Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Article
Copyright © 2011 by the Columbia Human Rights Law Review; Valentina S. Vadi
*798 I. INTRODUCTION
The protection of cultural heritage has profound significance for human dignity and assumes
particular importance with regard to indigenous peoples. Although the recognition of indigenous
peoples' rights and cultural heritage has gained some momentum in international law since the
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP), [FN1] states have interpreted the right to develop "on their own terms" in order
to *799prosper "as they see fit." [FN2] Meanwhile an international economic culturehas emerged
that "cuts across traditional cultural divides" [FN3] and emphasizes productivity and economic
development. [FN4] Development is considered "a transformation of society, a movement
from traditional relations,traditional ways of thinking, traditional ways of dealing with health and
education, traditional methods of production, to more 'modern' ways." [FN5]Conceptualizing
economic progress as "a process of successive upgrading," economists have highlighted the pressures
on societies to adopt a productive economic culture and the "growing convergence around the
productivity paradigm." [FN6]
Because policymakers tend to favor growth, regardless of actual or potential infringement
of cultural entitlements, "existing laws frequently fail to strike a balance between economic
development" and indigenous peoples' rights. [FN7]As a result, indigenous peoples suffer the
consequences of a regime that favors, for example, mining over the environment and
indigenous culture. As one scholar points out, "the incorporation of culture into development
processes remains unclear, and there is no agreed model for describing how this should
occur." [FN8] However, the protection of cultural diversity has profound significance: not only
is cultural diversity conceived of as a "rich asset for individuals and societies" but its
protection *800 and promotion are "an essential requirement for sustainable development." [FN9]
While the clash between economic development and indigenous peoples' rights is by no means
new, [FN10] this Article approaches this well-known theme from a new perspective by *801 focusing
on international investment law and arbitration. This Article explores the way in which international
investment treaties and arbitral tribunals have dealt with indigenous peoples' rights. This research is
timely as in the past decade there has been a boom of investor-state arbitration which is contributing
significantly to the development of international law. [FN11] While the traditional focus of investment
lawyers has been the analysis of the relevant investment law provisions, little, if any, research has
focused on the substantive interplay between indigenous peoples' rights and investor's rights in
international investment law and arbitration. Only recently have legal commentators begun to analyze
and critically assess the substantive interplay between different international law regimes in
investment treaty law and arbitration. [FN12] Among these pioneering works, however, specific focus
on indigenous peoples' rights is missing. This Article aims to fill this existing lacuna in contemporary
legal studies.
The key questions are whether international investment law has embraced a pure international
economic culture or whether it is open to encapsulate non-economic or cultural concerns in its modus
operandi. Until recently, international investment law had developed only limited tools for the
protection of cultural heritage through investment dispute settlement. [FN13] However, recent arbitral
awards have shown an increasing awareness of the need to protect cultural heritage within investment
disputes. Increasingly, arbitrators have not only considered non-investment related values in the
context of investment disputes, but have also balanced the different values at stake. [FN14] Is this
adjudicative model adequate to deal with indigenous peoples' rights?
*802 This Article will proceed as follows. Part II provides a brief description and assessment of
the emergence of international norms protecting indigenous cultural heritage. Part III describes the
investment law framework, investor-state arbitration, and relevant emerging issues. Parts IV and V
scrutinize the conflict of norms protecting indigenous cultural heritage and norms of investment with
reference to relevant cases. Indigenous peoples' rights have played only a marginal role in the context
of investor-state arbitration; affected indigenous peoples have virtually no legal standing in these
procedures and have made use of only limited participatory procedures. Their limited role is inversely
proportional to the number of arbitrations that have involved indigenous peoples' rights.
Parts VI and VII offer recommendations that would better reconcile the different interests at stake
and thereby ensure the protection of indigenous peoples' rights in the context of investor-state
arbitrations. A moderate judicialization of the arbitral process through increased transparency and
openness may ensure better participation in proceedings by indigenous peoples' representatives.
However, an extreme judicialization of the arbitral process is not desirable as it would ultimately
undermine the rationale underlying investor-state arbitration. Under international law, states have the
duty to protect indigenous peoples' rights, and other dispute settlement mechanisms are available
which may ensure indigenous peoples' access to justice. If foreign investors challenge state measures
furthering indigenous peoples' rights before tribunals, human rights considerations cannot be
dismissed by arbitral tribunals as irrelevant. Even where states do not make reference to their human
rights obligations, it may be questioned whether arbitrators could dismiss international public policy in
the context of the proceedings. In the exercise of the judicial function, arbitrators need to take
international law into account. If norms external to international investment law come to the fore, the
arbitrators may take them into account albeit incidenter tantum. Part VIII concludes.
V. CASE STUDIES
To date several investment disputes have involved indigenous cultural heritage. While it is not
possible to examine all these awards in the context of this contribution, a selection of case studies will
be analytically assessed. Although this case law is not homogeneous, it can be scrutinized according to
the taxonomy of the claims brought by foreign investors, including, inter alia: (1) expropriation, (2)
lack of fair and equitable treatment, (3) discrimination, and (4) lack of full protection and security. The
cultural arguments discussed within each case will be analyzed and critically assessed in light of the
legal framework protecting indigenous cultural heritage at the international law level. The reasoning of
the arbitral tribunals will therefore be evaluated within the context of current human rights law and
jurisprudence.
A. Expropriation Claims
The clash between indigenous culture and national and international economic culture has been
adjudicated at various levels: (1) administrative and constitutional courts at the national
level, [FN199] (2) human rights bodies at the regional [FN200] and
international *838 level, [FN201] and (3) arbitral tribunals. While scholarly analysis and critical
assessment of the former two are extensive, [FN202] less is known about the emerging case law of
arbitral tribunals dealing with elements of indigenous cultural heritage. Given the impact that arbitral
awards can have on indigenous peoples' life and culture, scrutiny and critical assessment of this
jurisprudence is of the utmost relevance. Several investment treaty arbitrations have dealt with the
question of whether regulation allegedly aimed at protecting indigenous cultural heritage may be
deemed to be an indirect expropriation or a measure tantamount to expropriation.
In the Glamis Gold Case, a Canadian mining company planned to mine gold at the Imperial
Project, on federal land in *839 southeastern California. [FN203]According to the claimant, however,
not only did the U.S. Interior Department fail to promptly approve the project, thus unreasonably
delaying its mining operations, but California's regulation requiring the backfilling of open-pit gold
mines also made its mining operation uneconomical. [FN204] Therefore, the investor claimed inter
alia, that the United States had expropriated its mining rights in violation of Article 1110 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement.[FN205] In its award, the arbitral tribunal held that the complained
measures did not cause a sufficient economic impact to Glamis' investment and thus did not amount
to a regulatory expropriation. [FN206]
If one considers the facts of the case, the area in and around the Imperial Project was "heavily
utilized by pre-contact Native Americans as a travel route."[FN207] Furthermore, the Quechan, a
Native American tribe, opposed the project because it would destroy the Trail of Dreams, a sacred
path still used while performing ceremonial practices. Representatives of the tribe emphasized that the
tribe had allowed other mining operations to "go by," "partly because [they] knew [they] had an area
in reserve ... owned by the public." Thus, the Imperial Project area became the Tribe's "last
stand." [FN208] Because the 2000 environmental impact study indicated that the best option was that
of "no action," the Department of the Interior withdrew the Imperial Project from further mineral entry
for 20 years to protect historic properties. [FN209] In 2002, however, permission for the project was
granted and the State Mining and Geology Board enacted emergency regulations requiring the
backfilling of all open-pit mines to re-create the approximate contours of the land prior to
mining. [FN210]
In response to the federal and state actions, the claimant filed its Notice of Arbitration, arguing
that state and federal measures constituted an indirect expropriation in violation of Article 1110 of
NAFTA. The claimant asserted that respondents deprived its *840 property interests of their
value. [FN211]According to the claimant, the expropriation began with the federal government's
unlawful refusal to approve claimant's plan of operations and continued with the backfilling
requirement. [FN212] In particular, backfilling would be uneconomical and arbitrary since it would not
be rationally related to its stated purpose of protecting cultural resources. [FN213] The claimant
pointed out that "once you take the material out [of] the ground and if there are cultural resources on
the surface, they are destroyed. Putting the dirt back in the pit actually does not protect those
resources" but may lead to the burial of more artifacts and cause greater environmental
degradation. [FN214] Thus, the claimant argued that the California measures aimed to "stop the
Imperial Project from ever proceeding while seeking to avoid payment of compensation it knew to be
required had it processed transparently and directly through eminent domain." [FN215]
In its statement, the United States argued that mining is a highly regulated industry and that any
reasonable investor should have reasonably anticipated the extension of those
regulations. [FN216] The respondent mentioned that, while other states had completely prohibited the
use of all open-pit mining,[FN217] the California legislation did not impede the excavation and mineral
exploitation of the zone: it required backfilling to restore the landscape to the way it was before the
mining operations. The respondent also stressed that in this case the legislature was attempting "to
reconcile competing interests by addressing the threat to Native American sites in the [California
Desert Conservation Area] while recognizing mining companies' rights to mine there."[FN218] On the
one hand, the California measures effectively limited the waste piles that would have obstructed the
view from the Running Man to the Indian Pass. [FN219] On the other hand, the company could still
fully use its property. According to the United States, it would not be disproportionate for a State to
require mining *841 operators to internalize the costs of the environmental damage caused by their
own activities. [FN220]
The arbitral tribunal found the claimant's expropriation argument to be without merit. [FN221] In
order to distinguish a non-compensable regulation and a compensable expropriation, the tribunal
established a two-tiered test, under which it ascertained: (1) the extent to which the measures
interfered with reasonable and investment-backed expectations of a stable regulatory framework, and
(2) the purpose and the character of the governmental actions taken. [FN222] First, the tribunal found
that the California backfilling measures "did not cause a sufficient economic impact to the Imperial
Project to effect an expropriation of Claimant's investment." [FN223] Second, the tribunal deemed the
measures to be rationally related to its stated purpose. [FN224] The tribunal admitted that "some
cultural artifacts will indeed be disturbed, if not buried, in the process of excavating and
backfilling," [FN225] but concluded that, without such legislative measures, the landscape would be
harmed by significant pits and waste piles in the near vicinity. [FN226] Remarkably, the arbitral
tribunal also expressly referred to Article 12 of the World Heritage Convention, [FN227]which requires
States to protect their cultural heritage even if it is not listed in the World Heritage lists. [FN228] This
is rather extraordinary as cultural heritage experts have repeatedly stressed that Article 12 of the
WHC is an often neglected provision. [FN229]
*842 In Grand River v. United States, a claim of expropriation was brought against the host state
by a foreign company controlled by indigenous peoples.[FN230] A Canadian company engaged in
exporting tobacco in the United States argued that its investment had been harmed by the U.S.
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), [FN231] which requires the contribution of funds from tobacco
companies in order to pay expenses incurred in the treatment of indigent patients suffering from
tobacco-related illnesses. [FN232] In exchange for such payments, the U.S. dropped all lawsuits
against the tobacco industry. [FN233]In general terms, the petitioners argued that the major tobacco
firms conspired to ensure that other firms were covered by the terms of the settlement to force the
smaller companies out of business. [FN234] The claimants argued that such regulation amounted,
inter alia, to indirect expropriation, in violation of NAFTA Article 1110. [FN235] The respondent
contended, however, that regulatory action in the maintenance of public health does not amount to
expropriation, provided that "it is not a clear and discriminatory violation of the law of the state
concerned, and it is not an unreasonable departure from the principles of justice recognized by the
legal systems of the world." [FN236]
*843 The arbitral tribunal rejected the expropriation claim. While the claimant had argued that
the disputed measures were inconsistent with his "legitimate expectation ... not to be subject to MSA-
related regulatory actions" because of his status as a member of one of the First Nations in North
America,[FN237] the tribunal declined to "decide whether or not [the claimant] [wa]s correct on the
underlying domestic legal proposition of immunity from the state regulation." [FN238] Rather, the
tribunal determined that, "[o]rdinarily, reasonable or legitimate expectations of the kind protected by
NAFTA are those that arise through targeted representations or assurances made explicitly or
implicitly by a state party." [FN239] Because "trade in tobacco products has historically been the
subject of close and extensive regulation by U.S. States" the tribunal held that the investor should not
have reasonably expected to engage in large-scale tobacco distribution business without encountering
state regulation. [FN240] Relying on previous NAFTA cases, the tribunal also stated that NAFTA Article
1110 requires "a complete or very substantial deprivation of owners' rights in the totality of the
investment." [FN241] As the claimant's business had remained "profitable," [FN242] the tribunal
concluded that there was no expropriation. [FN243]
C. Discrimination
A crucial element in investment disputes with elements of cultural heritage is the ascertainment of
non-discrimination against the foreign investor. The non-discrimination principle is typically reflected
in two investment treaty provisions: the national treatment (NT) and most-favored nation (MFN)
treatment. [FN265]These two standards do not guarantee a specific level of protection but are relative
standards that require a host country to treat a foreign investor in the same way that a domestic
investor or an investor from another country would be treated. [FN266] The basic purpose of the MFN
and NT clauses is to avoid discrimination and to guarantee equal competitive opportunities for foreign
investors in the host state. [FN267] The key question is whether foreign investments are being
regulated *848 because of public policy goals, or whether they are being regulated by virtue of
foreign ownership. [FN268]
Nowadays it is undoubtedly difficult to spot openly discriminatory language in regulations,
although these characteristics have appeared in investment disputes. For instance, the pending Gallo
v. Canada case is significant because it concerns regulation that even in its title includes reference to
the foreign investment. [FN269] The investment concerned the creation of a landfill on a former open-
pit mine site located in northern Ontario. [FN270] In 2004, the newly elected Ontario provincial
government enacted legislation preventing the project from proceeding. [FN271] Acquisitions of new
lands were not granted to the investor either. [FN272] The investor, a U.S. national, filed an investor-
state arbitration alleging expropriation and violation of the FET standard and requesting
compensation. [FN273]
Canada, inter alia, asserted that the acquisition of some areas was denied because the enterprise
had not fulfilled its duty to consult with relevant Aboriginal communities [FN274] and that
the *849 proposed transfer of land would infringe Aboriginal rights. [FN275] Canada also argued that
the enacted legislation was due to the hydro-geological conditions of the mine. [FN276]Although the
case has yet to be decided, it appears that both arguments presented by the parties--the alleged
discrimination and the alleged justification of the same--will have to be taken into account by the
arbitral tribunal to determine whether there was discrimination and, if this was the case, whether the
difference in treatment was justified by the circumstances of the case.
In John Andre v. Canada, a U.S.-based businessman lodged a Notice of Intent to arbitrate,
alleging losses arisen from legislative measures affecting his caribou-hunting outfitter in Northern
Canada. [FN277] Prior to 2007, the claimant had 360 caribou hunting licenses (called Caribou Quota
Tags) and organized hunting camps for tourists and hunters who would travel from locations outside
Canada to the aboriginal land in Canada's North West Territories (NWT). [FN278] In 2007, the
Government of the NWT decided to grant only seventy-five Caribou quota Tags per
outfitter. [FN279] Outfitters with commitments to clients would be required to buy Caribou Quota Tags
from their competitors. [FN280] The claimant argues that the relevant authorities have cut the
number of hunting licenses in a discriminatory manner. [FN281] Because many of the local outfitters
only used seventy-five to one hundred Caribou Quota Tags or less per year, the claimant alleges that
the Government developed a strategy to minimize the negative effect on local outfitters and maximize
the negative effects on the investor. [FN282] The investor thus claims to have *850 been targeted as
a non-resident of Canada and to have been discriminated against on the basis of his U.S.
nationality. [FN283]
The press has recently reported that while the ban initially included the aboriginal caribou hunt,
the NWT government and the Tlicho aboriginal government have jointly agreed to keep a total hunting
ban only for non-aboriginal hunters and commercial hunting outfitters. [FN284] In other words, while
the sport hunt of caribou remains cancelled, [FN285] the aboriginal subsistence hunt will he
permitted.
This differential treatment may be justified under human rights law. The fall hunt allows the
indigenous tribes to preserve their traditional culture and to rely on caribou meat in the
winter. [FN286] A number of cases at the international, regional, and national levels provide evidence
of the recognition of indigenous peoples' cultural rights in this sense. In the Kitok case, the Human
Rights Committee stated that reindeer husbandry, as a traditional livelihood of the indigenous Saami
people, is an activity protected under ICCPR Article 27.[FN287] In Jouni Lansman v. Finland, the
Committee found that reindeer herding fits into the definition of cultural activities. [FN288] In
reaching this conclusion, the Committee has recognized that indigenous peoples' subsistence activities
are an integral part of their culture:
With regard to the exercise of the cultural rights protected under Article 27, the Committee
observes that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with
the use of land resources, specially [sic] in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include
suchtraditional activities as fishing or hunting .... The enjoyment of those rights may require positive
legal measures of *851 protection and measures to ensure the effective participation of members of
minority communities in decisions that affect them .... The protection of these rights is directed to
ensure the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of the
minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole. [FN289]
At the national level, in 1999, the High Court of Australia dismissed a charge against a member of
an aboriginal tribe who had caught two young crocodiles in Queensland using a traditional
harpoon. [FN290] Although the appellant did not have a hunting permit, the Court concluded that he
was exempted from the obligation of obtaining a permit, since his act was based on a traditional
aboriginal custom which deems catching young crocodiles of high spiritual significance. [FN291] The
U.S. case of the Makah people who obtained permission to hunt whales also has bearing on competing
cultural and environmental interests in the aboriginal hunting debate. [FN292]
More recently, Canadian Inuit have filed a lawsuit before the European Court of Justice to overturn
an EU regulation [FN293] banning the import of seal products into the European
Union. [FN294] The *852 regulation expressly recognizes that "the hunt is an integral part of the
culture and identity of the members of the Inuit society, and as such is recognized by the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." [FN295] Thus, it states that "the
placing on the market of seal products which results from hunts traditionally conducted by Inuit and
other indigenous communities and which contribute to their subsistence should be
allowed." [FN296] Although Inuit are exempt from the ban, they claim they are nevertheless being
affected, [FN297]as the regulation "will likely result in the loss of, inter alia, the market in
infrastructure such as auction houses and tanneries, which are mostly owned by non-Inuit commercial
corporations." [FN298] Furthermore, "since the Inuit people do not export seal products themselves,
the derogation for which regulation No. 1007/2009 provides in favor of the Inuit will remain an 'empty
box."' [FN299]The applicants also claim that the regulation seriously affects their right "to engage in
the commercial exploitation of seal products, which constitutes an important source of their
income." [FN300] In August 2010, the ECJ's General Court accepted a moratorium request by the
indigenous communities, but it is still too early to predict how the dispute will evolve. [FN301] The
case is interesting as it shows that even aboriginal exemptions cannot be enough to sustain cultural
practices, and, in turn, cultural practices may clash with environmental concerns.
An "Aboriginal exemption" is a common feature of natural resource conservation
legislation. [FN302] A number of international environmentaltreaties which protect certain species
include derogations to their main principles to "accommodate the needs of *853 traditional
subsistence users of such species," [FN303] thus protecting traditional hunting practices linked to the
cultural heritage of the communities concerned. For instance, Article VII of the 1957 Convention on
Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals describes the aboriginal hunting practices that are exempted
by the application of the Convention. [FN304] The 1931 Convention for Regulation of Whaling
expressly allowed aboriginal subsistence whaling. [FN305] The 1946 International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, which superseded the 1931 Convention, retains aboriginal rights to subsistence
whaling. [FN306]
VIII. CONCLUSION
The effective protection of cultural heritage benefits all humanity. Cultural heritage is a legacy for
everyone as its reveals aspects of a country's history and yields a sense of identity for the present and
future generations. The relevant case law shows that cultural heritage can be endangered by foreign
investment, [FN497] but the *887 impact of foreign investment on indigenous cultural heritage is an
almost unexplored field.
The delegation of investment dispute resolution to international tribunals, "undercuts the authority
of national courts to deal with [such] disputes."[FN498] Furthermore, court decisions in the host state
granting complaints brought by private parties against a foreign investor may be attacked by the
investor before an arbitral tribunal on the ground that they constitute wrongful interference with the
investment. While investor-state arbitration depoliticizes international disputes, it may not be the
most suitable forum to settle disputes involving indigenous cultural entitlements. Investor-state
arbitration distinguishes between two types of non-state actors: (1) the investor engaged in foreign
direct investment and (2) the affected communities, including indigenous peoples impacted by the
investment. While foreign investors have direct access to investor-state arbitration under the relevant
BIT, the affected indigenous peoples do not have direct access, and their participation is only possible
through the submission of amicus curiae briefs. The submission of amicus curiae is not a right, but is
considered by the arbitral tribunal on a case-by-case basis. While the host state generally represents
the affected communities, [FN499] one may wonder whether indigenous peoples need additional
procedural guarantees, due to their special status under international law.
Arbitration rules of procedure are not sufficiently developed to adequately protect indigenous
peoples' rights. Their participation as amici curiae at arbitral proceedings is not automatically granted,
and arbitral proceedings involving cultural heritage are not always open to the public. Only recently
has investment arbitration started *888 to acknowledge its quasi-constitutional role, responding
positively to the requests by public interest groups to make amicus curiae submissions. [FN500] In
doing so, some tribunals have decided that the advantages of public debate outweigh the
disadvantage of any additional costs and procedural complexity. Furthermore, some arbitral
institutions have adopted policies concerning transparency and openness that facilitate public
scrutiny. [FN501]
At a substantive level, as claims involving indigenous cultural heritage and foreign investment
clearly involve fundamental human rights, arbitrators should take international law into account as
part of the applicable law. In this sense, arbitrators can evaluate whether measures adopted by the
host state are in compliance with its international law obligations, albeit incidenter tantum. In any
case, arbitrators are bound to apply relevant peremptory norms of international law norms whether or
not such approach was pleaded by the parties. Furthermore, according to customary rules of treaty
interpretation, international investment law is not a universe unto itself. Accordingly, there should be
a "constitutional" balancing between foreign investors' rights and legitimate state concerns flowing
from international human rights treaties.
As arbitral tribunals may face difficulties in finding an appropriate balance between the different
interests concerned, cultural exceptions should be introduced in the text of BITs. On the one side, this
would provide certainty to foreign investors. On the other, it would adequately protect the cultural
entitlements of indigenous peoples. De jure condendo, procedural mechanisms to *889 ensure that
indigenous peoples can participate as amici curiae and their arguments be taken into account by
arbitral tribunals should be used consistently.
In conclusion, although foreign investment represents a potentially positive force for development,
state policy and practice concerning resource exploitation must be mindful of its human rights
implications. While the notion of indigenous heritage has only recently come to the forefront of legal
debate, it clearly has a direct linkage with the protection of indigenous peoples' rights and human
dignity.
