Nicole

 Bowcutt  
December  13,  2017  
ISRL289i:  The  Israeli-­‐Palestinian  Conflict  
 
The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Oslo  Process  

  The  Oslo  Accords  were  a  set  of  seven  agreements  that  attempted  to  regulate  

the  period  of  negotiations  between  Israel  and  the  Palestinian  Liberation  

Organization  (PLO)1.    These  agreements  were  the  first  time  Israel  and  the  PLO  

formally  recognized  one  another  and  marked  a  commitment  by  the  two  nations  to  

develop  a  solution  to  their  conflict.    The  Oslo  Accords  provided  Palestine  with  an  

interim  self-­‐government  authority  and  gradually  withdrew  Israel  from  territory  in  

the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip;2  they  did  so  with  the  hope  that  enough  goodwill  

fostered  on  both  sides  would  aid  negotiations  on  core  issues  such  as  borders,  

security,  refugees,  settlements,  and  control  of  Jerusalem.3    The  implicit  purpose  of  

the  accords  was  to  develop  a  two-­‐state  agreement  between  Israel  and  the  PLO,  

where  a  Palestinian  authority  would  govern  over  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip  

and  Israel  would  control  the  remaining  territory  of  historic  Palestine.    

Unfortunately,  the  Oslo  Process  was  unsuccessful  in  furthering  peace  efforts  

between  the  two  nations.    On  the  contrary,  Oslo  “only  succeeded  in  maintaining  the  

occupation  and  tripling  the  population  of  Israeli  settlements  in  the  West  Bank.”4  

  The  Oslo  Accords  were  an  indirect  result  of  the  First  Intifada  in  1987.    

Although  unsuccessful,  this  uprising  was  significant  in  two  ways.    First,  the  violence  

caused  Yasir  Arafat,  chairman  of  the  PLO,  to  change  the  organization’s  strategy.    
                                                                                                               
1  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans  1993-­‐2010.”  pp.  92  
2  “Declaration  of  Principles  on  Interim  Self-­‐Government  Arrangements”  (1993)  
3  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  92  
4  Scheller,  Bente,  René  Wildangel,  Joachim  Paul,  “20  Years  Since  Oslo:  Palestinian  Perspectives”  Heading:  

Editorial  (2013).    pp.  4    

Instead  of  a  complete  eradication  of  the  Israeli  state,  Arafat  was  now  willing  to  

negotiate  a  two-­‐state  solution.    Second,  the  intifada  produced  powerful  imagery  that  

increased  support  for  the  Palestinian  plight  from  the  international  community.5    

This  forced  Israel  to  the  negotiation  table;  meetings  between  Israeli  and  PLO  

officials  began  taking  place  in  Oslo,  Norway,  and  in  1993,  Arafat  and  Israeli  Prime  

Minister  Yitzhak  Rabin  met  at  the  White  House  to  sign  the  “Declaration  of  

Principles.”    Arafat  renounced  armed  violence  on  behalf  of  the  PLO  and  agreed  to  

recognize  Resolution  242.    In  turn,  Rabin  promised  to  recognize  the  PLO  as  the  

official  representative  of  the  Palestinian  people  and  to  work  towards  a  peaceful  

resolution  to  the  conflict.6        

  The  failure  of  Oslo  can  be  credited  to  many  events  and  circumstances,  one  

example  being  the  prolonged  violence  between  the  two  nations.    Between  1994  and  

1996,  several  attacks  proved  that  the  promise  to  end  violence  was  easier  said  than  

done.    On  February  24,  1994,  an  American-­‐Israeli  killed  29  and  injured  125  when  he  

opened  fire  on  a  group  of  Muslim  worshippers  during  Ramadan.    The  following  

April,  a  Palestinian  killed  eight  people  in  Israel  through  a  suicide  bombing.7    In  1995,  

