TORTS REVIEWER | PROF.
DANNY UY
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Definition
Civil Code Art. 2176
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Civil Code Art. 1157
Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts
Mendoza v. Arrieta
Facts: A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a
Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep
owned and driven by respondent Salazar; and a gravel and sand
truck owned by respondent Timbol and driven by Montoya. As
a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for
Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed
against Salazar and Montoya with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. The case against truck-driver Montoya, was for
causing damage to the jeep owned by Salazar, by hitting it at the
right rear portion thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an
oncoming car, which happened to be petitioner's Mercedes
Benz. The case against jeep-owner-driver Salazar was for
causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner.
The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the
collision between Salazar's jeep and petitioner's car was the
result of the former having been bumped from behind by the
truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded
damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver
Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a
civil case with the Court of First Instance of Manila against
respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Timbol for
indemnification for the damages sustained by his car.
Held:
Against truck-owner Timbol
For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case,
the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final
judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be,
between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, Identity
of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.
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We agree with petitioner that there is no Identity of cause of
action between the criminal case and civil case. Obvious is the
fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not
prosecuted for damage to petitioner's car but for damage to the
jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. And
more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was
the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal
negligence under Article l of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article
2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, petitioner's cause of action being based
on quasi-delict, said case may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is
concerned, the Civil Case is not barred by the fact that
petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to
file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.
Against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil liability
co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminalunder
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article
2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111
of the Rules of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for
separate application by the offended party.
Crystal clear is the trial Court's pronouncement that under the
facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable
for the damages sustained by petitioner's car. In other words,
"the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist."
Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner's cause of action as against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex-delictu, founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, the civil action must be held to have
been extinguished in consonance with Section 3(c), Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.
And even if petitioner's cause of action as against jeep-owner-
driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the
same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that
Salazar's acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt,
consequently, a civil action for damages can no longer be
instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the
Civil Code.
Cinco v. Canonoy
Facts: Petitioner herein filed for the recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a
jeepney driven and operated by respondents. Subsequent
thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver arising from
the same accident.
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Issue: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action
for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal
action. YES.
Held: From the Complaint filed by petitioner , it is evident that
the nature and character of his action was quasi-
delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code.
The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the
criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
(Article 31, Civil Code), for a quasi-delict is an independent
source of obligation (Article 1157, Civil Code).
It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based
on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as enunciated in
Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it
includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to
property.
Elcano v. Hill
Facts: Plaintiffs filed a complaint for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time, and his
father, with whom he was living getting subsistence, for the
killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs. The accused had
been acquitted in an earlier criminal action.
Issue: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for
civil liability, was not reversed? NO.
Held: Criminal negligence is a violation of the criminal law,
while civil negligence is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of
ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Therefore,
under Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a
bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from
criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in
a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two. In other words,
the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
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committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law.
B. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Crime
RPC Art. 100-101
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony . — Every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1,
2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of
this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which
shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil
liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person,
and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without
discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that
there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or
minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if
such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt
from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the
persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined,
even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with
the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification
shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12,
the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be
primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons,
those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that
part of their property exempt from execution.
ROC Rule 111
Prosecution of Civil Action
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When
a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
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action shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party
a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against
the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute
a first lien on the judgment awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified
in the complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees
shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in
court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall
be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be
filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action
which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the
amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the
actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information
also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional
filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts
are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently
awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount
awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the
criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing
consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
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Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has
been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits.
The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the
court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the
evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed
automatically reproduced in the criminal action without
prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the
witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case
and of the parties to present additional evidence. The
consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and
decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be
instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended
shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on
delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (2a)
Section 3. When civil action may proceeded independently . —
In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may
be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed
independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. (3a)
Section 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the
accused after arraignment and during the pendency of the
criminal action shall extinguish the civil liability arising from the
delict. However, the independent civil action instituted under
section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to enforce
liability arising from other sources of obligation may be
continued against the estate or legal representative of the
accused after proper substitution or against said estate, as the
case may be. The heirs of the accused may be substituted for
the deceased without requiring the appointment of an executor
or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad
litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of
thirty (30) days from notice.
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be
enforced in the manner especially provided in these rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of the deceased.
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be
dismissed without prejudice to any civil action the offended
party may file against the estate of the deceased. (n)
Section 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar. — A final judgment
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rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil
liability is not a bar to a criminal action against the defendant
for the same act or omission subject of the civil action. (4a)
Section 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. — A
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon the
pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed
in the office of the prosecutor or the court conducting the
preliminary investigation. When the criminal action has been
filed in court for trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in
the same criminal action at any time before the prosecution
rests. (6a)
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. — The elements of
a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution
of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. (5a)
Manliclic v. Calaunan
Facts: Respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza,
was on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-
type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus owned and driven by
petitioners was likewise bound for Manila from Tarlac. The
front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side
of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the
right and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further
extensive damage.
By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging
petitioner Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently,
respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioners
Manliclic and PRBLI. The criminal case was tried before the
civil case.
Issue: Can Manliclic still be held liable for the collision and be
found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of
Appeals in the criminal case that there was an absence of
negligence on his part?
Held: From the declaration of the Court of Appeals, it appears
that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt,
but on the ground that he is not the author of the act
complained of which is based on Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist.
In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held
liable for the mishap. The afore-quoted section applies only to
a civil action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil
action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3,
Rule 111 [now Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to
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civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code that is entirely apart and independent
from a delict or crime – a distinction exists between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that
acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not
guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable
doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may
be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an
accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of
the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration
in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability
based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there
being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon
or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any,
may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained
of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether
it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the
author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist). An acquittal or conviction in
the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
Maniago v. CA
Facts: One of petitioner’s buses figured in a vehicular accident
with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent. As a
result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries
was filed against petitioners driver. A month later, a civil case
for damages was filed by private respondent against petitioner
himself. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the
proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of
the criminal case against his driver.
Issue: Whether despite the absence of a reservation, private
respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages
against petitioner under Art. 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Held: Art. 2177 states that responsibility for fault or negligence
under the above provisions is entirely separate and distinct from
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the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers
Penal Code.
Facts: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages filed
However, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, on by petitioner Dr. Huang against herein respondents. The
while reiterating that a civil action under these provisions of the said Complaint was premised on the alleged negligence of
Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal action, respondent’s staff, in the untimely putting off all the lights
provides that the right to bring it must be reserved. within the hotel’s swimming pool area, as well as the locking of
the main entrance door of the area, prompting petitioner to
We have reached the conclusion that the right to bring an grope for a way out. While doing so, a folding wooden counter
action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as top fell on her head causing her serious brain injury.
required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. In
other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for Held: Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and
the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from DTPCI mainly on account of their negligence but not on any
crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the breach of contract. Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on
Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had a change of heart
instituted with the criminal action. and later claimed that an implied contract existed between her
and respondents PHI and DTPCI and that the latter were
On the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of liable for breach of their obligation to keep her safe and out of
civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the harm. A perusal of petitioner’s Complaint evidently shows that
criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from her cause of action was based solely on quasi-delict.
the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal
action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) breach of contract (culpa
or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal contractual)
action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was negligence is direct, negligence is merely incidental
brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal substantive and independent to the performance of the
of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the contractual obligation; there is
acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil a pre-existing contract or
liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil obligation
Code. the defense of "good father of such is not a complete and
a family" is a complete and proper defense in the
Dulay v. CA proper defense insofar as selection and supervision of
parents, guardians and employees
Facts: An altercation between Torzuela and Napoleon Dulay employers are concerned
occurred at the “Big Bang sa Alabang” as a result of which there is no presumption of negligence is presumed so
Torzuela, the security guard in duty at the said carnival, shot negligence and it is incumbent long as it can be proved that
and killed Dulay. upon the injured party to there was breach of the
prove the negligence of the contract and the burden is on
Held: It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being
defendant, otherwise, the the defendant to prove that
prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Napoleon
former’s complaint will be there was no negligence in the
Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
dismissed carrying out of the terms of
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action the contract; the rule of
before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence respondeat superior is
is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of followed.