[FNa1]. Lecturer in international law (Maastricht University), Ph.D. (European University Institute),
M.Jur. (Oxon), M.Res. (EUI), J.D. and M.Pol.Sc. (Siena). She may be contacted at
v.vadi@maastrichtuniversity.nl. This paper was presented at 2010 Society of Legal Scholars
Conference held at Southampton University on September 15, 2010. The author wishes to thank
Professor Francesco Francioni, Professor Peter Van den Bossche, Professor Colin Reid, Professor
Rosalind Malcolm, Professor Claire Cutler, Professor Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Achraf Farraj, and the
participants to the conference for their comments.
[FN1]. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 1013 (2007)[hereinafter UNDRIP]. The UN General
Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on September
13, 2007 with anoverwhelming majority of 14.3 votes in favor, only 4 negative votes ... and 11
abstentions. Press Release, Gen. Assembly Dep't of Pub. Info., General Assembly Adopts Declaration
on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; 'Major Step Forward' Towards Human Rights for All. Says President,
U.N. Press Release GA/10612 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm. However, "[s]ince its adoption. Australia, New
Zealand, Canada and the United States have all reversed their positions and now endorse the
Declaration." United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Adopted by the General
Assembly 13 September 2007, U.N. Permanent. Forum on Indigenous Issues, http://
www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2011). The Declaration was
negotiated for more than 20 years between nation-states and Indigenous Peoples. Id. As Anaya puts
it, "[w]hile the explanatory statements of the four States that voted against adoption of the
Declaration ... showed disagreement with the wording of specific articles or concerns with the process
of adoption, they also expressed a general acceptance of the core principles and values advanced by
the Declaration." Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
Indigenous People, Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political. Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, including the Right to Development, U.N. Human Rights Council, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/9/9 (Aug. 11, 2008) (by S. James Anaya), available at http://www.ur.org/ga/search/view_
doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/9/9 [hereinafter Anaya, Promotion and Protection].
[FN2]. Klaus Bosselmann, Introduction to State Sovereignty, Indigenous Governance and International
Law, in Democracy, Ecological Integrity and International Law 116, 116 (J. Ronald Engel et al. eds.,
2010).
[FN3]. Michael E. Porter, Attitudes, Values, Beliefs, and the Microeconomics of Prosperity, in Culture
Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress 14, 27 (Samuel P. Huntington & Lawrence E. Harrison
eds., 2000).
[FN4]. Two cultures compete in the global governance of natural resources: the culture of growth and
the culture of limits. See Richard D. Lamm, The Culture of Growth and the Culture of Limits, 9 Soc.
Cont. 163 (1999).
[FN5]. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice President & Chief Economist, World Bank, 9th Raul Prebisch
Lecture at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Toward a New Paradigm for
Development (Oct. 18, 1998), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/prebisch9th.en.pdf
(emphasis omitted).
[FN6]. Porter, supra note 3, at 20, 26.
[FN7]. Lila Barrera-Hernández, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and Natural Resource
Development: Chile's Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water, 11 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 1
(2005).
[FN8]. David Throsby, Culture in Sustainable Development: Insights for the Future Implementation of
Article 13 3 (2008), available at http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001572/157287e.pdf
(emphasis added).
[FN9]. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions art. 2,
Oct. 20, 2005, 2440 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force Mar. 18, 2007). See UNDRIP, supra note 1,
pmbl. ("respect for indigenous knowledge,cultures and traditional practices contributes to
sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment"). Sustainable
development is a normative concept which reflects forms of development that "meet[] the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." G.A.
Res. 42/187, pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/187 (Dec. 11, 1987). As an important component of
contemporary international law, sustainable development is composed of three pillars: (1)
international environmental law; (2) international human rights law; and (3) international economic
law. Dominic McGoldrick, Sustainable Development andHuman Rights: An Integrated Conception, 45
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 796, 796-97 (1996). The literature on sustainable development is extensive. See,
e.g., Daniel B. Magraw & Lisa D. Hawke, Sustainable Development, in The Oxford Handbook of
International Environmental Law 613 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007) (examining "the evolution
and content of the concept of 'sustainable development,' its legal status and function, and its
implications for principles and tools of international environmental law"); Marie-Claire Cordonier
Segger & Ashfaq Khalfan, Sustainable Development Law: Principles, Practices and Prospects 129-32
(2004) (discussing the protection of fragile ecosystems inhabited by indigenous communities as an
example of the intersection between the human rights movement and environment protection). On
sustainable development, see Alan Boyle & David Freestone (eds.), Internationa] Law and Sustainable
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (2001).
[FN10]. The literature is extensive. See, e.g., Laura Westra. Environmental Justice and the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples--International & Domestic Perspectives (2008) 17-21 (arguing that the biological
and ecological integrities of indigenous peoples' lands are constantly under attack through the
economic activities of developed countries); Marcos A. Orellana, Int'l Inst. for Env't and Dev.,
Indigenous Peoples, Mining and International Law 3-6 (2002) 'discussing the historical evolution of the
law due to European invasion and indigenous people's resistance to it). For earlier works, see
generally Benedict Kingsbury,Indigenous Peoples in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to
the Asian Controversy, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 414 (1998) (discussing whether the concept of "indigenous
peoples" formed in regions dominated by European settlement should be applied to Asia); W. Michael
Reisman, Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 350
(1995) (discussing the development of "indigenous rights" as recent claims by indigenous peoples for
direct protection by the international community); Dean E. Cycon, When Worlds Collide: Law,
Development, and Indigenous Peoples, 25 New Eng. L. Rev. 761 (1991) (discussing the effects of
development on indigenous people and the need for regulation at the international, rather than
nation-state, level).
[FN11]. On the contribution of international investment law to the development of international law,
see Valentina Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 39 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 67 (2010); Andreas Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and
International Law, 42 Colum. J. Trans. L. 123 (2003).
[FN12]. See generally Human Rights in International Investment Law andArbitration (Pierre-Marie
Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the role of human rights in international economic adjudication
and arbitration); Bruno Simma & Theodore Kill, Harmonizing Investment Protection and International
Human Rights: First Steps towards a Methodology, in International Investment Law for the 21st
Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Shreuer 678, 678-82 (2009).
[FN13]. See Valentina Vadi, Cultural Heritage & International Investment Law: A Stormy Relationship,
15 Int'l J. Cultural Prop. 1, 2 (2008).
[FN14]. See Valentina Vadi, Fragmentation or Cohesion? Investment versus Cultural Protection Rules,
10 J. World Inv. & Trade 573, 593-96 (2009).
[FN15]. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 2, ¶¶ 202-09 (June 2). "[E]ach state is permitted, by the principle of state sovereignty, to
decide freely for example the choice of political, economic, social and cultural system, and formulation
of foreign policy." Id. ¶ 205.
[FN16]. For an account of this evolution, see Francesco Francioni, Culture, Heritage and Human
Rights: An Introduction, in Cultural Human Rights 1--15(Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds.,
2008).
[FN17]. In terms of international cultural law, this Article mainly refers to the treaty and soft law
developed by the UNESCO in the cultural sector.
[FN18]. Fergus MacKay, Universal Rights or a Universe unto Itself? Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights
and the World Bank's Draft Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 527,
536-37 (2002). See also Siegfried Wiessner, The Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 Harv. Hum. Rights J. 57, 127 (1999) (noting the
crystallization of customary norms protecting indigenous peoples' rights).
[FN19]. Jeremy Waldron, Indigeneity? First Peoples and Last Occupancy, 1 N.Z. Journal of Pub. & Int'l
Law 55, 57 (2003).
[FN20]. As Waldron explains, "indigeneity" is derived from "indigenous," which in turn is derived from
indu, an old Latin root meaning "within" 'like the Greek <fl>, endon) and gignere meaning "to beget."
Id. at 56.
[FN21]. See International Labour Organization Convention 169 ConcerningIndigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries art. 1. June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 384 (entered into force May 9,
1991) [hereinafter ILO Convention 169].
[FN23]. The report identifies indigenous peoples as those who "having a historical continuity with pre-
invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct
from other sectors of society now prevailing in those territories or parts of them." Special Rapporteur
on the Rights of Indigenous People, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous
Populations, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Econ. and
Soe. Council. ¶ 379, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4 (1987) (by Jose R. Martinez-Cobo)
[hereinafter Martinéz-Cobo Report]. Indigenous people are said to "form at present non-dominant
sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems." Id.
[FN24]. Waldron distinguishes two possible ways of defining objective "indigeneity": "(a) indigenous
peoples are the descendants of the first human inhabitants of a land; and (b) indigenous peoples are
the descendants of those who inhabited the land at the time of European colonization." Waldron, supra
note 21, at 55.
[FN28]. Id.
[FN29]. Id.
[FN30]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 33(1). The UNDRIP further provides that "It]his does not impair
the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they live." Id.
[FN31]. See Ben Boer, Article 3: Identification and Delineation of World Heritage Properties, in The
1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary 85- 102 (Francesco. Francioni & Federico Lenzerini
eds., 2008).
[FN34]. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 1. Nov.
16, 1972. 27 U.S.T. 37. 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Dec. 15. 1975) [hereinafter World
Heritage Convention],
[FN35]. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (entered into force Aug. 7, 1956) (defining cultural property
as property of "great importance to the cultural heritage of every people," including art, books,
monuments, and buildings used to preserve this property); Convention on the Means of Prohibiting
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov.
14. 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Apr. 24, 1972) (defining cultural property as property
"specifically designated by each State as being of importance" in relation to history, art, and science,
among other things. and falls into a specific category including rare collections, archaeological
findings, and other rare or original items).
[FN36]. For example, the U.N. General Assembly has recognized "the right of members of all
civilizations to preserve and develop their cultural heritage within their own societies." Global Agenda
for Dialogue Among Civilizations G.A. Res. 56/6, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/6 (Nov. 21, 2001).
[FN38]. See Dusan Pokorny, Property, Culture, and Cultural Property, 9 (3) Constellations 356, 356
(2002).
[FN40]. Claire O'Faircheallaigh, Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal Mining Company Agreements
in Australia, 39 (1) Dev. & Change 1, 25, 27 (2003).
[FN44]. The World Heritage List includes 911 properties. World Heritage List, UNESCO,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
[FN45]. See Marina Kuleshova, Cultural Landscapes in the World Heritage List 16 (2007) (asserting
that the "role of Europe in the List is decisive, the overwhelming majority of sites are nominated by
European countries, and [their] cultural heritage is dominant").
[FN46]. See Valentina Vadi et al., The Unique/The Universal, in London Debates 2009: What Role do
Museums Play in the Globalisation of Culture? 5, 5 (2009), available at
http://www.sas.ac.uk/londoridebates.html.
[FN47]. The term "general application" refers to human rights instruments not exclusively or
specifically focused on indigenous peoples. The UNDRIP provides that "[i]ndigenous peoples have the
right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as individuals, of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and international human rights law." UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 1. As a U.N. Special
Rapporteur has clarified, "all general human rights principles and norms apply equally to indigenous
peoples, and are to be interpreted and applied with regard to the specific historical, cultural, social and
economic circumstances of these people." Anaya, Promotion and Protection, supra note 1, 11 20.
[FN49]. See, e.g., Francioni, supra note 16, at 6-7 (describing the development of the term "cultural
heritage" and the subsequent association of cultural heritage with cultural rights).
[FN50]. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 31 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
(c) 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Wor
(3 screens)
[FN51]. "The Human Rights Committee is the body of independent experts that monitors implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights by its State parties .... The Committee also publishes its interpretation of the content of
human rights provisions, known as general comments on thematic issues ...." Human Rights Committee, Office of the U.N. High
Comm'r for Human Rights, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc (last visited Feb. 8, 2011).
[FN52]. According to Anaya, the Committee has "advance[d] a broad interpretation of the international norm of cultural integrity in
the context of indigenous peoples, understanding that norm to encompass all aspects of indigenous culture including rights to lands
and resources." Anaya, Promotion and Protection, supra note 1, ¶ 22.
[FN53]. Chief Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Human Rights Coram, Commc'n. No. 511/1992, ¶ 33, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984 (Mar. 26, 1990).
[FN55]. Lansman v. Finland, Human Rights Comm, Commc'n. No. 511/1992, 1 9.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 14,
1993). The authors of the communication, all reindeer breeders of Sami ethnic origin, contended that "[t]he quarrying and
transport of anorthocite would disturb their reindeer herding activities and the complex system of reindeer fences determined by
the natural environment" and observed that "the site of the quarry, mount Etelä-Riutusvaara, is a sacred place of the old Sami
religion, where in old times reindeer were slaughtered." Id. ¶¶ 2.5, 2.6. Thus, they claimed that these activities "violate[d] their
rights under article 27 of the Covenant, in particular their right to enjoy their own culture, which has traditionally been and remains
essentially based on reindeer husbandry." Id. ¶ 3.1. It is worth noting that international legal instruments, including the ICCPR
article 7, do not provide a right to culture, but refer to cultural rights. See Valentina Vadi,Book Review, 21 Eur. J. Int'l L. 1111,
1111 (2010) (reviewing Elsa Stamatopoulou, Cultural Rights in International Law (2007)). The protection of indigenous culture or
cultural heritage--in this case reindeer husbandry--and the protection of sacred places are elements of cultural rights. See
Francioni, supra note 16. at 6-7 (further describing the concept of cultural heritage).
[FN57]. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 30, opened far signature Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 54 (entered into force
Sept. 2. 1990).
[FN58]. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [CERD], General Recommendation No. 23: Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 3,
U.N. Doc. A/52/18, Annex V (Aug. 18, 1997).
[FN59]. Id. ¶ 1.
[FN61]. See, e.g., Megan Mooney, Note, How the Organization of American States Took the Lead: The Development of Indigenous
Peoples' Rights in the Americas, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 553, 553 (2006-07) (arguing that the OAS has taken "the most aggressive
approach" to upholding the collective rights of indigenous peoples); Isabel Madariaga Cuneo, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and
the Inter-American Human Rights System, 22 Ariz, J. Int'l & Comp. L. 53 (2005) (describing the reports of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both autonomous organs of the
OAS, on issues relating to the rights of indigenous persons).
[FN62]. See Mayagna Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (2001).
[FN63]. U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev., Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, Principle 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) Annex 1 (Aug. 12, 1992),
available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126- lannexl.htm.
[FN64]. U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev., Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Agenda
21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) Annex 2 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Agenda 21]. Agenda 21 is a "comprehensive
plan of action" to address human activities that impact the environment. Agenda 21, Div. for Sustainable Dev., U.N. Dep't of Econ.
and Soc. Affairs, http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/agenda21/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). It was adopted by more than 178
governments at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Id.
[FN67]. Convention on Biological Diversity art. 10(c), opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79, 143; 31 I.L.M. 818
(entered into force Dec. 29, 1993).
[FN69]. See, e.g., Peter Fowler, Cultural Landscape: (treat Concept, Pity about the Phrase, in The Cultural Landscape: Planning for
Sustainable Partnership between People and Place 64 (R. Kelly et al. eds., 2001).
[FN70]. In certain unique situations, broader considerations are taken into account. For example, the listing of the Old City of
Jerusalem and its walls was proposed by Jordan because Israel was not a member of the World Heritage Convention at the time).
See World Heritage Committee. UNESCO, Report of the Rapporteur, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. CC/CH/5.10/81/771 (Sept. 30, 1981), available
at http://whc.unesco.org/document/886. While the United States opposed this inscription, as it was not, in conformity with the
letter of the WHC, which is based on territoriality and the consent of the state concerned, the site was inscribed in the Wor ld
Heritage List. Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.
[FN71]. See Richard Black, Troubled History Tinges Marine Plan, BBC News, Mar. 2, 2010, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/richardblack/2010/03/murky_waters_of_marine_ reserve.html (discussing whether the Chagos
archipelago should become a maritime reserve; Peter Sand, The Chagos Archipelago: Footprint of Empire or World Heritage?, 40
Envt'l Pol'y & L. 232, 237 (2010) (arguing that the archipelago "unquestionably deserves recognition and protection as global
natural heritage" and suggesting a "joint nomination of the Chagos by the UK and Mauritius" under the WHC).
[FN72]. The WHC was "ratified by the UK on 25 May 1984, with a declaration extending it to all British overseas territories except
the BIOT [British Indian Ocean Territory]." Sand, supra note 71, ¶ 236.
[FN73]. Id.
[FN74]. See Tiamsoon Sirisrisak & Natsuko Akagawa, Cultural Landscape in the World Heritage List: Understanding on the Gap and
Categorisation, 2 (3) City & Time 11, 11 (2007), available at http://www.ceci-br.org/novo/revista/docs2007/CT-2007-72.pdf.
[FN75]. See generally Kakadu National Park, UNESCO, http:// whc.unesco.org/en/list/147 (last visited Feb. 13, 2010) (describing
the park's natural and cultural features).
[FN76]. Ben W. Boer, World Heritage Disputes in Australia, 7 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 247, 271 (1992).
[FN77]. Id.
[FN78]. UNESCO World Heritage Comm., Report on the Mission to Kakadu National Park, Australia 26 October to 1 November 1986,
1, WCH-98/CONF. 203/INF.18 (Nov. 29, 1998), available at http:// unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001175/117512e.pdf
[hereinafter Report on the Mission to Kakadu).
[FN80]. See Federico Lenzerini, Article 12 Protection of Properties Not Inscribed on the World Heritage List, in The 1972 World
Heritage Convention: A Commentary 201 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2008).
[FN82]. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003. 2368 U.N.T.S. 3. The Convention was
adopted by UNESCO's General Conference on October 17, 2003. Text of the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural
Heritage, UNESCO, http:// www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00022 (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). It entered into
force on April 20, 2006. The States Parties to the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00024 (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). As of January 26, 2011. the
Convention had 134 States Parties. Id.
[FN83]. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, supra note 9. The Convention was
adopted by the 33rd General Conference of UNESCO on October 20, 2005. entered into force on March 18, 2007. and had 115
States Parties as of February 13, 2011. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,
UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31038&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_ SECTION=201.html #ENTRY (last visited
Feb. 13, 2011).
[FN84]. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, supra note 82, art. 2(1).
[FN85]. "This intangible cultural heritage, transmitted from generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and
groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and their history, and provides them with a sense of identity
and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity." Id.
[FN86]. "For the purposes of this Convention, consideration will be given solely to such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible
with existing international human rights instruments, as well as with the requirements of mutual respect among communities,
groups and individuals, and of sustainable development." Id.
[FN87]. Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,supra note 9, pmbl.
[FN88]. On indigenous peoples' intangible cultural heritage, see Valentina Vadi, Intangible Heritage:Traditional Medicine and
Knowledge Governance, 2 Journal of Intellectual Property Law and Practice 682 (2007) (discussing the tension between IP
regulation and traditional knowledge with regard to medicinal products); Wend B. Wendland, Intellectual Property and the
Protection ofTraditional Knowledge and Cultural Expressions, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice 327-39
(Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006) (discussing the relationship between IP and protection of traditional knowledge and culture with
reference to work taking place at the World Intellectual Property Organization); Hester du Plessis, Culture, Science and Indigenous
Technology, in Art and Cultural Heritage: Law, Policy and Practice, 363-69 (Barbara T. Hoffman ed., 2006) (arguing that
indigenous knowledge of societies must be included in the reinterpretation of culturalconcepts to comply with the relevant issues
of the new technological era); Federico Lenzerini, Indigenous Peoples' Cultural Rights and the Controversy over Commercial Use of
their TraditionalKnowledge, in Cultural Human Rights 119-150 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008) (discussing the
debate over modern commercial uses of traditional indigenous cultural knowledge).
[FN92]. "Control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting them and their lands, territories and resources will enable
them to maintain and strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with
their aspirations and needs." Id. pmbl. Article 8 of the Declaration also states inter alia that "[i]ndigenous peoples and individuals
have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture" and that "states shall provide effective
mechanisms for the prevention of, and redress for: ... any action which has the aim or the effect of dispossessing them of their
lands, territories or resources ...." Id. art. 8. Article 11 states: "Indigenous peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their
cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations
of their cultures, such as archaeological and historical sites, artifacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and performing
arts and literature." Id. art. 11.
[FN93]. See The World Bank Group, Striking a Better Balance: Final Report of the World Bank Independent Extractive Industries
Review 55 (2003), available at
http://irispublic.worldbank.org/85257559006C22E9/AlkDocuments/85257559006C22E985256FF6006843AB/
$File/volumelenglish.pdf.
[FN95]. See World Bank, Operational Directive 4.20 on Indigenous Peoples, in The World Bank Operational Manual ¶ 6 (1991);
World Bank, Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous Peoples, in The World Bank Operational Manual ¶ 1 (2005).
[FN96]. MacKay. supra note 18, at 537. See also Fergus MacKay. The Draft World Bank Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous
Peoples: Progress or More of the Same?, 22 Arizona J. Int'l & Comp. Law 65. 66 (2005) (noting the inconsistency of compliance
with OD 4.20).
[FN97]. See UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage (Oct. 17, 2003), http://
unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001331/133171e.pdf#page=68.
[FN99]. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Impact of Legal Instruments Adopted by UNESCO on General International Law, in 1 Standard
Setting in UNESCO 351, 358- 62 (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf ed., 2007). See also Francesco Francioni, Au-delà dess traités: l'émergence
d'un nouveau droit coutumier pour la protection du patrimoine culturel (European University Institute, Department of Law, Working
Paper LAW 2008/05, 2008), available at http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/7992 (arguing that despite the dearth of case law on
the matter, customary international law has created core substantive and procedural obligations for the protection of cultural
heritage).
[FN100]. Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity, 25
Mich. J. Int'l L. 1209, 1213 (2004).
[FN101]. A custom is made up by two elements: a consistent practice (usus or diuturnitas) and the understanding that such a
practice reflects existing international law (opinio juris). See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l L. 1 (1975); Michael Byers,Custom, Power and the Power of Rules, 17 Mich. J. Int'l L. 109 (1995); Maurice Mendelson, The
Formation of Customary International Law, in Recuiel des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law
155, 187-89 (1998); Anthea E. Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95
Am. J. Int'l L. 757 (2001); Jorg Kammerhofer, The Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International
Law and Some of its Problems 15-3 Eur. J. Int'l L. 523 (2004); Andrew Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 Mich. J.
Int'l L. 115 (2005); Jack Goldsmith & Eric Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law (U. of Chi. L. Sch., John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper No. 63, 1998), available at http:// www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/63.Goldsmith-Posner.pdf. For earlier
contributions, see Lazare Kopelmanas, Custom as a Means of the Creation of International Law, 18 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 127 (1937);
Josef L. Kunz, The Nature of Customary International Law, 47 Am. J. Int'l L. 662 (1953).
[FN102]. See Wiessner, supra note 18, at 127; Austen Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and the Development of
Indigenous Rights, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 291, 310 (2007)(arguing that customary law also includes the right to self-determination
and the right to participate).