Israeli  PM  Yitzhak  Rabin  was  attending  a  peace  rally  when  a  right-­‐wing  Israeli  

extremist  assassinated  him.    The  year  after,  several  bomb  attacks  on  Israeli  civilians,  

orchestrated  by  the  terrorist  group  Hamas,  caused  further  damage  to  the  

negotiations.8    Israel  later  claimed  that  the  Palestinian  Authority  failed  to  uphold  its  

                                                                                                               
5  “Oslo  Explained”  Heading:  How  did  the  Oslo  Accords  come  about?  (2013).    
6  “Oslo  Explained”  
7  Scheller,  Bente,  “20  Years.”  pp.  5  
8  “Oslo  Explained”  Heading:  How  did  the  Oslo  Accords  break  down?  
side  of  the  security  aspects  of  Oslo  by  failing  to  stop  Hamas  and  Islamic  Jihad  

terrorism.9  

  Another  matter  that  worked  to  Oslo’s  detriment  regarded  settlement  

building  and  security.    The  issue  of  settlements  was  technically  left  for  final  status  

talks;  however,  Palestinians  argued  that  some  clauses  of  the  Declaration  of  

Principles  were  violated  by  Israel’s  continued  settlement  building  and  expansion.    

Not  only  did  Israel  continue  to  use  disputed  land  to  build  settlements,  they  also  built  

bypass  roads  to  ensure  settler  security  (a  responsibility  that  was  outlined  for  them  

under  Oslo).10      

The  Oslo  II  Accords  signed  in  Taba  attempted  to  fix  this  issue  by  dividing  the  

West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  territories  into  three  areas:  A,  B,  and  C.    Israel  would  

completely  withdraw  from  Area  A  and  give  full  civil  and  security  control  to  the  

Palestinian  authority.    Area  B  would  remain  under  Israeli  security  but  would  be  

withdrawn  from  otherwise.    Lastly,  Area  C  would  remain  fully  under  Israeli  

control.11    It  was  up  to  the  Palestinian  Authority  to  establish  a  police  force  to  

maintain  order  in  their  areas.    Israel  claimed  the  failure  of  Oslo  II  was  due  to  the  

failure  of  Palestine  to  properly  execute  their  security  measures;  Palestinians  

claimed  the  failure  was  due  to  Israel  not  respecting  area  assignments  and  

continuing  to  build  settlements.    The  second  Accords  also  helped  established  

measures  for  releasing  prisoners,  dealing  with  terrorism,  and  opening  safe  passage  

in  East  Jerusalem  (since  Jerusalem  was  a  final-­‐status  issue,  there  was  much  conflict  

                                                                                                               
9  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  93  
10  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  93  
11  Scheller,  Bente,  “20  Years.”  pp.  6  
regarding  who  could  access  East  Jerusalem  and  who  could  not).    Delays  and  failures  

to  implement  these  measures  also  led  to  the  breakdown  of  the  Oslo  Accords.12    

  In  1998,  Israel  and  Palestine  attempted  to  resolve  the  issues  that  Oslo  

negotiations  were  facing  by  enacting  the  Wye  River  Memorandum.    This  agreement  

entailed  further  redeployments  from  Israel  in  Area  A,  extending  the  territory  by  13  

percent.    In  return,  the  Palestinian  Authority  promised  to  take  further  measures  to  

combat  terrorism  and  anti-­‐Israel  sentiment.13    The  Wye  River  Memorandum  was  the  

last  major  agreement  of  the  Oslo  Accords  and  failed  based  on  the  actions  of  the  

newly-­‐elected  Israeli  PM,  Benyamin  Netanyahu.    Netanyahu  had  attempted  to  

appease  the  United  States  and  Israeli  moderates  by  signing  the  memorandum;  

however,  to  maintain  the  support  of  his  political  party,  the  Likud,  he  violated  the  

agreement  by  refusing  to  give  up  the  additional  13  percent  of  the  West  Bank.    Facing  

immense  pressure,  Netanyahu’s  government  collapsed  after  voting  to  reject  the  Wye  

River  Memorandum  and  dissolve  itself.14  

  The  peace  attempts  resumed  in  1998.    Israel’s  new  prime  minister,  Ehud  