express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted As petitioner’s cause of action is based on quasi-delict, it is
to do in this case. However, the private respondents opposed incumbent upon her to prove the presence of the following
the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a requisites before respondents can be held liable, to wit:
delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not attended
by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
petitioner's cause of action. (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well- by the plaintiff
entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary Further, since petitioner’s case is for quasi-delict, the negligence
and intentional. or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her
action. The burden of proof is upon petitioner. Section 1, Rule
C. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished from Breach Of 131 of the Rules of Court provides that "burden of proof is the
Contract (Culpa Contractual) duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
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necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law." It is then up for the plaintiff to
establish his cause of action or the defendant to establish his
defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant,
he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns.
The quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence.
In this case, as found by the trial court and affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner utterly failed to prove the alleged
negligence of respondents.
Uy Notes: Huang was not a booked guest. She was merely
invited by her friend staying there to swim at their pool. There
was clearly no contractual breach. Did Philippine Hoteliers
have any other obligation?
Calalas v. Sunga
Facts: Respondent Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the
conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As
Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger, an Isuzu truck driven
by Verena and owned by Salva bumped the left rear portion of
the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
Calalas filed an independent action against Salva (driver) and
Verena (owner) for quasi-delict docketed as Civil Case No.
3490. In said case, both the driver and owner of the truck were
held liable for quasi-delict.
Meanwhile, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in
failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint
against Salva.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in the lower court Civil Case
No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate
cause of the accident negates his liability in this case.
Held: The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck
liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party
to that case and, therefore, the principle of res judicatadoes not
apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present
case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether
Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the
damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the
issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of
carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
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negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract
or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be
clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas
in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries
to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the
Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier
the burden of proof.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only
in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract.
Air France v. Carrascoso
Facts: Defendant Air France, through its authorized agent,
Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round
trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because there was a "white
man", who had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate
his "first class" seat, the plaintiff refused; a commotion ensued,
and "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist
class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across
to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat
to the white man"
Held: The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of
its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled in
41
law. For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager,
petitioner, his employer, must answer (Article 21, Civil Code)
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and
degree from any other contractual relation. And this, because,
although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature," nevertheless, “the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort.” Petitioner's contract with
Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This
is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Radio Communications v. CA
Held: The action for damages was filed in the lower court
directly against respondent corporation not as an employer
subsidiarily liable under the provisions of Article 1161 of the
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
New Civil Code in relation to Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. The cause of action of the private respondent is based
on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code, as well as on
respondent's breach of contract thru the negligence of its own
employees.
There is a clear case of breach of contract by the petitioner. As
a corporation, the petitioner can act only through its employees.
Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and transmitting
messages are the acts of the petitioner.
Uy Notes: This case would not apply today as this mode of
communication has been rendered obsolete by text messaging.
D. Interference with Contracts
Civil Code Art. 1314
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his
contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting
party.
Lagon v. CA
Facts: Lagon purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi,
through an intestate court two parcels of land. A few months
after the sale, private respondent Lapuz filed a complaint for
torts and damages against petitioner. He claimed that he
entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi
Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the property)
One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent
to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased
to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would
answer for the rent private respondent was obligated to pay Bai
Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease
contract ended but since the construction of the commercial
buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was
allegedly renewed.
Before the appellate court, petitioner disclaimed knowledge of
any lease contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and private
respondent. On the other hand, private respondent insisted that
it was impossible for petitioner not to know about the contract
since the latter was aware that he was collecting rentals from the
tenants of the building. While the appellate court disbelieved
the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held that, for
petitioner to become liable for damages, he must have known
of the lease contract and must have also acted with malice or
bad faith when he bought the subject parcels of land. (Article
1314, Civil Code)
Issue: Whether the purchase by petitioner of the subject
property, during the supposed existence of private respondents
lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted
tortuous interference for which petitioner should be held liable
for damages.
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Held: Elements of tortuous interference with contractual
relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the
part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c)
interference of the third person without legal justification or
excuse
Even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the
renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was
that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of
petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of
tortuous interference was never established.
A person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled
by a proper business interest. In other words, a financial or
profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious
interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad
faith involved.
In sum, we rule that, petitioner cannot be made to answer for
private respondents losses.
This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without
injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is
the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. There can
be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the
result of a violation of a legal duty. In that instance, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to legal injury or wrong. Indeed, lack
of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery of
damages.
Uy Notes:
 Why would a lessor allow a lessee to sublease the
properties to other tenants instead of collection the
payments himself?
- If he couldn’t do it himself.
 Who was the owner of the building after it was
constructed?
- Sepi.
 If Sepi sold his property to Lagon, shouldn’t Lagon respect
the lease agreement?
- Yes.
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
II. NEGLIGENCE
A. Concept
Civil Code Art. 1173
The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission
of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the
persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence above
shows bad faith, Articles 1171 and 2201, par. 2 shall apply.
 Art. 1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is
demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action
for future fraud is void.
 Art. 2201 (2) In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or
wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good
father of a family shall be required.
Mercury Drug v. Baking (2007)
GR No. 156037
Facts: Respondent’s doctor gave him two medical prescriptions,
Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to Mercury Drug to
buy the prescribed medicine. However, the saleslady misread
the prescription and sold to respondent Domicum, a potent
sleeping tablet.
On the third day he took the medicin, respondent fell asleep
while driving. He figured in a vehicular accident and could not
remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact.
Held: To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the
following requisites must concur:
(a) damage suffered by the plaintiff;
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and,
(c) connection of cause and effect between the fault
or negligence of the defendant and the damage
incurred by the plaintiff.
It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued
with public interest. The health and safety of the people will be
put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the
highest degree of care and diligence in selling medicines.
Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we
defer to the findings of the trial court affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
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Obviously, petitioner’s employee was grossly negligent in selling
to respondent Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.
Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and
death for a buying patient, the said employee should have been
very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified
whether the medicine she gave respondent was indeed the one
prescribed by his physician. The care required must be
commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed
must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business
which the law demands.
Cantre v. Sps Go (2007)
522 SCRA 547
Facts: Dr. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at
the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the
attending physician of respondent Nora S. Go, who was
admitted at the said hospital on April 19, 1992.
At 1:30 a.m. of April 20, 1992, Nora gave birth to her fourth
child, but around 3:30 a.m., Nora suffered profuse bleeding
inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were
not completely expelled from her womb after delivery. While
petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and
stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her
baby.
While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John
noticed a fresh gaping wound in the inner portion of her left
arm. The medico-legal officer of the NBI later found it to be a
burn and that a droplight when placed near the skin for about
10 minutes could cause such burn.
Nora’s injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at the Dr. Jesus
Delgado Memorial Hospital for skin grafting, the costs of which
were shouldered by the hospital. Unfortunately, Nora’s arm
would never be the same. Aside from the unsightly mark, the
pain in her left arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle
her wounded arm. Her movements now are also restricted. Her
children cannot play with the left side of her body as they might
accidentally bump the injured arm, which aches at the slightest
touch.
Held: The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give
primordial consideration to the well-being of their patients. If a
doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his
acts. This notwithstanding, courts face a unique restraint in
adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are
not guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally
cause injury to their patients. However, intent is immaterial in
negligence cases because where negligence exists and is proven,
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the
damage caused.