[FN103]. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in International Law 242-43 (1996). For a more restrictive approach, see Alexandra
Xanthaki, Indigenous Rights in International Law over the Last 10 Years and Future Developments, 10 Melb. J. Int'l L. 27, 36
(2009) (noting that "viewing the Declaration or substantial parts of it as customary international law may be rather premature").
[FN104]. See U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2, art. 55; ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 1; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1.966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
[FN105]. ICCPR. supra note 50, art. 1, para. 1. The ICCPR also provides that "[a]ll peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose
of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence."
Id. art. 1, para. 2.
[FN106]. In the East Timor Case, the ICJ upheld Portugal's assertion that the right of peoples to self-determination, as it evolved
from the Charter and from United Nations practice, has an erga omnes character. In the Court's view, Portugal's assertion was
irreproachable. See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (Jan. 30) [hereinafter Case Concerning East
Timor]. See also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004
I.C.J. 136, ¶ 88 (July 9) ("The Court also notes that the principle of self-determination of peoples has been enshrined in the United
Nations Charter and reaffirmed by the General Assembly in resolution 2625 (XXV) ...."). The principle of self-determination of
peoples has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the jurisprudence of the Court; it is one of the essential
principles of contemporary international law. Case Concerning East Timor, supra, ¶ 26. See Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶ 52 (June 21); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 11 51-70 (Oct. 16).
[FN108]. Martin Scheinin, The Right of a People to Enjoy Its Culture: Towards a Nordic Saami Convention, in Cultural Human Rights
151, 162 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008).
[FN109]. UNDRIP, supra note 1, art. 3 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").
[FN110]. According to article 46(1), nothing in the UNDRIP "may be ... construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which
would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States ..." Id.
art. 46(1).
[FN112]. See Xanthaki. supra note 103, at 30; Russell A Miller. Collective Discursive Democracy as the Indigenous Right to Self-
Determination, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 341, 343 (2007). On the different degrees of self-determination, see Frederic Kirgis,
The Degrees of Self-Determination in the United States Era, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 304, 306 (1994).
[FN114]. See Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Explanatory Note
Contenting the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous, ¶¶ 4-5, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/Add.1 (July 19, 1993) (by
Erica-Irene Daes). See also Erica-Irene Daes,Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to Self-Determination, 3
Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 1, 9 (1993) (arguing "the right of self-determination should ordinarily be interpreted as the right of
the peoples to negotiate freely their political status and representation in the States in which they live").
[FN117]. Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 134 (Can.).
[FN118]. Ana F. Vrdoljak. Self-Determination and Cultural Rights, in Cultural Human Rights 41, 78. (Francesco Francioni & Martin
Scheinin eds., 2008).
[FN119]. See Peter Manus, Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environment-Based Cultures: The Emerging Voice of Indigenous
Peoples in International Law, 23 Wis. Int'l L.J. 553, 620 (2005). Some scholars have criticized this approach, contending that
emphasizing the cultural entitlements of indigenous peoples de facto reduces their political rights and limits their claims to self-
determination. According to these authors, overemphasizing culture risks undermining self-determination. See Claire Cutler, The
Globalization of International Law, Indigenous Identity, and the "New Constitutionalism, in Property, Territory, Globalization:
Struggles over Autonomy 29 (William D. Coleman ed., 2011); Cherie Metcalf, Indigenous Rights and the Environment: Evolving
International Law, 35 Ottawa L. Rev. 101, 124 (2003).
[FN120]. Vrdoljak stresses that "the articulation of the legal right to self-determination during the 1960s and 1970s was firmly tied
to development and control of natural resources." Vrdoljak, supra note 118, at 53. Instead, "[t]he conceptualization and promotion
of cultural rights has been tied inextricably to the fluctuating fortunes of minority protection in international law." Id. at 56. This
difference is normatively reflected in the ICCPR, which includes provisions covering self-determination and the cultural rights of
minorities. Id. at 78.
[FN121]. See ICCPR, supra note 50, art. 1; ICESCR, supra note 104, art. 1.
[FN123]. "The provisions of article 1 [the right to self-determination] may be relevant in the interpretation of other rights protected
by the Covenant, in particular Article 27." Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, U.N. Human Rights Comm., Communication No.
547/1993, ¶ 9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/ae41739262a9ca2dc12569ad00329e41.
[FN124]. See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: United
States of America, Concluding Observations, ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/3/CRP.4 (July 28, 2006).
[FN127]. Zachary Douglas has argued that only the procedural obligations of investment treaties are owed directly to the investor.
According to Douglas, the substantive obligations are owed to the State and operate as "applicable adjudicative standards for the
claimant's cause rather than binding obligations owed directly to the investor." Zachary Douglas. The International Law
of Investment Claims 35 (2009). According to James Crawford, the Fifth Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, "lilt is a matter
of interpretation whether the primary obligations (e.g. of fair and equitable treatment) created by such treaties are owed to the
qualified investors directly, or only to the other contracting state(s) ... an interstate treaty may create individual rights, whether or
not they are classified as 'human rights' ...." James Crawford, The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 Am. J. Int'l L. 874, 887-88 (2002).
[FN128]. See Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 Int'l &
Comp. L. Q. 279, 284 (2005).
[FN130]. On the substantive standards of protection of foreign direct, investment, see Standards of Investment Protection (August
Reinisch ed., 2008) (analyzing the origins and variations in the wording used in investment agreements and identifying possible
consensus on the interpretation of substantive treatment standards such as full protection and security, most- favored nation,
national treatment, and others); Todd J. Grierson-Weiler & Ian A. Laird, Standards of Treatment, in The Oxford Handbook of
International Investment Law 259 (Peter Muchlinski, et al., eds., 2008) (analyzing the interpretation of non-discrimination and
minimum standard provisions in investment treaty arbitration).
[FN131]. On the umbrella clause, see Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of Contract,
Treaty Violations, and the Divide between Developing and Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 Geo. Mason L.
Rev. 135 (2006) (discussing the application of umbrella clauses to investor-state contracts and its implication for the exercise of
jurisdiction by BIT tribunals). See also Stephan Schill, Enabling Private Ordering: Function, Scope and Effect of Umbrella Clauses in
International Investment Treaties, 18 Minn. J. Intl. L. 1 (2009)(analyzing the function, scope, and effect of umbrella clauses and
arguing that umbrella clauses stabilize the investor-state relationship).
[FN132]. See Kenneth Vandevelde, The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, 92 Am. J. Int'l L. 621, 631 (1998). For a
more critical assessment of such provisions, see Kevin Gallagher, Trading Away Financial Stability, Guardian.co.uk (May 4, 2010,
4:00 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/may/03/financial-stability-emerging-economiesus-trade
(arguing that provisions in U.S. trade and investment agreements requiring free transfer of U.S. capital without delay and without
exception can harm emerging economies).
[FN134]. U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., Foreign Direct Investment and Performance Requirements: New Evidence from Selected
Countries 19 (2003), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20037_en.pdf. Performance requirements are provisions
that impose certain obligations on investors to act in ways considered beneficial for the host economy. They commonly relate to
using local content, engaging in joint ventures, transferring technology, and employing nationals. Usually these provisions may
appear in contracts between foreign investors and the host state as a means to ensure that FDI in the host state will contribute to
domestic development. Id. at 1-3.
[FN135]. The literature on regulatory expropriation is extensive. See, e.g., Justin Marlles, Public Purpose, Private Losses:
Regulatory Expropriation and Environmental Regulation in International Investment Law, 16 J. Transnat'l L. & Pol'y 275
(2007) (determining the point at which the normal exercise of government regulatory powers becomes compensable regulatory
expropriation!; Surya Subedi, The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing Principles within the Law of Foreign Investment with
Special Reference to the Recent Trend in the Interpretation of the Term "Expropriation," 40 Int'l L. 121 (2006) (arguing for a
balancing of the rights of investors with a state's legitimate concerns for the environment and for human rights); Org. for Econ. Co-
operation and Dev. [OECD], "Indirect Expropriation" and the "Right to Regulate" in International Investment Law (Working Paper on
Int'l Inv. No. 2004/4, 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf (presenting the issues at stake in
regulatory expropriation, reviewing the legal framework, and identifying the criteria for determining whether expropriation
occurred] (hereinafter OECD Investment Paper); Charles N. Brower & Eckhard R. Hellbeck, The Implications of National and
International Environmental Obligations for Foreign Investments Protection Standards, Including Valuation: A Report From the
Front Lines, in International Investments and Protection of the Environment: The Role of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 19, 21
(2001) (describing developments in environmental regulation and their effect on international investment); Mark Rosenberg &
Michael Cheah, Arbitrating Environmental Disputes, 16 ICSID Rev. Foreign Inv. L. J., 39. 41 (2001) (surveying decisions and
developments in international environmental arbitration).
[FN136]. Expropriation is direct where an investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through formal transfer of
title or physical seizure. Expropriation is indirect where the host state interferes with the use of property or with the enjoyment of
its benefits even where the property is not seized and the legal title of the property is not affected. The so-called creeping
expropriation--i.e., where the host state effectively expropriates an investment by a series of measures that, over time, deprive the
investor of its use and enjoyment--may constitute a form of indirect expropriation. See OECD Investment Paper, supra note 135, at
3-4.
[FN137]. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID Rev. Foreign Inv. L. J., 232, 233 (1995).
[FN138]. From 1995 to 2004 ICSID registered four times as many claims as in the previous 30 years and the growth rate appears
to be increasing in the last 5 years. The ICSID renaissance is probably due to economic globalization and the proliferation of
investment treaties. There seems to be a parallel growth in other fora, but data is not available because of the confidentiality
requirements. Also, some disputes may be unknown because they were settled before registration. See David Sedlak, ICSID's
Resurgence in International Investment Arbitration: Can the Momentum Hold?, 23 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 147 (2004).
[FN139]. See, e.g., Andrew Newcombe & Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties 24 (2009) (noting that in the post-
World War II era, foreign investors generally preferred international arbitration to local courts where "decisions might be affected
by bias, corruption and inefficiency"); Mariel Dimsey, The Resolution of International Investment Disputes: Challenges and
Solutions 224 (2008) ("Indeed, one of the original reasons for distancing investment dispute resolution from national courts was
the inevitable and unavoidable perception of bias that would arise if states were subjected to the courts of their own system.");
Augustus A. Agyemang, African Courts, the Settlement of Investment Disputes and the Enforcement of Awards, 33 J. Afr. L., 31, 31
(1989) (discussing the suitability of African courts for settling investment disputes). But see Gus Van Harten, Five Justifications for
Investment Treaties: A Critical Discussion, 2 Trade Law & Dev. 19 (2010) (asserting that rationalizing international investment
tribunals based on the unreliability of domestic courts is both under-inclusive, as access to international adjudication is extended
only to a narrow class of private actors, and over-inclusive, by failing to account for situations in which domestic courts offer justice
to a foreign investor).
[FN140]. See Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA, 1
ICSID Rev. Foreign Inv. L. J. 1, 7-10 (1986) (discussing arbitration pursuant to the Washington Convention).
[FN141]. See Nigel Blackaby, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration (or the Tale of the Dolphin and the Shark), in
Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration 217, 232-33 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D. M. Lew eds., 2006).
[FN142]. See Pierre Lalive, Conclusions, in The Arbitral Process and the Independence of Arbitration 119, 123 (1991).
[FN143]. See, e.g., Vandevelde, supra note 132. at 636 ("States have important interests other than maximizing productivity, such
as ensuring an acceptable distribution of wealth and protecting national security that may necessitate deviations from the liberal
model.").
[FN144]. Alan S. Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. Tex. L. Rev. 485. 506-07 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
[FN145]. Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, for example. "[h]earings shall be held in camera unless the parties agree
otherwise." U N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules art. 28(3) (2010), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arbrules-reviseoVarb-rules-revised-2010-e.pdf.
[FN146]. For instance, Article 32.5 of the UNCITRAL Rules provides that "[a]n award may be made public with the consent of all
parties or where and to the extent disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal right or in relation to
legal proceedings before a court or other competent authority. Id. art. 32.5.
[FN147]. See, e.g., Arbitration Inst. of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Arbitration Rules art. 46 (2007), available at http://
www.sccinstitute.eom/filearchive/3/35894/K4_Skiljedomsregler%20eng%2ARB% 20TRYCK_1_100927.pdf (providing that unless
otherwise agreed by the parties, the SCC Institute and the Arbitral Tribunal shall maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and
the award).
[FN148]. Because investment disputes are settled using a variety of arbitral rules--and not all of which provide for public disclosure
of claims--there can be no accurate accounting of all such disputes. That some portion of the iceberg remains hidden from view
should be a matter of concern given the public policy implications of such disputes.
[FN150]. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation para. A.1
(Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementsaccords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Nondisputing-
en.pdf [hereinafter Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation]. Interpretative statements of the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission are binding on tribunals established pursuant to NAFTA Chapter 11. North American Free Trade Agreement art.
1131(2), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
[FN151]. See Int'l Centre for the Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], Administrative and Financial Regulations, reprinted in ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules 55, 66 (2006), available at http:// icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-
final.pdf. Regulation 22(1) provides: "The Secretary-General shall appropriately publish information about the operation of the
Centre, including the registration of all requests for conciliation or arbitration and in due course an indication of the date and
method of the termination of each proceeding." Id. Regulation 22(2), however, specifically excludes awards, minutes of proceedings
and reports of conciliation commissions unless the parties consent to such disclosure.
[FN152]. On the issue of amicus curiae briefs in investor state arbitration, see Amokura Kawharu, Participation of Non-
Governmental Organizations in Investment Arbitration as Amici Curiae, in The Backlash against: Investment Arbitration:
Perceptions and Reality 275, 279-80 Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (noting acceptance of amicus curiae participation in five
international tribunals since 2001); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richards, Amicus Curiae: A Panacea for Legitimacy in Investment
Arbitration?, in The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 253, 253 (Michael Waibel et al eds., 2010)
(describing acceptance of amicus curiae submissions since 2001 as the principal development in response to criticisms that the
investment arbitration process was inconsistent with public international nature of investment treaty arbitration); Federico Ortino
The Impact of Amicus Curiae Briefs in the Settlement of Trade and Investment Disputes: An Analysis of the Shrimp/Turtle and
Methanex Decisions, in Economic Law as an Economic Good 301, 304-05, 310-11 (K. M. Meessen ed., 2009) (describing decisions
by WTO and NAFTA panels to accept amicus curiae submissions); James Harrison, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus Curiae
Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 396, 401--05 'Pierre-
Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (explaining the recent acceptance of amici curiae submissions by NAFTA and ICSID arbitral panels).
[FN153]. See ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), reprinted in ICSID Convention, Regulations
and Rules r. 37, at 117 (2006), available at http:// icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/liasicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf
[hereinafter ICSID, Arbitration Rules]. Rule 37(2) empowers the tribunal to "allow a person or entity that is not a party to the
dispute ... to file a written submission with the Tribunal regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute." Id. It also lists criteria
for determining whether to allow such a filing and requires the tribunal to "ensure that the non-disputing party submission does not
disrupt the proceeding or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party." Id.
[FN154]. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, opened for signature June 10,
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force June 7, 1959) [hereinafter New York Convention].
[FN155]. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, opened for
signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 entered into force Oct. 14, 1966) [hereinafter Washington Convention].
There are currently 157 signatory States to the ICSID Convention. Of these, 146 States have also deposited their instruments of
ratification, acceptance, or approval of the Convention and have become ICSID Contracting States. List of Contracting States and
Other Signatories to the Convention, ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English (last visited Feb. 27, 2011).
[FN157]. Washington Convention, supra note 155, art. 52. The ICSID annulment process provides a very limited review. ICSID
annulment committees only have the ability to annul awards and send them back to the tribunal or to a new tribunal for a new
decision, but cannot replace the decision with their own. The grounds for annulment are very narrow and concern due process
issues: thetribunal was not properly constituted, it manifestly exceeded its powers, there was corruption on the part of a member,
there was a fundamental serious departure from a procedural rule, or the award did not state the reasons on which it was based.
For more information on the ICSID annulment process, see Christoph Schreuer, Three Generations of ICSID Annulment
Proceedings, in Annulment of ICSID Awards (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2004); Christoph Schreuer, ICSID
Annulment Revisited, 30 Legal Iss. of Econ. Integration 103-122 (2003); David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID
Annulment Process: Understanding the Distinction between Annulment and Appeal ICSID, Foreign Investment Law J. 7 21-56
(1992). See also Kate Knox, Annulment: A Delaying Tactic for ICSID Respondents?, International Arbitration Newsletter, October
2006 (discussing the ICSID annulment procedure's potential to delay resolution of a dispute).
[FN158]. Luke Eric Peterson, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties and Development Policy-Making 22
(2004).
[FN159]. See Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State,
56 Int'l & Clomp. L. Q. 371. 372 (2007). See generally, Zachary Douglas The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration,
74 Brit. Y.B. of Int'l L. 151 (2003) (asserting that the investment treaty regime for investor/state disputes embodies elements of
both public international law and private international law).
[FN160]. See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law 70 (2007); Barnali Choudhuri, Recapturing Public
Power: Is Investment Arbitration's Engagement of the Public Interest Contributing to Democratic Deficit?, 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L.
775 (2008).
[FN161]. See M. Sornarajah, Simon Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy at the Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs: The Clash of Globalizations and the International Law on Foreign Investment (Sept. 12, 2002) (on file with the author);
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilization of Investment Arbitration, 113 Penn St. L. Rev. 1269, 1272 (2009) ("This marriage
of public international law and international commercial arbitration has not always produced harmonious results ....").
[FN162]. See generally Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction
of a Transnational Legal Order (1996) (examining the characteristics and credentials of the people who are recognized as having
authority to handle high-stakes, complicated arbitration disputes).
[FN164]. While this case proceeded under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the challenge was entertained by ICSID officials because
NAFTA designates the Secretary General of the ICSID as the appointing authority for NAFTA arbitrations. See Damon Vis-Dunbar &
Luke Eric Peterson, ICSID Rejects US Challenge to Arbitrator in Grand River NAFTA Case, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. (Dec. 4,
2007), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_dec14_2007.pdf.
[FN165]. Professor Anaya has authored several pieces on indigenous people's rights. See, e.g., Anaya, supra note 103, at 4, 6
(outlining "the development of international law and treatment of indigenous peoples over time" and contending that "international
law ... has developed and continues to develop ... to support indigenous peoples' demands").
[FN166]. These matters included advocacy before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, where United States'
compliance with its international obligations vis-à-vis Native Americans was under review.
[FN167]. Letter from Ana Palacio, Secretary General, ICSID, to Professor Anaya (Nov. 28, 2007), available at http://
www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/GrandRiver/GRE-USA-Anaya_Challenge-28-11- 07.pdf.
[FN168]. See Stuart Grass, Note, Inordinate Chill: BITs, Non-NAFTA MITs and Host-State Regulatory Freedom--An Indonesian Case
Study, 24 Mich. J. Int'l L. 893, 894 (2003).
[FN169]. Id.
[FN170]. See Philip Alston, The "Not-a-Cat" Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State
Actors?, in Non-State Actors and Human Rights 3, 14-19 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (discussing various proposed definitions of "non-
state actors").
[FN171]. See Noemi Gal-Or, The Investor and Civil Society as Twin Global Citizens: Proposing a New Interpretation in the
Legitimacy Debate, 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 271, 282-99 (2009).
[FN172]. Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice, and International Investment Law, in Human Rights in
International Investment Law and Arbitration 63, 72 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
[FN173]. Id.
[FN174]. See Peter T. Muchlinski, Global Bukovina Examined: Viewing the Multinational Enterprise as a Transnational Law Making
Community, in Global Law Without a State 79, 97 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997).
[FN175]. The foreign investor has evolved from an object of international law to a confident participant in the legal process. See
Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 11, 16-18 (1978).
[FN176]. See Catherine W. Brown, Are Indigenous Populations Entitled to International Juridical Personality?, 79 Am. Soc'y Int'l L.
Proc. 189, 190-93, 200-01 (1985) (discussing whether indigenous peoples have gained international legal personality); Judith
Kimerling, Transnational Operations, Bi-National Injustice: ChevronTexaco and Indigenous Huaorani and Kichwa in the Amazon
Rainforest in Ecuador, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 445, 506 (2006-2007) (noting that states have to comply with the norms protecting
indigenous peoples but that these norms ultimately "rely on those same state actors to apply and enforce them"; further noting
that both the investor's home state and the host state of FDI can be unable or unwilling to recognize and enforce indigenous
peoples' rights).
[FN180]. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Report on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporation and
Other Business Enterprises, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie).
[FN181]. See, e.g., Jérémie Gilbert, Indigenous Peoples' Land Rights under International Law: From Victims to Actors 196 (2006)
("[U]nder recent developments, indigenous peoples have gained access to international law as actors of their own future, as the
development of contemporary human rights law is based on the notion of consent between states and indigenous peoples on
territorial issues."); Anna Meijknecht, The (Re-)Emergence of Indigenous Peoples as Actors in International Law, 10 Tilburg Foreign
L. Rev. 315, 320-21 (2003) (discussing the history of treatment of indigenous peoples in international law, and the role of the
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples and overcoming some of the past injustices
against them).
[FN183]. See Michele Langfield, "Indigenous Peoples are Not Multicultural Minorities": Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Indigenous
Human Rights in Australia, in Cultural Diversity, Heritage and Human Rights: Intersections in Theory and Practice 135, 135-36
(Michele Langfield et al. eds., 2010) (providing several working definitions of "indigeneity").
[FN184]. Parrish, supra note 102, at 298. See also M. E. Turpel, Indigenous Peoples's Rights of Political Participation and Self-
Determination: Recent International Law Developments and the Continuing Struggle for Recognition, 25 Cornell Int'l L. J. 579, 580
(1992) ("Indigenous peoples are entrapped peoples--enclaves with distinct cultural, linguistic, political and spiritual attributes
surrounded by the dominant society .... Indigenous peoples are truly nations within.").
[FN185]. Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (1984).
[FN186]. See Siegfried Wiessner, Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 41 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1141, 1152-59 (2008).
[FN187]. Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 Tex. Int'l
L. J. 155, 180 (2007).
[FN188]. "Global citizenship" is admittedly a theoretical tool rather than a legal one. See Diego Valadés, Global Citizenship for the
21st Century, 1 Mexican L. Rev. 150 (2009); Gal-Or, supra note 171, at 293.
[FN189]. On procedural participation, see the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, opened for signature June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 1999 (entered into force October 30,
2001).
[FN190]. See, e.g., Crina Baltag, Precedent on Notion of Investment: ICSID Awards in MHS v. Malaysia, Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt.,
Sept. 2007 (discussing ICSID tribunals' efforts to define investment under the Washington Convention).
