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22 m a rk e . bu t t o n
“born equal” and thus did not, like their European counterparts, have
to fight to become so – a more recent group of scholars have empha-
sized the importance of a variety of countervailing traditions operat-
ing within the formation of the American republic, including deeply
illiberal ones like nativism, racism, and sexism.3 These scholars have
joined an already extensive group of historians who have highlighted
the contributions of alternative (but not necessarily incompatible)
philosophical discourses to Lockean liberalism within American
political history, including Calvinism, radical Whiggism, civic repub-
licanism, and Scottish moral sense philosophy.4 While a growing
number of scholars no longer view liberalism as the exclusive ideo-
logical core of American history or national identity, the very idea
of American liberalism still excites interpretive battles among
historians and contemporary political pundits alike. For their part,
historians continue to debate the intellectual sources considered
most responsible for shaping the origins and direction of American
political development, with liberalism as one dominant strand
within this complex history,5 while writers both within and outside
of the academy continue to contest the meaning, value, and propriety
of a “liberalism” associated (since the Progressive and New Deal eras)
with an activist state committed to various kinds of social and polit-
ical reform.
One of the consequences of this interpretive diversity is that a
considerable amount of confusion exists about the precise meaning
and core intellectual and political priorities of American liberalism.
Since liberalism in America has never been a singular or fixed ideol-
ogy but a diverse family of ideas and practices, some of this confusion
is both understandable and appropriate to the subject. In America
liberalism has been a dissident’s creed for individual rights against
the trepidations of political power (including democratic majorities),
and it has served as a public philosophy to mobilize social and polit-
ical power in pursuit of greater equality and social justice. In a figure
like Lincoln, both of these features of liberalism are joined together in
evanescent union, albeit with enormous difficulty and intrinsic lim-
itations. One of the additional consequences of this intellectual diver-
sity is that American liberalism – as both an historical phenomenon
and a contemporary political philosophy – has generated a plethora of
critics who have variously charged it with, on the one hand, inflating
the significance of individual reason and personal rights over the
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 23
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24 m a rk e . bu t t o n
pre-liberal beginnings
If the ancient polis was a “moral community of men permanently
united as a people by a common way of life,”9 then the Puritans in
America had more in common with ancient republicanism (or medi-
eval corporatism) than they did with modern liberalism. The dissent-
ing English Puritans who migrated to North America in the
seventeenth century placed the “care of the public” over the interests
of all “particular estates” and subordinated both the community and
the individual to the fulfillment of a divinely appointed mission to
purify the Christian commonwealth on earth.10 These were com-
munities, in places like Massachusetts Bay and New Haven, that
were “knit together” as one body through “the bond of love” for the
elect among them, and thus trucked neither religious diversity from
“false churches” (e.g., Quakers and Baptists) nor internal dissent from
so-called “antinomians” (e.g., Anne Hutchison and Roger Williams).
In the New England colonies of the seventeenth century, liberty
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 25
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26 m a rk e . bu t t o n
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 27
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28 m a rk e . bu t t o n
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 29
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30 m a rk e . bu t t o n
human interests, they also learned through repeated trial and error
that established political powers posed significant threats to life,
liberty, and the individual pursuit of economic prosperity. These
lessons in the capriciousness and injustice of political power –
whether in the form of colonial administrators, or later, with state
legislatures under the Articles of Confederation – did as much to
inform the political thinking of figures like Madison, Hamilton, and
Wilson as did the political science they gleaned from Montesquieu,
Blackstone, and Hume. In this context, Madison’s recounting of the
numerous “vices” of the Articles of Confederation raised a profound
problem for all liberal republicans because it compelled them to ask
whether “the fundamental principle of republican Government, that
the majority who rule in such Governments, are the safest Guardians
both of public Good and private rights?”31 The turn to a more liberal
political outlook on the relationship between the individual and the
state is in part the product of taking this question seriously and
seeking institutional remedies for the “mortal diseases” of republican
rule. As Madison would argue in the Federalist Papers (1787), the aim
of the new Constitution was to “combine the requisite stability and
energy in government with the inviolable attention due to liberty and
to the republican form.”32
The institutional configuration most conducive to the preserva-
tion of personal liberty within the establishment of effective general
governance is the central question at issue in the ratification debates
that surround the proposed Constitution of 1787. The difference
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists was not one between liber-
alism and republicanism but was rather a difference in the ways that
the representatives of these opposing views on the proposed
Constitution sought to balance republicanism and liberal principles
within the organization of political power. In pushing for decentral-
ized nodes of political power in the states and for closing the space
between the government and the governed (as well as blurring the
demographic characteristics between rulers and ruled), the Anti-
Federalists sought to maximize local republican rule within liberal
natural rights constraints. By contrast, the Federalists sought to max-
imize personal rights and the advantages of a commercial society
within a republican frame stretched over an extended sphere incor-
porating a diversity of contending interests and opposing moral
values.