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a
presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the
following requisites concur:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Clearly, under the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for
moral damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result of
petitioner’s negligence.
B. Persons Liable
i. Tortfeasor, for his own acts
Civil Code, Art. 2180-2181
Article 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in
the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or
on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the
official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
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The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Article 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his
dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he
has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. (1904)
Article 2182. If the minor or insane person causing damage
has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be
answerable with his own property in an action against him
where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
ii. Parents
Family Code, Art. 211, 221, 236
Article 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall
always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and
are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under
parental authority.
Article 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
Article 236 (as amended by RA 6809). Emancipation shall
terminate parental authority over the person and property of
the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts
of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in
special cases. Contracting marriage shall require parental
consent until the age of twenty-one. Nothing in this Code shall
be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
 The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. (Art. 2194, CC)
 Article 211, FC effectively amended Article 2180, CC
such that the distinction in the latter where the father is
liable before the mother no longer applies.
 In case the child lives separately from the parents, the
liability of the parents depends on the reason for the
separation. If the separation is unjustifiable, the
parents may still be held liable for want of adequate
vigilance and care over the child.
 Parental liability is based on parental authority - which
includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of
the child. (Tamargo v. CA)
 When the tort by the child happened before adoption,
the adopting parents will not be liable. Liability will fall
on persons actually exercising parental authority when
the tort happened. (Tamargo v. CA)
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
 The diligence of a good father of a family required by
law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a
large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the
child. (Libi v. IAC)
 Elements of parental liability under Article 2180:
a) The child is a minor;
b) He lives in his parents’ custody; and
c) There was failure on his parents’ part to employ
diligence in supervising him or in exercising their
parental authority (Libi v. IAC)
Exconde v. Capuno (1957)
Dante Capuno, a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and
a student of Balintawak Elementary school, attended a parade
in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's
supervisor. Dante, with the other students, boarded a jeep
where he took hold of the wheel and drove it. The jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore
Caperiña, died. Delfin Capuno, Dante’s father, was not with his
son at the time of the accident, nor did he know that his son
was going to attend a parade.
He only came to know it when his son told him after the
accident that he attended the parade upon instruction of his
teacher.
ISSUE: WON defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly
liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for damages
resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the
negligent act of minor Dante Capuno  YES
RATIO: The civil liability which the law imposes upon the
father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for
any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them, is obvious. This is the necessary consequence of the
parental authority they exercise over them, which imposes upon
the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their
company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to
their means", while, on the other hand, giving them the "right to
correct and punish them in moderation". The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove
that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
Fuellas v. Cadano (1961)
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas were classmates at St. Mary’s
High School. After an altercation between the two, Rico held
Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of
balance and pushed him to ground. Pepito fell on his right side
with his right arm under his body while Rico rode on his left
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side. Consequently, Pepito’s arm suffered a complete fracture.
A criminal case was filed against Rico, who was convicted, while
a civil action for damages was filed against his dad, Agapito.
The RTC and CA both held that Agapito is liable under Article
2180. Agapito argued that Article 2180 only applies when there
was “fault or negligence”, but not when the act was with
deliberate criminal intent.
ISSUE: WON Agapito Fuellas was civilly liable for the criminal
act of his son, Rico YES
RATIO: Under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father
is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if
the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over
9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment,
unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part.
But a minor over 15 who has acts with discernment is not
exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is
silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand
convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law
which is the Civil Code.
The particular law that governs in this case is Article 2180 of
the Civil Code. To hold that this provision does not apply
because it only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts
and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would
result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal
intent.
Cuadra v. Monfort (1970)
Maria Teresa Cuadra and Maria Teresa Monfort were
classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in
Bacolod City.
While in school, their teacher assigned them to weed the grass.
Monfort found a plastic headband which she jokingly tossed to
her friend, saying she had found an earthworm. The object hit
Cuadra’s right eye, because of which her eye became swollen.
She underwent surgical operation twice and stayed in the
hospital for a total of twenty-three days. Cuadra completely lost
the sight of her right eye. The parents of Cuadra filed an action
for damages against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's
father in behalf of their minor daughter.
ISSUE: WON Alfonso Monfort is liable for the act of his
minor child which caused damage to another under Articles
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code NO
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
RATIO: It is clear that vicarious liability is based on the fault or
negligence accompanying the causative act or omission. it
implies a consideration of the attendant circumstances in every
individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of
such diligence the damage could have been prevented. This
presumption is merely prima facie and may, therefore, be
rebutted by the defendant.
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be
inferred that the defendant could have prevented the damage
by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss
in the exercise of his parental authority in failing to foresee such
damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child
was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she
was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
supervision of the teacher.
Rodriguez-Luna v. IAC (1985)
Roberto Luna was killed in a collision between his go-kart and a
car driven by the minor Luis dela Rosa. The heirs of Luna
brought a suit for damages against Luis dela Rosa and his father
Jose. Luis dela Rosa is now of age, married with two children,
and living in Spain. He was only casually employed, his
compensation is hardly enough to support his family, and he
has no assets of his own as yet. The dela Rosas, invoking
Elcano v. Hill, argued that since Luis had attained age, the
liability of the father should be subsidiary only as a matter of
equity.
ISSUE: WON the liability of Jose dele Rosa, the father of Luis,
should be subsidiary only NO
RATIO: To apply equity instead of strict law in this case will
not serve the ends of justice in view of the fact that Luis dela
Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts, does
not have any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere,
and whose earnings are insufficient to support his family.
Libi v. IAC (1992)
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, who were former
sweethearts, each died from a single gunshot wound inflicted
from a firearm licensed in the name of Wendell’s father. Julie
Ann’s parents submitted that Wendell caused Julie Ann’s death
by shooting her with the said firearm and thereafter turned the
gun on himself. As a result, they filed a civil case against
Wendell’s parents to recover damages arising from the latter’s
vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
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ISSUE: WON Cresencio Libi and Amelia Yap Libi are
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from the crime
committed by their son, Wendell YES
RATIO: The Libis’ defense that they exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family is not borne out by the
evidence on record. Wendell’s father owns a gun which he kept
in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the
keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around
or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other
key was.
The civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor
children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. Just like the rule in Article 2180,
under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, the civil liability
of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is
likewise direct and primary. If the liability of the parents for
crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary,
then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil
liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damages.
iii. Guardians
Family Code, Art. 216-217
Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of
age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of
age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed.
Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused
children and other children similarly situated, parental authority
shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of
children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly
accredited by the proper government agency.
ROC, Rule 92 Sec. 2
Section 2. Meaning of word "incompetent." — Under this rule,
the word "incompetent" includes
 persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or
who are hospitalized lepers,
 prodigals,
 deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
 those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and
 persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of
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age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves
and manage their property, becoming thereby an easy
prey for deceit and exploitation.
iv. Employers
Cangco v. Manila Railroad (1918)
38 Phil 768
in his mind with regard to the length of the step he was required
to take and the character of the platform where he was alighting.
Cangco was ignorant of the fact that there was an obstruction to
the platform but he had a right to assume, in the absence of
some circumstances to warn him to the contrary, that the
platform was clear.
Although not an issue on appeal, the Court discussed also
whether Manila Railroad was negligent:

Doctrine: In a quasi-delict, the law creates a presumption that,

where the employee causes damage, the employer has been Liability of an Employer - Liability of an Employer -
negligent in the selection or direction of such employee. But Culpa Aquiliana Culpa Contractual
the presumption is rebuttable with proof of due diligence.
