the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Taada was asked what remedies

he would suggest if he
nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator Taada replied:.

"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we feel aggrieved and there is
no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator
Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme
Court has always ruled against any action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of
separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our President, notwithstanding, I
may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose, Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme
Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is
pursuant to the provision of the Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).

This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as
members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after the aforementioned statement of Senator Taada was
made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".

As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is political or not. In this connection,
Willoughby lucidly states:.

"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to pass
judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute,
the manner in which those powers are exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the
question as to the existence and extent of these discretionary powers.

"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political departments of government because
in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of public or political
policy of course will not permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the
Constitution or by, statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain set of facts
exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow therefrom, may not be traversed in the
courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).

To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.

"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such
questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory provisions.

"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to
designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112
F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).

Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with the
procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.

"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the court
has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The
question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it
would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx x x x.

" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470,
948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143,
42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed constitutional
amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because they involve political question, but
because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers
delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary
acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular
matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject him to the restraining and
controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature. One department is just as
representative as the other, and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the
law places upon all official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that
the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional
document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).

In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of
the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and
spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number
of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in
the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are
claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in
connection therewith.

".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by
statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with
such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .."
(16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).

It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by the
parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.

Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.

"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).

It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the
Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Taada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the session
of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved that Senator Taada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the
privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329),
referring to those who, according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of votes"
in the Senate. Senator Taada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party,
as the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned
members of said Tribunal, the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the
Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Taada to nominate three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as
representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion.
Senator Taada further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator
Sabido in support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the
Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).

Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Taada, but,
also, maintaining that "Senator Taada should nominate only one" member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator who
belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not
belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman, Senator Taada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well
as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the deliberations of
the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question before the Senate
appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise
formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon,
Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Taada stated:.

"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada.".

Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.

"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now making this
proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to
complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators Delgado and Cuenco.".

What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.

"SENATOR TAADA. Mr. President.

"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and Cuenco,
not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these
additional nominations are not sanctioned by the Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the
largest number of votes to nominate three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my objection to the
last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion hecha
por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si.
(Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377;
emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party,
and the election by the Senate, of Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be
members thereof, must necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is,
admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Taada belongs and which he represents.

Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9) members,"
six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the
nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator
Taada nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that, when Senator
Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the
number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body,
and the appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.

At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator Sabido to
the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three
Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present
composition of the Senate had created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although
Senator Taada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party; and that Senator
Taada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the framers of the Constitution"
(Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.

"At present Senator Taada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing
Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we
should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Taada only as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis
supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Taada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to nominate,"
adding that:.

".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such a party,
and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Taada was
included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista
Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator Taada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he
did not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party entered into a mere coalition,
that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the
certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Taada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p.
360; emphasis supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Taada:.

"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether we like
it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the Citizens
Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the
spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to
Senator Taada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Taada the "privilege" to nominate,
and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without any, objection
whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has
regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator Taada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.

Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional
provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and
that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.

Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution of the
question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general
rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application".
As a consequence, "where the meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is
entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that "the application of the
doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to
statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department,
contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the
court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it may
he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.

The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so essential to
give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning
of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit
of said provisions do not warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .

The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word "shall", as
regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the method prescribed
for their election, and that both form part of a single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same
thought. Indeed, respondents have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the
number of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their selection. More important
still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the
theory of petitioners herein.

Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for the adjudication
of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said
Convention, says:.

"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack of political
justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the
dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent
injection of partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as well as by the
organs of public opinion.

"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was by no
means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the
Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and
Canada.

"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1,
pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).

This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.

".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party in a
position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make
each House the judge of every election protest involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate
the decision in the case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the expense
and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done even under the old system, like that
case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the
intervention of President Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.

"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the rare
exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a position to dictate
the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of them
belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party having the second largest number votes so that these
members may represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a
party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p.
351; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the legislative
bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So
the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive
body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should
continue or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system
obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why that power or that right vested
in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest,
purely political as has been observed in the past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).

It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the equal
representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the
Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in
the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking
body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:.

"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the minority party,
there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times
in the many protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it
is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that there
would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.

`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this
intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any
fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of
the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon
the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought
before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law and the doctrine of the
Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters
having as we shall have three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.

`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests. Hence,
the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as
well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the
intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees
could remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the intervention of
the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I
understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the
majority in electoral cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the
majority but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme
Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he asserted:.

"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and experience. To
be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it
wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was
designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some
members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can
be said now is that, upon the approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate
justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).

"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so
much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative
contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership
three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.

As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres
miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el
asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los de la
minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es
suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; emphasis
supplied.).