[FN191]. See Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive Development of
International Environmental Law, in Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes: Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas
Mensah 315 (Tafsir Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007).
[FN192]. According to Verhoosel, "[e]ffective stabilization clauses aim to protect contracts from being subject to legislative or
administrative measures occurring after the conclusion of a contract." Gaëtan Verhoosel, Foreign Direct Investment and Legal
Constraints on Domestic Environmental Policies: Striking a "Reasonable" Balance between Stability and Change, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l
Bus. 451, 455 (1998).
[FN193]. See Kyla Tienhaara, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You: Investor-State Disputes and the Protection of the Environment
in Developing Countries, 6 Global Envtl. Pol. 73, 87-96 (2006)(discussing case study of mining in Indonesia).
[FN194]. See Kristen M. Gast, Environmental Justice and Indigenous Peoples in the United States: An International Human Rights
Analysis, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 253, 255 (2004); L. Barrera-Hernández, Indigenous Peoples, Human Rights and
Natural Resource Development: Chile's Mapuche Peoples and the Right to Water, 11 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 13 (2005).
[FN196]. See, e.g., OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development: Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs 3 (2002), available at
http:// www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/1959815.pdf ("Foreign direct investment ... is an integral part of an open and effective
international economic system and a major catalyst to development.").
[FN197]. See Margaret Satterthwaite & Deena Hurwitz, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Meaningful Consent in Extractive
Industry Projects, 22 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 1-2 (2005).
[FN199]. See, e.g., Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh, Negotiating Cultural Heritage? Aboriginal-Mining Company Agreements in Australia, 39
Dev. and Change 1, 34 (2008) ("The [Australian] High Court ruled that indigenous common law rights in land ('native title') had
survived Britain's colonization of Australia in 1788."); Viniyanka Prasad, The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A
Flexible Approach to Addressing the Unique Needs of Varying Populations, 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 297, 305-311 (2008) (discussing several
Australian High Court decisions regarding indigenous rights); Tamzyn Chapman. Corroboree Shield: A Comparative Historical
Analysis of (the Lack of International, National and State Level Indigenous Cultural Heritage Protection, 5 Macquarie J. Int'l &
Comp. Envtl. L. 81, 84. 95 (2008) (identifying several English and Australian High Court decisions focusing on indigenous rights).
[FN200]. See, e.g., Eva Brems, Human Rights as a Framework for Negotiating/Protecting Cultural Differences: An Exploration of the
Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in Cultural Diversity and the Law- State Responses from Around the World 663,
667-73, 680-82 (Marie-Claire Foblets et al., eds. 2006) (discussing claims related to cultural heritage, discrimination, and the
protection of minority languages brought before the European Court of Human Rights); Osvaldo Kreimer, Collective Rights
of Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System, Organization of American States, 94 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 315
(2000) 'discussing indigenous rights in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
[FN201]. For a discussion of the cases before the Human Rights Committee in the context of the international provisions for the
preservation of culture (Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politica Rights), see Laura Westra. Indigenous Peoples
and Minorities in International Jurisprudence and the Responsibility of the World Bank, in Environmental Justice & the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: International & Domestic Legal Perspectives 71 (2008).
[FN202]. See supra notes 199-201. For a discussior of the debate on the illicit traffic of and restitution of indigenous cultural goods
and remains, see Kimberly Alderman, Ethical Issues in Cultural Property Law Pertaining to Indigenous Peoples, 45 Idaho L. Rev.
515 (2009) (discussing ethical challenges in property law pertaining to indigenous peoples); Jason G. Roberts. Comment, The
Protection of Indigenous Populations Cultural Property in Peru. Mexico and the United States, 1 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 327 (1997)
(examining "international agreements and national legislation protecting cultural property as a nonrenewable resource for the
indigenous populations".
[FN203]. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Award, ¶ 10 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009), available at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/125798.pdf [hereinafter Glamis Gold, Award].
[FN205]. See id. ¶ 1. For general information about NAFTA, see Patricia Isela Hansen, Judicialization and Globalization in the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 38 Tex. Int'l L.J. 489, 489-90 (2003).
[FN228]. Article 12 of the WHC reads as follows: "The fact that a property belonging to the cultural or natural heritage has not been
included ... shall in no way be construed to mean that it does not have an outstanding universal value for purposes other than
those resulting from inclusion in these lists." World Heritage Convention, supra note 34, art. 12.
[FN229]. See Frederico Lenzerini, Article 12, in The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary 201, 210-11 (Francesco
Francioni ed., 2008) (noting that the World Heritage Committee has underestimated the significance of Article 12 in implementing
the practice of the Convention). But see Patrick J. O'Keefe, Foreign Investment and the World Heritage Convention, 3 Int'l J. of
Cultural Prop. 259, 263-64 (1994) (referring to an Australian case where Article 12 of the WHC was successfully invoked).
[FN230]. See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America. Award, ¶ 2 (NAFTA Art). Trib. Jan. 12, 2011),
available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/156820.pdf [hereinafter Grand River, Award).
[FN231]. As scientific evidence mounted that cigarette smoking caused health problems, 46 U.S. States entered into the 1998
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with major tobacco firms. See National Association of Attorneys General, Master Settlement
Agreement [MSA] (1998), available at http:// www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-
pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig9f20Pages% 20and%20Exhibits.pdf/file_view. The MSA has been characterized by the US Supreme Court
as a "landmark" public health agreement, which addresses tobacco consumption as one of the most troubling public health
problems. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525. 533 (2001).
[FN232]. See Counter-Memorial at 13, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Dec 22,
2008), available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/114065.pdf [hereinafter Grand River, Counter-Memorial].
[FN234]. See Particularized Statement of Claims ¶¶ 62-69, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (NAFTA
Arb. Trib. June 30, 2005) [hereinafter Particularized Statement of Claims].
[FN236]. Grand River, Counter-Memorial, supra note 232, ¶ 166 (quoting Louis B. Sohn and R.R. Baxter, Convention on the
International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, Final Draft with Explanatory Notes, Art. 10(5), reprinted in 55 Am. J.
Int'l L. 545, 554 (1961)). For in depth commentary, see Valentina Vadi, Trademark Protection, Public Health and International
Investment Law: Strains and Paradoxes, 20 Eur. J. Int'l L. 773 (2009) (exploring the "antinomies and paradoxes" of international
investment law); Valentina Vadi, Reconciling Public Health and Investor Rights: The Case of Tobacco, in Human Rights in
International Investment Law and Arbitration 452-86 (P.M. Dupuy et al. eds., 2009) (offering a case study on protection standards
and specific human rights claims in investor-state arbitration).
[FN237]. Grand River, Award, supra note 230, ¶ 128.
[FN238]. Id. 11 139. The tribunal also "declined to resolve the opposing interpretations of the Jay Treaty in relation to [the
claimant's] commercial activities ....." Id. 1 143. Given that the claimant "assert[ed] an absolute immunity from state regulation for
commercial activities involving cross-border trade at a significant scale, and in doing so relie[d] on an interpretation of the Jay
Treaty that is not plainly supported by the text or easily derived from application of accepted rules of treaty interpretation," his
interpretation did not have "the degree of certainty that might reasonably ground ... a reasonable expectation that [the claimant]
could avoid state application of the MSA measures." Id.
[FN246]. Statement of Claimants' Claims Arising Directly Out of the Adoption and Implementation of the Allocable Share
Amendments at 1, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Nov. 6, 2006). available at
http://www.state.gov/flocuments/organization/75752.pdf.
[FN247]. See Particularized Statement of Claims, supra note 234. ¶ 140 ("Within the context of this case, these international norms
elaborate exactly what it means for the Investors, as aboriginal nationals of Canada, to receive 'fair and equitable treatment' from
the United States and its instrumentalities.").
[FN249]. See Claimants Memorial, Merits Phase ¶¶ 188-89, Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. United States of America (July
10, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107684.pdf.
[FN250]. Under the persistent objector doctrine, "if a state persistently objects to the development of a customary international
law, it cannot be held to that law when the custom ripens. Presently, persistent objection is a valid defense unless the customary
international law attains the rare status of a peremptory norm ...." Holning Lau, Rethinking the Persistent Objector Doctrine in
International Human Rights Law, 6 Chi. J. Int'l L. 495, 495 (2005). For further discussion on the use and role of the persistent
objector doctrine, see Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in International
Law 26 Harv. Int'l L. J. 457 (1985) (explaining the role of the persistent objector doctrine in the legal relations between states);
Lynn Loschin, The Persistent Objector and Customary Human Rights Law: A Proposed Analytical Framework 2 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L
and Pol'y 147 (1996) (analyzing the persistent objector doctrine as an element of customary international law). But see Antonio
Cassese, International Law 173 (2003) (arguing that, while the opposition of a powerful state may slow and even impede the
formation of a custom, customary law does not depend on the consent of states; rather, when a custom has crystallized, all
members of the international community are bound to it, including those states that opposed its formation).
[FN252]. Canada noted that only 20 of 193 U.N. member states have ratified the ILO Convention, and the UNDRIP is not a legally
binding document. In addition, both Canada and the United States voted against adopting the Declaration. Therefore, Canada
argued that neither instrument forms part of customary international law. See Fernando Cabrera & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Parties File
Memorials in Long-running NAFTA Dispute over U.S. Tobacco Settlements, Investment Treaty News (Jan. 29, 2009), http://
www.iisd.org/itn/2009/01/29/parties-file-memorials-in-long-running-nafta-dispute-over-u-s-tobaccosettlements-canada-intervenes-
with-opinion-on-customary-international-lawrelated-to-aboriginal-rights/. In the spring of 2010, however, both Canada and the
United States reviewed their positions regarding the Declaration, and they subsequently reversed their position and have indicated
their support for the Declaration. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Permanent Forum on
Indigenous Issues (Sept. 1 3, 2007), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html.
[FN265]. See Federico Ortino, Non-Discriminatory Treatment in Investment Disputes, in Human Rights in International Investment
Law and Arbitration 344, 346-47 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
[FN266]. See Paul E. Comeaux & N. Stephan Kinsella, Protecting Foreign Investment under International Law: Legal Aspects of
Political Risk 44, 106 (1997).
[FN267]. See Fernando Gonzalez Rojas, The Notion of Discrimination in Article 1102 of NAFTA 41-42 (Jean Monnet Working Paper,
June 5, 2005).
[FN269]. See Investors Memorial ¶ 1, Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010), available at
http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Memorial_Public_Final.pdf ("The Adams Mine
Lake Act ('the AMLA') was a political decision made by a new and inexperienced Government, which would remove, by legislative
fiat, the right of ... [the enterprise] to enjoy the property rights it held in the Adams Site.") [hereinafter Vito, Investor's Memorial].
[FN271]. See Notice of Arbitration at 11-12, Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007), available
at http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Gallo2007.pdf. The notice of intent to
submit a claim to arbitration was received on October 12, 2006. Id. at 1. Subsequently, on March 30, 2007, Canada was served
with a Notice of Arbitration. Id. at 20.
[FN274]. See Counter Memorial ¶¶ 137-55, Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA) (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 29, 2010;,
available at http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Gallo_ Counter_Memorial.pdf
[hereinafter Vito. Counter Memorial]. In this regard-- although this is not mentioned in the Counter Memorial, and does not
necessarily reflect the position of Canada--it is worth noting that, at the international law level, human rights treaty bodies have
recommended "that consultations be held ... to seek the free, prior, and informed consent of indigenous peoples in cases of
activities planned in areas of spiritual and cultural significance to them." U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights. The Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 11, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/51 (Jan. 14 2009). available at
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_ doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/10/51. They also "stress the need for consultation prior to large-scale
development projects (such as the establishment of national parks) in indigenous territories and before granting concessions for
economic exploitation on disputed lands or any exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories." Id. (citations omitted).
[FN276]. See Vito G. Gallo v. Gov't of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Statement of Defence, ¶ 138 (Sept. 15, 2008).
[FN277]. See John R. Andre v. Gov't of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit Claim to Arbitration Pursuant to Chapter Eleven of the
North American Free Trade Agreement, ¶ 8 (Mar. 19, 2010), available at http:// www.international.gc.ca/tradeagreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/JohnR_ Andre_FiledNOI.pdf.
[FN284]. See New Plan for Canadian Bathurst Caribou Herd Management, Eye on the Arctic (June 2, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://
eyeonthearctic.rcinet.ca/en/news/canada/35-geopolitics/232-new-plan-for- canadian-bathurst-caribou-herdmanagement.
[FN285]. See Debate over N.W.T. Caribou Hunting does Public, CBC News (Feb. 9, 2010),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2010/02/09/nwt-cariboudebate.html.
[FN286]. See N.W.T. First Nation Cancels Caribou Hunt, CBC News (Sept, 16, 2009),
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/s1ory/2009/09/16/nwt-denecaribou.html.
[FN287]. See Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 197/1985, ¶ 4.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 (July
27, 1988).
[FN288]. See Jouni Länsman v. Finland, Human Rights Comm., Commc'n No. 671/1995, ¶ 10.2. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995
(Nov. 22, 1996).
[FN289]. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (art. 27), ¶¶ 7, 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994).
[FN290]. See Yanner v. Eaton (1999) 166 ALR 258, 301 (Austl.). For a comprehensive analysis and critical assessment of the
relevant domestic practice, see Federico Lenzerini, The Interplay between Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples' Rights
in International Law, 10 Afr. Y.B. Int'l L. 63 (2002).
[FN292]. See Diana Wagner, Competing Cultural Interests in the Whaling Debate: An Exception to the Universality of the Right to
Culture, 14 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 831 (2004); Alexander Gillespie, Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling: A Critique of the
Interrelationship between International Law and the International Whaling Commission, 12 Colo. J. Int'L Envtl. L & Pol'y 77 (2001);
Brian T. Hodges, The Cracking Facade of the International Whaling Commission as an Institution of International Law: Norwegian
Small-Type Whaling and the Aboriginal Subsistence Exemption, 15 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 295 (2000); Anthony Matera, Whale Quotas:
A Market-Based Solution to the Whaling Controversy, 13 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 23 (2000); Lawrence Watters & Connie Dugger
TheHunt for Gray Whales: The Dilemma of Native American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium on Whaling, 22 Colum.
J. Envtl. L 319 (1997).
[FN294]. See Case T 18/10 R, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami e.a. v. Parliament and Council, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/ (search
"T-18/10 R" and follow link to the "T-18/10 R" hyperlink, which corresponds with "Order" and "2010-04- 30") [hereinafter Inuit
Tapiriit Kanatami].
[FN296]. Id.
[FN297]. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ¶ 97. The governments of Canada and Norway also initiated a formal application for the
establishment of a World Trade Organization dispute settlement panel to address the matter. Request for Consultations by Canada,
European Communities--Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WT/DS400 (Nov. 2, 2009); Request
for Consultations by Norway, European Communities--Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products,
WT/DS401 (Nov. 5, 2009).
[FN301]. See Canada Welcomes Court Suspension of EU Seal Ban, Reuters (Aug. 19, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67I4TV20100820.
[FN302]. See Edward Mitchell & Randall Reeves, The Alaska Bowhead Problem: A Commentary, 33 Arctic 686, 687.
[FN303]. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species art. 3, ¶ 5, June 23, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 11.
[FN304]. Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals art. 7, Feb. 9, 1957, 314 U.N.T.S. 105 (entered into force
Oct. 14, 1958) (exempting certain indigenous people "who carry on pelagic sealing in canoes not transported by or used in
connection with other vessels, and propelled entirely by oars, paddles, or sails, and manned by not more than five persons ea ch, in
the way hitherto practiced and without the use of firearms"). To prevent circumvention of the Convention, the exemption does not
apply if the hunters are "in the employment of other persons or under contract to deliver the skins to any person." Id.
[FN305]. Article 3 of the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling precluded its application to "aborigines dwelling on the coasts of
the territories of the High Contracting Parties," provided the following conditions were met: "(1) They only use canoes, pirogues or
other exclusively native craft propelled by oars or sails; (2) They do not carry firearms; (3) They are not in the employment of
persons other than aborigines; (4) They are not under contract to deliver the products of their whaling to any third person."
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. 3, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 349 (entered into force Jan. 16,
1935). Canada, Denmark and the U.S. were parties to this Convention. See id. pmbl.
[FN306]. The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling permits the taking various baleen whales by aborigines, but
stipulates that "the meat and products of such whales are to be used exclusively for local consumption by the aborigines."
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling sched. art. III(13)(b), Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72
(entered into force Nov. 10, 1946), available at http:// www.iwcoffice.org/commission/schedule.htm.
[FN307]. Rudolph Dolzer & Christoph Schreuer. Principles of International Investment Law 149 (2008).
[FN308]. Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador. ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶27-37 (June 2,
2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1530_En&caseId=C300 [hereinafter Burlington Resources, Decision on
Jurisdiction].
[FN309]. "The indigenous peoples' opposition to ... Burlington Resources operations in their territories has compelled the companies
to halt their exploration activities and issue declarations of force majeure' ... as specified in their contracts." Chevron (CVX) in the
Amazon--Oil Rights or Human Rights? Texaeo's legacy, Chevron's Responsibility, Amnesty Int'l, http://
www.amnestyusa.org/business-and-human-rights/extractives/chevroncorp/page.do? id=1101670 (last visited Feb. 26, 2011).
[FN310]. See Burlington Resources, Decision on Jurisdiction. supra note 308, ¶¶ 26, 53.
[FN313]. See Matter of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, Provisional Measures, Order of the Court, "Decides," (Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. Feb. 4, 2010), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/sarayaku_se_04_ing.pdf. "In May 2004, the IACHR
requested that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights take provisional measures regarding the pending claim." Isabela
Figueroa, Indigenous Peoples v. Oil Companies: Constitutional Control within Resistance, 4 SUR-Int'l J. on Hum. Rts. 51, 59 (2006).
Two months later, "the Court issued a series of decisions in favor of the integrity of Sarayaku and of its right to free circulation." Id.
"[I]n July 2005, the Court took further provisional measures, and reiterated that the state should maintain the previously-adopted
measures." Id. at 60.
[FN314]. See Ole Spiermann, Applicable Law, in The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law 89, 92 (Peter Muchlinski et
al. eds., 2008).
[FN315]. See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Model BIT].
[FN319]. Raymond D. Bishop et al., Foreign Investment Disputes: Cases, Materials and Commentary 14 (2005).
[FN320]. Id.
[FN321]. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Human Rights and International Investment Law, in Human Rights in International Investment
Law and Arbitration 25 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 2009).
[FN322]. Richard H. Kreindler, The Law Applicable to International Investment Disputes, in Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes
401. 412 (Norbert Horn ed., 2004).
[FN323]. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law 492 (2006); Dupuy, supra note 321, at 25.
[FN324]. Egerton v. Brownlow, [1853] 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (H.L.) 437 (appeal taken from Eng.).
[FN325]. Martin Hunter & Gui Conde e Silva, Transnational Public Policy and its Application in Investment Arbitrations, 4 J. World
Inv. 3, 367 (2003).
[FN326]. Audley Sheppard. Public Policy and the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: Should There Be a Global Standard?, Transnat'l
Disp. Mgmt., Feb. 2004. at 2.
[FN327]. Pierre Mayer, Droit International Privé 22-23 (4th ed. 1991).
[FN328]. Pierre Lalive, Ordre public transnational (ou réellement international) et arbitrage international, 3 Revue de l'arbitrage
329, 342-43 (1986).
[FN329]. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
[FN330]. Georges Abi-Saab, The Third World and the Future of the International Legal Order, 29 Revue Egyptienne de Droit
International 27, 53 (1973).
[FN332]. For some skeptical views, see Mark. W. Janis, Jus Cogens: An Artful Not a Scientific Reality, 3 Conn. J. Int'l L. 370, 370
(1988) (arguing that jus cogens, like many norms of international law, is not a concept with objective scientific reality but only has
the subjective reality assigned to it by its users); Antony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens!, 6 Conn. J. Int'l L. 1, 1
(1991) ("[T]he sheer ephemerality of jus cogens is an asset, enabling any writer to christen any ordinary norm of his or her choice
as a new jus cogens norm, thereby in one stroke investing it with magical power."); Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in
Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 Eur. J. Int'l L. 113, 122 (2005) (jus cogens and obligations erga omnes "have no clear
reference in this world," and "[i]nstead of a meaning, they invoke a nostalgia for having such a meaning ....").
[FN333]. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Some Reflections on Contemporary International Law and the Appeal to Universal Values: A
Response to Martti Koskenniemi, 16 Eur. J. of Int'l L. 131, 136 (2005) ("jus cogens ... is also ... positive law"); Andrea
Binnchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 491, 491 (2008) ("Georges Abi-Saab certainly had a good
point when he said that even if the normative category of jus cogens were to be an 'empty box, the category was still useful; for
without the box, it cannot be filled."'); F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of Jus Cogens in International Law, in Further Studies in
International Law 84 (1990).
[FN334]. Brian A. Lichter, The Offences Clause, Due Process, and the Extraterritorial Reach of Federal Criminal Law in Narco-
Terrorism Prosecutions, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1929, 1935 (2009) ("Six offenses are widely considered to have achieved jus cogens
status: piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture."). See also Evan J. Griddle & Evan Fox-
Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 Yale J. Int'l L. 331, 331 (2008) (stating that jus cogens includes, "at a minimum, the
prohibitions against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and 'the principles of the
United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force."').
[FN335]. See generally Christopher P. Cline, Note, Pursuing Native American Rights in International Law Venues: A Jus Cogens
Strategy after Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association 42 Hastings L.J. 591 (1991) (arguing that a Supreme
Court decision that upheld the destruction of a forest used for religious ceremonies by Native American tribes was a violation of jus
cogens norms).
[FN336]. See Rebecca Tsotie, Who Controls Native Cultural Heritage?, in Cultural Heritage Issues: The Legacy of Conquest
Colonization and Commerce 3, 14 (James A. R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski eds., 2009) (noting that federal Indian law enhancing
self-determination also protects culture with the aim of ensuring cultural survival).
[FN337]. The lCJ and most scholars conclude that the right to self-determination is a peremptory norm of international law.
See Case Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.). 1995 I.C.J. 90, ¶ 29 (June 30). See also Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law 513 (6th ed. 2003) (noting that states must respect non-nationals' right to culture); Karen Parker & Lyn B.
Neylon. Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 411, 440 (1989) (recognizing that
cultural rights, in addition to political and economic rights, are included within norm of self-determination).
[FN338]. Cultural rights have been perceived as less important than other human rights. See Yvonne Donders, A Right to Cultural
Identity in UNESCO, in Cultural Human Rights 317, 318 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008) (noting that because
culture was often considered an elite concept, states have been reluctant to adopt cultural rights, and that they are thus less
developed than political, economic and social rights).
[FN339]. New peremptory norms may arise and may modify the existing norms. See Vienna Convention, supra note 329, arts. 53,
64.
