T110

IUMCC 2017

IN THE JOINT HEARING OF THE MATTERS OF

STEFFI JOHNSON VS UNION OF INDIA AND SIFF VS UNION OF INDIA

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION, 2017,

WRIT PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

JOINT HEARING AS PER SECTION 151 OF CIVIL PROCEDURAL CODE

Written Submission on behalf of Petitioner Steffi Johnson

Counsel for Petitioner

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 INDEX:

1. Statement of Jurisdiction - Page no. 3

2. Index of Authorities - Page no. 3
3. List of Abbreviations - Page no. 4
4. Statement of Facts - Page no. 5
5. Issues Raised - Page no. 5
6. Summary of Arguments - Page no. 6
7. Advanced Arguments - Page no. 8
8. Prayer - Page no 13

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Mrs. Steffi Johnson submits writ petition of Mandamus under article 32 of the Constitution of
India, with regard to an infringement of her Right To Life guaranteed by article 21 of Part III
of the Constitution of India.

Further, the Supreme Court of India uses its discretionary powers in the interests of justice,
under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to hear both petitions jointly, because
otherwise two separate petitions looking for opposite reliefs would exist.

In retaliation, Save Indian Family Federation has filed a Public Interest Litigation under
article 32 before the Supreme Court, thereby relaxing its locus standi, and seeking a writ of
Injunction and Quo Warranto on the Compulsory payment of Honorarium to Housewives
Act, as well as the applicability of the act to Mrs Steffi Johnson.

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

I. Statutes
1. Constitution of India
2. Code of Civil Procedure
3. Compulsory Payment of Honorarium to Housewives Act
4. Indian Succession Act
5. Section 110, An Act to establish eight classes of municipalities, by population, based
on the 1970 Federal decennial census, 1979-United States of America
6. Special Marriage Act
7. Manual Scavenging (Prohibition) Act

II. List of Cases

1. Md Farooque vs State of WB AIR 1995 Cal 98
2. Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61, 106
3. Shanti vs Vasudev AIR 2005 Karn 417

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 III. Common law
1. pg 637 para 689 halsbury’s 61

IV. Textbooks Referred

1. Occasion’, Merriam-Webster, 6b-retrieved on 10.8.17 at https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/occasion

V. Articles:
1. Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case. Author(s): Arthur L. Goodhart. Source:
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Dec., 1930), pp. 161-183

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

1. AIR-All India Reporter

2. CHH-Compulsory payment of Honorarium to Housewives

3. HL-House of Lords

4. IUMCC-Intra University Moot Court Competition

5. Karn.-Karnataka

6. Mr.-Mister

7. Mrs.-Missus

8. pp.-pages

9. SIFF-Save Indian Families Federation

10. Vs-Versus

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11. WB-West Bengal

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mrs. Steffi Johnson is married under the Special Marriage Act to Mr. Rajput. She quit her job
to take care of their children as well as his parents. Having estranged from her own family
due to her marriage, she spent her savings in In Vitro Fertilization treatment for her and her
husband, and also worked for free in the old age home owned and managed by her father in
law.

She occasionally tutored students in a nearby school on French and earned meager amounts.

Hearing about the Compulsory payment of Honorarium for Housewives Act, she sought a
writ of Mandamus from the Supreme Court against:

a) The Union of India, for setting up an enforcement authority, as mentioned under this
Act
b) The Supreme Court, for establishing a penalty for violation of the Act and
c) Mr. Rajput, for paying said honorarium to her

Mr. Rajput obtained the support of the Save Indian Family Federation, which challenged the
Compulsory payment of Honorarium for Housewives Act as being unconstitutional, as well
as its applicability to Mrs. Steffi.

The Supreme Court is hearing both petitions jointly.

ISSUES RAISED:

I. Whether the petition by Steffi Johnson is maintainable

II. Whether the Compulsory payment of Honorarium to Housewives Act applies to
Steffi Johnson
III. Whether the CHH Act is constitutional

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 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. MAINTAINABILTIY of the Suit

1.1. The honorarium to Mrs. Johnson is not secured under her entitlement to business
under article 21 of the Constitution. Here, the specific legitimate articulations as to
the other side to under article 21 of the constitution, which develops the benefit to
life and individual flexibility, are overseen. Particularly, it will be shown that the
benefit to employment i.e the privilege, must be considered as a fundamental perfect
in particular conditions. These conditions will be showed up as surenesses of purpose
of intrigue case laws and those will be appeared differently in relation to the realities
in the inquiry close by, to exhibit that the current charged infringement of rights is
not an encroachment of the benefit to function as under article 21. The privilege to
job as a classification under article 21 of the constitution is not to be utilized as a part
of non-fundamental conditions.
2. To build up the contentions on the past conflicts, it is set here how the benefit to
occupation as a key right should simply be brought up in certain specific conditions, in
light of criticalness, and how this situation or question is not one of those conditions.
Toward the end, it will be developed how article 32 is an unacceptable answer for
Mrs.Steffi Johnson.