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 31
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32 m a rk e . bu t t o n
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 33
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34 m a rk e . bu t t o n
concerning “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro” (1852), these
actors militated for political and economic inclusion by utilizing
the liberatory political ideals (and Christian moral beliefs) that had
previously inspired America’s revolutionary struggle against recalci-
trant political power. For example, Douglass drew upon the patriot-
ism and just pride that surrounded the commemoration ceremonies
of the signing of the Declaration of Independence to exclaim that,
“The existence of slavery in this country brands your republicanism
as a sham, your humanity as a base pretense, and your Christianity
as a lie.”44 The Seneca Falls Declaration that called for women’s
“sacred right to the elective franchise” was carefully crafted to mirror
the Declaration of Independence in both substance and style: effec-
tively undermining while correcting the false universalism of
American liberalism. To be sure, there were significant conflicts
internal to reform movements like abolition, as testified by the
distance between William Lloyd Garrison’s public burning of the
Constitution as a “compact with the devil,” and Douglass’s cham-
pioning of the Constitution as a “glorious liberty document.” While
united in the aspiration for equal freedom and human dignity, opposi-
tional politics in nineteenth-century America did not follow a singu-
lar liberal script but moved between commitments to non-violent
“moral suasion” (Angela Grimke, Lucretia Mott), complete disen-
gagement from a corrupt political order (Garrison, Thoreau), to vio-
lent armed struggle against slave holders (Nat Turner, John Brown).
That liberalism in America has flourished with racial, ethnic, and
gender hierarchies for most of its history is not simply a contradiction
between high moral principles and everyday social practice; it also
highlights the existence of powerful opposing commitments to sus-
taining white male superiority in multiple spheres of life (political,
economic, domestic). “Inegalitarian ascriptive ideologies” that have
simultaneously animated liberal politics while undermining the phil-
osophical (logical) coherence of American liberalism include such
things as biblical and scientific justifications for slavery and the
removal of Native peoples, legal doctrines of female coverture, and
principles like “republican motherhood.”45 These sets of beliefs in
the natural inequality of people based on race, ethnicity, and gender
were undergirded and further energized by prevailing economic rela-
tions and reasoned legal decisions. For example, broad economic
reliance on slavery between Northern manufacturing interests and
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36 m a rk e . bu t t o n
conclusion
Liberalism in America was formed with great difficulty over several
centuries of profound moral and political conflict. The construction
of American liberalism took place against the persistent backdrop of
its forceful rejection in the form of religious establishments, imperial
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 37
and colonial hierarchies, and racial, ethnic, class, and gendered exclu-
sions. To put the liberty of individuals and the pluralism of human
associations first – as a philosophical conviction and an organizing
political commitment – is something both historically rare and ethi-
cally more demanding than is often realized – even for the founders of
the liberal tradition in American politics. The history of American
liberalism provides multiple chapters for the confirmation of this
baleful observation. Hence, for every properly canonized epic hero
of American liberalism – John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James
Madison, and Abraham Lincoln – there are tragic heroes who still
largely remain outside the dominant narrative frame of American
liberalism – Angela Grimke, David Walker, Frederick Douglass, and
W. E. B. Du Bois (to name only a few).
Across nearly all ideological and denominational lines, Americans
revere their “founding fathers,” but they remain uncertain about
what to do with those immanent critics of American political history
who have urged the republic to “rise up and live out the true meaning
of its creed” (Martin Luther King, Jr.). Thus, if Americans have grad-
ually come to accept a broad “liberal consensus” – granting reciprocal
freedoms to all citizens, tolerating reasonable group differences, and
providing for a limited state authorized and accountable to the peo-
ple – this “consensus” has always been less wide and less deep, at
almost every stage of the republic, than most Americans, past or
present, might otherwise care to admit. For the questions of who is
a citizen, what makes for legitimate group difference, and how much
of a role the state should play in the society and the economy were
quandaries that vexed Americans at the founding of the republic, and
continue to define the basic contours of American politics to this day.
But if American liberalism stands for anything that can be shared
within and across these interminable differences, it is to sustain the
liberal tradition as one of the primary conditions for coordinating
these conflicts in a manner that can do justice to the freedom, rights,
and equal dignity of all persons.
notes
1. Lincoln, “Address at Gettysburg,” p. 295.
2. Myrdal, An American Dilemma; Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in
America; and Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition.