[FN340]. See Raphael Lemkin, Acts Constituting a General (Transnational) Danger Considered as Offences Against the Law of
Nations, Prevent Genocide International, http://www.preventgenocide.org/lemkin/madrid1933-english.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2011). On Lemkin, see Michael A. MacDonnell & A. Dirk Moses, Raphael Lemkin as Historian of Genocide in the Americas, 7(4) J.
Genocide Res. 501 (2005) (noting modern misinterpretation of Lemkin's work as focused on a mass killing conception of genocide,
when in fact, he originally developed the term with a focus on colonial occupations that did not include mass killing).
[FN341]. See Robert van Krieken, Cultural Genocide Reconsidered, 12 Austl. Indigenous L. Rev. 76, 77 (2008) (noting that the
distinction between cultural and physical genocide is unstable and that continuity exists between the two concepts). See also
Pamela de Condappa, Cultural Genocide: Destroying Material Culture, Destroying Identity, in New Directions in Genocide Research
(Adam Jones ed., forthcoming 2011) (arguing that cultural genocide is a potential precursor to physical genocide).
[FN342]. Daniele Conversi, Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing and Nationalism, in The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism 320,
326 (Gerard Delanty & Krishan Kumar eds., 2006).
[FN343]. Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277
(entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
[FN344]. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 576 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2,
2001). For an analysis and critical assessment of the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention with respect to the concept
of cultural genocide, see generally Johannes Morsink, Cultural Genocide, the Universal Declaration, and Minority Rights, 21Hu m.
Rts. Q. 1009 (1999).
[FN345]. Article 7 of a 2007 draft of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples used the phrase
"ethnocide." but again the term was dropped in the final declaration. See A. Dirk Moses. Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept
of Genocide, in The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies 19, 39 (Donald Bloxham & A. Dirk Moses eds., 2010).
[FN348]. Id.
[FN349]. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 1998. 37 I.L.M. 999, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Statute]. As of October 12, 2008, 114 countries were States Parties to the ICC
Statute. The States Parties to the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court (Oct. 12. 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/.
[FN352]. See Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 207 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Feb. 26, 2001); Francioni, supra note 16, at 12-13 (providing commentary on the case).
[FN353]. See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2,
2001), aff'd Case No. IT-98-33-A (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 19, 2004).
[FN354]. Marina Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the Cultural Identities of Indigenous
Peoples under International Law, 8 Chap. L. Rev. 201, 201 (2005).
[FN355]. Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 Eur. J.
Int'l L. 619, 650 (2003) (citation omitted).
[FN356]. See Vittorio Mainetti, Le principe du patrimoine culturel de l'humanité: de la république des arts à un ordre public
international, in La salvaguardia dei beni culturali nel diritto internazionale: atti del convegno Dodicesima Giornata Gentiliana 581,
595-596 (Alberico Gentili ed., 2008).
[FN357]. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Apr. 1, 1997, Arrets du Tribunal Fédéral Suisse [ATF] 123 II 134 (Switz.).
For more information about the case, see Pierre Lalive, Réflexions sur un ordre public culturel, in L'extranétié ou le dépassement de
l'ordre juridique étatique 155 (Eric Wyler & Alain Papaux eds., 1999).
[FN358]. Barbara T. Hoffman, Cultural Rights, Cultural Property, and International Trade, in Art and Cultural Heritage Law, Policy
and Practice 89, 92 (2005) (quoting BGer Apr. 1, 1997, 123 ATF II 134. 143-44 (Switz.)). Author translation:
When, as in this case, the request is for the return of a cultural object, the judge must be careful
to take into account the interest of the international community ... tied to the protection of cultural
property. These provisions are based on a common inspiration and constitute the expression of an
international public order which is in force or in the process of developing. These norms concretize the
imperative of an international struggle against the traffic in cultural property.
[FN359]. Marc-Andre Renold, An Important Swiss Decision Relating to the International Transfer of
Cultural Goods: The Swiss Supreme Court's Decision on the Giant Antique Mogul Gold Coins, 13 Int'l J.
of Cultural Prop 36 1, 365 (2006).
[FN362]. Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, International Arbitration Law and Practice 534-35 (2d ed.
2001).
[FN363]. Case No. 1110 of 1963, 21 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 47, 61 (ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.).
[FN364]. World Duty Free v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, Award (Oct. 4, 2006),
available at http:// ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/WDFv.KenyaAward.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2011).
[FN366]. Methanex v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, Part IV, ch. C, ¶ 24 (Aug. 3, 2005).
[FN369]. Orakhelashvili, supra note 323, at 493. See also Phillippe Fouchard et al., Applicable Law
Chosen by the Parties, in On International Commercial Arbitration 861 (1999) ("[A]rbitrators have the
right--and even the obligation--to themselves raise the issue of whether disputed contracts or legal
provisions before them satisfy the requirements of international public policy."); Richard H. Kreindler,
Approaches to the Application of Transnational Public Policy by Arbitrators, 4 J. World Investment 239,
244 ("[T]he arbitrator need not apply the agreed or determined governing law if doing so would cause
him to violate international public policy."!; Julian D. M. Lew et al., Comparative International
Commercial Arbitration 93-94 (2003) ("To the extent that human rights protection constitutes a core
part of international or national public policy, human rights aspects must be considered by the
tribunal").
[FN372]. As Criddle and Fox-Decent argue, "[i]nternational law also supports indigenous self-
determination and a duty to consult." Id. at 374. The violation of such "autonomy-enabling rights
would breach obligations that many states now recognize as fiduciary in character. Insofar as the
principle of internal self-determination addresses these or other constitutive concerns of the state-
subject fiduciary relation, it deserves to be accorded peremptory force within international law." Id.
[FN374]. See Lew et al., supra note 369, at 93-94 (arguing that the human rights aspects of
international and national public policy must be considered by the European Court of Human Rights).
[FN375]. Hector Gros Espiell, Self-Determination and Jus Cogens, in UN Law/Fundamental Rights: Two
Topics in International Law 167 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
[FN376]. For an analogous view in the WTO context, see Francesco Francioni, WTO Law in Context:
the Integration of International Human Rights and Environmental Law in the Dispute Settlement
Process, in The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System 143 (2006)
(discussing the methodology that should be followed when confronted with claims based on norms of
public international law that fall outside the treaty system of the WTO).
[FN377]. The principle of nec ultra petita concerns the arguments raised by the parties but does not
infringe or supersede the mandatory rules eventually applicable to the dispute. See, e.g., Giuditta
Cordero Moss, Is the Arbitral Tribunal Bound by the Parties' Factual and Legal Pleadings?, 3 Stockholm
Int'l Arb. Rev. 1, 12. (2006) (explaining that the rule that the award may not go beyond the factual
scope of the dispute as agreed upon by the parties does not apply to arguments made by the parties).
[FN378]. See Vaughan Lowe, Private Disputes and the Public Interest in International Law, in
International Law and Dispute Settlement: New Problemsand Techniques 3, 9 (Duncan French et al.
eds., 2010) ("There are no provisions directing a tribunal hearing a dispute on how it should ... put
arguments and facts relating to the public interest.").
[FN380]. On the interpretation of BITs, see, for example: Thomas W. Walde, Interpreting Investment
Treaties: Experiences and Examples, in International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in
Honour of Christoph Schreuer 724, 725 (Christina Binder et al. eds., 2009) (there is "a 'struggle' for
the soul of investment arbitration between international commercial arbitration and (public)
international law bars"); Ian A. Laird, Interpretation in International Investment Arbitration--Through
the Looking Glass, in A Liber Amicorum: Thomas Walde: Law Beyond Conventional Thought 151
(Jacques Werner & Arif Hyder Ali eds., 2009) (discussing Walde's contribution to the theory of
interpretation in investment treaties and arbitration).
[FN381]. Vienna Convention, supra note 329, art. 31(3)(c). For commentary, see Duncan French,
Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 281
(2006) (discussing mechanisms by which a tribunal may undertake a broader interpretive approach to
treaties): McLachlan,supra note 128 (discussing the importance of Article 31(3)(c) and the process of
operationalizing it in treaty interpretation).
[FN382]. See Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3. Award (June
27, 1990), 4 ICSID Rep. 245 (1997).
[FN383]. Id. ¶ 21, at 257.
[FN385]. See Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer. Human Rights and International Investment
Arbitration, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and Arbitration 82, 83 (Pierre-Marie
Dupuy et. al eds., 2009) ("[T]he present role of human rights in the context of investment arbitration
is peripheral at best.").
[FN387]. See, e.g., Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd. v. Ghana Investments Centre and the
Government of Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability. 95 I.L.R. 184 (UNCITRAL ad hoc tribunal
1989), available at http:// www.biicl.org/files/3937_1990_aapl_v_sri_lanka.pdf (holding that the
tribunal lacked jurisdiction to examine the allegations of human rights violations). See also Patrick
Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on the Application for Annulment of
the Award. ¶ 48 (Nov. 1, 2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC597_En&caseId=C183 (ordering an annulment
of the award on grounds of manifest excess of power and the Arbitral Tribunal's acceptance of
jurisdiction on the basis of the existence of an investment); Reiner & Schreuer, supra note 385, 83--
84 (arguing that although an independent human rights claim may fall outside the scope of the
tribunal, if a human rights violation affects investment, it may become arbitrable).
[FN388]. See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, ¶
114 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205, 1217 (2005).
[FN390]. With regard to the World Trade Organization context, see Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion
or Superiority Complex? What to Make of the WTO Waiver for "Conflict Diamonds" 24 Mich. J. Int'l L.
1177, 1199 (2003) (arguingagainst the "presumption that whatever is agreed upon outside the WTO
... must still be reconfirmed in the precinct of the WTO itself for it to have any value before WTO
organs, as if other instruments of international law can never add to or override the WTO treaty").
[FN391]. Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm Creation
Changing?, in The Role of Law in International Politics 207, 220 (Michael Byers ed., 2000).
[FN392]. See Thomas Carbonneau, Cases and Materials on the Law and Practice of Arbitration 1205
(3d rev. ed. 2003) ("The development of arbitration has raised questions about the limits and
boundaries of privatized justice and its relationship to and operation within society.").
[FN393]. For a similar conclusion, see Anne van Aaken. Opportunities and Limits to an Economic
Analysis of International Law 30 (U. of St. Gallen Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2010-09, 2010),
available, at http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1635390.
[FN394]. See Barnali Choudhury, Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating Human Rights
Issues into International Investment Agreements 8-13 (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law, Working Paper No.
2010/13, 2010.
[FN395]. See Rostam J. Neuwirth, Cultural Industries in International Trade Law: Insights from the
NAFTA, the WTO, and the EU 17 (2006) (providing examples of efforts to exempt certain goods from
the process of trade liberalization); John Morijin, Reframing Human Rights and Trade: Potential and
Limits of a Human Rights Persective of WTO Law on Cultural and Educational Goods and Services 15
(2010).
[FN399]. Trans-Pacific SEP, supra note 396, art. 19.5.1 ("[N]othing in this Agreement shall preclude
the adoption by New Zealand of measures it deems necessary to accord more favorable treatment to
Maori in respect of matters covered by this agreement including in fulfillment of its obligations under
the Treaty of Waitangi."). However, the article excludes measures "used as a means of arbitrary or
unjustified discrimination against persons of the other Parties or a disguised restriction on trade in
goods and services." Id.
[FN400]. See id. art. 19.5.2 (excluding "the interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, including as to
the nature of the rights and obligations arising under it," from the Trans-Pacific SEP's dispute
settlement provisions, and instead providing that Brunei Darussalam, Chile or Singapore may request
an arbitral tribunal to determine "whether any measure ... is inconsistent with their rights under this
Agreement").
[FN401]. See Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., Clarification on Aboriginals and Canada's Investment
Treaties, Investment L. and Pol'y Wkly. News Bull, June11, 2004, available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_investsd_june11_ 2004.pdf.
[FN402]. See Howard Mann, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev., International Investment Agreements,
Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities 11-12 (2008), available at
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/iia_business_human_ rights.pdf; M. Sornarajah, The International Law
on Foreign Investment 120-21, 366-67 (2004).
[FN403]. See United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Gov't of Can., Award on the Merits, ¶ 156 (May 24, 2007),
46 I.L.M. 922 (2007) [hereinafter UPS, Award on the Merits].
[FN404]. The origin of the cultural exemption lies in the negotiation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (CUFTA) in the 1980s. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., art. 2005.
Jan. 2, 1988. 27 I.L.M. 281. The clause has been carried over in NAFTA.
[FN405]. See UPS, Award on the Merits, supra note 403. ¶¶ 156-60.
[FN406]. See NAFTA, supra note 150, Annex 2106 (providing that measuresconcerning "cultural
industries" will be governed, subject to limited exceptions, under the BIT between Canada and the
United States).
[FN407]. South Africa's BEE scheme is an effort to boost the prospects of its black majority, along
with other ethnic minorities, which suffered systemic discrimination under the Apartheid system. See
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.), available at
www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68031.
[FN409]. Ockert Dupper, Affirmative Action in South Africa: (M)any Lessons for Europe? (2006) 39
Verfassung und Recht in Übersee (Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America) 138, 158 (2006),
available at http:// www.vrue.nomos.de/fileadmin/vrue/doc/VRUE_06_02.pdf.
[FN410]. In the case of Agri South Africa v. Minister, Minerals & Energy; Van Rooyen v. Minister,
Minerals & Energy (the AgriSA case), the North and South Gauteng High Court held that it is possible
for the holder of an unused old order right which has ceased to exist by virtue of the operation of the
MPRDA to prove that such right was expropriated and that the mere fact that a holder of an unused
old order right is afforded an opportunity to apply for a "new order" right did not, on its own, mean
that an expropriation had not occurred. See Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy; Van
Rooyen v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2009 (1) SA 104 (GNP) at 13 para. 17 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2009/2.pdf.
[FN411]. See Piero Foresti, Laura De Carli and Others v. Republic of S. Afr., ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/07/1, Award (Aug. 4 2010), available at http:// icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&doId=DC1651_En&caseId=C90 [hereinafter Foresti,
Award].
[FN412]. Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (S. Afr.), available at
http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a28-02.pdf [hereinafter MPRDA].
[FN417]. Luke Eric Peterson, South African Arbitration may Raise Delicate Human Rights Issues,
Investment Treaty News (Feb. 14, 2007), www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/itn_feb14_2007.pdf.
[FN419]. Because the request for arbitration was filed by seven Italian nationals and a company
incorproated in Luxembourg, the proceedings were brought pursuant to the provisions of two BITs. Id.
¶ 1.
[FN420]. See id. ¶ 67. For the text of the BITs, see Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Italian Republic for the Promotion and Protection
of Investments. S. Afr.-It., June 9, 1997; Agreement between the Republic of South Africa and the
Belo-Luxembourg Economic Union on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 5,
August 14, 1998, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/belg_lux_southafrica_fr.pdf.
[FN422]. For instance, doubts over reconciling the BEE program with investment treaty standards
have led to a dead lock in negotiations on a free trade agreement between the United States and the
South African Custom Union. See Luke Eric Peterson, US-Southern Africa Negotiations Stall-Race
Based Affirmative Action an Obstacle?, Int'l Inst. for Sustainable Dev. (July 22, 2004),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2004/investment_investsd_july22_2004.pdf.
[FN423]. A number of South African BITs, including those with the United Kingdom, Belgium-
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands lack specific provisions exempting the BEE from the scope of the
treaty. See Luke Eric Peterson, South Africa's Bilateral Investment Treaties: Implications for
Development and Human Rights 11 (2006), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/global/04137-20080708.pdf.
[FN424]. Id.
[FN425]. Agreement Between the Czech Republic and the Republic of South Africa for the Promotion
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments art. 3(3)(c), Czech Rep.-S. Afr., Dec. 14, 1998, available at
http:// www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/czech_southafrica.pdf.
[FN427]. See Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines for
the Conduct of Cultural Environmental and Social Impact Assessments Regarding Developments
Proposed to Take Place on, or which are Likely to Impact on, Sacred Sites and on Lands and Waters
Traditionally Occupied or Used by Indigenous and Local Communities ¶ 6(b) (2004).
[FN428]. See Frequently Asked Questions about Cultural Impact Assessments,Quality Planning: The
RMA Planning Resource, http:// www.qualityplanning.org.nz/consents/cultural-impact-assessment.php
(last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
[FN429]. Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society art. 8,
Oct. 27, 2005, C.E.T.S. No. 199, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/199.htm.
[FN430]. For instance, Articles 2 and 10.7 of the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation mandate environmental impact assessments. See North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation arts. 2, 10.7. Sept. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480, 1483, 1486-87. However, as
Professor Gaines points out, there is no "established mechanism to bridge the gap between
environmental co-operation and investor compensation." Sanford Gaines, Protecting Investors,
Protecting the Environment: The Unexpected Story of NAFTA Chapter 11, in Greening NAFTA: The
North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation 173, 185 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox
eds., 2003).
[FN431]. See World Bank, Environmental Assessment Sourcebook 1991, ch. 1, ¶ 5, (1999), available
at http://go.worldbank.org/2YP7C0PTJ0 (follow "Chapter 1" hyperlink). See generally, William V.
Kennedy, Environmental Impact Assessment and Multilateral Financial Institutions, in Handbook of
Environmental Impact Assessment 98, 98 (Judith Petts ed., 1999) (commenting on environmental
assessments procedures and the experiences of multilateral financial institutions in attempting to
implement those procedures).
[FN432]. See Andrei Barannik & Valentina Okaru, Harmonization of EA Procedures And Requirements
between the World Bank and Borrowing Countries, in Environmental Assessment (EIA) in Africa: A
WorldBank Commitment, Proceedings of the Durban World Bank Workshop 35, 40 (Robert Goodland
et al., eds., 1996).
[FN433]. See Francesco Francioni, Dispute Avoidance in International Environmental Law, in Economic
Globalization and Compliance with International Environmental Agreements 229, 235-36 (Alexandre
Kiss et al. eds., 2003).
[FN434]. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Award of the Tribunal, ¶ 44 (Nov.
13, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 419 (2002).
[FN438]. Notice of Arbitration ¶ 9, Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't of Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2008), available at http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/BilconNoticeofArbitration.pdf [hereinafter Clayton/Bilcon, Notice of
Arbitration].
[FN439]. Statement of Claim ¶ 19, Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't of Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2009). available at http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreementR-accords-
commeiciaux/assets/pdfs/BilconStatementClaim+Exhibits.pdf [hereinafter Clayton/Bilcon, Statement
of Claim].
[FN440]. Statement of Defense ¶ 15, Clayton/Bilcon v. Gov't of Can., P.C.A. Case No. 2009-04 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2009), available at http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerctaux/assets/pdfs/CanadaStatementDefence04May.PDF [hereinafter Clayton/Bilcon,
Statement of Defense].
[FN445]. See id. ¶ 10. "Biosphere reserves are areas of terrestrial and coastal ecosystems promoting
solutions to reconcile the conservation of biodiversity with its sustainable use." See FAQ--Biosphere
Reserues?, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/mab/doc/faq/brs.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).
[FN448]. See John Collier & Vaughan Lowe, The Settlement of Disputes in International Law:
Institutions and Procedures 33-34 (1999) (discussing the differences between arbitration and judicial
settlement in the InternationalCourt of Justice or other international tribunals); J.G. Merrills,
International Dispute Settlement 91 (4th ed. 2005) (noting that arbitration "requires the parties
themselves to set up the machinery to handle a dispute, or series of disputes, between them" while
"[j]udicial settlement involves the reference of a dispute to the International Court or some other
standing tribunal").
[FN449]. See Dora Marta Gruner, Note, Accounting for the Public Interest in International Arbitration:
The Need for Procedural and Structural Reform, 41 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 923 (2003).
[FN450]. On the judicialization of NAFTA Chapter 11, see Hansen, supra note 205.
[FN451]. See Joachim Delaney & Daniel Barstow Magraw, Procedural Transparency, in The Oxford
Handbook of International Investment Law 721, 743- 46 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008).
[FN452]. See Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 Yale J. Int'l L. 141, 184 (2002)("[w]hile a participatory revolution may
have occurred in internationalenvironmental law, so far it has spread slowly to the realm of trade and
investment ...." The protectionist approach to sovereignty "in relation to civil society is anomalous and
unjustified, particularly in light of the far more pressing and substantial threats to sovereignty posed
by the parallel investor claim process."). See also James Harrison, Human Rights Arguments in Amicus
Curiae Submissions: Promoting Social Justice?, in Human Rights in International Investment Law and
Arbitration 396, 405 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy et al. eds., 20091 (describing the use of amicus curiae
submissions in investment treaty arbitration "as a mechanism for allowing participation of those who
are representing broader public interest considerations"!.
[FN453]. See Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a
Different Legal Order, 27 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 429, 437-49 (2004).
[FN454]. See Benjamin H. Tahyar, Confidentiality in ICSID Arbitration after Amco Asia v Indonesia:
Watchword or White Elephant?, 10 Fordham Int'l L.J. 93, 117 (1987) (arguing that "ICSID's reputation
as a reliable and independent arbitral institution can best be served by subordinating the requirement
of confidentiality to the publication of arbitral awards").
[FN455]. See Nigel Blackaby, Public Interest and Investment Treaty Arbitration, Transnat'l Disp.
Mgmt., Feb. 2004, at 4.
[FN456]. See ICSID, Arbitration Rules, supra note 153, r. 48(1)(a), at 122. The ICSID Arbitration
Rules of 2006 require that where consensus of the parties is not forthcoming, ICSID must promptly
publish excerpts of the tribunal's legal reasoning. Id. r. 48(4), at 122.
[FN457]. See Delaney & Magraw, supra note 451, at 739 ("One of the main perceived advantages of
ICC arbitration is that the proceedings before the tribunal and the ICC Court are confidential ....").
[FN458]. See NAFTA Free Trade Comm'n, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions
(July 31, 2001), available at http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=en [hereinafter Notes of Interpretation]. The NAFTA
Free Trade Commission is composed of the trade ministers from each of the NAFTA countries. See
NAFTA, supra note 150, art. 2001(1). The Commission's interpretations of NAFTA are binding on
tribunals formed under NAFTA Chapter 11. Id. art 1131(2).
[FN460]. Notes of Interpretation, supra note 458, § A2b (providing exceptions for (i) confidential
business information; (ii) information privileged under law; and (iii) information that must be withheld
pursuant to relevant arbitral rules).
[FN461]. See U.S. Model BIT, supra note 315, art. 19; Agreement Between Canada and [Country] for
the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 38, available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf [hereinafter Canadian Model BIT].
[FN463]. See ICSID, Rules of Procedure for Arbitral Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) r. 32 (2003).
[FN464]. See ICSID, Arbitration Rules, supra note 153. r. 32(2), at 115.