Presumptive responsibility for Liability of masters and
The employer, thus, cannot raise as a defense that it was the the negligence of servants employers for employees’
servants or agents who caused the negligence or omission. negligence is not based upon a
presumption of the master’s
Facts: Jose Cangco was a clerk for Manila Railroad Company negligence
who used the company’s train as well to go to their main office
in Manila from his house in Rizal. While he was alighting from Can be rebutted by proof of Proof of exercise of utmost
the cement platform to one of the coaches, his feet came in exercise of due care in diligence and care does not
contact with a sack of watermelons, piled at the edge of the selection and supervision relieve the master of his
platform in a row to be brought for shipment to the market. He liability.
slipped and fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from
Substantive and independent Incident in the performance
the platform and was drawn by the moving car for around six
as a source of obligation of an obligation already
meters. His right arm had to be amputated after 2 medical
among persons not formerly existing
operations.
connected by any legal tie.
Cangco’s cause of action was against the negligence of the
servants and employees of Manila Railroad for placing the sacks The contract of carriage of Manila Railroad to transport Cangco
of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
be a menace to the security of passengers boarding the trains. and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains.
However, the trial court ruled that Cangco was precluded from That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its
recovering damages because even though Manila Railroad was non--performance could not be excused by proof that the fault
negligent for placing the sacks of melon in such manner, was morally imputable to Manila Railroad’s
Cangco himself failed to use diligence in alighting from the servants/employees.
coach. Cangco was barred by his contributory negligence.
Cuison v. Norton & Harrison (1930)
Issue: Whether plaintiff Cangco was guilty of contributory
negligence 55 Phil 18

Held: No. Therefore, only defendant Manila Railroad is
negligent as an employer. Cangco must be paid damages.
Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a
common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day
without suffering injury. Given the stable and even surface of
the platform, and Cangco’s vigor and agility of young manhood,
it was by no means risky for him to get off while the train was
yet moving. He did not act imprudently or recklessly because
given his age, sex and physical condition as well as the fact that
the place was perfectly familiar to him, there was no uncertainty
Doctrine: An employer is liable only for the negligence of his
employees in the discharge of their duties. He would not be
liable for the negligence of an independent contractor.
Facts: While 7-year old Moises Cuison was going to school in
Santa Mesa, a truck with lumber stopped for the purpose of
rearranging the lumber in its trunk that had become loose.
However, as the truck stopped, the lumber fell on the boy,
pinning him and causing him almost instant death. Father of
boy, Cuison, filed suit to recover damages against Norton &
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
Harrison whose firm initials “N&H” were displayed on said
truck.
In court, the following were established: The truck is actually
owned by Antonio Ora who is renting it to Norton & Harrison
for the purpose of transporting N&H lumber to different
destinations. Ora is likewise an employee of N&H, being their
foreman or capetaz, in charge of directing and loading the
lumber to truck. On the day of the incident, three persons were
in the truck, Felix Jose (driver), Telesforo Binoya (washing),
and Francisco Bautista (helper), all of whom were employed by
Ora. Binoya and Bautista were youth under the age of 18 who
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
Issue: W/N Ora is a servant or independent contractor of
N&H? Court ruled Ora as both contractor & employee of
N&H; therefore, N&H is liable for Ora’s negligence.
Held: While he is a contractor, he cannot be considered as an
independent contractor, since he is, at the same time, at the
employ of Norton. He is a foreman who is tasked by Norton to
transport the lumber. Norton retained the power of directing
and controlling the work. Therefore, Ora is both an employee
and a contractor.
Insofar as renting the truck to defendant, he was an
independent contractor, but insofar as he served as foreman, he
was defendant’s employee. The negligence consisted in the
loading of the lumber and the use of minors as Ora’s helpers,
and as an employee of defendant, Ora must be held liable for
the death of plaintiff’s child.
The basis of civil law liability is not respondeat superior but the
relationship of paterfamilias. This theory bases the liability of
the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant.
China Airlines v. CA (1990)
185 SCRA 449
Doctrine : The general rule is that the principal, and not the
agent, is personally liable for tort. The exception is when tort
has been committed by the employee of the agent. In such case,
the agent will be liable.
Facts: Jose Pagsibigan, VP and General Manager of local firm,
bought a Manila-Taipei-HK-Manila flight from Transaire
Travel Agency. Said agency (through Cecille Baron) contacted
the Manila Hotel Branch of Philippine Airlines (PAL), which
was a sales and ticketing agent of China Airlines (CAL). A few
days later, PAL though ticketing clerk Roberto Espiritu cut and
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issued a CAL Ticket for Manila-Taipei-HK-Manila flight to
depart 1720 hours (5:20pm).
On the day of the flight, however, respondent arrived at the
airport and found that the plane had left at 10:20am. He was
only able to fly out the next day, missing his business meeting
and suffering embarrassment from his colleagues who he was
supposed to fly with. Hence, he filed an action for damages,
alleging further the negligence of Roberto Espiritu.
PAL on its defense alleges that its ticketing office through
Roberto Espiritu asked for confirmation from CAL before
issuing the ticket to Pagsibagan, which CAL confirmed.
Defendant China Air Lines, for its part, disclaims liability for
the negligence and incompetence of the employees of PAL.
Moreover, CAL avers that it had properly notified PAL of the
flight schedule.
Held: Pagsibigan opted to seek redress by pursuing two
remedies at the same time, that is, to enforce the civil liability of
CAL for breach of contract and, likewise, to recover from PAL
and Espiritu for tort or culpa aquiliana. A perusal of the
complaint of Pagisbigan will disclose that the allegations therein
make out a case for a quasi-delict. Had Pagisibigan intended to
maintain an action based on breach of contract, he could have
sued CAL alone considering that PAL is not a real party to the
contract. It is thus evident that when Pagsibigan sensed that he
cannot hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, he made a detour on
appeal, by claiming that his action against CAL is based on
breach of contract of carriage. SC did not allow Pagsibigan to
change his theory at this stage because it would be unfair for
CAL as it would have no opportunity to present further
evidence material to the new theory. But there is no basis to
hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, hence its exoneration from
any liability for fault or negligence.
In an action premised on the employee’s negligence, whereby
Pagsibigan seeks recovery for the damages from both PAL and
Espiritu without qualification, what is sought to be imposed is
the direct and primary liability of PAL as an employer. When
an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there
instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the employer. This presumption, however, may
be rebutted by clear showing on the part of the employer that it
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of his employee. PAL failed to
overcome such presumption.
As found by CA, PAL was duly informed of CAL’s revised
schedule, and in fact, PAL had been issuing and selling ticket
based on said revised time schedule. For his negligence,
Espiritu is primarily liable to Pagisbigan under Article 2176 of
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
the CC. For the failure of PAL to rebut the legal presumption
of negligence, it is also primarily liable under Article 2180 of
CC. PAL, however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement
of the amount which it will have to pay the offended party’s
claim.
Dulay v. CA (1995)
243 SCRA 220
Doctrine: The liability of the employer is direct and immediate;
it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent
employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such
employee.
It is incumbent upon the employer to prove that they exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
Facts:
 Dec 7, 1988: An altercation between Benigno
Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the
"Big Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa;
as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security
guard on duty at the said carnival, shot using .38
caliber revolver belonging to employer, and killed
Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
 Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow, filed an
action for damages vs Benigno Torzuela and private
respondents Safeguard Investigation and Security Co.,
Inc., and/or Superguard Security Corp, alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela, praying for actual,
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees
 Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
that the complaint does not state a valid cause of
action, that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was
beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the
alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate
intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is governed by
Article 100 RPC.
