Director of Religious Affairs VS Bayot

74 Phil 579 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice

In June 1943, Bayot advertised in a newspaper that he helps people in securing
marriage licenses; that he does so avoiding delays and publicity; that he also makes
marriage arrangements; that legal consultations are free for the poor; and that
everything is confidential. The Director of Religious Affairs took notice of the ad and
so he sued Bayot for Malpractice.
Bayot initially denied having published the advertisement. But later, he admitted the
same and asked for the court’s mercy as he promised to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bayot is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that “the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” The advertisement he caused to be
published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public..” It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The
Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
But because of Bayot’s plea for leniency and his promise and the fact that he did not
earn any case by reason of the ad, the Supreme Court merely reprimanded him.
In Re: Luis Tagorda

53 Phil 37 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice – Solicitation of Legal Business –

Advertisement in the Legal Profession – Stirring Up of Litigation
In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election,
he campaigned that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can
do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help
clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising
the latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still
practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is
willing to receive works regarding preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.;
that he is willing to receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation
for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the
outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by
personal relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business
by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the
importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions
and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced
lawyer and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being
disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of law for a month.
Ledesma VS Climaco

FACTS:

Atty. Ledesma was the counsel de parte of one of the accused when he was appoint
ed as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections. He then filed a motion with
drawing as such, but Judge Climaco denied it and appointed him as counsel de offici
o for the two defendants. Again, Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to withdraw on the gro
und that his appointment requires full time, but the Judge still denied it. Consequentl
y, the defense obtained 8 postponements.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio co

nsidering his appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING:

No. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, the welfare of the accu
sed could be prejudiced as stressed by Chief Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in t
hese words: ” Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the sci
ence of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he may be c
onvicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneduca
ted. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so importa
nt that it has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules o
f procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his right to have a
n attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but i
t is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and h
e is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.”

It has to be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with co
nditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession
, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. However, the admonition is
ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, a
nd this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the pr
omptings of self-interest.
Tan Tek Beng VS David

126 SCRA 389 – Legal Ethics – Malpractice – Solicitation of Cases

In 1970, Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng, a non-lawyer, entered into an agreement whereby
Tan Tek Beng will supply clients to Atty. David and in exchange thereof, Atty. David shall
give Tan Tek Beng 50% of the attorney’s fees collected as the latter’s commission. Atty.
David also agreed not to deal with clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng directly without the
latter’s consent. The agreement went sour due to allegations of double-cross from both
sides. Tan Tek Beng denounced Atty. David before the Supreme Court but did not seek
the enforcement of their agreement.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. David is guilty of Malpractice.
HELD: Yes. The agreement between Atty. David and Tan Tek Beng is void because it
was tantamount to malpractice which is “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers” Sec. 27, Rule 138,
Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty
committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
“malpractice”.
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a
profession, not a business. “The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional”.
On the agreement to divide the attorney’s fees, the Supreme Court noted: No division of
fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of
service or responsibility.
On the agreement that Atty. David shall not deal with clients supplied by Beng directly:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law
agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. A lawyer’s
responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct
the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation
to his client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client. . . .”
Ulep VS The Legal Clinic

223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal Profession
– Practice of Law
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal
Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal
Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-
quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina
Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems”
in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how
complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in
various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are
backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in
the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides,
the advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic
offers.
 ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such
is allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is
not allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered
include various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services
are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of
lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services
being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards
of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic
seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions
of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which
is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it
and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product
of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
Antonio VS Court of Appeals

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
seeks to annul the Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated on March 10, 1987 which denied the
admission of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the decision 2 earlier rendered. Also, it prays that a writ of preliminary
injunction be immediately issued to restrain the respondent Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City, Branch CXX, from implementing its
Order dated March 6, 1987, which issued a writ of execution in accordance with the Court of Appeals decision on the case, thereby
asking that said court be directed to defer or stay the execution pending the resolution of this petition and an annulment case allegedly
appealed with the Court of Appeals.

The petitioners are lessees of an apartment building located in No. 121, 2nd Street, 9th Avenue,
Caloocan City. This property was foreclosed by the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) after its original owner failed to pay back his loan.

After due notice to the petitioners and all others concerned, the property was sold to the private
respondent at a public bidding held on July 29, 1982. It appears, petitioners deliberately did not
participate in the said bidding because they believed that, as tenants therein, they have priority in
law to acquire the property. Their thinking was that their participation would be deemed a waiver
of their right to question the act of the GSIS in selling the property and would adversely affect
their offer to buy the same.

