Q improve its living conditions. In hierarchic sociecies, it is nO[ easy fo r
individuals eb become aware of cheir own inrerests and to work Out ho\V to
improve eheir quality of life. Even when rhey manage ir, chey are still faced
\Vi th the difficult cask of mobili zi ng rhemselves in order to fighc for th eir
objectives, since, on mosr occasions, this implies facing elites \Vho are resisranr
ro transfornling rhe sratus quo that t:1VOrs th eir o\Vn accumularion process. Bm,
when rh e population does succeed in mobi1izing itseIf, ie generares a very dif-
ferenr power relanon [Q rhar of the elires' inrernal comperirion. In these cases,
che individuals' objectives are specific and, when rbey are achieved, the po wer
relanon comes to an end. For rhis reason, we are speaking of linea r relations
tbat originare in the process of awareness and finish if Illobilization is successful
and demands are mec.
The population as a social group is usually use d as a teso urce by the elites.
People's daily ives are generally based on handing over rheir decisio n-making
capaciry, whether this is a conscious, unconscious or forced acnon. Represenrative
democr.lcy, relatioos of producnon, ideologies, conrrol of inforrnation, coercion
and rhe staee itself are a11 tools in the hands of rhe elites, used to extracr and
accuffiulare the populacion 's power.
However, when a majoriey of che population establishes linear power rela-
cions ro achieve its own objectives, ir beco mes a trallsfo nning agem \Vith the
Sociology cif power iJl today's Amb I/Jorld 1'1
capaciry ro bring ab puc socieral change. This cbange is defilled by rhe objectives
sough t and can be nlinor and circumstantial, for example, in th e case of a
collecrive agreement in a company, or rhe batde [Q improve a neighb orhood.
Alremarively, change can be important and stmctural, such as the popularion 's
demand foc rights and tTeedoffi against a colonial power or dictatorship. Processes of
social cbange cake place ooly when people fighr foc their own intereses, rhus
becoming a potirical actor and no longer a reso urce foc che elires. This does not
mean, though, rhar alliances between rb e population and sorne of rhe elires
caonm be esrablished when boch parties' interests coincide, as \Ve \ViII
subsequenrly disco ver.
Actors
In rhe sociology of power, analysis of the acrors is cemered on rhose individuals
with rhe capaciry ro make decisions on the use of power resources and ro
iotervene in power relarions. Our definition of 'acrors' is based on the following
pre mise: it is applied only ro human beings w ho are conscious of their intereses
and whose acrivity is characterized by imentionality and modifies e::\.;scing
power relations.
We can differentiate between two main caeego ries of acto r: rhe elites and rhe
popularion. As we have previously seen, chis division responds ro che intereses
and eype of power relarions established by eaeh gro up. On the o ne hand, the
elites' interesr lies in the differential accumularion of power and their resulrin g
relations are circular; on rhe orher hand, the interesr of rhe populacion IS 111
improving their living condirions, and their relarions are linear.
Tlle elites
Theoretical approaches to rhe concept of elires have been de veloped fram differ-
ent points of view. In our srudy, we will depart fro m nmions of class or privilege8
in order to focus on che idea of competition for differentiaI accumularion of
power, and \Ve will ahvays refer ro a limiced number of people. As Machiave lli
pointed Out ' ... for in aU republics w haeeve r rhe foml of cheir governmenr,
barely forry or fifey eitizens have any place in the direetion of aff.,irs' (Maehiavelli,
1513-17: cap. XVI). W e therefore consider the elites ro be the individuals \Vith
supe rior hiera rchic position wichin social inscirutions and whose survival in chis
posirion depends on their capacity ro compete for po wer accumularion.
Each elire has the potenrial ro inrervene to different extents depending on
the power structure of che society they are in. Hence, in more demo cratic
socieries, there is grearer specializa tion among e1ires, sin ce [he y are berter con-
nected ro specific power resources. r11 more autocratic sociecies, their control is
concenrrated 011 a larger variery of resources. However, complere specializatio n
in one resource or absolute control over aH reso urces is very diffi cult in con-
re mporary societies, regardless of their syscem of power, as rhere is no\V greater
diversification than in che pasto
12 Fen'all Izquierdo B,ic/s alld ArhitIa LAlllpridi-KelllOI/
The degree t which power is concentrated may also be relevant if we wish
t analyze the system. A system structured on a small number of primary elites
will tend tewards oligarchy, i.e. towards autocracy in its political dimension and
monopoly in its economic dimensiono T he grearer rhe number of elites partici-
pating in rhe competition, rhe teugher ir will be, and rhe more opporrunities for
rhe population te establish linear relations for its own interests. As Mannheim
suggests, rhe higher proportion of elires in a socieey, rhe grearer chance rhar
each individual elire will lose irs funcrion and inAuence as a leader, sin ce each
elire compensares rhe odler. In a democratic mass socieey, particularIy one where
social mobilizarion is important, no group can succeed in deeply influencing
society as a whole (Mannheim, 1940).
As chis study will reveal, mosc of che Arab counmes are examples of che
opposite tendency; a reduced group of pea pIe control che main power resources
and, masr importantly, uphold an aurocratic relationship wich rhe srate, principaUy
through a monopoly over how foreign income is used. However, this do es nar
mean rhat che ruJer exerts abso lute control over al! resources. Instead, he
competes wirh elites who control rhe military, rhe dominant political parry, the
secret service or the strongest ideology. The monarchies of Morocco and
Jardan are probably rhose w hich have achieved the highest concentrarion of
control over resources, ranging from th e stare ro capital and rhe military.
In contrast, a system that is strucrured around a Jarge diversiey of primary
elites \Viii tend rowards polyarchy, due to the open competition it implies.
Nonetheless, we should not associate polyarchy with demo cracy. Lebanon is a
use fuI example, as, alrhough rhe Lebanese elites foml a notably more polyarchic
system than chose in other Arab sociecies, cheir confessional polinca! system
cannot coneeal rhe undemocracic na rure of power- accumularion processes in
cheir respective religious communines. George Conn even compares rhe
Lebanese system ro a tetalicarian sysrem (Corm, 2005).
Analysis of che elites and their competition for ditferential accumulation of
power must take into account several facrors, for example, their background
(social, professional, educacional, corporace, civil service, etc.) or the mechanisms
through which they access control over power resources (inheritance, nepotism,
clientelism, conquest, revolution ... ). In the recent history of the Anb world,
independence and coups provided access ro resources for those elites connected
to the groups responsible for political change. Subsequendy, as the elites established
themselves and continued Co grow, neporism and c1ientelism became the most
corrunon mechanism. Over rime, generacional change also led te inheritance, nar
only within the monarchies but also in republican regimes and ati other spheres
of power. Syria (with the Assad) provides the most obvious example of a
dynamic nor only resrricted to che mase important ru lers bU[ also discernible in
oth er elites. T his can be seen in sections of che I new guard' in Syria, Jordan,
Egyp t, Morocco and arher counmes, w here \Ve find the children of established
elites challengin g the 'old guard' fol' political and economic power.
The background of elites has an imporcanr impact on rhe homogeneiey of
rhe ruling group, and cohesion as \Vell as capaciey ro generare alliances can be
Soci%g)' oJ pOl/Jer iI/ today's Am world 13
made easier or 1110r~ diffieult 3ccording co che degree ofhomogeneiry. Giddens
disnnguishes berween moral integration and social imegrarion; rhe fornler refers
te che ideas an d values shared by rhe eli tes alld ro eheir consciousness of cies of
solidariey existing between rhem. The laner refers te the frequency and nature of
the contacts and relationships between them (Giddens, 1974: 5). For example, in
the case of rhe Saudi elites, \Ve find a vel)' high level of moral as well as social
integr.tion, mainly within the primary elites constituted by the Saud f.mlily. In
contrast ro Jordan and Mo rocco, che extension of the Saud L1nlily makes it
passible fo r its members ro occupy not only pasitions within che royal Llnlily bU[
also rhe main polineal and econolllic posrs. The system is therefore slight1y more
decentralized rhan in Morocco and Jordan, where the I{jng is pracrically the sole
primal)' actor. Lebanon, on the other hand, gives us an example of elires with a
very low degree of social and moral inregration on a narional sGlIe (alrh ough in
sorne areas of rhe communiry \Ve find the exact opposite).
Differences in rhe elires' moral or social inregration are refleered in cheir
capaciey to generace alliances. Homogeneity helps creace similar intereses and
perceptions to\Vards socieey, which f.lcilitate rhe fomlation of alliances (Whitley,
1974: 65). Therefore, alliances agai nst third parties are likely ro be more easily
formed and ro Jast longer, ar competirion for power ro be better reguJated and
less conRictive. w hen fonned wi thin a homageneous elite. Follo\Ving our earlier
examples, Soler and Zaccara show that, despire being very tense on some Dcca-
sions, and occurring at pivotal moments, such as the succession to the crown,
dispures witrun the Saud family have almosr always been resolved through
negotiations and, in sorne cases, even through rhe introduetion of an institution
required ro direct the sueeession process (che Fundamental Law prornulgated in
1992 and the Allegiance ((Bay'a)) Conm1ission in 2007). However, we must
remember that eompetitio n berween elites never truly comes ro an end, since
its principal dynarnic revolves around individual players. As \Ve can observe in the
chaprer on Syria, despi re che Syrian elite's homogeneity, competition has resulted
in coup attempts such as that by Rifa'ar against his brother Hafez aI-Assad, and in
tensions between Bashar aI-Assad and his brmher-in-Iaw Shawkat. However, if
we compare me period of che Assad regime \Vith earlier eras. \Ve cannot help bur
acknowledge a srability in which the integration of elites p1ayed an important role.
In the opposite sense, we see that hererogeneiry of elites can cause instabiliey
and even have bloody consequences. An example is in Leba non , whe re control
over power resources much less valuable than those in Saudi Arabia has led ro
amled confrontations and on sorne occasions ca civil war.
We must aIso take imo account w hether orher acrors have open or
obstructed access te rhe elites. If 3n elice group is closed off, it is gene rally
more homogeneous and competirion is therefore less conRictive. However,
being closed may also lead competitors outside the group ro employ more
drastie methods in order ro gain access ro ie, chus ca using major changes to rhe
system stm cCu re. For example, in Saudi Arabia new elices ourside the Saud
f.lnlily wouId only be able ro compete for state control rhrough a revolution
chat radically rransfonned the system .
 14 Fe/Tall Izquierdo Bricfs al/d Athilla .Luupridi-Kellloll
As an alternative, effecrive democrarizarion of the polirical syscem could grane
new elires an ordedy access te srare control, chus reducing rhe risk of instabiliry and
violence. However, rhis would c1earIy weaken che current leaders and force che
dominanr elires ro do everything in their power ro prevent orher comperirors fi'om
accessing control of the state ... And herein lies rhe reason for rhe relucrance of
Arab regimes ro ailow cruIy democraric rransirions and \Vhy effecrive control of
the state remains in the hands of rhe regime even when fonnal elecrions are
called. This situation is bIatanrly repeared in ail of the counrries which have
made liberalizing gesrures, such as Jordan or Morocco. As a specific example,
the rapid response rrom rhe Algerian elites in power was to stage a coup that
quashed che Islamisrs' electoral victory and, at rhe same time, led to civil war.
In places where old elires have been unable ro prevenr it, new elires have
achieved state control - but not wirhout meering srrong resistance rrom estab-
lished mlers dm;ng rhe process. In the Palestinian Occupied Terrirories, Farah 's
rericence to accepr rhe Hamas government increased tensions ro such an extenr
thar che outcome was the separation between rhe Gaza Strip and the West
Bank. In Lebanon, Hezbollah had te use milirary force to ensure irs inclusion in
the shareout of rhe stare between different cornmunities.
The posinon of elites wirhin the sysrem and rheir accumulacion capacity are
also linked ro rhe resources rhey control. Obviously, nor all sysrems are strUctured
in the same way; in sorne, the essential resource can be rhe stare, in others,
capiral, coercion, infoonation or ideology, or a combinacion of several. In
the Arab world specificaily, bar excepcional cases, rhe fundamental resource is the
state and rhe foremosr comperition rakes place between elites who can rival one
another for its control. Other resources Sllch as capiral, infonnation or coercion
depend co a large extenr on this key resource. Only ideology in some circum-
stances can escape state control, thus allowing comperirive elires te threaren the
supremacy of regimes. Today, the ideological rhreat origina tes from Islamism,
which has replaced nationalism and lefr-wing chought as the mobilizing ideol-
ogy of rhe masses. Information is also escaping the control of the regimes, wich
Al jazeera, blogs and social networks becoming a resource of the popular
uprisings.
Primal}' aud scco/ldar]' elites
Analysis of the elites reveals that, alrhough they may a11 compete for difl:erential
accumularion of power, chey will each achieve differenr levels of impact on rhe
system. For example, primary elites llave the capaciry to compete for control of
the resources thar aIlow for the greatesr accumulation, while che relations they
establish wirh one another delimit rhe power balance underpinning the system.
As mentioned above, in rhe Arab wodd che primary elites will be rhose \Vho
can compere effectively for sta te conerol, foreign income, coercion and, on
certain occasions, privare capital and ideology.
With regard to secondal)' elites, even if rhey intervene in the competirion,
rhey will evolve in a stmcture generated by the primary elites, and occupy
Sociology of pOll'er ill today's Amo !!lorld 15
subordinate positioJ;1s in the hierarchy. Hence, rheir access ro resources wm
depend on rher alliances with rhe primal)' elites. As will become apparent, an
elite's primary or secondary posirion may vary according to changes in che
sysrem strucrure, either due ro a new equilibrium or to revolutionalY changes
among rhe resources or acrors involved. As states were being established
rhroughour rhe Arab countries, the tribal elites lost rheir power and began ro
repeatedly depend on rhe srate elites, since rhe distribution of social benefits,
work and privileges is determined by whoever controls foreign income. The
role played by rribal elices was rherefore no longer primary, as it had been when
rhe tribe was rhe foundarion of all social, polirical and economic organizarion; as
rhe srare became ceneral to che power-accumularion process, rhe tribe became
secondary.
Even when an individual or group has an importanr power resource at their
disposal, if chey are in a posicion of dependency, rhey will concinue ro funcrion
as a secondary elire. Bustos and Ma give an eXJmple of this situarion in rhe
chaprer dedica red to Algeria, where chey mention rhe case of rhe magnate
Abdelmunim Khalifa who, in spite of his huge fortune, held only a secondary
posirion and fell rrom grace when deemed no longer useful for rhe Algerian
primary elites' power-accumulation process.
Another way of identifying an elire's posirion in che syscem is by analyzing
wherher or not they are easily replaceable during rhe formarion of alliances,
withour causing a significant decrease in rhe power held by their allied elites.
Primary actors can easily interchange che secondary acrors they are allied to with
no bearing on their own power-accumulation capacity, whereas secondary actors
are completely dependent on their alliances with primary actors for power
accumulation. For example, this situation occurs when an elite from an Arab
counery stare decides ro replace the director of a company, or to rediscribure
income to other tribes or ro the same cribe but through another Sheik or
notable. Moreover, primary elites will always establish rheir relationships with
secondary elites in an attempt ro prevent the latter rrom gaining access to the main
power resources. In this respect, Ayubi says that alliances \vith a distriburive basis
will in elude che elites allied ro the regime in an economic sense bur exelude
rhem polirieally (Ayubi, 2000: 307).
On the contrary, changes in alliances between primary actors are pare of the
'big game' and can have direcr repercussions on the system's balance of power
and, therefore, on ies srructure. An important alliance berween primary acrors
in rhe Arab world was rhat of Muhammad ibn Saud wirh Muhammad ibn Abd
al-Wahhab, whieh gave birrh ro presenr-day Saudi Arabia. The Nacional Paer
in Lebanon is anorher example of funcrional alliance, in this case, a sysrem
based on cornmuniry equilibrium. As desCl;bed by Goenaga and Snchez
Mateos, modem Lebanon was bom out of the pact between the Christian and Suni
elites to share out stare control. The system has been undergoing rescrucruring and
reassertion due to shifts in rhe power struggle becween differenr communities,
especially since the Shiite elites have been able to reelaim their right to participate
in institurional conerol after che civil war wirh rhe incroduction of che Taif
 16 Fen'(J1I Izquierdo Bricl/s aud Atlua Lalllpn'd-Kclllou
Agreemem, and folJo\Ving HezboUah's sho\V of force with the Doha Agreemems
in 2008.
The capaciry ce be :In actor directly depends on the po\Ver one manages to
accumulate; hence, each actor must be studied within the subsystem over
which they exert inAuence. Differem COntexts obvious ly generate different
systems with diverse Structures. Thus, in the global system, \Ve will o nly take
inca accouI1t actors \Vith the capaciry to use 'global' resources such as world
po\Vers, big transnational corporations, global ideologies (Le. the great religions,
neoliberalism, socialism or conullunism bU[ not the narionalist ideologies which
are only usefitl as power resources in narional spheres), internarional coercion
capacity, internarional infonnarion capacity, and international rules and insrirutions.
However, regional, state and local systems may also exist, or even systems
related to insritlltions such as churches, political parties or corporations, etc.
Conseguently, primary actors in an inferior sys tem may be secondary actors within
a superior one. For example, if we analyze the tribal system, then \Ve find that
Sheiks are primary actors; on the other hand, when \Ve look at the counny's
system, Sheiks occupY a position secondary ro the elites \Vho control the state.
Tite poplIlatioll
Analysis of the popula.tion as an actOr presents greacer difficulties chan chat of
the elites. In fact, on many occasions, mobilization of the masses aIso takes
place in response to the elites' capacity [Q manipula te and use [he m ro [heir
own advantage.
In this respec[, Inglehart distinguishes between participarion direc[ed by the
eli te and parti cipation defying the elite. In the first case, he refers [Q the large
mass of citizens who, ge nerally speaking, are politically unprepared, and guided
by a small nllmber of leaders, usually through parties, labor llnions, churches or
other institutions. In the second case, action is dire cted by th e population
towards specific and tangible objectives, and is more commooly driven by
groups fonned ad hoe [han [hrollgh a bllreaucratized organization. This larrer sce-
nario requires higher level of polioe. 1 eoq,erienee on behalf of che popularion
(Inglehart, 1977: 299-300) .
In order ro detemline w hecher the population is an actor or resource, it is
th erefore necessary to analyze th e goals of each mobili zation . When the
population's aims are linked to enhancing its living conditions, we encounter
linear po\Ver relations where social movemems play the role of the subject. T he
popuJation moves along an J..'\.is of intereses, which ranges fro m zera consciousness
(due [O ideological manipularion by the elites) to daims for improvement in
living conditions and [he mobilization req uired ro achieve it. Accordillg ro i[s
position on the axis, the population wilJ srop being a mere resource in the
hands of che mos[ powerful and start ro cake reactive action against the elites.
This will be targeted against interventions tha t pose a threat ro its wellbeing.
The papulation may even go so tu as to take proactive acrion, in order to
redefine and achieve tS rrue objectives. The relarian fomled between the elites
Socolog}' 01 power i/l today's Arab I/Iodd 17
and the po pularion. wiU also vary according ro its positian on the axis. T he
more conscious peopIe are of their social si tuation, the m ore the elites will have
to legicimize cheir own position and find cheir accu mulation capacity atfected
by th e need to ad dress che pOPlllation's intereses and demands.
In most instances, [he popllla[ion becomes mobilized because the elites have made
decisions detrimemal to its intereses. In Tilly's words, a collective reactive acoon
consists of a group's effort to reestablish acguired righes when sorneone tlueatens or
violates them (Tilly, 1978: 367-68). When ulis is the case, che inioaove . 1\Vays
origina tes from the elites. Hence, the goals of a reactive acuon can hardly be
desc ribed as ambitious, sin ce [he population's posirian is defensive.
W hen the population is flllly conscious ofits interests, it can take che initiative
and 1110bilize itself to aehieve self-defined obj eetives, bre.king through bound-
aries imposed by the elices. As T illy sripulates in the same book, proactive action
stakes a claim tO rights w hich have not previously been exercised. O n these
occasions, move ment is transfomung social reality. H owever, the mobiJizarion
will prove [ O be more difficu l[, si nce people must first become conscious of
their sinlation and then consider the changes necessary to improve it, as well as
uniting in order ro fight for them.
Therefore, a crucial f.1Ctor in the population's mobilization is its capaciry for
collective action. As mentioned by Przeworski, the real threat to authoritarian
regimes is not a 1055 of legiti macy bU[ the organization of a co unter-hegemony;
th e exis[ence of a collective projecc as an alternative fo r the future (przewors ki,
1991: 54). In the Arab world, great pro.etive mobiliz.tions took place - and
sall take place in the case of [he Palestinian and Saharan people - in favor of
liberalization from coloni al control. Once independence had been achieved -
umil the uprisings of2011 - mass mobiliza[ions became reactive and took place
principally in times af economic crisis, when the regimes co uId not co nrinue to
sllStain social improvements aIongside the consolidation of independent sta[es.
As \Ve will see throu ghout chis book, the 'bread rioes', which cook place in
most Arab co untries during the 1980s and 1990s, illllscrate this situatio n c1earIy.
In order to fulfill its interests, [he main reso urce needed by the popuJarion is
its o\Vn mobilizarion - acguired through acrions of protest, oppositio n or
resis[a nce. However, this is neither the only resou rce available nor the most
common. Sorne rimes, the population may use the competinan becween elites
as a resource to achieve its o\Vn objecrives, during times when these elites need
the support of soei. 1 groups. T his allows the people to build up eemin
negotiation capacity in order te demand imp rovements in their wellbeing; on
the mher hand, they conrinue ro be subjecc [Q the circumstamial needs of che
elites and ro serve as a resource in the ir competition.
T he presence of an avant-garde group may also be a resource for the population 's
mobilization. These groups can be fouod in civil society organizanons, syndica[es or
even polincal organizations (if [hey defend the m;uority's interests), and their
action capaci[y is directIy linked to their impact on and potential to mobilize
the population. Nevenheless, these organizatians will almosc certainIy e:\-perience
substantial tensions if they do gain access to power resou rces, since at that point
18 Fcnoll Izq/lierdo Briclls (I/Id Atltillo Lmllprdi-Kel/lo/l
rhe objeerives of rhe people may clash wirh rhe organizaoon leaders' needs.
The leaders will lose rheir avant-garde role &-0111 the original linear relanon and
assume their new role as competitive elites in che circular one. Several leaders
and ntlers operme within this context of ambivalence: for example, leaders
from professional and business associarions inJordan and Egypr, from NGOs in rhe
Occupied Palesrinian Terrirories, from polirical parties in Moroceo , Algeria or
Egypt and even sorne leade" from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan.
Ir is possible to disringllish berween rhree differenr Ievels of perfomlance in
rhe acrions of rhe poplllarion, since ir never aces wirh rhe same incemiryY
Reactive acrions rend ro be specific proresrs and enj oy a certain degree of
spomaneiry. They are eirher movemems in response ro concrere facrs, or claims
resulring fram pressure exerted ro such an extenr rhar people can no longer
wirhsrand ir.
Opposirion differs rrom proresr because ir is more srrucrllred. Ir can also be
differenriared frorn resisrance if ir is insrigared from wirhin rhe sysrem, rh ereby
accepting rhe system's rules of play. As for opposirion rno vemenrs, rhey are
usually led by political, religiol1s or legallparaJegal (non- c1andestine) organiza-
rions belonging ro civil society. These kinds of organizations have AOllrished
wirh rhe opening up of so rne of rhe Arab regimes, and, on some occasions,
grOllpS rhar had cake n clandestine acrion against the regime \Vhile under che
roughesr repression have no\V accepced a level of compliance \Virh power in
order ro m ove out of rhe shado\Vs and from resisrance activiry ro rhar of
opposirion. An example of rhis particular dynamic is rhe Muslim Brorberhood
in Egypt.
Arrempes ro rransfonn rhe system or make changes ro poHcies ha ve a deeper
dimension rhan proresr and opposirion movernents, when chey affecc a regime's
fOllndarions. .As a result, resiscance movements are o nly srrong in a regime's
momencs of fragility. And, whereas rhe regime's respo nse ro protesr and
opposirion movemems oscillaces ber\Veen repression or negoriariol1 an d con-
cessions ro increase les legitimacy, in rhe case of resistance movements, coercion
is manifesr, sin ce rhey qllestion rhe pennanence of elices, rheir control over
power accumularion and, cherefore, rheir very exiscence.
As \Ve observed in Inglehart, the popularion's actions can also be studied
according to their relarions \Virh rhe elires. The populacio n can eirher be ruled
by rhe elires or alcematively can quesrion or even rhrearen rh eir exiscence;
despite rhe paradox, both elements are ofren present in rhe same mobiliz.1tion.
In rhe firsr scenario, behind rhe popularion's accions, \Ve ofcen find srable and
hierarchied groups, which are urilized by rhe leaders as a resource in rheir
comperirion ro accumulace po\Ver. In rhe second scenario, when mobilizarions
esrablish linear relarions, che groups are usual1y Ilon- hierarchied and less srable,
disappearing or modifying rheir campaign once che specific objective of rheir
mobilization has been meto
However, when linear rnobilizations are long lasring, as rhey frequemly are
in rhe fighr for major social rransfonnarions, comroversy sUfTounds rhe role of
the avanr- garde. Over rime, ir is li kely tbar rhe grOllpS rhar initiared rhe
Soci%gy of pO/llCf ill todoy's AralJ !/Jorld 19
mobilizarion become hierarchied and rheir avant-garde plays a role ever closer
ro rhar of the elites: This can lead to rhe emergence of polieicaJ parties or ro a
situation where some Ieaders refuse to wirhdraw once their original objecrive is
mer, arrempring instead ro cake advamage of rhe mobilization's success to
position rhernselves wirhin rhe elite. Ir can also be rhe case rhar, once rhis
avam- garde has beco me an elite, ie cries to modify che pOPlllarion's inirial
objecrives for ics own benefir. In borh cases, rhe leaders in quesrion will have
abandoned rh eir avant-garde role within rh e linear relarion in order to acqllire
a ro le in rhe elire. Some of che republi can Arab re gimes are produccs of chis
evol urion of rhe avanr-garde, such as rhe FLN in Algeria , rhe Ba'az in Syria and
lraq or Farah in Palestine.
Moreover, as we have previollsly seen, che exiscence of linear relarions do es
not automarically imply the disappearance of circular ones. In many cases, as
rhe masses become an actor, they also beco me a resource for sorne of rhe elites,
w ho wilI rake advanrage of che mobilizarion fOl" rheir own beneflr. On rhese
particular occasions, che more the elites respond ro rhe popularion's demands,
che more power chey achieve. In rhis respecr, the Iegirirnization of Arab
regimes OCCllrs chrallgh rwo differenr mechanisms: eirher through leadership of
a hegernonic ideology or in response ro rhe demands of rhe people. Thus,
when ideological resources f.1il, the majoriry of rhe elites in power rry to sarisfy
the population and, if hey lack the capacity ro successfully respond ro their
claims, a crisis of legirimacy will follow.
Consequenrly, llntil che uprisings of 2011, \Ve acknowledge chrollghollt chis
book a pessimiscic image of che Arab popularion's vical strengrh as an actor. In
more general renns, mobilizarion of cirizens is sporadic and mainly limired ro
actions of protesto And when rhey are nor serving as mere instrumen rs Ole rhe
service of cheir leaders' power accllmlllarion, civil sociery organizacions are scarce
and weak, and syndicates and poliricaJ parties acr ever frequenrly as an 'opposirion'
rhat does nor caH into question rhe foundations of rhe regimes rhemselves.
Power resources
The resources elites may use in rheir competirion ro accurnulare power shape
ano ther derennining fac ror of rhe sysrem structure. The impacr made by diverse
resources is linked ro circumscance and accumularion processes; control over
each reSQurce generaces a variery of inrerests and policies [har are frequenrIy
opposed. A sysrem whose elites have a high degree of specialization in differenr
reSQurces or wh ich sho\Vs diversiry in its fundamental resources for power
accumulation will be more diffused and possess a greater range of elires. In the
opposire sense, a sysrem of elires \Virh lircle specializacion and rherefore a capaciry
ro compere fOl" all fundamental reSOllrces, or in which po\Ver accumularion is
based on on]y one resource, \Viii have a grearer concenrration of elires. In Arab
counrries, rhe majoriry of sysrems cend ro be barely specialized \Vi rh a few elires
competing for che srare as rheir primary resource. In mosr cases, this srrengrhens
che rendency towards oligarchy and polirical autocracy.
 20 FemlJl Izq //ierdo Blichs n/Id Atlu'IIa Lal/Jpridi-KcIJIOl/
This prevalence of the state as a power resource is our main focus, but first we
will cake a brief look at sorne of the other power resources ac che elites' disposal.
Without entering into a debate abotlc the definition of capal, ic is none-
cheless important not to confuse this resource with eicher wea]ch or profit. In
the contexc of political economy. we concur wich che conclusion presented by
Nitzan and Bichler, w ho also introduce the idea of differential accllmularion:
( ... ) ebe accun1ulation of capital represents neither material wealth, nor a
productive amalgamate of 'dead labor', bU[ rather the COIIIIIIOd{ficatioll cif
powcr. Capitaliscs accumulate no t things camed over from the past, bU[
vendible power cicles projected into cbe fmure. In chis sense, their capitalised
profit represents a claim not for a share of the outpm, bU[ for a share cif cO/ltrol
Olla lhe social proccss. Now, whereas capitalisc power is exerted over society,
it is measllred re/atille Co the power of other owners. ( ... ) In short, the real
issue is not absolme accumulacion, bue differcIHial accumu lation. ( ... ) The
connection between differential accumulation and power sho uld now
become clearer. To accumulate differentially is ca increase your share of total
profit and capitaHsacion. And to in crease your discributive share of these
magnicudes is to increase your relative power te shape che process of social
change. The source of such power is the ab ility of owners co str.J.[egically
limic, or 'sabotage' the process of social reproducnon
(Nitzan and Bichler, 2002: 36--38)
From this definition, \Ve can underscand that 'capital' will be everything thar
serves to accumulate increased 'merchandized power'. It is therefore necessary
co differentiate, for insrance, capital from foreign income, whether che latter is
che product 'of oil exportation, received aid or comracted debt. The function of
chis n come in most Arab countries is to generate I110re accuI11ulation nO[ in the
foml of capital bm in the fornl of SCaCe control, c1ientelism and legitimacy in
the eyes of the population.
It is also important te remember that capical and corporation are nO[ synonyms;
it is th erefore necessary to distinguish between capital accumu lation and cor-
porate power accumulacion. Giddens djfferentiates becween elites w ho own
organizanons and those who control th em. Modem corporacions have evolved
from being owner-controlled to manager-controlled, and these two sectors can
have dilferem imerests (Giddens, 1974: 9). Galbra ith also wamed ofthe power
of corporate bureaucracy (Galbraith, 2004), an d of corporate dominance over
capitalist economy, incorrecdy tenned 'market economy' (Galbraith, 1973).
Capital and corporacions have achieved a fundamental place in rhe accumula-
rion processes of developed countries and wichin the global system. In the Arab
world, however, despite excepcional cases such as that of Hariri in Lebanon, we
can see rhar borh capital accumulation and corporate activiry in egual measure
contillue ca heavily depend on the sCate or multinacional corporations, which
explains why, in most cases, capiralist and corporate Arab elites hold a secondary
posiciono
Socio{oSY 01 power ,I toda),'s Arab I/Jorld 21
fu we have seen., anO[her important resource is che relationship berween
elices and che populacion. Efforcs to obtain popular suPPOrt consticuce a clear
illustration of the importance of chis resource for the elices. Ir, as Arendc
affirrned, power lies in the group. che n che competidon between elites to succeed
as the deposirories of that po\Ver will be very tough. Voting in elections in a
representative dernocracy is certainly che most visible mechanism for extracting
power tTom rhe populanon in favor of es accurnulanon by rhe elires. The main
reason the popularion becomes used as a reSOllrce can be explained by the lack
of consciousness of ies o\Vn intereses. As Marx previously srated, alienation
supposes che loss of the subj ect's human essence to beco me an object (Marx,
1844), \Vhich wiJI be used by the eli tes in cheir competirion for differemial
accumularion of power. Ideology plays a funda mental role in chis process.
The analysis of ideology as a resource leads \.IS to distinguish becween three dif-
ferent levels of inftuence. The first two, w hich \Ve \Vill examine further, are pare of
the system srructure, whereas the last level is a resource used by some elites ro
compete wieh one another. The first level, which impregnares all social relation-
ships, is whar Foucault calls rhe 'regime oftroch', and where we find unconscious
mechanisms prompting us to accept or rejecc ideas, values and discourse. The
second level, defrned by Gramsci as 'cultural hegemony', is where a c1ass or social
group succeeds in having its group intereses assurned as che general interest.
Bo th levels will be analyzed in more detail in the 'Syscem structure' secnon of
chis chapter.
The third le vel is more concrete and immediate; it consists of political and
religio lls belief systems promulgated by the elites to manipulate the populacion.
It constituces the most obviollS level of inllllence, since ic can be use d directly
and independently in che compention for power and is where we find rival
policical and religious ideologies or disputes over ebeir control. In many cases,
these confromations take place within the srm cture established by the 're gime
of trueh' and 'cultural hegemony', even among the same social c1asses. T he
weakness of hegemony as shown by the Arab wo rld makes che competition
between different belief systems a1l che more fieree. This competition does noe
only take place between specific opposing political or religious ideologies but
among all ideologies, since their function is che same: accuIDulation of power
by the elites that control th em. An example of chis is rhe decadence of Arab
nacionalism, which fed [he reislamizacion of Norch African and Middle Eastem
Muslim socienes.
The importance of info nuacio n aS a power resource is rellected in the great
effores made by differem actors to control it. Informanon as a resource manifests
itselfin two ways: as control over the infolmacion received by citizens (media and
education), and as informanon held on citizens and other actors (the intelligence
service) . Regarding analysis of che media, there are several factors which must
be cake n into account. Firsc, th e degree of media concentration which leans,
almost worldwide, towards oligarcby; second, censorship as much exerted from
the outside as originating from inside the media; and third, rhe media's
independence, i.e. if its directors are primary or secondary elites connected to
 22 Fe/Tall Izquierdo Bric/s alld Albilla Lnmpridi-Kclllol/
me sra re, a church, a palitical parry or corporation, ere. The imporrance of control
over infonnation in rhe Arab \Vorld is made evidem by the level of media con-
centrarion and its secondary posirion lJis-rt-IJjs rhe elires who control rhe stare. In
some countries, infoonation appeared ro have undergone a slight liberalization, for
example, in Morocco, Jordan or Egypt. But then the mies of censorship came
back into play, escablishing red lines that cannot be crossed withotlt severe pun-
ishment. The case of Al jazeem, the Qamn satellite television channel, is a para-
digm rhar helps ro illllsrrare the concem caused by independem infomlation in
Arab regimes. As Azaola and Lampridi-Kemou will discuss further in rhe chapter
011 Egypt, rhe twenry-two Communication Minisrers of the Arab League
(excepe for che Lebanese and Qatari ministers) met in 2008 to esrablish a censorship
prorocol on the media, its main objective being ro limit viewing of the sllccessful Al
jazccm in Arab cOllnnies. As previollsly mentioned, social networks and rhe imemer
constinlte a sphere of popular resistance ro che elitist control ofinfonnauon.
As for rhe imelligenee service, ir is Ilecessary ro stress the imponance of rhe
JV"kllabaml in almost aH Arab COllntries. As in .111 autocraeies, control ayer rivaIs
as weH as over cicizens is a special weapon far the elires in power. Here \Ve find
rhar rhe resource of coercion is linked ro rhat of infonnarion, in arder ro keep rhe
population subdued. The omnipresent imelligence senrices have a hllge dissuasive
effect on many peopIe, blarantly redu cing the number of demonstrarions of pop-
ular disconrem, as \Vell as managing ro cause grear misrnlse within the heart
of protesr, opposieion or resistance groups and movements, due ro sllspicions of
infileration by members of the seeret service.
The majori ty of hierarehic organizatiolls ha ve coercive meehanisms at rheir
disposal to impose respect for rhe aurhoriry of ruling elites w hen hegemonic
mechanisms .oegitimaey and ideology) fai!. Direct repression is usually rhe final
resource ro be utilized by regimes in rheir attempts to ensure survival. But, in
many Arab counrries, as in any autocracy, violence is inflicred on rhe populacion
mueh more ofren than in a liberal democratic system. Imprisonmem, ronure
and even the dearh penalry are not sporadie occurrences in [hese regimes; rhey
are used ro such an exrent rhar even rhe Whire House, as 1S widely known, did
nor hesitare in resorting to rhe seeree services of rhose countries ro torture
prisoners in 1ts own 'fighr against terror'. However, despi re violen ce being rhe
most visible element, coercive capacity is a1so reflected by the use of threat and
punishmenr through non-violent means in order ro reaffion authoriry. Within
this practice, \Ve can again observe the inteHigence service playing rhe central
role, effectively creating rhe pennanent presence of a 'Big Brother' sta re.
FunhemlOre, rhe strugg1e for indepe ndence and the regional eonflicrs rhat
followed have reinforced rhe power of the milirary and militarization of rhe
sysrem in these countries. Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Mauntania are clear examples
of rhe anned forces' predominanr role in rhe configuration of their regimes. In
Lebanon, we can see rhe importance of th e anned forces in che role they play
in militia and at present in HezboUah, even when ir comes to achieving legitimacy
in the eyes of the population. In al! other Arab countries, the military upholds a
fundamentaJ posirion. Furthennore, rhe C0l111110n perceprion of irs historical
Sociology oJ pOI/lCf in loday's Arab I/Iorlrl 23
role as the instirution responsible for achieving and maimaining independ ence,
and as rhe guaranror of securiry in a region with so many open confl.icts, has led
ro a positive image of the army among rhe population. This comributes to
increased legitimacy, immunity and budget for the military elites. Even where
rhe generals do not rule, rhe civilian polirical elires do everything th ey can ro
keep che nlilirary sarisfied, and ae rhe same time under control. And when chis
does nor prove possible, compecition for power explodes in rhe fonn of coups
d'rat or depuration \Virhin dle arnly. Another consequence of the milirarizarion of
Arab sysrems has been mar almas[ all arrnies in the region have assumed ultimare
responsibility for maintaining rhe regimes, eirher beca use power is controlled by
rh e military or as a result of its alliances \Virh the regimes' elites.
TI" $Iale
InsrirLttionalizarion of control ayer rhe population represems one of rhe main
mechanisms for power exrracrion and crearion of elires. Through the approval
of laws and mIes, rhis process makes possible rhe introduetion of collective
objectives accepred by the majarity and the concentraran of power in rhe
hands of hierarchies, so rhat social strarificacion in tllln becomes an inscirution
wirhin sociery. The genesis of rhe seare is rhen direetly connecred ro rhe
population's su bordinacion ro a group. Following Balandier's words, che tradi-
tional stare enables a minority [Q exert a lasring dominance. w hich sees ies
superior pasirion srrengrhened rarher tha n weakened by rhe power struggle
be[ween rhe elires. Power and amhariey are indi vidualized ro such an extent
tbat ir becomes difficult ro differentiate berween rhe Pllblic interests and privare
interests of those who assume them (Balandier, 1999: 176-77).
As \Ve previously highlighted, from Hannah Arendt's poine ofview, power is
based on the group and is never owned by one individual alone. The indivi-
dual always receives 'powers' from a eertain number of people and, as soon as
,he group disappears, this power also vanishes (Are ndt, 2005 [1 970]). If to
Arendt's view \Ve add Ma:x Weher's defmition of rhe srare as 'a human conullunity
that (successfully) daims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force
within a given tetritory' (Weber, 1985: 19), we can condude that one of the
mose valuable traits of che seate as a power resource for rhe elires who control ir
is chis 'legirimacy' in rhe government's exertion of power and use of violen ce.
Weber himself, when analyzing rhe different mechanisms oflegitimarization of
power (tradicional, charismatic and legal), referred ro certain elires' capacities ro
legitimize their power thro ugh control of the state (Weber, 1985: 11- 12).
It is necessary for us ro make rhe disonerion between srare, government and
regime. The sraee is an insrirurion encompassing orher insritutions, in w hich
legitimacy of the ultimate exertion of po\Ver and legitimacy of violence converge.
The state is a power resource, but it is .lIso an organizational srructure of social
and economic relations, and, aboye all, a system channeling che concentradon and
distribution of resources. Govemment is rhe accion of using rhe 'srare' reso urce;
ir is also rhe concept we use ro refer ro acrors who have rhe capacity ca carry
 24 Femlll Izq//ierdo BI1'd,S (!/Id Atl/Ia i/llpridi-Ke/llOI/
Out rhar action at a specific momento Regime, however, is more rhan govem-
menr - ir is rhe srmcrure moIded by power relarions in rheir control of rhe
'srate' resource. We aIso use rhis tenn ro define elices who have rhe eapacity ro
shape thar scrueture. The fonn of sra te, govemmem and regime will vary
aeeording ro eaeh soeiety's hisrorieal cireulllsranees.
The Arab stare scarred ro draw theoreticians' imerest from rhe 19805
onwards. Before then, they had focused eheir atrention more closely on notions
such as 'lsbmic Ummah' or Arab nationalism (Ayubi, 2000). The process of
forming rhe Arab srate adopeed several guises, since the diverse soeieties origi-
nated from different fonns of poJitical organizarion rhat later underwent varied
SOrts of 'exportation' of the European srace ar discrete moments in history.
Radie, for instan ce, points oue rhat rhe d verse poJiticaI and cultural pracrices in
che process of exportaton of rhe stace fram che mecropolis ro rhe calonies
varied according ro the socio-polirical trajectory of each colonial power (nadie,
1992). The interesr of postcolonial elites in che sta te as a power resource with
huge potential should also be added to this colonial and globalizing dynamic,
which imposes stare models aecording to its needs.
Experts in the study of the Arab state put forward differem state typologies
depending on the elemems they ehoose ro focus on. AJj al-Wardi disringuishes
between duee types of Arab sta re: a) the majority stace, in which rhe nomad
groups (badawa) and the urban groups OJadara) coexist in a conflictive way; b)
rhe stare in w hich the nomad groups became rhe donlinam ones, as in rhe
Arabian pennsula; e) rhe srare in which the urban groups mIed, as in rhe case
of Egypt (quoted in Ayubi, 2000: 84). For lliya HaIik, there are five differem
types: a) the lmam-Chief system; b) the system of allianee ber\Veen Imams and
Chiefs: c) the tradicional secular system; d) che oligarehic type \Vith a military-
bureaucratic basis and e) the system as a product of colonization (Harik, 1987:
23-34). According to Ghassan Salam, contraty to the rest of the Arab coun-
rries, the posccolonial sra tes of Moroeco and Egypt are based on the 'rradirion
of power' makhzen (in rhe fonner) and pharaonic and lslarrue tradirion (in che
latter) (Salam, 1996: 59). Nazih Ayllbi identilies three different poles arollnd
whieh sra ce and regime are organized: che presidenr, the military and rhe parry.
The boss-stare strucrures the sys[em and below ir rhe security-state (rhe military
and rhe \tltlkhaarnt) , rhe parry-srate and the bureaucraric-stare compere (Ayubi,
2000: 300-301). As \Ve can see, \Vithout exception, the final fom> of'state' is linked
to the background of rhe elire who controls it and ro the fundamental resource mat
will have enabled this elite ro esrablish a regime beneficia! to ies needs.
In rhe case of the Arab srate, as in mosr pre-modem societies, [here has never
~een a group capable of maintaining a hegemonic posirion in ideologieal tenns
(m che Gramscian sense of rhe word). The elites' ncapacity to generare hege-
mony over society is clear1y refl.ected by rhe legitimacy crisis as menrioned by
Gema Martn Muoz:
Thei~ historieal legitimacy - as a result of leading rhe independenee _
consntuced the substancial element which gave postcolonial mlers
Soci%gy of power iI, todais Ara/J l/Iorld 25
recognition frOPl the population; such legirimizarion \Vas proIonged by
rheir promise ro achieve political independenee and economic develop-
ment ( ... ) As [the postcolonial elites] were dismanding the social pact that
sustained rhe proteetive sta te, having not fu lfilled rheir promises of non-
dependen ce and ecanamic developmenr (nacionalisr legitimacy), cirizens'
unease became polarized over the lack of soeio-politica! participation and
represenrarion (democratie legitimacy) and over the need for a cultural
recuperation of their own IsIamic values (Islamic legitinlacy) in the face of
exogenous ones ( ... ). The progressive droughr of these sources of legir-
imization has been occumng to the prese nr day, in which ?ocial contracr,
polirical model and cultural identity are in crisis.'
(Martin MlIoz, 1999: 19)
For rhis reason, in contrast ro rhe situaron in Westem socieries, aurhority in
Arab counrries musr rely more heavily on coercive mechanisITlS.
The role played by vioIence and coercan is nor one of a lasr resort buc rhat
of a daily and nonnalized recourse (as in che omnipresence of rhe 11!Jllklll1uarat).
We are doser here ro pre-modem auchoriry rhan ro rhe invisible aurhority of
hegemony in modem societies. The weakness of hegemony makes eoereion
inereasingly neeessary and pre-modern aurhority pucs ieself and irs aces on dis-
play, for example, in the fonn ofpublic punishmenr, as a mechanism ro reassert
and uphold es aurhority over whoever dares ro quesrion ir.
We use rhe reml pre-modem to refer ro soeieties which haven 't yer had
access ro the modemity of developed economies and ro rhe inherited insritu-
tions ofthe Enlightenment. We do nor use it in a ehronological sense as ifpre-
modemity were a srare follawed by development and modemity. In f.1ct,
within the globalized capitalist system, the model of modemity for developed
core economies prevents peripheraI undeveloped eco no mies from accessing
modemity. Pre-modemity is therefore more of a pennanent srare chan a spe-
cific moment in che evolurion of societies.
Ar rhis poinr, ir 15 imponanr ro move away &om the mosr limited Marxisr ana-
Iyses in which rhe SCare is presenred as a mere resource in the hands of capital. This
is more rhan obvious even in the analysis of eurrenr pre-modero societies. The
main so urce of power accumu]arion is rhe stare ieseIf, which means rhar primary
elites \Vho shape power balance wi ll rherefore be rhose who control rhe stare
appararus (exeepr maybe in the case of Lebanon and Mauritania, w here religious
community and cribe conrinue ro hold a fundamental weighr).
Within the process of power accllmulation, rhe biggest power struggle is
caused by and pennanenciy revolves around srare cenrrality. Thus, although
the ana!ysis of Arab societies in remlS of c1ass is necessary, ir soB proves to be
insuffieient, since equilibrium in relations of power and accumulation is related
more c10sely ro state control rhan ro relacions of production and aecumulation
of capital. This Iargely explains the difliculty of traI>sition towards democratic
political sysrems, as the Ioss of stare control wouId almost eertainly imply rhe
disappearance of rhe present elites.
 26 FClTflll Izquierdo En'clEs (/lId Athilla Lalllpridi-Kclllol/
Tite reutie .. states
!he fragile legitimacy of the elites who conerol the Arab state is aIso reflected
~n the ~vay in which some resources are extracted from sociery. Absence of
l~eologtcal hegen~ony and lack of legitimacy make the accumulation process
dIfEcult for the elItes due to institutional mechanisms, e.g. tax colIection. This
lack oflegitimacy ema~s ~he emergence of other processes such as comlption and,
aboye al1, the appropnanon of resources (e.g. natural resources, foreign income
?r extemal debt). before the population can access them. Once pO\ver is gained over
lTIcome-gener~tlTIg resources, the reIarion established te citizens is no Ionger
~ne, of colI~ct~on bur o.f distriburion, which eno rmously weakens rhe popula-
non ~ negotlanon capaclry, while strengthening the elites' power and authoriry.
In thIS ,:'ay" the state becomes an instrument for 'illegirimate' appropriation ofrhe
populano~l s resources, rarher rhan ehe produce of a social agreement or thar of a
hegemomc gro.up \Vhose interests might be accepted as if rhey \Vere shared by
the resr of socrery. Therefore, rhe elires who control rhe seare will seek meir
stabiliry. through three l11ain s~raregies: distribution of income obrained through
appropnaeed resources, coopranon of secondal)' elites and repression.
. Analyses of rhe .pol!tical economies of oil-producing countries have converged
111 the concepcuabzanon of rentier econornies. Mai and De la Cmara define
oil-reneier economies as 'rhe eco no mies of those terrirories in \Vhich hydro-
carbons ~lanagement is canied our \Vith rhe polircaI objecrive of achieving the
grearest 1I1come from subsoil for narional citizens' (Ma and De la Cmara
2005) .. The authors focus their analysis on inca me produced by resourc~
extract1on, bur \Ve may extend rhe rentier mechanisI11s to include external debt
and .aid :eceived by certain stares. 10 These rwo mechanisms make ir possible for
r~ntler tles te:' be maintained berween the popuJarion and Arab stares in non-
oll-ptod.ucing coun~ries, ~rovided rhey have a debr-sel\!icing capaciry and rhe
prop.enslry to recelve ald. Governl11ene intel\!enrion is based on revenue
obtall1ed f:om fore.i~n income, meaning thae budgeeary policies comisr mainly
of expendIture pobCles and aim ar legirimizing rhe regime. This dynamic leads
te ~he dev~lopment of an unproductive economy based on foreign income,
\Vhlch sustal11S consumer goods and sel\!ices sectors principally \Vith imporred
produces. The co~seq:lence of this situaron is the economy and regimes' direct
dependen ce on oil pnces or on rheir capaciry ro obeain credir and external aid.
. Stare and foreign income rhus merge as power resources in the hands of rhe
e~Ites that ~an control them. As a result, these elites accul11ulare a level of power
dIsp~OpOrtl~nat: ro rhat .of other periods of time or other contemporary elites .
:V 111]e f?relgn ~ncome IS plemiful, disniburive capaciry generaeed by foreign
l11come rs suffiClent to control rhe popularion, and, ae the same time, to convert
groups compering for po\Ver accumularioI1 into clients .
.The l1:ajoriry of Arab sra tes, whether rich or poor in oil, have entered into
thIS rentler dynamic to a grearer or lesser degree. Regimes wirhour oil teok
advamage of the strategic importance of their proximiry te oil \Vells in order to
obtain foreign income, as much from rhose \Vho wanted rbem as allies as &om
S(}ciolo,-~}' of pOl/ler iI today's Amv I/Jorfd 27
those prepared ro Pi1Y ro protect their posiron. For this very reason, sin ce oil
generates foreign and domestic threats as \Vell as vulnerability, while none-
theless enabling rhe milieary , poli ce and JVII/khavamt budgers ro be increased,
regimes become militarized and tum imo SOl11e of rhe most important c1ients of
the arrns indllstry (Beblawi and Lllciani, 1987: 18,52,59-60).
Analysis carried out from the sociology of power perspective helps us te
identify ehe main agents, their objecrives and rhe function of resources ae their
disposal. Oil-producing sta tes are ofren presented as failures for not meeting the
objecrive of economic development or being unable to consolidare rheir inde-
peodence in reJarion to the big Western corporations. Similar criticisms are also
expressed regarding rhe sea tes thar depend on an income ried ro 'external aid or
extemal debe. However, ehese accusanons derive &om t\Vo false supposi eions:
the first being that a srate has irs own objectives and the second thar priority is
given by the governmencs of these seares to econonllc and social development.
In contrase wirh officiaI discourse rhar presents the regimes' economic activiry as
a parh towards development, \Ve muse point our thar development ",ould have
be en counterproductive for the primary elites thel11se1ves. The real development
of Arab socieries and eheir respective economies would have facilieared ehe
emergence of other independenr elites in rhe competition for power, as \Vell as
the appearance of sectors of rhe population willing te and capable of making
rheir voices heard, which, in tum, \Vould have resulted in accumulation 10sses
for the elites controlling rhe srare. We should not forger thar rhe elires' pnority
objecrive is accumuJation; rherefore, the success of the policies ehey apply muse
be measured in relation ro ehat objecrive. For rhis reason, what we obsel\!e here
is nor failure bur, on rhe conrrary, grear success - since power in the hands of
tbe elites in rentier countries is l11uch more significant than in orher societies.
Hence, it transpires tbar the dorninanr elites in a remier staee cannot be coo-
sidered as a bourgeoisie who accul11ulares power in rhe fon11 of capiral but rarher as
a rentier arisrocracy, since eheir posieion in rhe accul11ulation process depends on
rheir capaciry ro control tbe sta te. In turn, this renrier aristocracy irself depends
direccly on tbe international bourgeoisie and support of global elites. However, in
parallel ro rhe consolidarion of rhe staee's rulers, a bourgeoisie directIy conneceed
to the regime's power also emerged. This emergence \Vas due ro several factors: on
some occasi0115, because rhe staee insritutionalIy provided certain individuals
wirh the means te invesr (as in the case of Libya and Saudi Arabia); on others,
because well-posirioned senior officials diverted resources to che privare sector for
their own benefit (for example, in Algeria, Syria, !raq aud the majoriry of the Arab
stares); and final1y because some businessmen took advanrage of foreign income
and the demand generated by oil in order to invesr in secters \Vith no deficit, a
situation repeared in aH Arab countries. As a general rule, rhe bourgeoisie \Vho
usuaIIy belong te the latter group tend ro fee1 out of place and mistreared by
rhe regime, as they perceive a disloyal competirion \Vieh rhe other t\Vo groups,
\Vho share beuefits the bourgeoisie do not enjoy (Vieille, 1984: 17).
The rentier state has therefore beco me a power resource and an essential
srnIcrural fearure of contemporary Arab regimes. The power and srabiliry of its
 28 Fe/mil Izq//ierdo Bdc/s mld Athi/ll1 LnI/Jpridi-KelJ/oJJ
primal)' elites wilI irnmediarely reflecr times of strength, when oil priees are
high or \Vhen rhere are more possibilities co receive aid and credir, and equaJly
times of weakness when rhe opposire is rnle.
System structure
One of the issues ar rhe eore of social science is rhe debate of agency versus
strucrure. On rhe one hand, rhe perspective rhat defends rhe role of struCtllre as
fundamental eonsiders the interesrs and behavior of accors to be defined bv rhe
framework in which rhey evolve. On rhe other hand, those \Vho defend rhe
actors' primacy consider srrucrure to be rhe resuIt of action from individuals
\Virh maximizing objecnves. In orher words, srntctures are viewed either as
constraincs or as the product of individual decisions. As for our analysis, we
consider rhar actors continuously produce and reproduce rh e characteriscics of a
socieey, and rhar their activiry does nor aJways evolve wirhin rhe condirions
rhey have chosen. Actors' decisions are noc fully derermined by srructure,
bltt nor are rhey always raken within a framework rhar rhe accors ll fully coo-
rrol. Following Bhaskar and Giddens, we can rh erefore affiml rhar srnlcrure
is dual (Bhaskar, 1979; Giddens, 1984). With regards to the practices that
constirure social systems, Giddens declares rhat strucrure is boch rhe environ-
ment in which they develop and their result (Giddens, 1981: 27). Thus, actors
and structures are nor opposing concepts; rather, each implies the ocher's
existen ce. In daily compecinon, actors do not have the capaciey to direcdy
affect the factors defining srructure. This possibility only exisrs in times of
revolutionary change usually accompanied by che population's linear 1110biJiza-
rion. For this reason, one of the characteristics ehar enable lIS to discern whether
a partem is ' srrucrural or circumsrantial is precisely ebe actors' difficlllry 111
inftuencing it directly.
As previously mentioned, we could define srructllre as rbe framework 111
which acto es ev01ve. Ir is necessary ro remember that structure determines nor
only the actors' constraints, but also their opportunities (Giddens, 1976: 161).
Thus, in the competitive game, constrainrs for sorne will be advantages for
ochers; acto es who have ro fighr againsr cerrain structural constrainrs have a
linlited margin of acrion, \Vhereas rhose \Vho can cake advamage of opporruniries
\Viii have greacer accumularion capacity.
Colin Wighr goes beyond this and presems [\VO theorerical tradiaons in
strucrure analysis. In the first one, strucrure is considered as the environment in
which actors evolve, generanng constraints and opportuniries. In rhe second,
coUective representations of social facrs are added (Wight, 2006: 126). We thus
find different rypes of constrainrs or possibilities which can come from a) rhe
pressures of rhe popularion or diverse cornmunities \vho are capable of gen-
eraring linear relarions, which oblige elires to carry out celtain actions and
forbid ochers; b) orher elites' pressures, which will forge power equilibrium in
rhe system; c) pressures from insritutions and nJes, for example, rhe stare,
constitucional laws, cusroms, etc.; 12 d) pressures fr0111 values and ideologies,
Sociofogy c.if power iI todl1Y's Arab world 29
parricularly relared t~ whae \Ve have defined as the Foucauldian and Gramscian
levels (regime of truth and cultural hegemon y).
C hanges in rhe system stntcture resulr fcom changes in acrors, resources,
relations of power or che ideological environmenr.
In the case of acto es, changes can take place when rhere 1S an ncrease or
decrease in rhe power of primary actors capable of generating a new equili-
briuIll. As we menrioned when analyzing the actors, [he c1earesr manifesration
of rhe power balance between primary actors in tbe system Structure is rhe
sysrem's rendency rowards oligarchy or polyarcby. In rhe Arab world, excepe
for Lebanon, \Ve come across structures where there is a large concenrration of
power in very few hands. An example of changes in rhe equilibrium would be,
for instan ce, rhe posirion of rhe stare elites who control foreign income in
relation to the directors of global oi1 corporations, or to the leaders of financial
or state insntucions providing credit; rheir position is never the same and
oscillaees from dependen ce ro alliance, according to rheir capaciry for power
accumulacion or to rhe system structure irself. Therefore, taking the renner state
based on oil exportanoo as an example, we can observe how rhe system con-
siderably changed over time. At first, during rhe years of decolonization, state
elites \Vere weak in che face of rhe seven large petrol corporacions rhat func-
tioned as a cartel. Larer on, during rhe 1970s, the state elites who had natio-
nalized resources and creared OPEC achieved power and capaciry to evolve in
rhe global sysrem, but in subsequent years were confIonted again wirh crisis and
weakness as a resulr of the decrease in oH prices and IMF pressures. We can see
at present thar rhese elites have regained po\Ver rhanks to che in crease in oil
prices and diversificacion of competition for demand, with rhe anival of Chinese
corporarians on rhe scene. Henceforth, the sta ce elires' dependen ce on COl'P0-
care elites became a reIation of alliance and compecicion, admittedly with irs ups
and downs, but overall much more stable.
In the case of resources, rhe transfonning f.1ctor of rhe sysrem structure will
be the change in a resource's usefulness for power aecumularion. The value of a
power resource is noe an intrinsic properry; racher, it depends on rhe competition's
circumstances. Valid resources during one petiod of time may be useless in
another; therefore. rhose elites who can use rhe new resources in rhe following
era will displace the oId elires. As \Ve have previously described, the emergence
of stare apparatus led ro rhe decline of rribal elites to a dependent, secondary
posiciono As we will see rhrough examples of the Arab \Vorld, variarion in oil
prices generates inereases and decreases in accumulation capacity. And a very
important contemporary example is rhe huge value acqu ired by control over
ideology as a resource (in rhe past, nationalist - currently, Islamist), as much for
opposition groups as for che regimes rhemselves.