[FN465]. Canada released a Statement on Open Hearings in 2003. followed by the U.S. Mexico joined
Canada and the U.S. in 2004. See Press Release, Can. Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Int'l Trade,
Statement of Canada on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter Eleven Arbitrations (Oct. 7. 2003). available
at http:// www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/nafta-
transparency-alena-transparence.aspx?lang=eng; Press release, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, NAFTA Commission Announces New-Transparency Measures (Oct. 2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/archives/2003/october/nafta-commission-
announces-new-
(c) 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
(3 screens)
FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
transparen.
[FN466]. See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America, Procedural Order No. 11, ¶ 15 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. July 9, 2007),
available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/88173.pdf.
[FN467]. See id. (noting tribal identification was required for admission to the viewing).
[FN468]. See Delaney & Magraw, supra note 451, at 746 (noting that there is a trend in allowing public participation in Chapter 11
arbitration. NAFTA allows the Tribunal to appoint experts, but there is no provision regarding submissions by non-disputing
parties.). See also Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and Proposed Reforms to
the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 885, 898- 99 (2007) (analyzing the revisions to rule 37 of the
ICSID Rules and the ways in which they allow the Tribunal to accept amicus briefs).
[FN470]. See U.S. Model BIT, supra at note 315; Canadian Model BIT, supra note 461, art. 39.
[FN471]. Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation, supra note 150, para. A.1.
[FN472]. See id. para. B. Any non-disputing party that wishes to file a written submission with the Tribunal will apply for leave from
the Tribunal to file such a submission. The applicant will attach the submission to the application Statement of the Free Trade
Commission on Non-Disputing Party Participation, Para B.1. The application for leave to file a non-disputing party submission, inter
alia, has to be in writing, be no longer than five typed pages, disclose whether or not the applicant has any affiliation, direct or
indirect, with any disputing party, and specify the nature of the interest that the applicant has in the arbitration. Id. para. B.2. The
submission filed by a non-disputing party must be, among other things, concise, "in no case longer than 20 typed pages, including
any appendices" and can "only address matters within the scope of the dispute." Id. para B.3.
[FN473]. See Application for Leave to File a Non-Party Submission, Submission of the Quechan Indian Nation at 3, Glamis Gold Ltd.
v United States of America (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Aug. 19, 2005), available at
http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/52531.pdf ("This tribunal should accept the Tribe's submission because it will assist
the Tribunal in the determination of factual and legal issues by bringing the perspective, particular knowledge and insight that is
unique to American tribal sovereign governments.") [hereinafter Glamis Gold, Quechan Application for Leave].
[FN474]. Id. at 4.
[FN475]. See United States Submission regarding Quechan Indian Nation Application at 2, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of
America (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54087.pdf (encouraging the tribunal to
accept the submission of the Quechan Indian Nation and arguing that the Nation brings a different perspective on the matter).
[FN476]. If we admit jura novit curia, the arbitral tribunal will know the legal relevance and importance of these briefs, according to
their content and source.
[FN477]. Grand River v. United States of America, Amicus Curiae Submission of the Office of the National Chief of the Assembly of
Nations, Mr. Phil Fontaine, to the arbitrators. Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Mr. John R. Crook, and Professor James Anaya, Jan. 19, 2009,
available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/117812.pdf.
[FN478]. See Non-Party Submission of the Quechan Nation at 7-8, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America (Aug. 19, 2005,
available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/52531.pdf: Non-Party Supplemental Submission at 1-7, 11-12, Glamis
Gold Ltd. v. United States of America (Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75016.pdf.
[FN479]. See Valentina Vadi, Towards Arbitral Path Coherence & Judicial Borrowing: Persuasive Precedent in Investment
Arbitration, Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt., May 2008, at 7-10 (noting that arbitral tribunals have relied upon precedent for their persuasive
force, rather than as binding authority).
[FN480]. Glamis Gold, Quechan Application for Leave, supra note 473, at 2.
[FN481]. Id. at 3. The application also clarifies that "the Tribe is recognized as a sovereign government in the United States
Constitution, [and is] one of but three kinds of domestic sovereign governments recognized: the federal government, states and
Indian tribes." Id. (internal citations omitted).
[FN482]. For instance, amicus curiae were admitted in the Methanex, UPS, Biwater Gauff, and Vivendi cases. See Methanex Corp.
v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as Amici Curiae, ¶ 53 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Jan.
15, 2001), available at http:// www.state.gov/documents/organization/6039.pdf; United Parcel Serv. of Am. v. Gov't of Canada,
Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, ¶ 73 (NAFTA Arb. Trib. Oct.17, 2001),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/6033.pdf; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania,
ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 5, ¶ 55 (Feb. 2, 2007); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and
Vivendi Universal S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus Curiae in Suez, ¶ 23 (July 30, 2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docld=DC516_En&caseId=C19.
[FN483]. See Grand River Ltd. v. United States of America, Letter to the Parties Concerning Amicus Curiae Submission (NAFTA Arb.
Trib. Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117813.pdf.
[FN487]. See Anne K. Hoffmann & Python Schifferli Peter, Counterclaims by the Respondent State in Investment Arbitrations: The
Decision on Jurisdiction Over Respondent's Counterclaim in Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, 3 Transnat'l Disp. Mgmt.,
Dec. 2006 at 10 (arguing that if an arbitral tribunal allows a state to make counterclaims, it should apply "the same standards ... as
to those [counterclaims] brought by an investor"); Hege E. Kjos, Counterclaims in Investment Treaty Arbitration, Transnat'l Disp.
Mgmt., July 2007. at 4-6; Hege E. Kjos, Counterclaims by Host States in Investment Dispute Arbitration "Without Privity," in New
Aspects of International Investment Law 597 (T. W. Wälde & Philippe Kahn eds., 2007).
[FN488]. See Todd Weiler, Balancing Human Rights and Investor Protection: A New Approach for a Different Legal Order, 27 B.C.
Int'l & Comp. L.Rev. 429, 450 (2004).
[FN490]. See, e.g., Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area art. 28.9, May 23, 2007, 33 I.L.M.
1067, available at http:// programmes.comesa.int/attachments/104_Investment%20agreement%20for%20the%
20CCIA%20FINAL%20_English.pdf (providing that a COMESA member state can raise as a defense or counterclaim against a
complaining investor that the investor "has not fulfilled its obligations under [the] Agreement, including the obligations to comply
with all applicable domestic measures!,] or that it has not taken all reasonable steps to mitigate possible damages").
[FN491]. The limits of this approach are evident. Limiting the prosecution of human rights breaches by investors to counterclaims
does not address the problem that arises where the host state is complicit in the violations. Conferring the right to prosecute only
to the state would potentially imply selective prosecution. Professor Caron argues in favor of a "context sensitive" approach, which
allows "for international procedures to act as a supplement where the state's representation is inadequate. In some measure, this is
what occurs with the recent practice authorizing amicus filings because such filings can bring to the tribunal's attention an y
argument that the State does not wish to raise." See David D. Caron, Investor State Arbitration: Strategic and Tactical Perspectives
on Legitimacy, 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 513, 520 (2009).
[FN492]. High Comm'r for Human Rights, Human Rights, Trade and Investment, 1 57, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9 (Jul. 2,
2003).
[FN493]. See Francesco Francioni, WTO Law in Context: The Integration of International Human Rights and Environmental Late in
the Dispute Settlement Process, in The WTO at Ten 143-54 (G. Sacerdoti et al. eds., 2006).
[FN495]. On the "repoliticization of investor protection," the ability of arbitral tribunals "to manage the outbreak of politics." and
"the normative disagreement and contestation about human interests and values." see Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging:
Tribunalization in a Fragmented but Interconnected Global Order, 41 Int'l. L. & Pol. 959, 985 (2009) (noting that "a repoliticization
of investor protection has ... gone hand in hand with some countries threatening to withdraw from treaty commitments requiring
arbitration or from arbitration processes altogether").
[FN496]. States must ensure the protection of human rights and the fulfillment of their obligations under human rights law. See
supra Part VI.
[FN497]. See Valentina Vadi, Fragmentation or Cohesion? Investment versus Cultural Protection Rules, 10 J. World Investment and
Trade 573 (2009) (discussing two sub-systems of international law and arguing in favor of unity in international law); Valentina
Vadi, Cultural Heritage and International Investment Law: A Stormy Relationship, 15 Int'l J. Cultural Prop. 1, 2 (2008) (explaining
that cultural rights have been "traditionally neglected for decades"); Valentina Vadi, The Challenge of Reconciling Underwater
Cultural Heritage and Foreign Direct Investment: A Case Study, 17 Italian Y.B. of Int'l L. 143 (Benedetto Conforti et al. eds., 2007)
(analyzing the international legal framework protecting underwater cultural heritage); Valenina Vadi, Investing In Culture:
Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Investment Law 42 Vand. J. of Transnat'l L. 3 (2009) (arguing that synergy
between public and private actors can be found in providing an alternative framework for protection of undersea heritage).
[FN499]. As Professor Caron puts it, "the question of whether the state adequately represents the investor-impacted community in
a particular proceeding is ultimately a contextual question and depends on the state and community in question". Caron, supra note
491, at 520.
[FN500]. For a detailed analysis of these issues, see Christina Knahr, Transparency, Third Party Participation and Access to
Documents in International Investment Arbitration, 23 Arb. Int'l 327 (2007); Nigel Blackaby & Caroline Richard, Amicus Curiae: A
Panacea for Legitimacy?, in Investment Arbitration?, in The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality 253
(Michael Weibel et al. eds., 2010).
[FN501]. For instance, in Glamis Gold, the parties agreed to make the hearing open to the public, except for those parts which
involved confidential matters. Glamis Gold, Award, supra note 203, ¶¶ 102, 121. The hearing was also broadcasted live at the
World Bank. Press Release, ICSID, Glamis Gold v. United States of America, NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Proceeding (Aug.
13, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp (follow link adjacent to "August 13, 2007"). More
recently, in Pacific Rim Cayman v. Ecuador, a hearing on preliminary objections was transmitted live via internet feed. See Press
Release. ICSID, Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12)--Public Hearing (May 25. 2010).
available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/ViewNewsReleases.jsp (follow link adjacent to "May 25, 2010").
END OF DOCUMENT
(3 layar)
HANYA UNTUK PENGGUNAAN PENDIDIKAN
42 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 797
Pasal
* 797 KETIKA BUDAYA berbenturan: INVESTASI ASING LANGSUNG, SUMBER DAYA ALAM,
DAN PRIBUMI DALAM HUKUM INVESTASI HERITAGE INTERNASIONAL
Hak Cipta © 2011 oleh Columbia Hukum Hak Asasi Manusia Tinjauan; Valentina S. Vadi
* 798 I. PENDAHULUAN
Perlindungan warisan budaya memiliki makna mendalam bagi martabat manusia dan menganggap penting berkaitan
dengan masyarakat adat. Meskipun pengakuan hak masyarakat adat dan warisan budaya telah memperoleh
beberapa momentum dalam hukum internasional sejak diadopsinya Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Masyarakat
Adat (UNDRIP), [FN1] negara telah menafsirkan hak untuk mengembangkan "sendiri istilah "dalam rangka *
799prosper" seperti yang mereka lihat cocok. "[FN2] Sementara itu suatu culturehas ekonomi internasional muncul
bahwa "melintasi budaya tradisional membagi" [FN3] dan menekankan produktivitas dan pembangunan
ekonomi.[FN4] Pembangunan dianggap "transformasi masyarakat, gerakan dari hubungan tradisional, cara-cara
berpikir tradisional, cara-cara tradisional berurusan dengan kesehatan dan pendidikan, metode tradisional produksi,
untuk lebih 'modern' cara." [FN5] Konseptualisasi kemajuan ekonomi sebagai "proses upgrade berturut-turut,"
ekonom telah menyoroti tekanan pada masyarakat untuk mengadopsi budaya ekonomi produktif dan "konvergensi
tumbuh di sekitar paradigma produktivitas." [FN6]
Karena pembuat kebijakan cenderung mendukung pertumbuhan, terlepas dari pelanggaran aktual atau potensial dari
hak budaya, "hukum yang ada sering gagal untuk keseimbangan antara pembangunan ekonomi" dan hak-hak
masyarakat adat. [FN7] Akibatnya, masyarakat adat menderita konsekuensi dari sebuah rezim yang nikmat,
misalnya, pertambangan terhadap lingkungan dan budaya penduduk asli.Sebagai titik sarjana satu, "tetap
penggabungan budaya ke dalam proses pembangunan tidak jelas, dan tidak ada model yang disepakati untuk
menjelaskan bagaimana ini harus terjadi."[FN8] Namun, perlindungan keragaman budaya memiliki makna yang
mendalam: tidak hanya keragaman budaya dipahami sebagai sebuah "aset yang kaya untuk individu dan
masyarakat" tapi perlindungan * 800 dan promosi "merupakan persyaratan penting bagi pembangunan
berkelanjutan." [FN9]
Sementara bentrokan antara pembangunan ekonomi dan hak-hak masyarakat adat adalah dengan tidak berarti baru,
[FN10] Pasal ini mendekati tema ini terkenal dari perspektif baru dengan * 801 berfokus pada hukum investasi
internasional dan arbitrase. Pasal ini membahas cara di mana perjanjian investasi internasional dan pengadilan
arbitrase telah berurusan dengan hak-hak masyarakat adat. Penelitian ini tepat waktu seperti dalam dekade terakhir
telah terjadi booming investor-negara arbitrase yang memberikan kontribusi signifikan terhadap perkembangan
hukum internasional. [FN11] Meskipun fokus tradisional pengacara investasi telah analisis ketentuan undang-undang
investasi yang relevan, sedikit, jika ada, penelitian telah difokuskan pada interaksi substantif antara hak-hak
masyarakat adat dan hak-hak investor dalam hukum investasi internasional dan arbitrase. Hanya baru-baru ini
komentator hukum mulai menganalisis dan kritis menilai interaksi antara berbagai rezim substantif hukum
internasional dalam hukum perjanjian investasi dan arbitrase. [FN12] Di antara karya-karya perintis, bagaimanapun,
fokus khusus pada hak-hak masyarakat adat hilang. Pasal ini bertujuan untuk mengisi kekosongan yang ada ini
dalam studi hukum kontemporer.
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan kunci adalah apakah hukum investasi internasional telah memeluk budaya ekonomi murni
internasional atau apakah ia terbuka untuk merangkum masalah non-ekonomi atau budaya dalam modus operandi-
nya. Sampai saat ini, hukum investasi internasional telah mengembangkan hanya alat yang terbatas untuk
perlindungan warisan budaya melalui penyelesaian sengketa investasi. [FN13] Namun, putusan arbitrase terbaru
menunjukkan meningkatnya kesadaran akan kebutuhan untuk melindungi warisan budaya dalam perselisihan
investasi. Semakin, arbiter tidak hanya dianggap non-investasi nilai-nilai terkait dalam konteks sengketa investasi,
tetapi juga seimbang nilai yang berbeda dipertaruhkan. [FN14] Apakah model ini adjudicative cukup memadai untuk
menangani hak-hak masyarakat adat?
* 802 Pasal ini akan lanjutkan sebagai berikut. Bagian II menyajikan penjelasan singkat dan penilaian munculnya
norma-norma internasional yang melindungi warisan budaya tradisional.Bagian III menggambarkan kerangka
investasi hukum, investor-negara arbitrase, dan muncul isu yang relevan. Bagian IV dan V meneliti konflik norma
melindungi warisan budaya tradisional dan norma-norma investasi dengan mengacu pada kasus-kasus yang
relevan. Hak-hak masyarakat adat telah memainkan peran marjinal hanya dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase;
masyarakat adat yang terkena dampak hampir tidak memiliki legal standing dalam prosedur ini dan telah
memanfaatkan hanya prosedur partisipatif terbatas. Peran yang terbatas mereka berbanding terbalik dengan jumlah
arbitrase yang melibatkan hak-hak masyarakat adat.
Bagian VI dan VII menawarkan rekomendasi yang lebih baik akan mendamaikan kepentingan yang berbeda
dipertaruhkan dan dengan demikian menjamin perlindungan hak-hak masyarakat adat dalam konteks investor-
negara arbitrase.Sebuah judicialization moderat proses arbitrase melalui peningkatan transparansi dan keterbukaan
dapat memastikan partisipasi yang lebih baik dalam proses oleh perwakilan masyarakat adat. Namun, judicialization
ekstrim dari proses arbitrase tidak diinginkan karena pada akhirnya akan merusak alasan yang mendasari negara
investor arbitrase. Menurut hukum internasional, negara memiliki kewajiban untuk melindungi hak masyarakat adat,
dan mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa lainnya yang tersedia yang dapat menjamin masyarakat adat akses ke
keadilan. Jika investor asing negara tantangan langkah-langkah memajukan hak-hak masyarakat adat 'sebelum
pengadilan, hak asasi manusia pertimbangan tidak dapat diberhentikan oleh pengadilan arbitrase sebagai tidak
relevan. Bahkan di mana negara bagian tidak membuat referensi terhadap kewajiban hak asasi manusia mereka,
mungkin mempertanyakan apakah arbiter bisa mengabaikan kebijakan publik internasional dalam konteks
proses. Dalam pelaksanaan fungsi yudisial, arbiter perlu mengambil hukum internasional ke rekening. Jika norma-
norma eksternal hukum investasi internasional datang ke depan, para arbiter mungkin membawa mereka ke rekening
meskipun incidenter tantum.Bagian VIII menyimpulkan.
II. PERLINDUNGAN WARISAN BUDAYA ADAT DALAM HUKUM INTERNASIONAL
Kedaulatan budaya, yang berarti kebebasan negara apapun untuk memilih model budaya, secara tradisional jatuh
dalam yurisdiksi domestik 803 * negara. [FN15] Meskipun demikian, dalam enam puluh tahun terakhir telah terjadi
erosi bertahap dari domain cadangan negara-negara di sektor budaya, [FN16] karena munculnya dan kodifikasi
hukum hak asasi manusia dan hukum budaya internasional. [FN17] Bagian ini membahas bagaimana dan sampai
sejauh mana warisan budaya adat dilindungi di bawah hukum internasional.
Bagian ini diorganisasikan sebagai berikut: pertama, menyelidiki gagasan indigeneity, kedua, ia mendalami gagasan
warisan budaya pada umumnya dan gagasan spesifik dari warisan budaya tradisional, ketiga, mengkaji instrumen
hukum internasional yang melindungi warisan budaya tradisional, dankeempat, itu alamat apakah norma hukum
kebiasaan internasional membutuhkan perlindungan warisan budaya tradisional. Evolusi pendapat hukum dan
praktek negara telah menyebabkan banyak untuk menyimpulkan bahwa "beberapa hak adat telah mencapai status
hukum internasional adat, oleh karena itu, statesregardless mengikat apakah mereka telah meratifikasi perjanjian
yang relevan." [FN18] Akhirnya, menyimpulkan bahwa hak-hak budaya merupakan komponen penting dari hak-hak
masyarakat adat dan melengkapi hak-hak lain mereka manusia.
V. STUDI KASUS
Sampai saat ini sengketa investasi melibatkan beberapa warisan budaya tradisional. Meskipun tidak mungkin untuk
memeriksa semua penghargaan ini dalam konteks kontribusi ini, pilihan studi kasus akan analitis dinilai. Meskipun ini
kasus hukum tidak homogen, dapat diteliti sesuai dengan taksonomi klaim dibawa oleh investor asing, termasuk,
antara lain: (1) pengambilalihan, (2) kurangnya perlakuan yang adil dan merata, (3) diskriminasi, dan (4) kurangnya
perlindungan penuh dan keamanan. Argumen budaya dibahas dalam setiap kasus akan dianalisis dan dinilai secara
kritis dalam terang kerangka hukum yang melindungi warisan budaya masyarakat adat pada tingkat hukum
internasional. Alasan dari pengadilan arbitrase karena itu akan dievaluasi dalam konteks hukum hak asasi manusia
dan hukum saat ini.
Pengambilalihan A. Klaim
Bentrokan antara budaya adat dan budaya ekonomi nasional dan internasional telah diadili di berbagai tingkatan: (1)
pengadilan administrasi dan konstitusi pada tingkat nasional, [FN199] (2) badan hak asasi manusia di [FN200] tingkat
regional dan internasional * 838 , [FN201] dan (3) pengadilan arbitrase. Sedangkan analisis ilmiah dan penilaian kritis
dari dua mantan yang luas, [FN202] sedikit yang diketahui tentang kasus hukum yang muncul dari pengadilan
arbitrase berurusan dengan unsur-unsur warisan budaya asli. Mengingat dampak yang penghargaan arbitrase dapat
memiliki pada kehidupan masyarakat adat dan budaya, pengawasan dan penilaian kritis terhadap yurisprudensi ini
adalah relevansi penting. Beberapa perjanjian arbitrase investasi telah berurusan dengan pertanyaan apakah
regulasi diduga ditujukan untuk melindungi warisan budaya tradisional dapat dianggap menjadi pengambilalihan tidak
langsung atau ukuran sama dengan pengambilalihan.