Barak,  endorsed  the  negotiation  efforts  that  began  with  his  mentor,  Yitzhak  Rabin,  

and  recognized  the  need  for  compromise.15    This  led  to  the  enactment  of  the  Sharm  

el-­‐Sheikh  Memorandum,  which  attempted  to  implement  the  Oslo  II  Accords  and  

other  small  agreements.    In  implementing  Sharm  el-­‐Sheikh,  more  occupied  land  was  

transferred  to  Areas  A  and  B  and  Israel  released  about  200  Palestinian  prisoners  by  

                                                                                                               
12  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  93  
13  Scheller,  Bente,  “20  Years.”  pp.  6  
14  Cleveland,  William,  “Israeli-­‐Palestinian  Relations  Since  the  Gulf  War”  Heading:  The  Fall  of  the  Netanyahu  

Government  and  the  Elections  of  1999  (2000).    

15  Cleveland,  William,  “Israeli-­‐Palestinian  Relations.”  
September  of  that  year.    Despite  this  new  agreement,  Israel  still  controlled  the  

majority  of  the  land  in  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip.16  

  The  following  year,  the  United  States  intervened  in  an  attempt  to  finalize  

negotiations  between  Israel  and  Palestine.    The  Camp  David  Summit  brought  

together  US  President  Bill  Clinton,  Israeli  Prime  Minister  Ehud  Barak,  and  PA  

President  Yasser  Arafat  to  discuss  the  final-­‐status  issues  that  were  instrumental  to  

the  conflict.    The  Summit  ultimately  only  produced  proposals,  and  no  definitive  plan.    

Two  concessions  that  were  important  during  these  talks  included  “the  Barak  

proposal  for  an  international  presence  on  the  international  border  (with  Jordan)  

and,  most  importantly,  Israeli  and  American  agreement  on  the  creation  of  a  

Palestinian  state.”17    However,  Israel  and  Palestine  were  unable  to  agree  on  the  

division  of  land  and  barely  even  addressed  the  refugee  “right  of  return”  issue,  two  

key  issues  in  the  debate.    They  also  could  not  reach  an  agreement  on  East  Jerusalem  

and  the  Temple  Mount/Haram  al-­‐Sharif  area.    Clinton  and  Barak  proposed  

Palestinian  sovereignty  of  several  quarters  of  East  Jerusalem  as  well  as  Palestinian  

“custody”  of  the  Temple  Mount/Haram  al-­‐Sharif.    Arafat  refused  these  compromises;  

the  Palestinian  Authority  wanted  returned  sovereignty  over  all  of  East  Jerusalem  

and  would  not  settle  for  custody  of  the  Temple  Mount/Haram  al-­‐Sharif  if  it  

remained  under  Israeli  control.    This  issue  was  the  definitive  issue  in  the  collapse  of  

the  talks.    While  Clinton  and  Barak  blamed  Arafat  for  the  failure  of  the  Camp  David  

                                                                                                               
16  Scheller,  Bente,  “20  Years.”  pp.  6  
17  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  94  
Summit,  both  sides  believed  the  other  was  unreasonable  and  unwilling  to  negotiate  

for  peace.18  

  Following  the  failure  at  Camp  David,  specific  inflammatory  incidents  

committed  by  groups  on  both  sides,  neglect  and  corruption  within  the  Palestinian  

Authority,19  and  a  visit  by  Likud  leader  Ariel  Sharon  to  the  Temple  Mount  escalated  

hostile  feelings  between  Israelis  and  Palestinians.    The  result  was  the  Second  

Intifada,  which  began  in  September  2000  and  lasted  for  five  years.    The  violence  

caused  1,036  Israeli  casualties  and  3,592  Palestinian  casualties.20    This  conflict  

helped  support  the  Israeli  belief  that  Arafat  was  the  cause  of  Camp  David’s  failure.21  

  In  December  2000,  President  Clinton  presented  both  sides  with  the  “Clinton  