In the case of power relations, the f.1ctor \Virh che potencial to modify rhe
system stmcture will be rhe emption of linear relanons. Mobilization of rhe
populatian can weaken so me elites, but ir can also give strength to rhose who
might have capaciry ro take advantage of the mpetus provided by popular
lllovement. Linear relacions may eventualIy have revolutionary consequences,
 30 Fcrr(1/I Izqllierdo BJichs alld .-1t/il1a LaJ/lpridi-KcJ/lolI
too che poine of ~odifying rhe rules of play, elitninanng SOrne of che existing
elires and generarU1g new ones, or bringing to th e fore power resources which
were noc previously useful for rhe comperirion. This phenomenon will depend
on th e capaciry ?f rhe pop.ulario~ for consciousness and mobilization. According
ro Skocpol. social revoluClons dlffer fi-om other transfolTInrion processes in rhe
presence of rwo dynamics: srructural change of sociery wirh c1ass unrest and
social and polirical rransformarions (Skocpol, '1979: 4). In rhe conremporary
Arab \:,orld, ,thlS pro.ces~ has only been \V~rnessed in. rhe recene uprisings of
2011 , 111 rhe bread l10rs of rhe 19805 and 19905, dunng rhe Palesrinian resis-
tanc e againsr Israeli occupation and, above aU, in th e fight againsc colonial
domination. In conjuncrion wirh so me of rhe elites, chis larcer example was
dotl~tless rhe only mornenr in which rhe popularion was capable of developing
a reslstance movemenr strong enough ro cause srrucrural change.
In rhe case of collective representarions of social facts, we differentiare
between whac we have renued rhe FOllcau Idian and Grarnscian levels.
According ca Foucaulr,
each society has ies regime of trurh, es 'general polirics o f trurh ': rhar is ro
say, ir defines the types of discourse rhar ir accepcs and makes rhem funcrion as
tnle; rhe mechanisms and instances which enable rhe disrincnon berween rme
or false sracel11enes, rhe differenc ways in which rhese are sancrione' rhe
techniques and procedures rhar are valued in order ro obtain ~rh ,
rhe Starus of rhose in charge of deciding \Vhat functions as rrue'
(Foucaulr, 1999: 53).
This 'regime of tmth' is only rnodified \Virh rhe passing of time and rhe evolution
of social rela r:ions; it cannot be manipulated by rhe elites as they wish. For rhe
same renson, nor can distincr opposirion and resistance prograrns against rhe
'regime of tnlrh' be established. However, it do es noc mean rhar sorne elites
cannoc cake advamage of rhe regime ro improve their posirion in the competinon
for power.
On rhe leve! defined by Gramsci as 'culrural hegemony', a universalized
belief syscem is esrablished rhar causes the interesrs of a cenain secror te be
accepted as beneficiaI for rhe whole sociery. Capacity ro have rheir o\Vn imerests
accepre~ as universal ena~les elites ro esrabhsh th e agenda and [he priorities of
rhar soclery. Hegemony 15 esrablished by a large coalirion o f people fro m an
Imp~rtam sector of socle.ty, aImost a cIass in irself, th erefore impossibIe ro
mampulare - at leas r nor m rhe shorr rernl; nevertheless, as ir 1S more defined
rhan Foucault's 'regil11e of truth', open fighes may break out ro weaken ir or
esrablish counrer-hegemonies.
Autocratic Arab regimes have benefited fi.'ol11 the strengrh of authorirarianism
on rhe ideological level of rhe Foucauldian 'regime of trurh '. As Ghassan
SaIam poims out, in the Arab and Muslim worlds, we find a particular insisten ce
on order and authOlity rhar \Ve do n ot find in rhe Western \Vorld (Salam
1994: W-11 ). This does nO[ imply rhar in our analysis \Ve shall adopr ~
Sociology oJ powC/' iI today's Amu world 31
culcuralistic vision apd join rhose who c1aim thar rhe Islamic \Vorld is incom-
patible \Virh democracy, bur \Ve view it as an elemem thar musr be raken inro
account ro analyze resources o\Vned by rhe differenr elires and principalJy by
rhe regil11es in po\Ver. Aurhorirarian elites find in rh is dominam 'trurh ' an
imponanr supporring factor ro justify rheir fo nu of govemmenr and also
weake n voices demandin g democra tizarion . On rhe FOllcauldian le vel. we find
a series of social, f.,mitial and comlT1unity relationships mar rely 011 aurhorirarianism
assumed by rhe grear majoriry of rhe pop ulari on. The respecr of youngsrers for
rheir elders, of children for rheir parents, of rribes' members for rhe Sheiks. of
\Vives for their husbands, of studenrs for cheir teachers, of citizens for civil ser-
vanrs ... all email a submissive componenr which works in favor of authorirarian
rela rions of power. ParadoxicaUy, the 111ain opposirion members' discourse,
ranging [rom narionalis111 ca lslamism, has nor weakened rhar authorirarian
rnlrh, since rhey do nor concem rhemselves \Virh democracy or wirh citizen
parriciparion in govemmenr. On rhe contrary, narionalisr elites \Vere able ca rake
advanrage of this auchoricarianism [O become esrablished in power when given
access to ir. Nonerheless, Islamiscs are roday in an increasingly contradictory
posirion, since rheir main opporruniry ro co me ro po\Ver \VouId exist onJy through
defeating aurocracy and implememing an anci-aurhoritarian, democraric system.
By nor facing up ro aurhorirarian tnlth, rhey lose srrength w hen confronring
rhe regimes. Ho wever, rhose \Vho sra nd ro lose mosr in this siruation are the
democrats and rhe sectors of rhe populariol1 opposed ro aurhorirarianism, as
rhe dominant discourse of borh the regimes and rhe Islam.iscs evoIves within rhe
aurhoritarian framework, rhus co nsrantly reinforcing ir. Changes in rhis 'regime
ofrntrh' are exrremely sIow and, in this context, stmcture is thus an elemenr of
continuity and a strong paraIyzing faccar in favor of rhe regimes.
On rhe ocher hand, as mentioned in rhe previous secrion, the elites' incapa-
ciry ro generate cultural hegemonies in the Gral11scian sense in addition to the
\Veakness of rhei[ Iegirimacy are facrors causing instability in [he strucrure of
Arab sysrems.
Considering anocher dimension in our analysis, sysrem structure is a1so linked
ro sup erior sysrems and ro rh e changes th ac may take place within chem. In chis
respecr, we find comperirive subsysrems existing wi[hin mam sysrems, and th e
alliances of e1ires in one subsysrem with rhose in a superior system will be,
accordingIy, a conmlon po\Ver resource. For example, as \Ve have previously
observed, power comperition in a cribe wiII be partIy shaped by rhe alliance
capaciry of deremuned rribal elires wirh elires \Vho control che sta re. Or, ar a
higher leve!, rhe alhance of elires on rhe world periphery wirh global elires \ViII
consrirure a po\Ver resource rhar ensures rhe posirion of rhe former.
In rhe Arab \Vorld, rhe ntIin g caste is largeIy independem of production
processes and social class, but heavily depend enr on rhe ourside \Vorld (~yubi,
2000: 51). The globalizarion ofre!arions ofproducrion gave rise ro bourgeOls and
polirical elites \Vho largely depend on rhe core elites. As rhe power accumulanon
of peripheral elires in rhe globalized system depends partIy on rheir function as
inrermediaries \Virh core elires, che main obj ecrives of both \Vill be to keep
 32 Femlll Izquierdo Bric/s mld At/w Lmllpridi-Kc/JIOI/
rhese societies in a stare of pre-modemiry. This encourages dependence of pre-
modem societies on rhe modemiry developed ar rhe core of rhe global sysrem,
rhus par.l lyzi ng rheir modernizing capaciry. This dependence on and alliance
wirh core elires is aIsa reAecred in cultural remlS, wirh an importanr wesremizarion
of rhe elires in contrasr wirh rhe more 'ori ema]' popula r c1asses.
Conclusion: sociology of power in today's Arab world
As we will see rhrough the srudy of specific cases, power stnlctllres in rhe Arab
wo rld presem a series of characterisrics rhat make democratizarion of rhe region
di.fficult. At the pinnacle of each system, we find a tiny minority of primary
elItes who control the majority of the power resollrces. These elires came co
power after fre eing rhel11selves from colonial rule and winning the competition
ro control sta tes. Since rhen, rhey have achieved grear srability, closing rhe door
to any olltside elites' renewal. In mosr cOllntries, although not a11, the central
power core is lIsually very homo geneollS, both at social and moral levels. In
almast a11 Arab states, the state is (he basic resoll rce in rh e comperirion for dif-
feremial power accu mulation. As previously menrioned, possibly Lebanon and
Mauritania are rhe only exceptions ro (his model, rheir cOl11munity or tribal ti es
having a fundamental bearing. Moreover, in mosr cases, rh e power of rhe state
is based on foreign income and coercion, w hich increases rhe importance of
o rher acrors' subordination to rhose \Vho control it.
Over rime, regimes have acquired an incredibly introverred quality and
become increasingly centered on pe rso nal ties, including rh ose w hich are her-
edirary. This dynal11ic, cornmonplace in monarchies, has even occurred in
republics. In rh e wake of the independence processes, che struggle for srate
con~rol brought miliraty men ro power as \Vell as dominant men from political
parues. T hese men fornled very tighr-knit, guarded grou ps. Once in power,
these 'cJans' ensured their pennanence by o nly al10wing other elires ro access
power if tbey carne from spheres close to their own - rhe milirary, political
parries, che region, rhe fam.i1y, che tribe or the coml11uniry. As a result, presenr-day
c.ompetition for power wirhin the regime is mainly brought about in genera-
nonal tenns. The children of elites w ho setcled in power afrer decolonization
are ~10W disputing wicll the geronrocracy over primary roJes, generating repeared
tenslons berween rhe old and new guard o This may be reftecred in smalJ
rransfomlations in rhe sysrem, particularly in rhe processes of eco nomic liber-
alizarian. However, nei rher rhe old nor the yo ung elires are inreresred in
altematives ro rhe system, rhey only seek te find advantages in the circular
competirion wirhin the same regime. Therefo re, the new guard's insistence on
economic liberalization is, in l11any cases, a consequence of rhe old guard's
control over foreign income and the state's coercion apparatus, i.e. rhe Inilirary
and rhe i\lIl/kl/(/bnrat; the young must rherefore focus their interese on orher
reSOurces such as capital, in order ro gain sorne kind of presence. Nonetheless,
th e obj ective for thema11 is still srate conerol, since rbis remains che foundarion
of power in Arab countries despite incipient economic liberalizations.
Sociology 01 pO/ller ill todny Js Amb !/Iorld 33
lndeed, che srare i:; a fundamenral resource in rhe competirion for differential
power accumulation in the Arab wo rld, as we ll as one of (he most imponan t
elemenrs in (he definirion of system srnlCtUre. The Arab acrors evolve in a
fra mework of constrainr and oppomlJ1iry provided by che sta re w hich also
controls rhe resources of foreign incorne and rhose of coercion, essential in
most Arab regimes. The srare's concurrent role as a resou rce and srfUcrural
factor means that aImost aU oeher power rescurces are ti ed ro ie in one way or
anorher. Power balance is mainly defi ned by the acrors' capacity ro use state
mechanisms ro benefit rheir accul11ulation capacity, an d the configuration
adop red by rhe srare afrer independence defines rhe stnlcture of the system in
w hich the elices compete.
Anorher commonly generalzed charactensric of Arab sysrel11 stmcture uncl
2011 was the population's weakness as an actor. With rhe exception of che
Palestinian case, Arab masses ha ve had the capaciry ro only act in a reactive way
since rh e dawn of the srmggles for independence, through iso la red proteses
dun ng periods of economic crisis and ineome curSo On only very few occasions,
th ere have been opposition or resistance groups capable of leading these pro-
tests rowards change in che regimes. In the 19705 and 19805, nanonalists and
leftist graups had a certain mobiliza tion capaciry, which rhey subsequentIy lost
du e to tough repression from the regimes. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Islamists
rook over and became another threat tO the elites in powe r, bur nor did th ey
succeed in transforming sociery.
O n som e occasions, th e conjunction of popular protesr and ideological
inflllence callsed weakening of che regimes ro su eh an exrenr rhar rh e ghase of
defear lingered over rhern. Their first response consisted of cosmerie changes in
th e foml of a few liberalizing meaSll res, including th e convocation of elections
\Vith the opposition 's patticipation, bm, when ir was feared there was a possi-
bility of rhe elites falling from power, the milicary and rhe II'Il/khabnrat beeame
the ulrimare effective defenders ofrhe status quo. Thlls, as che [.1.11 ofthe Shah's
re gime in lran was a warning ro aurocracies across the Middle East Jnd the
Arab wo rld, rhe milirary respo nse in Algeria was a warning ro lslamist groups
and served as a model for other repressive regimes. Moreover, the respo nse
from Europe and (he United Stares to the Algerian mili caries' coup againsr rhe
Islam.ists' electoral vicrory dern onstrared unquestionably ro rhe Arab elires rhar
they were allowed ro use force against rhe possible rise of lslamists to power.
Discourse in defense of human rights and democracy was easily forgotten \Virh
che [hrear ro global acrers' intereses, and th e [errorist acrack of September 11th
buned any exeernal pressure on the allied regimes. Exeept fo1' the case of Libya,
rh is Western pemlissiveness has manifested itself again in the 2011 uprisings,
especially in the case of a11ied regimes su eh as Bahrain and Morocco.
The Algerian experience also caused changes in Islamisr groups rhrough rhe
whole region. Within th ese groups, it was rhe sectors mosr interested in
approximaring power and playing a role in 'loyal' opposirion ro rhe regime or
at most aspiring ro be the avant-garde of sorne prorescs chat grew srronger and
forgot dleir discourse of the 1980s about tr;msforming the system. The few
 34 Fcrrall izql/ierdo Bric/s alld Afhilla Lalllprid-Kclllol/
selecr groups rhar conrinue ro uphold objecrives of rransfonllation have become
a minority and have adopred, on certain occasions, a violem streak, growing
doser to rhe al-Qaeda nebllIa and l110ving frther from rhe population.
FinaIly, as Our analysis of tbe stmcture of Arab sysrems bas revealed, it is also
necessary ro take imo accollnt rheir posirion wirhin rhe international sysrem. As
pre-modern societies, a11 of them are loca red on rhe periphery of tbe global
sysrern. However, nar al! of rhem have rhe same degree of dependen ce on rhe
primary core elires. Tbe elires of oil-producing counrries have a greater margin
of autonomy, aboye all in times when energy prices rise. On the conrrary, elites
who depend on rhe in come produced by exrernal aid ar debt playa much
more secondary role and rhe impact of foreign elires on rbese counrnes is tbus
more significanr. In rbe same way, tbe elites of countries \vith Jess capaciry to
generate foreign income and in which rhe regime is therefore less dependent
on ir, as is the case in Morocco, luye grearer margin for maneuver. We can
even see thar, on some occasions, tbe Saudi elires have be en able ro achieve an
aImost primaly role in tbe internarional sysrem. In other cases, such as rbe
Algerian elites or rhose from other counnies with less production capacity, rhey
oscillare ber\Veen auronomy in prosperous times for energy prices, and depen-
den ce in moments of crisis - for example in the 19805, when rhey had no otber
choice bur to turn ro international organizations in order ro solve their debr
problems. Others, su eh as the jordanian, Egyptian or Palesrinian (from Fatah)
elires, largely depend on exrernal aid; tbeir auronomy in rhe global sysrem is
hence very lil11ired and even in domestic affairs rhey are forced ro obey the
directives of their donors.
We can rberefore conclude thar rhe configllration of Arab sysrem structures
has senolls consequences for the demacratic development of these societies.
Most of the regil11es luye sbown a grear capaciry for resiscance in relation ro
c1aims for democrarization ar in rhe face of differenr opposition movements.
The regimes' moments of clisis and weakness in the 1980s and 1990s forced
elites ro \Vear a democratic mask for rheir survival, bur ar presenr ir is clear thar
no changes bave yer made a real impacc on the control held by pnmaty elites
over the srate and the principal resources of power. On1y popular uprisings can
force democratic ehanges. But even in this case, as in 2011, che popularion faces
buge resisrance trom regime elites. The faH of eertain rulers, such as Ben Ah in
Tunisia ar Mubarak in Egypt, do es nO[ guaranree democraric change. The
elites will rry ro retain rheir power, \Virh all rhe means at rheir disposa1, even if
they do have ro aIlaw some changes to keep rhings the same.
Notes
This study has been c:mied out \vithin the guidelnes of tbe research project 'Analysis of
political transitions in the Arab World', funded by the CIDOB Found:uion, and of the
Project I+D+i, funded by the IvIinisrry of Science and Innovarion ('Stabiliry, govem-
abiliey and poltical change in Turkey, the Middle East and North Africa: mpace on
Spani~h policy ro\\'ards this region' (CS02008-06232-C03-02/CPOL)), conducted by
ehe Autonomous University ofBarcelona.
Sociology of powcr h today's Arab [/Jorld 35
2 Rusto\\', 1970; O'Donnell et al., 1986; Schmitter, 1999; Prze\Vorski, 199 1; Huntington, 1991 .
3 Salam, 1994; Norron, 1995; Khader, 1997; Brynen ee aL, 1995; Perthes, 2004; PNUD.
Regional Bureau [or Arab Srates, 2005.
4 See Izquierdo Brichs, 2008; Izquierdo Brichs, 2007b; Kemou , 20~7. ..
5 According ro om approach, man does nm live pem~~men~y dommared by 1m ~h.mt fo.r
po\Ver. Ir is che system tbar genera tes the struggle, In wluc? leaders musc ~artlClpate If
they imend ca remain in che hierarchy. Therefore, power In che f0011 of mftuence or
control is merely the spark thac ignices the infinite circular game. Afterwards, the accors'
main objective will be competition itsel( ' .
6 On che concepe of differential accumulation of power, see Nltzan and Blchler, 2002.
7 In his classic TI/c POl/lcr Elitc, Wrighr Milis focuses primanly on che elites who control che
srace, che corporatiom and the anny. However, we believe rhar the sociology of power
must analyze the competition for control over a1l power resource~, .and resour~es such as
ideology, infonnaeion or cechnology may emerge even more declslve dependmg 011 che
comexc (\YJright Mills, 2000 [1956]). . .
8 Here we distance ourselves from Veblen who cemers rus study of the elices on the dls-
tinction between che 'leisure cbss' and che rest of rhe populacion. From our point of
view, che driving force behind che sysrem is rhe competition berween elites and nor their
distinction fram rhe masses (Veblen, 1971 [1899]).
9 Bustos and Ma devclop this subjecc in decail in rhe chapcer on Algeria.
l OAn ana,lysis of che remier sta tes from che socioJogy of power perspective can be found in
Izquierdo Brichs, 2007a. . ...
11 Fram rhe sociology of power perspcctive, however, \Ve thm~ 1t 15 lmp~rram noc ca
confuse systemic game wich structure. The syscem is. based o~ lmea~ and CIrcular power
relations. Elites' decisions cal1not escape the competiaon for differentlal power accumula-
rion; if they abandon their priority ca maximize power, chey \villlose their position as elites.
Nevertheless, the competition is carried out in a structure chae differs in every system.
J 2 An extreme buc compelling example of these pressures is the ac~ep~an~e of wa.r as ~ legal
inscitution when practiced through the state, but not when orher II1StltUt10ns are nnphcated.
Bibliography
Arendt, H. (2005 [1970]) Sobrc 1(/ [liolcllcia, Alianza, Madrid.
Ayubi, N. N. (2000) PJltiCII y sociedad en On"CIltC Prximo. Lt f/ipertrojia del CS(ado rabc,
Bellarerra, Barcelona.
Badie, B. (1991) L'tllf import. L'occidcmalisatio/I de /'ordrc politique, Fayard, Paris.
BaJandier, G. (1999) AllffIropologic politiquc, Quadrige/PUF, Paris.
Bebbwi, H. and Luciani, G. (Eds) (1987) Thc RCl/Iicr Statc, Croom Hclm, Londoll.
Bhaskar, R. A. (1979) TIIC Possibi/ity of j\latl/ralism, Routledge, London.
Brumberg, D. (2002) 'The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy', j01l1l1lJ1 cif DCIIIOCf(/C)',13, 4.
- -(2003) 'Liberalizarion versus Democracy. Understanding Arab Political Refonn',
rVorkill! Papcrs. ClIlllCgic Em/oZl'II/CIlf jilr IlItcmiltional PCIICC, 37.
Brynen, R., Korany, B. and Noble, P. (Eds) (1995) Po{itj((l{ Uberaliziltion (/lId DC/llocratizarioll
;11 the Arab World. Vol 1. TIlcorctica{ Perspcctivcs, Lynne Rienner, Boulder.
Camau, M. (1971) L/ IlOtitlll de dlllocmtic dll/ls la pCllsc dcs din"gcallts maghrcbins, CNRS, Paris.
- -(1999) 'La cransicologie a l'preuve du Moyen- Oriem et de l'Afrique du Nard',
A/lIlllilirc dc l'Afiiqllc dll \lord, XXXVIII.
Conn, G. (27-12-2005) 'Emretien. Georges Conn. Le sysreme communautaire ec
confessionnel s'apparente au cocalicarisme', {'Hllma/lit.
Foucault, IvI. (1999) Estratcgias de poder, Paids, Barcelona.
Galbraith, J. K. (1973) 'Power and che Useful Economisc', TI/c Amcricall Ecollolllic RCflicll', 63, 1.
- -(2004) L/ economa del frill/(le illocc/lte, Ctica, Madrid.
36 FerrO/I Izql/ierdo Bric!Is O/Id AtlIilla Lalllpridi-KC/JIO/l Sociology oJ pOll'cr ill todl1Y's ArClb world 37
Giddens, A. (1974) 'Elites in the British Class Structure', in P. Stal1worth and A. Giddens Schmitter, P. C. (1999) 'Se dplapnr au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord, "transitologues"
(Eds), Elites 111/(1 POll'er " British Saciet}', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. et "consolidologues" sont-ils toujours assurs de voyager en toute scurit ?', AlIIlIIairc de
--(1976) J\lew RHles cf Soci%gical Met/lOd: A Pasiti"c Cn'lique c!l JlIlerpretlltille Socio/(Isies, l'Afriqlle du Nord, XXXVIII.
Hurchinson, London. Skocpol, T. (1979) States al/d Social RellOllltiolls: A Compararillc Allal)'sis of Frallce, Russia alld
--(1981) A COlltemporar)' Critique of Historical Marerilllism. Vol. 'l. PO/per, Properr}' aml thc Chilla, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Stalc, Macmillan, London. Tillv, C. (1978) From Mobilizarioll to ReJlo/Clfioll, McGraw- Hill, New York.
--(1984) TI,e COlIstitlltiall of Socict}'. Omlillc r.?f tllf~ 77/Cory of Stl'l/cluration, Polity, Cambridge. Veblen, T. (1971 [1899]) Teona de /1I e/l/se ociosa, Fondo de Cultura Econmica, Mxico.
Gramsci, A. (1971) Sc/ccriolls frOIll {he PriSOIl lVorebooks {edited by Quimon Hoare and Vieille, P. (1984) 'Le ptrole comme rapport socia!', PCllp/CS mditcrrallel/s, 26.
Geoffrey Nowdl Smith], New York, International Publishers. Weber, M. ('I985) ElIsayos de sociolag{a cOIlfemporllea, Planeta- Agostini, Barcelona.
Harik, I. (1987) 'The Origins ofthe Arab State System', in G. Salam (Ed.) 77/c For/ndatiolls Whitley, R. (1974) 'The City and Industry: The Directors of Large Companies, Their
ofthe Arab Slate, Croom Helm, London; New York; Sydney. Characteristics and Connections', in P. Stanworth and A. Giddens (Eds), Elites ami P01/lcr
Huntington, S. (1991) TIlc 77/1'rd fValle: Democratizario/l in the L/te TWclllieth CC/lt//I}', OkIahoma ill Bn'tish Saciet)', Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
University Press, Oklahoma. \Vight, C. (2006) Agcllts, SlllIcwres 1I1/d IlIIcmaliOllll1 Rclmicllls. Poliries as Olltolog)', Cambridge
Inglehart, R. (1977) TIle Si/em Rcvolcuioll: CIllIlIgillg Va/l/es alld Politica/ Sl}'les al/lOng Weslem Universiey Press, Cambridge.
Pllblics, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.]. Wright Mills, C. (2000 (l956]) TIle POIPa Elite, Oxford Univcrsity Press, New York.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2007a) 'Poder y Estado rentista en el mundo rabe', RelJista de Estudios
Jlltemaciol/a/es i.Heditcrrt/leos, 2.
--(2007b) 'Poder y transicin poltica en el mundo rabe', AH'raq, XXIV.
--(2008) Poder}' felicidad. Una propuesta de sociologla del porler, La Catarata, Madrid.
Kemou, A. (2007) Nasser's Ntltiollal J"terest: A 'Soci%g)' of POll'er' A llalJ'sis, Fimam, Alrafulla.
Khader, B. (1997) tllt, sacit cil'i1e et dmocratie dalls le mOl/de ambo IIII/su/mal/, CERlv1AC.
Lovaina.
Leca, j. (1994) 'La dmocratisation dans le monde acabe: incertitude, vulnerabilit et lgit-
imit', in G. Salam (Ed.), Dmocmties sm/S dmocmtcs. Politiqflcs d'O/wertllre dm/s le mOl/de
ambe el islal1liqr/C, Fayard, Paris.
Machiavelli, N. (1513-17) Disco/lfSCS 011 tlu: Finl Decade cf Tilrls Ul'ius, Project Gutenberg,
Firenze - http://www.gutenberg.org/ fues/1 0827 / 10827-28.txt
Mannheim, K. (1940) Mml al/d Societ)' i/l all Age r.?f RccolIStnlctio/l, Routledge, London.
Ma, A. and ' De la Cmara, C. (2005) 'Rusia: hacia una econona petrolero-rentista?',
Rel'ista de Ecol/oma Crtica, 3.
Martn Muoz, G. (1999) El Estado rabe. Crisis de legitimidad}' ctllltcsracill islmllta, Bellaterr.J.,
Barcelona.
Marx, K. (1844) COl1llllellts ol/james lHill, lmellls D'collomie Politiq/lc, http://www.marxist5.
o rgl archive I marxlwo rks/18 44/j ames-mill l
Nitzan,]. and Bichler, S. (2002) 77/C Global Political Eco/lolllj' of Israel, Pluto Press, London.
Norton, A. R. (1993) 'The Future ofCivil Society in the Middle East', Middle EIlStjollma/, 47, 2.
--(Ed.) (1995) Ciril Societ}' i" tIJe Middle EasI, EJ.BrilI, London.
O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, P. C. :md Whitehead, L. (Eds) (1986) Trallsitiollsfrom Alltl/Oritarial/
Rule: Som{cm EI/rope, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Perthes, V. (2004) Amb Elites: Negotiatillg rIJe Politics r.?fCIJmlgc, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.
PNUD. Regional Bureau for Arab States (2005) 77/C Arab Hlllllall DClfeloplllcllf Report 2004.
TOl/lards Freedol/J il/ rllC Arab fVor/d, United Nations Publications, Amman.
Przeworski, A. (1991) Democmc}' lIIld tIJe MlIrkct. Politica/ 11//(/ Ecol/olllic Riforms ill Easrem
EI/rope alld Lati" America, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Rustow, D. A. (1970) 'Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Moder, Comparati!!e
Polities, 2.
Salam, G. (Ed.) (1994) Dmocratics salls dmoCTrncs. Politiq/les d'o/lIIertl/re dmls le mOl/de arabe et
islallliqlle, Fayard, Paris.
--(1996) Appc/s d'empire. JI/grcllces et rsistlll/ccs al'ge de la lIIol/dialisatiol/, Fayard, Paris.

2 Algeria: post-colonial power
structure and reproduction of elites
without renewal 1
Rife! Bustos alld Aurelia Mari
Cartography of elites and control of resources in AIgeria
In arder to understand rhe composition of rhe A1gerian elites and (he resources
[hey control, \Ve muse sean by explaining [he nature of Algerian societv and rhe
post-colonial Algerian seaee. .
The type of colonlzation rbar raok place in AJgeria, in contrase to other
councries su eh as T unisia and Moroeco, forbade rhe fOl1nltion of any native
form of social or cultural cohesion, as well as destroyed che resaurces of pre-colonial
elites (agticulture and commerce). This entailed rhe following [hree consequences:
Unlike oeher cOllntries, when independence arrived in Algeria, tradicional
groups (mral arisrocracy and cOl1lmercial bourgeoisie) practically disappeared
frOJ11 rhe power struggle.
2 At a theor:eticallevel, aU the groups that compete for power in Algeria share
the same characteristics (i.e. rhey are the result of the Algerian War of
lndependenee and linked to the armed stmggle'). The aetoes who did not
opt for armed conflict have been marginalized (MNA, the Algerian
Narional Movemem, creared by Messali Hadj; UDMA, the Demacrar
Union of Algerian Manifesto, founded by BenyoueefBenkhedda and Ferhat
Abbas; and, to a lesser degree, the Ulemas Council). Ir makes the campo si-
tion of rhe elire in Algeria arypical: it has rhe strucntre of a dynamic primary
elite, in che sense given to che expression by IsabelIe Werenfels (2007). The
Algerian elite is composed of factions, originating from one and the same
group, which emerged in the process of the Algerian state's fonnation.
These f.1ctions correspond to whar have been called clalls oJ Atl?eriml power. 3
Egualiry and at the same time livalry between stronger f.1ctions or clan s
derive from this Algerian peculiarity, sin ce they aU use the same credemials
(fighting in the Algerian War of lndependenee, 1954-62) to reaeh che
summit of power. As rhese factions are all very similar in composition and
have the same access to essential resources, a dynamic stmcture is generated
within the primary elite. Their differem factional componems alternare in
rhe privileged mling posirion, as if rhey were riding a noria (Ferris wheel) of
power, whose movement do es nor alter the essential part of rhe system.
Algeria: post-colollial pOlller strllct/lfe 39
3 The corollary oC che previous poims, and che \Vay in which the Algerian
War of lndependence unfolded, led to a third outcome: power wem to the
only Algerian emity thar had become an organized group during the war
years (1954-62), the High Command of che NLA (National Liberation
Army - ALN Arme de Libration Nationale) or Froneier Anny (Arme des
frontit~res), so called as ie was stationed ourside of rhe country's borders
during the \Var, due to French milicary superioriry.
For all of these reasons, it can be said that rhe Algetian state \Vas 'occupied'
right from the beginning by a group \Vho had no righr ro do SO.4 As a result,
the Algerian regime's main issue was - and cominues ro be - che search for a
fonnula to stay in power, ehat is to say, to find a way to become a legitimare
aurhoriry. On rhe one hand, the seate's 'occupiers' had ro respond ro the Algerians'
collective aspirarions - ro achieve independence and develop the counrry -
and, on the other hand, they had ro show the other groups vying for power
that they \Vere the only ones capable of carrying out rhis task.
After independence was achieved, a loss of validiry in nationalist discourse
and rhe need for the regime to create an iUusion of uniry led ro the promotion
of a societ)' project, which would give so me substance ro 'independence'. This
project had as a central <Lxis another collective aspirarion - the counuy's econonllc
development - and hence what delives from ie: modernization and progress.
The Algerian state's 'occupiers' became the driving forces of economic
development and, moreover, they defined rhemselves as such. Thls implied tha e
they needed ro luve access ro aU the necessary financial resources ro carry it out;
what's more, not muy did chey presem chis process as the only viable option bur
also stated rhat ir was an opeion rhar only they \Vere capable of implememing.
They rherefore had ro elaborate a legicimizing discourse that would be consistem
and credible and would jusrify rheir occupation of power, which was highly
guestionable - as much in the eyes of the population as in rhose of the milieary
(ocher factions and clans). Thus, the namre of their discourse could only be
economic, since polirical and ideological discourse was high!y questionable, as
a11 other competing groups were eguaUy legitimaee.
This process was realized through an 'Algerian social pacr' whose craftsman
\Vas Houari Boumediene (1962-78). Afeer purring an end ro che instability of
Ben Bella's era,s Boumediene consolldated his re gime ehanks ro charisma and
ability, as Roberts (2003) poines out, and built a stable politieal eonm1Unity.
Two facrors were equally essemial: first, the nationalization of hydrocarbons in
1971, which provided him wieh rhe necessary resources ro shape his strategy with-
out depending on the rest of che country's acrors; and second, the articulation,
possibly unigue in rhe hisrory of Algeria, of an economic discourse consistent
wirh irs realizarion. The insrmmem ehar \Vas chosen in arder ro put this social
pact imo practice \Vas SONATRACH. 6 les narionalization in 1971 implied the
crearion of barriers by the state ro prevem the enrry of foreign companies; thus, in
beeoming the owner of SONATRACH, the state established itself as che
represemarive of rhe Algerian nation. The level of state income was substanrially
 40 Rifel B//stos (1Ild Aurclia iHml
increosed ,hrough profits previously ob,ained by SONATRACH, as well as the
colJectjon of fiscal ta."\:es in relarion ro oil acnvity. With hydrocarbons a nanonal
properey, the stare was abIe ro impIement an imponant cenrralized policy of
expenses and investmems, and SONATRACH was defined as the 'instrument
ofpublic intervention'.J In facr, wha t realIy bes[Qwed cenrraIity and autonomy on
the primary elites \Vas their control oyer rhe instrument of public intelVention, .e.
rhe exploitation of rhe hydrocarbons sector.
However, SONATRACH united strengrh and weakness, as the srate did nor
depend on [he popularion for ies survival, bU[ did depend on the evolurion of
crude oil prices. In other words, owning rhe hydroearbons sector pennitted the
colleerion of income; the srate's autonomy in relation to rhe population gave it
an importanr margin of maneuver when devising ts policies on public expendimre
bm at the same rime this relllier state8 neirher eontrol1ed nor couId ensure a
eonstant and foreseeable volume of resources, snce extreme variation in oil prices
was beyond its reach. Other power resources such as coercive resources or rhose
provided by the alliances fornled wirh secondary elites were therefore indispensable.
The AJgeri:1I1 pacr consisted of three binding elemenrs, since if one were ro
fail (as happened from Bendjedid's presidency onwards) ,he w hole system
would be jeopardized. They were as follows:
The stare should receive a substanrial source of foreign income.
2 Ir should have dislribwilJe il1stitwiollS9 (public industrial companies) ro dispense
rhis income, in the f0011 of paymenrs, transfers or matetiaJ goods distribured ro
society as a whole.
3 The population must identity wi,h the projec, proposed by the state.
In Boumediene's years (1965-78), the Algetian sta,e', economic policy had 'wo
basic aims: to obtain as many financial resou rces as possible from hydrocarbons
and ro use them ro finance a massive edification of basic industries. The
weakness of this economic program lay in ies function being more political than
eeonomic and the results in ternlS of legitimacy were therefore more important
than rhose of economic development.
The First and Second Four-Year Plans (1970-77) helped channel between
57 percenr and 61 percem of hydrocarbons in come mo rh e country's indus-
crializmion 10 (in rhe grearest endeavor of industrial invesrmem world wide);
however, the result \Vas rhe deindusrrializarion of rhe counny. Ayear before
Boumediene's dea,h, a' the end of the Second Plan in 1977, the position of
industry in AJgeria's GDP rarings (nor including che hydrocarbons sector) was
almost five poinrs below rhar of 1969. J 1 On a strktly economic Ievel, the result
of this scraeegy was an increased reinforcemenr of che financiaI funcaon of
hydrocarbons, as chey had ro finan ce not only rhe strategy of industrialization
bur aIso irs (non)resulrs, Le. che continuous growth in imports of a11 goods no
longer produced in ,he country.
. T he distriburive funcrion of industrial companies was linked ro obtaining
lllcome from oil, since ir \Vas through chese companies that the factors of
Algcl1a: post-colollial pOlller stmCfllre 41
production (the wage-earning working-c1ass popularion) were paid and that
goods w hich had been acquired abroad were cornmercialized by rhe privare
sector ca be distribured later, thanks ca the monopoly of importation. It per-
mitted rhe progressive enrichmenr (although unplanned) of rhe private sector.
This situaron lasred unru rhe mid-eigheies when, during Chadli Bendjedid's
presidency, a significanr decrease in oil prices hit rhe foun dario ns of rhe Algerian
econorny bard, calling imo quescion rhe social pace and srarring rhe first rorarien of
primary elites' posirions, as \Vell as the shift of some factions from core ro
peripheral areas.
Dtifiution 01 the Algerau elites ami ,esotlrces
rile elites
As we have previously seen, the singularity of che Algerian situation lies in che
emergence of ies mast powerful elites alongside che crearion of an in depende m
st:ue, adopng the stnIcrure of a primary dynamic elite. Algeria does not dis-
tinguish itself fram other Arab countries because of [he state's centrality in its
political development; as a marrer of facr, sraee centraliey usually dim.inishes
elites' auronomy. In Algeria, however, e1ites oueside ofrhe sure are scarce, and
alI of them depend on rhe exploitation of hydrocarbollS as rheir onIy financial
resource.
Bearing in mind these consideratiolls, Algerian elites can be c1assified into
four main groups:
1 State elites: senior officials &om the coercive apparatus of the state (tbe
anlled forces and intelligence service), directors of SONATRACH, some
poliricians and other senior sta te officials, particularIy from the finance and
energy sectors (technocraes) and belonging ro the diploma tic sphere . Para-
stacal associarions of ex-combatancs also parrake in this 'great revolutionary
family' (SllIIhada and Mlyahidecll).
2 Commercial elites, Tlemcenian and Consrantine 'bourgeoisie' (with or
withour family ries ro rhe state apparatus) and Alger 'new bourgeoisie' from
Alger and orher regions, particularly from [he 'impore-import' sector,I2 w ho
narurally have ties with rhe srare appararus.
3 Elites who have emerged from the indusrrializacion process (industrialists),
fonned by managers of national companies, directors of mass organizations,
professionals and inrelligentsia.
4 Local elires, especially those from nlral areas (wa!is or governors, mral or
urban mafias, amled groups dedicated ro extOrtion and smuggling, qaids or tribal
digoitaries) and some religious authorities (shcik.s from brorherhoods or tmiqas).
The following rabIe SUIl1S up the eli tes' position in relation to the importance
of the resources they control (primary or secondary elites) and their c10seness ro
the political core of decision-making (core or peripheral elites). This table is ro
42 Rafcl BI/sros mld A/IIBia Hml
be viewed bearing in mind rhar rhe elites' classificarion musr rake imo account
thejr dynamic namre and their flucmating distan ce [rom the core of decision-
making. It is as ir there was a Fems w heel of power rotating and altemating, w hose
center is occupied by dominant fucrions. The most powerh.1 elites (core primary
elices) are at rhe cemer of the wheel, hence at the core of decision-making,
altho ugh they may become secondary. The most remare elites (peripheral
elites), regardless of the importance of rheir resources, tilr oe revolve around
core elites, entering a game of alliances. This game may entail a shift of specific
core eli tes from a secondary ro a primary position or vice versa.
The core primary elires' peoftle in Algeria showed thar, up until 1990, its members
followed one ofthese rrajectories: a milirary career, diplomacy or teclmocracy,13 in
particular, specializing in financial or rechnical hydro carbons managemenr (Bustos,
2004). In f..1cr, the hard core or core alliance of Algerian elites was rradirionally
fomled by sectors of the state's coercive apparatus (its milirary and intelligence
service),14 rechn ocrars and senior officials hardened in Foreign Service.
One section of the commercial bourgeoisie 15 has in tegrared itself wirh rhe
primary elires: they are the few emrepreneurs' fa milies w ho hisrorically
achieved successful tcansirion &om colonial cin1es ro thar of independence.
Some had developed imponant businesses during French dominarion; others
were social climbers who rook advamage of the colonizers' departure ro rake
over their businesses, estares and company in&asrru cru re ar a derisory price.
Both had che abiliry ro mainra in and legitimize rheir activiries under socialist
regimes largely due te familiar alliances \Virh military and civil po wer cireles
(Liabes, 1982). To this end, they ensured matrimonial ties with high-ranking
officials from the military or from sta re businesses (Liabes, 1982).
The new Algerian bourgeoisie of rhe presenr day is tacked on to this traditional
ptivate sector, and mosciy idemified wirh the 'import-import' sector. It has
blossomed since rhe eighries and possesses important contacts in rhe upper ranks of
che scate ad miniscration. A nouveau riche elass or new bourgeoisie, ir is relared
ro the phenomenon of pOlle,.l]' describ ed by Koma i (1984), as in the case of
T/lblc 1 CJassificarion o r Algerian elites
Core elitcs Pcripllcral elites
Primary elites Chiet5 or coercive apparatus. N ew bou rgeoisie , commercial
(Rc\'oJutionary f.l miJ}') directors orSONATRAC H*, bou rgcoisie with ties to the state
technocrars and diplomats and rhe SIIIIII/Ida Jnd Mlljahidccll
Sccondary elites Groups that have emerged Bourgeoisie \"\'ithout ties ro rhe
under industrialism Stltc and local elites (main1y
rural)
NQ[cs
* Wh cther the SONATRACH directors must be inc\uded or llar as core primary dites is open to
qUCSCiOll. T he argument againsr ir is rhar rhey do nor imrinsically bdong lO what could be named the
'rcvolutionary f.1mily'. In spite af chis, all rhe SONATRACH dircclOrs It!lve been Illembcrs of rhe
AIgcri!ln powcr cemer and m!lny of tltem have bccn minisrers. For rhis rcasan . \Ve would opt for
induding thclll as core primar)' elitt:5.
Algeria: post-colollial pOlllcr strllctllre 43
Central and Easrem European counrries. This fundarnenrally idIe c1ass starred ro
gro\V in che 1980s \Vich anci-poverry policies and public incentives ro encourage
consum ption (;,ifitall), and \Vas kno w n by che popular secto rs as ulli-ull,
mea ning someching akin ro 'the posh set'. In facc, ic is rhe same private secrar
ro w hich Boumediene's socialism had lefr behind some smaU bU[ non erheless
very proficable room ra mane uver, in che foml of conm1ercial intennediarion w ith
industrial producrs, not produced bU( imported by public companies. Whar we
are dealing with here is che concept of 'crony capitalism', analyzed by several
aurho" in relarion to Egypt or Morocco (Kienle, 2001; Carusse, 2006, respecrively),
which can be perfectly applied te rhis ne\V Algerian bourgeoisie. Su~sequently , this
social group has beco me rich \Virh fortun es made from rhe 'import-import'
business. These nouveaux rich es have aH of th e necessary puHs (pisto liS in
French) in srare administration te provide them \Vith essencial imporr pernIits
and pl;vace infolTIlacion from whi ch to profi t.
The general characterisric of a11 Algerian elites is their dependence on the sta ce.
H owever, we must poim out [har there are sorne secrors from the Tlemcenian and
Constantine commercial bourgeoisie, which, although a small minoriry, have kepc
away from the core power apparatus and co ncinued co sustain rhe mselves upon
che usual principies of accumulacion. In chis sense, chey remained regional
elites, lin ted in rheir growrh and thus considered peripheral secondary elires.
D eher secondary elites are the industrialist groups and rhe local elites, mainly
from rural areas. Urban elires or industrialiscs, principally concentrated in public
sector services, which have grown unabated sin ce independence was ac hieved
rhroughour the Arab ",orld (AYllbi, 1988, 1998), are also ried to the state
because of their depend ence on the resources distribured. This group includes
th e 'white-collar workers', employed in public services, the working class \Vho
emerged from industrializaron, and pro fessionals from different backgrounds:
teachers, journalists, docters, engineers and lawyers. Ir is important te take into
acco unt rhat, in this socialist co unrry, che \Vorking and agricultura! classes \Vere
never properIy represenred in rhe scare's potitical scructures, conrrary ro whar
was elaimed in official discourse (Leca and Varin, 1979). For this reason, the
UGTA union has always been dominaced by 'white-collar workers' and is te
[he present day, \Vhereas che FLN's Direcrive con1fl1inee never managed ro succeed
in incorporating a significanr percencage of workers and peasams. The differenr
echelons of rhe party were, in fact, mosay occupied by trained rechnicians and
employees, once again 'white-collar worke,,' (Bustos, 2004: 281). In the indlls-
[rialist groups, w e include 'organic' inteIJectua]s or 'inteUigentsia' from socialist
cimes, w ho \Vere then in charge of es tab lishing the adequare ideological or
religious j ustifications for official messages and sratemenrs, and the majority of
whom have now recyc1ed [heir skills in che media. Finally, we find in local
elires rhe figure of rhe wali, rhe 'de- cencrali zed' echelon of sta te administration,
,vho is, in faet, rhe region's delega te from ce nrral govemmem, endowed wich
bread executive powers. The ruali or governor is named by the president and is
often an army officer. There are aIso figu res of social authority such as the qaid
(nibal dignitary or chief) and rhe slleik (chief) fro m the local religious brotherhood
r
44 Rafe! B/lStos a//(I A "relia l11aii
(tariqa). But rhis renninology ma}' lead ro confUsioo if strictIy imerpre red according
to tradicional society. Such figures have survived wirh functions Jnd charactenstics
completely different from whar \Vas there originally, and exercise their authority
Qver a sociery greac1y changed by [he acclII11ulated effecrs of colonizarian, socialism
and emigratian. The element rhar may llave modified these local power reIancns
mast in recent years is che emergence of violence, an enduring phenomenon,
\Vhieh has mainly erupted in and aftecred rhe nlra! world. Not on1y does ir dismpr
rhe distriburion of coercive resaurces wthin sociery (rhe crearion of Local Groups
of Defense, GLD), bU[ it also alters the role of popular or m arabutic Islam,
which has heen considered by rhe regime as an ally in es 'fight' againsr Islamisr
amled groups (presented for thar marrer as a foreign and heretic import).
This phenomenon of violence, combined with a predatory economy, will
indubicably influence rhe elires' future stnlcture in Algeria. In facr, rhe emergence
of new amled groups since 1990, che expansion of an infonllal econorny,
economic precariousness and smuggling (Irabel/do) have a1ready been modifYing
resource distriburion. In tum, imernal conflicr has accelerated rh e privarizarion of
the incredibly important A1gerian public sector. It \Yas first initiated by opening up
rhe hydrocarb ons sector to internacional companies and was later strengrhened by a
program of strucmral adjustment (1994-99) unde r the auspices of the Intemational
Monetary Fund, whose deregulation measures have had enduring etrects.
The very violence of this conRicr enabled property cransfer to take place
from stace hands ce priva ce hands or from privace hands ro other privace hands.
The c10sing of public companies due to Iack of profitabili ty or their desrruction
as a result of ' rerrorisr' anacks has led ro a conrinuous tr.msfer of resources from
rhe public sector ro rhe privare. Dne example is whar happened in Miridja's
fertile Iand, where sorne of rhe conflicr's mosr rerrible massacres raok place
(Kalyvas, 1999). Such changes of ownership could, in the ti.1ture, modilY the
composirion of pnmary and secondary eliees. Ir is rherefore nor surprising rbae
new elires linked to an infonnal criminal econorny sbould appear; mafias,
arnled groups who are more imeresred in delinquency rhan in an idemifiable
political cause (Martinez, 1998) and, of course, smuggling net\Yorks (at the
country 's bordees and in rhe Sourh). However, ir is difficult ro figure our
whom or which are the alremative eliees, owing to rhe (lce chat, si nce 1962,
relevant power poses have been occupied by nationalisrs from che 'oId guard',
\Vho a11 hail from rhe large revolucionary f.ll1lily . This realiry causes us to doubc
rhe exisrence of a replacement elire in che presenr day.
OtlJe,. resoJlrces (coercoll, iriformatioll, ideolog}' aud capital)
We will now examine how the other resources are distribuced between elites
and define which are rhe most useful for power accumularion.
CoercillC resources
Despire rhe fact that in recent years che siruation seems ro have improved (or ar
leasr up until rhe worsening rerrorisr siruarion in 2007), rhe monopoly of
A{gcria: post-ca/ollial pOWC/" 51/llCture 45
coercive resources " as been seliously called ioto question since 1992. The
existence of a number of Islamisr guerrillas and urban commandos along wirh
delinquenr gangs has enrailed a certain scarrering of coercive resources and
exertion of violence. Nor only have rhe 'Islamisr maquis' and criminal gangs
questioned rhe stace's monopoly on violence bur rhe Algelian scare irself, following
che Turkish and Larin American examples, has hand ed out weapons and allowed
the fom"tion oflocal milicia - in charge of the anti-Islamist fight - named Local
Defense Groups (G LD). They \Vere legaUy authorized and organized in 1997
and co che presenc day have not been disarnled. The military's readjusonent ro
guerrilla warfare ir had been unprepared for, rhrough rhe acquisi?on of modem
milirary equipmenr, and rhe benevolenr internatio nal attitude rowards che regime
(especiaUy since 2001) have both tipped the scales in favor of the A1gerian state.
Even if a new rerrorisr wave is alive roday, albeir in somewhar differenr conditions,
wirh rhe al-Qaeda nebula in Maghreb and threats againsr certain foreign corpora-
rioos, rhe regime's capacicy fo r survival seems to be ensured.
lI ifor/llatioll
Infonnacion is an extreme!y important resource in an authorirarian staee, which
is, by definition, opaque. TradicionalIy, rhe inrelligence services were che 111ain
procagonisrs and beneficiaries. They inherired significanr power during che era
of rhe single-party state when chey controUed virtualIy a11 sectors of activity
chrough the farnous 'blue certifica tes' documents endorsed by feared agencs
\Vho gave the green Iight tO public sector engagement (Bustos, 2004). Eco-
nomic infonnation acquires great importan ce, hi gher than char of polirics, in an
econorny currentIy undergoing a process of liberalizarion (alrhough nor a
markec process). Knowledge of adminisrrative mies and bureaucraric mses has
become an essential power resource. lt a110ws rhe circurnnavigation of customs
obsracles affecti ng rhe export of certain products, orherwise held up for days ar
a time \Vich no apparent reason (Hadjadj, 2001). Confidential infonnarion l6 is
rhen essential for rhe bribery needed ro win exmrtionace comracts for constnJcoon
and services.
Ide%gJ'
Ideological resources used by che regime are more disparare roday rhan rhey
a
were during rhe socialisr era. Now rhar socialism la Algricw/C has disappeared
as an ideology, and nationalism has been shghdy mirigared, we have retumed
ro rhe old modemisr-developmentist discourse (in facr empry of real comem).
Moreover, rhere is a religious re-traditionalism char, since rhe 1980s and 19905,
has served rhe regime in appropria ring parts of Islamist discourse in order ro
fight againsc it. Buc who holds these resources? There are several answers: sra ce
relevision and radio, almosr monopolistic; rhe official press and organs of rhe
srate such as rhe Presidency and rhe Head of the Cabinec; bur also rhe Ministry
of Religious Affairs, which conrrols sennons held in the masques. The privare
 46 Rafel Bllstos (/lId Amelia lHaii
press indeed exists, aIrh ough ir is far from being independenr, si nce it is fornlcd
by a m ynad of small newspapers behind which hide bllsinessmen or high-ranking
officers (rom che military, or some of rheir allianees \V ho, trom these platfonns,
launch attacks against one clan/ faC[ion or another.
Capital
Despice economic rransformaoons (che end of socialism, stmctural adjustment
programs, privatizations and violence), economic resources continue ro be tied
ro income and have a rustributive narure, just as \Ve described in Our introducrion.
In f..1cr, che impact of hydrocarbons 011 rhe GDP and fiscal revenue is higher
today rhan ir was in che 19805 and chis in crease looks ser te continuc (Mai1,
2006b).
Disttibution chains or networks have no douht becn modified in comparison
\Virh rhose rhat existed during the socialist era. T h ey are no\V more complex
and diversified but still fu ncnon rhrough public resource circulanon, their main
component being oil ra..xarion. This chain is composed of three echelons: firsr,
substantial scare in vestmene;17 second, infoml al networks f.lrce ned by capiral
evasio n; and, final1y, subsidies ro ex-combarants or rh eir relarives. Large
invesrments are no longer desnned for rhe creanon of an industrial sector bur (Q
infrasrnIcture and public consrfUcrion.
Fonnal net\Vorks that previously \Vene chrough che privare sector - as it played
che role of intenneruary bet\Veen socialist societies and the popularian - na\V
revolve around large and medium imporr societies (Hadjadj, 2001). Thanks to
oi! and gas income, Algeria is one of rhe greatest imporrers \Vorldwide; 18 irs
\Vhole economy depends on importation. 19 Moreover, some of rhe dividends
obrained [rom , capital evasion, \Vhich reach an astronom.icaJ amoune of l11oney,:w
fatten rhose econornic nerworks through cOl11mercial and speculative (real-estare)
investments.
T he lasr echelon of rhe disrribution chain consists of subsidies ro relatives of
rhe martyrs and combaranes of rhe Liberation War (kllljallideclI and SllIIhada),
which remain one ofthe mosr significant irems in rhe Algerian budger today.21
In many cases, rhese subsidies and orber public benefits only reach com batan ts
and rh eir families, who live off a very low income, in smaU amounts at a time;
hence, owing to rhe large number of fa milies affecred, many end up llving off
other more infonnal secrors of rhe econorny.
Putring rhe previously stared resources (coercion, informarion, ideology and
capiral) ineo rank order according ro their importance for power accumulation,
\Ve find in first place the in come from hydrocarb011S and, in rhe last years of the
cwencierh century, at aImost rhe same level, coercive reSOurces relarcd ro the
persisrence of polieical and criminal violen ce in rhe counrry.:!:! Nexr comes
infonnarion, closely related te imelligence services and fraudulenr privare busi-
nesses tha r cap into public income and common revenlle distriburion networks.
And finally, in last place, \Ve find ideology and che few economic resources rhat
are lInrelated te che hydrocarbons sector.
A~cria: post-colollial pOl/lcr sfl1/ctr/l"c 47
IdentifYing pro test, opposition and resistance movements
in Algeria
Claims
Prmesrs: These are more or less spomaneous demonsrracions against coml~rion
and despotism (frequenr and scattered). They rake place in response ~o Issues
such as rhe fraudulent allocacion of subsidized housing, incomprehensible and
sudden increases in rhe price of burane gas cylinders (in rhe 'gas country'),
excessive repression perpetrared by security forces, or bJS~d on iSSlles cOJ~
cerning internacional politics, such as the wars and bombmgs tha.r occur In
Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. For the Jasr 25 years, riots (lllcutes In F:enc~l)
luve been integral te Algerian sociery, commencing with rhe Qasba nors 111
1985 and followed by the famolls and tragic events of Ocrober 1988.
Opposition: Polirical opposiriol1, either legal Ol" situated on .cl~e edge ~f rhe law
(illegal or nor legalized), is extremeJy weak. Legal opposlOon part1~s such ~s
rhe Socialist Front Forces (FFS) or rhe Movemenr for Democracy 111 Algena
(MDA), are parliame ntary mi non des and divided by internal disputes.
Despice rhis, rhe FFS has managed ro mle severaJ distrlcrs ~f Kabyl.la ~or SOJ11~
rime ... Some historical opposition Jeaders such as Mehn, Ibrahu11l, Goz~h
and Hamrouch have eirher been allo\Ved te legalize the ir parry (e.g. Ibrahl-
mi's Wafa and Goza]j's Democratic Front (FD)) or their presidential
candidature has been rejected (Hal11n1ch and Ibrahimi's). Luisa Hanun's
Workers' Party is anocher legalized oppositioll party, which, in spite of
having participared in several govemmenrs, up holds a criti~a~ srance [Q\Var~s
sorne aspects of the regime. As fOl" rhe illegalized O~posl~lon, rhe l~laml c
From of Salvation (FIS) 110 longer exisrs as a party, S1I1ce ItS leaderslup has
become both geographically and polirically divided; its fom1er leaders now
operate individualIy. . ..
Resistance: These are organized mobilizations against speclfic pohcles or aspec.ts
of rhe regime. Since it gained independence, Algeria has been democratIc
and its regime fonned around an ethnic-regional base (Kabylia in the 1970s, 1980s
and fmt decade of the twenry-fmt century). ln the last t\Vo decades: omer fonus
of 1110bilization have emerged, led by women's groups in favor of dlSband1l1 ~ or
modilYing th e Family Code; by 'oflicial' trade unions campaigning agamst
privatizarion; by independenr syndicates fighring for trade UJ1l0~ .freedo111
and sa]ary improvemenrs; by [he relarives of rnissing per5ons; by nlllnants for
human rights and orher groups fighting againsr rhe impunity. of rhe Charter
for Peace and National Reconciliation; and, lastly, by Islanusr groups asso -
ciated \Vith legal parties (HAMAS-MSP and MRN-lslah), in relarion ro
religiollS argumenrs againsr the modernizarion of rhe Algenan Family Code.
G'OUPS 01' social IlIOIJerneuis ",itlr mobilizatioll capacit]'
The decree of me state of exception, declared in 1991 and extended in 1993,
remains vaJid roday. Ir prohibirs demonstrarions and alI meerings are subject to
 48 Rafel BI/stos alld Am'rfa iVIll/l
official allrhorizarion, only gramed under limired circllmsrances. The number of
official or pro-official gatherings is disproportionately high in comparison \Vith
rhose of rhe opposirion or of any mher social gro ups. Furthennore, mobilizations of
persecmed Islamisr grOllps do nm rake place for obvious reasans. Ir is rhus difficulr
ro gauge precisely the tme mobilization capaciey of rhe d ifferent groups.
Groups and social movements wirh mobiliza tion capacicy are as follo\Vs:
rhe fOl1l1er sale rrade union, wruch is naw rhe donnnanr crade union (UGTA, rhe
General Unian of Algerian Workers); organizations linked ro va ri ous srare
appararus such as rhe Narional Organizarion of rhe l\Ifyahidcell (ONM, fomler
\Var combatants), relatives of rhe SIJ///ada or \Var marryrs 23 and orher sem..i-
official NGOs; rhe Arouch movement or Berber Arouch Cirizen's Movement
in Kabylia, rhar ga rb ers many members and symparhizers in rhe capiral, despire
ics wilring power; rbe so-called 'independent rrad e unions' (ac ti ve in educaton
and orber professional secrors); civil communiey groups and associarions
(women's associarians, militants for human rights, LADDH, Algerian League
for the Defense of Human Rights, etc.); Islamic chariries Iinked to legal Islamist
parries (MSP-ex HAMAS and MRN-Islah); and, finaU y, the tradirional rural
S01.lCnlfes (cribes \Virh their respective cruefs or qairls and the Islam.ic brotherhoods
or tariqas, who range &om being local groups ro exisnng 0 11 an almosr narional,
if not rr.msnational, level). The tariqas are coordinated by a nacional associarion ,
w hich has recenrly been operating closely \V irh the regime, parriclIlady in its
SllppOrt for the figh t againsr Islamisr maquis.