The award or sale of the property to the private respondent was duly approved by the GSIS
Board of Trustees in its Resolution No. 772 adopted on August 20, 1982. It was then certified
that the possession and administration of the property had been transferred to the private
respondent A conditional deed of sale was executed in favor of private respondent by the GSIS
stating that for all intents and purposes, the private respondent is the owner of the property.

The GSIS advised the petitioners that they should now pay their rent and arrearages to the
private respondent. But despite repeated written demands, the petitioners failed and refused to
settle their accounts.

After a barangay conciliation proceeding proved futile, the private respondent filed a complaint
for ejectment against the petitioners with the Metropolitan Trial Court in that locality. Said court
rendered judgment on January 8, 1985, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises occupied
by them and to pay certain amounts as damages.

Not satisfied therewith, the petitioners appealed to the respondent Regional Trial Court which, on
August 20, 1985, rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial
Court.

The petitioners then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the respondent Court of Appeals.
This case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 07828.

On December 5, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the
petitioner for review. Later an entry of judgment dated February 3, 1987, was duly certified
thereupon by the Clerk of Court attesting to the fact that the judgment became final and
executory as of January 22, 1987. The records of the case were consequently, remanded to the
respondent Regional Trial Court on February 11, 1987.

On February 23, 1987, the petitioners, through their new counsel, filed an "Appearance And
Motion For Leave To Admit Motion For Reconsideration, together with the Motion For
Reconsideration With Prayer For Issuance Of Temporary Restraining Order," with the
respondent Court of Appeals. They moved that the respondent Court of Appeals admit their
motion for reconsideration, which was obviously filed beyond the reglementary period for filing
the same, alleging that their counsel of record abandoned them and migrated to the United
States without at least informing them that a decision was rendered against them.
The petitioners' motion was denied by the respondent Court of Appeals in the Resolution dated
March 10, 1987, now put in issue. It is hereunder reproduced, thus:

Now before this Court is an Appearance and Motion for Leave to Admit Motion for
Reconsideration' filed by petitioners in the above-entitled case on February 23,
1987 on the ground that their former counsel Atty. Funelas had abandoned the
case and is now abroad, together with the corresponding Motion For
Reconsideration With Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order.

Considering that the decision sought to be reconsidered dated December 5, 1986

had become final, entry of judgment having been issued on February 3, 1987 and
the records remanded to the court a quo on February 11, 1987, for which reason
the said decision has become final and this Court has become bereft of
jurisdiction to act thereupon, the abovementioned Motions are
hereby noted.Parenthetically, and merely for purposes of record, it is observed
that counsel of record of petitioners is the law office Funelas, Perez and
Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone. Therefore, the fact that Atty. Funelas has
abandoned the case and is now abroad is not a valid ground for the late filing of
the motion for reconsideration. 3

Earlier, on March 6, 1987, the respondent Regional Trial Court issued an order 4 for a writ of
execution to be issued against the petitioners for the enforcement of the decision in CA-G.R. No.
07828.

Henceforth, the petitioners, believing that they were deprived of their day in court when the
respondent Court of Appeals denied their motion for reconsideration, instituted this petition.

As their initial argument in this petition and as contained in their "Appearance And Motion For
Leave To Admit Motion For Reconsideration," the petitioners maintain that they were deprived of
their day in court-equivalent to a denial of due process of law-when their motion for
reconsideration was refused due course by the respondent Court of Appeals. They alleged that
their counsel at that time, Atty. Pitty A. Funelas, virtually abandoned them by leaving abroad
without at least notifying them. So when the Court of Appeals decision was rendered and a copy
was sent to Atty. Funelas, no notice thereof was ever received by the petitioners. The petitioners
only had knowledge of the judgment against them after it was eventually entered in the Book of
Entries Of Judgments for being final and executory.

A certain Romeo S. Obligar, representing himself as the former messenger of Atty. Funelas,
executed an affidavit on February 19, 1987 stating among others that while getting the mails from
the Post Office last January 6, 1987, for his new employer, he received the decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 07828; that since the records of that case was with Atty. Funelas, he was not able to
contact the petitioners herein; and that he forgot all about said decision until a secretary informed
him that the petitioners were verifying the said case when they happened to visit the office of his
new employer.