Parameters.”    This  plan  was  either  to  be  accepted  or  rejected  by  both  sides;  

negotiation  was  no  longer  a  tactic  in  this  phase  of  the  peace  talks.    Clinton’s  

Parameters  allotted  94  to  96  percent  of  the  West  Bank  to  Palestine  with  an  

additional  land  swap  of  1  to  3  percent.    The  refugee  problem  had  two  proposed  

solutions.    In  the  first,  Palestinian  refugees  had  the  right  to  return  to  historic  

Palestine.    In  the  second  proposal,  Palestinian  refugees  had  five  options:  1)  return  to  

the  Palestinian  state,  2)  return  to  now-­‐Palestinian  land  (due  to  land  swaps),  3)  

integrate  into  their  current  country,  4)  resettle  in  a  different  country,  or  5)  settle  in  

Israel.    In  regards  to  Jerusalem,  Palestine  would  have  authority  over  the  Arab  

neighborhoods  and  Israel  would  control  the  Jewish  neighborhoods,  effectively  

                                                                                                               
18  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  94-­‐95  
19  Pundak,  Ron,  “From  Oslo  to  Taba:  What  Went  Wrong?”  (2001).  pp.  35  
20  Scheller,  Bente,  “20  Years.”  pp.  6  
21  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  95  

 
splitting  the  city  in  two.    Despite  reservations,  Barak  agreed  to  the  Parameters.    

Arafat  let  the  deadline  come  and  go  with  no  response.22  

  In  a  final  effort  to  achieve  peace,  both  parties  came  together  in  2001  for  the  

Taba  Summit.    The  Taba  talks  followed  many  of  the  parameters  proposed  by  Clinton,  

but  the  only  agreement  made  during  this  time  regarded  the  refugee  issue.    So,  while  

Israel  agreed  to  allow  the  return  of  40,000  refugees  over  a  five-­‐year  period,  the  

issues  of  borders,  settlements,  and  Jerusalem  were  never  truly  resolved.23    In  

February  2001,  Israel’s  newly-­‐elected  prime  minister,  Ariel  Sharon,  began  

implementing  unilateral  policies  in  line  with  the  right-­‐wing  views  of  his  Likud  party.  

Thus,  the  period  of  peace  negotiations  known  as  the  Oslo  Process  ended  (despite  the  

Oslo  Accords  officially  ending  with  the  failed  implementation  of  the  Wye  River  

Memorandum  in  1998).24    

  The  failure  of  the  Oslo  Process  can  be  attributed  to  many  issues  and  events.    

As  mentioned  earlier,  the  recurring  violence  from  both  sides,  including  terrorist  

attacks  and  riots,  was  an  obstacle  to  peace.25    From  the  Israeli  perspective,  the  

Palestinian  Authority’s  inability  to  control  the  violent  acts  of  terrorist  groups  like  

Hamas  showed  an  unwilling  attitude  towards  peace.    Oslo  was  also  weakened  

because  of  its  failure  to  include  a  monitoring  body,  which  resulted  in  vastly  different  

interpretations  of  implementation  of  the  Accords.26    The  United  States  eventually  

worked  as  a  mediator  between  the  two  groups.    However,  years  of  

misunderstandings  over  implementation  and  blatant  attempts  by  Oslo  opponents  to  
                                                                                                               
22  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  95-­‐97  
23  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  97  
24  Scheller,  Bente,  “20  Years.”  pp.  7  
25  “Oslo  Explained”  Heading:  How  did  the  Oslo  Accords  break  down?  
26  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  93  
prevent  implementation  caused  the  two  nations  to  harbor  even  more  distrust  

towards  one  another…  the  opposite  of  what  the  interim  period  had  intended.27    

Mediation  by  that  time  proved  ineffective.    Palestinians  also  blamed  the  United  

States  for  failing  to  remain  impartial;  many  believed  that  Clinton’s  compromises  

favored  Israel,  an  idea  that  was  supported  when  Clinton  placed  the  blame  for  the  

failure  at  Camp  David  on  Arafat’s  shoulders.28      

Another  source  of  failure  was  simply  a  difference  in  perceptions.    From  an  