 Safeguard filed a motion praying that it be excluded as
defendant on the ground that defendant Torzuela is
not one of its employee's
 April 13, 1989: respondent Judge Regino issued an
order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss
and SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as
defendant, declaring:
o that the complaint did not state facts
necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-
delict - no mention of any negligence on the
part of Torzuela in shooting Dulay or that the
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same was done in the performance of his
duties.
o that the complaint was one for damages
founded on crimes punishable under Articles
100 and 103 RPC as distinguished from
those arising from, quasi-delict.
 CA affirmed, MR denied.
Issues: WON Safeguard and/or Superguard are liable as
employers - YES
Held:
 Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is
no justification for limiting the scope of Art. 2176 CC
to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Art.
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional
 Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable
under Article 33, to wit:
o Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
 The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already
been construed to include bodily injuries causing
death
 It is not the same as the crime of physical injuries
defined in RPC because it includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide.
 Although in the Marcia case it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33
where the crime is the result of criminal negligence, it
must be noted however, that Torzuela, is charged with
homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless
imprudence.
 Thus, civil action based on Article 33 lies
 The complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable
breach on the part of the defendant Torzuela and
respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD.
It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno
Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's
death; that the shooting occurred while Torzuela was
on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's employer and
responsible for his acts.
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 This however, does not establish that the defendants
(Employers’) are liable. This is an issue which can be
better resolved after trial on the merits where each
party can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses.
Universal v. QC Human Resources (2007)
533 RA 38
Doctrine It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of its
employees attaches only when the tortious conduct of the
employee relates to, or is in the course of, his employment. An
employer incurs no liability when an employee’s conduct, act or
omission is beyond the range of employment.
The question then is whether, at the time of the damage or
injury, the employee is engaged in the affairs or concerns of the
employer or, independently, in that of his own.
Facts
 Parties involved:
o Universal Aquarius, Inc. - engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of chemical
products
o Conchita Tan- proprietor of Marman Trading;
engaged in the trading, delivery and distribution
of chemical products in Metro Manila, with a
depot in Antipolo City adjoining Universal's
chemical plant.
o Q.C. Human Resources Management
Corporation - supplied Universal with 74
temporary workers
 December 13, 2000 - Rodolfo Capocyan, (claiming to be
the national president of Obrero Pilipino (Universal
Chapter)), sent a Notice of Strike to Universal.
o Resources informed the Reg’l Office of the
DOLE that the officers and members of Obrero
Pilipino are its employees and not employees of
Universal.
 December 19, 2000 - Capocyon and 36 other union
officers and members of Obrero Pilipino, picketed,
barricaded and obstructed the entry and exit of Universal's
Antipolo City chemical plant and intercepted Universal's
delivery trucks thereby disrupting its business operations.
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o Marman's depot, which adjoined Universal's
plant, suffered a similar fate.
 December 27, 2000 - Universal and Tan filed a Complaint
vs the strikers and Resources in RTC for breach of
contract and damages suffered due to the disruption of
their respective business operations,
Issues: WON both have a cause of action against Resources -
NO
Held:
 Re: Universal's claim for breach for contract and damage
o Universal had a contract of employment of
temporary workers with Resources; and that
Resources violated said contract by supplying it
with unfit, maladjusted individuals who staged a
strike and disrupted its business operations.
 Re: Tan's claim for damages,
o No cause of action against Resources.
o Tan's claim for damages clearly springs from the
strike effected by the employees of Resources.
o It is settled that an employer's liability for acts of
its employees attaches only when the tortious
conduct of the employee relates to, or is in the
course of, his employment
 The question then is whether, at the
time of the damage or injury, the
employee is engaged in the affairs or
concerns of the employer or,
independently, in that of his own. An
employer incurs no liability when an
employees conduct, act or omission is
beyond the range of employment
o Thus, when Resources' employees staged a strike,
they were acting on their own, beyond the range
of their employment.
 Resources cannot be held liable for
damages caused by the strike staged by
its employees
Ortaliz v. Echarri (1957)
101 Phil 947
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
DOCTRINE: An employer must be engaged in some kind of
industry, and the felony must have been committed in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such industry, in
order for the employer to be held subsidiarily liable for felonies
committed by his employee. (RPC Art. 103) However, this
requirement is not needed to hold an employer principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks. (CC Art. 2180)
FACTS:
 On December 18, 1953, the plaintiff’s son was struck by a
Studebaker Sedan car which was being driven by a
Segundino Estanda, who is under the employ of the car’s
owner, Corado Echarri.
 An information was filed in the MTC against Estanda for
the crime of Slight Physical Injuries Through Reckless
Imprudence. Estanda pleaded guilty and was finally
sentenced to 5 days of Arresto Menor and to pay the costs.
This sentence has already now been served.
 In this complaint against the defendant Echarri, Plaintiff
claims damages in the form of expenses paid for the
hospitalization, medicines, physicians' fees and incidental
expense of his son, Winston Ortaliz, in the amount of
P446.58 and moral damages in the amount of P2,000.
 Defendant Echarri filed a motion to dismiss, alleging:
o That defendant is being sued in his capacity as the
employer of the perpetrator for defendant's
supposed subsidiary civil liability under the RPC
Article 103, in relation to Art. 1161 of the Civil
Code,
o That it is essential, in order for an employer to be
liable subsidiarily for felonies committed by his
employee, that the former be engaged in some
kind of industry, and that the employer had
committed the crime in the discharge of his duties
in connection with such industry,
o That the complaint does not allege that defendant
was nor is engaged in any business or industry in
conjunction with which he has at any time used
the said car, much less on the occasion of the
alleged accident, nor the defendant had at any
time put out the said car for hire.
 The MTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
sufficient cause of action.
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 Plaintiff now contends that under paragraph 2 of Article
2884 of the Civil Code and paragraph 1 and 5 of Article
2180, a sufficient cause of action has been clearly alleged in
the disputed complaint and therefore the same should not
have been dismissed. Article 2180 in part provides:
o ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omission but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
o Employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
 and Article 2184 in its last paragraph provides:
o If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
HELD:
 In view of the aforementioned provision, and those of Art.
2176, there seems to be good reason to support plaintiff's
contention that the complaint in question states sufficient
cause of action.
 Paragraph 5 of Article 2180 refutes the defendant’s
contentions, for it clearly provides that "Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry."
 Defendant-appellee also contends that when the judgment
in the criminal case was rendered against the driver
Estanda, plaintiff did not reserve the civil action and thus
he lost his right thereto. This contention, however, is
untenable, for Article 33 of the Civil Code clearly provides:
o ART. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a civil
action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Mendoza v. Soriano (2007)
524 SCRA 260
FACTS
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 Sonny Soriano met an accident while crossing
Commonwealth Avenue at around 1 am. He was hit by a
speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa, who
allegedly fled the scene, and failed to bring him to the
hospital. Soriano died later on, prompting his wife and
daughter to file a complaint for damages against the driver
and Flordeliza Mendoza, the owner of the vehicle.
Petitioner contends that she was not liable as the owner,
having exercised the diligence of a good father of the family
over her employee, Macasasa.
 Trial court dismissed respondents’ complaint finding
Soriano negligent for crossing Commonwealth Ave rather
than using the pedestrian overpass. Court of Appeals ruled
that, while Soriano was negligent, Macasasa was also
negligent for speeding. Since petitioner failed to present
evidence to the contrary and conformably w/ Art 2180, the
presumption of negligence of the employer in the selection
and supervision of employees stood.
ISSUE: WON petitioner could be held liable for Soriano’s
accident.
HELD
 In this case, we hold petitioner primarily and solidarily
liable for the damages caused by Macasasa. Respondents
could recover directly from petitioner since petitioner
failed to overcome the presumption of negligence and
prove that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in supervising Macasasa.
Metro Manila Transit Co. v. CA (1993)
223 RA 521
DOCTRINE: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides for the
liability of an employer for the tortuous acts of his employees.