It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the
disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a)
the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each
House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that
partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the
Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the
former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.

This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant to
Senator Taada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with
it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to
prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis
supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).

Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.

".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and make the
members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal
situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; emphasis supplied.).

Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will
become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to
decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that
even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that
we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three from the majority and the three from
the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party
liner, still there is the guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three
Justices who have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority
from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or
Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives
to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to
create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and independence in its
decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive
vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).

So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate
questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Taada, as representative of
the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and
Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties
respectively making the nominations. 10.

It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest, number of votes
in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is
patent, however, that the most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting
equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present
Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be
organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).

Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true
intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.

"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of
statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within
the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C.
J. S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which
are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to
ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not
depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would
result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive
character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they
cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory,
such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory
whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction;
but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of
that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence
of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction.
Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of
convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct
of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were
no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other
than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to
matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way
shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same
antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be
exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467; emphasis
supplied.).

What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure
thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are
members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of members of
the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said
procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to seven
(7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our
Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its
letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal
consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.

Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has only one
member in the Upper House, Senator Taada felt he should nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party.
The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Taada did not nominate other two
Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the
aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista Party would have five
(5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With
the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The
equilibrium between the political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the Supreme
Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political considerations in the
determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to
forestall. 13.

This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of fact, when
Senator Taada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the
principle involved. When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political
parties above referred to, the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the
individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note,
as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself
to giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even
the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the
demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from which
it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).

In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the
Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.

" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal basis for the
final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with
unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed
elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the
reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the minority, who would sit in
judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral
Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully,
we pray this Honorable Court to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and
ruthless party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.
xxx xxx x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority
against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates
of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the
above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious
and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates who
were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Taada are untenable. Although "an individual may waive constitutional
provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his
personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted
in response to the demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom it applies
should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without an intent to such effect, which
Senator Taada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party,
other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the Constitution.

The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify
it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar, petitioner Senator Taada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias
could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make the
nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the rule on estoppel applies to
questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490,
495). Such is not the nature of the situation that confronted Senator Taada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta
vs. De la Costa (66 Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of
which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Taada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
separate, distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have not
been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the Senate may
nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these
three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination and that the
nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said
Tribunal, are null and void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however, that their
appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman, presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or,
pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal matter
falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take appropriate measures, in
relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not been
duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby,
enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with
Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.

JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,

vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION,
GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.
FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
----------------------------------------
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are
the constitutional issues embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship
between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.

First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected
Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and
the respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.

From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His
sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on
air and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in
jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor Singson
P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to
the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato
Cayetano) for joint investigation.2

The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez,
decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.

Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the
Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to
govern.3 Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the petitioner.4
Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of
resignation.5 Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and Services 6 and later asked for petitioner's resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office
and refused to resign.

The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They
were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip. 8 On
November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry. 9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10

The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was
unseated by Representative Fuentebella.12 On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one
(21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.13

The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started. 14 The battle royale was fought by
some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and
Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy Speaker of the
House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its
course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The
dramatic point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that
she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature "Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.15

After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more
bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the
witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider
trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-1017 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde."
The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.18 The ruling
made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at
the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.

On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal. 19 Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement
of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief
Justice Davide granted the motion.20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles
formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their concordance.
Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more people.21

On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on
behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to
this government."23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.24 Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts.25
Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced he was
ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelope.26 There was no turning back the tide. The tide had
become a tsunami.

January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power started
at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential
Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now
Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. 27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at
Mendiola between pro and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. 28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner
and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued the following press statement: 30

"20 January 2001

STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along
with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will
not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Icall on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: 31

"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the
powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"

A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20.23 Another copy was transmitted to Senate President
Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency. On the
same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:

"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of
the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President
of the Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request
was treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.

This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys. 34 Recognition of respondent Arroyo's
government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent Arroyo.35 US
President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her government.36

On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives. 37 The House then passed
Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the
assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution."39

On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act.40 A few days later, she also signed into law the Political
Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act.41

On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President. 42 The next day, February 7, the Senate
adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. 43 Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and
John Osmena voted "yes" with reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.44 The House of Representatives also
approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No. 178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.46

On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been terminated.47
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the
Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run
for another elective post.48

Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38%
on January 26, 2001.49 In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos
nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60%
in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54%
among the E's or very poor class.50

After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc;
(3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et
al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is
chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor
Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints against
him.

Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos.
OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February
6, required the respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On February 13, the Court
ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of
February 15."

On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr. 51 and Associate
Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the
charge of counsel Saguisag that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side" but
nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to
submit their simultaneous replies.