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38 m a rk e . bu t t o n
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 39
17. See Bushman, From Puritan to Yankee. For a different account that
places Puritan declension within the seventeenth century, see Miller,
The New England Mind.
18. Writing as “Novanglus,” John Adams explained that the “revolution
principles” in America were the principles of “Aristotle and Plato, of
Livy and Cicero, and Sidney, Harrington, and Locke,” in The
Revolutionary Writings of John Adams, p. 152. Thomas Jefferson had a
very similar list: see his Letter to Henry Lee, May 8, 1825. For the argu-
ment that republicanism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century is a species of liberalism in America, see Ericson, The Shaping
of American Liberalism; Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion; see also
Banning, “Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited.”
19. The Congregationalist minister John Wise, responding to the earlier tax
policy of Governor Andros, provides another important example of
American Puritanism drawing on Lockean themes of natural reason
and personal judgment in matters affecting the individual pursuit of
happiness. See Wise, “A Vindication of New England Churches.” To be
sure, Locke is not an exclusive source for these ministers, as Mayhew
also draws extensively from Bishop Benjamin Hoadly; see Bailyn,
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, ch. 2.
20. See Otis, “Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved.” For related
language see Hopkins, “The Rights of the Colonies Examined”; Adams,
“A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” in Revolutionary
Writings; Dickinson, “Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania”; and
Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America.”
21. Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” p. 9.
22. Some notable exceptions include: Benjamin Rush, “An Address to the
Inhabitants of the British Settlements in America Upon Slave-Keeping”
[1773], and Nathaniel Niles, “Two Discourses on Liberty” [1774], in
Hyneman and Lutz (eds.), American Political Writings During the
Founding Era, 1760–1805, vol. i. See also Bailyn, Ideological Origins of
the American Revolution, ch. 6.
23. See also Ketcham, Framed for Posterity, ch. 6.
24. See Pettit, Republicanism.
25. See Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution.
26. Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination,
p. 185. For Appleby this deliverance from an attachment to English
Constitutional history also amounted to liberation from the strictures
of classical republicanism and the adoption of liberal belief in “a natural
harmony of benignly striving individuals.”
27. On these points see Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots,
ch. 9.
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40 m a rk e . bu t t o n
28. For an example of loyalist political writing that does not concede Locke
to the revolutionaries, see Galloway, “Candid Examination of the
Mutual Claims of Great Britain and the Colonies” (1775); on slave resist-
ance during the revolution, see Nash, Race and Revolution and Frey,
Water from Rock; for an early call for a modest kind of gender equity
during the Revolution, see Abigail Adams, Letter to John Adams, March
1776.
29. “The Virgina Declaration of Rights” (1776), the Constitution of
Massachusetts (1780), and Adams’s “Thoughts on Government” (1776)
all played a formative role.
30. On all of these points, see Wood, Creation of the American Republic,
ch. 5; Kramnick, “Editor’s Introduction” to The Federalist Papers, ed.
Rossiter.
31. See Madison, “Vices of the Political System of the United States” (April
1787), in James Madison: Writings, p. 75. See also Madison’s “Letter to
Thomas Jefferson,” October 24, 1787; and Federalist Papers, no. 14.
32. Federalist Papers, no. 37, p. 226.
33. “Brutus” Essay I, October 18, 1787; and “Federal Farmer” Letters,
October 8 and 9, 1787, in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the
Constitutional Convention Debates, ed. Ketcham, pp. 270–80 and
257–69 respectively. More broadly, see Storing, What the Anti-
Federalists Were For and Sinopoli, The Foundations of American
Citizenship. “Publius’s” response to these specific concerns can be
found in Federalist Papers, nos. 27 and 34.
34. From the pro-Constitution newspaper the Pennsylvania Packet
(September 1787), cited in Kramnick, “Editor’s Introduction” to The
Federalist Papers.
35. See Federalist Papers, nos. 6, 9, 10, 15, 55.
36. See Federalist Papers, no. 10.
37. See Federalist Papers, nos. 49, 63.
38. See Federalist Papers, nos. 55, 57, 63. See also Gibson, “Impartial
Representation and the Extended Republic” and Kalyvas and Katznelson,
Liberal Beginnings, ch. 4.
39. See Vetterli and Bryner, In Search of the Republic.
40. See Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism.
41. See Amar, “The Bill of Rights as a Constitution”; Ketcham, Framed for
Posterity, ch. 10; Smith, Civic Ideals, pp. 134–35.
42. See Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, ch. 7.
43. This is the insight behind the observation (frequently repeated) that the
Progressives employed “Hamiltonian means for Jeffersonian ends.” See
Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement, p. 145.
44. Douglass, “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” p. 203.
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a m e ri c an l i b er a l i s m 41
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