Dalam Kasus Emas Glamis, sebuah perusahaan pertambangan Kanada direncanakan untuk menambang emas di
Proyek Imperial, di darat federal di * 839 tenggara California. [FN203] Menurut penggugat, namun, tidak hanya AS
Negeri Departemen gagal untuk segera menyetujui proyek itu, sehingga masuk akal menunda operasi
pertambangan, tapi regulasi California membutuhkan penimbunan open-tambang emas juga membuat operasi
pertambangan tidak ekonomis. [FN204] Oleh karena itu, investor mengklaim inter alia, bahwa Amerika Serikat telah
mengambil alih hak pertambangan yang melanggar Pasal 1110 Perjanjian Perdagangan Bebas Amerika Utara
[FN205] Dalam penghargaan, majelis arbitrase menyatakan bahwa langkah-langkah yang mengeluh
tidak. menimbulkan dampak ekonomi yang cukup untuk investasi Glamis 'dan dengan demikian tidak jumlah untuk
pengambilalihan regulasi. [FN206]
Jika kita menganggap fakta-fakta kasus, daerah di sekitar Proyek Imperial "sangat dimanfaatkan oleh pra-kontak asli
Amerika sebagai rute perjalanan." [FN207] Selain itu, Quechan, suku asli Amerika, menentang proyek karena itu
akan menghancurkan Trail of Dreams, jalan suci masih digunakan ketika melakukan praktek seremonial. Perwakilan
dari suku menekankan bahwa suku telah mengizinkan operasi pertambangan lain untuk "pergi dengan," "sebagian
karena [mereka] tahu [mereka] memiliki luas dalam cadangan ... dimiliki oleh publik." Dengan demikian, wilayah
Proyek Imperial menjadi "pertahanan terakhir." Suku itu [FN208] Karena penelitian dampak lingkungan 2000
menunjukkan bahwa pilihan terbaik adalah bahwa "tidak ada tindakan," menarik Departemen Dalam Negeri Proyek
Imperial dari entry mineral lebih selama 20 tahun untuk melindungi properti bersejarah. [FN209] Pada tahun 2002,
bagaimanapun, izin untuk proyek ini diberikan dan Pertambangan Negara dan Badan Geologi mengundangkan
peraturan darurat yang memerlukan penimbunan semua terbuka tambang untuk menciptakan kembali perkiraan
kontur tanah sebelum penambangan. [FN210]
Dalam menanggapi tindakan federal dan negara, penggugat mengajukan Pemberitahuan atas Arbitrase, menyatakan
bahwa negara bagian dan federal merupakan suatu tindakan pengambilalihan tidak langsung melanggar Pasal 1110
NAFTA.Penuntut menegaskan bahwa responden kehilangan * nya kepentingan properti 840 dari nilai
mereka. [FN211] Menurut penggugat, pengambilalihan dimulai dengan penolakan melanggar hukum pemerintah
federal untuk menyetujui rencana penggugat dari operasi dan dilanjutkan dengan persyaratan penimbunan. [FN212]
Secara khusus, penimbunan akan ekonomis dan sewenang-wenang karena tidak akan rasional terkait dengan tujuan
yang dinyatakan melindungi sumber daya budaya. [FN213] Penggugat menunjukkan bahwa "setelah Anda
mengambil materi keluar [dari] tanah dan jika ada sumber daya budaya di permukaan, mereka menghancurkan
kotoran Menempatkan kembali di pit sebenarnya tidak melindungi sumber daya tersebut." Tetapi
mungkin menyebabkan penguburan artefak lebih dan menyebabkan kerusakan lingkungan yang lebih besar. [FN214]
Dengan demikian, penggugat berpendapat bahwa langkah-langkah California bertujuan untuk "menghentikan Proyek
Imperial dari yang pernah melanjutkan sambil berusaha untuk menghindari pembayaran kompensasi itu tahu akan
diperlukan memilikinya transparan dan diproses langsung melalui eminent domain." [FN215]
Dalam pernyataannya, Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa pertambangan adalah industri yang sangat diatur dan
bahwa setiap investor harus memiliki cukup wajar mengantisipasi perluasan peraturan-peraturan tersebut. [FN216]
Responden menyebutkan bahwa, sementara negara-negara lain telah benar-benar melarang penggunaan semua
pertambangan terbuka, [FN217] undang-undang California tidak menghalangi penggalian dan eksploitasi mineral dari
zona: itu diperlukan pengurukan untuk mengembalikan lanskap ke jalan itu sebelum operasi
pertambangan. Responden juga menekankan bahwa dalam kasus ini legislatif itu mencoba [FN218] "untuk
mendamaikan kepentingan-kepentingan yang bersaing dengan mengatasi ancaman ke situs asli Amerika di
[Kawasan Konservasi Gurun California] sementara mengakui hak-hak pertambangan perusahaan untuk menambang
di sana." Di satutangan, California langkah efektif membatasi tumpukan sampah yang akan menghalangi
pemandangan dari Running Man untuk Pass India. [FN219] Di sisi lain, perusahaan masih bisa sepenuhnya
menggunakan properti. Menurut Amerika Serikat, itu tidak akan tidak proporsional bagi suatu Negara untuk
mewajibkan pertambangan * 841 operator untuk menginternalisasi biaya kerusakan lingkungan yang disebabkan
oleh kegiatan mereka sendiri. [FN220]
Majelis arbitrase ditemukan argumen pengambilalihan penggugat untuk menjadi tidak berdasar. [FN221] Dalam
rangka untuk membedakan regulasi non-compensable dan pengambilalihan diganti rugi, pengadilan menetapkan uji
dua-tier, di mana ia dipastikan: (1) sejauh mana langkah-langkah mengganggu ekspektasi yang wajar dan investasi
yang didukung dari kerangka kerja peraturan yang stabil, dan (2) tujuan dan karakter dari tindakan pemerintah yang
diambil.[FN222] Pertama, pengadilan menemukan bahwa tindakan California penimbunan "tidak menyebabkan
dampak ekonomi yang cukup untuk Proyek Imperial untuk efek pengambilalihan investasi Pemohon itu." [FN223]
Kedua, pengadilan dianggap sebagai langkah-langkah untuk secara rasional berkaitan dengan tujuan yang
dinyatakan. [FN224] Pengadilan mengakui bahwa "beberapa artefak budaya memang akan terganggu, jika tidak
dikuburkan, dalam proses penggalian dan pengurukan," [FN225] tetapi menyimpulkan bahwa, tanpa tindakan-
tindakan legislatif tersebut, pemandangannya akan dirugikan oleh lubang signifikan dan tumpukan sampah di sekitar
dekat. [FN226] Hebatnya, sidang arbitrase juga tegas dimaksud dalam Pasal 12 dari Konvensi Warisan Dunia,
[FN227] yang membutuhkan Amerika untuk melindungi warisan budaya mereka bahkan jika tidak terdaftar dalam
daftar Warisan Dunia. [FN228] ini agak luar biasa sebagai ahli warisan budaya telah berulang kali menekankan
bahwa Pasal 12 dari WHC merupakan penyediaan layanan sering diabaikan. [FN229]
* 842 Dalam ay Sungai Agung Amerika Serikat, klaim pengambilalihan dibawa terhadap negara tuan rumah oleh
perusahaan asing dikendalikan oleh masyarakat adat. [FN230] Sebuah perusahaan Kanada yang bergerak dalam
tembakau ekspor di Amerika Serikat berpendapat bahwa investasinya telah dirugikan oleh Perjanjian Penyelesaian
Guru AS (MSA), [FN231] yang memerlukan kontribusi dana dari perusahaan tembakau untuk membayar biaya yang
dikeluarkan dalam pengobatan pasien miskin yang menderita penyakit terkait tembakau. [FN232] Dalam pertukaran
untuk pembayaran tersebut, AS menjatuhkan semua tuntutan hukum terhadap industri tembakau. [FN233] Secara
umum, para pemohon berargumen bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan tembakau besar berkonspirasi untuk memastikan
bahwa perusahaan-perusahaan lain ditutupi oleh ketentuan penyelesaian untuk memaksa perusahaan-perusahaan
kecil keluar dari bisnis.[FN234] Para penggugat berargumen bahwa regulasi tersebut sebesar, antara lain, untuk
pengambilalihan tidak langsung, melanggar NAFTA Pasal 1110. [FN235] Responden berpendapat, bagaimanapun,
bahwa tindakan pengaturan dalam pemeliharaan kesehatan publik tidak sebesar pengambilalihan, asalkan "tidak
jelas pelanggaran dan diskriminatif dari hukum negara yang bersangkutan, dan tidak masuk akal keberangkatan dari
prinsip-prinsip keadilan yang diakui oleh sistem hukum dunia. " [FN236]
* 843 Sidang arbitrase menolak klaim pengambilalihan.Sementara penggugat telah menegaskan bahwa langkah-
langkah yang disengketakan tidak konsisten dengan "harapan yang sah ... untuk tidak tunduk pada MSA-peraturan
terkait tindakan" karena statusnya sebagai anggota salah satu Perserikatan Bangsa Pertama di Amerika Utara,
[FN237]pengadilan menolak untuk "memutuskan apakah atau tidak [penuntut] [wa] s yang benar pada proposisi
hukum yang mendasari domestik kekebalan dari regulasi negara." [FN238] Sebaliknya, pengadilan memutuskan
bahwa, "[o] rdinarily, ekspektasi yang wajar atau sah dari jenis yang dilindungi oleh NAFTA adalah mereka yang
muncul melalui representasi yang ditargetkan atau jaminan dibuat secara eksplisit maupun implisit oleh pihak
negara." [FN239] Karena "perdagangan produk tembakau secara historis menjadi subyek peraturan dekat dan luas
oleh Amerika Serikat" pengadilan berpendapat bahwa investor seharusnya tidak cukup diharapkan untuk terlibat
dalam skala besar bisnis distribusi tembakau tanpa menghadapi peraturan negara. [FN240] Mengandalkan
sebelumnya NAFTA kasus, pengadilan juga menyatakan bahwa NAFTA Pasal 1110 mensyaratkan "perampasan
lengkap atau sangat besar pemilik hak 'dalam totalitas investasi." [FN241] Sebagai bisnis penggugat tetap
"menguntungkan," [FN242] pengadilan menyimpulkan bahwa tidak ada pengambilalihan. [FN243]
C. Diskriminasi
Unsur penting dalam perselisihan investasi dengan unsur-unsur warisan budaya adalah pemastian non-diskriminasi
terhadap investor asing. Prinsip non-diskriminasi biasanya tercermin dalam dua ketentuan-ketentuan investasi
perjanjian: perlakuan nasional (NT) dan paling disukai bangsa (MFN) pengobatan.[FN265] Kedua standar tidak
menjamin tingkat tertentu perlindungan tetapi standar relatif yang memerlukan negara tuan rumah untuk mengobati
investor asing dengan cara yang sama bahwa investor domestik atau investor dari negara lain akan
diperlakukan. [FN266] Tujuan dasar dari klausul MFN dan NT untuk menghindari diskriminasi dan menjamin
kesempatan yang sama kompetitif bagi investor asing di negara tuan rumah.[FN267] Pertanyaan kunci adalah
apakah investasi asing sedang diatur * 848 karena tujuan kebijakan publik, atau apakah mereka sedang diatur
berdasarkan kepemilikan asing. [FN268]
Saat ini tidak diragukan lagi sulit untuk melihat bahasa secara terbuka diskriminatif dalam peraturan, meskipun
karakteristik ini telah muncul dalam perselisihan investasi. Misalnya, kasus Gallo tertunda v. Kanada adalah penting
karena menyangkut regulasi bahwa bahkan dalam judul meliputi referensi untuk investasi asing. [FN269] investasi itu
menyangkut penciptaan TPA pada situs-lubang tambang terbuka mantan terletak di utara Ontario.[FN270] Pada
tahun 2004, pemerintah Ontario provinsi baru terpilih membuat undang-undang mencegah proyek dari
melanjutkan. [FN271] Akuisisi lahan baru tidak diberikan kepada investor baik. [FN272] Investor, nasional AS,
mengajukan arbitrase investor-negara menuduh pengambilalihan dan pelanggaran standar FET dan meminta
kompensasi. [FN273]
Kanada, antara lain, menegaskan bahwa akuisisi beberapa daerah itu ditolak karena perusahaan belum memenuhi
kewajiban untuk berkonsultasi dengan masyarakat Aborigin yang relevan [FN274] dan bahwa * 849 diusulkan
pengalihan lahan akan melanggar hak-hak Aborigin. [FN275] Kanada juga berpendapat bahwa undang-undang
berlaku disebabkan oleh hidro-geologi kondisi tambang. [FN276] Meskipun kasus ini belum diputuskan, tampak
bahwa kedua argumen yang disajikan oleh pihak - dugaan diskriminasi dan pembenaran dugaan sama - akan harus
diperhitungkan oleh pengadilan arbitrase untuk menentukan apakah ada adalah diskriminasi dan, jika ini terjadi,
apakah perbedaan dalam pengobatan dibenarkan oleh keadaan kasus ini.
Dalam Yohanes Andre v. Kanada, seorang pengusaha yang berbasis di AS mengajukan Pemberitahuan Niat untuk
arbitrase, menyatakan kerugian timbul dari tindakan legislatif yang mempengaruhi nya karibu-berburu pakaian
eceran di Kanada Utara. [FN277] Sebelum tahun 2007, penggugat telah 360 lisensi berburu karibu (disebut Caribou
Tags Kuota) dan kamp berburu terorganisir bagi wisatawan dan pemburu yang akan melakukan perjalanan dari
lokasi di luar Kanada untuk tanah asli di Kanada Barat, Wilayah Utara (NWT). [FN278] Pada tahun 2007, Pemerintah
NWT memutuskan untuk memberikan hanya Tags Caribou tujuh puluh lima kuota per pakaian eceran.[FN279]
Outfitters dengan komitmen untuk klien akan diminta untuk membeli Tags Caribou Kuota dari pesaing
mereka.[FN280] Penggugat berpendapat bahwa pihak berwenang yang relevan telah memotong jumlah lisensi
berburu secara diskriminatif. [FN281] Karena banyak Outfitters lokal hanya digunakan 75-100 Tags Caribou Kuota
atau kurang per tahun, penggugat menuduh bahwa Pemerintah mengembangkan strategi untuk meminimalkan efek
negatif pada Outfitters lokal dan memaksimalkan efek negatif pada investor . [FN282] Investor demikian mengklaim
telah * 850 telah ditargetkan sebagai non-penduduk Kanada dan telah didiskriminasikan atas dasar kebangsaan AS-
nya. [FN283]
Pers baru-baru ini melaporkan bahwa sementara larangan tersebut awalnya termasuk perburuan karibu aborigin,
pemerintahan NWT dan Tlicho pemerintah asli bersama-sama telah sepakat untuk menjaga larangan berburu total
hanya untuk non-aborigin pemburu dan Outfitters perburuan komersial.[FN284] Dengan kata lain, sementara
perburuan olahraga karibu tetap dibatalkan, [FN285] perburuan subsistensi asli akan dia diizinkan.
Perlakuan diferensial dapat dibenarkan di bawah hukum hak asasi manusia. Perburuan jatuh memungkinkan suku-
suku adat untuk melestarikan budaya tradisional mereka dan bergantung pada daging karibu di musim
dingin. [FN286] Sejumlah kasus di tingkat internasional, regional, dan nasional memberikan bukti pengakuan hak-hak
budaya masyarakat adat dalam pengertian ini. Dalam kasus Kitok, Komite Hak Asasi Manusia menyatakan bahwa
peternakan rusa, sebagai mata pencaharian tradisional masyarakat adat Saami, adalah kegiatan yang dilindungi
menurut Pasal 27 ICCPR [FN287] Dalam Jouni Lansman ay Finlandia, Komite menemukan bahwa menggiring rusa
cocok.dalam definisi kegiatan budaya. [FN288] Dalam mencapai kesimpulan ini, Komite telah mengakui bahwa
kegiatan subsisten masyarakat adat merupakan bagian integral dari budaya mereka:
Berkenaan dengan pelaksanaan hak-hak budaya yang dilindungi dalam Pasal 27, Komite mengamati budaya yang
memanifestasikan dirinya dalam berbagai bentuk, termasuk cara tertentu hidup yang terkait dengan penggunaan
sumber daya lahan, khusus [sic] dalam kasus masyarakat adat. Hak yang dapat mencakup kegiatan suchtraditional
sebagai memancing atau berburu .... Pemenuhan hak tersebut memerlukan langkah-langkah hukum positif * 851
perlindungan dan langkah-langkah untuk menjamin partisipasi efektif dari anggota masyarakat minoritas dalam
pengambilan keputusan yang mempengaruhi mereka .... Perlindungan hak-hak diarahkan untuk menjamin
kelangsungan hidup dan pengembangan lanjutan dari identitas budaya, agama dan sosial dari minoritas yang
bersangkutan, sehingga memperkaya struktur masyarakat secara keseluruhan. [FN289]
Pada tingkat nasional, pada tahun 1999, Pengadilan Tinggi Australia menolak tuduhan terhadap anggota suku asli
yang telah menangkap dua buaya muda di Queensland menggunakan tombak tradisional. [FN290] Meskipun
pemohon tidak memiliki izin berburu, Pengadilan menyimpulkan bahwa ia dibebaskan dari kewajiban memperoleh
izin, karena aksinya didasarkan pada kebiasaan tradisional yang dianggap aborigin menangkap buaya muda
signifikansi spiritual yang tinggi. [FN291] Kasus AS dari orang-orang Makah yang mendapat izin untuk berburu ikan
paus juga memiliki bantalan pada kepentingan budaya dan lingkungan bersaing dalam debat berburu asli. [FN292]
Baru-baru ini, Kanada telah mengajukan gugatan Inuit sebelum Pengadilan Eropa untuk membatalkan suatu
peraturan Uni Eropa [FN293] melarang impor produk segel ke Uni Eropa.[FN294] Para * 852 peraturan tegas
mengakui bahwa "berburu merupakan bagian integral dari budaya dan identitas anggota masyarakat Inuit, dan
dengan demikian diakui oleh Deklarasi PBB tentang Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat." [FN295] Dengan demikian,
menyatakan bahwa "menempatkan di pasar produk segel yang hasil dari perburuan tradisional yang dilakukan oleh
Inuit dan masyarakat adat lain dan yang berkontribusi terhadap subsistensi mereka seharusnya
diperbolehkan." [FN296] Meskipun Inuit dibebaskan dari larangan tersebut, mereka mengklaim mereka tetap
terpengaruh, [FN297] sebagai peraturan yang "mungkin akan mengakibatkan hilangnya, antara lain, pasar di
infrastruktur seperti rumah lelang dan penyamakan kulit, yang sebagian besar dimiliki oleh non-Inuit perusahaan
komersial. " [FN298] Selain itu, "karena orang Inuit tidak mengekspor produk segel sendiri, pengurangan yang
Peraturan No 1007/2009 menyediakan dalam mendukung Inuit akan tetap sebuah 'kotak kosong."' [FN299] Para
pemohon juga mengklaim bahwa peraturan serius mempengaruhi hak mereka "untuk terlibat dalam eksploitasi
komersial dari produk segel, yang merupakan sumber penting pendapatan mereka." [FN300] Pada bulan Agustus
2010, Pengadilan Umum ECJ itu diterima permintaan moratorium oleh masyarakat adat, tetapi masih terlalu dini
untuk memprediksi bagaimana sengketa akan berkembang. [FN301] Kasus ini menarik karena menunjukkan bahwa
bahkan pembebasan aborigin tidak dapat cukup untuk mempertahankan praktek-praktek budaya, dan, pada
gilirannya, praktek-praktek budaya dapat berbenturan dengan masalah lingkungan.
Sebuah "pembebasan Aborigin" adalah fitur umum dari undang-undang konservasi sumber daya alam. [FN302]
Sejumlah environmentaltreaties internasional yang melindungi spesies tertentu termasuk derogations prinsip-prinsip
utama mereka untuk "mengakomodir kebutuhan * 853 pengguna subsisten tradisional spesies tersebut," [FN303]
sehingga melindungi praktek-praktek perburuan tradisional terkait dengan warisan budaya
masyarakat bersangkutan. Misalnya, Pasal VII Konvensi 1957 tentang Konservasi Utara Seal Fur Pasifik
menjelaskan praktik berburu aborigin yang dikecualikan oleh penerapan Konvensi. [FN304] Konvensi 1931 untuk
Peraturan Penangkapan Ikan Paus tegas diperbolehkan subsistensi asli paus. [FN305] Konvensi 1946 Internasional
untuk Peraturan Penangkapan Ikan Paus, yang menggantikan Konvensi 1931, mempertahankan hak aborigin untuk
penangkapan ikan paus subsisten. [FN306]
Pengadilan telah menyoroti adanya ketertiban Culturel publique.[FN356] Misalnya, Mahkamah Agung Swiss telah
mengakui keberadaan ketertiban umum internasional di bidang properti budaya: [FN357]
* 862 Lorsque, comme l'espéce, la demande sur la porte d'un bien restitusi Culturel, le juge de l'entraide doit prendre
en veiller à l'interet Compte publik internasional ... bohong la de ces biens perlindungan. Ces normes, qui d'une
relèvent inspirasi komune, konstituen autant d'un ordre d'ekspresi publik internasional en vigueur ou en formasi
... ces normes, qui l'concrétisent d'une impératif Lutte internationale efficace Contre le traffic de biens culturels
.... [FN358]
"[A] kontrak yang melanggar aturan asing melarang ekspor harta nasional bisa dianggap batal secara independen
dari keabsahan berdasarkan hukum ... substantif berlaku untuk kontrak." [FN359] Misalnya, Bundesgerichtshof
Jerman (Mahkamah Agung) telah mengakui bahwa kontrak asuransi tunduk pada hukum Jerman adalah batal demi
hukum karena terkait dengan ekspor ilegal barang-barang budaya dari Nigeria.[FN360]
Bagaimana pengadilan arbitrase ditangani dengan kebijakan publik dan jus cogens? Kebijakan publik telah disebut
"kuda sangat sulit diatur, dan ketika begitu Anda mendapatkan mengangkang itu Anda tidak pernah tahu di mana itu
akan membawa Anda." [FN361] Namun demikian. telah tegas dinyatakan dalam serangkaian arbitrase
internasional. Misalnya, dalam Maria Luz arbitrase, tsar Rusia, duduk sebagai arbiter tunggal, menarik pada
kebijakan publik dalam menyatakan bahwa Jepang "tidak melanggar aturan umum Hukum Bangsa" membebaskan
budak di dilakukan pada Peru kapal Maria Luz dan menyangkal * 863 berikutnya tuntutan untuk ganti rugi warga
Peru. [FN362] Baru-baru ini, dalam arbitrase ICC, Mr Lagergreen, bertindak sebagai arbiter tunggal, menyatakan
bahwa "tidak dapat diganggu gugat bahwa ada prinsip umum hukum yang diakui oleh bangsa-bangsa beradab yang
melanggar kontrak yang serius adat istiadat bonos atau publik internasional kebijakan valid atau setidaknya tidak
dapat diterapkan dan bahwa mereka tidak dapat disetujui oleh pengadilan atau arbiter. "[FN363]
Demikian pula, di Perusahaan Dunia Duty Free Terbatas v. Republik Kenya, [FN364] Pusat Internasional untuk
Penyelesaian Perselisihan Investasi (ICSID) Pengadilan sebagaimana dimaksud kebijakan publik internasional dan
tidak memungkinkan klaim berdasarkan suap atau kontrak yang diperoleh oleh korupsi . [FN365] Mengadopsi
pandangan yang sama, Pengadilan ICSID dalam kasus Methanex menegaskan bahwa "sebagai masalah hukum
konstitusi internasional, pengadilan memiliki tugas independen untuk menerapkan prinsip-prinsip imperatif hukum
atau jus cogens dan tidak memberikan efek kepada para pihak ' pilihan hukum yang tidak konsisten dengan prinsip-
prinsip seperti itu. " [FN366] Dalam kasus lain, seperti Profesor Martin Hunter menunjukkan, meskipun arbiter "akan
mengklaim bahwa mereka tidak pernah menerapkan prinsip-prinsip transnasional kebijakan publik dalam
merumuskan penghargaan mereka," mereka telah menerapkan prinsip-prinsip kebijakan publik, khususnya berkaitan
dengan barang-barang lingkungan. [FN367]
Kebijakan publik adalah sebuah konsep yang fleksibel dan dinamis yang dapat digunakan sebagai mekanisme
korektif atau sebagai alat untuk menyeimbangkan tujuan rumit dan sering bertentangan. [FN368] Oleh karena itu,
komentator telah menyoroti bahwa "[a] ny tribunalowes kewajiban kepada masyarakat internasional untuk
menerapkan kebijakan publik internasional" dan bahwa "tidak ada yang bisa membebaskan pengadilan dari
mandatnya untuk menerapkan kebijakan publik."[FN369] Para * 864 tujuan utama ketertiban umum internasional
adalah untuk menjaga integritas dari norma-norma dasar dari hukum internasional. Dalam hal ini, kebijakan publik
menyangkut "konstitusional" aspek hukum internasional publik [FN370] Sebagai negara tuan rumah di mana
masyarakat adat tinggal "latihan [s] otoritas yang berdaulat sebagai [a] fidusia rakyat tunduk pada kekuasaan [yang]
[, ] ... [itu] harus sesuai dengan jus cogens "[FN371] dan, jika relevan, lihat kewajibannya untuk masyarakat adat
dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase. Jika negara tidak, itu melanggar kewajiban internasionalnya terhadap
masyarakat adat, khususnya hak mereka untuk menentukan nasib sendiri [FN372] dan hak budaya mereka. [FN373]
Kebijakan publik internasional menuntut bahwa arbiter internasional menerapkan kebijakan publik internasional
sebagai bagian dari hukum yang berlaku. [FN374] Sebagai prinsip penentuan nasib sendiri telah dipandang sebagai
"norma-norma umum hukum internasional," [FN375] argumen untuk mengambil ke rekening di investor-negara:
arbitrase menjadi menarik. Ini bukan pertanyaan tentang aplikasi langsung non-investasi principaliter norma-norma
oleh pengadilan arbitrase. Sebaliknya, itu adalah pertanyaan apakah pengadilan arbitrase harus mengacu pada
hukum internasional dalam mengevaluasi apakah kebijakan negara dibenarkan, bahkan jika seperti * 865 kebijakan
sebaliknya akan tidak konsisten dengan perjanjian investasi. [FN376] Dalam kasus apapun, arbiter terikat untuk
menerapkan norma-norma ditaati hukum internasional yang relevan apakah atau tidak mereka mengaku oleh para
pihak. Pertanyaannya bukanlah apakah untuk menambahkan klaim baru untuk mereka yang diartikulasikan oleh para
pihak, tetapi untuk menentukan hukum yang berlaku dalam sengketa. [FN377]
B. Interpretasi Perjanjian
Interaksi antara perlindungan warisan budaya dan promosi FDI tidak jelas ditujukan oleh mayoritas perjanjian
investasi, [FN378] dengan beberapa pengecualian yang luar biasa. [FN379] Dalam lanskap terfragmentasi, di mana
pengadilan arbitrase tampaknya memiliki kata terakhir pada tema penting di persimpangan budaya dan ekonomi,
interpretasi perjanjian adalah sangat penting. [FN380]
* 866 aturan Adat penafsiran perjanjian, sebagaimana tercermin dalam Konvensi Wina tentang Hukum Perjanjian,
membutuhkan interpretasi sistemik dan referensi ke "peraturan terkait dari hukum internasional yang berlaku dalam
hubungan antara pihak-pihak." [FN381] Sebagai majelis arbitrase di Asia Ltd Produk Pertanian v. Republik Sri Lanka
mengatakan, [FN382] BITS adalah "bukan sistem hukum mandiri tertutup" tetapi harus "dipertimbangkan dalam
konteks yang lebih luas yuridis dimana aturan dari sumber lain yang terpadu melalui metode penggabungan tersirat,
atau dengan referensi langsung aturan tambahan tertentu apakah karakter hukum internasional atau hukum
domestik alam. " [FN383] Selain itu, karena perjanjian investasi biasanya mengabadikan hak-hak investor dalam
"bahasa umum, bertekstur terbuka," "pertimbangan praktis dapat mendorong penafsir untuk mencari bimbingan dari
hukum internasional umum." [FN384]
Pengadilan arbitrase, bagaimanapun, sering mengadopsi reduksionis atau visi minimalis mandat arbitrase. [FN385]
pengadilan Arbitrase jarang ditujukan hukum eksternal dengan hukum investasi, sebagai norma-norma jarang
dipanggil oleh investor dalam arbitrase investasi. [FN386] Bahkan ketika non-investasi norma dipanggil, pengadilan
arbitrase telah baik membubarkan mereka dengan alasan hukum atau gagal untuk mengatasi mereka sama
sekali. [FN387] Bahkan ketika negara-negara tuan rumah * 867relied pada pertimbangan hak asasi manusia untuk
membenarkan tindakan dengan efek buruk pada investasi, dengan alasan bahwa tindakan mereka sebagai
kelanjutan tertentu komitmen hak asasi manusia internasional, mereka telah bertemu hanya sedikit keberhasilan.
