DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G.

LUCERO
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948

FACTS:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner
might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the
strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused, assisted by counsel,
appeared at the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him
of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of not
guilty. Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she and her
witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law. The
fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was
sustained. In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to
present evidence, and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first instance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record.

HELD:
Evidence is the mode and manner of proving competent facts and circumstances on which a party
relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law. The
Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. Said section defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the majority
and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge holding the preliminary
investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.

EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

G.R. No. 177188 December 4, 2008

FACTS:
The BOC issued a Warrant of Seizure and Detention of the rice shipped by M/V Criston, operated by Glucer
Shipping, on the ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary clearance from the Philippine
Coast Guard. A notice of the scheduled hearing of the seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping but it
failed to appear at the hearing. After a typhoon had passed through Albay, M/V Criston failed to return to
the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be found. The BOC then received information that M/V Criston was
found in Bataan sporting the name of M/V Neptune Breeze. The District Collector rendered a Decision
ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, and its cargo. In the
meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze filed a
Motion for Intervention claiming that M/V Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by
Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V Criston which had been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi,
Albay.
Manila District Collector issued an Order quashing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued against
M/V Neptune Breeze for lack of probable cause that the said vessel was the same one known as M/V
Criston which fled from the jurisdiction of the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and detained therein
for allegedly engaging in smuggling activities. By review of the BOC, the prior order was reversed. CTA
ordered forfeiture of the vessel. MR was denied for failure to present issues that had not been previously
threshed out in its earlier Decision. CTA en Banc affirmed CTA division.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.

RULING: YES
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA are binding on this Court and can only be
disturbed on appeal if not supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

The court cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not
the same as M/V Criston in light of the substantial evidence on record to the contrary. The foreign
registration of M/V Neptune Breeze proves only that it was registered in a foreign country; but it does not
render impossible the conclusions consistently reached by the courts, that M/V Neptune Breeze was the
very same vessel used in the conduct of smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.

In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of.

Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings, it had ample opportunity to present its side of
the controversy in before the Manila District Collector. Even the evidence presented by El Greco in the
latter proceedings fails to persuade. The only vital evidence it presented before the Manila District
Collector was the foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence which
El Greco submitted to this Court.

Sahali vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 134169 February 2, 2000

Facts: During the 2010 elections, Sahali and Matba were two of the four candidates who ran for the
position of governor in the Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and Usman ran for the position of Vice-
Governor. The Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the
duly elected governor and vice-governor, respectively.

Matba and Usman filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam with the COMELEC. Matba contested the results
in 39 out of 282 clustered precincts that functioned in the province of TawiTawi. Sadikul and Ruby filed
their answer with counter protest.

The COMELEC First Division directed its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to conduct a
technical examination of the said election paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks
appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters. Sadikul and
Ruby jointly filed with the COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave Concern and Motion
for Reconsideration.
The COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order which denied the said motion for
reconsideration filed by Sadikul and Ruby. Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition asserting that the
COMELEC First Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether Sadikul and Ruby were denied due process when the COMELEC granted the motion for
technical examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them the opportunity to oppose the said
motion?

Held: No. The Supreme Court cannot see how due process was denied to the petitioners in the issuance of
the COMELEC First Divisions Order.

It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is not duty-bound to notify and direct a party
therein to file an opposition to a motion filed by the other party. It is incumbent upon the party
concerned, if he/she deems it necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days from receipt of
a copy of the same without awaiting for the COMELEC's directive to do so.

Sadikul and Ruby were able to present their opposition to the said motion for technical examination in
their manifestation and motion for reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, their objections to the technical examination of the said election paraphernalia were exhaustively
discussed by the COMELEC First Divisions Resolution. Having filed a motion for reconsideration of the
COMELEC First Divisions Order, their claim of denial of due process is clearly unfounded.

The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard.

On the question of Jurisdiction, the power of the Supreme Court to review election cases falling within the
original exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or resolutions of the
COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory orders issued by a Division thereof.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, Supreme Court elucidated on the import of Section 7, Art IX of the Constitution
in this wise: We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the
COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This decision must be a
final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order
of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a
final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

Here, the Orders issued by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely interlocutory orders since
they only disposed of an incident in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical examination of the
said election paraphernalia. Thus, the proper recourse for Sadikul and Ruby is to await the decision of the
COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved
thereby, to appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835; April 20, 2010
Facts:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with her face superimposed on the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused
for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262.
The sender’s cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that
Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they
were in Baguio in 2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to create
similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustan’s
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The
CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan
filed the present for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.
Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture for the first time
before the Supreme Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission
of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt.

People of the Philippines v. Noel Enojas, et al., G.R. No. 204894, 10 March 2014
.entry-header
Remedial Law; Evidence; Electronic Evidence; Admissibility; Text Messages – As to the admissibility of the
text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the
Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved
by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.16 Here,
PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to
identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his
possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA
7
NOV
G.R. No. 110662 | August 4, 1994 | J. Padilla

Facts:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage
license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone
conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafael’s oral offer of evidence. However, the trial court
admitted all of private respondent’s offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends from the
military to wire tap his home telephone.
CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are
presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and
the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is notoriously
inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial. The ruling on
admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is erroneous, the ruling
should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and not through the special civil
action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists, cannot be anymore than an error
of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals

Held:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes” expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using
a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-
recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or secured
by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in
any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]
15
AUG
.date
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed,
insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed
a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial
court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of
Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently
denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point
of absurdity.