We agree with the Court of Appeals in denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. It is
well-settled that after the lapse of fifteen (1 5) days from notice of judgment, the same becomes
final and the Court of Appeals loses, jurisdiction over the case. And the subsequent filing of a
motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment nor restore jurisdiction
which had already been lost. 5 The court a quo cannot decide the case anew. decision rendered
anew notwithstanding the finality of the original one is null and void. 6

In this case, the messenger, Mr. Obligar, received a copy of the decision on January 6, 1987.
This decision became final and executory on January 22, 1987. Thus, the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners on February 23, 1987, could not be acted upon on the
merits and could only be noted by the respondent Court of Appeals. It was properly denied.
The negligence attributed by the petitioners to their then counsel, Atty. Funelas, is not excusable.
Clear and as it can be seen from the pleadings filed that the petitioners' counsel of record is the
law office of Funelas Perez and Associates and not Atty. Funelas alone. Atty. Funelas signed the
documents in his capacity as the representative of the said law firm. The respondent Court of
Appeals made this same observation in its questioned resolution.

In an attempt to belie the preceding observation, the petitioners submitted to this Court another
affidavit executed by Mr. Obligar dated March 17, 1987. This affidavit stated that the law firm of
Funelas, Perez and Associates was actually composed of only Atty. Funelas; that Atty. Perez
was only a partner in name, never handled any case of the law office, and did not actually report
in said office; that there were no associates of Atty. Funelas; and that said law firm was dissolved
in August, 1986. This affidavit has no evidentiary value. It was executed and submitted after the
questioned resolution was already promulgated. Hence, it could not have affected or influenced
the adjudication of the said resolution.

It is safe to presume that a law firm which registered and represented itself as such, with at least
two named partners, is composed of at least two lawyers. And if it is true that this law office was
earlier dissolved, the winding up process is presumed to have been performed in a regular
manner, with all the obligations properly accounted for. Very concrete evidence must be
presented in order that these presumptions may be rebutted.

At most, the affidavit must be classified as a mere afterthought and a futile attempt to contradict
the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals.

Recently, this Court laid down a ruling that is applicable to this case. It reads:

When a party appears by attorney in an action or proceeding all court, all notices
required to be given therein must be given to their attorney and not to the client.
Hence, a notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in law.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that the client is bound by the negligence or failings
of counsel. It is the duty of an attorney to himself and to his clients to invariably
adopt a system whereby he can be sure of receiving promptly all judicial notices
during his absence from his address of record. The attorney must so arrange
matters that communications sent by mail addressed to his office or residence,
may reach him promptly. ... 7

In the motion for reconsideration, the sole issue presented for reconsideration was a mere
amplification of one argument already passed upon by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
decision.

On January 18, 1983 before the ejectment case was instituted, the petitioners filed a complaint in
the then Court of First Instance to annul the award in a public auction of the leased premises by
the GSIS to the private respondent for they claimed that as tenants therein, they have the priority
in law over the same. The court, in a decision rendered on January 28, 1985, dismissed the case
for lack of a cause of action. Now, this case is allegedly pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.

The issue, thus, advanced in the motion for reconsideration is whether the pendency of an
annulment case of an award in public auction is prejudicial to an ejectment suit as to warrant the
suspension of the latter proceeding.

We quote with approval the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals on this matter, thus:

The pendency of an action for title filed by the defendants (now petitioners) with
the Regional Trial Court does not have the effect of removing the ejectment case
from the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The rule is well- settled that
 an action for ownership or annulment of title is not a bar to an action for forcible
entry and detainer (Alviar, et al. vs. Pampolina, et al., 84 Phil. 45, at p. 47; Padilla
vs. de Jesus, et al., 95 Phil. 688, at p. 691; Aguilar vs. Cabrera, et al., 74 Phil.
658, at p. 868.) 8

In an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is
ownership. 9 Therefore, an ejectment case can very well proceed independently of an annulment
case. The only recognized exception to the preceding doctrine is the situation wherein the
question of possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership to the effect that the
question of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the question of ownership. This
case at bar does not fall within the exception. Accordingly, the petitioners' position that this
ejectment proceeding should be suspended in deference to an annulment proceeding presently
pending in another forum must necessarily be rejected.