This, however, does not exempt the employees from personal
liability, especially if there are no persons having direct
supervision over them, or if there is proof of the existence of
negligence on their part. So the injured party can bring an
action directly against the author of the negligent act or
omission, although he may sue as joint defendants such author
and the person responsible for him.
FACTS:
 A collision between a public utility jeepney and a MMTC
bus driven by Godofredo Leonardo caused respondent
Nenita Custodio to hit the front windshield of the jeepney,
where she was thrown therefrom, causing her to fall and
remain unconscious for a few days, with serious physical
injuries. Thereafter, she filed a complaint for damages
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against the driver and the owner of the vehicles. MMTC
opined that they had a very diligent and careful application
process and that the daily operation of their buses were
religiously supervised. The trial court ruled that both
drivers and jeepney owner were concurrently negligent,
and as joint-feasors were solidarily liable to Custodio.
MMTC, however, is absolved from liability because it
exercised the required diligence necessary in the selection
and supervision of its employees. Meanwhile, the Court of
Appeals ruled that MMTC is also solidarily liable. CA was
not convinced that MMTC exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of driver Leonardo.
ISSUE: WON the evidence presented with respect to the proof
of due diligence of MMTC in the selection and supervision of
its employees, particularly driver Leonardo, is sufficient. No.
MMTC is liable to respondent.
HELD:
 MMTC’s attempt to prove its diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail
as it was unable to buttress the same with any other
evidence, apart from their testimony. Statements made by
their training officer and transport supervisor regarding the
company’s policies were too general and did not even
present any evidence that driver Leonardo complied with
such.
 As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the
latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not
only in the selection of employees but also in the actual
supervision of their work.
Belizar v. Brazas (1961)
2 SCRA 526
FACTS: One of Belizar’s auto-trucks fell into the river and was
submerged in water while on board a ferry boat of Samar
Express Transit operated by Florencio Brazas, Felix Hilario,
and Lucio Baldonilo. Belizar filed a complaint against Brazas,
Hilario and Baldonilo. They are being sued in their capacity as
employees of the Bureau of Public Highways for their gross
negligence in not providing the ferry boat with safety devices.
The lower court dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: WON the lower court dismissed the complaint
HELD:
 Belizar is suing the defendant employees personally for
their negligent acts under the doctrine of quasi-delict.
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 Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides for the liability of
an employer for the tortuous acts of his employees. This,
however, does not exempt the employees from personal
liability, especially if there are no persons having direct
supervision over them, or if there is proof of the existence
of negligence on their part. So the injured party can bring
an action directly against the author of the negligent act or
omission, although he may sue as joint defendants such
author and the person responsible for him.
 The fact that the duties and positions are indicated does
not mean that they are being sued in their official
capacities, especially as the present action is not one against
the Government.
 The dismissal of the complaint is not justified, remanded
to the lower courts.
YHT Realty v. CA (2005)
451 SCRA 638
DOCTRINE: The New Civil Code in Articles 1998-2003 is
explicit that the responsibility of the hotel-keeper shall extend
to loss of, or injury to, the personal property of the guests even
if caused by servants or employees of the keepers of hotels or
inns as well as by strangers, except as it may proceed from any
force majeure. It is the loss through force majeure that may
spare the hotel-keeper from liability.
FACTS:
 Private respondent Mcloughlin was convinced by Tan to
stay in Tropicana where Lainez, Payam, and Danilo Lopez
were employed. Lopez is the manager while Payam and
Lainez had custody of the keys for the safety deposit boxes
of Tropicana.
 Every deposit box has two keys: one given to the registered
guest and the other remaining in possession of the
management of the hotel.
 Mcloughlin rented a safety deposit box and placed the
following: 1 envelope containing 10,000 USD, 1 envelope
containing 5,000 USD, 1 envelope containing 10,000
AUD, 2 envelopes containing letters and credit cards, 2
bankbooks, and a checkbook.
 Before leaving for Hong Kong, he opened the deposit box
and took the envelope containing 5,000 USD.
 Upon arriving in Hong Kong, he opened the envelope
containing 5,000 USD and discovered that only 3,000
USD were enclosed therein.
 Went back to the Philippines and checked out of
Tropicana. He then left for Australia. He discovered that
the envelope containing 10,000 USD was short of 5,000
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USD and some jewelries he bought in Hong Kong were
also missing.
 He went back to the Philippines, registered at Tropicana
and rented a safety deposit box. He placed therein: 1
envelope containing 15,000 USD, 1 envelope containing
10,000 AUD, and other envelopes containing his traveling
papers/documents.
 He noticed that 2,000 USD were missing from the
envelope containing 15,000 USD and 4,500 AUD were
missing from the envelope containing 10,000 AUD.
 Tan admitted that she had stolen McLoughlin’s key and
was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance
of Lopez, Payam and Lainez.
 Lopez wrote on a piece of paper a promissory note which
was signed by Tan.
 Despite the execution of promissory note by Tan,
McLoughin insisted that it must be the hotel who must
assume responsibility for the loss he suffered.
 Lopez refused to accept the responsibility relying on
paragraphs (2) and (4) of “Undertaking For the Use of
Safety Deposit Box”
o 2. To release and hold free and blameless
TROPICANA APARTMENT HOTEL from
any liability arising from any loss in the contents
and/or use of the said deposit box for any cause
whatsoever, including but not limited to the
presentation or use thereof by any other person
should the key be lost;
o ...
o 4. To return the key and execute the RELEASE
in favor of TROPICANA APARTMENT
HOTEL upon giving up the use of the box.
ISSUE: Whether or not a hotel may evade liability for the loss
of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these
guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its
employees free from blame for such loss in light of Article 2003
of the Civil Code which voids such waivers.
HELD:
 It is undeniable that without the acquiescence of the
employees of Tropicana to the opening of the safety
deposit box, the loss of McLoughlin's money could and
should have been avoided.
 The issue of whether the "Undertaking For The Use of
Safety Deposit Box" executed by McLoughlin is tainted
with nullity presents a legal question appropriate for
resolution in this petition. Notably, both the trial court and
the appellate court found the same to be null and void.
 Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the "undertaking" manifestly
contravene Article 2003 of the New Civil Code for they
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from
any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box
for any cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was
intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of
the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not
negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees.
The New Civil Code is explicit that the responsibility of the
hotel-keeper shall extend to loss of, or injury to, the
personal property of the guests even if caused by servants
or employees of the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by
strangers, except as it may proceed from any force
majeure. It is the loss through force majeure that may spare
the hotel-keeper from liability. In the case at bar, there is
no showing that the act of the thief or robber was done
with the use of arms or through an irresistible force to
qualify the same as force majeure.
a. Employer-employee relationship must be
established
4-Fold Test:
1. Engagement and selection of the employee
2. Payment of wages
3. Power of dismissal
4. Control test: control on the means and methods of
doing the work
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Court of Appeals
Facts: Camacho, owner of a gasoline station selling Shell
product requested Shell Corp. to conduct a hydro-pressure test
on the underground storage tanks of her station. Shell hired
Jesus Feliciano who conducted the test. Feliciano and his men
drained the storage tank and filled it with water. Before the tank
is filled, Feliciano requested the gasolineboy to switch the faucet
off if already filled and then he left. But not until the next day,
at 2 am, was the faucet turned off when Camacho saw that the
water already reached the lip of the pipe. Unknowingly, her
husband sold gasoline that day, but customers returned
complaining that the gasoline sold was adulterated. The
incident was widely publicized in the local media. Upon
investigation, they learned that the water being filled in the
storage tank undergoing hydro pressure test is transferring to
other gasoline tanks causing the adulteration. Camacho
demanded Shell to pay P10,000 but Shell refused. Thereafter,
Camacho filed a civil case for damages against Shell. Shell’s
defense was that Feliciano is an independent contractor and not
its employee, hence it cannot be held liable for Feliciano’s
negligence.