APPLICABILITY

2.1 Regularity of Income of Mrs. Steffi Johnson

a) Here it will be displayed that Mrs. Johnson's periodical and controlled benefit from
French instructive expenses are as a general rule from a typical wellspring of
compensation, and in view of having a consistent wellspring of wage, Mrs. Johnson is
excluded from utilizing the CHH Demonstration. Vocabulary suggestions and
specially based law reference books will be used to describe the operational terms of
the statute.
b) Applicability of CHH Act to Special Marriage Act,1954:

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Here the real nature of the Obligatory portion of Honorarium to Housewives Act to a
marriage under the Exceptional Marriage Act is tended to. The CHH Demonstration applies
just to individual or common laws, though the unique marriage act explicitly distinguishes as
not one or the other, and shows elements of the two ideas.

3. CONSTITUTIONALITY

a) Nature of the Constitution:

Here the limit of Part III of the Constitution is investigated and it is submitted how a low
measure of Phenomenal rights are yielded to ladies, and how thus, article 15 is being
damaged by the CHH Demonstration. At the end of the day it will be presented that the CHH
Demonstration segregates on the grounds of sex.

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 ADVANCED ARGUMENTS

1. MAINTAINABILTIY

 Mrs. Johnson’s honorarium is not covered by her right to livelihood as under article
21.

On account of Raja Mahendra Pal where the Incomparable court held that the benefit to work
under article 21 was NOT to be extensively interpreted. This was additionally expounded in
Delhi Transport Partnership versus DTC Majdoor congress likewise held that privilege to
business is just when such right is vital for sustenance and hardship would undermine
presence.

Essentially what is submitted in view of these two cases is that the privilege to work as under
article 21 and the certification to one side to life might be considered as a central right of Part
III of the constitution, just if absence of such business represents a desperate danger to life of
the applicant itself. This is what is implied by the expression 'minimal level'.

In other words, right to livelihood can be considered a fundamental right only to the least
possible extent. This is nothing but the extent up till which such livelihood is essential for
dignified survival.

For the current situation, obviously independent of regardless of whether Mrs. Steffi Johnson
needs to work hard, there is no risk to her survival, as her better half is an expert inspector
with a steady wellspring of salary. Besides, the family unmistakably gains enough in general
to support a maturity home as well, as Mrs. Johnson's marital home gets benefits for the sake
of her dad in law as well. Accordingly, accounts for the family are not tight by any means.

 The right to livelihood as a category under article 21 of the constitution is not to be

used in non-vital circumstances: There are two major cases that establish this point.
First we have the Olga Tellis case law. Olga Tellis was further supported in

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 Md.Farooque vs State of West Bengal, where it was held that the right to earn
livelihood would be a component of the right to life, at the marginal level alone.1

(The owner of a piece of property protested the rate hike and the subsequent tax hike on his
property as violative of his right to livelihood. He was denied remedy.)

What is submitted from these cases is reiterative of the points made in the previous argument.

Essentially, Mrs. Johnson appreciates a level of solace and is positively not a ruined national.
Much the same as how in the referred to points of reference a man who dissented expanded
assessments as encroaching on his survival was not yielded to be oppressed of his rights
under Part III of the constitution, here too we have a solicitor who has an offer in her
significant other's property which incorporates considerable profit, and who is a beneficiary
to a maturity home as well. The Indian Succession Act is applicable to marriages under the
special Marriage Act, and hence in the event of Mr. Rajput’s demise, if he has predeceased
Mrs. Johnson, she is heir to a third of his property2.

 Applicability of Mandamus absent herein:

Mandamus is traditionally issued for breach of duty such as failure to exercise a discretion, or
to exercise it according to proper legal principles.3

In the case at hand one of the demands made by the petitioner of this court is to ask the
government to set up a mechanism for penalizing violation of obligations conferred by the
Compulsory Payment of Honorarium Act.

The statute itself does not confer on the state any such duty, only having referred to an
enforcement authority being set up.

In this way any writ of mandamus that requests the setting up of a punishment for non-
execution of the commitments of CHH Act is ultra vires the forces of this court. This makes
the request of Mrs. Johnson void up till that degree.

1
Md Farooque vs State of WB AIR 1995 Cal 98
2
Section 33, Indian Succession Act
3
pg 637 para 689 halsbury’s 61

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 2. APPLICABILITY

a) Regularity of Income of Mrs. Steffi Johnson

It is undisputed that Mrs. Johnson earns incomes ‘occasionally’ from the neighboring school.

Now, the Merriam Webster dictionary has among its definitions of ‘occasion’ the phrase
‘from time to time’. This phrase clearly denotes a periodical and continuous system of
occurrences, which in turn can only be described as regular.4

Moreover, it is legitimate to take note of that an instructive foundation is not a brief wander
and is built up with a perfect of interminability. This implies the wellspring of pay itself is as
normal as whatever other source organization may guarantee. Notwithstanding accepting by
methods for arguendo that the establishment is a constrained wander or an organization
restricted by time, this does not make the wellspring of salary itself unpredictable. In this
manner it is presented that the wellspring of salary being customary does not have an
indistinguishable comment from the wage itself being standard. Indeed, even in a steady
occupation, a representative might be missing for work because of different components and
thus have unsteady wage. Correspondingly, even a general paying employment is not safe to
sudden disintegration, or different procedures of ending up, because of different
circumstances, for example, bankruptcy. In this manner, the reasonable separation between
'customary wellspring of pay' and 'general wage' must be conceded.