The capacicy of rhese groups :md social 1110vements ro express eheir strengrh
varies nor only according ro rhe resources rhey have ar eheir disposal, bur al so
accarding ro rhe lim.itations esrablished by rhe srare of excepciono Ir 1S alsa affeeted
by rhe level of 'harassmenr' rhar certain acrors may sufrer in comparison w1th rhe
preferencial rreatmenr enjoyed by orhers (for example, compare rhe rreahnenr
of rhe independent trade unions, LADDH, the relarives of missing persons, Islamist
studenrs, erc. with rhar ofthe UGTA, ONM, presidencial coalitia n parries (such as
rhe MSP- Sociecy ofPeace Movement), semi- afficial NGOs, nacional coordinanon
of rariqas, associations for vicrims of terrorism, ere.). Thase 'in f.lvor' have not
onl y quasi- institurional srructures clase at hand bllt a1so che main media of
communicarion at th eir disposal (Le. public television - rh e only exisrlng
channe), radio srations and che state-o\Vned secti on of th e press).
Cil'wlal' aud linear ,'elations oI social gl'OlIpS aud movcmcnts
The main difference between linear and circular re)acions of power srems from
rhe facr chat the firsr arise from a seareh for empowern1enr over people's rights,
in order ro improve eirher general wellbeing or rhar of a particular group; circular
~elacians, however, are promored by elires so thar rheir relarive posirion mighr
lmprove. In rhe case of linear mobilizations, che srmggle lasts until eirher legal
refo nns are achieved or a certain aeknowledgement of wellbeing is gtanred.
By contrasr, the disputes wirhin circular re!arions can be defined as indefinite or
pennanent (Izq uierdo, 2008).
AlgeJin: post-colollial power stmctJJJ"c 49
We may observe .wirhin this dynamic that, due ro rheir proximiry ro rhe
regime, certain groups \Virh mobilizanon capaciey do nor fit into any of rhe
pro rest, opposirion and resistance caregories described aboye (UGTA, ONM,
NGOs, semi-pu blic organizatiolls, erc.).
Due ro their spontaneous narure, agents of proresr are relatively compliallr
and dissolve easily; they largely emerge wirhil1 a certain neighborhood, village
or age group (e.g. reenagers and youngsrers), in response ro power ab use or
Aagranr inj usrice. The aim of pro tests and riors consists generally in amending
an event perceived as 'hogra' (meaning 'humiliaring') and, on sorne occasions, in
rrying ro amend an injustice; however, in mosr cases, ir is an oexpression of
collecrive anger which is ulnma tely more skeptical rhan hopeful.
Owing ro either legal or policical reasons, tradirional opposition actors
(Le . polirical opposirion parties) are incapable of mobilizing large secrors of rhe
popularion. Nor only have rhey experienced the shrinkage affecting all Al gerian
parties, but they are also f.lcing problems of leadership and fragmentarion as a
consequence of rheir leaders' exile, in addirio n ro a ee rtain political caciquismo
Resisrance actors (the Arouch movemenr, independenr trade unions,
wo men's associa rio ns, militanrs for human riglus and sometimes charines, associa-
rions for v1CtimS of terrorism and rhe UGTA) may defend anoehetical positions and
rherefore be in confrontarion \Virh one another. At any one time, rhey can also
a11 be opposed ro rhe regime's poticies, decisio ns or acrions, be it privaozacioll,
police repression in Kabylia, reduction of n-ade union's freedom , impunity or
absolurion rowards terrorists, concealmenr of enforced disappearances or refonn of
the Family Codeo The Arouch movement's divisian inco two groups, as a resulr
of their negoriations with rhe governmenr, is sympromarie of how difficulr ir is
ro determine wherher groups or movements evolve chrough linear or circular
power relarions. Coapration , being such a cniCial insrrument ta rhe regime,
very ofren coneeals the tme narure of rhese relarions.
Relations of competition and alliance between different elites
and the influence of social movements in AIgeria
StructlJl'C 01 domcstic ,.clatioJJs DI compctitiou a"d alliauce
In chis secrion, we will examine ro w hat extent Algerian eles have undergone
a circularion process in the last fifteen years (1992-2007). What kind of circu-
larion, if any, has taken place; \Vas due to generarional renewal, cooptation or
social ascension; or \Vas it due ro rhe population's eruprlon through linear
power relations (fo r insrance, through revolurionary processes)? We will also
explore rhe population's claim-making capacicy and asce ndant mobility aimed
at satisfYing rs palitieal demands during the same period. Have rhese polirical
mobilizations succeeded in democratizing rhe sysrem or have [hey, on the
contrary, created new vertical and h.ierarchic srructures? Whar influence have
rhese so-caBed social movements had on rhe dynamic of competition and
alliance between elires?
50 RaJel Bustos alld A rlrelia iHai
GeneraUy speaking, central Algerian elires have undergone a slighr renewal,
rhe most concrete proof of which is rhe comeback from 1999 onwards ofleaders
from the 19705 (Abdelaziz Bouteflika , the top leader, but also the Minister of
Foreign Affairs Moharnmed Bejaoui, historical figure from Boumedianism,
\Vho had also been, ar key momenes, presidenc of che senace). The average age
of parliamem members continues ro be high, despice che relative rejuvenation
that took place in the legislative eleetions of 2002 (Werenfels, 2007; Benyoub,
2002) and to a lesser extent during those of 2007 (B ustos, 2007; Marx, 2007) .
This generational angle is a11 the more important if we take inco account che
proporcion of youngsters and children who have beco me, in rhe same period of
rime, rhe most abundant segment of che population. 2 .
The mosc scable, albeir invisible, demarcacion tine can be drawn between
differem f..1ccions of rhe elites. This dividing line is dynamic and cherefore
variable, since it depends on power accumulation. Elites' factions are made up
of clans, which are clans of power rarher than clan s in che anthropological
sense; in other words, rhey are patronage and cliente1ism nerworks which
spring up around important figures and often folJow cerrain regional tines.
Examples may be found (in the West) in the Oudja clan \Vho took Ben Bella
ro powe r, the Zero ual-Berchin-Benhamouda clan (from Consranrinople in dle
East) and more reeently the Bouteflika-Belkheir clan (&om the Tlemeenian
region in the West).
Alrhough conAicrs berween securiry services an d anned forces over stare
hegemony have previously been mentioned, it see ms more accuraee in rhe
context of Algeria ro speak in renns of fighes beeween rhe clans who belong ro
these instirutiollS. If a clan wanes ro ger access to fundamental resources, it will
have ro rely n,ot only on high-ranking officers but also on intelligence service
directors, in view of rhe vanous agencies imo which espionage services find
themselves divided.
Competicion between different c1ans foIlo\Vs some\Vhac complex rules,
which we have nonetheless been able ro identify as fo11o\Vs: membership of a
regional clan or kinship, the interna] solidarity of a grOllp \Vich a strong shared
experience, and comp]ementary or comperitive elemencs of rhe clienrele's
economic interests. As per cheir beginnings during and afrer che Liberarion
War, elans are fornled around families and che al1iances chey \Veave (Liabes,
1982). However, even in chis inirial srage, solidariry grOllpS such as rhe DAF
(French Anny Deserters) are fonned, who can be fOllnd within rhe Border
Army or among the members of the National Liberation Anny (ALN) fighring
in the maquis inside che borders procecred by the French. This was rhe situation
in the case of those who founded the MALG (Ministry of Am1aIllent and
General Liaisons), \Vhich \Vas the espionage service during the War of In de-
pendenee. Subsequently, by the 19805, new c1ans related to the business world
\Vere already emerging. President Bendjedid's wife, Halima, native ro Mostaganell1
(in the East) put the senior offieer Larbi Belkheir (DAF, as in me case of
Bendjedid) in contacr with a large number of busnessmen and social climbers.
These c1ans would go on to do good business throughout the 19805 (for
Algelia: post-cololliaf pOl/Jcr stnrcflIrc 51
example, in the Riad el-Farh scandal or in che case of loa m granted ro a friend
of the president's son), whieh grew exponentially in the 19905 and the first
decade of rhe rwenry-firsr cenrury as a resuIr of rhe ongoing conflict.
This conflicr gives visibiliry ro rhe dispure berween regional clans widun
che srate appararus. Since 2004, when General Mohamed Lamari retired ro the
arrny reselVe due ro healrh problems, President Boureflika has raken advantage of
rhe situarion ro sean making important changes within the anny and the amled
forces. These changes - which should not be inrerpreced, as has somenmes be en
suggesred, as proof of rhe president's auronomy regarding po\Ver c1ans - have
entailed fliction and negoriaeions becween che differenr regional clans. Boureflika
has promoeed a new generanon of officers co imporranc posts s~ch as Military
Region Commander. The members of this generation \Vere mainly rrained in
Algerian military academies (generaron ANP - rhe Narional Popular Anny)
and not in rhe big international academies, in contrast ro che fOffiler generarion and
the DAF. He has also attempred ro place important figures from rhe Wesr in
key pom, sueh as General Mohamed Senhadji. To eounteraet this, high-ranking
officers from rhe Easrem clan have, in rum, tried to promore officers rrom chis
region [O imponanr poses, as in rhe case of Ahmed Bousrila.
In conclusion, the facrots rhar explain rhe division and fighring berween
facoons are complerely inremvined. H ailing &om the same geographical area
does llor necessaruy imply thar r\Vo members of rhe elite will borh belong ro a
detennned regional clan. Two important figures from che same area can be
broughr inco conflicr if chey are from differenr generations or have diametricalIy
opposed shared experiences. This is the case for General Rachid Benyelles and
Presidenc Bouceflika, who are sworn enemies despire boch originaring from
Tlemcen. Groups whose solidariry is based on shared experience are reasonably
strong, even if members leave rhe group 01' if rhe group has a hierarchic struc-
ture. To illuserate rhese ideas, \Ve \ViII use che example of rhe DAF where
officers with combae experience are considered differendy from rhose who
specialize in engineering, military serategy analysis or military adminisrrarion
(such as in rhe case of General Mohammed Touati, despite his perceived value
as a 'military brain').
FinaIly, \Ve will examine how econornic intereses of different clienreles may
lead to either conflicr or cooperarion. Clearly, aIl elans have a srrucrural interesr
in sustaining che sysrem rhar enables rhem te achieve po\Ver accumu]arion;
rherefore, in a renrier economy such as Algeria's, rhe intereses of privare
indllsrrialists and rhose of importers and distributors are not encirely hamlo-
nious. On rhe contrary, many of the dispuces taking place berween clans are
relared ro rhe type of public measures in place and wheeher ehey are beneficia]
or detrimental ro rhe main importers or induserialises. For rhis reason, ie is
logical rhar \Ve witness a cerrain tacocal complicity berween clans who will
benefit more &om imporraeion chan production and vice versa. Following che
same logic, each one of them will vie ro facilitate imporration in rheir sector,
\Vhether of weapons and rhe sectnity services, medicine, luxury producrs or
basic essenriaIs.
 r
52 RnJeI BI/stos nlld AI/relin lvJaii
Alliances between elites rake place amid facrions or clans who belong ro
primaIY elites and different secondaIY elires. A good example of the obscure ties
rhar unite some ro orhers is reflected in rhe rise to power of rhe magnare
Abdelmoumen Khalifa and his subsequent fall. During rhe 1990s, Khalifa
became rich overnight and saw his empire desrroyed juSt as rapidly - an empire
rhar was formed by banks, relevision channels, airlines and rravel agencies.
Khalifa is currentIy detained in rhe Unired Kingdom and awairing an exrradirion
order to Algeria. The collapse of Khalifa's crading represems, according ro
experts, the grearesr embezzlel11ent and prejudice inflicred on the Algerian state
by a privare company rhroughollt ies enrire history. According ro justice rribunals,
nor only 'Vould businesses of rhe Khalifa Bank (Banque Khalifa) have served ro
launder money and award certain loans to power figures, but capiral from the
bank would have been used by several Algerian public insaturions ro create
pension funds, since rhe renns offered by IUlalif..1 were more advamageous than
those of other banks (Werenfels, 2007: 190).
On another level, primaIY elite faccions collaborate and fornl alliances wirh
one another on fixed occasions, such as during the presidenrial election. Pre-
sidency is the state posicion, which, due to ies irnportance, cannor be achieved
withour powerfitl suPPOrt provided by prirnaIY elites. However, it does nor
mean that all dan s may provide the sal11e suPPOrt to the presidential candidate.
Sorne of thel11 may have been forced to give the go-ahead in order to reach a
collective solution, which will enable rhem to continue with their accumulation
gal11e, as in che case of Abdelaziz Boureflika's selection in 1999. Ifthe suPPOrt
of Larbi Belkheir and his clan was indeed decisive, other officers were not
totally convinced. This was due ro Boureflika's previous role as an ambitious
and difficulr-~o-bridle politician, arnong other factors. Moreover, once the
infonllal presidenrial election is over, certain clans can question irs legirinlacy and
iniciate a strategy of armaon to force the current presidem's exit or resignarion.
This is precisely what happened in the case of Presidenr Liamine Zeroual
(199+-99), who - forced imo a comer by many pressures in addiaon ro the
rnurder of several of his close collaborarors (Benhamouda among thel11) -
announced further elections and his resignation trorn the electoral process.
Zeroual could undeniably reIy on the suPPOrt of General Mohamed Berchine's
clan and of the Clinton administration in the USA; however, certain evenes -
principally the sabotage (with negociations camed out in parallel) of initiatives
ro negociate his exit - convinced him of the futility of goveming the sta te ..:!5
A good example of alliances bet\Veen primary factions and secondary elires
may be fOllnd in the presidency of Abdelaziz Boureflika. Despite coming to
power wirhout excessive support &0111 primaIY clans, his presidency was con-
solidated thanks to the internarional support nerwork he had bllilr during his
golden exile, while working as a consultanr for cornpanies from the Persian
Gulf rhar \Vere established in Europe. Boureflika did nor rrust political parties
and continues not to trust them to rhis day (including his o'Vn parry, rhe FLN);
therefore, he escablished non-partisan networks of presidemial support, rhe
well-known 'popular' platforms, which he would use both in 1999 and 2004,
A{geric/: post-colollial pOl/Jcr strllctlfre 53
and \Vhich \Vere ledoby local elites, dignitaries, tribal chielS and rural religious
aurhoriries. Rural Islam administratively represented by rhe National Association
of Zawiyas has remained faithful through the years, being active in electoral
campaigns in exchange for generous donations and public aid (\IIerenfels, 2007). In
rhe foreign sphere, Bouteflika's presidency has strong parrners in large multinacional
companies, mainly frOI11 the Unired States and France, as \Ven as in the govem-
l11enes of rhese countries. Regionally speaking, his center of graviry is rhe Westem
area of rhe region of Tlemcen and Tiaret, from where Abdelaziz Belkhadem,.:!6
Mohanmled Bedjaoui, Larbi Belkheir and BouteAika themselves originare ..:!7
Rclatiolls lVitlJ foreiglZ elites
The rwo linchpins of the relaronships between che Algerian elites and the
foreign sphere have tradirionally been the relarionships between the Algerian
elites themselves, depending on whether their groups are inside the country or
in exile, and rheir relationship with the French elites. As Roberts (2003)
explains, some relations wirh foreign elites have been fonned rhrough the
exiled members of powerful factions, who had lost their power in the srruggle
for srate control.
According ro Roberts, rhe extroversion of faccional confticr in Algeria ac the
beginning of rhe 1990s resulted in intemationalizarion of the AIgerian conflicto
This change could be explained by d,e fact rhat, at the beginning of rhe 1990s,
for che very firsr time in independent Algeria's history, it \vas the state and nor
che factions in exile which sought foreign backing, so thar extemal contacts
couId intervene or ar least give rheir opinion on Algerian politics. This inter-
nacionalizaron is reflected in che appearance of three new groups of agents on
the Algerian polirical scene: a) the foreign states; b) NGOs (human rights and
mediacion associations, such as the Saint Egide's cOl11muniry) and public opinion,
especialIy since the agreement \vith the IMF signed in 1994; c) internacional
economic enticies and orher foreign economic agents. The consequence is
double. On the one hand, rhe point of view of foreign actors on what goes on
in Algeria is becoming increasingly important, and chus Algerian actors begin ro
worry abotIt mainraining and using rhese relacions in the domesrc sphere. On
the orher hand, che Algerian political arena beco mes more internaaonaIized
and what takes place in Algeria starts to fonn part of rhe internacional agenda.
This alters Algeria's o\Vn national poJitics and strategy, as \Vell as 1110difying the
in te rventio n of exremal actors in irs economic and poliacal life. The summit of
this change seems ro be the rransnationalization of poltical and economic
Al genan networ ks.-'8
For historical reasons, the scrongest relarionships have existed and concinue to
exist wirh the French elites. The relationship frame\Vork is complex and ir is
developed through mediation from the Algerian cOlTIl11uniry living in France
(eight million Algelians and one million with dual nationality).
It is aIso construcred through business cies wirh Algeria held by rhe afore-
mencioned coml11unity and other French nationals, since Algeria is rhe first
 54 Rnfel Bllsros nlld Allrelin Mall
importarion marker for Franee in Africa. T he importance of French intereses
within rhe Alge Lian elites has been feeding che idea of '/izb al-ji"(Jl/Sa', or che
Parey of Fra nee. During che post-revolucionary era, [hose \V ho \Vere accused of
belongillg [Q '/iz b n/{mllsn' could be persecuted by the poli tical and espio nage
police. Le. che military's securiry service. Over time, chis pri ncipaUy po1iacal
accusation has become economic and cultural, while skillfully taken advantage of
by the (slamist sec tions (e.g. the F1S). It is directed at the elites who own busi-
nesses in Fr.l11ce, who send eheir children te 5eho ol [hefe and lcad a European
and ostentatious lifesryle (see ]off, 1995 , among others).
Relations between Algeria and Franee have J10 [ bee n srr:lighrforward since
AJgeria \Von independence, \Virh severa) pending afTairs, such as French citizens'
claims for compensation, or demands from the Algerian authorities for the
retum of colonial archives, many of w hich are still in Franee. There are also
c1aims regarding more sensitive issues surrounding che praetice of torture during
che war and the massaeres perpetrated againsc Algeri an demonstrators in Serif
(1945) and Paris (1961). The nationalization of hydrocarbons, decided in 1971 ,
also creaced a siruation of bilateral crisis, as did che c10sure of borders to
AJge ri an \Vorkers, decreed by France in 1973 due to rhe economic crisis.
Howeve r, rhis has nor prevented rhe continuarion of importam rechnicaJ,
cornmercial and even milirary reIarions.::!9 From rhe eighties o nwards, relarions
between che r\Vo coumries improved considera.bly under the respecrive pre-
sidencies of Fran~ois Mitterand and Chadli Bendjedid, who shared great personal
undersranding.
T h is improved political situation also broughr improvemem in rhe
commercial and eco nomic cIimate, resulting in an enonnous increase in
Algeria 's conulfercial deficic to France caused by a gro\Vrh in impares, the fall in oil
prices and a drop in th e value of rh e do llar. Algelia chus found itself in massive
debr and, as a last resort, rumed ro the IMF for assisra nce.
Fra.nce's positio n - or ro be more precise the posirioll of its co mmercial and
financial networks susraining businesses in Algeria - became imponam durill g
what is known as the 'Algerian spring' (1988-92). There is proofthat these sectors
did not bestow rhe support necessary for Mouloud Hamrouche, a refonn minister,
ta indeed carry out 'his' refonTIS. In facr, resisrance came from borh sides, since rhe
companies from AJgeria 's public secto r, which enjoyed stable relations with
rheir French partners, did nar desire a change of situarion eirher (Bustos, 2004).
Anorher sign of discon tent in relation ta rhe evems taking place in AJgeria, in
particuJar the FIS's electoldl advance, carne fiom rhe French media, who projected
an aJamusr image of rhe polincal evolution. This c1imace of opinion, manipula red
by che AJgerian Anny and relayed by orher international media, such as the
Fillal/cial Til/lcs, paved che way for a coup d'cac (Buscos, 2004).
H owever, possibly che most decisi ve moment of French influence occurred
when the electoral process was annulled in j an uary 1992. Such a decision couid
nor be made wirhollt cons ulting and infonning the French authori ties before-
hand. The aim of Larbi Belkheir's trip ro Paris in janll'Jly 1992 \Vas preciselv
this: ro consult the French governmenr and return wich their go- ahead, as weiI
Algerin: posr-colollial pOII'cr sl/1/[(llr, 55
as a promise of French non-inrervention \Virh regard ro decisions raken by the
military juma (Naylor, 2000).
Subsequen tly, duri ng Zeroual and BoureRika's presidencies, rhe presence of
the USA grew, fim with th e presidency of C lin ton (duting ZerouaJ's m le)
followed by that of G. W. Bush (during Bouteflika's rule). This alliance or
foreign suppon \Vas ro be consolidated from 2001 wirh rhe launch of BllSh 's
'War on Terror'. H owever, rhe stan of this increased American presence and
influence in Algeria can be t!.lced back to rhe beginning of che 1990s. These were
rhe years during \Vhich refonn of the law o n hydrocarbons \Vas prol11ulgated :md
the smctural adjusone nt program (SAP) adopted (1994-99). Both f~crors led ro the
opening of Algeria's producrive secrors ro che olltside world. Oil companies,
pareicularly Anadarko \Vith ies logistic branches (Halliburton, Bechtel), have
realized major discoveries of hydrocarbon deposirs since thar time - ro the
extenr that American investment in AJgeria has been more unportanr rhan
European invesrmenr for several years now (Mai'l Esrrada, 2006a).
AJgeria's business relations \Virh Spain and Ira1y (rh e gas industry) and wirh
the USA (the oil industry, impores of se molina and food produces), as well as
milirary coopeldrion \Virh rhe laner. have consideldble influence on ies rel ations
wim rhese countries. In rhe case of Spain, \Ve can duly speak of inrerdependence
(i.e. mu tual dependence) (Mali and Lorca, 2007), w hil e, in relario n to the
USA, \Ve can \Vitness a growing influe nce on A1geria (i.e. acknowledged impor-
rance of rhe American oil market plus oil cechnology and military coopeldtion),
sin ce ir is obvious that AIgeria cannot condirio n American politics. However,
Algeria do es have influence in Washington chrough powerful lobbies of which
little infomlation is kno\Vn.
Chakib ]e1il, SONATRACH CEO (Chief Execuove Oflicer) and the current
Minister for Energy, has be en spearheading Algeria's energy plans since 1999 .
He srudied engineering in Texas and has been closely linked ca rhe main
Algerian-Anlerican consortiums and ro contraces such as thar signed \Vith che
Valhyd Group, fOI" che production and disnibution ofLNG (Liquefied Natural Gas),
ar present the majar so urce of Algeria's hydrocarbons ncome. America's gro\Ving
presence in Algeria since 2001, has caused an.-xlous French political elires to
attempr to srrengthen meir nes as much as possible \Virh AJgerian authorities. A
prime example of this \Vas j acques Chira.c's congrarulatory trip ro AJger in 2004
before th e o ffi cial results had acrually bee n ann ounced.
lliflueuce 01 social IIJOl1Clllellts alld lIJe I'esultillg global dJ'IIamics
Thanks ro ies expetience in the War of (ndependence (MALG, the Minisrry of
Annament and General Liaison) and following the era of a single parry (MiJitary
Securiry), che AJgerian regim e now has at ics disposal an extrao rdinary capaciry
for infiltrarion, manipulation, provocation and disrortion. The discordant
Algelian rransition cannot be fully undersrood wirhout incorporacing this parti-
cular elemem and more specifically ies eftecr on the main organizing movement of
che time, the F1S - wirh ies Islamic Work Union (S IT) and irs nerwork of
56 RtifeJ Bustos nud Allrelin lvlnii
charities. Maniplllanon took place ar differem moments dllring rh ar era under
different guises and with diverse results: in October 1988, in May-June 1990
and once more before rhe elecrions in 1991 (Bustos, 2004). The mobilizanon
of a range of mass organizarions crea red by rhe single party, orchesrrared by rhe
regime, \Vas rhe detennining factor for electoral blockage Jnd the halr on
Algerian transron.
The operario n of these secret services (DRS &om 1990 on) has become
visible sin ce rhe so-called Berber crisis in 2001, during which an infLIrration of
rhe 'Arouch' movement took place and resulted in a division of rende ncies and
separare negonarions wirh rhe regime. In rhe first decade of 2000, several ex-
oflicers &om the Algerian secret service (N. Yous 2000, H. Soualdia 2001, H.
Aboud 2002, A. Tigha 2002 30 and M. Samraoui 2003) denounced one after
rhe other rhe DRS's infJtranon of rh e Islamist maquis to create criminal orga-
nizarions whose aim was ro discredit rhe AIS (Islamic Salvarion Amly) and rhe
Islamisr cause, eliciring their apparent responsibiliry for some of rh e mosr hor-
rendous murders of Algerians and foreigners.
Since 1995, but more specifically since 1997, we have witnessed the coop-
tarion of cemin Is!amist elites (MSP_HAMAS 31 ) by the regime, without
entailing any real political change; rhe regime is in control at aU times of rhis
cooptarion's modality (Hamladji, 2002; Werenfels, 2007). A good example was
the decision to exclude Mahfoud Nahnah, the MSP leader, &om a presidenrial
career in 1999 and to ask him instead ca support rhe insrirutional candidare
Abdelaziz BouteAika. His acceprance resulred in a blaranr electoral reprisal from
the MSP during rhe nexr elections, wirh a decrease in rhe nUl11ber of sears
(&o m 69 to 38) and intemal tension within the party.
Tradinonal aurhonties (tribal qaids and n1ral dignitaries) carry Out an impor-
rant fill1ction in eleccaral mobilization. This phenomenon of caciquism \Vas
idenrified in the elections of 1990 and 1991 (Cherrad, 1992) and in the previous
two of 1997 and 2002 (Djabi, 1998; Hachemaoui, 2003, 2004). The FLN
has dernonstrated in many electoral polls that it can mm te the electorate from
rhe inland areas of rhe country for suppOrt. Time afier time rhese fiefs hand
eOl11forrabJe vicrOlies, \Vith no surpnse, to rhe FLN. In sorne cases, rhis aIso
happens \Virh rhe RND, despite being a somewhar younger parry, which l11ainly
depends on urban bases. In the same respece, \Ve musr also remember ehar Kabyle
parties use similar reSOurces in their feudal domains in Kabylia ro attracr votes
(Layachi, 2004), or ehat independem candidares from cerrain areas (for example, rhe
Mzab) appeal ro crieena such as religious and communiry membership (exisrence
of Kharijite and Ibadi communiries) in order to be chosell.
Not al1 social groups are manipulared or coopted, however; on rhe contrary,
spomaneous or semi-spomaneous demonsrratiolls of proeese are frequent in
Algeria's recem history. As for the MRN-Islah party, it has kept i"elf relatively
separare from power, rejecring diverse invitations ro become parr ofthe governmem,
despire clearly owing its legal existence to the regime's consent.
The inconvenience for other movements of opposition or dissellc, wherner legal
(FFS, LADDH, MDA, etc.) or underground (MAOL,32 for instance), is that
.A(gelio: po,,-cololliol p011lel' sllT/C/llTe 57
rhey muse aet in secrer in order te avoid infiltration and manipuJation, which
forbids or makes any mobilization or organizarion difficulr on a large scale. le
rherefore eonspicuously diminishes their capaciry ro consrrain accumularion
srraregies of the elires, or the very operacion of rhe political syscem. The case of
the Algerian League of Defense for human righ" (LADDH) , which is divided
imo rwo wings, is sympromatic of chis diIemma. Hocine Zehouane, leader of
one ofrhe t\Vo wings, clings ro rhe organizarion's presidency, refusing ro follow
rhe imema! leaning towards reeleerion; to jusrify overlooking rhese demoeratic
mechanisl11s, he claims rhae che other wing has been infilrrated by rhe regime. 33
The power structure in Algeria
What we have seen in rhe previous secrions may be eharacrerized by three
main elemenrs:
The existence of an elire belonging te rhe same and sole soco-hisrorical
group. fragmented in irs 'occuparion' process of che staee.
2 One main and dominant accumulation resource frOJ11 which rhe ochers
denve (hydrocarbons income).
3 Fierce comperitive srrategies thar include rhe frequent use of violen ce in
relation ro both eompeting factions of rhe elire (physical eliminacion) and
asce nding social groups (infiltration, murder, mallipuJation).
This srructure relies on a primary elite divided imo dynamic factions who fight
te occupy rhe 1mb, the place where rhe Fenis \Vheel of power is acrivared,
where decision-making rakes place and in come streal11s are discribured and
redirecred. This central place is no other than che presidency irsel( AIchough
the presidenr is so me rimes presented as an arbirer between the facrions of an
elite, in f.1ct, he belongs to a clan himself; therefore, his funcrion will be both to
favor his immediate sphere (Tlemcen dan for insran ce) and ro maintain certain
equilibrium \Virh other dans, ar rhe risk of erearing excessive disconeem
among chem.
Occupying rhis central posirion on the Fems wheel also modifies che access
of peripheral elites to the spheres of decision-making. As Werenfels has pointed
our, rhese peripheral e1ires can move, depending on which primary actor occupies
the presidency, from rhe rhird ro the second circ1e of decision-making. Their
rescurces can also increase or decrease depending on these alliances. In other
\Vords, che relevance of peripheral actors borh in tenns of proximiry ro po \Ver and
of resources depends on rhe alliances ehey esrablish ,virh primary elites. In che case of
Algeria, considerable srabiliry in rhe composirion of primary elites as passengers
on che Fems wheel may be observed since, as \Ve have previously seen. aH
groups luve be en fonned in che same \Vay [or che last 45 years. At the same rime,
the existen ce of a unique plincipal po\Ver resource (hydrocarbons expIoirarion)
crystallizes che po\Ver strucrure, rhus making ehanges unlikeIy ro oceur in the
composition of pnmary elites. Hence, che mosr likely scenario is rhae secondary
r 58 Rtife! Buslos fllld AI/relia lHmi
elites neirher achieve amonomy nor sllcceed in encering rhe primary elites'
citele (an example of this is d,e weakness of the Khalifa grOllp).
In moments such as no\V - when che pl;ce of rhe oi! exceeds S100 per
barrel - a rapid acculllulation of capital and power takes place in AJgeria. By
contrast, when rhe expansive hydrocarbol1s cycle stops and recession begins,
tensions between f.1CtiOns intensify and ir is nO( rafe ro wirness a11 upsurge in
violence. Tensioos are even more acure when changes regarding rhe privileged
posirion of presidency are proposed \Virh urgency (as in rhe case ofBouteflika's
illness). Ir is rherefore unsurprising rhar random episodes of violence, whose
only apparent consistellcy is ro quesrion rhe authoriry of politicaI or military
leaders in one arca or anorher, periodically occur in Algeria. Private security COI11-
panies take advamage of rhis feeling of insecurity and have been making a for-
tune in Algeria,34 as well as in rhe Unired Srares;35 however, rhey are not rhe
only beneficiaries, sin ce on several occasions rhrears rowards foreign companies
ro leave rhe counny have quickly been capiralized on by companies from orher
countries (mainly dlOse with Chinese, Middle Eastem or Indian capital).
Apan from rhe use of violence and coacrion, one of rhe elites' srraregies for
sraying in power is conrrolled privarization and, aboye aH, the reconsrrucrion of
incorne rusrriburion mechanisms adapred to che new siruarion. Nowadays, che main
items of expenrurtlre are invesrmenrs in public construction and infrasffilccure
(exponential gro\Vrh of invesnnenr expendirtlre in rhe lasr few years36). Another
strategy that \Vas implemented in the mid-1980s, gained pace in the 1990s and
remains active roday is the intemationalization of elites, desctibed by Roborts (1996).
From 1990-91 onwards and wirh rhe second round of rhe elecrions can-
celled, main factions have runled ro internarional alliances, which generare a
completely new phenomenon in AJgelian political life. The very narure of
eompeting foro power is altered, since rhe botlndal)' between intemal and
external stmggles has blurred and AJgerian disputes are now parr of rhe inrer-
narional political and economic agenda. Each facrion of the regime makes use
of irs international alliances wieh rhe IMF, rhe USA, Fr.l.I1ce, major foreign
companies, rhe media , associarions for human riglus and foreign secret services,
etc. ro achieve ies internal aims.
Finally, che stracegy based on a strong capaciry ro penerrate, break and coopt
social movemems implies rhar rhe muy groups able ro act \Vith a certain freedom
are eicher social groups who function as rhe regime's mouthpiece or civic groups
rhar spontaneously trigger violenr riots, albeit isolared and wiehollt repercussion.
The resr of che opposition and resistance groups, limired by che ir underground
namre, by harassment or by exile, are ineapable of putting pressure on rhe regirne or
forcing it ro undergo any kind of opening up or politicalliberalization processes.
Future scenarios: leanings towards openness or
resistance to change
SenIcmral changes which may inftuence che political sysrem can be due ro the
(dis)appearance of acrors (for instance, secondary elires becoming primary); ro
At~,ria: post-colO/lal po""r ,(",c{JIre 59
changes regarding rhe importance of a particular resource; or to ehanges 111
allianee.
There are certain issues surrounding rhe role new sea re acrors can play in
rhe region, since rheir econonuc importance is likely ro carry on increasing. We
are referring here ro public and privare companies fi'om countries such as China,
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and India. On one hand, rhese companies are
taking advantage of rhe current oil tiow and rhe possibiliries of investmenr in
Alge ria. On the other hand, they are positoning th emselves te take advanrage
of rhe opening of a free rrade area with the European Union, inirialIy planned
for 2010. lf rhis free trade zone were ro be ereared, products .e xported from
Algeria and oeher counrries belonging te rhe euro-Medirerranean area would
enter European markers without any tax on custems. This possibiliry is causing
a real race between coumries ro pur rhemselves in rhe most advantageous
posi tion. However, it does not seem ae prese nc rhar a changeover in elites is
likely ro rake place, since the eonditions of instaUation and concession rhar
foreign companies must abide by continue te be dicrated by the Algerian elices.
Moreover, possible autonomy for secondary elites is still conditioned by oil
in come rhat by definirion is a centralized resource - even in rhe case of es
plivatizarion - rhus, it is always possible ro mm off the tapo
Ir is more likely rhar preexisnng resources wiII be transfonned befare oew
reso urces starr emerging. Such would be the case for hydrocarbons, especially
oil. Its public, Algerian ownership couId come ro an end, altbough chis ourcome
would depend on circumstances and oil prices. Since 1994, the rendency has
been ro lean ro\vards a deerease in [he relarive fiscaliry per barrel, i.e. the oil
price per barrel, which is nowadays camouflaged by high prices in faW oil and an
increase in producrion, deriving from the proliferation of foreign companies and
extraction zones (Ma, 2006b).
Another resource that could be modified is the finan ce associated wirh
hydrocatbons (petrodoHars), althol1gh in the Algerian case \Ve shol1ld be
speaking of 'gasodollm'. This reSOllrce eould beeome a ke y e1emenr in AJgerian
foreign policy rhrollgh giganric investmenr funds, Le. sovereign funds. The
example of the Kuwait agency lClO, weH eStablished in the USA and the
United IGngdom, and irs capacity ro inftuence37 North American Pllblic opinion
dllring the second Gulf War (1991) could be emulated by SONATRACH.
Such a resource, with a cencralized nature, wouId trigger new srnIggles
between Algerian elires for ies control and management.
On a differenc note, an immediare problem relared ro resources wiII be
rhe natural exhausrion ofhisroricalleaders. In fact, BouteAika is rhe lasc ofchose
hisrorieal leaders and none of che candidates looking ro succeed him enjoys
such a hisro rical legitimacy. With rhe disappearance of such leaders, rhe
nationalisr, modemist-developmenrist discourse is likely ro weaken, and ro
be replaced with a discourse more atruned ro the current phase of neoliberal
globalization, sprinkled wirh a certain dose of narionalism.
ill a cumulative result, che most likely scenario \ViII be continuation of che one
main income-distribution meehanism, something which, in rheory, prevents
60 R(/Je! BI/stos (/lId Al/re!i(/ lv[(//7
ahernanve economic and power sources from emerging. This could change,
however, if any of rhe following siruations were to occur: 1) an excessive
transfer of resources from the public sector to the privare sector or rhe Algetian
r A(geri(/: post-cololli(/f pOl/lcr stmctlfre
aurhoriries losing power; 2) an unbridled explosion of violence between clans;
or 3) rhe formarion of alliances wirh foreign interesrs, which will have become
too powerful. Ir is also possibIe rhat a rise in rhe number of actors who wanr a
piece of the in come 'pie' will make ir impossible to maimain rhe traditional
mechanisms of income disrriburion, ro rhe exrenr where they will have to
eirher face renewal or replacemenr by orhers. This process couId clearly creare
substanrial tension, thus pushing rhe political system to a position on the verge
of chao s and of war between clans.
As for the population and its possible intervention as a polirical actor, the
evolurion of such a situarion depends on the mass groups who receive indirect
income and who mainrain a certain distance from mobilization, far the time
being overcome with apathy ar fear or simply more concerned by their own
survival. To date, there is no movement ar group capable of motivating those
masses te take to the streets in an organized fashion, among orher reasons
beca use a radical populist option such as the FIS is still forbidden; however, it
could be presented under very different guises. In any case, while the oil cycle
continues to thrive, the greatest instability will come from Boureflika's succession.
In these circumstances, the military and the secret service have displayed great
political mastery_ But, if the situarion is accompanied by poliricalliberalizatian or
at Ieast by 'decompression', there couId be an opporruniry for social movements
to reasserr their aspirarions.
Notes
This anide is the result of funding by the Spanish Millistry of Education and Research,
through the projects 'Actores e intereses en las relaciones exteriores de Espaa con el
mundo rabe y musulmn' (CS02008-06232-C03- 03/CPOL) :md 'Espaa ante las
migraciones y las refomlas polticas en el Mediterneo y el Mundo Musulman'
(CS02008-06232-C03-O lICPOL). Our analysis is based on the Sociology of po\\'er
(see Izquierdo, 2008; and Izquierdo & Kemou, 2009).
2 Although there \Vas a traditional elite, it \Vas initially very eroded and marginalized by its
colonizer and then fragmemed during rhe process of independence.
3 As \Ve \Vill see, the differences bet\Veen f.lctions are due ca the distinctive trajectories
they follo\Ved during the state's 'occuparion'.
4 See Harbi (1993) fm an explanarion of tbe constitution of the FiN (National Liberation
Front) and che Etat M~or's seizure of power.
5 Ben BeUa, \Vho was president between 1962 and 1965, clme to power during the crisis
of the summer of 1962, aligning rumself \Vieh the Oujda f.lcrion (a Moroccan city near
the border \Vith Algeria) against the provisional government established in Alger.
6 Acronym for Socit Nationale pour le Transport et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures,
the National Algerian hydrocarbons society.
7 SEP: Rapport GnraJ. Second Plan Quadriennal, 1974-77, p.49.
8 We can define a rentier staee as one which generates oil-renrier economies or \Vhose
management of the hydrocarbons sector is camed out \Virh the poJitica! aim of achieving
ma.-cimum possible income from the subsoil, for its national residems. In these economies,
all che conditions are met: first, the economy is essentially one of exportation of crude oil
or natural resources. Second, ehe income- obeained from these exports is considered che
main instrument for public intervention, meaning that expenditure policies are intended for
the current system's legitimiz.1tion. Third, a non- productive economy is being created or
consolidated, characterized by che imponant role of the hydrocarbons sector, \vhich
6-1
fmances the services sector, a significant sector that feeds on either imported consumer
goods or 'petro-capital'. Finally, as a resule, evolution of che- main macro- economic
aggregaees depends on oil prices on the incemationa.l market. See Mai1 and De la
C:mllra (2005) for a more detailed analY5is of this subject.
9 For a more complete explanation on distributive institutions, see Vandc\Valle (1996: 210).
10 Source: MPAT: Syllf/f:sc dll ,ila collOluique el social de la dCCllllic -1967-1978; 1980.
11 Source: personal deduction based on ONS: Stalisliqucs, 35.
12 The 'impon-import' sector is a sarcastic denomination owed to Algerian humor but
\Vhich nonetheless refiect5 a tnte social phenomenon of the prolifer.uion of impon
companies, \Vhich only perfonn impon operations \Vithaut expomng anything in
exchange, hence the name 'import-import'.
13 The ENA (National School of Administrarian) played and still plays a relevant role in
the training of Algenan technocrats and high- ranking afficials, as ie also does in Fr,ll1ce.
14 The importance of the incelligencc service in state apparatus goes back to the Algenan
War of Independence when the MAiG (Ministry of Annament and General Liaisons) was
created. Many directors of the Algenan intelligence service and sorne imponant characters
fmm the politica.! and economic spheres were trained at the MAiG, among them Yazid
Zerhuni and Kasdi Merbah. See Bustos (2004: 156-60), the doctorate thesis by Jos Luis
Gmez Puyuelo (2005) and the article \Vritten by Nourredine Azzouz (2004). The btter
mentions a seminar on the MAiG, in which it was dedared chae tbree heads of govemment,
some twenty ministers and fifteen generals graduated from che MALG - the so-called
'Boussouf boys', named afcer the obscure character who founded the organization,
Colone! Abdelhafid Boussou( Following independence, he became a businessman.
15 We willuse the tenn 'bourgeoisie', since most auehors when mentioning this group use
it, alehough it is questionable that something similar to tbe concept of bourgeoisie as
defined by capiealist sta tes should exist in Algeria.
16 See the denunciacions presented by fonner Prime Minister A. Brahin in 1999 ayer the
alleged commissions on international transactions for an amount of S26 million, over a
period of twenty years - the equivalent of Algerian foreign debt ae that time (Bustos,
2004: 265 and 401).
17 Thanks to the peak in hydrocarbons prices, plans of investment have emerged again in
recent times reminiscent of che 19705. Since Abdelaziz Boutefiika's coming to po\Ver in
1999, large investments have been made, such as che- 'economic relaunch program' and the
'South program', which include imporrant activity in tenns of infrastructure, involving
three axes: employment, housing and territoria.! balance programs. These are the ctemal
aims of independent Algeria. See more infonnatian about tbese programs on the Algerian
govemment website: http://\V\V\V.cg.gov .dzldossiers.hem, last cal1Sulted on January 28th
2008.
18 Algeria \Vas number 56 in [he ranking of goods-imponing countries in 2005 and its volumc
ofimports grcw by 3.18 percent fmm S20,357 million in 2005 to S21,005 milIion in 2006
(Source: World Trade Organization and Algerian Minisuy of Commerce).
19 The main impon lines are basic food product5 (semoJina, milk and lamb), equipment (agri-
cultural and industrial), construceion and manufacruring materials. See updated statistical
infonnacion from the Algerian Ministry of Commerce at http://www.nncommerce.
gov .dz/fichiersl nots1 sem07. pdf
20 According to Transparency International's estimation in their 2007 repon, this evasion
would amount to S500 million; see this repare and also the arcicle by Smail Rouha in
L'Exprcssioll (September 27th 2007) 'Rapport de Transparency internacional sur la corrup-
tion. i'Algrie rtrograde a la 9ge place', at htrp:/ /\V\Vw.lexpressiondz.com Orher
Algerian sources, sllch as the Confederation of the Senior Staff of Financial Accoum:mcy
62 Raje' Bllstos afld Am'rfia A1aii
(CC FC), esrim:ttc that ir is 5900 million (Source: Blog of M o hamcd Benchikh, ex-edi tor
o f Le Matill, a newspaper banncd in Algeria).
2 1 Sec the 'Rcport o n the Budgets l aw' 2008 tO get an idea of the size of chis fun d, which
amoumed to 133,2-13,155,000 DA thar year, being rhe fo unh mosr imponam fund and
reprcsenting 8.4 percent of the lOcal opcrating budget. (nfonnario n ma)' be reviewed on
che Ministry of Economy and Finance websitc (http:/ / finances-a1g.ifumcc.com, Jasr
consuhed on Ju ne Isr 2008).
22 T he official defense budget in 2006, withour doubr lower rhan whar was really spent (since
it did nor include weapons purchases but onl)' openting e:\-pcnses), was l.8 billion (some
S4.6 billion) (Source: Chaliand and R ageau, 2007). The toeal cost ro A1geria of weapons
deals witb Russia berween 2006 and 2007 would amoune eo S 15 billion; see 'Nollveau
contrae militaire de 7 milliards de dollar.;' in Le Q/wlidiclI fI'Orall , March 3 1st 2007.
13 The martyrs' f.lmilies helong to t\Vo dierent associarions, The most important and
powerful of rhese is the National Organization of the Children of S!wl/(/da (1989), and rhe
second is the Nacional Coordination Platfo nn of the C hildre n of Slmllilda (1994); horh belong
ca the rcvolutionary f.muly, the lalter being Jess importailt, aJthough wirh the same aims.
24 In 1998, rhe popuJation under 25 years old represented 58.1 percent of rhe tmal,
accordin g ro the ONS (Office for National Statistics). In 2002, 33.5 percent of the
population was stillunder 15 years old, AW/(Irio IllIenlllcmal CIDOB 2006 (2007: 55 1) .
25 Some observers have mentioned rhar the murder of Lounes Matoub, rhe KabyIc popular
singer, which occurred in strange circumstances in 1998, \Vas rhe trigger fo r President
Lialninc Zeroual 's rcsignauon.
26 AbdeJaziz BeJkhadem comes fram a f.mlll}' from Lhagouat (a city situated in rhe Algerian
central steppe), wlto settled down in Tiaret (Wesr) - an arca he has been eIected to
represent as a dep uey in parliament.
27 Yarid Zerhouni, the Minister of Do mesuc Aff.lirs, is a similar case; originating from a
family frol11 the West of rhe country (flemcen) but rcsiding in Morocco, where the
currcm president was bom.
18 The idea of transnationalization is exrracted from Perthes' paper (2004a), in which he
cxplains rhar BoureRika has broadened his margin of mal1euver in rhe f.1ce of rhe 'generals',
through his rdationsh ips wirh international financing compa!ues and big transnational oil
groups, \Vho' provide their support.
29 For an example, please see FrJnce's use of the aromic base ar Regan and rbe maritime
base at Mars eJ-Kebir, which \Vere re tumed ro Algcria ar the end of the 19705 by virtue
of secret clauses [mm rhe E\~an Agreements. On anotber note, the AIgerian secret service has
sustained good reJationslups wirh es French counterparts from the DST, and figures such
as Be lkheir maintain longstanding personal contacts.
30 Abdelkader Tigha's testimon}' was relayed by Amaud Dubus, a joumalist from LibmrillJl,
and published December 23rd 2002 (see Dubus, 2002).
31 The ne\V Iaw o n panies 1997 makes HAMAS - acron)'m for Movemem for an Islamic
Socie cy - remove a11 Islamic references; ir then bccomcs Movemem fo r rhe Socieey of
Pcace, MSP.
32 Dissidenr group &om rhe military whose headquarters are in Madrid. The acronym
MAOL stands fo r 'Mouvemenr Algrien des Officil!r.; Libres' (Algerian Free Officers'
Movement, Imp://www.anp.org). Such a group, a minority and in exile, has nar be en
included among rhe actors w ith mobilization capadty in rhe previous section.
33 Sec, for example, the foliowing article: 'Situation indice au niveau de la LADDH
Hacine Zchouane et Mustapha Bouchachi se disputcnr la prsidence', November 3rd
2007 and also rhe edition of El W(I((I// October 29th 1007, at www.alge ria-watch.org/ fr/
mf\' /mrvra p / Iaddh _ im p lose .IHm
34 See 'Terrorist Attacks in Algeria . .El Dondo for Westl!m Security Companies' bv Bemard
Schmid in rhe Qalltrlrn NClI'slclIcr, October 5th 2007, ar h ttp://ww\V.qanta~.de. last
cOllSulted November 9rh 2007.
Afgcrin: post-c%llial pOl/lcr Stn lCTIlfC 63
35 The USA pwvide a \Vide anti-terrons< pwgram to the Sahel Coumnes and [he North
Africans (currencly Trans-Sahara Coumer Terrorisr Initiative , TSCTI).
36 Budge[ Act 2007 ar Imp://fi nances-alg. ifrance.com.
37 An aspect frequentl)' forgonen in rhe analysis o frhe so-called oil econolnies is the possible
influenee of 'rhe mone}" of oil. For more infonnation o n chis factor, see Panaspomprasr
(2005).
Bibliography
Ayubi, N. N. (1988) 'Arab Bureaucracics: Expandin g Size, Changing Roles', in Dawisha, A.
and Zartl11an, I. W. (Eds) Bc}'olld Coercioll. 17/C Dumbilit)' oJ tite Arnb Statc, Croom Helm Ltd,
Kem, R.U., pp. 14-34.
- -(1998) PoltiCCl y socicdad CII Oriclllc Pnb:imo. /.. hiperlrofia del cstado mbe (Original edition
O"crstmillg rhe Arab Srnrc. Polilics al/(/ Socicl)' ill lite Middlc ECI5t, Tauris, 1995), Bellarerra,
Barcelona.
Azzollz, N. (2004) 'Le MALG se penche sur sa propre histoire. Mettre les archives i la disposition
des chercbeu rs ', Le Quoridic/I d'Omll, December 15th 2004, Orn.
Benyo ub, R. (2002) L'AJlJlllairc politiq/lc de !'Algric, 4th edition, 1st ed. 2001. ANEP, Argel.
Bustos, R. (1004) El cambio poltico CI! Argclia (1988- 1992). A"lisis sistmico de filia
tmllsieiII discortlalltc_ Doctoral thesis. Depanamento de Derecho Internacio nal Pblico y
Relaciones Internacionales. Director S_ Persehen. Universidad Complutense de Madrid ,
Madrid.
- - (2007) Ficha Elcctofdl TE/M. Argelia/Legislativas 2007. Observatorio clecrora.l TEIM ,
Universidad Autnoma, Madrid, consultable en hnp: //www.uam.es/TEIM
Carusse, M. (2006) 'Ordonner, classer, pcnser la soci r: les pays arabes au prisme de l'conomie
politique', in Picard, E. (Ed.) Ll politiqr/e dam le /IIol/dc arabe, Annand Coli.:n, Pans, pp. 215-38.
Chali:md, G. y J.-P. Rageau (2007) Atlas Slmtgiqr/C, Complexe, Pans.
Cherrad, S.-E. (1992) 'lections municipales er lgislatives en Algrie. Les scrutins du 12juin
1990 et dll 26 dcembre 199 1', Laboratoire de Gographie rurale, Universir P aul Valry,
Monrp11ier.
Djabi, A (1988) ICCliolls: L'tClt cr 111 socit (rabe). Casbah ditions, Argel.
D ubus, A. (2002) 'Les sept moines de Tibhirine enlevs sur ordre d'Alger. Abdelkader Tigba
dcrir le role de la Scurit miliraire et ses licns avec les Grollpes islamistes anns'. Lil,ralioll,
December 23rd 2002, Pans.
Gmez Puyuelo, J. L (2005) Ejrcito }' podcr poltico ell Argelia (1954-1978). Doctoral thcsis.
Departamento de Hisroria Contempornea. Din:CtQr Pedro A. Martnez Lillo , Universidad
Aut noma de Madrid.
Haeh emaoui , M. (2003) 'La reprsentation poli tique en Algrie. Entre mdiarion d ientlairc
ct prdation' , RCI'lIcJmll(ailc dc sacllcc politiquc, 53, 1, Paris, pp. 35-73.
--(2004). 'la dhifa dans le jeu lectoral Ksourien', Naq d. Re/l/lc d'lIIdes et dc crjriq//c sorialc,
Autumn/Wintcr, 19/20, Argel, pp. 19- 26.
Hadjadj, D. (2001) Comrplioll CI dmocmrie CII A~nc. NOllvelle edition, La Dispu te/ SNEDIT, Paris.
Hamladji, N . (2002) Co-optatioll, ReprcssiOJ/ 111111 Arrtl/OlltCIllCII/ R cgime's SUnllml: TI/c Case oJ the
Islall/{sl A'SP-Hallllls i" A!geria, EU1 SPS 2002/07, Instituto Universitario Europeo, Aorencia.
Harbi, M. (1993) . Le FLN. Miwge el ralit, NAQD/ENAL, Argel.
International Crisis Group (2003) L'Algn'c: Agi/a/io/l et impassc ell Kabylic, 15, ICG, Bruselas,
Jun e 10th 2003.
Izquierdo Bricbs, F. (2008) Poder y .felicid(/d. UI/a propuestll dc sociolog{a del poder, Madrid. La
Catarata.
64 RnfeJ Bwfo.s alld A "reJia i\l/ml
Izquierdo Brichs, F., and Kernol! , A. (2009) 'La so ciologia del poder en el mundo rabe
contcmporneo'. In Izquierdo Brichs, F. (Ed.) Poder J' regmenes ell el IIH/lldo rabe
conremporllCo. Barcelona, C IDOB / Bellaterra.
j oJ1e, G. (1995) 'Alge ria: T he Failure ofD ialogue', The Mitld/c East I1l1d \'on/ AJrim Yel1rhook
1994, Europa Publications L(d., London, pp. 3-13.
Kalyvas, S. N. (1999) '\Vaneon and senseless? The ogic of massacres in AIgeria', Rariona/it}'
(I//d Socict}', Vol. 11 , no. 3, Comell Univcrsity, pp. 243-85.
Kicnle, E. (2001) A Gmlld Dclllsiol/: Dcmocmc)' alld EC{l/IOmic Rljilflll ill Eg}'JJt, 1.8. Tauris,
London.
Ko m:, j. (1984) Socialisme et r!co/lomie de la p/lllrie, M. Lavigne (rrad.), Economica, Paris.
Layachi, A. (2004) 'Ethnicit et politique en Algrie. Entre l'inclusion et le particularisme berbere',
Naqd. Rellllc d'mdes et de critique socialc, Autumn/Winter, 19/20, Argel, pp. 27- 54.
Leca, ]. and Vatin, j.-e. ("1979) L'ANerie poliriq/lc: lllStitllliollS et rgime, PUF, Pars.
Liabes. D. (1982) 'Sur la bourgeoisie prive', Les Temps Moden/cs, no. 432-33, Paris, pp. 108-31.
Ma Estr.lda, A. (2006a) 'la econona polioca del secrorde hidrocarburos en Argelia: elementos
estructurales y cambios recientes', C/mles de 111 ecolloma mlllulia/, 6th edition, Madrid.
- - (2006b) 'Argelia: retomo al nacionalismo energtico?', ARJ (Anlisis del R eal l/lstillao
Elcallo), R eal Instituto Elca.no, September 19th 2006, Madrid.
Ma , A. and De la Cmara, e. (2005) 'Is Russia drifting to\Vard a rcntier economy?',
Easten EI/ropellll Eco/lomia, Vol. 43, no. 5, pp. 49-76.
Ma, A. and Lorca, A. (2007) 'fii ca del Norte: su importa ncia geopoltica en el mbo unkno wllS, rh e same parame ters of instabiliry, the same unresolved struccural
energtico', DT11 / 2007 del R IE, 8olet/u del R/E, no. 91, Madrid.
Martinez, L. (1998) l gl/erre cil'ile ell A lgn'e, Ka.rthab, Paris.
Marx, D. (2007) Ficha electoral TElM, Argelia/Locales 2007. Observatorio Electoral TErM,
Universidad Autnoma de Madrid, consultable en http://www.uam.es/TEIM
Naylor, P. (2000) Frallce aud A~eria. A Histm")' <1 DecO/Ollizntioll aun Tmllifomll1ti(lIl , Univcrsiry
of Florida Press, GainesviUc.
Panaspomprasit, e. (2005) US-Kllwait RelatioJ/s, 1961-92. nll Ulleruy Relatiollslu]), Routledge,
London. '
Perthes, V. (2004a) 'Looking Ahead: Challcnges for Middle East Politics and Research'.
EllroMeSCo Papcrs, No. 29. Volker Penhes (coord.)). Stiftung W issenschaft und Politik,
Berlin, April 29th 2004: Imp:/ / www.euromesco. net/ inclex.p hp?opoon=coll1_co nrent&
task=view&id= 174&Itenud=48&lang= fr)
--(2004b) Arab Elites: Negotiatillg the Politics of ClwlIge, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, Colorado.
Roberts, H. (1996) 'Ooctrinaire Economics and Political Opportu nism in th e Str:ltegy of
Alger:i:m Islamism', in Rued)', j . (Ed.) lslmllism all Seclllan'sm ;11 Nort" -4fn'Cil, Macmillall
Press L{d . and Centre for Conrempor.uy Arab Studies, Georgctown Unive~i ry, Basingstoke,
Hampshire, R.U., pp. 123-48.
--(2003). TIle Baulcficld oJ A(geria (1988- 92). SfIldies;'l 11 BriJkm Polil}', Verso, London.
Snchez Andrs, A. (2006) 'Relaciones politico-econmicas entre Rusia y los Pases del
Narre de frica', OT No. 2212006 dd Real Instituto EJcano, Boletn del RIE, no. 77,
Madrid .
Te rnlali , Y. (2003) 'La revolte de Kabylic o u I'histoire d'un gach.is', COlljlflCII(CS Meditcrralle,
45, Spring, Paris.
Valldewalle, D. (1996) Non/ Afrim. DCllclopmcll1 alld Rifonu ill a C/Jal/gi//g G/ovlIl ECO/IOIIl)',
St Martill' s Press, N ew York.
Werenfels, r. (.2007) MmJagillg Illstabilir}' ill A lgeria. Elites mul Polit;w/ C/lIIlIge since 1995,
Roucledge, London / New York.
3 Whither Algeria? Two
normalizations, three unresolved
crises and two crucial unknowns
"n Nlart/l
Whirher Algeria? This quesrion, already posed in rhe rirle of a book by
Mohamed Boudiaf published in 1992, remams unresolved twe llty years later.
Boudiaf, l a charismaric figure &om the War of Independence, \Vas murdered
shorrly afrer being app oimed as Presidem of rhe High Srare Council (i.e. Head
of State). fu analysts, \Ve are [1eed wirh rhe same predicamenr as Sisyphus;
eonfronred by idemieal unresolved factors year afrer year - rhe same
challenges and rhe same stagnarion. ::!
At the end of2009, AIgeria's idJe foreign currency reserves were worrh more
rhan $148,000 million, as Presidem Abdelaziz BoureAika starred his rhird five-year
mandare (to lasr unril 20"14) - follo wing constitucional refonn in November
2008 ro allow him ro run for a third term, and presidenrial eleccions in April
2009, which he \Von \V ith 90.24 percent of the voces. A twenty-year cyc1e,
which had begun wirh rhe popular riors of 1988, rh us came ro an end. The
slump in international hydrocarbons prices since 1986 had left che Algerian
state on rhe verge ofbankruptcy, du e ro ies incapaciry to pay back extemal debt
and che resulcing deterioration of che population's living condirions. The
Consrirurion of 1989 followed nexr, w hich acknowledged polirical pluralism
and the emergence of the FIS as an lslamist polirical party \Virh a real chance of
winning che eleccions, However, these prospects were aborted by che military
coup in january 1992, plunging Algeria imo civil war an d causing between
150,000 and 200,000 dearhs in rhe five years rhar followed, and leading Algeria
ro be remporarily included in rhe list of failed srares in rhe region. Abdelaziz
Bouteflika's victory in che elections of 1999 as [he firsc civil president in che
coumry's history entailed a dual normalizanon.