In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for "Gag Order" on respondent
Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that
neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making
any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases
pending investigation in his office against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports that the
respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic." 53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an
Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative
and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress
that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14 th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that
these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.

We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact
latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle
of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law. 55 In the United States, the most
authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v.
Carr,56viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the
ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters
of a political question.57 Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that
political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of
the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. 59 Heretofore, the judiciary has
focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. 60 With the new provision, however, courts are
given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In
sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these
provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or
the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et
al.61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo,
ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we
held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful
one. No less than the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a
government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the
constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took
at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution.64In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987
Constitution.1wphi1.nt

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power
of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to
judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.

Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution
against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it
as among "the reforms sine quibus non."65 The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its
Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the
press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of the
right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States
acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President
McKinley, it is specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances." The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66

Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in
section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by
Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is a
method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage
and necessary consensus."69In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict necessary
to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society." 70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,71 this
function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association
which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force;
and this means talk for all and by all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that " it
should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of grievances, all should
listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."

Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of
certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, 74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has
been laid down that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in
vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner
Resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question
whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President
or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took
her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:

"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until
the President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took
her oath as the 14th President of the Public. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond
quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.78 The validity of a resignation is not
government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the
afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expos of
Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the
Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was
given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the
House of Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social
Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic
advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.

As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the
eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the
night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew
exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the
"Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary
reveals that in the morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided
to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the
presidential residence and exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)"80 An hour
later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal
for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner
and dramatically announced the AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic
shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider
the option of "dignified exit or resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently.82 The sky was falling fast on the petitioner.
At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener
by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family. 83Significantly, the petitioner
expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m.,
petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace." 85This is proof that
petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period
he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo
para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request.
Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.

The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The
negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety
of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. 87Again, we note
that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary
Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the
petitioner,viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am
very tired. I don't want any more of this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado
nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon
Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on
which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons
designated by the Vice President to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with the
incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice President as national military and police
authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the President and his family as approved by
the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the
Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.

Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the
presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and property throughout their natural
lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private
sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national
military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in
the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the 'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members
shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.

During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice President (Macapagal) as national military
and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this
agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to
this agreement."89

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of
negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be
undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then,
signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition.
However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the
general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which
day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by the
Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families
throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as
proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B" heretofore attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United
opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be
sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'

I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'

And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic. Within moments,
Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and
General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the provisions
on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.

The President is too stunned for words:

Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since
the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of
her proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will
not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
I
t was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about
its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as
soon as the disability disappears: (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring
to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come
ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has
given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was
petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate
President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:

"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the
powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. 91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even
intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during
the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-
long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell
the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent
Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was
prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands
scant legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will
especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal
significance to petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on
section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:

"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No.
293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under
administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire." 92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was
inserted as section 15:

"Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or
pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his
incumbency."93

The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that
the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the
new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the
veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending
criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation
or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative case
against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no
person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right. 94 A public official has the right not to serve if he
really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative or criminal investigation
or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot
use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on
January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and
0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as
pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.

III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and
hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to
Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether
the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII." 95 This contention is the centerpiece
of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress
shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1
2 Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House;
3
4 Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
5
6 Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175; 96
7

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which states:

"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS
CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE
NATION'S GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;

WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President
of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;

WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the
purpose of national unity and development;

WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of
the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the House
of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment
thereof;

WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal
social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various
segments of the whole nation;

WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend its
support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nation-
building, the national interest demanding no less:

Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President
from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position
of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino
people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various
capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Senator of the Philippines qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be
it

Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General"

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following:

"RESOLUTION

WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;

WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic)
will;

WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;

WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and
overcome the nation's challenges." 99

On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:

"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo;

WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President
from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;

WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position
of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino
people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;

WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having served the government in various
capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic
of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which states:

"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO

Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17,
2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope" be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for
proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon
written approval of the Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate"

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in the Senate and calling on the
COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial
candidate garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.'

(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.

(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of
government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to
claim that his inability to govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress
has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise
the decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,102 we
hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative xxx branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the
power and duties of the presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a
political issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because
he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether
criminal or civil.

Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of executive
immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent
Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge,
Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In
granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:

" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General;
that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under the
guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from interference of courts
or legislatures. This does not mean, either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has n remedy,
but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governors-general, like the judges if the courts and the members of the
Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his official duties.
The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the
Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his property by
such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his personal or property rights have been
invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally in
damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine
Assembly. Public policy forbids it.

Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to
perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the
liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so
plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to
act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also when he
is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to
act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his
authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of authority
to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a
private individual, and as such must answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important
matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one
of the highest officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the
integrity of government itself."105

Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial law
years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments
involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a
Defense To Actions For Damages,"106 petitioner's learned counsel, former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened
the modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:

"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we
extended it to shield the President not only form civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so
that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not only
the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be said
that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The
move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity
granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the
anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.

The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987
Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was
given by delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.

The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with
Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity
from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence that the
President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be spending
all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigation's almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.

Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.

Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add
other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason
that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for
petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted, would put a
perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation than a non-
sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the
debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz: 110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns before
judgement of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding? Will it be
necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and
academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."

This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court
during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against
the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his
criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs.
Sandiganbayan112 and related cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada
are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially
plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be
anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.114

Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the privilege especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, 115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting
President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and advisers. Seven advisers
of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of
the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon himself was
named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground, among others, that the President was not
subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial
proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed
materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald,116 the US Supreme Court
further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion
to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones117 where it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising
out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes
of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. 118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity
in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the
Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. 124 These
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity from suit for criminal acts
committed during his incumbency.

V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him
due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the
criminal cases violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases.125 The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus,
English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. 126 The American approach is
different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a fair trial. They
have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and
present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal
cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for,
as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day,
gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one,
it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of
the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form
part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of
touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially.
xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation.
Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test
of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been
unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'

We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no
procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been
aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of
publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even
today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in the
case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and
their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the seminal case of Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a
b The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's
organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized when a shocking crime
occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an
important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work effectively, it is important
that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which
can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons
as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial
under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
c The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as those of speech
and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit
guarantees; the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech
and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an
independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen
deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be
present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
d Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various
fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The
right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which
 people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process
right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation
and proofthat the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find
nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the
fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ
Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be
blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted
despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness.
At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity." (emphasis supplied)

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have
already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the
respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed
at him by the mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of
the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner
cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice
and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are
reviewable by their superiors.134 They can be reversed but they can not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other
words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file
the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the
remedy of assailing it before the proper court.

VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage
- - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of
the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the guilty
and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms."135 To be sure,
the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls "the impatient vehemence of the
majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily
resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of the rule of law. If
democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it
is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to civilization. Let us
not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President
of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN, defendants, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
defendant-appellant.
Dionisio E. Moya for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon B. de los Reyes for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:
A correct appreciation of the controlling doctrine as to the effect, if any, to be attached to a statute subsequently adjudged invalid, is decisive of
this appeal from a lower court decision. Plaintiff Francisco Serrano de Agbayani, now appellee, was able to obtain a favorable judgment in her
suit against defendant, now appellant Philippine National Bank, permanently enjoining the other defendant, the Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan,
from proceeding with an extra-judicial foreclosure sale of land belonging to plaintiff mortgaged to appellant Bank to secure a loan declared no
longer enforceable, the prescriptive period having lapsed. There was thus a failure to sustain the defense raised by appellant that if the
moratorium under an Executive Order and later an Act subsequently found unconstitutional were to be counted in the computation, then the
right to foreclose the mortgage was still subsisting. In arriving at such a conclusion, the lower court manifested a tenacious adherence to the
inflexible view that an unconstitutional act is not a law, creating no rights and imposing no duties, and thus as inoperative as if it had never been.
It was oblivious to the force of the principle adopted by this Court that while a statute's repugnancy to the fundamental law deprives it of its
character as a juridical norm, its having been operative prior to its being nullified is a fact that is not devoid of legal consequences. As will
hereafter be explained, such a failing of the lower court resulted in an erroneous decision. We find for appellant Philippine National Bank, and
we reverse.

There is no dispute as to the facts. Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank dated July 19, 1939, maturing on
July 19, 1944, secured by real estate mortgage duly registered covering property described in T.C.T. No. 11275 of the province of Pangasinan.
As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As early as July 13 of the same year, defendant
instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the
loan remaining unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation being that the mortgage
sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal.
Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the defense of prescription would not be
available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order No. 32 1was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act
2
extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank took no
legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As noted, the lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

Hence this appeal, which, as made clear at the outset, possesses merit, there being a failure on the part of the lower court to adhere to the
applicable constitutional doctrine as to the effect to be given to a statute subsequently declared invalid.

1. The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it.
Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the new
Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. 3 It is
understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive.

Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as
until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and
may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while
such legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the
governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed
before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness
and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.