Israeli  point-­‐of-­‐view,  Oslo  seemed  to  transform  the  PLO,  an  organization  intent  on  

the  destruction  of  Israel,  into  a  legitimate  political  actor.    Many  did  not  believe  in  

Arafat’s  supposed  change  in  strategy,  instead  believing  his  intention  was  to  make  

the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip  “terror  hotbeds.”29    From  the  Palestinian  perspective,  

the  election  of  Netanyahu,  a  Likud,  as  well  as  increased  settlement-­‐building  and  

restrictions  over  Palestinian  movements  led  very  few  to  believe  that  Israel  was  

actually  serious  in  its  attempts  to  negotiate  a  two-­‐state  solution.30    

Ultimately,  the  greatest  blow  to  the  Oslo  Process  was  the  disparity  between  

“the  maximum  Israel  was  willing  to  offer  and  the  minimum  Palestinians  were  

willing  to  accept.”31    In  the  most  crucial  moments  of  the  process  (Oslo  I,  the  Wye  

River  Memorandum,  and  the  Camp  David  Summit)  the  issues  were  not  simply  

misunderstandings  between  the  two  parties,  but  refusals  to  compromise  any  

further.    While  the  differing  narratives  of  Oslo,  the  lack  of  implementation  of  the  

peace  process,  and  the  unwillingness  to  compromise  outlined  above  can  all  be  
                                                                                                               
27  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  94  
28  Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans.”  pp.  95  
29  Karsh,  Ephraim,  “The  Oslo  Disaster.”  pp.  1-­‐2  
30  Pundak,  Ron,  “From  Oslo  to  Taba.”  pp.  31  
31  “Oslo  Explained”  Heading:  How  did  the  Oslo  Accords  break  down?  
traced  to  specific  events  or  patterns  within  the  Oslo  process,  ultimately  they  must  be  

attributed  to  the  historical  context  of  the  conflict.    A  conflict  spanning  as  many  years  

as  the  Israeli-­‐Palestinian  conflict  leaves  its  citizens  with  certain  paradigms  that  

inform  their  narrative  perceptions  as  well  as  their  peace-­‐building  actions.    In  order  

for  the  Oslo  process  to  have  succeeded,  those  paradigms  would  have  needed  to  shift.    

Because  distrust  between  the  two  parties  increased  rather  than  decreased,  these  

paradigms  went  unchanged  and  compromise  could  only  go  so  far.  

   
 Bibliography  

Cleveland,  William,  “Israeli-­‐Palestinian  Relations  Since  the  Gulf  War”  Heading:  The  

Fall  of  the  Netanyahu  Government  and  the  Elections  of  1999  (2000).  

https://acc.teachmideast.org/texts.php?module_id=3&reading_id=1026&seq

uence=8      

“Declaration  of  Principles  on  Interim  Self-­‐Government  Arrangements”  (1993).  

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/declaration-­‐of-­‐principles    

Golan,  Galia,  “Peace  Plans  1993-­‐2010.”    

https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/d7cfd3e8-­‐7de0-­‐49cb-­‐b6ef-­‐

04a922c60c77    

Karsh,  Ephraim,  “The  Oslo  Disaster.”    

https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/e01ec690-­‐eb3e-­‐454a-­‐b409-­‐

71a9cd61aa39  

“Oslo  Explained.”  Heading:  How  did  the  Oslo  Accords  come  about?  (2013).  

http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/13/oslo-­‐accords-­‐

explained.html    

Pundak,  Ron,  “From  Oslo  to  Taba:  What  Went  Wrong?”  (2001).  

https://files.acrobat.com/a/preview/494a15b6-­‐e77a-­‐45e9-­‐b424-­‐

92d66edfe3f4    

Scheller,  Bente,  René  Wildangel,  Joachim  Paul,  “20  Years  Since  Oslo:  Palestinian  

Perspectives”  Heading:  Editorial  (2013).    

https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/perspective_issue5_decembre_201

3.pdf