Two normalizations
The [rse nonnalizarion concem ed securiry conditions in che coumry, Wich che
1999 Civil Concord Law and the National Charrer for Pea ce and Reconciliarion,
approved by referendum in 2005, the situation moved from generalized vio-
lence typical of civil war to comrolled violen ce in the fonll of terrorist attacks,
similar to, if more frequ enr [han, those experienced by ocher coumries, \Vi th a
66 lvAIl l\t[ar,"
limired nllmber of viceims (che number of viccims has never exceeded one
rhousand per year since char poine) and an incrementalIy reduced nllmber of
guerrilla fighrers and rerrorisrs.
The second nomlalizarion \Vas politica1. Firsr and foremosr imemal nonnalization,
with a 'process of inscimtionalization' entailing che progressive escablishment of a
presidencial regime centralizing all po\Ver. This centralization has been taking
place ae the expense noe only of political parries Jnd civil society - including
rhe once po\Verful crade unions - buc of the milicary as \Vell, wieh periodic
pluraJisr elections whose principal aim is co perpenlare rhe regime in po\Ver. Wirh
his recenr electoral victory, Abdelaziz Bollteflika, who was forrnally presenced as
an 'independenc' candidare buc was, in facr, supporred by che rhree mose vored-for
parries, plltS Algeria on the same level as other policical regimes in rhe region,
such as eh ose of Tunisia or Egypr. Bue rhere is external nonnalization as \VeU,
wirh rhe end of rhe moral embargo imposed on Algeria by che internarional
community and rhe fun incorporarion of rhe councry as a straregic parrner in rhe
fight against internacional cerrorum in che aftennarh of rhe attacks of Seprember
11 th and the symbolie signing of the Assoeiaoon Agreemem with the E U in 2002.
From 1999 onwards, the po ce of oil inereased from just S19 ro over $150
per barre! in early 2008, before falling again to close ro 550 as a consequence of
rhe global econonuc crisis and rhen srarting an up\Vards crend again due flrst to che
pressures of emerging markees demand and rhen to rhe uneertainties of rhe
Arab Spring, in particular in Libya (S90 by the end of 2010 and $110 by May
2011); A1geria d1US eompleted a fuI! eeonomie eyele. A1though the eountry
comes oue of this cycle viffilally wirhour any external debe lefi: to repay and irs
incemanonal financia] solvency fuUy reesrablished, AJgeria has noc solved any of
rhe daunting economk challenges olltstanding: ies internarional economic
inserrion and rlle competitiveness of ts industrial and agricu!nlral producrion
sectors; the excensioll of ies infornul economy; sl11uggling and corruprion; rbe
implemenrarion of an efficiem market economy and che ercarion of employ-
mene prospeces for rhe largest generation of youngsrers in its enrire hiStory.3 From
chis perspective, \Ve may \VeU refer to 'the losr decade of development' in Algeria.
Abdelaziz Bouteflika himself aeknowledged the beginning of a new era in
December 2008 during a visir to rhe province of Ghardaia: \ve muse face up to
a \Vorld financial crisis. Afrer years of opulence, \Ve are going ro f..1ce leaner
times thae we have to handle \Vich precaution. Th e srare will need to be rig-
oratls in es management of rhe counrry's affairs. I am appealing to all Algerians
and asking them to righten cheir belts and roIl up rheir sleeves.'
According ro rhe \Vords of another researcher, 'some of che conditions which
comribured to rhe ollthreak of conflict in rhe 1990s are still present ar che
beginning of (he twenty-first cencury [ ... ] rhe options wh icb ha ve been
chosen [ ... ] have only conrributed to reinforee che slatl/s q/to and possibly ro
posrpone fresh outbreaks of Islamisr violence'' or social violence.
Againsr chis backdrop, Algeria's prospeces in che medium teml, as a counny
thar is abollt ro celebrare che fiftierh anniversary of independence in 2012, are
anyrhing bU[ promising. les sociaJ srability and developmem fi.lOcrion will
W/ir/cr Algcrin' 67
essenti:tlly depend on how rhree unresolved ctises are handled, and will be
conditioned by t\Vo lInknown facrors crucial to its fllture.
Three unresolved crises
The firsc lInresolved crisis is economic. The Algerian economic 1110del is
unchanged since the 19905; Algeria has not sllcceeded in overcoming ts srructural
dependen ce on rhe hydrocarbons sector (which represents 98 percent of ies
exports, 70 percenr of sra re in come and 45 percene of GDP), es border \Virh
Morocco is srill closed and irs econol11y continues te be highly . dependenc on
imports and overly proteeted (A1geria is not a member of the WTO despit"
longstanding attempts ca join). Ir basically remains a rent-based economy,:l
alrhough rhe income from hydrocarbons, which is channeled through rhe srare,
has been complememed during rhe last decade by in come &0111 huge import
streams. Algeria's indusny is scarcely competicive and rhe hydrocarbons sector is
rhe only sector to be managed accarding to professiona! commercial cnreria
(despice widespread comlprion) . In fact, ir cannot even be said rhat a social
consensus on markec economy exisrs in contemp orary AJgeria, and mosr of che
people expecc che srare, nor rhe marker, ro provide for a job and/ or a living.
The second crisis on rhe horizon is social. In addirion to che lack of rene\Val
of dominant economic and polirical elites, as described in rhe previous chaprer,
we must add a Jack of prospecrs and the majority of the population's growing
disaffection towards ies coumry and irs political elire. The local popular 'micro-riots'
criggered by issues relaring to living condirions (access [Q housing and public
employmem, cues in rhe warer supply, abuses of auchority and wage le veIs, etc.)
have become a phenomenon of daily social violence (already in 2005, rhe
newspaper Le QJlotidicl/ d'Orall wem so far as to nominate rhe EllICJltiCf II/COI/lIII,
the 'Unknown Rioter', as personaliry of the year, and in 2010 11,500 popular
revoles were counted chroughout (he councry). They are a direer expression of
gro\Ving social unresr and used ever more freque ntly as a mechanism of imeraetion
berween the popuJatian and rhe sra re ro convey people's social c1aims and to
ger specific concessions from rhe stare. Indeed, in 2011. Algeria \Vas rhe fiest
Arab eOllntry to be hit by popular revolts unpreeedented sine e 1988, resulong
in five dearhs and hundreds of wounded, bur, unlike Tunisia and larer Egypr. rhese
did nor join inco a nation-\Vide l110vement and did not induce a regime change.
The social crisis is being fed by rhe situation of rhe job market; more than
1,200,000 people are unemployed, with youth unemployment rates higher
than 30 percent among men and 57 percent among \Vomen. The currenr
demographic dynamics make rhe crearion of 300,000 new jabs per year an
absolure necessity in rhe nexr cen ro fif(een years onJy in order ro absorb
growrh of rhe labor force, and this in an economy registering around 30 percent
infannal employment. In rhe midst of the oil boom, the momhly minimum
wage is fixed at El20 and average wages have been consisrently reduced over
rhe Jasr t\Vo decades. A recent sunrey sho\Ved rhar half of yaung men aged
between 15 and 29 and one ouc of rhree you ng \Vomen of che same age \Vere
68 J"/l 11;Jart{/l
thinking of leaving che cou mry.6 The Algerian migrarory crisis is yer ro break
and years will pass before renllS such as ltittista, IlOgra and harraga mighr be banished
from Algeria's social vocabulary (rern1.'i meaning, respectively, 'wall-holders', rhe
young generation of unemployed men \Vho spend their time on rhe srreets;
Stare contempt rowards rhe citizens, exclusion; and clandestine emigrams who
bum rheir ID papers so as nor te be idenrified when rhey leave). Thus, rhe
econonUc and social inregr.:aion of young peopIe and of ",omen (with a Jabor
parricipacion rate of onIy 15.1 percent of working-age women) will be rhe
cornerstone of social cohesion in Algeria in rhe decades ro come. Other variables
in rhe narional equarion rhar wil! need ro be raken inro account are rhe Berber
issue, which is far [ram resolved, as weU as rhe re-islamizarion oflarge secrors of
society and parts of the Pllblic sphere.
The rhird and final un resolved crisis in AJgeria is political. The rwo fonner
presidencia! rern1S of Abdelaziz Bouteflika have served ro deprive politica! patries of
any mobilizarion capaciey as wen as ro demobilize civil sociery and co ncentrace
a11 fonns of power in che presiden r. Today's policical c1ass remains unchanged
smce independence \Vas achieved; rhe generation from rhe War oflndependence
(195 4-62) continues ro rule the political landscape, in a counrry where more
than 60 percent of its population is under 30 yeaL> old. This political group
mee es \Virh discredit reflected in the growing absrenrion rare, which cuhninated
in 2007 wieh a participation raee of only 25 percent in the legisJarive elections
(rhe majoriry of observers and even rhe independenc Algerian press stated thae rhe
74 percent parricipation rate announced for che presidencial elections of 2009
had been 'fubticated '). Political opposition parties either boycOtt elections
completely, considering them fraudulent, or are prohibired from taking pan in
them (as is the case of rhe Islamise mavements whose true elecroral potential,
following the ~xperience of 1988-92 and rhe civil war, is one of the grear
llnknowns of rhe AJgerian political system). Any attempr ro develop altematives
from wiehin the regime itself (as was the case of the candidature of fonller Prime
Minister Ni Benflis in 2004) has been aborted. Whar is even more serious is (he
disappearance of mechanisms for consrruceing social consensus w hich has taken
place over the Jasc fe\V years; ie is ehe refore difficule ro envision a political project
\Vhieh may provide a backbone ro a social and economic country project.
In response ro rhe \Vave of revol ts alld politieal ehange haunting che Arab
world, on Febmary 24th, Bouteflika suspended the srate of emergency in force
since 1993 (but kepc rhe prohibition of any demonscration in Algiers for 'securiry
reasons'). On April 15th, he announced a constitucio nal refOnll, including a
revamping of the electoral code and the parry la\V, as well as a review of the press
crimes law. But ioscead of convening a constitucional assembly, as demanded by
rhe opposicion or ntming ro existing representative politica! bodies, he entrusted
rhe Presidenr of rhe Senaee, Abdelkader Bensalah, on h1S personal capaciries, as
well as General Mohamed Touari, one of the masrenninds of rhe 1992 eoup
and his clase advisor, assisted by a 'cechnical commission', to consult wieh
political parties and civil society and submit his proposals to him, making clear
thar he would not tolerare rrespass of any 'red line'.
"""it"er il(gclia? 69
Two crucial unlqowns
This Ilotwithstanding, rhe t\Vo unknown s rhac ",i11 ultimarely deremline
Algeria's evolution durin g the upcoming ye~rs are bo.th exogenous. One is
related to the healrh of 74-year-old Abdelazlz Boutefllka, \Vho underwent a
surgical operation i" cxtrcJIlis in 2005 ro crear a ston~aeh ~lcer which some
believe is cancer. His reduced public appearan ces and 11Is obvlOusly poor health
condition during his twenty-minute TV speech announcing che constitucional
refoml on April 15th 2011 triggered aII the alanns again and made the issue of
his health a 'qlle5tioll d'ta,'. Bouteflika's trajectory is tighrly linked to the histoty of
independent Algeria and, beyond rhe issue of ~s succession, his disappearance
would rrigger the impending issue of a generatIOnal takeover, and of rhe very
nacure of rhe Algerian political syste m. le ",ould some how bring an end ro rhe
posr-independence era of narion-stat,e eons~lidation. a [ask BoureAika has
dedicated his life too There are many m Algena for whom the only hope of a
sweeping polieica! change relies on rhe wish of Bouteflika ~~ ensure a .Jas~ng
politica! legacy and complete his \York by m eaJ1S of a true polmeal nornlallzanon
through rhe consrintcional refoml he has undertaken.
The ocher unknown is linked ro rhe intemational prices of hydrocarbons,
wirhout any doubt the deciding variable for Algelia's level of economic, political
and social stabiliry. For decades, rhe in come from hydrocarbons has enabled the
AJgerian srate ca pastpone refonns and rransition from an administered economy
to a marke( economy, as well as ro preseO( the popuJarion with aJ1 illusion of
marerial wellbeing without any real prospecrs. Ar present, and taking inco
accounr the rarher positive prospeces of incemational hydrocarbon prices, there
is no reason ro believe rhe sintation in Algeria will not conrinue in this ",ay, as ir
has be en confinned by rhe developments in che economic policy in 2009-10. 7
Notes
1 0// va l'Algrie?, Editions Rahma, 1992. .,. " . .
2 See vin Mamn (2002), 'Adonde va Argelia?, In NIIO/lJI Arribe. no. 46,. WIIHer 2002,
pp. 47-59. Abridged English version: hup:/ / www.conRuences-rn cdltcrr.mee.com/
immartin / withcralgeria.htm . .
3 Sce van Martn (2003), 'Algeria's Poltical Economy (1999-2002): An ECOIlOllll C Solutlon
to rhe Crisis?' , 17/ejollf//nl ~r Nortll Afn'alll Stt/{lies, Vol. 8, ~rank C~SS, London, p~. 34-74.
4 See Laurencc Thieux (2007), Islamismo}' democriUill ell J"l.lgc!W, Frallcw}' Esfildos UllldosjrelZte ni
cOIiflicto, Ediciones del Oriente y del Mediterrneo, TEIM series no. 4, ~adrid, .z007, P', 402.
5 The example of Algeria as rencier sta tc is thoroughly :malyzed m Ferran IzqUIerdo
(2007), 'Poder y Estado rentisca t:n d mundo rabe', RCl'ista dc ESllldios III(cml1ciolll1lcs
Mc(lilerrt/lcos, no. 2, M ay-Augusc 2007.
6 Naccr-Eddine Hanullouda (2008), Le dsir Ile migrl1/i~" dlCz les jCI/IICS nlgliells. ~1I/l/rsc
micro-collomm'qrlc, CARIM Notes d'analyse ee synthcsc 2008 / 42. European UntWTSlty
Inscitute, Florence.
7 Ivan Martn (2010), 'Algeri3's Economic Nation3lism: Vintagc 2010', in IPRIS MnghrclJ
RClliclIl, no. 4, pp. 2-3, http ://w\Vw.ipris,org/ php/downlo:ld.php?6d=216
j

4 Morocco: the reinvention of an
authoritarian system 1
Laura Felill and lvI" Angustias Parejo
Introduction
One of cbe maio questions posed by academic lirerarure abolIr Moroeco is rhe
extent ro which rhe coumry has remained ::mchored ro daeed aurhorirarian
political stntcntres and rooted in a tradicional culture synonym of polio ea!
imffiobilism ; and t whar extenr es furure, lr rhe beginning of rhe tweoty-first
cenrury, mighr be similar to rhar of rhe firsr years of in dependen ce.
As Rmy Leve.u (1993: 50) decl.red .t the beginning of rhe 1990,: 'the
similarity of apparem stability in insrirurions and palitical symbols in Moroeco
roday and during che 19605 is amazing'. Much has occurred since rhen (the access
te rhe old opposition ca che government, rhe deach of Hassan 1I sllcceeded by
his so n Mohamed VI), buc in broad rem1S ir is a statem enr rhar remains relevant
today. The institucional organigram has remained practicalIy unaltered; the
monarchy still occllpies the superior vertex with vel)' Httle opposition. In many
ways, its Cllrrent control is more complere as there is little resistan ce from dissident
sectors; th e exertion of power has thus changed its fonns and methods, as so me
of ts fomler repressive pracoces are no longer needed.
A m odemizing evolution of the poltical culture, of sectors of the population
which 110W have access to educarian, of macroeconomic resrrictions and some
of rhe eonstraints of globalizarion has changed rhe appearanee of borh stare and
sociery wirhour, however, succeeding in acrua11y transfo nlling rhe piUars rhar
susram power.
The monarchy cu rrently conrrols securiry services, administrarion and rhe
judiciary; ir also esrablishes rhe mIes of rhe eeonomy (obraining imponant pri-
vate benefies) and conrrols rhe government rhrough differem meehanisms. Ir is
not rhat rhe monarchy takes decisions on aH marters, but ir certainly has rhe
abiliry and rhe intention ofbeing present in rhe mosr important ones. There are
no c1ear rules regardng when, how ar according to whac principies; arbitran-
ness and lack of rransparency and conrrol mechansms have beco me character-
istic feawres of the system. It wi11 nar be easy for rhe changes initiated afrer
popular demands for the democrarizarian af che system, ro transfaDll rhe basic
rules of che game, given rhe continuing control of rhe palaee over rhe entire
process.
klorocco: aH allfhoritarim systcIII 71
1. Cartography of elites and control of resources
Tile elites
In this srudy , \Ve consider rhe monarchy and ies sphere as rhe hegemon,
w hile ehe remainder are ranked as secondary actors, depending on [he fomler
and enjoying litcle functionaJ auconomy. This smlCrure fosters predominant
comperition and any alliance between secondary ae[Qrs is difficulr, while
constancJy ar the merey of the ever-present t11onarehy. This strucrure hinders
rhe constiru tion of alliances berween secondary actors and pro motes the
predominance of comperirion.
Wirhin polirical, social and religious sp heres, rhe monarcrucal instirution is
rhe principal power and actor, diccating rhe ruJes of rhe game. However, despite
their hegemony, rhe royal pala ce and its domain need a plural socio-policical
sp here for a number of reasons:
From rhe very beginning of independence, rhere has been compecicion \Virh
a nacional movemenr 2 also in possession of imponanr symbolic and material
resources (rhe control of an importanr pan of the adminisrrarion and securicy
forces, sou nd nationaJist polirical diseourse and a mobilizing socialist
ideology, etc.); later with the Islamist movement that is attempting to
appropriate the important field of religious legitimacy. This comperition has
nevicably led to the negociarion wirh different actors, since ir is impossible
ro completely eradicate alternarive sources of power. The legal standing of
rhe monarchy essenrially remains but irs foundarion has been eroded.
The successive military coups of che 1970s and the terrorisr attacks from
Jihadist Salafists rhirry years lacer demonstrare rhe dangers of governing alone
and rhe need to conrinue widening the palitical basis to neutralize dissident
sectors respecrively.
The Moroccan state lacks an importanc, stable source of inca me ro palliate
the extreme poverry srill suffered by an importam pan of the population,
while needing resources ro guarantee a peaceful socieey.
The state of Moroceo largely depends on foreign assistance (aid, emigration
renUtrances, cornmercial regula tio ns with Europe, etc.). Foreign support has
been offered ro the monarchy based on its projection as a plural. liberalized
state.
Therefore, in spite of their predominance over differem polirical and
social acrors, che Maroccan monarchy still needs to make successive paces with
rhem. The formulation of ehese pacts, a11 differenc in namre, enables the crown
ro shape rhe polirical and social syste m, f.1voring the ascension of same of
ies segments ar rhe expense of ochers; legitimizing certain policies and moving
away from its responsibiliry in che failure of athers, etc. These allianees
have varied ayer rime and largely shap ed the configuraton of che secondary
elite.
 72 'lll/'{J Felill alld VI" Allgl/stias Parejo
Prilllal1' elites: the 1/I01/(/rcl1y alld its clwirolllllCl1t
Ae che hearc of che primary elices are rhe king and a vel)' smalJ number (maybe
lirde more rhan rwemy) of the monarch 's trusred individuals; eirher long-
standing acquaintances, or comperem professionals ofcen educaced abroad or
wirh specialist knowledge in certain fields \Vich experience 'inherited' from che
reign of Hassan 11. The elitizacion process responds ca fonnal criteria as much as
ro clientelism and f.lmily ner\Vorks. Mohamed VI has brollghr fresh blood ro
the maeure neopatrimonial sysrem he inherired, renewing and reviralizing it,
bur above all he has sparked generarional reviva! in irs closest sphere.
This group of primal)' elires is fonl1ed by rhe members of rhe royal cabinet
(especially che royal co uncilors) , the directors of some of the srate and main
securi ry forces. as \Vell as several minisrerial delegares, stare secreranes and
ministers who are chosen by the king to hold posirions in rhe minisrries of
sovereignry and a few business managers connecred ro paJace aJf.1irs (Feliu, 2001).
When referring to rhe monarchy, ie is importanr ro nore rbar ir is siruared
above any legal sysrem. As sripllJated by rhe Constirution of 1996, which was
in che process of being revised in 2011, in anide 19: 'the king, Emir al 111[11111;11;",
supreme represemative of che nation, symbol of ies uni ry, guaranror of rhe
perperuiry and continuiry of rhe srare, assures che respece of Islam and rhe
Consriturion and che pro recrian of rhe righcs and Iiberties of cirizens, social
groups and coUecrivities'. Ir is the king w ho ensures respece for rhe Consncucion
and nor rhe contrat)'o He holds full responsibiliry over rhe main spheres of
Moroccan life. 3 In pracnce, rhe vision is confinl1ed; rh e king nor only reigns,
he also govems.
The royal cabiner is forrned by half a dozen cOllncilors responding direcdy ro
rhe king, and abour twenty represemanves (whose posirion is dicrared by rhe
king) and las tly approximately 150 eollaborarors, many of whom ensure rhe
link between rhe cabinet and rhe differem ministries. 4 With rhe exceprion of a
few modificarions, rhe srructure and operarions of the cabiner have remained
the same in rhe lasr few decades. Dllring rhe reign of Hassan 11 , che cabiner was
used as an inrerlude for rhe mosr prominent figures berween rhe rwo minisrnes,
bU[ ir would also be rhe place rhey were consigned to when removed from [he
pubJic sphere. Under Mohamed VI, nor only has ir grown in dimension bur ies
funcrions are also clearer and more specific, alrhough they may undergo chan-
ges beyond those esrablished by the respective dalli,., (royal edict). The eabiner
is also more visible to rhe pubJic and rherefore emaiJs certain discrenon from ts
memhers; belonging to rhis circle is decisive in rheir professional career. For rhe
rechnocratic elires who, llnlike in rhe pasr, no longer belong to the rank and
file of political parties, ir has become a coopnon mechanism. The royal cabinet
is decisively rhe power in rhe shadows wirh a certain control over rhe government,
but principally ruling rhe mosr relevant marters on rhe narional agenda.
Royal councilors enjoya privileged posirion within rhe polirical sphere due
ro a close and, in many cases, personal friendship with che monarch (generally
originaring from rheir srudenr years ar the Royal College, a gatbering of rhe
VIorocco: al/ alftl/Oritariall systcm 73
'Moroeean royal soe.iery', arrended by ehildren from the whole kingdom). By
way of example, [he foUowing have heen key figures in recent years: Mohamed
Roehdi (edueared ar rhe Royal College), w ho lInoffieially tules as director of
the cabiner, is one of rhe pro01inem representanves of rhIs caregol)', as IS
Abdelaziz Mesiane Belfkih, manager oflarge-scale operarions such as che Tanger-
Med port and responsible for diverse matters ofEducarion or the. Arnazig~ ~uestion,
and who also exerts importllir inftuence nm only on rhe electlOI1 of muusrers an?
directors of important Pllblic emerprise and administrarion, buc even on walls
and govemors ... Toa lesser exrem, Mohamed Moarassim (responsible for rhe
king's correspondence, Minisrer of Foreign Aff.1irs and later I/lal~ of :he Grand
Casablanca region), Zoulikha Nasn, expert in social affairs and adVIser ro :he
king, member of rhe adl11inistrarive board of rhe Mohamed V FOllndan~n
for Solidariry, Andr Azulay (a key figure during rhe reign of Hassan JI 111
economic matters \Vbo, despite losing his inftuence wirh che currenr kll1g, IS
still highly valued for his nerwork of intemanonal contaces in the US~, France
and no\V in Spain), Abbas El Jirari (Religious Affairs), Ornar KabbaJ or Fadel
Benyaieh. .
However, not all rhe mos[ closely related individuals are royal councllors.
SOl11e of rhe prorninent figures whose fiiendship wirh rhe king originare~ in
their years at rhe Royal College hold vet)' differenr positions: Fouad Ah El
Himma, w ho for years \Vas rhe closesr man ro ehe monarch as well as respon~lble
for so me parricularly imporrant O1atters (&001 [he Sahara ro Srare secun ty),
resigned &0111 office ro creare che Movemenr for AH Democrars (MTD) (which
Iarer beeame rhe Authentieiry and Moderniry Parry (PAM)) and to tun for
legislarive elecrions in September 2007, in al: endeavor ~riginall~ meaor to
'eleanse' Moroccan poliricallife and coumerpomt the lslanuc ascenSlon. Otl~ers
are minisrers ofrhe sovereignry, inelllding Ta'ieb Fassi Fihri, Minisrer ofForelgn
Aff.1irs.
In addirion ro rhis group made IIp by rhe primary elites are the. people in
charge of securiry: the Chief Commander of the Royal Gendarm~ne, Genera~
Hosni Benslimane responsible for rhe king's secllriry; Mohamed Yassme Mansoun
from rhe Directorare of Research and Documenrarion (DGED), a personal
friend of rhe king from rhe Royal CoUege, and rhe [rsr eivilian ro be responsible
for the foreign secrer service, which in [Um depends on the Offices and Servlces of
rhe Royal Anned Forees (FAR),s He is also a member of rhe Momeean delega-
rions in firsr-rank diplomaric affairs. Abdellatif HanlmollchI, dIrector of [he
General Direetorare of Territorial Seeuriry (DGST or DST, rhe Moroeean
secrer services), is nor fmm rhe king's6 direct cirele and rhe Interior Min.isrer
Chakib Benmoussa (a rechnocrac who was a member of rhe execunve conunmee
of the ONA group). . ...
Notable in rhe economic sphere is Mohammed MOllmr El MJjldl, rhe head
of rhe Privare Secrerariar of His Majesry and yer anorher friend from rhe Royal
College, who is also head of the steering eommitree of rhe royal holdings
(Siger, ONA, SIN, ere.) as well as his principal finaneJaI advlsor. Orher figures
from the business world are said to have clase relatlonslups wuh the royal
 74 Lal/m Felill a/ld lV/1l AI/gl/srias Pargo
paJace, such as Anas Sefrioui, who is at the head of one of rhe greacesc privare
fortunes in Maroeco, and, according ta rhe press, Maulay Rachid, rhe king's
brorher's fi-ont man. 7
Secolldm)' elites
Several srudies have shown rhe presence of important families in Moroccan
economic and policicallife. In his work on the genealogy of some of rhe main
ruling figures in che counrry, A1i Benhaddou (1997) iIlustrares how rhey \Vere
all from families (about fifty) in positions of responsibility during the rule of the
Sulran; wirh more rhan half relared ro economic activiries and rhe resr educated
or re!igious figures (C/01as and Ulelllas). Subsequently, the alliances between
families from different backgrounds (noble, eornmercial, business or polirically
relared) creared a eomplex ner\Vork of aIliances and ties that are fundamenralIy
endogamous, 8 and have only partly been modified by rhe arrival of new
business-relared individuals and rechnocrars.
The \Vords ofWaterbury (1975) are still valid roday: 'Al! the Moroccans that
belong ro rhe narional ruling classes know ea eh orher personally. Whether their
rebtionships are friendly or hostil e is less importanr than che fact that chey
exist.' These relationships shape rhe basis of rhe secondaly elites, briefly
described below.
A) FORMAL ELITES
The formal elites are made up of second-rank figures from the arn1ed forces
and the secret services, as well as high-ranking officers of rhe coercive apparatus.
Most escape parliamentary and government control and directly depend on the
pabee.
The process of narional constnlCrion, as in ocher countries, involved the
establishment of securiry forces ro control the renitary under rhe command of
a centralized aurhoriry and guarantee rhe union of the naron around irs sacred
principIes. As first was the case wich administrarion - cOl11posed of istiqlalis
l11ilitants, due to rhe policy of 'Moroccanizarion' - the Istiqlal unsuccessfully
rried to cake over the security forces, which evenrually ended under the
cutelage of the monarchy. Mohamed V restructured rhe military, and Hassan 11,
sti11 rhe crown prince, was assigned che mission of running the FAR.
The national securiry, Royal Gendarmerie, secret services and special brigades
were 500n under the control of the palace. Use of violence \Vas an absolute
monopoly.
The military coups at the beginning of the 19705 and the betraya! of the
king's right-hand man Mohamed Oufkir once agaill highlighted the need for
restrucruring in the security forces, wruch moved under the direcr rule of (he mon-
arch himself, while che 'Minisrry of Defense' was downgraded ro rhe 'Admin-
istracion ofDefense' and run by a general secretary. The beginning ofthe war
klorocco: (1/1 alltllOrifari(l// s}'stelll 75
in Westem Sahara 'Vas providential: rhe military was confined ro the sollthem
boundaries of the kingdol11 and moved away from the 'lIscjid Morocco'
(between 50 and 70 pereene of the troops are deployed in occupied Westem
Sahara). Furthennore, unlike in Algeria and Tunisia, the important develop-
ment of orher security and police forces meant the militalY \Vas borh restricted
and kept under control.
The anny has evolved from universal conscription inro an army of
volunteers of more than 200,000 soldiers among rhe three corps. A ger-
omocracy has been controlling the military leadership in che last decades.
The Royal Gendam1erie is an autono1110US force, comprising . about 22 ,000
people related ro che milirary and supervised by rhe monarch, which opera tes
olltside rhe big cities and whose functions \Vere reinforced after the milirary
coups: royal guard, paramilicary acrivities, internal and border policing
missions, etc.
Today, the military is still the grear unknown; a force withollt democraric
control, \Virh poor levels of education and episodes of radicalizarion in their
ranks (in recent years, dozens of officers have been forced ro resign, masques
have be en removed &om military bases, and military counterinrelligence has
been developing). It represents a l11eans ro make 'easy money' for ts high-
ranking officers (such as in the case of Air Force Captain Mustapha Adib,'J rhe
concession of fishing licenses ro great generals, lo and connectlons co smuggling
through the Callary [slands).
The different intelligence services, mosr of which were created in the after-
math of the srare coups in rhe 1970s, have very complex relations, as they are
in charge of similar affairs beyond the initial prerogatives and have no clear or
definire powers, and the predominance of certain individuals depends on who
is mling at any particular rime.
The Ministry of the Intenor plays an essential part in multiple areas of che
councry's public and priva te life, through a complex grid of general manage-
ment and departmems. The decree established on December 15th 1997
declared several general direcrions imide the Miniscry (internal affairs, national
security, auxiliary forces (related ro rhe local area and ruled by govemors in
charge of secrer detention centers and the general inspeccion of nacional
administration)). Likewise, rhere are other directions of importam inflllence
(local collecnviries, terrirory management, rural affairs" civil proreccion, admin-
istrative officers and rechnicians, coordinarion cf economic projects, adminis-
trarion service delegations, adminisrrative and social aff.lirs, etc.). In practlce,
rhey are similar to a mini-government that is a part af rhe 'ministries of the
sovereignty', namely, whose represemarives are nominated directly by rhe
monarch. 11
Institutions of parastatal nature: pern1Jnent councils and commissions or ad
floc foundatlons and inscitutes running derermined spheres of Moroccan
socio-palirical life. These instirutions are beyond any demacraric control
76 LO/Ira FeUtI (1Ild Ar AlIgl/slias Parejo
whatsoever and have no counterbaJance in any other solid democratic snuctures.
Borh government and parliamenr are rhus discredired or subtly comered by
this network of organizations rhat generally appear more neutral, rechnically
betrer prepared and not pollured by rhe political games of parties. Some of
rhese entities (such as rhe Royal Commissions for women, elections or
regionalization, rhe mosr recent being for rhe revision of the Consrirution)
were created ad !/OC and subsequendy disappeared once their funcrion was
undertaken. Others such as thase dedica red ro human rights (Advisory Council
on Human righes, CCDH, now NationaJ Council on Human Rights) , the
media (High Autbority for Audio-visual Communication, HACA), Amazigh
(Royal Institute ofthe Amazigb Culture, IRCAM) and education (Council of
Education, CSE) or the dilferenr royal foundations with huge resources and a
will to endure are connected ro rhe paJace via its councilors (although a certain
number of irs members can be elected by dilferent insriturions and in 2008 che
government revised the budget of the HACA and CCDH for the first time).
Their role has proved essential to coopr certain middle c1asses who were a pare
of the former opposition movement as well as entrisc factions of the movement
for human righrs, or as payment for cereain services.
The government. The members of che governmenr 12 have access to networks
of inAuence and rhe managemenr of certain fields, provided this access is nor
short-circuiced by rhe palace. 13 Despite rhe increasing importance of rhe
prime minisrer, since the refonn of the Consnrurion in 1996, the governmem
has nonetheless losr prerogatives wirh a whole network of important figures and
parastaral instirutions beyond democratic conerol. The conflict berween the
government and this 'parallel government' regularly surfaces withour really
questioning the rules of rhe game. Moreover, so me of the members of the
so-called min'istries of sovereignty (Foreign Affairs, justice, Islamic Affairs and
Interior .Aff.1.irs) are not assigned by popular electioos bU( chasen direccly by
the king.
Leaders of political parties and parliamentary elites: they have access to
material and symbolic resources of certain relevance but have no important
decision-making capacity. In this sector of rhe elite, there are rwo dilferenr
pracesses under way: the high tumover of parliamentary elite 1-+ and the
moderate transfonllation of the managemenr o1'ganizations of the parties;
hawever, both coincide in rheir lack of substancial political change, wthin
the political c1ass or driven by ir, since relatiooships (within and among the
parties) are competitive and extremely personaL
The high tumover af the Moroccan parliamemary15 stalf is not favorable for
the development of a hamogeneous parliamemary c1ass with a shared authority
capable of establishing consensus for its goals and pracedures, as well as its own
institutional culture. Such a high tumover of personnel underrnines the auton-
omy of the parliamemary institution, and do es nor conrribute to the democratic
process, This therefore leads to an excessively open parliamenr with foreseeable
difficulties for institutionalization, a condition that has concinued since the end
of the 1990s.
J\!Iorocco: (11/ mll/lOritan'a/I s}'sle/JI 77
On the orher h.and, there has been a slow and gradual regeneration of the
parties' highest aurhoriries at management leveL Changes ca rhe general
secrerariats and presidencies mainly occur when cheir leaders have died and,
to a lesser extent, ar che end of a political cyc1e or excepcionally afrer
voluntary resignation, With the exception of the unprecedented uprisings
in 2000 witbin the Party of Progress and Socialisl11 (PPS) (Parejo,
2006b: 178) and in 2001 in the Soeialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)
(Parejo, 2006a: 107), political bureaux have shown progressive expansion
with a balance between pernlanence and renewaL Gradual changes to
an increasingly fragmented political arena simply haven't encouraged the
emergen ce of strong leaderships with the integral capacity ro mobilize political
projects, nor have rhey brought about any profound innovatian within the
political culture or the sryles and strategies of the political action of the par-
ties' elite. Fram the 19705 onwards, this political c1ass has opted to fratemize
wirh the 1'egirne through a process of pacts that have been progressively
exrended,
The bureaucratic elices playa more important part than is cOl11rnonly believed,
especialIy those who luve emerged wieh the regionalization process (Ojeda,
2002a, 2002b, 2004), with new bodies such as the regional councils - co1'-
poranve institurions that elect che ir mel11bers 16 indirecdy and fonu a useful
network to expand the foundation of the 1'egime, The Ministry of the
Interior has a strong involvemem with rhese local organizations rhrough a
complete nerwork of govemors, caids or lIIoqadellls Oocal or neighborhood
authority), There is no consistent pyramidal outline hut rather two super-
imposed srrucrures, where one (central government) doesn't allo\:v the other to
develop (regional aurhorities). Although these councils have been assigned
certain jurisdiction,17 it is very limited and can be controlled at any time
through indirect mechanisms (ra..xes for instan ce) or others such as the exer-
eise of tutelage (Ojeda, 2002a).
B) NON-FORlvIAL ELITE S
This group comprises entrepreneurs, cOl11mercial elites and businessmen.
Tbe journalist jalid jamai counted 3,000 Moroccan millionaires in 1996.18 Tbis
'business bourgeoisie' is composed of oId families fi'ol11 Fez and the southem
region of Sus, and has added new members fram diverse origins, The question
of privatizanon, al1'eady presented by Hassan Il, sta tes the aim of fostering
the socio-economic recomposition of the country based on the expansion of
the middle classes, which under Mohamed VI includes the creatian of a new
entrepreneurial c1ass. In fact, rhis process has comributed ro an even greater
concentration of capital and only benefired a lirnited number of investors with
powerful connections to pawer and to large foreign groups. As Catusse
poines out, 'privatizations have been the opportunity for those \Vho hold
political power (the king as firsr chie) to distribure arbitrarily and discrerionally
( ... ) a series of privileges and capital. They haven't brought forth the
 78 Lallra Fclil/ (/lId j\lr Angustias Parejo
emergence of a new cJregory of economic operators' (2000b: 11). This con-
centraron has also be en subserved by the Moroccan banking strucrure thar is
controlled by imponanr private groups.
The arrivaJ of these businessmen ro rhe polirical sphere and rheir conrribu-
tion ro rh e economization of polirics (economic arrrihutes become legitimare
\vhen iniriaring a political career) is a ne\V facror and with the peculiariry
rhat, in Moroceo, unlike orher counrries, the imporranc f.1milies have reached
common agreemenrs te divide rhe marker among themselves. Catusse
(2000b: 5), \Vho has analyzed the figure of the new liberal businessman as
supporr for rhe monarchy, has presenred rhe hyporhesis of the new business
c1ass as eve ntually 'defending' rhe kingdom in che future.
The n1edia. The press and audiovisual media offer a public space whose
inAuence is relevant despite 10\V sales (for rhe press) and audience figures
(television and radio). In Morocco, there are 800 publications, ofwhich 100
are pubJished on a regular basis. Most receive indirecr sra re aid in rhe fonn of
subsidies for paper, printing and publicity. On the other hand, the indepen-
dene press (represented in recene years by Ic jOl/fllal Hcbdol1Jadaire, Assah[fo,
AI-Ayal/l, Dcmai/l, Dell/a;" lHagazillc, Dlllllau and TeJ QueJ, many no Ionger in
prinr) has suffered relenrless persecurion since Mohamed VI came ro rhe
rhrone, eirher direct1y (cIosure or rhe trial of rhose responsibIe, sued accord-
ing to che Media Code of Pracrice approved in May 2002,19 \Vith senrences
ranging from rhe blocking of websices ro imprisonment), or indirecdy (in
fines worth millions for sIander, pressure on shareholders, distributars and
prillting businesses, the coercion of certain companies ta derer them from
advertising in. such pubhcations). As a consequence, sorne of the main inde-
pendent joumalists clln-entIy live olltside rhe COUJ1try and ha ve opred for
electronic newspapers. 20
For che audiovisual media, rhe beginning of che liberalizaron of television
and radio has not yet led ro a greater pluraliry of COJ1rent; in facr, they are
still subjecr to official censorship thar sysremarcaIly veto es rhe presence of
'dissidenr' figures. The High Aurhoriry for Audiovisual Communicarion
(HACA), responsible for the development and liberalization of the sector as
well as che preservaron of independent infom1arion, is, in fact, hugeIy
dependent on rh e monarch and rus sphere.
COlJtlol of ,.esou,.ces
Coercion. Violen ce is still a resource, and repression perfonns a very specific
fun ccion wirhin the Moroccan poIirical sysrem: it regulares rhe mobility of
che differem social sectors, defines rhe boundaries thar cannot be trespassed
and prevenrs rhe fonnarion ofbreaches in 'narional unallimiry'. There is mose
definitely a manifest political will ro repress. According ro Artide 7 of the
Constirution, the morta ofrhe kingdom is: 'God, Homeland and King'. This
JVIOfOCCO: a/l muforitmiall sysfCIJ/ 79
trilogjl defines r\Je limirs of rhe pennirred from rhe prohibired, rh e legaliry
of rhe terrain of contfonration \Virh the lIIakilzell .22 The magnirude of pun-
ishmenr does nor so much depend on ideological considerarions or rhe
narure of whar is at srake, wherher it's raboo or nor, bU[ on rhe exrenr ro
which rhe power srrucrure is being challenged, and rhe hegemony of rhe
monarchy and its irnmediare sphere are being quesrioned.
The monopoly on violence \Vas only partially chalJenged by the last ter-
rorist attacks frOl11 Jihadist Salafist groups (May 2003, Apri! 2007, April
2011). Ir is importanr ro remember rhat imemal securiey, distribured bet\Veen
the Ministry of rhe Interior and, to a lesser extent, rhe Minisr.ry of Defense,
represenrs 28 percent of rhe Moroccan budget. (In Spain, rhe Minisrry of
Defense and Interior receive a total of 11 percent of the general budget.23)
Information. Primarv elite control over infonnation is almost absolure despice
an apparenr pluralir}r ofinformarion. The exrensive conrrol ofthe infOlmation
network ineludes aurhorities as di verse as rhe official press agency (MAPfJ. or
Moreccan diplomatic rep resentatives abroad. The independenr press has
progressively lost its mase emblemarc representarives.
Ideology. The resources previously menrioned are used by rhe monarchy and
irs coIlaborators ro guaranree rhe conerol of the ideologica! sphere, and
re volve around rhe rhree following rnain axes: modenzation, moderation of
religious discourse, and polirical reformo The rhree axes are c10sely linked and
involve a delicare balance between rhe rradtionalisr discourse hisrorically
founding rhe regime, the necessity ro control extremisr religious actors, and
the internal and externa! pressures for greacer liberalization. The aim is ro
achieve a monopoly in rhese fields againsr any alremative actors (lslamic and
opposition movements, human rights). The monarchy has llsed a number of
dfferenr instmments ro expand its discourse and image. In tem1S of religion,
as well as the High Council of Ule/llas (authorized to issue jafwas) , there is an
addirional prejecr ro fonn councils of regional Ulelllas as \Vell as foc rhe
Moroccan community in Europe, ro encourage mosques under srare control
and to prepare a Charrer for che Ulclllas. Modernizarion is linked ro eco-
nomic and social refonns (economic opporruniry, women's Iiberarion) and ro
the process of polirica1 liberaIization (constitutional and legislarive reforms,
polirical alremarion and rransparency of elecrions, etc.). Palitical reform is, in
facr, limired by a controlled political Jiheralizarion process, in which foreign
inftllences CllITentIy play an importam role such as Morocco's inrernarional
agreements.
Capital. In spite of being a cOllnrry of mediul11 income, the social indicarors
in Morecco correspond ta rh ose of a Iess developed counny: aImosr one in
five IVloroccans live in uner poverry, aImosr r\Vo million people live in slums
and 50 percenr of rhe adulr popllIacion is il1iterate, a sintarion thac remains
unaltered despite a growch of6 percenc2 5 in che lasr few years. The concentrarion
of capiral in rhe palace and its sphere and, secondly among rhe aforem~n
tion ed families rhar make up che COllntry elites, is an evident feantre of SOCI0-
economic inequality. The royal fortllne 26 is managed by t\Vo holdings, Ergis
80 LWTa Felill alld 1\tr Allgustias Parejo
Jnd Singer, and rhe patrimony incllldes large participarion from rhe follow-
ing companies: North African Omnium (ONA), Primarios (royal agrieulnual
domains), Compagnie Chrifienne de textiles (CTT) and Secam. Tms near
monopoly for some key economic sectors has exrended ro banking wirh rhe
pllrehase ofWafabank. Moreover, calculations prove rhar aImose 60 percenc of
acrivity ar rhe Casablanca srock exchange Oliginares in the palace. Therefore,
cOmIption, which is widespread rhroughollt aH levels of socieey, is especially
serious in rhe realm of che paJace where ir has become inscjcucionaJized under
the rule of Mohamed VI. 07
2. Identifying the different protest, opposition and resistan ce
naovennents in ~orocco
Clams
Protest movelnent. Despite che counny's economic poverry and rhe incapaciry
of rhe srate ca provide welfare, popular protesr (spontaneous and essentially
against corruption and despocism) has been kepc ro a m.inimum until very
recentIy. Every decade has se en individual episodes of upsurge, such as rhe bread
riots and protescs aga inst economic precariousness. Social peace has partIy
been maintained chanks ta the remirrance of emigrams, an infonnal, criminal
economy (smuggling, production of hashish in the North of the country)
and some weakened, but sllpportive, f.11l]y networks no\V coexisring with
newly fornled SCnlctures.
In 2005, an importam pro test movement mainly associaced with pro-
independence' secrors emerged in che Westem Sahara occupied by Morocco.
And it is precisely on this cenitary that a movement focllsed on Agdam lzik's
camp demanding economic, social and political improvements began in 2010
and \Vas to be violemly dismancled by the Gendannerie and the Moroccan
Auxiliary Forees. In rhe context of rhe Arab uprisings that are spreading
aeross differem cOllnrries in the region, rhe Moroecan movement of
February 20th - co nstituced by a heterogeneous amalgam of sectaf5 of
society led by a youth thar is Ilot associated to policical parties - demanded
profound constitucional change and a parliamentary l11onarchy. The move-
ment has succeeded in mobilizing dozens of thousands of people across the
\Vhole counrry since rhe beginning of 2011, \Vith the pocem help of intemet
social networks, and inftuencing the political agenda (in March 2011,
Mohamed VI announced a plan of constitutional refomls llndertaken from
the pabce.
The Opposition. The concept of opposition has notably evolved in recem
years. What was for decades a space for dissem, a thorollgh questioning of
structures, norms and rules has considerably diminished (ae least the formal
political manifesration of irs parties) since the end of the 1990s (Lpez Garda,
2000a, 2000b; Parejo, 1997b: C. II and 1lI, 1999c). Politieal opposition has
Nlorocco: all alflJlOn'fariml s)'ste/l1 81
been redllced in rhe polirical arena thac has instead seen grearer consensus for
the figure of the king and his project of 'modemization'.
In the partidist arena, the incerpretation most conlI1lOnly found in rhe
reference bibliography is the distriburion of Moroccan poHtical f0n11ations
according to rheir position in relarion to the central power and ditferent
instirurions. There is therefore a disrincrion berween parties related ro the
regime, encouraged or supported by rhe monarchy (also referred te as pro-
govemmem parties. pro-monarchical, legitimist, 'offieialist' or adminiscrative
parties) and parties of the opposition. The parties of the opposition (also
referred ro as democraric, nationalist or historic) are heif5 and sUrv1VOrs of the
national movement, responsible for the mobilizarion ehat led to rhe inde-
pendenee of the country. They are noteworthy for their relendess fight against
the monarchy's polirical hegemony, for defending democraric institutions and
greater areas of freedom, despire the discrepancies arising among them as to
the degree of dissidenee regarding che estabJishmem. The heterogeneiey of
the primicive narional mo ve ment inherited by rhe Istiqlal was che magma
from which differenc conflicring political and social projects would flow and
crystallize imo a series of political forces that preserved and redefined their
discou"e (as opponents) umil the mid-1990s, and have survived, although
noc without sequels, waves of repression and the constraints of the author-
itarian regime. The Istiqlal national conservarives, the USFP socio-democrats,
the OADP-PSU soeialisrs and the PPS and FFD communim fonn the hard
core of che opposition forces. FoUowing Youssoufi's governmenr (1998)
and rheir participarion in che executive (wh rhe exception of che OADP),
and political discourse, che media and certain specialist literature have started
ro denominate this group as ex-opposirion, fonl1er opposition or a new
majority (parejo, 2006a).
Since 2002, the moderate PJD lslam.ists have become the maio opposition
party. Following the electi ons in 2007, \Vhere they upheld their tide as the
major parry of oppositio n, rhey slightly improved their position to become
che primary electoral represenration. Never having become fu11y integraced
in the poliricaJ arena, Moroccan power has dealt with lslamism in a
peculiar variety of ways through the course of time, ranging from completely
avoiding the problem, denying its policical existence, presenting it as a
threat againsr orher actors ro reinforcing che culture of fear, concepmalizing
it as a systemic rhreat and fina11y arbitrating the integration of moderate
lslamism gradua11y, while observing the reacrions on ao individual and
coUective level.
Since ies legalization in 1996 and following rhe very first presenration in
2002 as the Jusrice and Development Party (PJD), PJD has shown an
imporrant mobilization capacity, based on its crearion of itself as an 'exemp-
1a.ry' parry.28 Unril now, it has opted for a differential serategy ro che ocher
'classic' parries during rhe elecrions (with a so und narional political discourse
that is close to the problems and daily life of voters, a rigorous selection of
candidates and an absolure refusal to eommercialize or monetize votes), as
82 Lal/ra Feliu alld 1\11" Augl/stias Parejo
well as posr-election maintenance of a high level of polirical acnviry and
ensllring continuing contacr with fellow cirizens. The posinon of rhe PJD in
regard te constitmional matrers is very sim.ilar, if nO[ mimeric, ro fornler
opposirion parties excepr in rhe specific reference ro Islam (also hisrorical1y
very presenc in che [stiqlnQ.
Any c1aiming of righrs has remained practically confined te a series of
small poHriea! rrends among left-wing extremists \Virh imponant ries co social
actors.:!9 and rhe subsrancialIy more important radical Islamisr movement
represented by Al Adl ",ni [{smIe Gusrice and Chariry) founded by Sheikh
Abdesslam Yassine. This group, creaced ac che beginning of che 1970s, has
direcdy challenged rhe monarch's religious legitimacy and dismissed rhe idea
rhar the tide of Emir El Muminin may be inherited amomaticaliy. This dis-
senting dimension is ideologically complered by rhe c1assic components of
political Islamism; non-violence, demand of an llpdaced caliphace (which
Sheik Yassine unofficially renounced in rhe Sllnlmer of 2008) and of rhe
implementarion of Islanlic Iaw, combined \Virh ano-capitalisr and ano-
imperialist discourse. In 2005, che polirical cirele gachering che main leaders of
rhis movement (srill under rhe unquestionable conU1land of Yassine) began
rhe de velopment process of a rruee-year program said te be che basis for rhe
2012 elections.
In view of rhe challenge char juscice and spiriruality represe nt, che move-
menc has noc been legalized, is hardly toleraced and is alcemacively subjecced
ro times of repression (prison for severa! of its members, prohibition of irs
publicatian and attemprs ro control ies web page) :lI1d more liberal rreatment
(cerrain raler:lI1ce rowards its leaders and some of rhe acovities rhey promete).
Despire rhe prohibition of a large pare of its beneficenr acciviries rhat have tra-
dirionally consorllted a very effective so urce of influence, al Adl has kepc active
through NGOs indirectly relared ro che movemenc.
Literarure is scarce regarding rhis group with very few in-depth swdies
ovailable (see ToZ)', 2000; Darifin Ayadi ec al., 2005). The nl/mber offollowers
oscillaces becween 100,000 and 500,000, figures which are essentially based
on police sources and estima tes from the few occasions members garhered
publiely (almose enrirely in manifestation of solidarity for che Palestinian
people). les control over srudem unions is more visible.
Thjs critica! fronr is moving beyond rhe insrirutiollal-represemative circuit
and operares rhrough a senes of networks, plarfornls, groups and collectiviries
belonging ro civil sociery, and whose activities are occasionally rreated by rhe
independenr press. les position as a critic is marerialized in the demand for
abrogarian or refornl of rhe currem Constiturion, namely che conversion
from a monarchy considered absolutisr ro one rhar is democratic. 30 As far as
radical lslamic secrors are concerned, chis qllestion, even if ir shares the
same prominence as orhers, is presented as che rellgious legirimacy of rhe
COJl1I11onder of che Faichfu1. These grOl/ps - eicher from cheir ptillCiples,
srrategy or necessiry - choose nor ro be fuUy incegrated wichin rhe political
arena.
A40Toeeo: mi I1WllOrilarim s)'5lcm 83
Resistance. Morocc.o has an active, sustained civil society organized and mobi-
lized around c1aims rhat encompass a full range of matters: human rights in
general, improving conditions for women, rhe Amazigh identiry c1aim, rhe
reinsertion of unemployed diplomats, dl e developmem of rural areas and
respecr for rhe environmem. The associacions, platfanns, networks and mave-
menes \virh a procese discourse have had a significam impact on rhe Moroccan
socio-political field.
FinalIy, differenr underground groups thar have for rhe mosr part used terrorisr
scraregies represenr Moroccan Jihadisr Salafism, which shares rhe characrerisrics
of borh rhe opposirion and the resisrance \Virhollt idenrifying ' wirh either. 31
Particularly frem rhe 1990s onwards, rhese exrrem.isc secrors started ro grow up
around charismaric sheikhs who find eheir followers in the pooresr neighborhoods
ofrhe big cicies ofthe counny. Along wirh rhese must be added che groups created
by rhose participacing as III1Ua}edeclIs or \Vho had artended training camps in
Afghanisran (Moroccan aurhorities have admitted that they can aCCOllm for
only 200 of che 600 Moroccans who hod been in Central Asia). The origin of
Jihadist Salafism may be ideologically linked to che Salafist doctrine chac had
grea( inAuence in rhe twenrierh cenrury, boch in irs refornust and conservative
aspect, rhough separ.lted from rhe latter by i(s acceprance of violent srraregies.
The derencian and sentencing of rhousands of cirizens associared wirh chis
ideological 1110vemenr after the rerrorisc attacks of May 2003 has cantributed
wi(hom any doubt to rhe radicalization of certain sectors of rhe movemem.
GI'OJJpS 01" social mOf'emerrts ",it/ mobilizatou capacity
Frem rhe 1950s unril rhe 1980s, rhe unions had a crucial role in social and
policical elaims in Morocco (Ayache, 1997; Benhlal, 1984; Lpez Garca, 1989).
Ac che end of che 1980s and especiaUy in che 1990s, che groups wich che
grearesr mobilization capaciry ro procest were che human rights associarions thar
concentrated in rhe fieId of civil and political rights. The first genera non originated
in rhe 1970s when it was extremely closely connecred and dependenr on
polirical parries from the opposicion. These organizarions are very isolated in
their sphere, with little funding and focused on acriviry relaced te rhe mosr
pressing affairs of rhe m.iljrant oppositio n and undenaking rhe mosr basic procese
work. Their policical inheticance is twofold: che political ideology of patries ori-
ginating in rhe nacional movement and rhe Marxisr-Leninisr, revolllrionary,
mast radical seccors of rhe exrreme left-wing patries.
In rhe 19905, a second generarion of associations represented a qualirative jllmp
in rhe fighr for civil and politica! righrs and a move rowards grearer professio-
nalizarion and independence. Ir \Vas accompanied by a series of decisive changes
in rhe origin and l11anagement of reso urces, as fi1l1ds from foreign contriburors
become increasingly important. From an ideological poinr of vie\V, rhe claim
for civil and policical rights relaced co democracic ideals has yet to become a key
f.lctor in rhe relationship between power and subjeccs, and will regenerare a
corrupr polirical contexc.
84 uwra Fclill alld iVr AJ/glIsrias Parejo
These groups have subsequentIy be en rransfonned (rhird generation) due te
rhe developmem of certain [eatures shared by rhe second generatian. A grearer
level of professionalization is accompanied by rhe \Vill ro define and apply
public policies (feliu, 2004, 2006). 1, has ,he,efo,e seen ,he acquisition and
assimiJa,ion of a highly legal and vel)' ' echnical new lallguage, an asep,ic jargoll
rhar will oruy rustance rhem from polirical acrion, and is a conunon phenomenon
also ,aking place in the rest of the world.
The dfferem members of the movemem muse chaose between twa
srraregies regarding coments and eonsequences: rhe aptian af 'enrrism', which
implies callaborating \Virh the regime (contributing ro rhe amhorities' image of
credibilil)' and honorabilil)') founded on the belief that it is possible to ,efonn
che sysrem fram wichin, or che rejection of any kind of cooptio n. Despice
these divergences, a division of rhe movement has been avoided so f..1r \Virh a
cerrain culture af consulrancy and caoperatian tbar has been consolidating since
the 1990s.
Early 2011 saw the February 20rh mavement, led by a new generation of
young peopIe who are nar necessarily associated \Vith political parries, unions
or associations, rake on the demands for democratiza rion and respece for rhe
dignil)' of Moroccans. Wi,h the powerful help of social Iletworks related te
new rechnologies, rhis movemem has succeeded in bringing rogerher sectors as
diverse as rrade unions, the human rights movemenr, Amazigh, wamen's rights,
secrors oflslamic youth and speeific political parees in rhe government. The strategy
followed has been rhe refom1Ulation of old demands (social improvements,
democrarization) withom in rhe firsr insranee directIy acracking monarchy bm
calling for profound transfomlation (parliamentary manarchy) and foe using on
the ctiticism of key figures in the sphere of the polace (Al Hinuna, M'!iidi, etc.).
On cbe spoc, rile movement has perfonned/acted tbrollgh the convocarion of
periodic demonstrations in dozens of rowns in the COUI1rry, spreading messages
through the intemet and the choice of symbolic goals to exemplify new models
(campaign againsr rhe musical festival Mawazine promoted by Mayudi, ere.).
3. Relations of eompetition and allianee between the elites
and the influenee of social movements
Tire stl1lctllre 01 domestic relatiolJs 01 compctitiolJ and alliancc. Pacts as a
sUl'vJ'al stl'atcg}' and tire adaptatiorr 01 aJltllOI'itm'ian;sm
In Morecco the pennanency of the ruling c1ass32 following independence \Vas
much more apparent than in any of its Maghreb neighbors. Independenee
posed the problem of the countl)"s modemization for the political elass. Until
1956, che bourgeoisie, che monarchy and rhe working c1ass had joined forces to
ohrain che besc condirions ofindependenee fr0111 rhe colonizers; however, rivalries
already exisced among them regarding rhe control of [mure national development.
Rural dignicaries and fanners were lefr behind in rhe narional game of politics
because of their alleged or actual collaboration \Vith the protectorare. In rhe
V!orocco: a/l (//u/lOn'tarim S)lSfCIII
beginning, rhe bOUT;geoisie had a pnvileged situation where they comrolIed
bureaucracy and administratian bm rhe plans for modernizaoon concemed rhe
85
peasann)'; eoupled with political miscalcularions, rhey enabled rhe king ro
[ake advamage of rhe situarion, resiware himsdf in rhe cemer of rhe sysrem,
and become rhe on]y possible incennediary berween the rural warld and rhe
national bourgeoisie.
The Isriqlal embodies che narional movemem, and for a while both names
became the same reality. Ir was fOllnded in 1943 by well-read urba11 elites te
mobilize the Moroccan people te the elaim fa, independence (istiq/aQ. Indepen-
dence represemed a shared rriumph and rhe 1110narch was the prime beneficiary as
a privileged inrerlocutor ro rh e French governmem. However, orher farces
from rhe rural areas claimed a prominent role in rhe distriburion of power.
Moroccan leaders were aware of rhe need (Q transfornl rhe counrry as well as
of their OW11 powerlessness ro do so. Isolared and f..1Cing rhe rural masses and rhe
urban working c1ass, rhis elite rried ro foml a compact block ro maintain rhe
sCatus qua rhar was based on rhe monarchy and Islam.
The king ar cerrain rinles \vamed ro promote rhe rrend towards modernizarion
but soon realized rhar ie \Vould lead te processes thar he wauld noe be able ro
control. Thus, monarchicallegi,imacy ,eestablished the honorabilil)' of rraditional
digniraries, allying itself ro them. The monarch soon undersrood rhe importance
of conrrolling ,he rural areas and curt.1iled the elfons of the Lstiq/a/. He
reesrablished rhe local assemblies as a territorial framework for erhnic solidariries, ar
che basis of the fonuer regime. 33
Frem a theoretical poim of view and using Izquierdo's (2007) rools of ana-
lysis, even in rhe vel)' firsr stage between 1956 and 1960 (with certain excep-
riom), there \Vas comperirion between the primal)' elires for power, each
equipped with differenr symbolical and material resources. Meer the 19605,
there was a progressive slip towards a hegemonic sysrem, where rhe monarchy
and irs sphere were rhe hegemon, while the rest were secondary actors wirh
scarce functional auronomy and tremendolls difficulties in fornting alliances, as
their relations were inAuenced by rhe inevitable presence of monarchy.