Issue: WON petitioner should be held accountable for the
damage to private respondent due to the hydro-pressure test
conducted by Jesus Feliciano.
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Held: No, Shell cannot be held liable because it is not an
employer of Feliciano there being no existing employer-
employee relationship between Shell and Feliciano. Feliciano is
an independent contractor. Being an independent contractor,
Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he
alone was in control over the manner of how he was to
undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the
consequences of his negligence. Shell did not exercise control
and supervision over Feliciano with regard to the manner in
which he conducted the hydro-pressure test. It merely relayed
to Feliciano the request of Camacho for a hydro-pressure test.
Feliciano is independently maintaining a business under a duly
registered business name, "JFS Repair and Maintenance
Service." He does not enjoy a fixed salary but instead charges a
lump sum consideration for every piece of work he
accomplishes.
FGU Insurance v. Court of Appeals
Facts: 2 vehicle collision along EDSA, one was owned by Lydia
Soriano and driver by Benjamin Jacildone, the other was owned
by FILCAR Transport Inc, a rent-a-car business, and was
driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen. While traversing EDSA, Dahl-
Jensen was to the left of Jacildone, the former swerved to the
right, hitting the latter. Dahl-Jensen was a Danish tourist and at
the time did not possess a driver’s license. FGU then paid
Soriano 25,382 due to their insurance policy and by
subrogation is now suing Dahl-Jensen, FILCAR and Fortune
Insurance Corp on the ground of Quasi-Delict.
Dahl-Jensen was not served summons as he was no longer
residing in the address that he gave. The RTC then dismissed
FGU’s claim due to failure to prove that it was subrogated the
rights of Soriano. The CA affirmed the Trial Court, however
on the ground that Dahl-Jensen was negligent but FILCAR was
not, put simply, he failed to prove that it was due to a quasi-
delict.
Petitioner now argues that based on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corp
v Vda. De Caldo that the owner of a vehicle is liable for
damages caused to a person although the vehicle was leased to
another.
Issue: W/N FILCAR can be made liable?
Held: NO. In order for a person to be held liable under quasi-
delict the following requisites must concur: (1) damage suffered
by the plaintiff; (2) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (3)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. Here
the 2nd requisite is absent, since only the negligence of Dahl-
Jensen was proven by FGU, it was Dahl-Jensen’s act of swerving
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
right which caused the damage, such negligence cannot be
attributed to FILCAR. 2180 imposes a liability by virtue of juris
tantum or rebuttable presumption of negligence on part of the
persons made liable due to their failure to exercise due car and
vigilance over the acts of their subordinates. Art. 2180 finds no
application in this case as the facts do not fall under any of the
instances 2180 provides. FILCAR is a rent-a-car business, it
merely owned the car, it had no Employer-Employee
Relationship with Dahl-Jensen. Relating 2180 to 2184, FGU
still has no cause of action as there is no Master-driver
relationship between FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen, ergo FGU
cannot sue FILCAR or Fortune. The case relied on by FGU
also finds no application as in that case the actual ruling of the
court was that the lease contract was merely made to conceal
the Employer-Employee Relationship in that case and that
relationship was the basis for the liability.
Ruling: Petition Denied, CA Affirmed.
National Power Corporation v. PHESCO Inc.
Doctrine: a finding that a contractor was a "labor-only"
contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor)
and the "labor-only" contractor, including the latter's workers.
Principal’s liability for the tortious acts of the worker is direct,
primary and solidary with the “labor only” contractor and the
worker
Facts:
 NPC’s four (4) dump trucks left Marawi city bound for
Iligan city.
 The truck driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a head-
on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw resulting to death
of (3) persons riding in the Tamaraw, as well as
physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
 The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for damages
against NPC and PHESCO Incorporated (PHESCO)
in the CFI of Lanao del Norte, Marawi City.
 PHESCO’s Answer: not the owner of the truck and
was merely a contractor of NPC with the main duty of
supplying workers and technicians for the latter's
projects.
 NPC’s Answer: denied any liability and driver of the
dump truck was the employee of PHESCO.
 Trial court absolved NPC. CA reversed finding
PHESCO as labor only contractor.
Issue: W/N PHESCO is the employer of driver Ilumba
Held: No. NPC has control over the performance of PHESCO
and is considered as its employer.
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PHESCO is merely an agent since it is engaged in labor-only
contracting. Based on jurisprudence, a finding that a contractor
was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the owner
(principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including
the latter's workers. NPC is liable as direct employer of the
driver under Art. 2180 of the CC. NPC's liability is direct,
primary and solidary with PHESCO and the driver.
On NPC and PHESCO’s contractual relationship
First, the Court determined the contractual relationship of NPC
and PHESCO. After considering the “Memorandum of
Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and NPC as well as
conditions under an independent contracting, the Court found
that NPC had control over PHESCO in matters concerning the
performance of the latter's work and is considered an employer.
Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that PHESCO was
engaged in "labor-only" contracting with NPC and as such, it is
considered merely an agent of the latter.
In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship
between the principal employer and the employees of the
"labor-only" contractor is created.
Job (independent) contracting is present if the following
conditions are met:
(a) the contractor carries on an independent business and
undertakes the contract work on his own account and
own responsibility according to his own manner and
method, free from the control and direction of his
employer or principal in all matters connected with
the performance of the work except to the result
thereof; and
(b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in
the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work
premises and other materials which are necessary in
the conduct of his business. Absent these requisites,
what exists is a "labor only" contract which makes the
contractor as an agent and the principal as the one
who is responsible to the workers in the same manner
and to the same extent as if they had been directly
employed by him.
The Memorandum provides that:
1. NPC had mandate to approve the "critical path
network and rate of expenditure to be undertaken by
PHESCO.
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
2. The manning schedule and pay scale of the workers
hired by PHESCO were subject to confirmation by
NPC.
3. If PHESCO enters into any sub-contract or lease,
again NPC's concurrence is needed.
4. The procurement of tools and equipment used by
PHESCO is subject to NPC's favorable
recommendation.
5. NPC that will provide the money or funding that will
be used by PHESCO to undertake the project.
The Court also noted that the project being undertaken by
PHESCO, i.e., construction of power energy facilities, is related
to NPC's principal business of power generation.
Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the
employees of the "labor-only" contractor as if such employees
had been directly employed by the principal employer. 13
Since PHESCO is only a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it
supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck,
should be considered as employees of NPC. After all, it is
axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters
into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the
performance of a specified work or for the supply of
manpower, assumes responsibility over the employees of the
latter.
On the contention that NPC’s liability is only under the Labor
Code
NPC maintains that even assuming that a "labor only" contract
exists between it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to
third persons who are injured due to the tortious acts of the
employee of the "labor-only" contractor. Its liability shall only be
limited to violations of the Labor Code (Section 9(b) of the
Labor Code: xxx shall be responsible to the workers in the
same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed
by him”) and not quasi-delicts or liabilities for damages to third
persons resulting from the employees' tortious acts under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SC: The reliance is misplaced. The action was premised on the
recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC
and PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code which is the applicable law in resolving this case.
Filamer Christian Institute v. IAC provides that an
implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a
shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the
Civil Code.
It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for
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damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of
the employees of the "labor only" contractor.
This is consistent with the ruling that a finding that a contractor
was a "labor-only" contractor is equivalent to a finding that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the owner
(principal contractor) and the "labor-only" contractor, including
the latter's workers.
In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary and solidary with
PHESCO and the driver.
NPC did not invoke the defense of due diligence in the
selection or supervision of PHESCO and Ilumba.