The order of the respondent Regional Trial Court for the issuance of a writ of execution was
because the decision in the ejectment case had already become final and executory. Its
implementation cannot be stayed.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. With costs against petitioners. This is immediately
executory.
 Dacanay VS Baker and Mckenzie

Legal Ethics – Use of Foreign Law Firm Name

In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented
by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres’ client. The
letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”. Dacanay denied Clurman’s liability
and at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker & McKenzie”, a
foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay
filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law
firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities
all over the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that
they can render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises
and others engaged in foreign trade and investment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.
HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law
firm are enjoined from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of law.
Dia-Añonuevo VS Bercasio

Facts: Mrs. Concepcion Dia-Añonuevo, claims to be a co-owner of an undivided interest

of a certain parcel of irrigated riceland situated in Cabilogan, Sto. Niño, Sto. Domingo,
Albay. This property was the object of a deed of sale executed by Maximo Balibado, Justo
Balibado and Petrona Balibado de Barrios in favor of Alfredo Ong and acknowledged
before Municipal Judge Bonifacio Bercacio, respondent herein, as ex-officio notary public,
on January 25, 1972. complainant informed respondent judge that the vendors owned
only one-third undivided portion of the property and that she and other cousins of hers
owned two-thirds thereof. Judge Bercacio advised the complainant to redeem or
repurchase the property from the vendee, Alfredo Ong. Complainant then requested the
judge to intercede in their behalf with the vendee to allow them to redeem the property
and for that purpose she gave respondent the amount of P3,500.00 to be used to pay
Alfredo Ong. Respondent agreed and received the amount of P3,500.00. Respondent
sent the corresponding letter to Alfredo Ong but the latter did not answer. Forthwith a
complaint was filed on March 8, 1972 with the Court of First Instance of Albay. During the
pendency of the civil case, complainant asked respondent judge to allow her to withdraw
P3,500.00 she had deposited with him as she was then in need of money, but no action
was taken by respondent.

Issue: WON respondent is engaging in the practice of law violating Judiciary Act of 1948

Ruling: Yes. Respondent violated Section 77 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
which provides in part: All provisions relative to the observance of office hours and the
holding of sessions applicable to courts of first instance shall likewise apply to municipal
judges, but the latter may, after office hours and with the permission of the district judge
concerned, engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law ...
Respondent submits that it was Atty. Berango and not he who assisted the complainant,
Mrs. Añonuevo, and her co-plaintiffs as counsel in the civil case. Respondent's claim is
belied, however, by the active interest he took in the case of Mrs. Añonuevo manifested
as follows: (a) He gave Mrs. Añonuevo legal advice on the remedy available to her and
her co-owners with regards to the property sold to Alfredo Ong. (b) He accepted from Mrs.
Añonuevo the sum of P3,500.00 for purposes of redeeming the property from the vendee,
plus P100.00 for incidental expenses. (c) He wrote to Alfredo Ong for and in behalf of Mrs.
Añonuevo and her co-owners offering to redeem the land in question. (d) When his
attempts at an out-of-court settlement failed, he caused the filing of the complaint in Civil
Case No. 4591 for which he was issued a receipt for docket and legal research fees. (e)
He was present together with Atty. Berango at the pre-trial of July 5, 1972, and although,
as he claims, it was Atty. Berango who made an appearance for that pre-trial, the trial
Judge nonetheless took note of respondent's presence so that the Order dictated on that
occasion reads: "Attys. Berango and Bercacio are notified of the date of the trial. The
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in court
proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a
litigation, giving of legal advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc.

The rule disqualifying a municipal judge from engaging in the practice of law seeks to
avoid the evil of possible use of the power and influence of his office to affect the outcome
of a litigation where he is retained as counsel. Compelling reasons of public policy lie
behind this prohibition, and judges are expected to conduct themselves in such a manner
as to preclude any suspicion that they are representing the interests of a party litigant.
MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of
War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits
then undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. On August 12, 1969
Martelino sought the disqualification of the President of the general court-martial,
following the latter's admission that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor
incident. Martelino contended that the case had received such an amount of publicity
in the press and other news media and in fact was being exploited for political
purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969 as to
imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
challenge. Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had
received, no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's
fairness and impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the
petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and
background" of the members of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to
prejudice their right to a fair trial?
HELD: NO, the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to
be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was
not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of
the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those
connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of
information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge
of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed, we cannot say that the trial of the
petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance
of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with
due process. Granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since
the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly
influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that
the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the purpose
sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner
until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the
publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the
trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
People VS Gacott Jr.

Facts: For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of
respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was
annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand
and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made
by the Second Division of the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge

Held: To support the Court’s ruling, Justice Regalado relied on his recollection of
a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion who was the
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission of which Regalado was also a member.

The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows
that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which
states that “the SC en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the
determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It
was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity.

The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein
and is intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other
hand that the Court en banc can “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted therein.” In this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated
upon and decided by the full Court itself.

Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to

the Court en banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be
imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary,
disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of
more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.

Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or
imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication
of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases
involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.