From its privileged posirion, rhe monarchy has established differenc political
pacCi in response to che socio-economic evolution to mainrain control over power
and material resources. Through rhe differenr stages, ir has rried to gain eonsensus
from rhe social body sUITounding s political projecr, undertaken a eamrolled
economie developmem projecr and fosrered a universal sense of modemiry,
meaning rhe lIIakllzell awakens civil sociery rhar is emerging wirh grear difficulry.
The monarchy has imposed a political culture dOl1nated by tradition nevertheless
endowed wirh a power that rr:1llscends a local eontexr and allowing ir ro face
rhe changing conditions. The combination of rhree revised, redefined facters
depending on ncw l11utarions and changes enable the regime ro endogenize rhe
new infomlation of rhe socio-political evolution wirhour eonrradiction and ro
accept refonns withour jeopardizing rs power.
From an analytical poim of view, duee imporrant pacrs or allianees, wirh
their subsequem politieal fonllulae,34 have shaped Moroccan pohrical
 86 LaJ/ra FcliJ/ alld iVr' ~,i.ltgllstias Parejo
architecture: one in rhe 19605, anorher in rhe mid-1970s and srill anorher in
the 19905, still in place today.
The polilieal pacr oJ Ihe 19605
The Moroccan monarchy undersrood early on ehae one of rhe firsr requisires
ro ts survival depended on carefill and obliging policies reJating ro the rural
world, and thus explains irs alliance with the rradirional elites (rural digniranes,
feudalism) and wirh the 111iliral)', as well as ies control over the local adminis-
tration network and irs firnmess towards ehe urban working class (Marais, 1969:
1181-84).
In rhe first years of construcring the ne\V sea re, ehe monarch appeared to
\Vant ro limit social rransfonnation so as nor to upser the equilibrium of che differem
groups. The middle-class rechnicians, \Vho elsewhere belong ro unique parries or
military movel11ents, accept and follow che monarchical policy, following the
example of a bourgeoisie rhar is \vell accustol11ed ro compromising with
rhe lIIak/ze/I. It rherefore enables the monarchy to reesrablish its alliance \Vith che
rural dignitalies and important landowners withour losing rhe suPPOrt of the urban
bourgeoisie feartUI of ascension from the working class. 35 The national movement
and, in particular, rhe Istiqlal are rhe grearesr politicaI losers in rhis sen se but are
compensa red by maintaining rheir economic status as merchant bourgeoisie and
town dignitaries.
Since rhe 19605, local elites have consrieured the gravity center of rhe system
ro rhe monarchy's benefit. The monarchy thereby reno unces profound change
in order ro maintain its power. The dependence on local elires has thus Ied ro a
level of irnmobility \Vith dire consequences for agriculture, administrarion,
educarion and foreign policy, and engendered a very conservative economie
project to proreet the inrerests of rhe most importanc landowners.
"DIe polilieal pacf of Ih e 1970s
If, in rhe period of early independence, the essential allianee made returned
po\Ver ro the feudal dignitaries, in this seeond period, there was an artempt ro
calm the expeetations of a growing bourgeoisie by establishing a public paet
with the rechno bureaueraes and middle classes. The hesitant opening of the
aurhoriranan system in che mid-1970s represented che end of rhe srare of excep-
cion,36 \Vhose repressive and painful sequeIs were ro linger into the following
decades.
In the eeonOrrlle sphere, this paet was embodied by a more dynarrllc voluntarist
econ0l11jc policy. The straregies il11plemenred between 1973 and 1977 con-
sisted in a larger distribution of rhe land,37 the expansion of the public sector
and a process of Moroccanizacion. 38 Subsequently, the dramacization of the
crisis in 1983 led ro the greater presence of the IMF, the withdrawal of the state
and the expansion of liberalisl11 (Ben Ali, 1991: 64-72). The state's withdrawal
from the eeon0l11y actually involved high social costs; a sysrel11atic freezing of
1\:[O/'OCCO: all alltltoritariall sysrc/II 87
wlges, ln increase il,1 the price of sta pIe necessities, unemployment and, more
serious still, rhe exc1usion of the underprivileged classes rhar l11ay find wirhin
integrism rhe ideoIogy rhat cements rheir discoment. Power ieself legitimizes
and is srrengrhened by appropriaring che resources and symbols of religion
(Tozy, 2000). The process of privatization initiated a srrategy that aimed to
redisrribure eeonomic power and provide an opportunity te new men, oper-
aring in favor of rhe middle class in which technocrats and managers were
coexistent. However, rhis did not necessarily mean rhar rhe hegemony could
dispense with its forrner suppore, bur rather that it couId diversify rhe nature
and hierarchy of su eh support.
TI" polificnl 1'"'1 of Ihe 1990s
In rhe 1980s, Leveau declared that, in spiee of rhe numerous ehanges rhat had
raken place in society, they had nor been reflected ar an insrirutionallevel and
rhe regime continued to depend on the lUfal areas, although ie had considerably
diversified its backing. Ben Ali (1991) , however, believes that a sociery in
constant change has led to ehe political response of changing the monarchy's
social paces ro ensure their endurance as master of rhe game. The author
observes rhe decline of rhe lUraI areas and a rapid increase in urbanization, a
decline of the traditional elites (Brahimi, 1992; Bras; 1991; Sehimi 1991), the
steady emergence of rechno bureaucracy and che middle classes, and the afore-
mentioned massive exc1usion of large segments of society. Ir may seem rhar
such transforrnarions do nor affect the essence of power; however, contrary ro
irs appearance as a rigid regime unlikely ro change, 'ir has been able to endogenize
rhe new contribunons thar are an essential part of modem evolunon [ ... ]; and
proven eapable of renovating irs social basis and rhe necessary means for the
control and subordination of sociery' (Ben Ali, 1991: 51).
The primary elires have reacted ro internal and external political pressures,39
becol11ing more deepIy invoIved in rhe economic liberalization process (rhe
adoption of the bw on the privatization of public companies in 1990, rhe
negoriarion of the EU-Morocco Associarion Agreement signed in 1996, etc.)
and initiated a politiealliberalization rha r began with the constitucional refom1s
of 1992 and 1996 (Parejo, 20l0b).
Liberalization encouraged the reforrnulation of alliances from the 1970s in an
inclusive and gradual poJitical pacr involving a diverse and large number of
actors including techno bureaucrars, new farrners, the reinforced middle classes
(with rhe recovery of rhe opposicion's elite), businessmelfw and subsequentIy
elires emerging from the most importam movements of civil society.
The novelty of rhis pacr \Vas tha t it acrually offered rhe opposition che
opportunity ro assume government tasks, an atrempr rhar \Vas fmsrrated in
1993, and culminated in 1998 wirh ehe establishment of Youssoufi's govem-
mento The fOllner opposicion's parries4 1 have subsequently become more
involved in such insritucional compromise and participared in the governments
of Jetrou (2002) and El Fassi (2007).
 88 Ln"ra Feli// alld lVr A /lg//sfias Parejo
Relations witIJ fOl'cigJJ eUtes
The fate and stability of che regime are c10sely relared ro rhe evoluoon ofits relations
\Vi~h rhe USA, Franee and Spain, and to a lesser extent \Virh imemationaJ orgaru-
zatlans (BM and FMI) and rhe oil monarchies. Moroccan relations \Vid, rhe
narthero Mediterranean countries and che Wescem \Vorld in general involved a
~umber of matters rhar clearly supported rhe continuation of rhe regime
(mveS011ent, exporrariol1 of products, a demand for 103ns, etc.), connections rhar
generally opeed for a liberal economy, and thar llave created grear economic
de~endence. The attemp t [Q delay :m outbreak of imemal crisis and pretece rhe
re~me and es cominuity againsr rhrears sllch as social o utbreaks (rhe unsrable
regIOnal sphere, rhe radicalizarion of rhe Salafisc seetors of political Islam, and
che 10ss of Wescern Sahara) is one of che rnain reasoI1S for che emergence of
n~w eeonomic policies. In rhe 1970s, Sllpport was soughr arnong rhe perroleurn
oil monarchies, but, since rh e 1980s, ie has been rhe Wesrern worId rhar has
upheld the majority of Moroeean economie stnleture (Leveau, 1987: 32).
Moroceo IS complerely subj ecr ca rhe vicissirudes of rhe internarional econorny.
~urthe~lOre, its choice of economic model has increased its dependency since
Ir has gven grearer emphasis ro Eurapean e:\.-poru (exrernal rather than internal
demand derennines prodllccion) and internacional funding and investmenr. As a
resu~e, borh ~.e foreign debe and rhe pao-onage ofinrernarional fmancial organizarions
are JeopardlZl11g any potencial solutions for rhe Moroccan economy.
Changes at a poliocal and economic, as \Vel] as nacional and internacio nal
leve1 have llnquesrionably led to condirions rhat are difficlllr for rhe policy-make~
ro control. The main inrernacional financial org.mizanol15 (me World Bank and
rhe Internarional Monecary Fund), rhe major powers ar me cemer of rhe s)'stem
(EU a~eement 1I1 . N ovember 1995) and imporrant economic actors such as rhe
rransnanonal compani es (Vivendi in rhe communication secto r) have an int1u-
en ce on national decision-making. T hese policies are nor only imposed by the
norrhem sraees bur folJow rhe logic of macroeconomics rhar is difficulr ca
conrrol. Such facrors are cerrainly atfecring rhe eounrry 's 'clieme1isric' culture
rhar has nar complecely disappeared bur has had to pllrsue orher channels.
The relations \virh foreign elires are rherefore essemial, and particlllarly wirh
France (fonner French President Jacques Chirac expressed crucial supporr of rhe
Maroccan govemmenr, larer reaffimled by his successor Sarkozy) and rhe USA
(free trade agreemem in 2006), and progressively with Spain (despite the period of
~nsls dllnng rhe seco nd mandare ofrhe PP, its special alliance has been maintained
III full rhetorieal splendor throughoutj. L. Zapatero's lUle). Both European eoun-
t~es hav~ pla~ed a key role in Morccca becoming rhe main beneficiary ofEuropean
ald and 1I1 bemg awarded an advanced sta rus in ies relarians w ith rhe EU in 2008. 41
4. Power structure in Morocco: from semi-competitive to
competitive authoritarianism
Since i~depend~nee, rhe Moroccan polirical sysrem has seen rhree main srages:
a cerrall1 plurahst aurhoritarianism for nearly rhe enrire first decade of its
A4orocco: mI muhoritminu s)'stelll 89
independence, a lare,r closed and repressive authoritarianism which revealed its
emelest f.,ce at the beginning of the "l970s when the painful 'Years of Lead'
were iniriared. Subsequently, in rhe mid-1970s, rhere was a very limired
opening in rhe regim e (followed by rhe inevitable repl'ession rhar is inherent in
any authoritarian sysrem), but ir canrinued ro move rowards semi- compenrive
aurhoritarianism. An increasing numb er of refonTIs accompanied rhe process
rhar, wirh a number of fllIctuarions, eventually led ro a slow rransirion towards
comperirive aurhorirarianism over rhe lasr rwo decades.
The controversia} pracess of Moroecan liberalizarion 43 began under rhe aegis
of Hassan 11 and was accompanied by che refonns sra red in the Constimtions of
1992 and 1996, and by the ehanges whieh \Vere planned for 2011, whieh are
the (CI'IlIil1llS nd qlfo of rhis movement of reforrm. Subsequenrly, rhere was, on the
one hand, a cascade of legislarion within differem areas \virh rhe arrempt ro
marerialize rhese new liberaJizing rrends, and, on rhe orher, a new palirical climare
\Vas defined by a certain level ofhape and optimismo On analysis, [wa phases may
be idenrified: rhe firsr, ar the origin of rhe process, involves rhe long-nmning
inrernal pressures generated by rhe opposirion and civil sociery, as well as
internarional pressure from rhe rr.msnanonal movemem for human righrs
exerted upon rhe United Seares, France and rhe EU ro make rhem respond ro
and question Moroeean power (Feliu, 1996: Chapters V-VI). The seeond scage
involved rhe response of the regime: implemenring refomls and acrivating rhe
political field, al10wing moderare Islamism access to the poliacal and elecroral
arena and requesnng more presenee in in volvemenr fram rhe opposirion in rhe
instirurional process. However, it is nor so much rhar rhe palace has expressed
ies will [Q change (possibly imerprered as another maneuver ro ensure barh irs
supremacy and control over change), buc the way rhis announcement is acrually
perceived within rhe political arena by secondary elites. In orher words, ir is
crucial rhar rbe 'liberalizing intennon be credible enough [Q change rhe str.lregy
of other actors' (O'Donnell and Sehmitter, 1988: 26).
It is uncertain to whar extem rhe opposition believes ir embodies the Iiberalizing
process of the 19905 or if ir understood rhar rhe only altemanve \Vas to accepr a
hypothetieaI transition that largely depended on royal wil! (Boudahrain, 1999:
164,244). Whatever the case, the season oflibe raliza tion did indeed provoke a
certain ehange in str.Hegy. The opposirion increasingly raok 'advanrage of demo-
cratic margins', relinquished head- ro-head confromarion and backed conse nsus, as
demonstrared by rhe almosr unanimous support for che referendum in 1996, and,
later, in rhe responsibilines assumed by irs governmenr since 1998. From rhen
on, it no longer brandished constitucional refom1 as a polirical weapon; wirh irs
strength for politica] negoriation significantIy diminishing, ir has slowly begun
ra undertake and reproduce a political discollrse of 'democratic rrallsirion'.
The serring for rhe new era of Mohamed VI was differem, particularly in
reference ro the main proragonisr: the monarchy. Ir is acceprable ro defme rhe
young monareh's politieal projeet as 'laelUng defmition' (Desmes, 2006). His dilfuse
and blurred propasal navigared on rhe sronny warers of che 'new concepr of
authority' (1999), moving through attempts to sketch out a model of 'speeifieally
90 LII/ra Felil/ al/(I ,,,r AlIgll5tias Parejo
Moroccan democracy' (2001) ro reach rhe recent port of 'a civil monarchy'
(2005), and for w hieh he proposed a 'ne\\' social and politieal pact' including
economic actors and m ore dynamic sectors from civil society. More rhan a new
political pact, ir \Vas actually rhe refomlUlarion of a new social pace to guarantee
che survival of polirical order as esrablished and implemented since rhe 19705.
Wirhour delving inco the cause of this programmatic imprecision ,44 it may srill
be said that Mohamed Vl's peculiar publie, diseursive and media-friendly polie)'
was very profirable for rhe monarchy, e nabling ir ro rerain rhe hegemony of rhe
polirical field and fiercely control rhe process of liberalization; distrring it and
reconsrrucring ir t such an exrent rhar ir actually hampered democratizarion
and would endanger ts Status. Not only have Mohamed VI and the plimary elires
refused to yield any fonnal, material or economic po\Ver, rhey have also invaded
and colonized new ateas wirhin convencional instimrions and srrengrhened
beyond proportion a parallel institucional network.
The majoriry of the elhe and rhe opposirion , disconcerted by a logic with
complere disregard for polirical negoriarion, have at least publicly declined their
judgment on the perfoOllance of the monarchy, as if they were guaranrors of
the country's stabiliry after the royal succession. They have percepriveIy lowered
their demands, avoided direcr or frontal pre5sures related ro rhe regime, been
led by rhe inertia of che sys remic game, and limited theit capaciry for initiative,
prescriprion and provocacion. Whether from sheer exhaustion or mere pragma-
tism, the y seemed to lack rhe courage ra propase any alremacive si tu arion or
project. Mrer decades of making consritucional refonn a requisite for polirical
acrion, rhe opposi rion raok refuge in consensus :md concentrared alJ irs efforts
in polirical reforms. The limits of this second-rank refonnist strategy have
become evident in the last two governments (Y ousouffi and J etto u) borh
weakened and \" ith their hands ried by the royal omnipresence.
Yer rhe opposicion mighe well be playing rhe card of a non-ma.'\:imalisr
opposition , ' His Highness' opposition' and nar rhe 'oppasicion againsr His
Highness', \vieh (he intention of slowly exrracring a transfer of power. And ir
may \Vell be the reason it avoided an open debate on constitucional refoOll,
conscitutive assembl y and che separarion of power with a serious disadvamage
where force is concerned. Now, rhe risks of this posirion of 'co mpromise', if too
long or wirhout any cangible polirical change for rhe better among the population,
could confine the opposirion to a circular powe t telarion, which would distan ce
them fram thejr foundacions and certain sectors of the inrellige nce services and,
more dangerol1s still, would furrher widen rhe gap separating rhem from the
Moroccan people.
These rrends oucline the transirion from semi-comperiri ve te comperirive (or
electoral) amhorirarianism. 45 The arti culation of rhe four arenas of democraric
protest that Levitsky and Wa)' (2002: 54-57) describe in their system atization of
rhe concept is slightly lacking. In the electoral arena, elecrions have been held
regulad)' sinee 1997. Sinee 1993, there has been an apparent ten den e)' for
greater freedom and rransparency; however, the legal and political condirions of
rhe electoral pracesses prevent any policical parry from rea chin g a majoriry or
/\tIorocco: all alltllOritmiall s}'stem 91
any impo rra nr parliamenrary respo nsibiliry,46 while there are scill political actors
being excluded rrom elecroral competirion. Within rhe legislarive arena,
rhe parliament is weak, lacks auco nomy and shows a high degree of parridist
fragmentation - espeeially sinee the elections in 2002 (Szmolka, 2009). The
importanr partidisr atomizarion and omnipresence of rhe monarchy dOllds
rhe notions of rhe govern m enr and parliamemary opposirion and makes a dear
vision of any possible conRicr berween them diffi clllr. The judicial arena 1S far
from being an independenr power rhar would ensu re respect for the ntle of
law. Finally, within the m edia, an independent press has emerged; participating
fuIl)', and pushi ng the Iiberalization proeess to the limit, w hile being hmhly
persecured for doing so.
In the last Hassanian deeade, the liberalized autoeracy (Brumberg, 2003) \Vas
characrerized, on rhe one hand, by a certain opening of rhe decision-making core,
appreciaced in rhe process of political negociarion and pennanenr communication
w irh [he political forces and rheir leaders; and, on rhe orher hand, by a co ntrol
of the pyramid basis rhrollgh two main elel11en rs: electoral engineering (Lpez
Garda, 2000b) , aud the inclllsion / exclusion of acto rs in and from the politieal
field, rhrough rhe bino mial repression-cooprion.
The fimdamenral novelry of rhe monarchical cransition is the (.,c[ thar
M ohamed VI seems to reverse rhe operations of the fonner authorirariallisl11.
Two sil11ultaneous processes may characterize rhis new aurhorirarianism: the
reinforcement and concenrration in rhe authorirarian apex rhar inrenrionall y
dispenses with any protocol or negoriation \Virh disrinct palirical fOnluciolls;
rhe ocher is an e::-.. pansion ar rhe base of rhe pyr.mud of competitive dil11ensio n in
rhe electoral processes. The electoral dimension has therefore become strollger,
repression has diminished, che number of acro rs has increased, there is greate r
room for maneuver in electo ral competirion, and likewise the authoritarian
dimension has been given new impetus. The new f.lce of authoriraTIanism renews
cooption and rhe distriburion of privare goods, underta ken by convencional
s[are instirutions, and creates new elitist agencies through paral1e1 insrimtiollal net-
works (conmUssions and councils) rhat avoid and marginalize the foOlla! insrirurions
of power, reduce and isolate decision-making capaciry and polirical exercise imo
very elase cireles. These drcles of primary elires face rhe paradox of fostering
changes which \vould direcrIy affecr their privileged positions of power. In June
2011, the exrent of the constituuonal reforn1s was due ro be revealed.
A foreseeable future is che co ntinual evolurion of aurhorirarianism \Vich a
particular emphasis on ies competirion and modernization. les grearesr challenge is ro
efficiem1y manage the public poJicies rhar would regain the rntsr of Moroccan citi-
zens and vorers. Currencly, the principal systemic risks are relared te the complicated
social quesrion and es consequent and foreseeabie outbreaks, and the Damocles
sword rhar is the threat of terrorismo However, rehJls sic s{{1I1diblfS Moroccan
aurhoricarianism is healthy and rhere is likely ro be a ca1culared, gradual evolurion,
ro adjust ro the internal socio-poliucal evolucion, internacional &ames of reference,
certain demands from the United Sta res and the slight pressure ofEuropean policies
(the Barcelona process, che Union for rhe Medirerranean, etc .... ).
92 Laura Felil/ (lIId J\lr AIIgll51ia5 Parejo
Notes
This research has been undertaken within che frame\Vork of che following projects:
'Observacono poltico Espaa-Magreb: liberalizacin poltica y migraciones', SEC 2005-
08867-C03--02 ('Politica! observarory Spain-Maghreb: politicalliberaliZ:ltion and nligrations'),
funded by rhe Ministry of Education \Virh principal researcher M' Angustias Parejo.
'Anlisis de las transiciones polticas en el mundo rabe' ('Analysis of che political trami-
rions in the Arab world') is subsidized by che CIOOB Foundation and direcced by Ferran
Izquierdo . Our :malysis is based o n che Sociology of power (see Izquierdo, 2008; and
Izquierdo & Kemou, 2009).
2 A more restriccive approach would ead us to consider che nacional movemem as a
struccure shaped wichin che framework of che Fighc for Independence, from chree main
forces: the resistan ce and the Lberation Anny (ALN), the Moroccan Labor Union
(UMT) ,nd the party of lstiqlal (pacejo, 1999" 150).
3 The monarch can proclaim rhe staee of exceprion and take up again che totality of
po\Vers (are. 35 of rhe Consticution), dissolve che Chambers (art. 27) and choose fivc out
of rhe nine members of rhe High Council of Magistrares, which he nlles, among orher
prerogatives.
4 TeI QlleI, no. 339 (Seprember 20ch-26th 2008), p. 3.
5 The FAR (Royal Armed Forces) were officially created in May 1956 and had Moham-
med V as che Supreme Comm::mder and Hassan 11 as [he Chief of Sraff. lo 1960, wilac
\Vas lefr of the Moroccan Liberation Anny joined these Forces. Mos[ of the Moroccan
officers c10se ro Hassan 11 had been rrained in che French colonial amly, as bad che
generals Oufkir and Ameziane.
6 The DST is an independent service cn:ared in 1973 to wruch most of rhe enforced
potitical disappearances during the leading years are attributed. The connection between
che differem corps can be exemplified by its fomler director H. Lan.igri, who \Vas
second te Kadiri for che DGED and was originally with rhe Geodannerie, \Vrule o ne of
his sons beg:ll1 ro work as the maio supervisor of palacc security.
7 Te! Q/le!, no. 342 (Octobor llth-17cl, 2008), p. 46.
8 In che intricate worId of Moroccan elire rebcionships, ir is most revealing thac General
H. Benslimane, Ismail Alaoui, che general secre raIY of rhe fonner Moroccan Communist
Party (PPS), and Saad Hassar, che State Interior sccretaIY, are borb the nephews of
Dr Abdelkrim Kharib, rhe fonner leader of rhe Justice :md Development Party (PJD).
Another example is the family El Fassi wirh dozens of distinguished members (such as the
Minister of Foreign Aff."lirs who is rhe nephew of Abbas el Fassi, rh e prime minister).
9 In November 1999, Caprain Adib acc used his supenors of corruptioo in the French
newspaper Le Momlc. In FebruaIY 2000, he \Vas sentenced in rhe firsr instance tO five
years in prison, a sentence invalidated by the Sup reme Court of Raba c. In Occober, the
Military Court of Rabar sentenced him to twO :md a half years in prison for 'offense to
rhe anny'.
10 The magazine co/lolllic & Emrepn'ses pubJished an article on rh e fishing businesses of
General H. Benslimane, Commander of the Royal Gend:mnerie, and Lieutenant General
A. El Kadiri, fonn erly responsible for the DGDE, as owners of che company Kahen Pesca
(Ka for Kadiri and Den for Eenslimane), which possessed four fishing licenses for export
ro Spain. In 2003, chey c10sed the campany. Anorher general in charge of che south area
(Sahara), A. Bennani, owns che company 'Royal F' which has 19 fisrung licenses. Aceording
to certain sources, rhese companies may possibly bcnefit from EU subsidies (annually 1,000
million DH) in compcnsation for the fishing activiries ofEuropean hoats.
11 Inrerview with AbdeJlacif Aguenouch in Le Q/lolidic/I dr .Maroe, Novcmber 27th 2000.
12 ln lis \Vork, El Messaoudi analyzes rhe ministcrs \Vho have been in charge since independence
umil Youssoufi's governmem (El Messaoudi, 1999, 2003). The prescn ce of women in
governmenr began in 1997 with the royal appoimmenr of four female sccrctaries of stace
in the cabinet presided over by Filali: Noulikha Nasri for Social Aff.1irs, Aziza Eennani
Nlorocco: aJl alllllOritfll;fII/ 5)'51CIII 93
for C ulcure , NawaJ Mourawacil for SportS and Amina Benkhadra for Energy and Mines.
In the [WO foUowing governments, women's reprcsemation was reduced by hale In the
firsc govemmem of Youssoufi (1998), rwo women held [\Vo secretariats of state (out of
rhe 41 members onJy 4.87 percl!nr are \Vomen): Nouzha Chekrouni, in charge of the
Depart\11ent of Handicapped People in rhe Minisrry of Social Development, Solidariey
Work and Professional Fonnation, and Aicha Belarbi, hcad ofthe Depanment ofCooper.nion
in ch e Minisny of Srare of Foreign Affairs :l.l1d Cooperarion. Following the restru crunng
of rhe govemmem of YOllssoufi in September 2000, only one woman remained (out of
rhe 33 nlinisters. chis represented 3 perccnc), Nouzha C hekro uni, ch e delega red Minister
of Women's Condition, Family and Childhood Prorcction and Integration of rhe Han-
dicapped . In Jeuou's govemment (2002), three women held responsibilities (ouc of che
38 minisrers, rrus rook rhe represenration ro 7.8 percent): Nouzha Chekrouni, who
participaced in [he fomlcr govemmcms of You.ssoufi, holds. the posi.ri~n of Mini~ter
delegated in Charge of rhe Moroccans who Reside Abroad, m the MIIlJStry o[ Forclgn
Aff."lirs and Cooperation, y. Badu is head of the secretanat of statc, holding ministerial port-
fo lios as impottant as those ofher male coUeagues and Najima Rhozali, Secrecary ofStare
ae the Ministry of National Education and Youth in charge of literacy and non-fo rnlal
education (El Messaoudi, 2010: 8; Parejo, 1999b: 154-55; Szmolb. 2003: 199 and 132).
13 See Stonn (2007: chaprers 6 and 7) on th e govcmmenr's frail independence and its
constitucio nally and politicaUy compromised posiciono
14 Within rhis renewaJ, rhe inclusion of women in th e parliamentary arena should be
naced. Unti! 1993, Moroceo had been one of the few coumnes in the \Vorld and the
only one in Maghreb in \Vluch women were excluded [rom parliamem. In 1993, rwo
women gained access ro rhe parliamenr, Latifa Bennai-Smires (PI) :l.Od Badea Skalli (USFP),
rcpresenting 0.6 percent of the deputies. In 1997, the same guara was maimained in the
Chambcr of Represencarives, \Vith Eadea Skalli confmrung her seat and Facima
Belmoud en. ano rher sociaJisc member of parliamcm, winnjng a seat (0.6 percenc of the
C hamber). In dle Chamber of Advisors. rwo women were elecred, one fro m che MOS
and another socialisc, Fatima Soussi (0.74 percem of rhe Chamber). In 2002, and thanks
ro rbe establishment of the system of quotas, female representation iocreased to 35
depurics (10.8 percem of the C hamber), a proportiona! \Veight thar decreased by a few
tenths in the Chamber of Represenratives (10.46 perccnt) in 2007 with 34 members of
parliamen r (Parejo, 1999b: 154 and dara from rhe lnterparliamemary Union).
15 W e rcfer ca rhe period 1977- 93. A5 far as \Ve are aware , cbere has not been any renewaJ
of staff wirhin parliamenc after this date (parejo, 1999b: 89-1 18).
16 The councils comprise represematives elecred by local collectiviries, members of rhe
professional chambers and Uluo ns, and members of parliament selected on a regional
level. Thc presidents of prefectural and provincial assemblies may pareicipate bur only in
an advisory capacity.
17 On paper, che jurisdiction may seem relevanc but ir is linlited te very specific aspects,
among \Vhich is voting on budgets, and cerrain compccences relating co educarion,
p:mimony and healrh.
18 L'Opi"ioll Oanuary 3rd 1996), p. 8. .
t 9 The new Code stipulates three- to five-year sentences (prevlOusly five to twenty) for
dcf.1mation againsr rhe king or his f.1mily. A joumaJisc can be impriso ned for a writren
article. The governme nt may aJso prohibir :my publicacion (are. 29) that manifests ideas
against Islam, the monarchy, territorial imegrity or public order, which may lend itself ro
very diverse interpretations. Howcver, prolbirion musc be justified in coure, and is no
longer merely adminisrrative.
20 See ww\V.demainonline.com or \V\vw.lakome.co m
21 Art. 108 of the Comtitution stipula tes char anything rela[ing to che monarchy and rdigion
cannot be subjec t ca constiturional revision.
22 The r/wk/rz eJI is a narion ch at usuaJly appears in bibliographies about Moro cco and is
commonly used in Moroccan politica! culture. At the end ofrhe nineteenth century, the
 -
94 Lwra Felilf a/ld lH a Allgustias Parejo
IIwkflZCII referred co rhe Morocc:m government, constituted by che Cherifian dynasties
(Saadi and Alaouice). After independence, in che mid-rwentieth ccnrury, rhe lIIakJzC/l
losr ie; official use but remained within socio-political life. It is currently understood as a
structure, a government practice and a group of institlltions. This 'ancient magic word'
corresponds ro che structure ofMoroccan political power in two spheres: one represenred by
the tnditiona! system and embodied by the sultan, Cherif, Emir El Mllminin, the other, by
rhe modem strucrure chat re vol ves around a king, a reigning head of state \Vho rei~s
and rules. The makJzclI is a \Vay co exert power, che means of conscituting the adnunis-
trative apparacus and to rule che sllbjects sum.ining it; it is a projecrion of the f.1milv and
a patriarchal authority over staCe organization. Ir is the visible f.1ce of neoparrimoni;lism.
The lIIakflZC/I also illudes co an institutional realit)' rhar includes any institution \"ith fomlal
po\Ver and che parallel net\Vork of structures endo\Ved \Virh material power, bOtl1 constitllting
the framework of che authoritarian system (parejo, 1999b: 260, 2004: 102- 3).
23 El Pas (November 17rh 2007).
24 In ]anuary 2008, che eighch secrion of che Madrid Provincial Audienee acknowledges
char, in a case of def.lmation \Vhere c\vo joumaliscs from the press agency reported Ali
Lrnr.lbec (a joumalisc at the time for El MIli/do), the MAP collabor.ued \Vith che Moroccan
secret services and rhat people closely rebted ro the DGED \Vere appointed to run che MAP.
25 In 1984,2 million households were classified as 'poor' and World Bank expens estimated
that 5.6 million people belonged to this category. The 10 percene consumpcion nte of che
poorest households was recorded at 1.9 percene of the country's total expenditure, whereas
10 percent ofche wealthiest households \Vere responsible for 30.9 percene (Djillali, 1991: 496).
According to the report on human developmene in Morocco, undertaken in 2006
(AA.VV., 2006), the poverty r.\te in Moroeco - e.g. less than six dirhams per day for food
and Iess than 11 for living- has dropped from 21.2 percent in che mid-1980s ro 13.1 percent
in 1990-91, 19 percent in 1988-89 and lastIy n.8 percent in 2000-01.
26 This subject is discussed in a polemic book written by Mohamed Diouri (1992).
27 See the December 2009 US Embassy report'i made public by WikiLeaks: 'Ver los
informes de la Embajada de Estados Unidos de diciembre de 2009 en esta direccin,
hechos pblicos por wikileaks.'
28 P]D seeks f.tithful partidist rebrions tl1rough constancy in its politics, based on proximiry
and a scrong discursive consiscency, as well :1S internal discipline, irreproachable behavior
and the conscientious work of its deputies (Fem:lndez, 2007: 27).
29 Abdallah El Harrifs Vie Dmocratique (Annahj Addimocrari), Ahmed Benjelloun and
Abderrahmane Benameur's Avant Garde Social Democratic Party (pADS, At-talia) and
GSU, United Socialisc Lefr, which comprises diverse rrends ofleft-wing excremisrs.
30 This claim includes rhe demand for the crearion of a constitutional frame with common
legitimacy (a chasen eonstituent or narional conference), a text that would guarantee the
separation of power and rhe responsibility of rile executive power.
31 The main terrorist offense took place in May 2003 in Casablanca with five simultaneous
attacb, which caused rhe death of forty-five people (including four Spanish people). In
March and April 2007, four ]ihadist~ died in suicide attacks. More recently, in April 2011,
another terrorist artack in a \Vell-known tourist cafe in Marrakeeh left si:xteen dead.
32 This tenn refers here to the bOllrgeoisie represenced by the lstiqlal ar rhe moment of
independence. This class has remained throughout al1 the regimes in po\Ver since the
nineteenth cenrury in Morocco (Marais, 1969: 1172).
33 See Leveau (1985: '11-19) on the control of the rural areas under che protecronte and
indigenous policy.
34 In a fonner study, Parejo (2004) proposed an opcrativization of rhe concept of political
fonnulae, shaping it around five variables: the principIes of che regime, representativity,
councerparcs for the freedom of its actors, che people excluded from rhe svstem and the
Jinuts of the process. . process and obstmct a democratizaton thar \Vould jeopardize ltS status.
35 See 'La reconstruction du sysceme des lites locales', che first part of rhe \Vell-known
work by Leveau (1985: 7-100).
AIorocco: (//1 aurllOritariml s)'srclIl 95
36 On June 7th 1965, Hassan 11 pubJished a decrce in which he proclaimed the state of
exception based on ' his ineerpretation of art. 35 of the Constiturion. The rcasons rhar
may explain his decision are, on the one hand, hi~ discontent with the way the first
parliamentary experienee had unfolded (1963-65); he was unable to cultivare a consiscent
loyalisc majoriry thar would support the govemment's acuon and the king's poJicies, and the
opposition (wirh a similar weight to that of rhe pro-monarchisrs) used che Chamber of
Representatives as a political tribunc srretching its constitucional possibilities to the
maximum ro harass the governmene and put pre'isure on the palace. On the other hand,
the opposition parties refused the proposal pur forward by the monarchy in April co
participare in a govemment of national uniry, afrer the repression ofthe strikes in March that
began in Casablanca and spread chroughout the most importanc cicies ofthe country. Hassan
11 undercook rhe presidency of the firsr govemmenr of exception (1965-67), dissolved
che chambers, marginalized the poJitical parties, repressed the opposic'ion and tried co
de-politicize public Jife. Ic is a period that \vas marked by a certain traditionalization, a
total concentration of power in che monarch '5 hands and a growing leve! of responsi-
bility ror the miJitJ.ry. The constitucional revision in 1970, ratified on JuIy 24th,
is officially seen as rhe end of the srate of exception, alrhough it only supposes its
constitutionalization.
37 Following the military coups onJune 10th 1971 and Allgust 16th 1972, bnd distribution
accelenred and, in 1976, reached a volume of disrribution ten times higher than rhat
between 1956 and 1970, a tocal of 400,000 hectares (Martnez Castellanos, 1992).
38 Moroccanization favored a financial concentration that benefited che high-ranking officers
responsible for che stace and some important Moroecan f.tnulies; 36 capitalisc f.tmiJies eon-
trolled 220 million dirhams, around 64 percent of rhe capital mecred by Moroecanization.
According ro Raki (1981), Moroccanization led ro a reduction of the socio-poltical
spaee oecupied by agrarian capital, consequencly questioning the privileged status of the
agrarian bOllrgeoisie.
39 In rhe first case, there are lengchy claims from the opposition (parejo, 1999c) and the
two strongest movements of the incipient civil socieey (prez, 2006a, 2006b): the human
rights (Feliu, 2004, 2006; Prez, 2003) and women's movements (prez, 2006c, 2007;
Rallrez, 2004). In rhe second, influences are more evanescent and less distinctive,
caused by the wave of democracization subsequent co che f.111 of the Berlin wall coupled
\Vith more detectable and subscantial influences, the result ofthe Moroccan regime's per-
ception of foreign activity and policies of the United Staees and France as chreatening
(feJiu, 1996: Chapters V-VI).
40 Tlus category is promoted and seasoned \Vith academic and mling political discourse as
the 'modern heroes' of economic and political Morocco. The well- kno\Vn businessmen
are presented as rhe avant-garde of change, whose action cannot bur bring benefits ror
che colleccivity's welf.1re (Catusse, 2002: 116).
41 USFP, PI and PPS are present in both Jettou and El Fassi's governments.
42 'Advanced status' means an intensifieation of political and securiry cooperation, rhe pre-
paration of a fOllrth ambicious agreemenc on global free tnde, the progressive integr.ltion of
Morocco in diverse sectorial policies within the EU and a higher level of exchange benveen
both countries.
43 The tenn liberalization here refers ro a process of expansion and the redefinition of
rights. 'We have named liberalization rhe process of redefining and extending rights ( ... )
By liberalization we mean che process in which certain rights which protect individuals
and social groups from arbitrary and illegal acts perfonned by the state or by third parties
becomes etTective' (O'Donnell and Schnutter, -1988: 20).
44 Perhaps due to a lack of direcrion, obstacles seen as rhrears or, on the contrary, a calcu-
lared planning to maintain irs political hegemony, and fiercely control the liberalization
45 Levitsky and Way used che concept of comperirive authoritarianism ro illustr.ue a
derenllined category of regimes wluch conjugare democratic resources, such as elections,
96 Lallm Felill alld kr Allgl/stias Parejo
wirh the endurance of forms of auchoriutive power (L evitskl' and Way, 2002: 5 t). In the
Morocc:1O case, dlere is a transition from a semi-compeci cive (Noh.lell , '1981: 574-75) [O
competitive authoritarianism (parejo :lI1d Veguilla, 2008: 12; Parejo, 20 1Oa: 368, 369,
398, Szmolka, 2009, 12).
46 The primary politicaJ forces in the JaSt three parliaments h;lVe obtained scarce repre-
sentarian: in 1992; the USFP achieved 17. 5 percent ; in 2002, the socialists dropped [O
15.25 pereent; and in 2007, che PI had 16 pereem.
Bibliography
AA.VV. (2006) Cillqlwmc miS de dllcfoppemclIf 111/111(1;11 mI M aroe & perspcctilcs 2025, Rabat
(http://www.rdh50.ma / )
Ayache, A. (1 997) Ewdcs d'fisroirc socia/e II/arocaillc, R abar Okad: Al Asas, Rabat.
Ayaru , Mahammcd El, Bourqia, Rahma and Darif, Mohamed (2005) rat, lIIollareJic er rcfigioll,
Fondation Abderrahm Bouabid - FAB, Rabat.
Ben Ali, Dris (199 1) 'Changement de pacee social ee coneinuie de l'ordre politique au
Maroc', ClulIIgelllcllrs poliriqllcs mI Magllrcb, CNRS, Paris , pp. 51 - 72.
Benhaddou, AJi (1997) Maroe: Les lircs dll R o}'ntl/lle. Essai SIIr I'orgallisatio/l dI/ pOl/voir m/
Maroe, L'H annattan, Paris.
Benhlal , M. (1984) 'Le syndicat comme enj eu politique au Maroc ( /955-1981)', in Amlllaire
de l'Alriquc du No rt11982, CNRS, Paris, pp. 2 17-58.
Bennani-C hr.bi, Mounia (2004) 'Reprsemer et mobiliser dans l'lection lgislative au
Maroe', in M. Bennani-Chralbi, M. Carusse and J. c. Samucci , Seellcs el eOll/isses de l'lce-
tioll au MarO(. Les fgislatil'es 2002, IREMAM , KarthaJa, pp. 15- 53.
Baudahrain, Abdcll ah (1999) , IIO/WCal/ Maroe polit;q/I/: qucl al'c/sir?, Socit d'dition
et Diffusion al Madariss, Casablanca.
Brahimi, Mustapha (1992), 'Grandeur et dcadellce des lices mra1cs', in Noureddine
el Aoufi, dir., L1 socit ciIJile aH Maroe, Smer, R aba t.
Bras,jean Philippc J 199 1) ' la recherche des lites locales' , in AH Sedjari (Ed.), Etar, espaec et
pO/lJloir local, Guessous, Rabat.
Bmmberg, Daniel (2003) 'Liberalization versus Demacrac)', Understanding Arab Political
Reform', IIVorki/lg Pllpas, Cartlcgic Elldol/Jlllcmjor Jmcntatiollal Peaec, no. 37.
Catusse, M)'riam (2000a) 'conomie des lections au Maroc', Maglrre-MaeJrek, no. 168,
pp. 51-66.
- -(2oo0b) 'Les entrepreneurs marocains, nouveaux dfenseurs du Trone?: Sur la constmction
sociale et poJitique d'une ca rgorie librale', Congres de J'AlSP, Qu hec, Le Magllre emn:
Globalisatiou et Dmocratisatioll. Ha fOe eOll/lll' modcle.
- - (2002) 'JI r.1ut grer la chose publiqu e come une en trcprise.. ', in Aj Sedjari (Ed.) ,
Elitcs, gOlwema//(ce l gestiolld,, (ltallgcmcm, L'Harmatt:m, GRET, Rabat,pp. 113--42.
Dcsrues, Thieny (2006) 'Maroc. Chronique politique 2004: De la 1110 narchie excutivc o u les
apories de la rente goscrargique', L'A/l/le dl/ Magltreb 2004, CNRS, Paris, pp. 243-73.
Diauri, M. (1992) Prefacc de M. Ahmed Rami, A qfli appartic/l l /CMaroe?, L'Hannattan , Pans.
Djillali, Liabcs (1991) 'Prcarisation croissante ce aggravation des ingalits sociaJes', in
C. Lacoste and Y. bcosre (Eds), L'tat du Magllrcb, La Dcollverte, Paris, pp. 494-97.
El Messao udi, Amina (1999) Les millistres da/ls Ic s)'stcmc politiqlfC llIarocnilf, Universidad de
Rabae, Tesis Doctoral de la Facultad de Derecho.
- -(2003) 'Les ministres de Hassan II. Continuit ou renouvell emen t?', in Noureddine Scicb
(Ed.), AI/ciell//es ctllofHIcllcs litcs d" Maghre, INAS, CRES and DISUD, Aix-en- Provence,
pp. 1 39~ 8.
iV[o/'Occo: mI multorirmi(/J/ system 97
--(2010) ' Gobeman~a y realidades electorales en Marruecos: las legislativas de 2007',
unpubJishcd.
FcJiu, Laura (1996) LA i/if/uc/lcill del sislcma il/tcmacio/laf sobre la sitl/ao deis drcls IlIfll/aus 111
MarrO( (1981- 1994), Universitat Au{o noma de Barcelona, Doctoral thesis, Facultar de
Ciencies Politiques i Soci ologa.
- -(200 1) ' Fellahs, cades, militantes y ministros en MalTIlecos', in Mariano Aguirre and
Mabel Gonzlez (Eds), Polticas I/lll/ldialcs, IC/l dCllcias pcligrosas. Clm!es sobre la rcalidml imemado/wl.
A /m ario CIP 2001 , Fundacin Hogar del Empleado, Icari a, Barcelona, pp. 213-36.
- -(2004) Eljardll secrelo. JS difcl/Sorcs dc los derechos 1/IIIIUlIlOSCll Mam/cCils, Instiruto Universitario
de Desarrollo y Cooperacin, Madrid.
- -(2005) 'El frente de rechazo y las elecciones lcgslativas de 2002: E~pacio poltico y
marginalidad en Mamlt!cos', in Amina El Messilouru and Joan Vintr (Eds), Elcerio/lcs, par-
tidos }' GobicfIlo e/I Manl/ccos, tEMED, Institu t de Dret Pblic, Tirant 10 Blanch, Valencia,
pp. 38-63.
- -(2006) 'El movimiento de derechos bumanos marroqu. Desafios )' riesgos ante un
contexto nacional e imemacional en cambio' , in Cannelo Prez (Ed.), Sociedad cillil, dcrcdws
IIIIIIWI/OS )' tlellloeracia ell Ham/ceos, Universidad de Granada, Granada, pp. 239-65.
- -(2007) 'Balance provisional de la Instancia Equidad y R econciliacin', AHuario del
Meditcrr!mco. Med. 2006, IEMed., CLDOB, Barcelona, pp. 125-27.
Fem:indez, Irene (2007) Le PjD Cl la politique I:trm/gere d" Maroe. E/Jtre I'idologie et le pmgmatisme,
C lDOB, Documentos Meditcrcineos, 7.
Gellner, Emest (1986) LA soeit'dad ml/sulmal/a, FCE, Mjico.
Ibarra, P., Mam, S. and Goma, R . (2003) (Eds), Creadores tic democracia radical, Icaria, Barcelona.
Izquierdo, Ferran (2007) 'Poder )' transicin poltica en el Mundo rabe', AlI'mq, no. 24,
pp. 123-66.
- -(200B) Poder }' felicidad. VI/a propl/esta elc sociologla del poder, Madrid, La Catarata.
Izqui erdo Brichs, F. & Kemou, A. (2009) 'La sociologa del poder en el mundo rabe COI1 -
tempocineo' . In Izquierdo Brichs, F. (Ed.) Poder}' re.~lllelles e/l e! mili/do rac (ol/tcmporneo.
Barcelona, Cidob/Bell aterra.
jamai, Aboubakr, Younes, AJanu and Fahd, Icaqui (2005) 'Combien vous callee la monarchie?',
LcJollflUlI Hebdomadtlirc, no. 230, Novembcr 12th-18th, pp. 22- 27.
j ordan, Javier (2005) 'El terrorismo yihadista en Espaa', )'ihadlllollitor (http://www.athenain
teIligence.org/ o traspu blis/ terrorismo Yihadista.pdf), March.
lGrhIani, Said (2011) 'La salcifi)'a: un nuevo "movimiento" en fase de gestacin', A ulisis de!
Obsewalorio electoral TEIM, March 2nd 20 11.
Leveau, R my (1985) Lejella/ marocai" djel/se/l r 11" TrOJ/e, PFNSP, Paris.
- - ( 1987) 'Stabilit du pouvoir monarchiqu e et financeme nt de la dette', Mag/lrc-Maehrek,
i\tIllI/de Arabe, no. 11 8 (Ocrobcr-December), pp. 5- 19.
- -(1 993) Le sabrc el le l/Irbal/ : I'mlel/ir dfl Maglrreb, Fran ~ois Bourin, Paris.
Levskl', S. and Way, L A. (2002) 'Elections without Democracy. The Rise to Competitive
Authoriur:ianism',jol/mal q{ Dell/oerat)', vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 51-65.
Lpez Garca, Bemab (1989) Poltica }' 1/I00,im;CIItos sociales ell el Magreb, CIS, Siglo XXI, Madrid.
- -(2000a) JHamlccos cn ImIlCC: N I/cvo Re)', //II evo siglo, / //I C/IO rgimclI? Biblioeeca Nueva,
Madrid.
- -(2000b) lHam/ecos polftico. el/arCilla mios de }Jwcesos electorales (1960-2000), CIS, Madrid.
Marais, Oceave (1964) 'La classe dirigeante au Maroc' , R e/I//C Frml(aisc de Scicl/cC Politiquc, vol.
XIV, no. 4, pp. 709-37.
- -(1969) 'Les relations entre la monarchie er la c1asse dirigeantc au Maroc', RCIJIIC Fm//(aisc
de Sciellce Poliliq/lc, voL X IX, no. 6, pp. 1172- 86.
98 Lal/ra FcliH alld lVI" Allgl/stias Parejo lHorocco: mi tlutl/Orirmiall s)'srem 99
M:mnez Castellanos, Amonio Javier (1992) Aspeaos gmemles de la jloUlim agmria II/mToqll. - -(2006c). 'Mujeres I.m.rroques ante la refonlla de la M//(lafl/{!/U1 : cambio social y referente
El desm1'cJ/lo de la agriwllllm delltro del proceso de plallijimcin t'CcJIIIII;CO )' social dc Marmecos cultural', in Camlelo Prez (Ed.), Sociedad civil, dCfcdros fl/llll(l/I OS }' demoaaa ell Mam/ccos,
illdepcl/dicllte, MA dissenation, Depamnent of Semitic Studies, University of Granada. Editorial Universidad de Granada, Granada, pp. 69-1 13 .
Noh1en, Dieter (1981), Sistcmas electorales (leI mili/do, Centro de Esrudios Constirucionalcs, Madrid. --(2007). 'Mujeres, camb io social e identidad en el Mundo Arabe: el caso de Maffilecos'
O'Don nell, Guillenn o and Schminer, Philippe C. (1988) Tmllsi(iO/lcs desde "" gobicnlo ffl llorirario. en El Mediterrlleo, cO/ifrollltldl/ o e//O/cIlIrO?, Gobierno de Aragn, Departamemo de
Vol. 4 COlldl/siolles tclltatill(/'s sobre 1M dCllloaad{/.S il/ciertas, Paids, Buenos Aires, Barcelona, MxlCO. Educacin, C ultura y Deporte, pp. 135- 156.
Ojeda, Raquel (2002a) Pollims de rlescclltrnlizadlI CII Marn/{xos. El proceso de regiolllllizadII, Raki, Mohamed (1981) 'Etat, capital agraire ee imprialismc, A l Asas, pp. 19-24.
Instituto Andaluz de Administracin Pblica, Junta de Andaluca, Sevilla. Ramrez, ngeles (2004) 'Oriente es OrientCf Feminismo e islamismo en Maffilecos',
- -(2002b) 'El pro ceso de regionalizacin en Maffilecos', RCI/ista de FO/m'lIro Social, Rellista IlIrel"/laciollal (le Soci()/('ga, no. 39, pp. 9- 33.
no. 225,january-March , pp. 151-73. Saadi, Mohamed S:d (1989) Les gral/pes fi /UlIIcit'r5 aH Maroe, Okad, R abat.
- - (2003) 'Les lites locales f.1ce ala dcenrraJ isation', in Noureddine Sr.'eb (Ed.), AI/aml/cs et Sehimi, Mustapha (199 1) ' Les lites locales entre "cribalisme" el majzen', in.Ali Sedjari (Ed.),
I/ol/lIcl!es li/cs du Magll reb, NAS, CREs and DISUD, Aix-en-Provence, pp. 167-83. Elar, cspace el pOIII'oir local, GlIessolls, R abat.
- - (2004) Po/{ticas dc distribuci" tmiron'al del podcr C/I .Marn,ccos. El proccso de dcscelllmlizacin Stoml, Lise (2007) Delllocm/izruioll 111 Morocco. R ourlcdge, London and New York.
((lJIIII/MI, Comares, Granada. Szmolka, Inmaculada (2003) Actores)' proceso pollico CII Mam/ecos. Dillrmicas illlemas }' SIIS
Parejo, M 1 Angustias (1997a) 'Limites al estado neopatrimonial en Marruecos. Nuevas dinmicas pcrcepcicmcs CII la prcusa cspm;(l/a , Doctora) thesis, University o r Granada.
y recomposicin de las relaciones clientela res' , in Truerry Desrues and Eduardo Moyano --(2009) 'La fragmenta cin en Maffil CCOS: anlisis de )a ofena partidista y el sistema
(Eds), Cambio, gobemabifirfad )' crisis el! el !HagrclJ. VI/a nj1cxilI desde las dos orillas, CS ICI electoral, RCI!ist(l Espmiofa de Ciellcia Pollica, no. 20, pp.11-48. (English version (20lO)
lESA, Crdoba, pp. 35-52. 'Party systcm fragmemati on in Morccco' , TIte JormUll 01 Norr'/ Afiirall SII/dies, vol. 15, no. 1,
- - ( l 997b) IS /ites po/{ticas I/wrToqrdcs: los par/mucn/arios (1977-93), Universidad de Granada. pp. 13- 37.)
Tesis doctoral de la Facu ltad de Cienci;s Polticas y Sociologa. Tozy, Mohall1ed (2000) MO/lllrql/f(l c islam p,{{rico CI !\I!amlccos. Bellaterra, Barcdona. Unin
- - ( 1999;) 'Gnesis del sistema de partidos polticos en Marruecos', RCI/ista flllen/aciol/al de Interparlamen taria. hup: llww\V .ipu.org/ wmn-el cbssif.htm
Sociologa, no. 23, pp. 145- 70. Waterbury, John (1975) Le Comma/ldellr (les cra)'atlls. LA I/Iollardlic II/aroraifl c et 50/1 lite, PUF,
--(1999b) Lns lircs poU/iras marroques: los jJilrlmllcmarios (1977- 93), AECI , Madrid . Paris.
--(1 999c) 'El proceso electoral como indicado r privilegiado de b transicin tutebda en
Maffilecos', Miscelnea de Estudios rabes y Hebraicos, no. 48, pp. 271-96.
- -(2004) ' Principio y fin de siglo en clave poltica: a..\remancia, sucesin e islamismo
politico en Marruecos', in Cannelo Prez (Ed .), El Imllldo nrabc e islmico alife I,)s retos (leI
fiflllm, Edito rial Universidad de Granada, Granada, pp. 99- 122.
- - (2006a) ' Los pesos pesados del ma..\trecho sistema de partidos polticos en Maffilecos: PI
y USFP', in Cannelo Prez (Ed.), Sociedad cjl, derechos IIIIII/(//IOS l' delllocrada C/I !Han/feeos,
Editorial Universidad de Granada, Granada, pp. 69-113.
- - (2006b) ' La larga andadura de los comunistas marroques en la arena poltica marroqu',
Rel'isra Historia Comcmpornllca, vol. J, no. 32, pp. 161-86.
- -(2010a) 'Los sonoros silencios sobre la reforma constitucional en Marruecos ', ltl
M 1 Angustias Parejo (Ed.), Emrc el allforirllrismo }' la dell/ocracill. Los procesos electoralcs en
el MlIgreb, Belbterra, Barcelona, pp. 365-412.
--(2010b) 'Liberalizacin poltica y redefinicin de la oposicin: la Klllla y la reforma
constitucional en Maffilecos (1992-2006)', MisccMllea de Esllldios Arabes J' Hebraicos,
vol. 59, pp. 91-114.
Parejo, M' Angustias and Veguilla, Victoria (2008) 'Elecciones y cambio politi co. Anlisis
diacrnico de los procesos electorales en Marruecos', All'raq, vol. XXV, pp. 11-41.
Prez, CanneIo (2003) 'El movimiento de derechos humanos en Marruecos: sociedad civil
por la paz', in C armelo Prez :md Fr.lOcisco A. Muiloz (Eds), Experiellcias de Paz ell
el MC(!ilcmlleo, Editorial Universidad de Granada , Granada, pp. 349-78.
- - (2006a) (Ed.) Sociedad ci/dl, dcredlOs IIII I/Ia/IOS JI demomuia cn Mam/ecos, Editorial Universidad
de Granada, Granada.
- -(2006b) 'Sociedad civil y transicin dem ocrtica en Mamlecos" in Camlelo Prez (Ed.),
Sociedad cil/il, derechos 11II/IIa/lOs J' dcmocracia e/I MamlCcos, Editorial Universidad de Granada,
Granada, pp. 9-23.

-'- -

5 Morocco: re gime and fuses
Ber/lab Lpez Carda
There is an overly frequent tendency ro idel1rify Morceeo and ts regime as a
unipersonal sysrem in which (he king is (he one and on1y omniporent actor. As
a marrer of f.1Ct, (he characterization of Moroeeo as a feudal manarehy dces nor
entirely correspond ro its composite reality, which, already defined as su eh by
Paul Pascan 40 years ago, I has been unfolding unevenly since rhen.
Nobody can deny [har institutionally and consotutionally (he king of Morceco
is (he 'only fuse', to guate 3n opportune expression by Felipe Gonzalez, clearly
defining [he organizarian of a political system loaded \Virh risks. The king
assumes legislative privilege, has [he Jasr \Vord on [he initiatives ro be raken,
presides ayer (he councils of minisrers, nominares high- ranking officers by dahir,
and directly controls a whole system of advisory royal councils throllgh which
he handles questions of viral importance (such as human right.~, education,
emigrarion ... ). He also fosrers social projeces through parasraral foundations
promoring local and regional investmenrs in relarion to his own agenda olltside
govemmemaI policy. Moreover, he relies on a parallel ream consriruted by his
royal councilors, 2 who fonn a kind of shadow cabiner that comperes wirh rhe
governmenr.
In such a sysrem, rhe king naturally capitalizes on rhe successes, 3 but
obviously also accumulares all the risks, as he is flllly responsible for rnanaging
day-to-day isslles and encourages rhe other members te dispense wirh responsibility.
This leads te a paralysis on every level: a powerless firsr minisrer, minisrers who have
become mere managers, a bicephalous administration in which the chain of
delegation of power from rhe king prevails rhrollgh an omniporent Ministry
of Interior, which, in rum, exerts ies rutelage over all rhe regional, provincial
and local adminisrrative services through //la lis or governors.
Among rhe risks incurred by such a system, \Ve can examine rhe following
t\Vo examples: rhe firsr, the way the Alhucemas earthqllake \Vas handled in
February 2004. The desire ro give primacy ro the king regarding hllmanirarian
action after the earthquake, combined \Vi rh security problems concerning rhe
monarch's rrip to rhe affecred area and rhe fear of assuming responsibility on rhe
part of rhe local authorities, entailed a conflict between population, aurhorities
and internarional bodies, making their work 4 even more complica red. The
second example is rhe monarch's long absence during rhe firsr semester in
l\rIofoccO: regimc alld jilses 101
2008. Alrhough rhe .m.inisrers had been meeting almosr weekly in government
councils under rhe firsr minisrer's presidency and had approved bills, rhese
hadn'r been ratified by rhe parliamenr, since rhey didn'r have the approval of
rhe counci} of minisrers presided over by rhe king as no meeting \Vas held
between December 13th 2007 and the beginning of 2008. During his long
absence, everyrhing had te be put on hold.
This is the Gordian knot of the political system.
In several of his royal speeches, especially rhe one in Toronto in July 2008,
rhe monarch has insisred on rhe responsibility of polirical parties regarding rhe
counrry's developmenr and has indirecrly accllsed them of callsing the system's
deficiencies and blockages. Morocco has a wide range of polirical f0011ations,
some of which are historic and roored in Moroccan sociery, whereas orhers,
fostered by power, have a large c1ienrelism and are more circlllnsrantial. The
resulr is a geographicalIy and polirically fragmented panorama in which none of
these political fomutions has succeeded in imposing itself. Albeir secondary,
these actors are nonetheless necessary eirher as parry-poopers or co-parricipants
in rhe farce, raking part in the sharing of rhe loor. Sorne of the mosr irnporranr
events in recent Moroccan hisrory, for better or \Vorse, such as the Moroccanizarion
in 1973 or rhe Green March, have been fostered by rhe muffied \Vork of these
nationalist and hisroric parties.