As per the hierarchy of the principle of Stare Decisis5, legislations come above rules and
orders, which supersede judicial precedents, after which come academic opinions followed
by the advocate’s opinion.

In this case there is absolutely no binding statute that defines the terms ‘regular’ or ‘source’.

Thus the direction for the respondent presents that the candidate unmistakably has a normal
wellspring of wage. Regardless of the possibility that the applicant does not have a consistent
wage, that is simply because of her own restraint from customary coaching at the school. She
is given pay for at whatever point she performs said coaching and consequently has a steady,
general wellspring of pay accessible, however not picked by her.

4
‘Occasion’, Merriam-Webster, 6b-retrieved on 10.8.17
5
Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case. Author(s): Arthur L. Goodhart. Source: The Yale Law Journal,
Vol. 40, No. 2 (Dec., 1930), pp. 161-183

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 b) Jurisprudence behind the Statute:

A provision’s meaning is determined by the legislative intent behind the same 6 . This is
known as the golden rule of interpretation, which was established in the case law Grey vs
Pearson.

A parallel is drawn between the CHH Demonstration to the statutes, for example, Hindu
Reception and Support Act, The Muslim Ladies (Insurance of Rights on Separation) Act and
the Indian Separation Act, under which spouses are given upkeep expenses or provision to
sustenance. Essentially it is held that housewives are conceded cash in the CHH
Demonstration to have a level of independence and assets of their own, as their work is
generally unpaid for, and consequently they have no different methods for occupation with
the exception of reliance on their marital homes.

(It is submitted that this argument is an arguendo to the SIFF’s stance on the
unconstitutionality of this CHH Act in the first place.)

Thus, as established above, in the previous argument, Mrs. Johnson indeed does have another
source of income. Moreover, her educational degree also allows her a chance to make a living
irrespective of a household to support her. This point of view is sustained in maintenance
cases too, such as the following:

Shanti vs vasudev7:

In this case the wife who was separating from the husband had a medical license. It was held
that she was capable of making a living, and hence she did not obtain a settlement decree.

Manta vs rajesh jaiswal:

The similar point of view was iterated in this case law too, the ratio of which is that
maintenance is for women incapable of supporting themselves.

c) Applicability of CHH Act to Special Marriage Act:

The CHH Demonstration is appropriate just to couples wedded under 'mainstream or

individual laws'. For the current situation, the couple is hitched under the Uncommon
Marriage Act. The content of this demonstration makes no say of whether it is an "individual"

6
Grey v. Pearson (1857) 6 H.L.C. 61, 106
7
Air 2005 karn 417

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or "mainstream" law. Neither of these terms from the CHH Demonstration are operationally
perceptible. The constitution of India says the word mainstream though the General
Conditions Act characterizes the word individual, however no extremity between the two are
clear in a legitimate sense. Moreover, it can't be expected that the Uncommon Marriage Act
falls under both of these two classes. Even from a logical standpoint, the Special Marriage
Act applies to inter-religion marriages, non-religious marriages as well as inter-Christian
marriages, thus making it at the least a secular and personal law, as opposed to either a
secular or a personal law.

3. CONSTITUTIONALITY

i) Nature of the Constitution:

Part III of the constitution manages the central rights agreed by the Union. There is however
a sharp juxtaposition among these rights. Articles 14 through 24 cover the rights to balance,
flexibility, life and individual freedom, and reservation, and the rights against separation,
untouchability, regular citizen respects and benefits, ex post facto laws, twofold jeapordy,
self-misuse, abuse and youngster work.

Now, articles 25 to 30 on the other hand cover the right to conscience, maintaining schools of
minority communities and languages, minority trusts and the likes. These communal rights
are mostly conservative and protective in nature and often operate against the right to equality
or the right against discrimination. However, these special rights often take precedence over
the rights to equality, freedom and against exploitation, as these rights are sought in rarer
circumstances and are instituted for the upliftment of backward communities.

In any case, none of these rights have been reached out to ladies. For minority groups as far
as culture and phonetics, particular rights have been specified To a limited extent III. In this
manner, the absence of such particular rights does not give much space for article 15(3),
which is an exemption to one side against separation on grounds of sex, to be connected on
such an extensive scale.

This act applies to all housewives, which is a very large and diverse category. As such it is
cleanly violating of article 15 which has the right against discrimination on grounds of sex.
department.

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 PRAYER

Thus, the Save Indian Families Federation humbly asks of this honorable Supreme Court to
grant the following orders:

A. That the Compulsory payment of Honorariam to Housewives Act is not applicable

to Mrs. Steffie Johnson.
B. That the Compulsory payment of Honorariam to Housewives Act is
unconstitutional, and as such be struck down with an Injunction, posing a Quo
Warranto to the Parliament.

And any other order that it may deem fit in the interests of equity, justice and good
consciousness.

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