[FN388] Sebagai Reiner dan Schreuer menunjukkan, "tampaknya [t] hese penghargaan untuk menunjukkan
keengganan pengadilan 'untuk mengambil hal-hal mengenai hak asasi manusia, lebih memilih untuk mengabaikan
masalah yang diangkat, secara prosedural, daripada berurusan dengan argumen substantif itu sendiri."[FN389]
Keengganan pengadilan arbitrase untuk menerapkan hukum eksternal untuk undang-undang investasi
mencerminkan kurangnya pertimbangan masalah politik dan sosial yang lebih luas dan dapat melemahkan efektivitas
yang lebih luas (dan legitimasi dianggap) investor-negara arbitrase. [FN390] Seperti yang terlihat di atas, norma-
norma adat internasional interpretasi perjanjian memerlukan penafsiran sistematis. Investor-negara arbitrase adalah
makhluk hukum internasional, dengan unsur-unsur hukum publik. Kewenangan pengadilan arbitrase tidak hanya
tergantung pada kehendak para pihak, tetapi pada perjanjian internasional.
Sebagai kesimpulan, penafsiran tidak hanya merupakan latihan logika hukum; ". Masalah selaras dengan apa,
menginginkan sebuah kata yang lebih baik, orang mungkin pengalaman panjang dan akal sehat" yang alat
penafsiran hakim menyebarkan sama [FN391] Sementara kemampuan arbitrase investasi untuk fungsi jelas penting,
kepentingan masyarakat dalam latihan yang sah otoritas dan pemeliharaan * 868 nilai-nilai yuridis adalah sama
pentingnya. [FN392] pengadilan Arbitrase harus mengambil lebih dari pertimbangan ekonomi ke rekening. [FN393]
Karena penawaran arbitrase investor negara dengan isu-isu penting hak asasi manusia, dimensi hukum perselisihan
ini tidak dapat diabaikan atau diberhentikan mendukung murni pertimbangan ekonomis.
* 880 Beberapa aturan arbitrase menyediakan akses publik terbatas pada sidang arbitrase, tetapi mereka
pengecualian.Menurut Pasal 28 (3) dari Peraturan UNCITRAL, dengar pendapat yang akan diadakan di kamera,
kecuali para pihak menyetujui lain. [FN462] Peraturan 32 dari Aturan Arbitrase ICSID 2003 diperlukan persetujuan
pihak non-partai pertemuan sidang. [FN463] Aturan 32 tahun 2006 Arbitrase ICSID Aturan menyatakan bahwa
"kecuali salah objek partai," pengadilan, setelah berkonsultasi dengan Sekretaris Jenderal ICSID, dapat
memungkinkan non-partai untuk menghadiri atau mengamati semua atau bagian dari sidang arbitrase. [FN464]
Sekali lagi, solusi yang lebih diinginkan muncul dalam konteks NAFTA, dimana NAFTA Pihak Negara telah sepakat
untuk mendukung sidang terbuka. [FN465] Dalam kasus Emas Glamis, masyarakat diundang untuk melihat proses di
ruang yang terpisah melalui televisi sirkuit tertutup. [FN466] Para Quechan diundang untuk melihat proses dari lokasi
yang berbeda dengan video feed terpisah untuk memungkinkan melihat mereka diskusi lain dibatasi lokasi
budaya. [FN467]
Keuntungan eksogen keterbukaan yang memungkinkan pengawasan publik dan partisipasi publik akhirnya. Telah
ada perdebatan * 881 apakah non-pihak yang berkepentingan dalam arbitrase dari suatu sengketa investasi harus
diperbolehkan untuk memberikan masukan amicus curiae. [FN468] Amici curiae tidak teknis pihak
prosedurnya. Sebaliknya mereka memasok pengadilan dengan informasi dan analisis hukum yang dapat membantu
untuk mencapai visi yang lebih lengkap dari latar belakang fakta dan hukum kasus. Sementara Pasal 17 (1) dari
Peraturan UNCITRAL, yang telah direvisi pada tahun 2010, memungkinkan majelis arbitrase "untuk melakukan
arbitrase sedemikian rupa dianggap sesuai," Pasal 37 (2) dari Peraturan ICSID, sebagaimana telah diubah pada
tahun 2006, menyediakan bahwa pengadilan dapat memungkinkan "non-partai yang bersengketa untuk mengajukan
pengajuan ditulis dengan Pengadilan tentang suatu hal dalam lingkup sengketa."[FN469] Oleh karena itu, sampai ke
pengadilan untuk memutuskan apakah untuk memungkinkan pengiriman amicus curiae, dan, sementara mereka
harus berkonsultasi, para pihak tidak memiliki hak veto. Ketentuan serupa sekarang termasuk di AS baru dan BIT
Model Kanada. [FN470] Dalam konteks NAFTA, Pernyataan dari Perdagangan Bebas, Komisi Non-Membantah
Partisipasi Pihak mengatur bahwa "[n] o penyediaan [NAFTA] batas diskresi suatu Tribunal untuk menerima
pengajuan tertulis dari seseorang atau badan yangbukan partai bersengketa (a 'non-partai yang bersengketa').
"[FN471] Para Negara Pihak Namun NAFTA juga merekomendasikan bahwa Bab 11 Pengadilan mengadopsi
sejumlah prosedur sehubungan dengan pengajuan tersebut.[FN472]
* 882 Amicus curiae celana memiliki relevansi mendasar untuk sengketa yang melibatkan hak-hak masyarakat
adat. Pertama, pengajuan celana amicus curiae oleh perwakilan masyarakat adat dapat memastikan bahwa
pengadilan arbitrase menyadari keprihatinan mereka. [FN473] Masyarakat adat adalah "diposisikan secara unik
untuk mengomentari dampak dari [kegiatan] diusulkan untuk sumber daya budaya, lanskap budaya atau
konteks." [FN474] Selain itu, pandangan mereka mungkin berbeda dari orang-orang dari pihak yang
bersengketa. [FN475]
Kedua, amicus curiae dapat membantu pengadilan dengan memperjelas aturan yang berlaku hukum internasional,
sehingga memberikan kontribusi bagi crosspollination norma-norma hukum internasional dan orang-orang hukum
investasi. [FN476] Misalnya, dalam kasus Sungai Agung, Kepala Nasional Majelis Bangsa Pertama, "yang mewakili
pandangan Bangsa Pertama baik nasional maupun internasional," menyatakan dukungan untuk pengadu dan
mengajukan amicus curiae singkat yang dimaksud sejumlah instrumen hukum internasional. [FN477] Demikian pula,
celana amicus curiae disampaikan oleh Nation Quechan dalam kasus Emas Glamis baik disebut kerangka untuk
perlindungan situs suci adat di bawah hukum domestik dan internasional. [FN478]
* 883 Ketiga, meskipun tidak ada hal seperti preseden yang mengikat di negara investor arbitrase, penghargaan
berurusan dengan warisan budaya adat mungkin memiliki peran penting dalam arbitrase berikutnya. [FN479]
Argumen ini; juga diajukan oleh Nation Quechan ketika mengajukan permohonan cuti ke file Submission Non-Partai
dalam Kasus Emas Glamis:
[T] dia cara di mana daerah ini sakral dan kepentingan Suku di dalamnya akan digambarkan dalam proses arbitrase
menjadi perhatian besar bagi masyarakat pribumi di seluruh dunia, yang sama-sama berusaha untuk melindungi
tempat suci dan tak tergantikan mereka menjamin kebebasan beragama .... Suku ingin memastikan bahwa sifat
sensitif dan serius daerah sakral adat benar diperhitungkan dalam hal ini, dan dalam semua, proses internasional di
masa depan. [FN480]
Akhirnya, pertimbangan celana amicus curiae oleh pengadilan arbitrase menawarkan cara, beton layak untuk
memecahkan dilema kedaulatan masyarakat adat. Serta berargumen oleh Nation Quechan dalam Kasus Emas
Glamis, "[a] sa bangsa yang berdaulat, Suku tidak dapat dikatakan memadai diwakili oleh berdaulat ...." [FN481]
Pengadilan arbitrase telah semakin diterima celana amicus curiae, [FN482] meskipun memaksakan syarat-syarat
tertentu untuk diterimanya mereka di * 884 agar tidak terlalu membebani melanjutkan atau keterlambatan
penyebab. Misalnya, dalam mempertimbangkan apakah akan menerima dan mempertimbangkan surat yang tidak
diminta dari Kepala Nasional Majelis Bangsa Pertama, Grand Sungai arbitrase pengadilan menegaskan niatnya
untuk dibimbing oleh, 7 Oktober 2003 Pernyataan Perdagangan Bebas Komisi. [FN483] Dalam penghargaan akhir,
para arbiter tegas mencatat bahwa huruf "itu dibaca dan dipertimbangkan oleh Pengadilan."[FN484] Dalam Kasus
Emas Glamis, Pengadilan Arbitrase menerima celana curiae amicus disajikan oleh Quechan suku Indian, setelah
berpandangan bahwa pengajuan "satisfie [d] prinsip-prinsip Pernyataan Komisi Perdagangan Bebas di non-
bersengketa pihak partisipasi. " [FN485] Meskipun tren ini, Pernyataan tersebut menyajikan hambatan untuk
pertimbangan celana amicus masyarakat adat curiae, karena menyediakan bahwa "pemberian cuti ke file pengajuan
partai non-bersengketa tidak memerlukan Pengadilan ke alamat tersebut penyerahan pada setiap titik dalam
arbitrase. " [FN486] Namun, karena alasan yang dijelaskan di atas, pengadilan arbitrase harus membayar
pertimbangan pengiriman yang disajikan oleh masyarakat adat.
Beberapa penulis telah mengusulkan penggunaan counterclaims di investor-negara arbitrase. [FN487] Menurut para
penulis ini, negara tuan rumah mungkin membawa counter-klaim atas nama warga terhadap * 885 investor asing
untuk pelanggaran hak asasi manusia di negara tuan rumah. [FN488] Menurut Weiler, "akan lebih baik ... jika
perjanjian perlindungan investasi masa depan digambarkan bahwa sama seperti negara wajib untuk mengobati
investasi asing sesuai dengan hukum internasional," demikian juga harus perusahaan memperlakukan negara tuan
rumah dan warganya sesuai dengan hukum internasional. "[FN489] Memang, beberapa perjanjian investasi baru-
baru khusus memungkinkan counterclaims terhadap investor yang memulai proses investor-negara. [FN490]
Di bawah perjanjian investasi, argumen dapat dibuat bahwa negara-negara host yang telah memiliki kemampuan
untuk menggunakan argumen hak asasi manusia sebagai pertahanan klaim dibawa oleh investor. [FN491] Misalnya,
Komisaris Tinggi Hak Asasi Manusia telah mendorong negara untuk meningkatkan kewajiban mereka sesuai hukum
hak asasi manusia di mana keputusan pengadilan dapat mempengaruhi penikmatan hak asasi manusia nasional
atau di mana penafsiran ketentuan dalam perjanjian investasi memilikimungkin dimensi hak asasi manusia. [FN492] *
886 Arbiter mungkin, meskipun incidenter tantum, pertimbangkan kewajiban non-investasi dari negara tuan rumah
[FN493].
Mengakui pihak ketiga, seperti orang-orang pribumi, untuk bertindak sebagai pihak dalam sidang akan mengambil
judicialization terlalu jauh. dan sebagai masalah prosedur, itu akan diinginkan. Ketika menyatakan setuju untuk BIT,
mereka menerima investor-negara arbitrase sebagai mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa untuk menyelesaikan
sengketa investasi dengan warga negara asing, tidak dengan pihak lain dengan kepentingan sangat
beragam. Identifikasi pihak ketiga yang berhak untuk berpartisipasi sebagai pihak akan menghadirkan masalah
tambahan. Selanjutnya, pengadilan internasional lainnya dan pengadilan, seperti pengadilan hak asasi manusia,
yang secara prosedural tersedia bagi individu yang terkena.[FN494] Akhirnya, seperti judicialization ekstrim dari
proses arbitrase pada akhirnya akan kembali-mempolitisir perselisihan investasi. [FN495] Hal ini tidak berarti,
bagaimanapun, bahwa negara tidak harus membuat referensi terhadap kewajiban hak asasi manusia yang relevan
dalam konteks investor-negara arbitrase. [FN496] Ini juga tidak berarti bahwa argumen tersebut tidak harus didengar
melalui mekanisme partisipatif seperti pengajuan amicus curiae.
VIII. KESIMPULAN
Perlindungan efektif dari warisan budaya manfaat seluruh umat manusia. Warisan budaya merupakan warisan bagi
semua orang seperti yang mengungkapkan aspek sejarah suatu negara dan menghasilkan rasa identitas bagi
generasi sekarang dan mendatang. Kasus hukum yang relevan menunjukkan bahwa warisan budaya dapat
terancam oleh investasi asing, [FN497] tapi * 887 dampak investasi asing terhadap warisan budaya pribumi adalah
bidang yang hampir belum diselidiki.
Delegasi resolusi sengketa kepada pengadilan investasi internasional, "memotong kewenangan pengadilan nasional
untuk menangani [seperti] sengketa." [FN498] Selain itu, keputusan pengadilan di negara tuan rumah memberikan
keluhan yang diajukan oleh pihak swasta terhadap investor asing dapat diserang oleh investor sebelum pengadilan
arbitrase atas dasar bahwa mereka merupakan gangguan salah dengan investasi. Sementara investor-negara
depoliticizes arbitrase sengketa internasional, mungkin tidak menjadi forum yang paling cocok untuk menyelesaikan
sengketa yang melibatkan hak-hak budaya asli. Investor-negara arbitrase membedakan antara dua tipe aktor non-
negara: (1) investor yang terlibat dalam investasi langsung asing dan (2) masyarakat yang terkena dampak,
termasuk masyarakat adat terkena dampak investasi. Sementara investor asing memiliki akses langsung kepada
investor-negara arbitrase di bawah BIT relevan, masyarakat adat yang terkena dampak tidak memiliki akses
langsung, dan partisipasi mereka hanya mungkin melalui pengajuan celana amicus curiae. Penyampaian amicus
curiae tidak benar, tetapi dianggap oleh pengadilan arbitrase berdasarkan kasus per kasus. Sementara negara tuan
rumah umumnya merupakan masyarakat yang terkena dampak, [FN499] satu mungkin bertanya-tanya apakah
masyarakat adat perlu tambahan jaminan prosedural, karena status khusus mereka di bawah hukum internasional.
Peraturan prosedur arbitrase tidak cukup dikembangkan untuk cukup melindungi hak-hak masyarakat
adat. Partisipasi mereka sebagai amici curiae pada proses arbitrase tidak secara otomatis diberikan, dan proses
arbitrase yang melibatkan warisan budaya tidak selalu terbuka untuk umum. Hanya baru-baru telah arbitrase
investasi mulai * 888 untuk mengakui kuasi-konstitusional perannya, menanggapi positif permintaan oleh kelompok-
kelompok kepentingan publik untuk memberikan masukan amicus curiae. [FN500] Dengan demikian, beberapa
pengadilan telah memutuskan bahwa keuntungan dari debat publik lebih besar daripada kerugian dari setiap biaya
tambahan dan kompleksitas prosedural. Selanjutnya, beberapa lembaga arbitrase telah mengadopsi kebijakan
tentang transparansi dan keterbukaan yang memfasilitasi pengawasan publik. [FN501]
Pada tingkat substantif, seperti klaim warisan budaya yang melibatkan adat dan investasi asing jelas melibatkan hak
asasi manusia, arbiter harus mempertimbangkan hukum internasional sebagai bagian dari hukum yang
berlaku. Dalam hal ini, arbiter dapat mengevaluasi apakah tindakan yang diadopsi oleh negara tuan rumah sesuai
dengan kewajiban internasionalnya, meskipun incidenter tantum. Dalam kasus apapun, arbiter terikat untuk
menerapkan norma-norma yang relevan ditaati norma-norma hukum internasional apakah pendekatan seperti itu
dimohonkan oleh para pihak. Selanjutnya, sesuai dengan aturan adat penafsiran perjanjian, undang-undang
investasi internasional bukanlah alam semesta tersendiri. Oleh karena itu, harus ada "konstitusional"
menyeimbangkan antara hak investor asing dan keprihatinan negara yang sah yang mengalir dari perjanjian-
perjanjian internasional hak asasi manusia.
Sebagai pengadilan arbitrase dapat menghadapi kesulitan dalam menemukan keseimbangan yang tepat antara
kepentingan yang berbeda yang bersangkutan, pengecualian budaya harus diperkenalkan dalam teks bit. Di satu
sisi, ini akan memberikan kepastian kepada investor asing. Di sisi lain, secara memadai akan melindungi hak-hak
budaya masyarakat adat. De jure condendo, mekanisme prosedural untuk * 889 memastikan bahwa masyarakat adat
dapat berpartisipasi sebagai amici curiae dan argumen mereka akan diperhitungkan oleh pengadilan arbitrase harus
digunakan secara konsisten.
Kesimpulannya, meskipun investasi asing merupakan suatu kekuatan yang berpotensi positif bagi pembangunan,
kebijakan negara dan praktek tentang eksploitasi sumber daya harus memperhatikan implikasi hak asasi
manusia. Sedangkan pengertian warisan adat baru-baru ini datang ke garis depan debat hukum, jelas memiliki
keterkaitan langsung dengan perlindungan hak-hak masyarakat adat dan martabat manusia.
[FNa1]. Dosen hukum internasional (Maastricht University), Ph.D. (European University Institute), M. Jur. (Oxon), M.
Res.(EUI), J.D. dan M.Pol.Sc. (Siena). Dia dapat dihubungi di v.vadi @ maastrichtuniversity.nl. Makalah ini
dipresentasikan pada 2010 Masyarakat Konferensi Ulama Hukum diselenggarakan di Universitas Southampton pada
15 September 2010. Penulis mengucapkan terima kasih kepada Profesor Francesco Francioni, Profesor Peter Van
den Bossche, Profesor Colin Reid, Profesor Malcolm Rosalind, Profesor Claire Cutler, Profesor Ana Filipa Vrdoljak,
Achraf Farraj, dan peserta untuk konferensi untuk komentar mereka.