No\V anorher question is wherher ar least the most prominent polrica! parties
of rhe more rhan half a cenrury of the countty's independent hisrory have be en
able ro rise ro rhe occasion or have merely responded ro rheir ruling elire's own
interesrs. In facr, barely 5 percent of rhe population identifies wirh any poltical
parry.5
In 2005 , a law dernanding rhat parties follow democraric rules was approved
ro rry ro pur order inro rhe polirical field. However, ir did nor succeed in
erasing rhe parries' Iack of credibility, as rhey had already becorne rhe system's
secondary appendages. In 2007, the elections once again highlighted voters'
derachmenr &om poliacal parries, elicited, wirhour any doubt, by the useless
role ro which rhe system has condemned them.
Fouad Ali El Himrna, closest rnan ro rhe king and, in fact, second only ro him, a
fonner school companion ar the Royal College and delegated Minisrer of the
Interior, started an operarion ofhassling, demolition and substirution ofthe parties
in 2007, rhus becoming the scapegoat of rhe regime. One month afrer resigning
from his functions, he ran as an independent candidare in rhe elections of his
native region (Reharnna) and amassed 72 percenr of the votes, razing rhe officia!ist
parties who had rradirionally won rhe elecrions in this electoral disrricr. 6 In rhe
new parliamenr, El Himma gathered a large and carefully selecred number of
deputies fram small parties te forrn a substantial parliamentarian group, which
broughr him to power as presidenr of rhe Commission of Foreign and Religious
Aairs, where he promored the idea of a Movemenr for All Democrars, \Vith
rhe aim of challenging rhe parties to clarify rheir posirions.
His initiative was ar firsr supported by polieica! figures be10nging ro different
political rrends, sorne of whom were linked to parries and sorne of whom were
102 Bcmab Lpez Carda l\rlorocco: regillle alld jitscs 103

noto Later, the idea of the consomoon of another poltical party materialized \vith che The problem do es not lie in the parties bU[ in che role they play in rhe
PAM, resulting frOI11 the fusion ofthe five parties, \Vhieh had blended in the parlia- system. And, while chis remains unchanged, wirh no tnle party protagonism or
mentary group (Al A11d Parry, PND, AlIianee ofLiberties (ADL), Environment and delimiring of rhe king's powe r, there w ill be no ehange in Morocco. However,
Development Parry (PED) and Citizens Initiative for Development (ICD)). as Rmy Leveau and Mounia Bennani Chraibi affinn, orher spheres may also need
Two things seem releva nt regarding chis operario n. The firsr thae may be a 'dean separarion' berween monarchy and sure, as in che case of economic and
wonh menrioning is that this iniriative is f:1r fi-om being innovative in Maroccan financial relacions, for change ca be possible in rhis counery. BU[ sllch deep
independenr hiscary, since ir is che fourth attempr at the creation of a royal changes require a real refo undation of Moroceo.
party that would maintain rhe sysrem's hegemony of the main actor. All previol1s
anempts have ended in disaster. The fu'St took place befare rhe first legislacive Notes
eleetions in 1963, w hen rhe Minister of rhe Imerior, Ahmed Reda Guedira,
1 See his artide published in LlIIutlifin 1967 ar Imp ://www.uam.es/ otroscl:ntros/TEIM /
who \Vas clase ca Hassa n 11, crea red th e From for rhe Defense of Constitucional
Rcvisra/rcim4/ pascon.htm
Insti tutions (FDIC) to oppose the powerful nationalist 1110vement split bet\Veen 2 Thc 'Gu ardi:ms of th e T emple' exprcssion used by th e magazin e Le JOllrllal ' cbdol/l"/,,irc
lsliqlal and UNFP. The operation ended in a tie r\Vo yea rs later and rhe FDIC April 26th-May 2nd 2008: 'Les 40 nouvcllcs stars du Makhzen '.
broke up due ro internal f.ghts. The seeond operation at the beginning ofJune 1977 3 Thc mos[ rclevanr tem from a westem poim of view \Vas rhe modiflcarion of ehe
was designed ro disererut the parties, promoting independem figures shamelessly Nludal/l(//llI, [he law thae regula tes family and women 's status.
4 See ngela Surcz CoUado, El tcrrcl/loto 'l"C cambi el dcsrillo dc AI/mecl/las. Dc 1(1 erisis
supported by the adminisrration \Vh o re-fonned rhe RNI (Narional Rally of
flrwli1/1itarill (11 dcsCllc!cwc l' dCSi11TOI/O del Rif, at http://sitcs.google.com /site/ teimprojecr/
Independems) presided over by rhe then First Minister, Ahmed Ousmane, tesinas-dea (post-graduare dcgree dissertation ycar 2007 / 2008) .
Hassan ll's brother-in-Iaw. The operarion failed once mare due ro imernal 5 According te a survey on valu es, fram rhe reporr on rhe ftfti eth annlvers:uy of inde-
quarreIs, \Vhieh led ro rhe PND splitring into r\Vo, while the RNI losr the pendencc, only l3 percem ofthe popubtion dedared itse1f to be sansfled wh [he action
government majariey. The rhird experience rook place before rhe municipal of the polirical parties and scarcely 1 percenr of young people belonged tO a party.
6 Th e p:my mose voted obrained only 15 percent of the votes. Taking imo acco unt that
elections in 1983 and was insrigared, in rhe middle of a srntcrural readjusnnenr,
abstention in this electoral district was 5 pcrcent higher even than in 2002 (58 percent in
by Firsr Minister Maati Bouabid who fonned the Constirutional Union (UC). rclati on to 53 percent), only 17.4 pcrcent of the people who had registcrcd acrually
Alrhough he did manage with considerable difficuley to obrain rhe greater voted.
number of rown councilors, he neverrheless \Von fewer votes rhan the IsriqJal.
Ayear larer, he succeeded in beating the other parries in tenns of nllmber of
votes and sears, rhough only collecred a quaner of rh e vores of rhe Chamber.
During the I~cal eleetions in July 2009, the PAM eontinued to make use of
pressllre racrics ro convince certain parries ro foml coalirions with them and ro
abandon th eir alliances wirh the PJD. T his forrns part of a stTaregy of th e pabce
ro prevent the PJD from winning some key localities (Tanger or Oujda), while
ir is allo\Ved ro rule in second-rank cines (Kenirra, Larache or Tetuan).
Over time, rhe RNI and the VC became two more parties in the divided
Moroccan polirical panorama.
Fouad A1i El Hinuna's parry wi ll also probably beco me one more parry,
possibly garhering a few more rown councilors or depuries than the orhers, bllt
srill unable ro reach a stable majority among corporarions and in rhe parliamenr.
Whar happened during rhe e1ections in R ehamna cannar be applied ro the whole
counrry. In faet, even if the patries are discredited and \Veak, rhey can nonetheless
reIy on che ir cliencelism and, even if royal supporr mighr help \vin over a few
rhousand vocers in favor of che new fonnarion in exchange for official gifts for
rheir region, rhe new parry \ViII nar prevail over eirher rhe partisan machinery
or the generalized aparhy srenurung fram che lack of f.1ich in rhe system. In che
end, ir is a circumsrantial instntment co reaftlnn rhe monarch's pnmacy in the
system (the success of rhe experience is proporcional to the royal support), and
will nor rherefore fosrer any real change, buc rach er pro long rhe sratUs quo.

L

6 E pur si muove? Logics of power
and the process of transition in the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania
Raquel Ojeda Carda and Alberto Lpez Bargados
Introduction
The lsl~mic Republic of Maurirania, which gained ies independence fam
Franee 111. 1960, ~l~S been undergoing ane of [he mast interesnng processes of
democranc transltlOn in rbe Arab and African contexto After decades of an
au.t~loritarian regime, a military COLIp on Augusr 3rd 2005 brought a group of
mihtary offieers led by Colon el Ely Ould Mohamed Vall to power as the Mili-
tary Couneil for Juscice and Demoeraey (CMJD). Despite its inicial skeptieism to
[he cou~'s leaders' pro-liberalization dec1arations, rhe international cornmunity
pr,ogressl:re1y started to suppart rhe transition process on account of rhe rigor
\:Ith :vll1ch e~ch ~istinctive phase, cu1l11inating \Virh rhe second tum of rhe pre-
sldennal electlOns In March 2007, had be en carried out. This process evemually
and slIeeessfilly ended with Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi's vietory as the new
presldent of the Republic. In view of chis experience of a cransition considered
as ex~mplary by different observers, and aJmost unprecedemed \virhin rhe Arab and
Musltm wodd, ~he presenr chapcer will essenrially focus on rhe transfomurions
rbar have affecred che Mauritanian elice rhroughollt che process and analyze
wherher rhe existing relarions were really challenged by che rransicion process. Ir
will also higblighc sorne of rhe probJems that the govenlmenr, fresh out of the
ballot box, had ro face, including the surprising wave of terrorisr acrions sutfered
by rhe country since rhe end of 2007 , which, without any doubr, has conditioned
the a~en~a of rhe international communiry in a country as high!y sarellized as
Ma\.:nram~ .. Ar the end of rhis chapter and as an epilogue, \Ve will try ro show
the lI1stabltty of the politieal regime. [n AlIgllst 2008, Ould Abdelaziz led a
new coup whi~h was ratified after rhe holding of presidential elections on July
18th 2009, whlch were strongly contested by opposition forces.
The Mauritanian elites: an X-ray of postcoloniaI
power managelnent
Our aim here is to define primary elites and secondary elires in Mauricania, rhe
po:w~r resources they intend ro conquer and/or accumulare, as well as the
e~lstlI1g relations berween rhem (Izquierdo and Kemou , 2009). Our firsr step
will be ro recall rhe influence of colonial power on rhe poJitical, social and
economic strucrure in the country.
Power mld tml/sitioll iJl klal/ritallia 105
Mauriranian culrur:al diversiry has been a source of consrant conflicts burdening
the country since its independence from Franee in 1960; however, economic
and polirical elires seem, exeept for a few exceprions, ro escape the complexities
of rhis erhnic mosaie. Ir is true thar the group in charge of rhe country's econol1lic
and polirical resources has undergone a series of readjusrmenes that have only
been ractical and therefore represented no real threat ro che privileges of a
rather ethnically homogeneous group. Indeed, Mauritanian dignitaries, wirh
very few exceprions, belong to the Bida/I, a majoriry ethnic group, divided in
tribes or qabilas, whose origin is ro be found in the Arab and Berber invasiollS.
Their Arab heritage is e::-..-pressed in rbeir vemacular language hassalliya, a dialecral
fom1 of Arabic which spread in the thirreenrh and fourreenth centuries along
the trans-Saharan eommereial routes (Nontis, 1986), and whieh prevailed over
Berber and sub-Saharan Janguages from the sevenreenth cenrury onwards
(Taylor, 2000). Until the droughts in the 1970s and 1980s, a Iarge part ofthe Bida/l
tribes was eonsrituted of nomads Jnd merchanes, which nor only eoincided with
the consolidarion of a large rnde network exrending aH over Wesrem Africa
but also with the expansion of Islam from ies Maghrebian enclave; rhe Bidml
made rhis religion rheirs and tribes such as the Zwaya specialized in its teaching
and disseminarion (Lpez Bargados, 2003). French eolonizers extracred their
first administrative execurives mainly fr0111 sub-Saharian groups such as me
fVohif and Pl/faar, who were more acculturared. These erhnic groups were chen
marginalized from rhe 1960s onwards, losing their positions ro rhe Bidml elites
of ZI/Jaya origino As Bidml power grew srronger, the members of the elite almost
always had the same profile: men who represented large ZI/laya cribes, srrategically
positioned in the cribe, belonging by and large ro its rnost noble lineage, with
cenain experience in posirions of responsibiliry in govemmenrs and supporred
by a network of relarives and c1ienrs ready ro defend rheir inrerests.
We may therefore conclude rhat rhe primary elites in Mauritania are fom1ed
by a rarher hornogeneous group of tribal factions and farnilies belonging to che
Bidall, the majoriry erhnic group. This is the reason why a11 Mauritanians utrer
the tribal names of Awlad Bu Sbaa, Smassid, Ida u Ali, Kunta, erc. whenever
they try to explain a political or economic decision made by rhe administration.
Imponant adjusollenrs bave taken place in half a century of independence:
during OuId Daddah 's regime, rribes from West Mauritania (Trarza region) and
panieulady the Awlad Abyaizi, a rribe che presidenr himself belonged ro, were
favored by the power in situ, while Taya's long-Iasting regime was in ies day
ealled 'Smassid-State', in referenee to his own qabila (Marehesin, 1992). The
transition proeess nm by Ely Ould Mohamed Vall has helped the A",lad B/I
Sbaa ro increase their influence in the country, if such a thing was possible. As
Ould Ahmed Salem (2000) has pointed out on several occasions, tribal reference
is sorne times thought ro merely represenr an arrifice of Janguage, a kind of
crutch used ro explain cultural actions guided by rhe mere strategic interest of
sorne key acrors. In Mauritania, however, triballogic and ies corollary - the existence
of clienrelisric networks mn by mese dignitaries (comprised of a hererogeneous
mixture of poor relatives, fom1er slaves and suchlike from orher erhnic groups
106 R. Ojeda Carda a/ld A. Upez Bmgada,
or groups wishing ro be prometed) - are stnIcruring eJements of che economic
and policleal de cisio n-making and a parameter che actors are fully JWJre of
wh ell [hey operare in [hese particular fields. The facrions are certainly nm as
homogeneous as [hey mighe appear according te a forn1er analysis (Marchesin,
"1992), :Ind cannot be evalu:1red exclusively according ro a sale tribal componem.
The tribal factor is, ho\Vever, a 5rrong 355et in che political arena and che juggling
ac[S rhe government has to perform in arder to address che disrinc[ groups and
regions' claims require real distribuove skills.
Relaelans within che primary e1ite and bet\Veen me primary and seconda!)'
groups of che elite revolve around che follo\Ving mechanisllls: kinship, nibe,
faccion, lineage o r fam.ily and clientelism. The Jarrer, in tum, wiII weave more
hecerogeneous net\Vorks, ehough often overlapping wieh t:1mily relanons,
chrough che discribution of resources and bribes.
The progressive reduccion of distributive Jogic as a resulr of repression coupled
wich the lack of interest or sheer weariness resulnng from the way power is
exened explain better than any ocher variable rhe conjunction of interests thar
spelled the end of Ould Taya's govemmem afeer 21 years in power. As che
years went by, the initially powerful coalition of interests thar revolved around
che presidenc began ro lose its componenrs umil it becal11e a small encysred
clique fighcing againsc che cide for intereses so lil11ited that the govemment fell
Iike ripe fruir. Of COUl"Se, the problems faced by rhe govemmenr \Vere most
certainly serious as well as numerous: a repressed democrarie opposicion wirh irs
hands tied; the question of rhe refugees in Senegal and MaJi and by extenSl0n
the so-called passif /lIIlIIallilaire. for which Ould Taya \Vas directly responsible
ber\Veen 1989 and 1991 ; ehe rhrear of Islamism ... However, none of chis was
decenninare and, as in the mase classic drama s, the conspiracy came from those
closest. . key elemenc, it is obviollsly the military, throllgh which che elite can control
Maintaining or changing tribes and f.1nulies wichin the selective sph ere of the
primary elites do es not only depend on relarions of kinship or clientelism;
coercion is also another decisive mechanisl11. Sin ce the firs t president of che
Republic, Mokhtar Ould Oaddah, was deposed in 1978, the military has sys-
cemacically intervened in the Mauritanian polincal scene. The succession of
coups between 1978 and 1984 ending with Ould Taya's seizing power, as well
as the frustrared coup arcempr in 2003 and che successful one in 2005, nO[ ro
forger che recene upheaval during the summer of 2008, have all been carried
ouc by che military. Again, ic \Vas the military thar provoked the changes wichin
rhe principal Birlal cribes in power. Their attempr te control and accumu1ate
power resources has led chem ro rry [Q conn'ol the main stare Stnlctures which
are essenria1 roo1s in chis process.
We may, therefore, observe from chis panorama thac che most fi-equent
power relations between primary elices are circular, that is ro say, chere is no
finaliry or goal that motivares chem. Beyond eheir rheroric of the n eed co end
che country's poverry or cheir atcempts ae liberalizarion and democratlzatlon
ge neraeed by the milicary chrough violem and coercive means, the only real
aspiranon of chese elites has been che accumulation of resources. No other
POWCf a/lrl tfallS;t;OIl II lVJallritallia 107
importune projecc (su~h as nacionalism, developmenralism , pan-Arabism, Islamism
or liberalism) has ever been able ro unite plimaly and secondary elites and
citizens in any common goal.
The seco ndary el ices may be found in the few spaces left over by che polirica!
and economic monopoly exercised by Bidal tribal fractions and f.1milies. The
remaining ethnic groups whose fanulies maintain close and long-ternl rela-
tionships (especially among the Plllam) take advamage of these gaps Ot room to
man euver. Elections, held on a regular basis since che actempcs at a fomlaI lib-
eralizaron of che state in 199'1 under ~uid T uya's regi me, playa fundamental
role for oeher new acrors ro ente r anta che scene.
The fideliey of che Haratin fanulies is essential to che capicalizacian of votes
dUrillg che electoral pracess and ro providing m eaning ro che facrional activiry.
Th e Ha ratin, a heterogen eo us group thac comprises rhe descendams of sIaves or
those ro whom this status is given and \Vho mainrain clientelisric nes wich the
families of their [onner owners, are a very significanr demographic segment of
che counrry. consrituting around one-chird of che \Vhole popularion. Their
cooption in electoral campaigns is a key faccor for political acuon and can be
used by che factions' leaders to obcain one position or another. If ie is troe thar
in re cem years a policical and cultural discourse has started ro emerge in rhe
Haratins' lIliliCHx, until no\V eheir fideliry has, however, always gone ro the
Bida" ttibes (of which they ate clients and m which they belonged de facm ,
despite th eir low status) and represents a firse-rate polincal insrrumenr in the
faccions' incense acciviry revolving around power and ts incerescs.
In the foUowing paragraph , we will analyze che differenr resources needed by
rhe primaly elire, among \Vhich che state proves ro be one of ehe mosc imp or-
cant. If there is one insntunon c10sely associated to the state that represems a
rhe rest of the seace insticuciOl1S including plivare capital. The conunand of the
battalion of presidential security has always been the urmost reward, especially
in recenr years, for th e most faithful presidencial servers bU[ is also the platfoml
from wh ich they can be brought down. Such is the case of Mohamed Ould
Abdelaziz, instigamr and member of the CMJD in 2005, who, as the presidem
of the High Council of State currendy ruling the destiny of the country, \Vas
the visible head of the COtlp d'tat on Atlgust 6th 2008.
According ro diverse observers, neopatrimonialism seems ro characterize the
Mauritan ian state and is no excep tion in posecolonial scares in Sub-Saharan
Aica. Jean-Fran<;ois Bayart (1999) has convincingly shown how this authotitarian
and predarory drive IS exte nded chroughout mosc of che continent. Observers
are, of course, right when chey declare chat this characcerisnc fics \Vith rradi-
tional aurhoritarian distribucive logics and \Vich th e strong cendency towards
personalism of policical relations in postcolonial Africa in general, but \Ve muse
not be misled on chis poim. The crinunal nature of the postcolonial Amcan
state is nor a kind of implacable remora from th e mast ancient Afi'ca n tradi-
tions that colonizacion was in capable of removin g, but racher che caricatural and
tragic colophon of a devascacing colonial action.
108 R. Ojeda Carela alld A. Lpcz Bmgados
One of che main characteristics of rhe postcolonial srJte is che extreme
ideological malleability of ies promoter<, directly related to the progressive
institucional weakness fosrered by internacional organisl11s. especiaUy rhe World
Bank and the IMF. In addirion to the filibuster logic of the 'sharing of the loot'
nherent ro institucional regimes \Vith 5tTOng leanings ro personaJism, rhe systemanc
dismantling of [he infamous, hypertrophied Mrican scate which \Vas much
talked about in the 1980s, promoted by diverse Plans of Structllral Adjustmem
and che gro\Ving precariousness of che coffers of che African state, have
increased rhe rapaciry of sorne elites who have become more and more incapable
of satisfying rhe usual demands and consequently of refining rheir ideological
insrnmlents te ma:\.-imize theiI [esources.
Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (2006: 39) also makes references to the existence
of a predatory and criminal neopatrimonialism in Mauritania's postcolonial
sta te: when the elite can no longer control the population through the distribution
of scarce resources as a consequence of the stagnanon or withdrawal of 'orga-
nizational comfon', they tend to inflict vioIence on the popuJarion and on
orher power factions which might rry to question rhe srarus qua. Ir is precisely
w hen che elires sysremarically resort [Q violen ce (including via private miliria)
rhar the scate cannot exen any control and, consequently, disappears as an
object of sttldy (Bratton and Chang, 2006: 1061). Levine (1999: 721), for his
pan, indicares rhar 'orgaruzational comfon consists in making bigger paymems
ro coalition members than are strictly required in order ro maintain th e orga-
nizatan'. The scarciry of the 'shock-absorbing' resources of uncerranry, which
reward loyalry and cooperarion, jeopardizes adminisrrarive sysrems as much as
political institurions. The facr is that, withour economic growth and with a
bigger and more diversified number of demands, che administrarion of public
institutions is obviously becoming a very difficulr maerer.
It s eherefore necessary to rake into account the specific conditions in \Vhich
power in Mauricania has been gescated and handled since ts independence.
Unlike its norrhern neighbors, especially Algeria and Libya, Maurirania has
lacked, llntil very reeendy, oil revenues which could grant the polirical elite the
freedom ro maneuver. As we will see later, recent extracrians carried out offihore
have already, right &om the fir<t months, defrauded the expectarions deposited
in rhe Mauricanian elires. In a highly satellzed counery wieh few resources,
internacional help is provided either ehrough local development projecrs or
rhrough diverse lines of credit conceded in response ro che more or less srrict
criteria of responsibilization and rransparency. le consrirutes one of rhe most
important contributions to Mauritanian GDP and is rherefore a firse-rate
resource wieh which neither che Maurieanian seaee nor its elite can dispense. In
such a context, it is tempring ro postula te that tbe autboritarian drift of ~uid
Taya's regime bad Ied the country into an econonuc and political dead-end &0111
whicb che military coup and promises of democratizaeion gradually rescued it.
However, this incerpreeation pro ves erroneous if we keep in mind rhar inter-
national help did not ostensibIy decrease until afrer cbe coup. In otber words,
despire ies undeniable authoritarian drive, ~uId Taya's regime relied umil che
POJl/e,. n/Id tml/sitio" i/l iVlallrita/lia 109
end on rhe racie f.1\,:or from rhe principal baillcl/J"S dc JOllds who were sarisfied
\Vith the political stability and ttading oppottuniries provided by the dictator
Qourde, 2007: 497).
The factions or lobbics. groups of an unsrable nature constitured by relaeions
of kinship and marica] ties in which che tribal facror plays an essenrial parr,
monopolize rhe concession of che main posts in rhe adnunistration (ministerial,
direcrion of pores, cusroms, etc.) as weU as the management of (he main public
and private comparues, through che backup sometimes granted ro che SlIffa/l - or
the 'commandemenc' in Mbembe's (1992) renns - in place who will provide
che necessary bribes in order ro guarantee their support. This is rhe way smaU
drilling industries (petrol, steel, copper), banks, export companies 'and the fishing
fleet fall into the dutches of a small group of people with such a distinet profile
that any Mautitanian \Vould be able to describe it blindfolded. That bank
belongs tO rhat tribe, this company is o\Vned by so and so, the concession of
these perrol stations is mn by such and such 3 minisrer's relative, etc ... . Tribal
lagic is used as a way te organize and make sense of political actions char-
accerized by insrabiliry when Malll;canians rey ro e:\.'Plain (eve n ro themselves) a
complex and elusive realit)'o
Opposition and protest movements
The elites are nat che only proragonists in rhe tragedy of Mauritarua despite
their decerrnination ro monopolize. Contraey to conventional representations of
an African postcolonial staee whose acrions are exerted wirh greater or lesser
pressure 011 a pop ulation chat is boch remate and a victim of che decisions made
by its administration, Mbembe (2001: (03) has pointed out that the logie of
political action in contemporaly Afriea is transversal; the elites' confusion and
ideological Aexibiliry are transmitted, albeit ro a lesser degree, eo rhe rest of rhe
population througb an effect of mimesis in which c1aims for democratization
cohabir \Vith acts of plunder and autllOritarian posruring. In cbis sense, che conrra-
dictions we, as Wescem observers, perceive in rhe \Vay polincal acrion is carried
out in Afuca are ehe result of a certain disrortion in the perspecrive we apply ro
a political field the lo gie of which , undel:5tood by them as complementary, is,
for us, impossible te reeoncile.
Now, the resule of this blend of codes and values in che eontext of dire
poveny can appear norhing bur extf'Jvagant and excessive: chis 'chaouc pluralicy',
as Mbembe (2001: 128-29) describes polirical action in comemporary Afiica,
makes the way power is handled a consenred pretense in which [he 3CtQrs
participate ,vith real detem1ination. As Ould Ahmed Sale m (1999: 132) has pin-
pointed, the aetors get prepared for the political game using all the trieks possible
witbout quesrioning their collective emst in its legitimacy. Srricr compliance
with the law in this kind of generalized sllspension oflegal order in which every-
ene, ro a greater or lesser degree, participates is imerpreted as a particularly
dangerous sign of incompetence, sine e the strategies adopced by primary and
secondary elites affect nat only them but also rhe clientelisric network [hat has
110 R. Ojcda Carda alld A. Lpez Bn/gados
grown up around rhem. The skillfu J employment of rhe art of deceprion, and
rh e violarion of co nunitm en ts made ro [he population and double-faced dis-
courses are no r necessarily srigmatized as is proved by corrupt practices, w hich,
al[hough largely sacani zed in publc speeches, are none[heless doggedly appled
in priva[e co me"cs. fu Olivier de Sardan (1996: 111 ) suggesced, [he 'moral
econorny of canupaon' is a transversal pfJcrice w hich seems [Q be marked by
rhe mimesis effecr \Ve mentioned earlier.
P a tirica! parries in Maurirania are nO[ divided according ro rhe c1assic d isrinctions
(ideological or nationalisc-cemrisc) . During Ould T aya', regime, each pany was
situaced in che political fi eld according to es opposition or non- op position to
che regime, even rhough che so-called 'palitical nomadisl11' proliferated, .e. political
migration fro111 e ne organization to anorher and, generalIy speaking, from che
opposi[ion bloc [O [he presidencial bloc.
In [he opposi tion, we found [he Union of Democracic Forces (U FD), led by
Ahmed Ould Daddah, brorher of rhe firsr presidenr of independenr Maurirania,
who was ar the head of the Resistance From for Uni ty, Independence and
Democracy (FRUlDEM) in [he 1980s (Ould Mohamedou, 2007: 330).
In Octobe r 2000, UFD /EN (UFD Ere Nouvelle), [he main opposicion pany,
dissolved under accusations of fome ncing popular riots (\Vithin rhe frame\Vork of
their pro-Palesnne poJicies aod against Maurirania's relarions \Virh Israel). Since
1992 (CJausen 2000--200 1: 110), Ahmed Ould D addah has reguJarly been
arresred and released, \Virhom any eharges being pressed aga inst hirn. Ir iSI1'r rhe
firs[ time ei[her [ha< chis has happened [O a pol[ical leader; Ould H aidallah, for
example, was arresred \Vhile ruoning for presidency in 2003. It is the second tim e a
legally constirllted and recognized parry has been dissolved, the firsr being in
1999 wi[h [he ~AN (A[[ali'a). The dissolucion of UFD/EN did no[ affec[ [he
ocher branch crea<ed in 1998 and led by Ould Maoulo ud an d M ohamed Ould
Bedreddine, w hich \Vas called [he Union of Forces for Progress (UFP) in
November 2000. Af[er [he official dissolution of [he UFD/EN, ies members
founded a new pany named [he Rally ofDemocracic Forces (RFD) in 2001. In
1995, rhe opposition managed ro fonu a coali rio n \Virh a bloc called rhe Fronr
of Opposi[ion pames (FPO) composed of [he five mosc importam opposicion
parties UFD / EN, AC, APP, Artali'a and FP (whi ch joined [he bloc in 1998)
(Min[ Ainina, 2000--2001: 349).
In 2005, afrer Ould Taya \Vas ousred as a consequence of rhe miJitary coup,
classical ideological forms of orgaoization seemed to be eme rging again in rhe
politica) field but, afrer rhe seco nd mm in rhe presidential eJections io 2007, it
\Vas d ear that it had only been a mirage and the presidencial majoriry \Virh a
tendency ro ooe-partyism w as back in place.
One of che successes of the modest but active civil society &om che capital
ciry \Vas ro demand fulfillmenr of the electoral prom.ise made by ca ndidate Sidi
Ould Cheikh Abdallahi after he had \Von [he second [um in [he presidencial
eIections io March 2007. If any sitllation \Vere to invi te a cert..1in optimism, it \Vas
precisely che way the so-called dossier of the passif 11I1/I/(1IIitaire \Vas handled. The
recently appoinred gove mmenr attempted eo be f.1ithful eo their co mmitmem
POl/lcr mld t/'al/sitioll i/l lVIallritmlia 111
by implemencin g a . series of meastlres ro pernlit the repatriation of Negro-
Mauritanian refugees, principally the PCIII people and TOl/eoll/curs, from SenegaI
w here [hey had been forced imo exile be[\Veen 1989 and 1991 af[er che \Vave of
repression led by che Mauriranian arnly domillated by a majori ry of rhe Bidall
echnic group. Inrervenrion by some of che main human righes organizarions
(AMD H and SOS-Esclaves) and good \V iii o n boch sides ([he Mauricanian
govemmem on rhe one hand and che diverse representatives of che cornmuniries
in exile on rhe oeher) have pemlitted the refllgees ca gradually rentm ro eheir
coun try. In Febmary 2008, the Agence Nationale d'Acclleil et de Rinserrion
des Rfugis (ANAlR) by mutual agreemem wi[h [he Uni[ed Nacions High
Conunission er for Refugees (UNHCR) proceeded ro rehouse the firse contingem
of 101 people, bU[ the process is 510'" and painsraking, owing ca th e co m-
plexity of the idemificaran pracedllres, but alsa principally due to che diffi clllry
of reinregranon and the llncerraillty sUITollnding ehe qllestion of compensation
the refugees must logically receive.
Power structure in Mauritania
In this chap rer, \Ve \Vill examine the namre of che relation between the con-
stnt ction of rhe srare in Mauricania and che consolidation of its regime. Bratton
and Chang (2006: 1061 ) underscand chis relatio n as reciprocal and necessary
since a democrarie regime cannO[ exist in a sraee rhar is weak. Ir do es nO[ seem
eherefore relevant ro debate whar comes firsc, coosm1Coo n of rhe staee or con-
solidation of a demacratic regime, since these processes are inseparable.
T his relarion may be approached in t\Vo difFerem \Vays: one of them is whac
Bratton and Chang have called the 'virttlous cirele'. Democratizanon entails
institutions thar link cirizens ro the seaee , while the state increases its capaciry ro
improve citizens' wellbeing, which, in tum, srrengrhens democracy. However, a
vicio liS cirde rnight aIso be prodllced, in which political leaders fail ro respand ro
citize ns' c1aims leading ro ehe \Vithdrawal of their supporr rowards the sta te. T his
spiral is exacerbated by the elites' corruption, which nurCllres state decadency
and comribmes [O [he escala[ion of chaos (Braceon and C hang, 2006: 1063).
T his coUective \Vork eelies o n che assumptio n rhat the seate 15 a reso urce in
the hands of rhe primary elire and therefore nO[ an actor in icself (Izquierdo and
Kemou, 2009) . To pU[ it anorher \Vay, as che scate is nor eonsidered an indepen-
dem variable, its constittlnon and \Vorkings, as \Vell as rhe rules of me gam e thar
stm cture it, are neirher decisive nor do rhey affect (he acrors, in this case the
primary and secondary elires. H owever, our ce ntral approach does nO[ seart out
from chis assumption; in face, \Ve co nsider ie more enlighrening ro try ro analyze
\Vheth er the proeess of construcring the state is really useful regarding the imple-
mentation of democracy in th e Mauritanian political system and, on ehe orher
hand, \Vhether che democranzarion initiated dllring th e transition rhrollgh elecroral
processes, institucional refonns and regul ations ca n conrribure ro the improve-
ment and consolidation of the state . The goal here is rherefore ro verify if che
sta re 'moves', even rhough \Ve may have ro provisionaUy challenge the idea of ehe
112 R. Ojeda Carela alld A. Lpcz Ba/gados
state as a mere reSQllrCe in che acrors' hands. This willlead LIS te exan-une ho\V and
to what extent institutional solutions affect [he processes of polineal negotiation.
In this sense, the position held by the sociologist Abdel Wedoud Ould
Cheikh, specialisr in Mauritania, forewarns us against excessive optimismo
~uId Cheikh declares [har a peculiar fonu of aurhorirarianism, the so-called
'sultanism', is prevailing in this country due te its Arab-Muslim inheritance, and
to the way poHtieal aurhority is represented and unfolds in chis specific cultural
area (Ould Cheikh, 2006: 29).
Befare \Ve seart ro examine rhe relationship between che construction of rhe
state and rhe consolidation of palitical regimes, \Ve must first define each of
these concepts and [he indicarors \Ve are going ro use for each of them. So,
when we speak abollt the sta te, we refer to structures and, when we use the
tenn regimes, we are referring to processes. The central aim of this approach is to
detemline what minimum conditions are required for a regime to be a democratic
regime. These requisites may be divided into three main categories with the
following cntena: the first category is of an economic nature and comprises a
minimum number of economic indicators expressing stability, certain growth
and a balanced distribunon of wealth. The second requisite is identiry related, and
involves a certain feeling of nacional identification. The third and last criteria,
which is crucial, is ehe existence of a rule of law, e.g. a regulatory frame
adopted and respeceed by the majoriry of citizens, ",hich establishes the rules of
ehe pluralistic institutional gameplay.
The state is shaped by political structures and administrative inscitutions. In ies
beginning, it was identified \Vith institutions using coercion, such as the military
and rhe police, as well as the courts and bureaucracies ruled by legislation. The
regime is linked ,w ith processes such as the rules of political play that detennine
who may take decisions and how. The characterization of regimes oscillates
berween rwo extremes: democracy and authoritarianism. In between, there is a
whole range of cases in which we may find game rules, mechanisms and pro-
cedures that belong to one model or rhe other. A democratic regime, as wi11 be
seen later, is defined by the existence of a rule oflaw, respect for human rights,
the response to cicizens' appeals, the control of corruption and institutional
logic revolving around consriturional values.
T o talk abour democracy in Mrica is probably ro stretch the tenn con-
siderably, since only five countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauririus, Namibia
and South Mrica), representing 7 percenr of the population of the whole COI1-
einent, can qualify as liberal democracies according to the ndices the World
Bank uses in irs repotts on govemance, which is to say, regimes which respect
civU and poliricalliberties. In a classificarion established according ro the greater
or lesser degree of democracy in any given political regime, we can define rhe
following categories: liberal democracy, electoral democracy, liberalized autocracy
and unrefonned autocracy. Electoral democracies respect a minimum of demo-
cratic preceprs (for example, the election of legislative and executive powers by
universal suffrage) bU( civil and poJitical freedom is not always assured. The
most common fonn of state political organization in Africa is rhe so-caBed
PO/ller a/ld lral/Sitio/l i/l JVlallrta/lia 113
liberalized aurocracy ..This kind of regime usually takes place after the promulgation
of certain refonns guaranteeing the survivaJ of regimes based on unique parry
systems or on rhe milieary. Their leaders eall elections and promise changes but
maintain fierce conrrol of public affairs and do not allow either fieedom of the
press or ehe developmenr of civil organizations, while the field of aetion of
policical parties is limited due ro the frequent imprisonment of their principal
leaders. Finally, unrefonned autoeracies are systems in which there is not che
least concern ro vest the regime wirh even a semblance of legitimacy through
rhe convoca tia n of more or less competitive elections (Brarron and Chang,
2006: 1065). Leaders come to power through inheritance (Swaziland), through
arnled upsurges (Eritrea or R wanda) or through elections in 'which a large
number of electo" are excluded (Sudan). These countries are generally
immersed in internal arnled conflicts (Bratton and Chang, 2006: 1065).
In order to carry out a characeerization of African sta tes, \Ve wi11 use five of
the main worldwide government indicators, developed and used by the World
Bank Institute: political seabiliry and absence of violence, state effectiveness,
regularory quality, rule of la\\', and control of comlpnon. We wil! see what
each parameter implies to further apply rhem to Mauritania. Political stabiliry is
related ro public arder understood as rhe lack of violence against the reginle, both
from inside (insurgency) and from olltside (international rerrorism). Governmenr
effectiveness is related to the quality of public services provided and civil servants'
degree of competence and independence. The regulatory qualiry of the state is
measured according to the capaciry to construct the necessary infrastructures
that \vill guarantee market functioning and the development of economic
poJicies. The rule of law, on the other hand, is a feature thae evaluares the
degree of criminaliry, rhe strength of the judicial sysrem and rhe degree of
compliance with juridical orders. Finally, the control of corruprion refleces ro
what extent official posirions are used for privaee benefit.
We have added three aspects to these five characrerisrics, so as ro gauge the
degree of consolidation of a state: the scope of the staee, state capaciry and state
legirimacy.
The scope of the srare is the first concept that \Ve will define; it relates to the
presence of the srate within the whole territory, through economic infTasnuctures
(electriciry, water, sewage syseems, etc.), polirieal infrastructures (police stations,
post office, milieary omposts) and social infrasrructures (education, public
health). One of the characterisncs of African countries is rhe huge difference
berween urban and rural environmems in terrns of seate presence and its adminis-
trarion. The second aspect, sta te capacity, is linked to whether public resources
are being spene in accordance with the task.s that have be en entrusted and the
objectives established. These tasks are obviously designed ro solve citizens' pro-
blems and respond to their petirions. Borh these aspects, the scope of ehe state
and state capaciry are closely linked to the third one, state legirimacy, which
refers to the degree of cirizen approval of state power and the rules proceeding
from its elite (Bratton and Chang, 2006: 1076). In the whole African continent
in general, and in Mauritania more particularly, rhe lack of emst beCVIeen rhe
114 R. Ojeda Carda all d A. Lpcz Bmgados
elites and che rese of rhe populatioll, added ro a gene ral and pervasive co ncext
of scarciry hovering ayer all kinds of relationships - policical or otherwise - may
explain w hy m ase citizens cake on [rus power Jccordin g to a crlterion of stricd y
personal profit and nO[ acc ording [Q ideological consideratio ns. In facr, Dne of
[he main fearures of che successive electoral cam paigns rhar have taken place
since 1992 is che profound de-ideologization of mase of che candidates running,
echoi ng rhe definire rendency ro political per;onalism presiding ove r rhe poltical
field in contexts defined by competitive autho ritarianism. Allianees, disputes
and breaches be tween political figures are Ilor interpreted, even in che media,
in r em1S of ideological swerving DI commitment to programs bm explicir1y in
tenns of the weight, influence and compensations of holdin g public oflices for
instance. In this sense and following Brarton and C hang's line of rhoughr (2006),
we are facing an almost paradigmatic example of 'che government of men'.
T he rule ofl aw is important in order Co democranze (or, ro pur ir differenr1y ,
citizens perceive violacions of che mle of law as whar most erodes democracy)
becallse ir is a characceristic fearme of states but also a reqllisite te democrarizarion,
since ic is related ro principies such as civil liberties, voluntary consent to govem-
ments, the obligarion ro respond and polirical aceounrability, and chis is whac
distinguishes ir fro m rhe government of m en (Brarron and C han g, 2006: 1078).
In vie\V of chese eonsiderations, Mauritania may be eonsidered as a scroog
stace, in relaco n [Q Afriean standards. This country \Vou ld therefore belong ro
the cacegory of regim es caBed a liberalized hege mo ni c aucocracy (Bratton and
C hang, 2006: 1072) since rhe promises and arremprs ar reform rhar Ould Taya
initiated in che 1990s did not ulrimately aim at che democratization of the
system, o nly rather at ts survival.
Finally, \Ve can declare chat, to qualif)r a regime as demoeratic, \Ve must have
che follo\Ving co nditions: seate smlctures mus r be implemenred, e.g. law and
c rder must preva il, respect for human rights must be guaranreed, citizens'
appeals must be addressed, corruption must be und er control and institutional
logie musc be based on constitutional vallles. Based on chis approach , according
to w hi ch che consolidation of che democratic regime and che constnlctio n of the
state are interlocked, our analysis will focus o n the Cllrrent Mauritanian situation
after rhe coup in Augusr 2005 and rhe rransitio n until May 2008, concluding
w ich cransfe r of power &0111 che Milcary Cou ncil for Justice and Democracy
(CMJD) ro Presidenr Ould Cheikh Abdallahi and rhe elecred parliament.
lfthe ntle oflaw is as much a fiest condition for che arra ngem em ofthe srate
as is democratic consolidation, \Ve can affiml rhat, in che case of Mauritania, an
enonn ous effon \Vas made in this sense in rhe cransitioll process. Not o nly \vith
rhe differenr electoral processes from June 2006, wirh the referendum for con-
stitu tional refol1n until the presidencial elections in March 2007, but al so with
the efforr te improve political institutiollS. Fiest, it is worch pointing out thar the
differem electoral calls \Vere organized and took place successfully. The presidencial
electioI1s (the lasr ones held) respecred rhe principIes of fi'eedom, ",ere transparenr
and clean, and th e wishes of rhe citizens \Vere co mplied \Vith as votes were
f.1ithfully rranslated into seacs or the naming of the wi nning eJ.nd idates. Secand,
PO!uer n/Id tnlllsitioll ill J\tIClllrit(l/liCl 115
notable among the institutio nal refoml s rhar also too k place within the same
process of tGlI1sition \Vere rhe crea n a n of the Com it IJlten ll illislerielle respon sible
for rhe Transition (whose missio11 \Vas co supervise, promoce, program and
follo\V up che process ofimplementing a democranc system \vithin a framework of
consensus and agreement), the Independem Nacional Electora1 conmussio n
(CEN I), rh e High Authotity for rhe P ress and Audiovisuals (HAPA) and rhe
Narional Observatory of Elecrions (ONE). W irh rhis lisr, \Ve \Vish ro highlighr
the interest and "vilI af rhe military junta tO iniriate a process of change in
which ins ritutians capable of m anaging such cransfonnations within a logic
approved by con sen sus are presento
Of all these institutions, the CENI has been th e Dne to play the most crucial
role and pass the evaluaran. It is tme that it has received significant intemacia llal
supp o rt from che E uropean Uni on and the Aftican Union, but ir is undeniabl e
thac, in spite of sorne initial setbacks, ir has nonetheless been capable of serting
imo metian the complex mechanism of elections (municipal, general and
presidemial as \VeU as rhe re ferendllll1) in record time and starting almost from
scratch , since ie had ro train natio nal o bservees, organize electoral coUeges, hand
oUt vocees' cards and implemem all th e UE requirements to guaramee trans-
pare ncy and fainless in che elecno ns. Final1y, regardin g regulatory re fo nTIS, \Ve
should fiesc underline th e approval of the constitucio nal refonn in a referendum
chac rook place 011 J une 25th 2006, \Vi ch a high rate of participato n (more chan
76 percent). Furthennore, a se ries of in tel1llinisterial documems were draw n up
conceming the follO\ving aspects: good govem ance and democratizarion , judicial
reform and ts administraton, as weU as the reform of press legislarion. In July
2006, rhe new legislatian on the freedom of the press \Vas approved, even
though che stace monopaly on televisio n and radio continues.
As m entioned previously. the ellart made to implement state sttuctures and
their legislarian \Vas evident dllting the transition periodo Ho\Vever, this fi rst
co ndirion for the democratization and consolidatian of rhe state may be
ll11anced if \Ve relate it to the aspect of che scope of che sta re, \Vhich we defined
earlier as che capacity of implem enration of rhe srare insritution \vithin rhe
eotaliry of the territory under irs jurisdiction. The ho lding of electiolls has
helped to promore the prese nce of che scate in the rerritory and [Q guaramee
che represemativiry of che citizens w ho live in the most remoce areas. B ut, if
\Ve look back in time and e:-.. p and our perspeccive beyond electoral processes, \Ve
may o bserve ho \V the successive droughts of the 1970s and 1980s contributed,
more chan an)' other precess, to notably increasing the establishment of scace
adminisrrations in Mamitanian territory. In f.1ct, on severa! occasions, Villasante- de
Beauvais (1991, 1998) and Leservoisier (1994) ha ve show n rhar the impacr of
tbese prolonged droughts \Vas entcial ro cbe process of a massive sedentarization
in N o uakchott and the cieies 011 the so-called ROllfe de l'Espoir (rhar links che
capital ciey te the far east of the co untry). This sedentarization allowed many citi-
ze ns to meet differenr representarives ofcbe seare for the fiesc time. In addition, rhe
handlin g of intemational fo od aid, comrolled by che Mauritanian administra-
ran during rbese times, reinforced cheir establishm ent \Vhich had, for the mast
 116 R. Ojeda Garda mld A . Lpez Ba/gado;
parr, beco purely nominal unril rhen. In any case, as \Ve mentioned earlier, rhe
process of state consolidarlon h35n '[ enrailed che relegaran of tribal arder
ro politicalmargi naliry, in (lec, [Q che conrrary.
In recene years, COIll/IIlIll C has become fe uda1. From 1997 onwards, because
ofche pocential ehaos, Maauya Quid Sid'Ahmed Taya who was chen president of
rhe Republic reacted and acceprcd tribal organizarian as a legi timare mode of
aerion in che modem political arena; h owever, he rejecced che imervention
of ocher primal, partieularly echnie, idenriries in polirieal life. The rtibal syscem,
omnipresenc among che Arab-Berber (BirlaJ/) popularian, which co mprises che
m ase importJllt ethnic group in che counrry. had been incredibly active in che
policieal sp here praecieally sinee independenee in 1960, alchou gh, of eourse, ic
wcnt underground during ~uId Daddah's centralist, modemizing regime. Ho\V-
ever, che sueeessive rnilitary regimes between 1978 and 1984, and m ase of all Quid
Taya's conung to power in 1984, entailed ID updating of tribal codes, whose
lexicol1 srarted to be pare of Mauritanian polioea! Janguage (Lpez Bargados,
1999,2005). In any ease, che logie applied by Quid Taya sin ee his rise to power
is transparento if ic allowed the conversion of the cribe (qabila) into a key polirieal
actor, ir \Vas precisely because chis faml of organization \Vas essentially present in
Bidall circles, w hile the Negro-Mauricanian population (rIVO(Of, TOflcollleur, PCl/1
and SOl1illke) \Vas, 0 11 the COl1crary, organized in te m 1S of ethni c groups. The
rejection of any kind of politieal organizatio n based 0 11 regionalism, echnic
identiry or religious confession, which \Vas sanctioned by che Constiru cion of
June 25ch 2006 (Lpez Eargados, 2007) follo\Vs chis eourse: ic prevents che for-
matioI1 of polirical parties \Virh an ethnic co mp osition and blocks rhe way (o
lslamic movemems, w hil e dodging rhe weight of che triballoyalties of rhe Bidal/.
Dunng Ould Taya's regime, ir was precisely the combination of political
tnbalism with a"urhontarianism, characrensnc of most of the African political
systems, wh ich ca used rhe multipany regime rha t ca me out of the constitu-
tional refoml in 1991 ca drifc towards a kind of de faeto single-parry seace, as
m any observers have pointed ouc (Qu id Ahmed Salem, 2004; Quid Cheikh,
2006). In f..1Ct, the constant m::mipulatio n of the elections in favo r of the offi-
cialist PRDS pany, despite che occasional organizacion of legislative. senatori al
and presidenrial o nes, and che verificacion rhar the only way to profit direcdy
under che fOLm of a public office was to j oin ch e presidencial majority, led che
Mauncanian poli tical elite over time eo choose chis o ption, increasingly
rerracting rheir support from che opposicion. Ir is che viccory of che homo 111(1/1-
dllcall; chac Eayart (1996) spoke of: declarations of uneonditional support to che
regime and unsbakeable adherence co che leade r proliferare in a conCexc of
che misappropriarion of che apparaeus of rhe srate which made and still makes che
political figures who haven 't yielded co rhe remp tation loo k inco mpeeenc and
undeserving of the trusr rheir clienrelisr network place in th em.
In this se nse. rhe crearion, subsequent to ebe presidential elections in March
2007, ofche Nacional Pace foc Democraey and Developmenc, gacllering indepen-
derre poliricians aro und an ever wider presidencial majority. rbar of Sidi Ould
Cheikh Abdallahi, hinced ac che aecivacioIl of chac same logic chac endowed
POIIIC,. allri tra/1Sitiol/ ill Alal/rilmja 117
~ui d Taya's regime. wirh stabili ty for twenry years. Such Iogic warks on the
fo mmion , around a serong leader, of a subdued policieal elice w hose loyalry is
based on che comman misappropnarion of rhe srace and rbar e nds up converting
rhe oppasition fo rces ineo mere labels lacking any influence. The polieieal
pluralism, w hich is no m ore rhan a simul acnl lll, is complere whe n rhe prc-
daeory str.Hegies wirhin rhe adminisrrarion are not muy colerared bU[ are, in a
cerrain way, consecrated by che use and pragmatism of a population who sees
chis 1101/1 0 I1Imlrillcalls as some kind of popular hero, the very personification of
social success. We w itness rhe use of a symbology char 'feminizes' rhe man
of inregriry who is respectful of the law, bra nding him as incomperenc, w hile
empharicaUy associating th e archerypes of extrem e viriliry and prestige with
those who manipulare rhe law for rheir own or their allies' benefit (QuId
Ahmed Salem, 2001).
T he seco nd criterion mentioned in our :lllalysis of rhe relarionship betwcell
rhe consrfU crio n of the stare and democrarle consolidation is respect for human
nghrs. This is che grear pending issue in Maurltania. During rhe transition and
afrer negoriarions wirh opposicion leaders, including rhose in exile, political
priso ners were liberared. However, Mauritania's big curse is whar is called rhe
sequels of extreme dominance. Slavery \Vas fOnllaUy abolished in 1959; however,
in 198 1, che marter \Vas broughr co legislation again and recently diverse judi-
cial m easures ha ve been inrrodu ced co favor rhe applica tion of a sanctioning
framework w hich bad up co rhen been worthl ess. The rei tera ted efforts co
forbid slavery and especially che attempcs duri ng Quid Tayas regime to deny its
ver)' exisre nce exemplify ho\V slavery or ar least ies effecrs on statllcory rela-
tionships between people srill represem a problem whose effeccs are L.1r &om
disappearing in Mauricania (Eensaad, 2006: 12).
The third cnterian in rhe establishment of a consolidated democracy and
state is rhe extenr ro whieh authonties respond to citizens' claims, whicb can
also be relared ro rhe aspect of legitimacy and che capaciry of rhe srate ro pro-
vide such services efficiendy. Wherher civil claims are addressed or not is ahvays
less quesrioned in che rural sphere rhan in che urban one, alrh ough the farnler is
much less provided for. Cities are generally more crirical towards aurhorities,
even chough they enjoy che larger part of public services. But w har is interesting
here in che discussion of cirizen satisf..1c rion is tO distinguish berween instirucional
legi rimacy and legitimacy by resulcs. The fornl er refers ro che citizens' aceep tance
of rhe authonty of rhe state because of sociaUy accep red values wh ile legi rimacy
by resulrs jusrifies rhe aurhority and respecr for power in temlS of rhe producrs
it generates, the retums ir gives rhe cicizens.
After the transition. Mauricania pro vides an example in w hi ch we can see
how insritucional legitimacy has prevailed upon thar of retums; ir is precisely
this sicuacion thac has allowed liberali zation during a period (2005-2008) in
which legislarive and consritucional changes weTe able to take place, such as che
power transfer from che milira!)' junta ro the insritutions eJected. The desricurion
of Ould T aya by his own milicary forces followed by their commitmenc ro cany
out a process af transinon cowards democracy and their keeping their promises
 11 8 R. Ojeda Carda mld A. Lpcz Bmgadas
(i~1sti~ltiol1al refonns, Ilor ru oning in rhe e1ecrions and withdrJwing (rom politics,
ylcldm g power ro w hoever rightfully wi ns ir in che elections) is w hat has
aIl owed che insDtucjonallegitimacy of rhe state and rhe regi me ro be stre ngthened.
The organizacio n of elections and che parti ciparian of differcm state instiru tio ns
in che proces5. have. highlig~ [ed rhe civil servams' capacity ro ser rhe complex
electoral maclunery mco mormo. For rhe firsr rime, they avoided rhe vicio us cirele
mar \Vas damaging demacradc consolidanon, in which che promises ofliberalization
and change \Vete in che end wortWess, as had already happened in rhe third wave of
democratizarion in rh e 19905 \Virh ~uId Taya's li berali zarian initiatives.
In any case, rhe merirs of rhe dem ocranc consolidarion process \Vere called
mo quesrio n for rhe m ain body of rhe popularion, as rhey did not receive rhe
benefi rs of insnrurional changes in any osrensible \Vay. Quire in co nrrasr ro rhe
promises of improvemenr in rhe qualiry of !ife which \Vo uld come from petrol
reven ues, unjusrified promises given rhe modese producrion of Mauriranian
oilfields, \Vhat Mamiranians \Vere sufferin g from as resu lt of rhe process of
demo cratic co nsolidanon \Vas rhe general cise in the cosr ofbare necessines and
rhe. reesra blis~n,lem of dail,Y practices of exrortio n . In such condirions, ir is only
lOgIcal rilar cltlzens quesaon rhe need for a superlicial process of re nova tion
wirh~~t any repercussio ns on rhe so-called real economy. The phantasmagoric
c~ndmon of rhe proc~ss of rransirion and democradc consolidan o n is perce ived
\Vlrh harshness and reahsm by mosr of rhe M auriranian population: as a way ro keep
comrol over po\Ver on rhe parr of a few elite who can renegotiare rheir posino n via
rhe accullluIarion ofl,e~timacy before rhe key actOrs of rhe internacional sysrem.
, The I.ast characrenmc \Vorrh highlightin g is rhe conerol of corruption which
15 also h nked ro stare capaciry. Ir is a tricky subj ect, ro which it is difficulr ro
offer only on~. r.esponse. When Maurirania ns are lsked abour rheir relarionship
ro rhe autho nnes, rhey almosr always admir ro having to olfer a gift or a bribe
ro ger a pen11..lt, a do cumenr or resolve any official procedure, however much ir
may be rhe civil servam's dury and rhe cirizen's righr. Comlprion is a generalized
ph~no.men,o n at~o ng Mallrirania's stare institurions and is one of rhe major
obJectlves In rhe unprovemenr of governance borh in this countty and in inter-
national insrirutions such as rhe World Bank. H owever, rhe high operativity of the
' m oral econom y of corruption' coupled w ith the malleabiliry of a polirical syste m
tha~ 15 treated as a show and marked by a blarJnr discrepancy between inter-
n ~tlo nal cOI1~traints demanding rhe implem ematio n of rh e very policies rhat
\Vill systematlcally be breached by daily realiry fo rebode di ffi culties \Vhen it
comes to sroppi ng such practices rhar sociery does 11 0[ on rhe w ho le stigmanze
(Blundo, 2007).
In conclusion, \Ve may say rh at, during the rransition (2005-2008), rhe state
preved ts institucional capaciry and irs po litical will ca co nsolidare a democraric
regi m e (especia lly through electoral processes) and to com tmcr a rule of law
and they provided rhe regularary and institurional basis ro carry ir aU out:
H owev~r, there has been litrle inftuence of rhese refomls 011 rhe socio-palitical
srru ctul1n g of the COlllltry and hardly any applicati on of rheir m easu res b
either the governmenrs of ~uid Zeidane or of Ould Cheikh Abdallahi , in spit~
Powcr alld rrmISitioll ill lHalfrifi1/1ia 119
of the fit Il legi rimacy they both enjoyed by being elected, in accordance \Vith
the liberal caoo ns of representative dem ocracy.
Epilogue
Anorhe r coup has shaken Maurirania. O n Augusr 6rh 2008, an importanr segmem
of th e military, led by General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz - the country's rrue
ironman and rhe main drive behind the fOnller coup, which led ca a process of
democrari e rransirion conside red as a model, and member of rhe same Birlall
tribe as Ely Ould Mohamed Vall (the AI/Ilad BII Suaa) - arrested President Sidi
Ould Cheikh AbdaIlahi and Prime Minister Yahya Ould Ahmed Waghf and
pur an end to rhe consritutional regime. Gen eral M o hamed QuId Abdelaziz
\Von the presidential e1ections h eld on July 18th 2009 on the first ball ot,
rhereby emailing the reesrablishmem of [he institurionalization of an author-
irarian regime. Once more, che postcolonial logic, rhe faccional srruggle wirhin
che eli te along with rribe and fa m ily des seem ro prevail over me rheo rerical
impersonali ry of a few insrinttions born out o f a process w hich, in Mauritania,
pro ves as abstraer as ir is srrange. Onee aga in, rhe sulra n see ms to have stmck
out \Vith th e autho ri ry to exercise his dominio n over the cou nny. Th is new
military pIllSC' invires us ro reRec r up o n rh e specrral narure of rhe so-called
'democrarie processes' in rhe Afriean con rin ent and rhe difficulries rhar the
primary Mauriranian elite eneounrer w hen cop in g w irh a political logic rhar is,
in shorr, exogenous and hypocnrical, sin ce ir has been imposed by an intema-
rional cornmuni ty more concerned \Virh safegllarding irs narional interesrs than
with real guaranrees of irreversible, or at least a profound, political change. In
view of rh e events whieh llave bee n taking place since August 2008 in the
Islami c Republic of Mauritania, rh e m ovemen r see ms ro be, as rhe wisdo ll1 of
Pannenides would have it, a m ere illllsion.
Bibliography
Bayan, Jean- Frant;:ois (1996) L'iIlrlsioll irlcmiu:irc. Fayard, Paris.
- - ( 1999) El estarlo ell Ain'ca: la polftim llel.,;cmre, Belbtem, Barcelona,
- - , Geschiere, P. and Nyam njo h, F. (2001) 'Amoch tonie, democr.ltie ee cieoycnner en
Afrique', en'lique IJllemmiol/ale, no, 10 (1), pp, 177- 9L
t
Bensad , AJi (2006) 'Mauritanic , rerriroire de marges ee de Jiens Ma.!!/lfe/J-Machrck, no. 189,
,
Autunm, pp, 7-28,
Bisson, Vincem (2006) 'Vill e et pouvoir en Mauriranie: un instrumem politiqu e po ur
intgrer J'tat triba!', L'Amre rlrt Maglrrcb, 2005- 2006, pp. 337- 48,
Blundo, Giorgio (2007) 'Graisser la /Jarbc', Mcwrlllcs et logiqrres rlc la comrptiorr err Mmrn'tatlic,
Symhesis note. Delegatian of the European Commission in Mauritania.