In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality],
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." 4 This language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v.
Hill 5 and the decision in Manila Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. 6 An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking for the Court
in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. 7

2. Such an approach all the more commends itself whenever police power legislation intended to promote public welfare but adversely affecting
property rights is involved. While subject to be assailed on due process, equal protection and non-impairment grounds, all that is required to
avoid the corrosion of invalidity is that the rational basis or reasonableness test is satisfied. The legislature on the whole is not likely to allow an
enactment suffering, to paraphrase Cardozo, from the infirmity of out running the bounds of reason and resulting in sheer oppression. It may be
of course that if challenged, an adverse judgment could be the result, as its running counter to the Constitution could still be shown. In the
meanwhile though, in the normal course of things, it has been acted upon by the public and accepted as valid. To ignore such a fact would
indeed be the fruitful parent of injustice. Moreover, as its constitutionality is conditioned on its being fair or reasonable, which in turn is
dependent on the actual situation, never static but subject to change, a measure valid when enacted may subsequently, due to altered
circumstances, be stricken down.

That is precisely what happened in connection with Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32,
issued by the then President Osmea, suspending the enforcement of payment of all debts and other monetary obligations payable by war
sufferers. So it was explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban 8 where such enactment was considered in 1953 "unreasonable and oppressive, and
should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect." 9 At the time of the
issuance of the above Executive Order in 1945 and of the passage of such Act in 1948, there was a factual justification for the moratorium. The
Philippines was confronted with an emergency of impressive magnitude at the time of her liberation from the Japanese military forces in 1945.
Business was at a standstill. Her economy lay prostrate. Measures, radical measures, were then devised to tide her over until some semblance
of normalcy could be restored and an improvement in her economy noted. No wonder then that the suspension of enforcement of payment of
the obligations then existing was declared first by executive order and then by legislation. The Supreme Court was right therefore in rejecting the
contention that on its face, the Moratorium Law was unconstitutional, amounting as it did to the impairment of the obligation of contracts.
Considering the circumstances confronting the legitimate government upon its return to the Philippines, some such remedial device was needed
and badly so. An unyielding insistence then on the rights to property on the part of the creditors was not likely to meet with judicial sympathy.
Time passed however, and conditions did change.

When the legislation was before this Court in 1953, the question before it was its satisfying the rational basis test, not as of the time of its
enactment but as of such date. Clearly, if then it were found unreasonable, the right to non-impairment of contractual obligations must prevail
over the assertion of community power to remedy an existing evil. The Supreme Court was convinced that such indeed was the case. As stated
in the opinion of Justice Bautista Angelo: "But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a
result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of
Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an
opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12)
years before they could affect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us unreasonable, if not
oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are
practically left at the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the credits are unsecured. And
the injustice is more patent when, under the law the debtor is not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar
statutes in the United States. 10 The conclusion to which the foregoing considerations inevitably led was that as of the time of adjudication, it was
apparent that Republic Act No. 342 could not survive the test of validity. Executive Order No. 32 should likewise be nullified. That before the
decision they were not constitutionally infirm was admitted expressly. There is all the more reason then to yield assent to the now prevailing
principle that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are
attached.

3. Precisely though because of the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the debtors who were
war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period
that Executive Order No. 32 and Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run. So it has been held from Day v. Court of First
Instance, 11 decided in 1954, to Republic v. Hernaez, 12 handed down only last year. What is deplorable is that as of the time of the lower court
decision on January 27, 1960, at least eight decisions had left no doubt as to the prescriptive period being tolled in the meanwhile prior to such
adjudication of invalidity. 13 Speaking of the opposite view entertained by the lower court, the present Chief Justice, in Liboro v. Finance and
Mining Investments Corp. 14 has categorized it as having been "explicitly and consistently rejected by this Court." 15

The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff's suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive
period was tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953, when the decision of Rutter v.
Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the
foreclosure of the mortgage obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.
WHEREFORE, the decision of January 27, 1960 is reversed and the suit of plaintiff filed August 10, 1959 dismissed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE
MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code,
prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card
ko.

2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following
telegram:

YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA
BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT
UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.

4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator
Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.

5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents
Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205.
Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today
proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar
who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team
chanced upon twelve talent performers practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated
assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at
her residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the
owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following:

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates
"due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.

2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."

3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family,
and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her consent and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under
Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code.

Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan)
are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to protect our
client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.

7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint
against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making
prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for the Court's
resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx

But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has
since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of
arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the
1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly
exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:

We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it
cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily
to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue
search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind
and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5

Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of
the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:

(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person
engaged in illegal recruitment. 6

On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against
illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to
further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7

On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such
non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public
order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities
found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 8

The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go
through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of
the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an
undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10
It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125).
That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the
nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is
injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil.
534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).

The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu
Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made
to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general
warrant:

Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have

(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape
recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive
organizations known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and

3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in
Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection with
the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it
is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear
and imminent danger to state security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order
arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.