Entton, Michael and Chang, Eri c (2006) 'Starc Building and Democnrization in Sub-Sahann
Africa: Forwards, Backwards, or Togerhcr?' , Corrrpamrifle Politica/ Srrrdics, vol. 39, no, 9,
pp. 1059-83.
Ccuppens, B. and Gcschicrc, P. (2005) 'A utochtoI1Y: Local or Global? Ncw Modcs in the
Stmggle over Citizenship in Afri ca and Europe', Amrrral RCI'icl/l oJ AlI1hrop%gJ', vol. 34,
pp. 385-407.
 120 R. Ojcda Carda alld A. Lpcz Bmgados
Clausen, Ursel (2000-2001) 'Chronique 2000: Une poli tique de censure et de rpression
pennanente de l'opposition', AIII/IIaire de l'Afi'iqllc dll Nord, vol. XXXIX, pp. 309-44.
Comit interministriel charg de la bonne gouven1Jncc (2006) Rappon dfillitif, Rpubliquc
Islamique de Maurit:l.I1ie. No\'ember 2005. www.mauritanie.mr/ fr/RapponsCM/bonne-
Gouvernance.pdf
Comit imenninistriel charg du processus de transition dmocntique (2005) Rapport dfi
lIitif, Rpublique Isl:lIuique de Mauriunie. No\'ember 2005. www.mauritall.ie.mr/ frl
RapponsCM/ upport-definitif-transition.pdf
Commissiol1 nationale consultative pour la rfomle de la presse ee de J'audiovisuel (2006)
R1Ipport Gllml prollisoire el AJIIlexcs, Nuakchott. March 2006. www.mauritania.mr/fr/
RapportsCM/RapportfinalCommissionenfrancais.pdf
Dpartement conomique et social (2004) FA O, Rapport spr:cial. Mission FAO / PAM flab/(l
lioll dcs rcoltes et des dispollibilits nlimelllaires ell l\1aurirallie, i/.\'c pllls partiCllIii:rcl/le/lt Sllr les
perles dlles m/x criquets pelenl/s. http: ww\V.fao.org/docrep007/j3970j/j3970mO.htm Con-
sulted on August 18th 2006.
Destremeau, Blandine and Tanguy, Philippe (2006) 'Projet de rgularisation et cration d'un
march foncier a Nouackchotr, Mauritanie: Que sont les pauvres de\'enus?', Mag}reb.
Mi/e/rek, no. 189, Autumn, pp. 111- 24.
Hochman, Dafna (2007) 'Divergent Democratization: The Paths of Tunisia, Morocco and
Mauritania', lUiddle East PoliC)', vol. XIV, no. 4, Winter, pp. 67- 83.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. and Kemou, A. (2009) 'La sociologa del poder en el mundo rabe
contemporneo'. In Izquierdo Brichs, F. (Ed.) Poder)' regme/les el el mlll/(/o nrabe COII-
tempornl/eo. Barcelona, Cidob/Bellaterra.
Jourde, Cdric (2007) 'The Internacional Relations ofSmall Neoauthoricarian States: Islamism,
\Varlordism, and the Framing ofStabiliry', Intmwtiol/al SII/dies Quarterly, no. 51, pp. 481-503.
Leservoisier, Olivier (1994) La qtlestiol/Jollcicre el Mmln'lallie, L'Hannattan, Pans.
Levine, Charles, H. (1999) 'La decadencia de las organizaciones y la administracin de
recortes', in Jay Shafritz and Albert Hyde, Clsicos de la admillislraci6/1 phlica, Fondo de
Cultura Econmica, Mexico.
LonsdaJe, J. (2000) 'Emicidad moral y tribalismo poltico', NOlla Africa, no. 8, pp. 37-58.
Lpez Bargados, Alberto (1999) 'L:J. tribu ante los dilemas de la modernizacin. La democracia
como f.,ctor de retnbalizacin en Mauritania', Swdia AJdea/la, no. 10, pp. 9-22.
--(2001) 'Ni blanco ni negro, sino gris. Los proyectos emanc.ipatorios del colectivo hron en
la sociedad mauritana contempornea', in D. Marre and M. Nash (Eds), MIIltiwlwmlismos }'
gnero, Bellaterra, Barcelona, pp. 195-218.
- - (2003) ArellllS ()lolliales. Los Awlad Dalllll allle la colonizacin fralleo-espmlola riel Shara,
Bellaterra, Barcelona.
--(2005) 'Primos pblicos y ancestros privados. Consideraciones sobre la nocin de
"tribu" en la sociedad mauritana contempornea', in A. Roca (Ed.), LA revolucilI pClldiellre.
El cambio poHtieo ell el Afn'ea /legra, Publicacions de la Universitar de L1cida, pp. 213-36.
--(2007) 'Mauritania, ;en marcha hacia la democracia? Variaciones sobre una tnnsicin
espectral', in F. fniesta (Ed.), Jfi"O/ltem ambiglla. TradicilI }' democracia ell {{rica, Bellaterra,
Barcelona, pp. 95-126.
Marchesin, Philippe (1992) Tn'/ms, er/mies et pOlllloi!' CII Malll1tallie, Karthala, Paris.
Maxred, Julia (2006) 'Exploitation oC Energy Resources in Africa and the Consequences for
M.inority Rights',jol/mal if De/lclopillg Socielies, no. 22 (1), pp. 29-37.
Mbembe, Achille (1992) 'The B:maliry oC Power and the Aesthetics of Vulgarity in the
Postcolony', Pllblic ClIltrlre, voL 4 (2), pp. 1-30.
--(2001) 011 the PostCO/OIIY, Universiry of Califomia Press, Berkeley.
Power atld tra/lSitioll ill lHallrifrlllia 121
Minr Ainina, Hindou (~000-2001) 'Chronique 2001: La politique de censure des parries de
I'opposition se consolide et le theme rabou de l'esclavage est devant de la scene politique',
Alllwaire de f'i ifn'ql/e d/l Nord, vol. XXXIX, pp. 343-62.
Mission d'observation lectonle, Union uropenne (MOE UE) (2007) Rapportfillal. Electiolls
IIII/IJiCljJalcs, lgislatiJles 2006 el prsidclltiellcs 2007. Nouackchott mars 2007. bttp://\V\Vw.
eueommauritania.org/mauritania/ MOE%20UE%20Mauritanic07_npport%20final.pdf
Consulted 011 June 30th 2007.
Moza/f..lr, Shaheen and Scarrit, James (2005) 'The Puzzle of African Parry Systems', Part}'
Poli/ies, vol. 11, no. 4, pp. 399-421.
Norris, H. T. (1986) TI/e Arab Ccmqllest of Ihe H/eslel"/l SaJwm, Libnirie du Liban, Beirut.
O livier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre (1996) 'L'conomie morale de la comlpt.i on en Afrique',
Poliliq/le q(n'cail/e, no. 63, pp. 97-116.
Ould Ahmed Salem, Zekeria (1999), 'La dmocratisarion en Mauricanie, une "illusio"
post-coloniale?', en Po/itiqlle AJrieaille, n 75.
--(2000) 'Une "illusion bien fonde": la centralit de la mobilisarion tribal e dans l'action
politique en Mauritanie', L'Olles Sa/ariell, vol. 2, pp. 127-56.
--(2001) "'Tcheb-tchib" ee compagnie. Lexique de la survie ce figures de la russire en
Mauritanie', Politiq/le rifi"icaille, no. 82, pp. 78-100.
--(2004) 'La dmocratisation au conerer', in Z. Alll11ed Salem (Ed.), Les trajectoires d'wl
tlltfrollliere. Espaces, ]lollltion politique et tmlliformatiol/S sociales ell .Malln"tallie, CODESRIA,
Daka" pp. 301-31.
Ould Cheikh, Abdel Wedoud (2006) 'Les habits neut5 du Sultan. Sur le pouvoir et ses (re)
sources en Mauritanie', MaghrebMlcllrek, no. 189, Autumn, pp. 29-52.
Ould Mohamedou, Mohammad- Mabmoud (1007) 'Nouvelle producrion de sens en Mauritania:
le coup d'rat du 3 aout 2005 et sa signification', in CA/lI/e du Magllreb, pp. 315-32.
Taylor, Raymond (2000) 'Statut, mdiation et ambigir ethnique en Mauritanie prcoloniaJe
(XIXeme siecle). Le cas des Ah1 al-Gibla et des Ahl Gannar', in M. Villasante-de Beauvals
CEd.), Groupes sen,iles (/11 Salwra. Approcl/C Comparatille a partir d/l ms des Arabopl/Olles de
Mauritanie, ed. du C.N.R.S.; Paris, pp. 83-95.
Ulfelder, Jay (2005) 'Contentious Collective Acrion and the Breakdown of Authoritarian
Regimes', [mel1latiollal Politjeal Scie/lce Relliell', vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 311-34.
Villasante-de Beauvals, Mariella (1991) 'Hirarchies statutaires ct confuts fonciers dans l'Assaba
contemporain', Re/me d/l MOl/de MlIsrtlmall et de la ivldircrralle, vol. 59-60, pp. 181- 210.
- -(1998) Parem et politiq/le ell Malll1tauie, L'Hanllattan, Paris.

7 Mauritania's challenges
Nfigllel Hern.al'ldo de Larralllel'ldi
MaUlitania is a counrry situated 011 che periphery of [he Arab \Vorld which aees
as a hinge becween che Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa. Since es independence
from Franee in 1960, che Mauritanian sta te has had co f.lce [he fragility of it<;
socio-economic stmcture as well as ies regional envirol1 l11 ent [har initially saw
independence as a maneuver on me pan of French colonizers ro mainrain their
intereses in a cerncory w hich had for a long time belonged [Q Weste m French
Africa (AOF).
The affical name of chis s[are - rhe Islamic Republic of Maurirania - reAeees
rhe derenninarion ro explicitly underJine rhe main integra ring fea cure of a popula-
rion w hose number is small and campmes 3.2 million inhabitants, from different
ethnic origins. Of its inhabitants, 70 pereent are Arab-Berbers, traditionally shep-
herds, nomads and m erchants, and 30 percent are Negro-Mauritanians from
diverse ethnic groups, su eh as che TOllcoJ/lclfrs, FI//be, rVolqfs. SOJ/illke - who
fonn sedemary communities by rhe Senegal River. Th ere luve been recurring
differcnces bet\~een rhe Arab-Berber community rhar has had che monopoly
on polinca! policy-making centers since independence and rhe differenr Arncan
erhnic groups regarding education and Arabization policies, foreign policies
oriemed either towards rhe Arab \Vorld or Sub-Saharan Afiica, as well as rhe dis-
tribution of economic resaurces. The consrruction of regulating dallli 011 rhe ncw,
inigated ands of rhe banks of rhe Senegal Ri ver triggered violent confrontations
in 1989 between the Arab-Berbet and the Negro-Afric. n population in borh
Mauritania and Senegal. The rerum and reinsercio n of rhe Negro-Mauritanian
refugees \Vho emigrared [Q Senegal after rheif repression by the Mauritanian
amly - an afElir known as passif 11IIIIlal/ifaire - is a problem w hose definirive
solution, albeir complex, is absolutely necessary [Q fosrer national imegrarion.
In addirion te this weak degree of national imegration, rh ere is a scarcity of
resources in rhis vasr but essenrially deserr counrry. The Mauritanian economy
relies on rhe exploiration and e:\.l'0rrarion of ts narural reSOllrces, such as iron ore
and copper, the fishing industry and, sinee February 2006, oil. The e~l'ectations
around rhe exploitation of oil wells haven'r been mer up to now; however, ner
oil incomes are expected to reach approximately an average of 3 percem of rhe
non-oil GDP and [Q rhen soar up [Q 10 percem fiom 20 '12 onwards. Foreign
aid has been added ro rhese resources since 1974, which amoums on average to
lHal/fitallia's c1lallclIgcs t 23
a fifrh of rhe coullny's GDP. The managemenr of resources is camed out through
a sysrem ntn by a small number of elite groups who use kinship networks ro
reproduce a c1ientelisnc system, which makes wealth creanon difficulr and feeds
COm.lpnon. The process of consoliclarion of rh e Mauritanian srare hasn 't
enrailed the disappearance of rhe tribal sys tem, w hich is srill a key element te
undersrand the political, economic and social dynamics of the councry.
Maurirania's fragiliry has contribllted ro reinforcing es sarellization in rhe
regional space. The Mauriranian state was nor recognized as such until the end
of rhe 1960s either by Moroeeo or by m osr of the Arab co umries and eoneentrated
its effore, under firsr President Mokh rar Ould Daddah 's imperus, O!l trying ro gain
reeognition fmm the international co mmuniry. As Morocco daimed Mauritania
as pare of ts rerritory, Mauritanian foreign policy focused on creating a buffer
state on irs northem border ro geographically separare it'ielf &om Moroceo . It
\Vas in rhis geopolitieal eontext thar a surprising allianee \Vas fonned between
tbese t\Vo eou ntries, which had until rhen been antagonisrs, in arder ro divide
the Westem Sahara after che Spanish \Virhdrawal in 1976. By annexing Ro
de Oro, che souchem area of the fomler Spanish Sahara, rhe Mauriranian regime
aimed [Q reinforce irs seeuriry. Numerous f.'CCOI'S heigheened rhe imernal co nrra-
dictions between the ptevailing Ar.b-Berber community (culturally, Iinguistically
and ethnieally doser to rhe Wesrem Sahara poplllaon) and rhe Negro-Mauritanian
eonmluniry, whieh was inditferem ro an expensive eonflicr threatening te jeo-
pardize rhe unstabIe equilibrium of che sta te and foreing che Mauritanian regim e co
seek ntilitary suppon from France and Morecco ro eombat rhe Polisario Front's
artaeks 1 Arnang sueh faetors \Vas rbe rriggeling of anned conRict and the faet
tbat rhe Polisario Front's military acrions between 1976 and 1978 were eon-
ce ntrated on Maurirania, which \Vas more vulnerable rhan Moroceo. Afrer
President Ould Daddah's ovenhro\V and rhe \Vithdrawal from Ro de Oro in
1979, sueeessive Mauritanian governmems, despite their different ideologieal
orien tations and regional ties, ha ve eoincided in defending Mauritania's
nelltrality in a eonRier of which rh ey felr no pan.
Ould Taya's relations \Virh Saddam Hussein's regime during rhe Kuwait
invasion in 1990 led Maurirania ineo international isolarion, as inter-ethnic
censions heigh tened in rhe cOllnrry. Ould Taya's internarional ehange of
direcrion rhrough diploma tic relacionships wh Israel and his suppon of the
'War on Terror' in northem Africa launehed by the BllSh administrarion once
again tipped the geopolitical equilibrium, and precipitated the fall of Ould
Taya's governmem in 2005.
Mauritanian poltieal Jife since OuId Daddah's overthrow has beell aeeom-
panied by a militarization process rhat was inrensified during Ould Taya 's mle
(1984--2005). The mi.'Xture of aurhoritarianism alld politieal tribalism has ehar-
aererized this poJitieal period and impeded the eonsolidatian of che eountry's
inreresring experienee between 2007 and 2008 after President ~uId Cheikh
Abdallahi's democrarie eleerion. Afrer the eOllp d'tat that overrhre\V him in
August 2008, seeurity matrers and eoUab orarion \Vieh Franee, the United States and
Spain in the fight against al-Qaeda in the lslamic Maghreb (AQIM) have
124 Nligl/cI Hemal1do de l/mlllClldi

beeome a powerful tool used by General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz in his

search for legitimacy and intemarional support. 8 Contemporary Egypt: between
Fifty years afrer its independence, Mauricania f.1ces important chaIlenges. These
include the reinforcemenr of social cohesion, che redllcrion of poverry, che creation reform and continuity
of mecharusms for rhe distributiOll of ecollomic power, and political representarioll
among me different ethnic and culmral groups as necessary condirions co successfully Athina Lalllpridi-KelllOlI and Brbara Azaola
taekle the ehallenges of democraozaoon and development.

Note
N.D.T: The Polisnrio, Polisario Front or Frente Polisnrio, from che Spanish abbreviation
of Frente Popular de Liberacin de Sngua el Hamra y Ro de Oro (Popular Front for
the Liberation of Saguia d-Hamra and Ro de Oro).
With the fall of Hosni Mubarak on February 11 th 2011, a new phase in eon-
temporary Egypt's history began, filJed with hope bllt also uneerrainty. After
eighreen days of proresrs and the pressure from rhe srreet ae unsustainable levels,
President Mubarak was finally foreed to step down !iom power. The folJowing
chaprer do es nO[ ana]yze rhe current transinon process, bur ir do es offer inru-
catQrs and keys tQ undersranding rhe inrernal correlarion between rhe different
forces rhac make up rhe regime and their role in che rransirion process ar rhe
rime rhis book \Vent to press.
The history of modem Egypt is tightly Iinked to the eonstruetion of the
Egyprian state. According ro dilferenr rusrorians, Muhammad Ali's arrival in
1805 as rhe governor of rhe Ocroman sultan may be considered as che birrh of rhe
'modern state' in Egypr. 1 A srare appaGltus rhen srarted [Q rake shape. sparking
che refonn of borh the miJirary and rhe administration rhrough a process
wherein Ayubi simares che genesis of rhe idea of 'Egyptian-ness' through che
ins tirut10n of rhe state (Ayubi: 1998). Since rhe end of rhe nineteenth cenrllry
and in spire of the limits imposed by colonial rule, rhere has been a rradition
of parliamentary Iife that has helped define the Egyptian eontempora!y politiea]
landseape. After the independenee of the countty in 1922, ehe liberal
projece conrinued llntil [he military coup canied out by che Free Officers in
1952.
Egypr has been rhe cradle of three ideologies chac have exerted greac influence
in the Arab-Muslim world : [slam, Pan-Arabism and liberalism (Martn Muoz,
2006: 4). Following the eOllntry's experienee with Iiberalism, after the Baghdad
pacto ie converred to an Arabic l1ationalism represenred by Nasser, from which a
support1ve nationalism wirh Arab movements of Jiberarion larer emerged,
bringing together - albeie at the same time deeply dividing - the Arab world
(Kemoll, 2007).
In rhe mid-1970s, under Sadat's mandare, rhe one-pany regime beca me a
limited multipany system. This political change rook place at a time when an
open-doors poliey - the ,!fita/ (Opening) - \Vas being implemented, \Vhose
economic orientarion promoted increased exporcation, foreign invesrment, and
rhe priva te sector and rrade liberalizanon. The conflllence between rhe two
political rrends, e.g. socialism and liberalism, led ro rhe emergence of different
 126 Arhil/(/ Lnmpridi-KclIlOII f/lld Brb(//"{/ Az(/ola
elires comprising mosr of rhe bureaucraric elite, high-ranking officers and rhe
urban bourgeoisie &om a growing privare secror.
Wirh Hosni Mubarak's seizure of power in 1981 , rhe fa~ade of multiparrism
\Vas kepr up, along wirh me srill more acrive liberal economic policies wirhour,
however, any real opening of rhe sysrem. The regime rhus controlIed mosr of
rhe power resources and accumulation processes in sphe of popular discomem
and rhe internacional rhetoric for a democrarization of rhe co umry.
Foundations of the elites
Up ro Hosni Mubarak's [111, there were t\Va main primary eliee groups: on che
one hand, Mllbarak and his allies, who fonned the regime and direedy and
indirectly \Vere comrolling aImose a11 Egyprian power resaurces; on rhe orher,
rhe organization of rhe Muslim Brorherhood, which controlled and still controIs
the ideologieal-religious discou,;e. The rest of the elites belonged to secondary
elire groups since rhe scope of rheir power \Vas nar autonomous bur derermined
by their relarions to the primary elite.
Ir should be underlined thar rhe foUowing c1assification of rhe e1ires does nor
mean thar rhese groups had complete or exclusive control over a specific
resou rce; ehe division aims rarher to highlighr rhe ma1n source of po\Ver rhae
eaeh group eontrolled.
MJlharak's I'cgimc
The Egyptian politieal sphere, up to Mubarak's foreed resignation had been
dominated by , lites reJated to the National Demoeratie Parry (NDP) . This
parry headed by Hosni Mubarak, president of the Repllblie, was the direet he ir
of the Arab Soeialist Union (ASU), the single party ereated by Nasser in 1962,
compnsing che differenc secrors rhat supported rhe coup led by rhe Free Officers
in 1952.
The process of reforms iniriared by Sadar in rhe nud-'1970s led ro the recon-
version of the Arab Socialist Union, which, alrhough it changed ts name to the
NDP, eoncinlled to be the ruling policieal force in the multiparry seenano. Sub-
' sequenr to Hosni Mubarak's coming ro power in 1981 , rhe process of change
in rhe parry conrinued, New actors from (he bourgeoisie emerging from rhe
fervor of rhe 1l1fitail liberalizing refom1S srarted ro join rhe elires \Vho were con-
necred ro power composed of st.1ce bureaucrats, secUliry forces and high-ranking
olliee,; from the military.
The main source of power for Mubarak and his allies \Vas ro be found in rhe
control over the srare apparatus. Executive and legislaeive power had been
mooopolized by rhe presidenc as a resulc of che cencralized presidential system
and emergency law eha( was applied afrer President Sadar's assassillation in 1981
and was renewed once more in 2010. Fmthennore, the la\V 66/1943, amended
by the Iaw 35/1984, allinns the independenee of jlldiciary power, though
esrablishing a series of resrricrions. 2
COl/teJllporal)' Egypt 127
In paraUe!, the NDP controUed the two Chambe,; of the Egyptian parliamenr,
the People's Assembly (Ma}lis al SI/a'b) and the Consllltacive Assembly (Ma}lis al
Slmra); however, si nce rhe end of rh e 1970s, orher poli rica] groups had also
been represemed in parliament. The presence of opposirion parries in rh e
Egyprian parJiament \Vas parricularly linu(ed and reached one of s lowesr levels
during rhe e1eccions in 2010, in which che opposition forces held on1y 3 percem
of the total of parJiamenrary sears. 3
Control over rhe administrarioo had been favored by a policy of expansion
of public employment, which started during Nasserism and pemutted the
incorporation of new graduaces imo rhe job market wha \Vere guarameed a
posr in the admi nistration 00 finishing rheir university srudies.' fhe Minisrry of
Labor aod Irnmigration \Vas created io 1962 ro implemem rhis policy.
Alehough chis guarancee disappeared de factO in 1990, in a country where che
unemployment rare is high (berween 10 and 20 percenr depending on sources),
and poverty affects 43.8 percent of ies inhabitams according ro rhe Unired
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the possibility of getting a job,
especially in che public secror, \Vas considered as privilege.
Mubarak's regime relied on civil servants and their families' nerworks as well
as on rhe milirary appararus ro maimain relarive social peace and cerrain control
over rhe popularion. In spe of rhe pressures from the internarional banking
enriries, a sysrem of subsidies for s(aple food products had been mainrained,
which is also one of rhe rools used by che regime to avoid social unresr.
Between 1981 and 1987, the pereentage of Pllblie expenditure designated ro
chese subsidies decreased &om 13.9 percent ro 5.6 percent. Such pracrices hado
ho\Vever, come ro represem a handicap for the Egyprian regime, as the governmenc
grants couId no longer be wichdrawn \Vichom jeopardizing irs survival.
The impetus provided by rhe receipts of the Bretton Woods institurions and
the eeonomie refomls of the JI/fita/ poliey fostered by President Sadat led to
ehe emergence of oew econOTnic acrors Iinked te the privare sector. Firsr Sadar
and then Mubarak tried ro exert co nrrol over rhese ne\V economic elites whase
imporrance had considerably increased LInder rhe impulse of che privatizacon
policies. Ir is wirhin (his framework ehar a law \Vas passed in the 1990s allowing
businessmen ro run as candidaces in the legislarive elecrions wirhou( having to
belong to any politieal parry. As a resu lt, during the last yea,; of Mubarak's
mandare, rhe number of busillessmen increased in (he Egyprian parliament
(from 7 in 1984 ro 71 in 2000) (Said Aly, 2005).
T he attempr to liberalize rhe Egyprian marker in rensified in rhe 19905,
withour, ho\Vever, entailing rhe complete disappearance of public companies.
Egypt had been undergoing a constanc gro\Vrh of bureaucrarizarion,s and
Mubarak, aware of the imporrance of maintaining control over rhe public
secror for the srability of the regime, managed ro combine rhe liberalizing
policies established by the Internacional MonetalY Fund (IMF), the World Bank
(WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), while preserving a publie sector
ehar exerts a significant influence, aIbeir to a lesser degree in more recenC years, on
rhe Egyprian economy in ies induscrial, agric ulntral, oil and consnucrion secrors.
 ~
I
128 Athlla llIlprdi-f(ellloll a/ld Brbara Azaola
The privatization policy has enoml0usly increased the priva ce sector rhac
accoumed for 73 percent of rhe Egyprian economy in 2000.
Bureaucr.J.riz.1rion and Iiberalizanon led ro che symbiosis of r\Vo par.illel sysrems:
one relaring ro rhe SCare machinery and rhe orher linked ro sectors of privare
capital. The boundary berween rhe r\Vo had been ambiguous and emailed a righr
relarion ber\Veen rhe respecrive elires since rhe prosperiry of rhe econorruc elires
based on privare capital depended on rheir relarions \Virh the polirical accofS.
Anorher power resource used by Mubarak's regime \Vas rhe managemem and
clientelisrie distriburion of foreign aid, especially &om rhe USA and rhe Glllf
counrries, Egypt being rhe second largesr recipient of American aid aCrer Israel,
most of which is military.
Control over rhe press and the audiovisual media has been used by the
regime, sin ce Nasser, as a tool ro ensure control over sociery. Egyprian radio
and television are under almosr total state ownership. However, rhe monopoly
over visual infom13cion was broken by che incroduction of che Al jazeera
channel via sa rellire in rhe 19905. The channel, \Vhieh is funded by rhe Emir
and rhe Qarar royal family, has been considered rhe firsr 'free' relevision in rhe
Arab world on accoum of irs programs of open debates on polirical and social
marrers (Gllaaybess, 2005).
Arab governments, alanned by rhe changes introduced by Al j(/zeera, and
seeing rhac rhe national measures ro fighr against a transnarional media were
ineffecrive, met up widn rhe tramework of che Arab League in February 2008
in Cairo in arder ro coordinare rheir accions regarding rhe 'danger' rhar rhe
infomlation broadcasc by rhe channel represenced. T \Venry-cwo miniscers of
communication gathered, with the exceprion of rhe Lebanese and rhe Qarar
minisrers, and aslopted a prorocol according to which channels cannor 'offend
rhe leaders, or rhe narional and religious symbols' nor 'rhrearen national peace,
narional uniry, public arder and tradirional values'.6
In an attempc to regain rhe audience chat had been lost by the pan-Arab
channel, in 1998, Mubarak Iallnehed rhe firsr Arab sarellire, rhe N ilesar 101,
which became Nilesac 102 in 2000 and was broadcasting around 400 channels
by 2007. In addirion, privare channels appeared in 200 1 rhar have managed ro
elude some degree of governmemal control, among them: Drct1Ill TV - in
whieh rhe Egyprian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) participares and
\Vhose owner is the bllsinessman Ahmed Bahgar - Al iV!chlllar - whose capical
belongs to a conglomerare of businessmen - and Rofalla.
The \Vrirten press had always been scrongly conrrolled by rhe regime ever
smce Nasser's rule. Despire its pluraliry, Mubarak's regime didn'r hesicare ro use
differem meties to ensure control over infonnarion, from applying che legislaron
provided by rhe emergency law thar allowed joumalisrs' imprisonment for libel
against rhe president and his family, ro imposing censorship on subjecrs con-
sidered taboo or closing clown newspapers for 'threatening social peace' and
'endangering narional security'.
Educarion was another resource used by che regime ro srrengchen ics conrrol
over Egyprian socieey. Egypt was one of che pioneer Arab councries in the
COllfe/llpora /)' Eg)'pl 129
developmem of rh~ infrascrucrure of modem universiries and \Vas, ar (he
beginning of rhe tweney-firsc centu ry, one of che micldle-income coumries
\Virh a particularIy elevated number of students in hgher education. Egyptian
university has always been a space for political accivism and procesc that che
regime cried ro keep under control. Its classrooms and corridors reflecc the political
c1imare experieneed on a narional scale (Azaola, 2007a). Public ownership of all
education cemers dllring Nasser's rule, guarameeing free ed ucaron :le all levels,
was affecred by rhe emergence of privare schools and universiries under
Mllbarak's7 mandare. The crearion of ren ne\V plivace universiries in rhe lasr
decade aimed ro satisfY che market for executives in che privare sector.
Tlle political elites
The process of increasing political openness iniciaced by Sadar in 1976 \Vas
accompanied by che legalization of some tradicional parties prohibited under
Nassensm, such as rhe Hltifd or other political grOllpS \Virh liberal or lefc-\Ving
rendencies. In 2010, rhere were 24 legal policieal parties in Egypr in addirion ro
rhe NDP, buc only some of rhem have had parliamemary representation.
Traditional political parries had no significant we ight in Egyprian sociery;
rheir flll1ction was merely symbolic as they were llSed to justifY a l11ultiparry
syscel11. Opposicion parties wirh differem leanings had sllcceeded in being
represenred in parliament, as had the Democraric Nasserist Parry, che lefr-wing
Tagallllllll and parties \Vich liberal rendencies such as che traditional NCI/J fJlqfd and
rhe AI-GI/ad, w hich was creared in 2004. Yer, as underlined previously, in rhe
parliamemary eleccions in 2010, rhe opposioon only held 3 percent of rhe sea".'
These legal political parries ha ve che ir own press, a relarively usefi.ll tool for
disseminating their deology among the population if \ve take mo aCCOllnt thar
che printing and diffllsion \Vere carried out \Virh state subsidies, t1.1rther limiting
their ability to act as an 'opposition' ro the regime. Al I'Vafd is the mosr sold
newspaper, alrhough ir only reaehes 3.4 percenr of rhe popularion. The orher
party-owned newspapers comprise Al Afw/y of rhe Tagallllllll parry, Al ArabJ' of
rhe Nasserist Parry and AI-Sllaah of rhe Islamie- oriemed soeialist labor parcy,
which has been edited in elecrronic fomlar only since 1998, afeer its printed
publication was closed down by che regime.
Togeeher wirh rhe legal parties, there are ocher political forces thac are tol-
era red or repressed according to the situanon. The resrrictions imposed by the
law rhar regulated the fomlation of pobtical parties in the coumry, together
\Virh rhe laek of popular support for tradicional parties, led ro rhe ereacion of new
fomlations, which afien involve atypical coalitions bervveen differem opposition
groups.
The Muslim Brocherhood's organizarion (AI-Ikhrllall al-J1iIl/slilllllll)'J represenrs
che principal force of opposicion in the Egyptian poliricallandscape. Their main
resource for l11obilizarion is ro be found in their moderare religiolls ideology
that provides chem \Vith significant popular supporc. Ar the same time, rhe
Brorherhood enjoys a rarher comfortable economic base provided by rheir
130 A tlJilla Lnlllpridi-KcllIOI/ alld Brbara A z aola
followers all over rhe counrry and ro a lesser exrenr from foreign fllnds. Such
econonlic capacity enables rhe Brorherh ood ro finan ce intense social \York for
rhe und erprivileged social classes.
Since rhe 1920s, eheir exrensive developmenr has enabled ehe Muslim
Brorherhood te be presene in almose a1l [acers of Egyprian life. Some of rheir
follo\V ers belong te rh e milirary, rhe seate bureaucracy and rhe business sp here, as
is the case fot Youssef Nada, who founded the Is!amic bank Al Tnwqn in 1988.
Y/le econolllic elites
Egypr is considered 'rhe morher of Arab liberalizarion' \Virh irs erajectery of
liberal economic refornlS thar were initiared with rh e 1I1fi(all, whose goal \Vas ro
broaden rhe social basis of support ro rh e regime.
Under Mubarak's mandare, rhe privare sector had been increasing its influence,
even if rhe seaee appararus still had a prol1l.inent role in th e Egyptian econol1l.y. The
liberaliza ti on process comrolled by rhe regime had been designed so as nor to
creare friccions \Virh the intereses of rhe std.re's elire. Thanks to rrus cOlllbinarion,
rhe regillle had been able ro impJemenr ehe economic refonns reconullended by
rhe internacional banking organiZJeio ns, while at the same rime preserving control
of me distribution of resources. Mosr of rhe acmrs fro m the privare secror had nght
relanons wirh rhe regime, and some of them, as well as wielding grear eco-
nomic power as businessmen, also had rhe privilege of fonning parr of rhe
poJitical establishment aS members of parliament. OSlllan Ahmed Osman,
'che rnan w ho buile the Aswan dJm ', embodied rhe symbiosis between rh e
private and rhe public sector \Virh his company Arab Contracmrs.
The Egyptia n business secror revolves around difterem organizations such as
rhe Egyptian Businessmen's Association, ehe Federaeion of Egyptian Chambers
of Commerce and rhe Internarional Chambers of Commerce in Egyp t (Ame rican,
British, Gennan and French). Orher stm cNres thar ha ve connections ab road
had be en creared alongside ehese eorpotare organiZJrions and perfo011ed a less
forrnalized yet equally relevanr role through rheir direcr contaer \Vieh the regime's
leadership. Some of rhe more prominent businessl11en had direce access ro
Mubarak through rh e Egyptian American Presidential Council,1O an advisorv
body ereared in 1995 ro '[aster privare sector businesses between the USA ami
Egypt, and the economic operung of cl,e co unrry'. It was comprised ofthi rry ofthe
principal businessmen &0111 borh counrries \Vho had neerests in Egypt Jnd \Vere
appointed by Mubarak himself (Moman i, 2003). lnJuly 1997, Mubarak appointed
his son Gamal as rhe council spokesperson, rhus ensming hil11self grearer control
of this importa m segment of the privare sector (Galal and Lawrence, 1998).
YIJe I'eligous elites
According to rhe Constitution of 1971 , \Vith nine of irs artides amended in
March 2011, Islam is the te ligio n of th e Egyptian state, although the same text
acknowledges the freedol11 of belief and worship. 11 The Copes conscituee che
COlltelllpora.}' Egypt 131
country 's mose important minoriry religiolls eom11111nity, ranging becween
12
5 an d 10 petcent of th e popu!ation, depending on th e so utce.
Within rh e Muslim communiry, the official Ulema are headed by ehe Grand
Mufri of Egypr. responsible for issui ng official fat\Va rhrough rhe insrirution Dar
nl-Iftn, and the Sheikh of the A1-Azhar Mosque, the major religious authority in
the country (Arigita, 2006: 18- 28). In 2010, these positions wete held by
Sheikh AIi Gomaa and Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb, who teplaced Muhammad
Sayyid Tantawi 13 in March 2010. These t\Vo religious institurions together
with the Ministty of R eligious Endowments (Alllqqfj, headed by Mahmoud
Harndi Zaqzouq, depended on rh e govern ment, w hich \Vas also in charge of
designating eheir top representa ti ves.
The importan ce of rbe mosque-university Al_Azhar 11 as rhe eenrer of Sunni
Muslim leaming and rhe sp read of irs srudenes across che lslamic '\vo rld t:1cilitare
ehe crearion of cooperanon networks beeween m e religious elires from differenr
Muslim COllnmes and help maintan a certain doctrinal uniry among Muslims
living in non-Islamic eOllnrries.
The Ulema, wherher progressive or conservative, maintain their inflllence in
the countty thanks ro their religious ideology that by and large adapts itself ro the
leading political power, and to rheir religious inflllence o n other popularions.
During Nasser's mandare, according to law no. 103 of 1961, rhe mosqlle-university
of Al-Azhar \Vas eonrrolled by the sraee, whieh rumed rhe Ulema into govem-
menr officials ar its service. This clase collaboration between institucional Islam
and rhe regime has been ma imained ever since.
In rhe political and religious fi eId, moderare Islam eoexists with radical
groups, prominent among which are rh e Al Call1a'a al-lslallli}'ah and rh e A I-jilwd.
Both share a radical reli gious diseourse and have resorted ro rhe use of violenee,
principally in che 1990s. The considerable presence of Islamise groups in
Egyptian sociery and their relations with foreign organizacions of similar ideol-
ogy have enabled th em to infiltrare difterenr secrors of rhe srate and rhe military
(Azarva, 2007: 8).
These groups are suppo rted by educated young people, who generally live in
the suburbs of big cities, an d llave had no opportunity of social mobili ty, benefiting
little from th e Iiberali zing economic tefO mlS adopted by the regime (Ayubi,
2006: 264).15
Under the wing of gIobalizaeio n, new forms of predicanon have emerged in
recenr years in Egypt \Vhere a new kind of religiolls aurhority has come ro Iight
rhar does nor rely on rhe tradicional fonnation of Al-Azhar's U1ema, nor is ie
under their control. Such is the case of the Egyptian preacher Amt KhaJed,
\Vho gradllated in business scudies and has used rhe resou rces provided by rhe
Internet, ne\V technologies and sJrelliee relevision channels ro transmic his reli-
gious message in a 'modern' sryle. He incends ro attracr a new bourgeojsie rhat
has emerged from rhe privarizarion process of rh e 1990s.
Pope Shenouda III has represented the Coptic community since 1971.
Thro llgh his more conciliarory relanons wieh Mubarak's regirne rhan eh ose held
wirh Presidenr Sadat, hannon ious dialogue wirh rhe represenrati ves of official
 132 Arhilla LaJ/lpridi-Kelllo/l mId Brbara Azaola
Islam has been mainrained &0111 the mid-1980s on\Vards. Are. politica] Islam has
become more influential, the Copts have had to withdraw from che poli tical arena,
w here theie access ro positions of responsibiliey \Vas limited, 16 into che economic
sphere. The Copes are indeed excluded from high positions in the military, the
police, the secret services and the magistracy, but, while they are underrepresenred
ae a politicaJ and institutionalle vel, they encounter no impediments w hatsoever in
the business sphere. One striking example of this is the Sawiris family and their
business group Orascom. 17 The growing censions between the t\Vo religious
communities and che limiced politica! role of che Copts creaced feelings of dis-
appoin tment from che Coptic side rowards the Egyptian president. Indicative of
the Coptic dissacisfacrion was che position of Michael M ourllr, presidenc of rhe
US Coptic Association, who stated that Mubarak had bee n ignoring their
demands, as was shown by the president's uI1willingness to 'regulate elecrions
so as ro ensure fair representaran for COptS in parliament'. 18
TIre militmJI elites
T he importan ce of che arrny in Egypr, boch in rhe collective imaginary as \VeIl
as in real temlS, is rooted in che rimes of Muhammad Ali. T he milicary background
of the laSt fo ur presidents has cotToborated the significant weight enjoyed by this
insam tion, A large part of the public funding is designated to military expenses:
2.7 billon dollars in 2006 representing 2.7 percent of the GDP. 19
In 1979, che peace treaty with its main 'enemy' Israel did not lead ro a
reduction of ts nlilitary capacity bur posed rhe question of th e role of che anny
in relation to rhe threar from radical Islamist groups. les function chus became more
and more orient,ated towarru domestic securiey. In addition ro ies securitarian role,
the arnly camed out civil functions such as fighting against illiteracy in per-
ipheral desert regio ns, providing Bedouin pop ulations \Virh fresh water and
medicines, and mediaring in cases ofland disputes (Ayubi, 2006: 272-75).
Under Mubarak's manda te, as in Sadat's rule, the amly \Vas also allo\Ved to
participate actively in the economic sector. As a consequence, the military
ind usrry i5 \Vell developed (seco nd in rhe region afrer Isra el) and entertains close
relations wirh American companies such as General Mocars.
Role of the people: between linear and clientelistic relations
As \Ve have previously mentioned, there has been a mu lripartidist system in
Egypt since the end of the 1970s, which \Vas initiated by President Sadat at the
end of his mandare and endured under his successor, H osni Mubarak. In 2010,
24 legal politica! parties coexisted, including left-\Ving opposition parties (Tagall llllll ,
Nasserst Party) and parties \Vith liberal inclinations (NeJII W'!fd, Al-Charl), having
scarce if any pa rliamentary representation.
In contrast to this multiparty fapde, the poltical opponents of the dissent
movemem against ehe regime did not enjoy legal starus. T his \Vas che case, firse of
aH, of rhe Islamist organization of che Muslim Brotherhood, which, albeit not
COl/telllporal}' Egypr 133
legally recognized a~ a political parey, participated in the elecrions, either in
coaltion \Vith other patTies - \Vith the W'!fd in 1984 and \Vith the Socialst
Labour Party and the Liberal Egyptian Parry in 1987 - or as independent can-
didates.::!o In the elecrions of November/ December 2005, they \Von 88 out of
454- seats in parliamem, thus becoming rhe main opposition force, \Vhich did not
prevent rhe regime from conrinuing its campaign of harassmem and persecurion of
rhe organizarion 's members and main leaders w hose cases \Vere being judged in
military coures.::!l
In the legislative elecrions in 2010, both the W'!fd and the Muslim Brotherhood
refused ro participare in rhe second ballet, alleging generalized fraud and intimi-
dation. The Muslim Brotherhood \Vas left \Vith only 1 seat Out of tbe 88 they had
before rhe elections. The NDP had rhus made sure ie had the effective monopoly
of ehe parliamenc. Opposed ro che regime are also less influencial and smaller
groups of acrors such as K<1a)'a (EllolIgh! in English), w hich was created in 2004
and has broughe rogeeher political activists with differenc tendencies as well as
members &om civil socieey.:!2
Whac has mosr conditioned [he cou nny's policical life for aImosr chirty years
\Vas, withour any doubt, che application of emerge ncy law. According co ano
148 of the Egyptian Coostirurion, rhe presidenr could declare a state of emer-
ge ncy far a detemuned periad of time and any further renovation had to be
approved by rhe parliamem . The renovation was initially approved every year
but ie has subsequently been every [\VO or th ree years. 23
This law gave the regime extensive powers ca impose restriceions on rhe
freedo m of assembly, movemenc and residency, as well as legal aurhori ty ea
arrest and detain suspects or anyone \Vho was supposed ro be 'dangerous', and ro
search people and places wichollt having to comply with the Law on Criminal
Jud gement. It aIlowed the authorities ro forbid any gathering that hadn't
received their go-ahead, and ro carry out many detentions, principally among
the members of the M uslim Brotherhood. Protected by the emergency law,
the regime prohibited sereet demonstrations, including those organized by legal
political parries, which were not allowed to hold meerings in public places, even
during election periods. Throughollt th e years, these measures, among orhers,
have restricted rhe role oflegal political parries, consrandy in danger of trespassing
the limits of che law. and have made rhem nonexlsrent to the majoriey of che
popularion.
This sicuarion thar could be called 'aurh oritarian pluralism' (Hemando de
LatTamendi, 2000) has aIlowed the emergence of other non-lega! gro ups of
polincal oppasition. In rhe last ten years, and more specificaIly since 2000, in
additian ro the Muslim Brorherhood, political acavity in Egypt has eaken ro
the streees again wirh Pllblic mass demonstrations in suppart of the second
Palestinian Illtifad(/. Opposition forces have used the issue of Palestine and che
occupation of lraq te increase their Pllblic visibiliry. The unpopulariry of the
regime's oftlcial positon regarding diplomatic relations wich Israel - initiated by
Sadat in 1977 and culminating in the signing of che peace treaty bet\Veen both
countries in 1979 (in spite of the vicissitlldes of che negotiation process) - has
 134 Ar!Ji/1(1 Lnl/lpridi-Kcl/loJ/ alld Brbara Azaola
obliged its Ieaders ro cultivare a certain atrirude of colerance concerning rhe
macrer. 24 The rejecrion of 'nOlmalizacion' (tatbia) \Virh rh e state of Israel \Vas
shared not onl y by the o pposition fo rces but a1so by Iarge sectors of the political
and inrellecruaJ elites connecced ca che regime.
Egyprian social opposron ro reJations \Virh Israel and ro rhe poliey of clase
ries \Virh rhe USA forced rhe regime ro tolerare public demonsrrarions and acts
of procesr as an escape valve for rhe people. Someching similar [ook plaee after
the American invasion of Irag in 2003. On rhac occasion, Mubarak's regime,
\Vhich had dissociared irself from che demoerarizing program of rhe ' Grearer
Middle Easr',25 bu r didn't want ro break ties wirh che U SA, allowed public
opinion ro express irs rejeenon of rhe occupation (Azaola, 2005).
Variolls aecors frOI11 che opposirion, as mueh &om the Muslim Brotherhood as
from orher groups rhar have emerged in rhe wake of rhese events, have taken
advantage of rhe regime's tolerance. Increased procesr in f..1vor of rhe JI/rifada in
2000 led to the creation of the 'Egyptian Pop ular Committee in SoJidatity \Vith
rhe Palesti nian Jlltifada', joining differenr sectors of civiIian sociery and pelieiea]
activists rhar progressively srarred to ferm ehe core of rhe Egyprian procesc
movements againsc the \Var in Irag.
The protesr against the \Var in Iraq eo nsiderabl y comributed ro rekindling the
debare on democracy, superseding rhe organizarions and insrirutions rhar had
rradinonaUy dealr wirh rhis question. Poltical activity seemed ro take ro rhe
streers aga ill and \Vas fomented by groups rhat \Vere nor legal, \Vhose members
had predominandy socialisr, Marxist and Nasserist leanings and \Vou ld later be
joined by memben; of the Muslim Brotherh ood (A2aola, 2008: 151).
T he mass demonsrration, partially tolerated by rhe authoriries, that took
place in Ca iro ~n March 20th 2003 on the day of the American attack in Iraq
served as a derona to r and led to rhe crearion of rhe plarform '20th of March
Movement fo r Change' (or 'Popular Movement for Challge'), whose priority
\Vas sunulled up in its morro againsr desporism and dicratorship. Its founders \Vere
intellecruals and lefr-\Ving activists \Vho not only asked for rhe liberaton of lraq
bur aIso for rhe liberaton of Egypr from corruption. Ayear and a half later, on
September 9th 2004, in preparation for th e elections of2005 an d in view ofthe
likelihood ofMubarak's rene\Ved candidacy, the new platform 'Popular Campaign
for C hange' \Vas bom out of other inirianves and organizarons sueh as rhe
'20rh of March Movemem for Change', rhe Cornmunisr Party, rhe Muslim
Brotherhood, A I-Kamma (a small und ergrou nd patty with a Nasserist trend)
and non-governrnental organizarions frol11 cvilian society \Vhich all signed a
communiqll w hose ticle \Vas: 'No ro renovarion, no ro hereditary slIccession,
yes ro presidencial electiol1s.'
The 'Egyptiall Movemenr for Change', a gro up that emerged in connection
to this ne\V platfonll, is rhe movement rhat has had mosc repercussions since its
firsr public demonstration \Vas organized in December 2004, under the matra
K~rnya, chat would larer give ts na me ro this movement. This group demanded
rhe end of Mubarak's mandate, of rhe manapoly of rhe National Democratic
Party and of emergency law. le comprises polirical acnviscs \Virh different
COlllempora/]' Egypt 135
lea nin gs - Marxisc. liberal, Islamisr, Nasserisr - as \Ve n as so me represematives
frol11 civil society. They caIl themselves 'movemem ' and nor 'parry' and declare
rhar ehey wam ro bring political awareness ro the majority of th e Egypcian
people.
Kcfa}'a \Vas chus born Out of rhe Pll blic demonsrra tions in support of
rh e Palesnnian cause and agail1Sc rhe war in Iraq and ended up as ann-Mubarak
protest. From thar momem on\Vards, Egypcian associa nons started to beco me
politicized again, \Vi rh ne\V proresr plarfonns emerging from civilian sociery
chat demanded democranc change in rhe country and che end of Hosni
Mubarak's government. Different opposirion groups \Vere created in rh e sryle
of Kcfaya, from different sectors of Egyp tian sociery, including elemems of the
state apparatus such as the j udiciary. In 2005, refonnist judges acclIsed orher
judges connected to the regime of electoral fraud. 26 As a resu1r, two of rh ese
independent judges \Vere prosecuted. The moveme m 'judges for Change' \Vas
creared in order to express their rejeccion of government inrervenrion in rhe
judiciary. rher movements \Vere similarly born Jike 'Teachers for C hange',
'Students for Change', 'Doctors ... t, 'Journalists ... " 'Engineers ... t, w hile ac
rhe same rime the Egyptian \Vo rld of che blogosphcrc emerged.
Anorher f.1Ctor issuing &om che rerrorisr accacks of Seprember 11 th was rhe
beginning of the Freedoltl flgw da for [he Middle East by the Bush administration.
The Egyptian respo nse to American pressure eonsisced of prerending ro cake a
fe\V sceps towards a process of polirical refoan reflecred by an opening in rhe
discourse ofpolitical power and, more specifically, in rhe direction ofrhe NDP,
the govemmem patty (Ben Nefissa, 2004--2005: 59-78). Before then, the debate
around democracy had been monopolized by acrors belonging to rhe political
opposition.
As Egypt was che rarget of rhe American ad ministraron and ts democracizing
program in the Middle East, [he authorities aJlowed the publication of many pri-
varely held newspapers, which gradually increased rheir criticism and launched
campaigns againsr Mubarak and his son Gamal, whose presidential ambitions
had srarted ro become evident.
The actors from the opposition opera red mainly through these newspapers
and che new channels pro vided by rhe 'ntemet. T he legal opposirion had been
using che traditional party-owned ne\Vspaper w hile rhe actors of non-legal
t
opposirion \Ve re acring principally rhrollgh rhe new newspapers \Virh privace
capiral.27 The Interner has played a fundamental role in che rransmission of
inforrnarion and beco me a field of opposinon, rene\Ving poJirica) activism;
an example of this is the groweh of blogs \Virh politica! and dissident content
\vith allleanings, from left-wing ro Islamist. 2!:! Electronic mails and messages from
ceU phones have aIso been used to relay calls for public demonsrrarions or ro
pass on infonllaron on the detention of activisrs.
Some ofrhe satellice TV channels, su eh as rhe Qarari channel Aljazeern, have
promoted certain prognms of political debate where actors from che opposirion
have be en provided \vith a space for expression that is difficu1r to obrain on sute
ehannels. Documentarles have also been broadcast on the new actors of che
136 At/il/(J Lalllpridi-Kell1ol/ alld Brbam Azaola
Egyptian politica] opposition such as Kifa)'a and on the importance of Egyp tian
bloggers. However, rhe headquan ers in Cairo had to babnce opposition participa-
cion \Virh government representation to stay 0 11 good renns with the Egyprian
autho rities.
Workers represem anmher sector rhar has gone back ro prmese. Since 2004,
more chan 3,000 workers' proreses have raken place nariol1- wide, \Virh an array
of demands going from s:1la1")' rises ro rhe right ro independem llnions.
Workers from rhe cernent indus try, civil servancs, reachers, posral workers
and machine operarors have backed rhe strike and creaced a grOllp of un ion
supporr called 'Workers Solidarity Commitree'. These procese movemenes irnplied
a challenge to official rrade unions, such as rhe Egyptian Ge nera] Federarion of
Trade Unions (Beinin and EI-Hamalawy, 2007; Beinin, 2007). In 2010, the
In ternational Labour Organizarion placed Egypr 25eh on its Ese of countries
rhar commitced che mosr violations of \Vorkers' righes. EspecialIy significant
\Vere ehe procesrs and srrikes camed out by rexrile-secror workers in Mahalla A1
Kubra in ehe Delta region, beginning in December 2006 and culminating in a
general strike on Ap ril 6th 2008, arranged via the social network Facebook in
suppore of che workers and in proeesr against increasing food paces and President
Mubarak's governance. The strike \Vas violently suppressed by securi ey forces
(Beinin and Abbas, 2010)29
Ho\Vever, rhe popularion had nor been widely involved nor did ir feel
represemed by rhe these opposiron voices rhar seel11ed to have lost their fear
when criticizing che regime's corruption or Gamal Mubarak's succession plans,
trespassing whar is caBed che 'red line'. The Kifaya group \Vas criticised and
accused of being roo 'eli tist' owing to its leaders' incelleccual origins, and to
cheir incapacity ,to channel the people's discontent.
During 2006, Kcfnyn began to lose its power to bring people together and
reduced ts public activiries due, among orher factors, to internal differences and
attempes by the au rh orities to stop irs main action: to demonstrJre withour
previous authorization. The heterogeneity that was its strength at rhe beginning
beca me a source of conflicto fu a result, the charismatic leader Georges lshaq
was replaeed by the writer and lIniversity teaeher Abdel Wahab El Messiri, who
eanle from the Islamise ranks of the movement (Be n Nefissa, 2007: 198-99).
There had also been generacional con/liets with the grOllp 'Youth for Change',
whieh mainly foeused on how their protese accions should be developed: politieal
slogans, locations for demonsrrarions and so on. However, despite rhis \Veak-
ening, the spirir of dissidence and defiance remained in Egypcian sociery, in part
thanks ro its drive.
Sinee the 1990s, an important net\Vork of NGOs has developed in Egypt
thac are linked co differem sectors within society. In 2005, rhere were 17,000,
although mosr of rhel11 only e;sred on paper or camed oue minority projects
(Abd Al Fatah, 2004) . Within the wide range of non-govemmental organizations
that fimction in Egypr, human righrs defense groups were su bjecr te severe
control under Mubarak's mandare by means of a resnictive legislarive framework. 30
Political facrions from the opposition also used rhe NGOs as a tool to
COlltel/lpornll' Egypt 137
counteract rhe limies of political acrion imposed by the el11ergency law
(Ferri, 2003).
Ir seemed chae rhe Muslim Brorherhood \Vas che only group capable of
channeling people's discomenr, owing to rh eir nerwork of partnerships and
political dimension, alrhough rheir leaders \Ve re somewhae an....ao us dealing wirh
non-organized l11asses. The conselVanve atrirude of the Brotherhood's leadership,
however, disranced rhe organization from che Egyptian demands. Indicacive \Vas
che Brocherhood's official position tJjs--vis the parliamenrary elecrions of 201 O.
Ac che beginning, the organizado n aUied \Virh Mohamed EIBaradei's31 demands
for a general boycott. Yer, jusc a few weeks before the elections, rhe Muslim
Brocherhood's official represencatives disconnected from ElBaradei's 'Nacional
fusociation [or Change'32 by rheir decision to participate in rhe electoral race - a
decision rha t clisappointed many of rhe Brotherhood's members and supporrers.
The Muslim Brotherhood's ro le had be en significanr in professional associations.
Despite rhe resm cnons applied by a regime chae did nor wish to leave too many
areas \Vithin the reach of Islamist sectors, they were nonerneless successful in
mosr areas when they managed to overcome legal impediments, as shown by
eheir gai ning the largest vote as a consequence of being better organized and
less corrupt. Alehough rhese professional associanons \Vere under judicial
impoundmenr, as in the case of che engineers, rhe aurhoriries could neither
prevent elections being held nor cOlltrol rheir resules, and especially wichin
professional associations where the Muslim Brotherhood's presence had been
srrong, as, for example, in the professional associanon of doctors, whose execu-
cive committee comprised a majority of members of rhe Islarnist organizarion
(Kienle, 2000: 84-87).
Uncl pro tests broke out on januaty 25th 2011, a date known as the 'Day of
Rage', the Egyprian population had no party, organization or union rhat could
channel its discontent. fu a result, sporadic protesrs sparked in te r-religious
confrontations between Copes and Muslims and provoked public chao s, which
was contriburing to growing violence and a genera] feeling of lack of safety.
From January 25rh onwards, and with the Tunisian example proving rhat
srreer protests couId bring down authoritarian regimes, a spiral of pro tests lefr
Mubarak with his baek againse the wall and ultimately brought about his fa Jl
eighteen days laeer. Slogans from Tunisia (al-sil/ah yl/rid isqat al-IIizal/l', 'che
people \Vant rhe regime ro fall') \Vere recycled in proresrs rhae saw an e:\.-panding
social support base. Convened via Faeebook by the Ap ril 6 Y outh Movement,
che prmesrs did nor have either leadership or a clearIy defined poJincal orien-
canon that ""em beyond che norion of toppling the regime. Social nec\Vorks
confinned cheir role as instruments of dissemination and mobilizanon, allowing
che protests ca spread geographically, reaching ocher ciries such as Suez and
Alexandria. The success of rhe uprising, however, depended on whar took
place in Cairo , and especially in Tahrir Square, which became rhe epicenter of
che prorests. Men, women , Muslims and C hrisrians, secular Egyprians, members
of the Muslim Brotherhood, youths and adu lts, aJl took part in the proteses,
driven by the belief that they eould make the president go . Mubarak did end
138 Ar/'ul LtI//Ipridi-KcJ/JolI t1/ld Brbara Azaola
up leaving power, delegating his powers to th e Supreme Council of che Anlled
Forces. 1t is chis instiru non, headed by the fomler Defense M iniscer MuhanUllad
H ussein T amawi, chat is now steering the transition process in Egypt and defining
th e road map for rhe furure.
T he Egyp tians that initiated the u prising maintained th eir convening power
and their detenninarion to keep pressuring rhe militalY junta to see their main
demands met, amo ng w hich rheir priorities \Vere ending the scare of emergency,
the drafring of a new consnrution, holding fresh elecriol1S - legislanve in Sepcember
and presidencial before the end of 2011 - as well as che creation of a civi1ian
rransition presidential plarform.
Tensions between the old guard, the new guard and
political Islam
The Egyptian regime, led by the president sine e the COllp in 1952, \Vas based
on relanons of cooperarion between high-rank.ing officials and 'civilian' elices chac
belonged to the sute sector and to private capital. In addicion te th e support che
regime received &0111 the military, rhe old elite linked ro the state and the eco-
nomic sector, M ubarak had woven :111 alliance with che 'new guard'. It was
comprised of prominem businessmen and a new ge neration of technocracs w ho
had obtained ministerial porrfolios in cheir lasc olfices in the cabinet. This alliance
was thus founded on rhe exchange of economic favors for politi ca! support in
order ro presenre the political and economic stabiliry of the regll11e.
This new crend wichin che regil11e was bom out of the atmosphere of
uncertainry surrounding Mubarak's succession. RlllllOrs abollt che president's
health , tegether \Vich the vacuum caused by the lack of a vice-president who,
according to che institunonalized system after Nasser's death, was the on1y
candidate for che presidency of the R epublic, had intensified the climate of
intra-regime competinon. In 2002, a new body \Vas creaced in the NDP: che
'Political Secretariat' or 'Cornmittee of Policies' whose leader, Gamal, \Vas
promoted by llis father Hosni Mubarak, at that time president of the party. Some
150 young economiscs, businessmen and academics close te Camal, originating
&om the economic, cultural and sciemific elites of the coun ny, as \Vell as aca-
demics withouc a political background \Ve re gathered under his leadership. Irs
objective consisted in 'learung' che transfomlatioo of che NDP and converting a
party 'sponsored' by the state and ruled by the old guard imo a modern party
run by technocrats (EI-Ghobashy, 2003) .
Gamal M ubarak belonged to this allimlCe JOl' pI'ofits, an expression used by
Waterbl.lry (1994: 27), that supported ao economic liberalization process
through structur.J.I refonns to imensify the weight of the private sector. These
included greac nacional plans such as che developmenr of nuclear energy and
so-calIed independence from American tutelage. In order ro screngthen good
relations bet\Veen the regime and this business sector, Mubarak had inclllded
technocracs and politicians wich a elear economic orientation in che ministerial
cabinets fornled after 2004, su eh as Youssef BOlltros- Ghali (Finan ces), Rachid
COllfelllpol'ml' Egypt 139
Mohamed Rachid . (T rade and Industry) and Mahrnolld Mohieldin
(Investment).33
Hosni Mubarak's attempc ro hand his funccio ns down [Q his son - Tall'dz al
SI/Ira - mec \Virh resistance fro m che members of the oId guard w ho saw th eir
posirion duearened . This old guard comprised members of the NDP, military
olficers and pare of the most conservacive wing of che state elite, and was
headed by General Ornar Suleiman,3. foml er director of the Egyptian Secret
Services (iVlllklwbamt) and the president's ri ght-hand man, who tried ro presenre
the role of the military in th e political sphere (Sp ringborg and Sfakianakis,
2001: 58) .
Some authors consider rbat rhe anny is a semi-autonomolls institution
regarding state control (AYllbi, 2006: 271). The autonomy it had been acqllir-
ing has given rise wichin che regime to che fear that such a vital inscicution
mighc escape irs co ntrol. Alrhough Mubarak is elosely connecced to che military
apparatus in which he trained and developed his career umil his appoinrrnent as
vice-president in 1975, incidents wi rh milical)' leaders, such as Abu Ghazala,35
had forced him ro pay particular attention ro che activities of che miliral)'. His
response \Vas aimed in t\Vo directioos: 011 che one hand, he tried to kee p rhe
high-ranking olficers satisfied, providing the m \Virh economic privileges, and,
o n the mher, he restricted cheir political lights an d rned to creare a hierarchical
stlu cntre that minimized rhe risk of a possible coup from rhe middle-r.J.nking
l1lilitary officers. In parallel, a Sovier-style SCnlcture had been implemeneed \Vith
frequent officer mmover and Mubarak's personal control on a11 promotions
from the rank of corporal on (Droz-Vincent, 1999: 18).
However, Mubarak's strategies to keep the anlly under conerol hadn'r prevemed
a division of interescs between che 'new' and 'old' guardo As Walke2 6 poimed
out regarding Gamal's succession, 'rhe entire rnilitary and securiry stmcture
could easily lose its privileges, ies special treacment, ics infonllal reeirement
benefits ( ... )'.
The compecition becween the rwo groups and their intene to maintain and/or
increase their power capaciry led them to seek the support of Washington,
al chough Its preference for Gamal or Omar \Vas not unanimous. In October
2007, Suleiman travelled [Q th e Uniced Scaces under rhe officia! pretexc of
holding talks abouc securiry ac che Gaza border. According [O some specialists,37
rhe reason for chis visit was to n0n11alize che bilateral relations between W ashington
and Cairo afier 200 million dollars in milicary aid had been cancelled in retaliation
for failing ro conrrol weapons rraffickin g ac che Gaza border and for not releasing
Ayman Nour, the founder of the liberal party Al-Gllad, imprisoned si nce 2006.
However, Suleiman's trip was probably aimed ac obraining backing &0111 American
polirical and econornic sectors for his leadership struggle with Mubarak's son. The
members of che new guard had also takell advan tage of their trips to che USA ro
maimain contact wich mel11bers of the Bush adminiscracio n, ourside che official
agen da.
In view of heighcelling tensiolls, fvl ubarak cried to assuage borh secrors,
ruling out the reproducrion of che model of a hereditary republic as in Syria:
 140 Atl/la Jlllpridi-KclIIOI/ aud Brbara Azaola
'We are not a monarchy. We are rh e Republic of Egypr ( ... ). We are nm
Syria and Gamal Mubarak \Viii not be the next president of Egypt.'38
Along \Vith rhe inrra-regime comperirion, rhe religious sphere was a sire of
incense pressure. To counteract rhe rhrear from the Muslim Brotherhood, rhe
regime mainrained relarions of alliance \Virh rhe official Ulema, strengthened by
the appointment of Sheikh Moharnmed Sayed Tantawi as the grand authority
of this religious institunon in 1996 (Kodmani, 2005). R elarions between the
regime and rhe Ulema were complex and oscillared between interdependence
and competirion. This alliance gives religious legirimacy ro rhe regime, sin ce ir
presenred irself as rhe legirimare defender of Islam, receiving imporcant polirical
and economic backing in exchange.
In parallel, the Ulema had sealed an allianee \Vith the Muslim Brotherhood
in order to mainrain Al-Azhar's autonomy. This infornlal yer powerful alliance
berween certain Ulema and members of rhe Muslim Brorherhood is present in
rhe insritunon of Al-Azhar Ulema Fronr. 39
Regarding relarions berween rhe regime and rhe Muslim Brotherhood,
Mubarak, like Sadat and Nasser, earried out a earrot-and-sriek poliey that had
not hampered collaborarion \Virh rhis organiza non on certain occasions. This
cooperarion gave more visibility ro rhe Muslim Brotherhood in rhe poJirical
sphere. They constituted a moderate opposition, which rhe president and his
allies used ro enhance their pluralisr cred enrials. However, such collaboranon
also created fucaon wirrun the organization itself and might have contribured
to the deteriorarion of its eredibility before [he publie. Muhammad Mahdi Akif
rook rhe reins of rh e organization in 2004 and ayear larer declared his suppon,
in a sub de manner, to Mubarak for a fifrh mandate, arguing rhar, according ro
rhe Koran, Mu~lims \Vere bound ro obey rheir leader.
fu ie became necessary for che Muslim Brorherhood to gain stronger support
fram rhe elite and rhe people, they had ro change rheir religious discourse and
rheir slogan 'Islam is rhe solunon.' Their arrennon rumed ro secular polincal
matters such as rhe limirarion of rhe number of presidencial mandares allowed,
the reduerion of [he powers of head of state, [he lifung of emerge ney law and
[he Iiberarion of more than 20,000 prisoners detained in Egyprian jails.
The Muslim Brocl,erhood has close relarions wi[h Riyadh originaring in Nasser's
time, and maintains channels of communication \Virh Washington. Although rhey
weren't officially recognized by rhe regime, rhe American administrarion could nor
ignore rhe weighr rhe Muslim Brarherhood has on Egypnan society in the
conrexr of a presidency succession marked by uncertainty:w
Radical Islamist groups, sueh as Galllaar al-Islallli]'al, and jillad, h.d rivalrous
relations nor only wirh rhe regime bur also wirh rhe Muslim Brotherhood
whom rhey consider r[Jitars for rneir collaboration wieh che regime. Their
rivalry was principally cemered on rh eir barde over control in che religious
domain. The Muslim Brotherhood's moderare discourse has led so me of the
most conservative sectors ro greater proximity with more radical groups.
Radical groups have received suPPOrt from rhe Atabian Peninsula ro achieve
rheir goal of spreading rhe Islamisr message across che regian. Their violent
COlltclllporar' Eg],pt 141
acrions in rhe COl1ntl)' had an impacr on rhe Egyptian economy in rhe 1990s, as
rhey were aimed ar rourisric targets, affecnng rhe econamic interesrs of
Ml1barak and his allies. The risk of new terrorisr attacks \Vas used by rhe regime
as a pretexr ta resrricr socio-polincal liberties, while intensifying rhe arsenal of
coercive measures. Mubarak sl1cceeded in making some of Galllaar al-lslmui}'a/'s
leaders publicly renounce violen ce from jail and freed sorne of rhe leaders and
members of rhe organizacion in compensation.
The e~srence of non-secular opposirion in Egypr had forced rhe regime inro
relative collaboration with secular political parries. The l\'ew f/Vtifd parry, which
includes members of rhe Copric community, belongs ro rhis group of poltical
parties rhar cooperared wirh so me of ehe NDP secrors. It repres~ntc; a relarively
'fai[hful' secular opposition .nd lent a demoera[ie profile [Q the Egyptian poli-
rical landscape in exchange for privileged rrearment fram rhe regime. Ir also
received economic and polirical backing from American Coptic grOl1ps. A
similar situarion was taking place \Virh the parey Al-C'ad.
Rel acions berween moderare groups of rhe Muslim and Copnc communiries
were nO[ generaUy hosrile. However, rhe prohibicion againsr fonning religion-
based polirical parties whose official goal was ro prorect rhe Coptic minority,
buc which was in reality aimed ar avoiding fiJrther power accumu1arion by rhe
Muslim Brotherhood, generated fuction berween rhe rwo communiries.
As for internarional a!lianees, Mubarak belonged [O the group of Arab heads of
srates who rook advantage of rhe internacional situaron of rhe so-called 'War
againsr Terrorism' launched by rhe American adminisrranon after Seprember
11 ch, to weake n rheir rivaJs and ensure meir hegemonic position in che sysrem.
Relations wirh ehe USA ar an economic, polirical and milirary level in exchange
for Egyptian fairhfulness can be considered Jn additional power resource for rhe
regime againsc ies competirors. Since rhe Camp David Accords in 1979, Caira
has received a rhousand million doUars in military and economic aid. ~ 1 American
aid ro Cairo \Vas closely relared ro US interesrs in rhe Middle Easrern region ,
rhar is, ta ensuring rhe exisren ce of a moderare Arab artitude rowards Israel and
aUowing control of rhe main energy reserves worldwide (1va rez-Ossori o and
Izquierdo Briehs, 2005).
However, the new regi onal contexr afrer rhe invasion of Iraq in 2003, along
with Mubarak's criticisms of the 'Greaeer Middle Easr' praject and rhe stntggle
for his succession \Vithin rhe party, had creared doubts abollt American support.
The eooperarive relations with Tel Aviv'" helped keep Mubarak's 'fuendship'
\Virh W ashington and ruled Ollr the possibility of a 'hosrile annosphere' rhar
mighr jeopardize regional equilibril1111. The situation of peace wirh rs 111:1ill
'foreign enemy' strengrhened rh e civil funcrions of rhe Egyprian anny. On rhe
Israel side, cooperarion wieh Mubarak improved its inrernanonal image and
ruled out rhe evenruality of a crisis on irs sourhern border following che lsraeli
anl1y's withdrawal fram Gaza in August 2005 afrer 38 years of occuparion.
As Izql1ierdo Briehs (2005: 60) declared, 'Palesrine .nd [he Ar.b-Israeli eonRiet
have beco me rhe core of inter-Arab relarions as \Vell as the Arab world's
internacional relations.' The Camp David Accords, rogerher wieh other factors ,
142 At'i/l(J Ltlllpridi-KclIIOII mld Brbara Azaola
resulted in che official exclusion ofCairo in intr.1-Arab organizacions. Egypt's retum
to tile Arab League in 1989 had enabled Cairo to play the role of middlernan in
severa! problematic ma rrers in che region (Syria, Lebanon , Israel-Palestine).
Despire Cairo's efforts ro recoup some of s presrige as rhe center of 'Arab and
Muslim cireles', Mubarak and his allies didn'r succeed in imposing che ir w ill on
rhe Arab rabie of nego tiarion. Their limi re d influence in che regio n was due,
among orher factors , ro their visible dependenc)' on Washington that, none-
rhel ess, did not conceal irs preferences for the establishment of Saudi hegemony
in rhe region.
There had been, howeve r, cooperation berween Mubarak and che 'moderare'
Arab-Muslim govemmental elites that f0n11ed pare of the so-called 'a:'\:is of
good' according to rhe American discou rse, because oftheir common inrention to
maintain che status qua boch wichin rheir respecrive regimes and in the region.
Centripetal and centrifuga) dynamics
Since the coup of the Ftee OfficetS in 1952, Egypt hos expelienced an asyrn-
mecrical accumulation of power in cbe hands of a reduced elite gro up rhat,
despite being renewed, had maintained certain continuiey as regards its core
group and ies recruitment processes.
Mubarak' s regime conrrolled th e sea ce, rhe coercive appararuses and che main
machinery of rhe produc tion of beliefs. At rhe same time, it enjoyed consider-
able poleical and economic backing frol11 the American administration and, as
we previously saw , ies eco nomic powe r was ensured by a strong cliencelistic
sysrem rhat forced priva te secrors to maintain righr relations wirh the regime.
Long-lived aprhorirarianism cogecher with rhe patriarchal modeI of Egyptian
society, created and re-creaced a patcem of submission and acceprance of dominion
both wichin socieey and within the elites. The imposition of rhe regime's interests
as someching beneficiaI for rhe \Vhole socieey aUo\Ved ies control over ideology,
rhereby maintaining and instirutionalizing an aucocradc sysrem w here personal
freedom \Vas sacrificed in rh e name of safery and social srabiliry.
Mubarak and his allies rhus directly or indirecdy conrrolled aImosr a11 che
power resources, principa11y rhrough the seace which \Vas providing them wirh
srrtlcrural power and the ability ro design rhe ideological and material rules of
the game by w hich the resr of the E gyptian elites had ro play.
However, sorne sources of power were escaping rhe regirne's dominion. The
non-Iegalized political opposition, led by the Muslim Brotherhood, was in control
of rhe ideological resource ac a secondary level, through a polieicaI Jnd reIigious
discourse mobilizing a significanr part of Egyptian society. Neverrheless, ie did
not enable them to accumulace power capaciey to compete \Virh che regime, for
several different reasons: firsc, chere \Vas an en0n110US difference, boch qualicative
and quantiearive, ber\Veen che power held by the regime and thar of che Muslim
Brotherhood. Second, the nacional and extra-national ideology in ts more
general sense had been favo ring the cominuiry of the current regime in which
che Brocherhood had ro foUo w specific, already defined pattems of action.
CO /llClIlpomr)' Egypt 143
In addicion ro rhc:=se t\Vo faccors, \Ve musr add che relacive \Veakness char-
actetizing relations between the Brotherhood and the people, based partly on
rhe c1ientelistic pracrices of the organi zaeio n ehae was functioning as a lo\-V- cosr
\-Velf..1fe sysrem in exchange for pu blic and social suppo rt. FinaUy, che regime
probably had been exaggeranng rhe weighr of rhe organiza non in order to
obrain greacer inrernational support amid fears of rhe possible esrablishment of a
religiollS regime contrary ro western interesrs.
The secondary role of che popularion as a power resource resulred rrom rhe
srrong repression exerted in che counrry. The long-Iasnng imposition of
emergency la\V rogerher \Virh a series of laws and practices pre ventin g social
claims from being filed had strongly lim.i.ced ics role, resrricting ' ies capaciey ro
establish linear relations and chus become actor. The people had found ehemselves
rrapped in a relarion of give and cake berween rhe regime Uob offers in rhe
public seccor and the milirary and food subsidies) and che different opposition
groups. As Izquierdo Btichs highliglm:
in th e case of renrisft) sea tes , once dominion has bee n achieved on the resource
that generaces income, che relacion with cicizens is no longer one of collection
buc of distribution, weakening che people's negotiation capaciry and rherefore
end owing the elite wirh grearer and more aurhorimrian powe r
(2007: 4).
The relations becween che people and regime \Vere thus characterized by che
pe rso nalizario n of aurhoriey (Hinnebusch, 1985: 227).
The process of an opening up to democracy, cancelled after rhe refere ndum
in 2007, coupled wirh wors.ening social and economic co ndirions, had led ro
grearer activisl11 on the part of rhe Egypeian people. Scrikes in specific eco nomic
secrors and public demonstrarions undertaken in recent years could Iead to a
relarive 'awakening' of che people, facilicaeed by rhe introdu ction of independent
infomlarion that has beco me accessible rhanks ro new rechnologies. However,
\Ve should not forgec ho\V rhe regime had already used che people, for example,
in rela rion to certain American imperarives. The disco urse of democratization
of rhe countries in che region, which forced Mubarak to open up rhe autocratic
sysrem, entailed a scrategy of using popular disconrem for che regime's o\Vn
be nefir. This is rhe reaso n that che tirsr Pllblic demo nsrrations rol era ted under
Mubarak's m le, excepe in rhe case of che second 11l1ifada, \Vere rhe o nes againsr
lraq. The regime had also attempted ro co ntrol civilian socieey by foseering rhe
crea rion of NGOs 1inked to rhe sta te apparahls.-H
The repression, not only physical, suflered by Egyptian society had led ro a
general lack of inrerest regarding rhe - ar rhar rime - seeming impossibility of
change, ro which could be added the intemal divisions of the iUegal political
movemencs, already fragile in tenns of power and limited in rh eir ca paciry of
action, as well as che general disdain for rhe legal opposition.
The Egyptian peopIe couId not rherefore succeed in esrablishing linear relations
and asserring ieself as actor. Civil c1aims relared more ro daily survival problem5
144 AIIli11a Lalllpridi-Kellloll alld Brbara Azaola
(housing, sa1::ny rises, continuity of subsidies for basic products and privanzarions)
and Arab and / or Muslim l11atrers (Iraq, Palesrine) rhan to polirical c1ail11s in rhe
stricr sense of rhe cern1, as indica red by che limired participa tia n of che people in
politica! actlons (referendul11, eIections, public demonsrrations). This paradox - i.e.
the actualizing of SOl11e of cheir c1aims withollt however being able to bring
rhem to resolution - \Vas probably due ro che lack of organization of 'civil'
sociery resulting rrolll legal and pragmatic resrricrions rhar issue from rhe lack of
a va nguard capable of channeling people's general frusrration, passiviry and
despair into politica! acrion.
In view of rhis analysis, ir is evidenc chac rhe main ehallenge faeed by che
regime was its own fragmentation as a result of rhe rensions between rhe old and
ne\V guards. T he imponance of rhe stare as a resource in Egypcian sociery and the
dependence of the ocher resources on rhe stare imposed on borh sides a C0111-
pulsary symbiesis in arder ro keep their hegemonic role. As a result, two primary
elite groups lud emetged, which were both capable of fighring intensely for a
sllbseqllem differenria} accumulation of power.
On the one hand, Gama! and his allies, in spire of having important resources
ae their dispesal, did nor succeed in imposing their mIes, as \Vas refleceed by rhe
f.1cr thar Mubarak's son was not officially appoinred as his facher's successor. Ar
rhe same rime, rhe backing out after th e referendum in March 2007 and the
increase of expenses in secrors connecred te the apparatus of repression showed
rhe ne\V guard's incapacity to triumph. On the orher hand, Suleiman and rhe
old guard who principally controlled the military sphere seemed incapa ble of
disconneenng from Mubarak's rutelage.
This situarion entailed a framework of negotiarion between the r\Vo groups in
which rhe other. e1ire groups \vere nar capable of changing rhe game or of repre-
senting an additional po\Ver resource ar either's disposal. The cenrrality of che
resource state in Egyprian society genera red a powerful dependen ce of the second-
aly elites on rhe regime, which eliminated rhe possibility of disconnecring their
po\Ver capaciry &om the regime. They were rhus trapped in a hegemonic Olodel
rhar, withour a cerrain opening up of rhe sysreOl, provided no \Vay out. At me
apex ofrhe hierarchy, the main acrors had been Jtrempting (Q avoid a bipolarization
of rhe power structure by mainraining a certain cohesion among rhemselves and
crying to maintain cheir exelusivity as hegemonic elire. As a result, rhe secondary
elires \Vere foreed ro support this process in order to stay in the po\Ver cireles.
The need for rhe American administration to ensure the stability of the
regimes, especially after the failure of rs policies in rhe region, had played an
importanr pan in this process. The posirion ofWashingron \Vas a key factor in
Mubarak's succession, alrh ough, as previously mentioned, American preferences
\Vere not unanimous, which further complicared rhe situation.
Multiparty authoritarianislTI or authoritarian lTIulti-party-isrn?
Up to Mubarak's forced resignarion, rhe polirical evolution of Egypt \Vas
dependent on how che uncertainty regarding Mubarak's succession \Vas ro be
COl/te/llporal)' Egypt 145
handled. Internal and external actors are c10sely fo Uowing this situanon, which
\Vill be decisve for the evolllrion of rhe country in che coming years.
If Hosni Mubarak pulled out of rhe presidential cace in favor of his son, a
possibility that \Vas mu ch speculared, Gamal would inherit his farher's privileges
and hegemony of po\Ver. The main impedimenr wouId have come ftom che
old guard of the NDP or from the military - who objected ro the rule of a
president who did not have a military profile Iike rus predecessors. Before
Mubarak's fall on February 11th 2011 , the membe rs of the military hadn't
expressed their opinion and had left party membe rs ro rule on political quesriollS.
Ho\Vever, rhere is speclllation among the m.ilirary execurives in regard ca
General Omar Suleiman, rhen direcror of rhe Egyptian secrer service, as a possible
SllCceSSQr ro the presidenc. 45 Sllleiman shared Mubarak's oriemarion IJis-c-js TeI
Aviv and Washington, alehough he remained relarively unknown ro mesr
Egyptians in spire of his discrete funcrion as middleman between Palesrinian
facrions in recenr years. 46
Up tO Muba rak's forced resignarion, the Muslim Brorherhood did not seem
to have any chance of seeing an increase in its influence in rhe official poliacal
sphere. The 34 constiturional amendmems ratified in rhe referendum on March
26rh 2007 seemed to be geared towards this goal. The amendmenr of anide S,
for eX3mple, sripu1ared the prohibirion of any kind of polineal activity or for-
marion of religion- based political patries. This restricrive framework couId
weaken the posinon of che secrors in favor of che rules of the insrirutionalized
policical game and, as a consequence, strengrhen rhe mosr radical sectors \Vithin
[he Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, the intemaJ problems rhar rhe organization
\Vas facing - a consequence of it~ polyphony and internal power srruggle, and
ies leaders' efforrs ro maimain rheir personaJ power capacities - caused a progressive
\Veakening in tenns of popular appea!.
Up ro rhe third Egyptian revolurio n, differenr heavily publicized actors such
as Kifaya, or 'National Associarion for Change', \Vho had occasionally resorted
to sectors thar \Vere ideologically in conflicr, \Vere pro ven incapable of solving
their intemal problems through a c1early defined political project and thus
unable to channel rhe expeccarions of Egyptian sociery.
At an economic leve!, Egypc, prior to the anti- aurhor1raria n pro reses that
began on January 25th 2011, had levels of growth that co uld be seen as very posi-
tive from a macro-economic perspective . The Arab HUIIla/1 Dellc/oplllcllt Report
2005 staeed thar rhe inflation rate was 4.5 percene, the GDP had risen 7.5
percem, direcr foreign investmenr had increased, the blldger deficit had gone
down by 8 percent of the GDP and there had been a growth in exports. However,
20 percent of Egyptians lived with less than a dollar a day and the percentage of
the unemployment rare, already more than 10 percene, is soU increasing..J7 Egype
had a t\Vo-rier social and economic sysrem: on rhe one hand, a minoriry had access
to the mose comperem ser.vices and shared rhe benefits of economic growth; on
rhe orher, education, public healrh and decem living conditions \Vere unattainable
for rhe m;tiority of rhe population. The economic situarion of Egyptians \Vas
rherefore in conrinuous decline, aggravated by the important rises in prices. 48
146 Athilla Lmllpridi-Kcmolf alld Bcrbara Azao/a
The deceriorarion ofliving conditions in large sectors of che popularion along
wich cominuing repressive poJicies led prospeccive analyses ro not rule out
che possibiliry of social riors like rhe ones rhar rook place in 1977. As rhe police
were focused on procecting rhe regime, attacks and robberies wirh violence
towards rhe wealrhiesr classes were happening more and more ofren, crearing a
climare of public unsafery. Until rhe 'Day of Rage', for many scholars, rhe
economic factor seemed ro be rhe mosr decisive for rhe future of Egypt.
The rhird Egyprian revolution.j9 demoI1Srrated rhe Egyprian popularion's
ability ro rebel. The rage that got under way in the 'rebel' city of MahaIJa and
extended ro six orher cities around rhe counrry pur an end ro rhe Mubarak
regime. On ]anuary 26th 2011, in Tahrir (Freedom) Square, rhe Cairenes
raised rheir VOlees againsr Hosni Mubarak and his son Gamal, shouting,
'Down w1rh Hosni, clown wirh Gama!', calling for an end ro the srare of
emergency and rhe Mubarak government, and improvemenrs ro rheir eco-
nomic conclitioI1S. In rhis way, a[rer years of dociliry, Egyprians proved rhar rhe
people can be a vehicle for change. The faH of Hosni Mubarak \Vas a c1ear
demonsrration of chis.
Change, however, seems ro be limited, given thar rhe Supreme Council of the
Arrned Forces' leadership during rhe rransirion period implies a certain continuiry
of rhe old regime in power. Ar rhe same time, rhe speed wirh which con-
stitucional changes \Vere proposed, with rhe backing of rhe Council of rhe
Amled Forces and rhe Muslim Brorherhood especially, as well as the imI11i-
nence of the e1ecrions, suppose additional obsracles ro genuine change in
contemporary Egypr. 50
Notes
We would like to acknowledge our gratirude fm the in[onnation and eomments provided by
Ami.l Howeidy, Ibrahim EI-Houdaiby, Wael Khalil, Basel RJmsis and Lorenzo Gabrielli. Our
analysis is bJ5ed on the Sociology of power (see Izquierdo, 2008; and Izquierdo & Kemou, 2009).
1 See Com1 (2003) and Ortega Glvez (1997) abollt tbe modemizing role ofMuhammad Ali.
2 According to artic1e 9/4, rhe Minister ofJustice has the last word regarding the assignatiol1
m rcne\val ofthe conditions ofjudges in the Tribunal of Appcllation. The $ame bw (art.
78) establishes the existence of a department of judicial)' inspection in the Ministry of
Justice ro control the judges' actions, their promotions aod transfers, under the mlnister's
control (Gohar, 2006: 13).
3 The limited presence of opposition parties in the parliament in 2010 \Vas due to elecrorJI
fraud as \VeU as the boycott o[ the process by many opposition parties. It is important ro
highlight that the r\Vo most important opposition forces, ]\kll' Wqfrl and the Muslim
Brotberhood, decided to withdra\v from the electoral proeess at the mooffs.
4 Decree 425/1962 which became la\V 85/1973. Bronsveld (1981) and Birdsall and
Q'Connell (1999).
5 Ayubi cJl.cuIates this growth according to four criteria: the increase in the number
admlnistrative unirs, in the number of civil servants, in ordinary public expenses and in
civil serv:mts' wages (2006: 289-328).
6 El Pas, FebruJry 15th 2008. http:// elpais.com/diarioI2008 / 02/ 15/internacional/
1203030012_850215.hnnl
COJltelllporary Eg)'pl 147
7 According ro la\V t1~. 101/1992, Egyptiao private uruversicies must be founded by pre-
sidentia.! dceree after approva.! by the Council of Ministers, and more than half of irs
capital must be Egyptian (Azaola, 2007a: 261).
8 The NClI' T+'afil parry, which official1y withdrew from the nll1-offs, occupied si.'\: seats, tbe
Tagm/UI!II parry five seats and the parties Al-CJwd, Al-Gil, Al-Sa/mll and Social Justicc one
seat eJch. Finallv, the Muslim Brotherbood \Van a seat after the group's decision to
withdraw from t1e runoirs.
9 There is an extensive bibliog.lphy on the Muslim Brotherhood. See CaIT (1982) and
Kepel (2002).
10 lo 2001, this eouncil was rcstructured and cal1ed the 'Egyptian - American Business
CounciJ'.
11 According ro arto 40: 'a11 the citizens Jre equal before the bw. They hav ~ the same public
rights and duties \Vithout discrimination of gender, ethnic origin, language, religion or
belief.' Art. 46 establishes that: 'the state must guarantee the freedom of belief and the
freedom of religious practices.'
12 According ro official data in 2007, thete \Vere 3.5 milljon Copts among a rotal 70 million
Egyptians. Accotding to Ayad (2002: 54), they represent 10 percent of the Egyptian
population.
13 MuhammJd Sayyid Tantawi died in J hospital in Riyadh in 2010 at the age of 82.
14 See ZeghIaI, 1997; Martn Muoz, 1999; Arigita, 2006 on Al-Azhar.
15 An example of the influence of the most [undamentalist sector of these groups on
Egyptian sociery is the case of Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid, profes50r of Arab and IsIamic
studies. In 1995, an Egyptian court accused him o[ being an apostate in view of his
\Vritings on Islam, and ordered him to divorce his \Vife given that 'a Muslim cmmot be
joined in matrimony with atl apostate'. The group Al Jihad backed the verdict and,
resorting to the Islamic law S}aria, threatened to kilI him. Abu Zaid and his \Vife souglu
exile in the NetherIands. The divorce sentence was later suspended but the accusation of
apostasy has bcen maintained. Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid died on JuIy 2010 in Cairo. Sec
Arigita (2001 - 2005) for other examples.
16 A[ter the legisbtive elections in 2005, Muba.lk chose [our Coptic depueies, three
women and a !l1Jn, out o[ the ten seats assigned by the president. In the cabinet, two
Copric l1linisters were appointed and, for the first time in thirry years, Mubarak
appointed a Copric govemor for the region of Quena \Vith es large Coptic population
(A,"ob, 2007b).
17 This group started in the col1Struction business, continued in tourism and is no\V
investiog in telecommunications and its services, creating one of the most powerful
mobile telephone compaoies (Telecom) in Egypt, whose presenee also extends to other
Arab countries.
18 See http://ww\V.aln1J.sryalyoum.com/en/ news/ copts- voice- anger-over-mu baraks-par-
liamentarv-address
19 SIPRI Military Expenditure DatabJse http:/ / first.sipri.org/non_ first/milex.php See
Azarva (2007) and Droz-Vincent (1999) on the annament capacity ofthe Egyptian anny.
20 See the chart on the participation of Islamist groups in the elections in different
A.lb countries including Egypt at www.camegieendowment.org/ 61es/islam_electiol1S_
chart.pdf
21 According to the NGO Human Rights Watch, more than 1,000 members of the
Muslim Brothethood were aITested between March 2006 and Match 2007. lo June
2007, around 800 of them \Vere stilI under arrest.
22 \Ve must point out the salience of the group the April 6 Youth Movement since 2008,
aIld since 2010, in view of the 2011 presidential eIections, the 'Nacional Association for
Change' led by Mohamed ElBa.ldei, an Egyptiao diplomat [onnedy in charge of the
Intemational Atomic Enetgy Agency (lAEA) and Nobe1 peace laureate, who played a
prominent part during the 2003 inspections in search of weapons of mass destruction ehat
\Vere undertaken in Iraq.
148 Athil1a Lnlllpr;di-Ke/llo/l alld Brbara Azaola
23 Mubarak eXlended this law since 1981 eh rough le mpOr.lry resolu tion no, 560/ 1981 ,
justitying its applicaeion by the necessiry to fighe terrorismo In 2005. inftuenced by rhe
imernacional context ::md the 'War against Terrotism' declared by Gt!orgc W. Bush,
presidem of rhe USA, after rhe attacks of 5eprember 11th 2001, during his electoral
campaign, Mubar.lk promised to change [he eme rgenc)' law for a more sp ecifically
anti-cerrorisr law (Bro\Vn et al., 2007: 2).
24 For chis reason, rhe Egypci;1.J1 Juthorities did nOl try to stop mJSS demonstrations in fJvor
of the Palestinjan cause.
25 T he 'G rearer MiddJe Ease' is a term coincd by the American administration to designare
a no n-contiguous region encompassing rhe Arab world , plus Ir.:I.J1. Turkey, Israel, Pakistan
and Afghanislan.
26 5ee Hawrhorn e and Nasr (2006) on the inclusion of judges in the opposition plarfonn.
27 This is the case with the ncwspapers Al DlIslIIr, Al Badcel, Al Kamwa, Al .\I]as1)' al- )"011111,
Nahdet Misr, El WIIS(l/ and Al 0511011, and ofthe weekIy magazines Al Ftyr and Sau!( al-Uw/l1a.
28 See examples at http://baheyya.blogspoc.com/: www.egybloggers.com/; www.manal aa.
ner/ (Prize 'Reporters wichour Borders' in rhe Oeutsche WelJe a\Vards in 2005); http://
misrdigiralblogspiric.com/; http:// arabist.net/ ; lmp: //arabisr.ner/arabawy/ ; http:// ihoudaiby.
blogspot.com/ ; http: //ana-ikhwan.blogspot.com/
29 The organization of chis ge neral srrike gave binh to rhe April 6 Youth Movement,
which was behind th e mobilizations on Facebook rhal broughr about the 'Oay of Rage'
on January 25th 20 I '1 - a date chat coincided wirh Nacional Police Day - and thar culmmared,
eighceen days larer, in che fall of Presidenr Mubarak on February -11ch.
30 In 1964, ]aw no. 32 regubted the crearian and functioning of the NGOs; it can be
comulted in Ben Nefissa (199 1: 124-32). Ir \Vas modified and bec:llne bw no. 84 in 2002.
31 Moh:llued Musrafa ElBaradei \Vas a candidare for che presidemia! eJecriom scheduled for
20 11 . He was che Director General ofthe Imemational Aromic Energy AgenC)' (IAEA) from
Deeember 1997 lO November 2009. He \Vas aJso awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.
32 'Nacional Association for C hange' is a political placfo rm headed by EIDaradei. which
succeeded in a fe\\' momhs in congregacing rhe major opposirion groups and move ments,
induding che Muslim Brotherhood and all the opposicion parties, \Virh rhe exception of
NCII! T 'VIId, Nasserisr and Tagilllllml.
33 Gamal Mubacik is married co Khadiya El Gam1l1al, daugbter of one of rhe construction
industry magnates in che country, Mallmoud El Gamma!. Gamal Mubarak, in mid-2011,
\Vas in prisan, accused of corruption and mone}' laundering, along \Virh his brother Aba
and severa! ocher 'businessmen-ministers'.
34 Omar Suleiman did nor officialJy belong ro tlle NOP, allhough his role \Vas equivalent
ro ehac of minister whour ponfolio \Vho atlended rhe Council of M iniscers. Ornar
Suleiman \Vas named vice-president by Mubarak o nJanuary 29th 201 1, fOUT days afrer rhe
pro-democracy procests began in Egypt. On February 10th, he assumed che presidential
functions char Mubarak handed over, befare Mubarak ultimately transferrt!d po\Ver to
che Suprcme Counci] of the Armed Forces.
35 General Abu Ghazala represented an important challenge for Mubarak ul1ci] 1989, whcn
he \Vas accused of sl11ugg1ing military material. A similar siruation had eaken place in the
past between Abdel Hakim Amer and Nasser, \Vhen Amer \Vas Nasscr's comma nder of rhe
armed forces. Amer progressively escaped Nasser's control, \Vhich lcd lO a bipolarization of
the regime and a sttuggle for power between che rwo. In the end, Nasscr managed lO
remove Ame r, \Vho 'committed suicide' on September 14rh 1967 (Kemo u, 2007).
36 Ed\Vard S. Walker Jr. was an American ambassador in Egypt and Israel. Quoted in AA.
VV. (2006) 'The Future of Egypt'.
37 http://weekly.ahmm.org.eg/index.htm. !ast cOllsulted October 10th 2007.
38 Declaration made in 2004 (Remnick, 2004).
39 Creared in 1946 as an NGO to look aftcr che social ineerests of che U lema al1d rh eir
f.111UJ.ies, ir doesn't instirurionally belong ro A] -Azhar, although ir became important in
che 1990s as an body issuing fatw a (Kodmani, 2005: 7).
1 COlltCl1IpOral)1 Egypt 149
I 40 Some of the ex- Islamist depuries, such as A1-Karami, spokesman of rhe Muslim Brorher-
hood. have had privare meeti ngs \Virh Demacrane politieians like Steny Hoyer. Sce 'A
separace meeting?' Al Almllll Wcckl)', May-June 2007, http://\Veekly.abram.org.eg/
2007/847/eg2.hcm
41 Egypt eosured Arab cooperation \Virh the USA \Virh a con tri bu tia n of 30,000 soldicrs
and opcn ing ies air space. In cxchange, W ashington \Vrore off 7.1 million dollars of
Egyptian debt and 50 percem of rhe fo reign deb e of the Paris Club (Ezzedine. 1999).
42 See Kcmou (2008) for a Itistorical approach to the relaeions between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
43 A1chough Eb'Ypr daesn'[ fann part of the 'perro-slatcs', income is discributed in a sinlar
way \Virh rhe S[J[e be ing rhe main distributor of wealth (Pappe, 2005: 53).
44 Such \Vas rhe case of lhe 'Egyptian NGO Support Cenrer' regisrered as an Egyptian
NGO and inaugurated in February 2005. le \Vas che result of a proj ecr run by che
USAID during 2000-2005 and sponsored by rhe Egyptian Ministry of Social Mairs;
WW\V .egyp tngosu pport. org/ de f.1 ul t.aspx
45 !tumors regarding Suleiman's futurc role became more and 1110re concrete as thc e1cc-
tiom of 20 1O approached. In Scprcmber 20 lO, the streets of Giza in Cairo \Vere covered
\Virh Suleinun 's posrers. According to press SOllrces, lhe postcrs were hung up by a
group of aetivises supporting the country's famler inreLligence chief as a possiblc pre-
sidencial candidate, announcing in Ar.Ibic: 'The real alccmative: Ornar Suleimall, Prc-
sident fo r lhe Republic.'
46 See rhe artide 'Hamas: Egipto se pronuncia' ('Egypc gives its opimon'), BBC Mundo.
com, Fcbruary 6th 2006, for Su leiman's role in rhese meetings. Imp://news.bbc.co.uk/
hilspanish/intern acional/ne\Vsid_ 4672000/ 46 72456.stl11
47 See annexes of Amb Hlllllml DC!!elOpIllCllt Rcport 2005 (PNUD).
48 In July 2006, prices soared in t\Vo sectors eonsidered unrollchable until tllen: petrol and
public transport rose by 30 pereene.
49 T he firsc \Vas in 1919 agains[ rh e British occupation of Egypt and Sudan, \Vh ile the
sccond \Vas in 1952 wirh the Free Officers' eoup .
50 An eve nr chat \Vas indicative of the Supreme Council of lhe Arrned Farces' scance was
rhe anny's attack on the thousands of Egyptians \Vho gathered in Tahrir Square on
Fcbnlary 25th 2011 ro celebrate che Stlccess of th e revollltion and demand rhat the ne\V
govemmenr purge membcrs of che old guardo
Bibliography
AA . W. (2006) 'The Furure ofEgypt. Panel Discussion', T1w Middlc Erut R elticlll oJ !flIcl'/uuiol/al
Affairs (MERlA), vol. ID, no. 2 Qune), hup :/ / meria.ide.ac. il/joumaJ/2006/ issuc2/
jv IOn02a3.html
Abd Al Farah, N. (Ed.) (2004) al-MIII/(IdCIIl/at al-A!Jli)'}'{/ {/I-Arabi}'}'fl !(Ia-l-Hllklll/li)')'a, Markaz
al-Oirasat al-S iyasiyya wa-l-I srratiyiyya, al-Qahira.
A1-Shoubaki (2007) 'New Social Fonm ofProteses: R eality Takcs its R evenge', AR! NCII's-
lcltcr, http://\Vww.arab-rcfonn.nct/
lvarez Ossorio, 1. and Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2005) Porqu //(1 fi'acasarlo la pCl:z? Clmlcs para
clltcl/dcr el cOI!fiicto pa/estillo-israel, Los libros de la Cacarata, Madrid.
Arigiea, E. (200 1-2005) ' Islam y c;mb io social: auroridad religiosa y opinin pblic; en el
Egipto conrempocineo' , Awmq, no . XXII, MC I, 2001 - 2005, Madrid, pp. 326- 50.
- - (2006) El Islam iustitllciol/al CII el Egipto COlltClllpOrllco, Universidad de Granada, Granada.
Ayad, e (2002) Go]Joliriqllc de I'gyprc, di tions Complexe, Bruxelles.
Ayubi, N. (1998) Polftiw )' soci~'dtUl CI I Oricnte Prximo, Bcllarerra, Barcelona.
--(2006) O!!cr-stll,illg the Artlb S/at c. Politics ami Socie/)' ill rIle Middle East, LB. Tallris & Co
Ltd, N ew York.
 150 Athil/fI Lal/lpn'di-Kellloll alld Brbara Aznola
Azaola, B. (2005) 'Egipco ante la sucesin de MlIbar:ak: oposicin politica y emergencia de
nuevos actores', in F. Izquierdo Brichs :m~ T. Desrues (Eds), Actls del Primer congreso del
Foro de In vestigadores sobre el Mundo Arabe y Musulmn (FlMAM) (BeUatell'J-Barce-
lona 17- 19 de marlO de 2005), Fimam, Barcelona, hrrp: llwww.flmam.org/ Barbara%
20Azaola.pdf
- - (2007a) I /II/iJ!/:rsidtJd eOl/lo ((/IIIPO de acd" sodo}JoJtira 1:11 el Norte (Ic A.fiica: el CllsO dc Egiplo.
Cantoblanco, Servicio Publicaciones Uni"eGidad Amnoma de Madrid, 2007, CD-ROM.
- -(2007b) 'La gestin de la diversidad tnica y religiosa en el Egipto contemporneo', in
C De Cueto and A. Sid Ahmed (Eds), Droits IlIullaillS et dillmit clJmoCIIllllrelle da/U l'cspacc
ellrol/lditerr.mell: ralils CI pcrspcailles, PUBLISUD, P:uis.
- -(2008) His(on'a del Egipto cOlllelllpOr/lco, Los libros de la C:narata, Madrid.
Azarva, J. (2007) 'From Cold Peace to Cold War? The significance of Egypt's military
buildup', Middle Eas( Rellie/{I 01 IlIlcmariol/al AJJiJrs, "01. 11, no. '1, http://meria .idc.ac.il/
Beinin,]. (2007) 'The Militancy ofMahalla aI-Kubra', Middlc East Rcp)f{ OllfillC, September
24dl, http://www.merip.org/mero/mero092907.html
- -and Abbas, K. (2010) 'Labor Protest Politics and Worker Rights in Egypt', Camcgie
EIII/OII I/llCl/t for J"tcrt/atiollal PcaCl'.
--and El-Hamalawy, H. (2007) 'Egyptian Textile Workers Confronc the New Economic
Order', Mi(ltIIc Etul Rcport DI/lillc, March 25th, http://www.merip.org/ mero/
mcro032507.luml
Ben Nefissa, S. (1991) 'L'Etat Egypcien et le monde associatif a tr:avers les textes juridiques
(introduccion et problmatique)', Eg)'plelMomlc Ambe, no. 8, 4emc trim ., Le Caire,
pp. 124-32.
- -(2004- 2005) 'Le dblocage du dbat dmocracique en gypce, legs Ilass rien et poids
du secreur priv', in Jean-Yvcs Moisseron (Ed.), 'l'gypte: mondialisacion et dmocratisation',
Maglm:b-Mac}rck, no.182, Winter, pp. 59-78.
--(2007) 'Egipto politico en 2006: estacion:l.Iniento de la movilizacin democrtica y
confinnacin del escenario de la sucesin hereditaria', ;!/IIwn'o del Meditcmllco Med 2007,
lMEd, Fundacin Cidob, Barcelona, pp. 198-20 l.
Birdsall, N. and O'Connell , L. (1999) 'Putring Education ro Work in E6ry-pr', Cafllegie Paper,
no. S, Augusr, http://www.camegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfill?f.1=view&
id=685
Bronsveld,]. (1981) "'Education et emploi: le produit du sym!l11e dllcarif et ses dbouchs
en Egypre', in DilllellSiCII/S sociales de l'ellseigllemclll ell Eg)'ptc, Seminario CNRSC, CEDE]
and CEROAC, May 11th-13th 1980, CEDE], Cairo, pp. 175- 209.
Drown, N., Dunne, M. and Hamzawy, A. (2007) 'Egypt's Controversial Constitucio nal
Amendments', Cam('gie E/ldoll'lIICllt jor lllt('mariollal p('tJcc, March, http://www.camegieen
dowmenc.org/ publications/ index.cfin?fa=view&id= 19075&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme
Carr, O. (Ed.) (1982) L'l.slam ell'tat da/U le 1II01Ulc d'mifl/rtl '/I/Ii, PUF, Paris.
Casa rabe (2007) 'los trabajadores egipcios reclaman derechos y aum entos de salario',
BoleflI de EcollolII{a )' \'egodos, ao ], no. 3.
Conn, G. (2003) Le Proc'e-Orielll cllll, 1956-2003, Gallimard, Paris.
Droz-Vince nr, P. (1999) 'Le militaire et le politique en Egypte', MOlUlc arabc A:[ag/rcb-Mac/rcq,
no. 162, July- Septcmber, pp. 16- 35.
El Amrani, I. (2005) 'Controlled Rcfonn in Egypt: Neitber Rt!fonnist nor Controlled',
Middle ErlSt Report D I/fil/e, Dccember, no. 15, MERIP, http://www.merip.org/mero/
mcro121505.html
EI-Ghobashy, M. (2003) 'Egypt's slllnmer of discontent', Middle East Repmr Ol/fillC, 18 septiembre,
MERIP, Imp:llwww.mcrip.org/mero/mero091803.hrm.l
COl/telllporal]! Egypf 151
Ezzedine, F. (1999) 'Mubarak in Washington Assessing the US-Egyptian Bilateral Rela-
cionship', Middle Easl Report DI/filie, ]une 30th, MERIP, http: //\Vw\V.merip.org/ mero/
mero 063099. hrml
Ferri, j. N. (2003) ' Les limites d'une dClllocratisatioll par la socit civile en Afriquc du
Nord', Mag//reb-Mac/rek, no. 175, Spnng, pp. 13-33.
Galal, A. and Lawrence, R. (Eds.) (1998) Building Bridgcs. ."111 Eg)'pl-U.S. Frce Trade ...t~~recl/lel/t,
Brooking Institution Press, Washingto n.
Cohar, N. (2006) 'Political Participation wichin the Egyptian Contexr', Paper presented
at rhe SCIJclltl/ .Mcditcrralleml Social (!lid Po/itical RcscarclJ Meelillg, Florence and Momecatini
Temle, March 22nd-26th 2006, organiszd by rhe Mediterranean Programme of the
Roben Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European Univers}r:y Institute.
Cuaaybess, T. (2005) Tl,'sio/ls arnl!es sllr orl!it('. UII s)'stC/lJC lIIdialiql/e C/I mllfltiolJ (1960-2004),
CNRS ditions, Paris.
Hawthome, A. and Nasr, H. (2006) 'Egypt: Jud ges win Public Support buc not Govemment
Concessions', AmI! Rifon/l Bullen'I/, vol. 4, no. 4, May.
Hemando de Larramendi, M. (2000) 'Argelia, Tnez, Mauritania y Libia durante los ailos
noventa: entre el pluralismo autoritario y el ocaso de las masas', CHademos de csrmtegill,
no. 106, Madrid, pp. 107-56.
Hinnebusch, R. (1985) Egyptian Po/itia I/lIder Sadat. TI/e Post-Popufis( DCllcl0l,mCI/( 01 al!
AIIf/JOrilariau-Modm/izillg Statc, Cambridge Uni"crsicy Press, Cambridge.
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (2005) GI/erra )' agua.' ciIJiflicto poltico J' caresta de aglla e/l PII/c.stiufl, Ar.tguane}',
Santiago de Compostela.
- -(2007) 'Poder y estado rentista en el mundo rabe' , RCf1ista dc Estudios l/lterllaciollalcs
Mcdircmueos, no. 2, May-Augu st, http://ww\V.ualll.es/ otroscen cTOs/ TEIM / Revista/ reim
%202/ Fcrrnn_Izqllerdo_art.hnn
- -(2008) Poder}' felicidad. UI/II propllesfll de soci() I(J~~{iI del poder, Madrid, La Catarata.
--and Kcmoll, A. (2009) 'la sociologa del poder <:11 el mundo rabe contempocineo'. In
Izquierdo Brichs, F. (Ed.) Poder }' reg{,/lcIICS el/ el I/lIl11do rabe colltcmporllco. Barcelona,
Cidob/Bellaterra.
Kemou, A. (2007) Nasscr's Naritllwlll/tcrest. A 'Socioh)~~}' oJ POUJer' Al1alysis, Fimam, Altafulla,
http://www.fimam.org/4.htm
--(2008) 'From Cairo to TeI Aviv: Nasscr's Difrerenrial Accumularioll of Power and its
Impact on the Rclations bctwcen Egypt and Isracl', Rellista de Esll/dios lmen/(/cio/lafcs
Mcdircrr"eos, no. 5, May-August, htrp: llwww.uam.es/ otroscentros/ TEIM / Revistal
reim5 / pdIS/ 04-AKemou.pdf
Kepel, G. (2002) I Yihl1l/. EXl'al/Siu )' (lt'e1illc del islamismo, Ediciones Pelnsula,
Barcelona.
Kienle, E. (2000) A Gmm/ Dclllsio/l. Dell/ocmc)' /ll/d Eco//(IlIIic R~ro nll in Egypt, LB Tauru Publishers,
London/ New York.
Kodmani, B. (2005) 'The DangeG ofPoliricaJ Exclusion: Egypc's lslamist Problem', Democr.lcy
and Rule of Law Project, Camcgi(' EJldoll'lIIcm for /mcn/(/t;ollal Peacc, Camegie Papers, no. 63,
W l shingcon DC
Marn Muiloz, G. (1999) El esrado r,lbe. Crisis de lcgirilllidad }' call1csradlI islamislll, 1st edirion,
Bellaterra, Barcelona.
- - (2006) 'Egipte en el mn rabe. Un Lidcratge amb Alts i Baixos', in DC/DOB, Egipre,
cl/caix elt ml/sici, no. 97, FUl1daci Cidob, Barcelona, pp. 4-7.
Momani, B. (2003) ' Promoting Economic Liberalization in Egypt: Frol11 U.S. Foreign Aid
ro Trade and rnvestment', MERlA )mll"//(/l, vol. 7, no. 3, September, http ://meria.idc.ac.
illjollmall2003/issue3/jv7n3a6.hrml

152 AfllilllJ Ltl/llpridi-Kel1lol1 lJlld Brbara AZlJollJ
OrtegJ G:.lvcz, M. (1997) 'UnJ experiencia modernizadora en la periferia: Las reformas del
Egipto de Muhammad Al (1805-48)', Scripta l'.ropa, Revista Electrnica de Geogl.l6a y
Cien cias Sociales. Universidad de Barcelona, no. 8, October 1st.
Pappe, 1. (2005) 11/C Moden! MitM!e East, Roudedgc, London .
PNUD (2005) nrab Hllmal/ Del,clopmclll Reporl 2005.
Remnick, D. (2004) 'Going Nowhere. In Mubarak's Egypt, Democracy is ao Idea Whose
Time Has not ycr Come', 11/C Nel/l Yorker, july 12th , http: //www.newyorker.com /
archiveI2004/07/12/040712fa_factl
Said Aly, A. M. (2005) 'Egipto y dcmocraci:l', Va l/gllardia Dossier, no . 15 , April/june,
pp. 96-105.
Springborg, R. and Sfaki:lnakis, J. (2001 ) 'Th e Military's Role in Preside ntial Succession ', in
May Chartouni-Dub:ury (Ed.), Anne el nmioll elJ Eg),pte. palmoi, potitique, pOlllloi, militaire,
rfri, no. 3 1, February, pp. 57-72.
Waterbury,j. (1994) 'Democracy Witbout Democrat5: The Potenrial for Polirical Liberalizaton in
the fvl.iddlc East', in Ghassan Salam (Ed.), DemolTdc}' WitiJo/JI De1/locrars. p"litia /?fUbemlizlII;oll
;11 liJe Arnb a/Jd Muslim Worltl, L!3. Tauris, London, pp. 23-47.
Zeghlal, M. (1997) Los guardiwJes del Islam , los lIte/caJlales tmdiciolJl1{cs }' el reto tic In IJwdemidnd,
Ediciones Belbterra, Barcelona.
~
I
9 Egypt from yesterday to the present
Ge/lla Martn Nlllioz
Egypt has occupied a notable centraliry in che Arab contemporary era through ts
leadership (epicemer of che greac political1andmarks), ies creaave and imeUecrual
force and strategic vallle.
The great trends of political contemporary Arab thollghc were born and/or
developed in Egypt: liberal, Islamisr (Muslim Brorherhood) and socialist. Ir was in
Egypr where rhe fi[Sr polirical parties of rhe Arab \Vorld emerged (rhe Narional
Party, che Association ofYoung Egypc) , \Vhere che firsc representative insarutions
\Vere implemenred (M,ylis al-Slll/ra of lG,edive Isma'il) and w here rhe monarehy,
the proclamarion of the Repllblic and pan-Arab nationalism were experiences
of great regional inflllence.
lc is the most populated co unrry in the Arab world with 74 milliol1 inhabitants
and \Vil!, by 2025, probably be rhe eoumry \Virh rhe largest popularion in ,he
whole of che Medicerranean region after Turkey. Situated ac che crossroads
between t\Vo continems and three seas (the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the
Indian Ocean) with [he Suez Canal as a \Vacerway of great strategic relevan ce,
Egyp' is a key geographieal point fOl" su pplying oil 'o Europe and for mediarion
in regional Jnd international con Rices. Its anny has be en the mosr numerous
in che Arab wo rld (wirh more than half a million soldiers) since the nineteenth
cenrury, representing che principal military force in che region.
Throughout rhe twentieth cenrury, chis accumularion of facters enabled
Egypt ro boch 'foster the upsurge' against the Wescern world (narionaJization of
rhe Suez Canal in 1956, strategie aliianee \Virh rhe URSS in 1960), as wel! as 'o
aer as its key suPPOrt in rhe region (alIianee \Vith rhe USA in ,he mid-1970s, rhe
signing of,he Camp David Aecarels in 1978, mili,ary participation in ,he GulfWar
in 1991), endowing it \Vith unique [eatures in che international order.
Ho wever, the Gulf War in 1991 \Vas not the only co ntext which served to
[estructure unipolar inremacional order; so \Vas rhat of rhe Arab region. Dunng
,he momhs of August 1990 to Mareh 1991 , ali , he syStems ofin,er-Arab allianees
\Vere undennined, local antagonism \Vas openly expressed, the huge problems
of the popular legitimacy of Arab regimes \Vere broughr te light Jnd the
unmenrionable dependency on the USA was unveiled. For rhe first time ever,
the larger pan of rhe Arab \Vorld \Vas on rhe same side as Israel, whiJe ae rhe same
time al! [he incer-srata] Arab organiz..1 cions showed rheir inefficiency. The

154 Gel/la JHarr/l lHlllioz
supra-sta tal Arab order was definitively dismembered. The success of Egypt in
1961 in prevenring rhe Iraqi invasion of Kuwair had rransfonned inro f.1ilure
and reveaIed rhe dimension of change this counny and irs reglan had undergone.
The Arab environmenr as a joim regional system had ceased to e:\;sr, intensifying
rhe individual and bilareral policy of each sra re.
Since rhen, the USA, for their part, reinforced their political conool over
Arab regimes, guaranreeing rhem Washingron's backing, so tha[ rhey can sur-
vive in government, providing rhey rake 011 rhe American srraregic projecr, accepr
rheir 'War againsr Terror' paranleters and don'r 'fomem uprising'. These circum-
sta.nces have enrailed a large dependence on rhe part of governing elire groups
on che superpower ca mainrain rheir power, drascically lim.icing rheir room ca
maneuver when ir comes to developing local leadership \Virh rhe sufficiem
capaciry ca consolidare rhe regio n around common and srable imerests. To put
ir anorher way, whar has raken place is a process of weakening of local leader-
ship in favor of foreign leadership.
Consequemly, rhis new regional and internacional frame work worked ro rhe
disadvantage of the Arab regional leadership eapaeiry of Egypt and generated a
dynamic of aurhorirarianism observable in the refonn of the Conscirution, in
rhe harassmem of rhe main opposirion, rhe Muslim Brotherhood, and, finalIy,
in rhe last municipal election process in May 2008. As an example, out of more
rh an 5,000 candidares presemed by the Muslim Brorherhood, only 21 were
admirred, whereas, out of the 4,000 presented by dle orher opposirion parties
(1,700 from the liberal part)' A/-Wa(d, 600 from the lefr-wing parry A/-Tngnllllllll
and 700 from the also liberal parry A/-G/w), only 1,200 managed ro register.
Even among rhe ra nks of rhe governmentaJ parry, the Nacional Democranc
Part)' (the PND), eonAiets rook place bet\Veen the difierent applieants ro the
candidature (restilting in 600 of them resigning), a siruation which was inrerpreted
as pan of rhe rensions rhe political families had been experiencing for same
time in rebtion to rhe furure succession ro the president of rhe Republic.
Hosni Mubarak's inclinarion ro ser his son Gamal up as successor had nor been
met by a general consensus.
The breach berween sociery and governmem was widening in rhe Nile
country, while rensions in the polirical and social spheres were mounring
(strikes and public demonsrraoons of workers from che textile induscry, fonnal
complaints from che defenders of human tights, pressures on rhe independem
press). In conclusion, \Ve \Vere wimessing a political system \Vith great difficulties
in generaong legirimacy among its people and developing a regional leadership
capable of defining ies o\Vn imerests. I
Note
Months after this text \Vas \Vritten, the T:1hrir revolucion of Febnl:1ry 201 1 put:1n end to
rhe Mubat:lk regim c. A new cycle of history opened in which citiwns' rights and
democt:luc principIes form the He\\' poli tical focus for rhe fururc.
-=---
I
I
I 10 Saudi Arabia: family, religion, army
and oil
I
I Eduard Soler Lecha a/ld Lucia/lo Zaccara
Introduction
Two images of the Saudi policical sysrem exisr ragerher. The Kin~d?~l of Saudi
Arabia is somerimes shown as a monolirhic country, w here rhe ngtdtry of CllS-
rams mies, and as an aurhoritarian regime where po\Ver is concemrared i11[o
the hands of rhe royal family wirhour a gleam of hope for any altemative
credible governmenr. Saudi Arabia has also been presemed as if the foun?ations
of the royal famil)' have been trembling sinee September II th and as If both
rhe t:,ll of the aJ-Saud t:1mily and a change of regtme \Vere mevltable. Nelrher
ofchese images reAects \Vith exacrirude che reali ty ofrhe kingdom: the situation of
rhe royal family is nor rhar precarious nor is ir true that chere aren't any
opposicion movements or changes taking place in rhe counny.
In chis chaprer, \Ve w ill fi rsc recall rhe historical background of rhe country,
and how currenr elites were f0n11ed, while also examining wherher chere is a
single elire or differem elite groups in competirion. We will the~ go on ~o
analyze che opposirion movements pointing out hO\:" che p.an-Arabtc and le~tIst
movements are less impo rranr no\V than they were In prevlOUS decades, havmg
been replaced by radical Islamism and, to a lesse r exrenr, by liberal movemel:ts
of different rrends and groups excl uded from rhe main spheres of power as In
the case of rhe Shiite communi ry. We \Viii rhen proceed to an alyze th e pro-
cesses of adjustl11em, opening or repression thae have recemly been canied out
by different governmem bodies IJis-a-Jjs the .opposit~on m?v~ments. This will
help 115 detennine how che power structurc 111 Saudl ArabIa IS configured and
whac possible filture scenalios we may be abl e to anticipate.
Cartography of the formation of the elites and of their control
of the power resources
Dcfiuitl'ou aud formatioJJ of tire elites
COfe elites
The srare of Saudi Arabia \Vas fOl111Jlly crearcd in 1932, after rhe unification of
che KingdolTlS of Najd and Hijaz, as a resulr of a process of territory expansion