Ruling: CA decision AFFIRMED without prejudice to the right
of NPC to demand from PHESCO and Ilumba reimbursement
of the damages it would be adjudged to pay to complainants.
No costs.
Professional Services v. Agana
Facts: These are three consolidated petitions.
Natividad Agana was rushed to Medical City General Hospital
because of difficulty in bowel movement and bloody anal
discharge. After medical examinations, Dr. Ampil diagnosed
her to be suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid”.
Because of it she had to undergo surgery, which was performed
by Dr. Ampil. During which, he discovered that the cancer had
already spread to her left ovary. So he obtained consent from
Agana’s husband for Dr. Fuentes to remove the same.
Afterwards, Dr. Ampil took over again and completed the
operation, closing the incision.
However, it appears that the operation was flawed. According
to the Record of Operation, two sponges from the count are
missing. This was announced to surgeon and they searched for
them but to no avail.
After Natividad was released, she complained of excruciating
pain in her anal region. Upon consultation from the two
doctors, they answered that this was natural result of surgery.
She then proceeded to go to US to seek further treatment but
was declared clear of cancer.
Upon returning to the Philippines, the pain continued. Two
weeks after, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding
from her vagina. Dr. Ampil was informed and he extracted it by
hand. He assured her that the pains would now vanish – except
they didn’t.
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY TAMAYO | D2020

So, Natividad sought treatment from Polymedic General
Hospital where the doctor there detected a foul-smelling gauze
which badly infected her vaginal vault, forming a recto-vaginal
fistula so that her stools are being excreted through the vagina.
Another operation was needed and conducted.
completion of residency, educational qualifications, and
evidence of accreditation.
In other words, private hospitals hire, fire and exercise real
control over their attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff.

Natividad and her husband filed with RTC a complaint for The control exercised, the hiring, and the rights to terminate
damages against Professional Services Inc. (PSI), owner of the consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of employer-
Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes alleging that employee relationship except payment of wages. However, such
they are liable for negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze is of not matter because the control test is determining.
inside her body and for malpractice for concealing their acts of
Additionally, such liability also arises from agency by estoppel
negligence.
and the doctrine of corporate negligence.
An administrative case was filed by the husband with the
Therefore, pursuant to Article 2180, PSI is solidarily liable with
Professional Regulation Commission containing complaint for
Dr. Ampil.
gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes. Sadly, Natividad died during the pendency of the case. Case EER Liability
Pilipinas Shell X X
RTC found PSI and the two doctors liable for negligence and Petroleum v. CA (independent
malpractice. As for the administrative case, PRC dismissed the contractor)
case against Dr. Fuentes holding that the prosecution failed to FGU Insurance v. X X
show that he was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside CA (lease)
Natividad’s body. CA rendered a decision jointly disposing of NAPOCOR v. / /
the two cases. PHESCO Inc (labor-only)
Professional X /
PSI raises the contention that Dr. Ampil is not its employee, Services v. Agana (skilled professional)
and so it is not solidarily liable with him. They posit that he is a
mere consultant or independent contractor and as such, he b. Acting within the scope of assigned tasks
alone must answer for his negligence. Who does Art. 2180, par. 5 pertain to?
Art. 2180, par. 5 pertains to employees or household helpers
Issue: Whether or not Dr. Ampil is PSI’s employee and thus who act within the scope of their assigned tasks. These
“assigned tasks” include “any act done by an employee in
could be held solidarily liable for his negligence?
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account
of the employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or
Held: Yes, there exists an employee-employer relationship.
damage.” (Filamer vs. IAC)
The pertinent provisions off the NCC are Article 2176 and
When Applicable
Article 2180 par. 1, 4, 5, and 8. An employer may be held liable not just for actions performed
within the regular course of employment, but also for all acts
The Court pointed out that while the previous doctrines dictate done to further the employer’s interest. The employer is
that because of the high-level of skills possessed by expected to impose the necessary discipline for the
professionals, they are treated as independent contracts and not performance of any act indispensable to the business and
as employees of the hospital, and such must not be liable. beneficial to the employer. (Filamer vs. IAC)

However, it has been expressly pointed out by the PH SC in Defense of the employer/ When Not Applicable
Ramos v CA that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in Clear proof that an employee abandoned his employer’s
business to engage in a purpose wholly his own will relieve his
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in
employer of liability. (De Leon Brokerage vs. CA)
effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
Filamer vs Court of Appeals (1990)
Hospitals now exercise significant control in the hiring and
firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within FACTS
hospital premises. They are required to submit proof of

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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY TAMAYO | D2020

 Potenciano Kapunan, Sr. was struck by a Pinoy Jeep multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within
owned by FIlamer Christian Institute and driven by Daniel the ambit of his assigned tasks.
Funetha.
 In other words, at the time of the injury Funetcha was not
 The authorized was Allan Masa, but Daniel Funetcha, an engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which
employee of the school (part time janitor and scholar of he was employed, but for some purpose of his own.
FIC) who only had a student’s permit, was allowed to drive
by Allan when the incident occurred. However, this case was revisited in 1992, wherein the Supreme
Court reversed its judgment.
 Named defendants were petitioner Filamer, Funetcha and
Filamer vs. IAC (1992)
Agustin Masa (director and president of FIC) in his
personal capacity in that he personal authorized and ISSUE
allowed Funetcha, his houseboy to drive the vehicle in
question without the necessary license.  Whether or not Funetcha can be considered an employee
as he was actin the furtherance of FCI’s interest.
ISSUE
HELD
 Whether or not there was an employer-employee
relationship between Filamer and its scholar student,  This time, the Supreme Court held YES.
Funetcha.
 Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school
HELD president where both Allan and Funetcha reside is an act in
furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. Allan’s
 There was NO employer-employee relationship and FCI
job demands that he drive home the school jeep so he can
cannot be held responsible for Funetcha tortious act.
use it to fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.
 To determine the existence of such a relationship, the
Supreme Court looked into the Implementing Rules and
 In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle’s home,
Regulation of the Labor Code, Rule X, Book III: Sec. 14
Funetcha was definitely not having a joyride. He was not
which pertained to working scholars: “There is no
driving for the purpose of his own enjoyment but
employer-employee relationship between students on the
ultimately for the service for which the jeep was intended
one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the
by the petitioner school. Therefore, the Court is
other, where students work for the latter in exchange for
constrained to conclude that the act of Funetcha in taking
the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students
over the steering wheel was one done for and in behalf of
are given real opportunity, including such facilities as may
his employer.
be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court under
such arrangement.”  He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s
position in order that the petitioner may be held
 Hence, Funetcha is a working scholar, not an employee.
responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient
that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the
 But even if we were to concede the status of an employee
benefit of the petitioner.
on Funetcha, still the primary responsibility for his
wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for
 Hence, the fact that Funetcha was not the school driver or
the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been
was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does
satisfactorily shown that Funetcha was not acting within the
not relieve the petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
scope of his supposed employment.
presumption that there was negligence on its part either in
the selection of a servant or employee, or in the
 Filamer’s duty to the school was merely to sweep the
supervision over him.
school passages for two hours every morning before his
regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy Jeep from Discussion of the Filamer Cases
the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then
driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in

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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY TAMAYO | D2020

In the second case, the Supreme Court reversed its initial and from there, proceed to Nueva Ecija. However, after
decision and held that Funetcha was an employee of FIC, unloading his cargo in Pampanga, Luna immediately
despite the definition of working scholars provided in the Labor returned to Manila. According to petitioner, this means
Code. Rather, they explained that under paragraph 5 of Article that Luna was no longer in the performance of his duties at
2180, there need not be an employer-employee relationship as the time of the collision.
described in the Code. The employer-employee relationship as
defined under the Civil Code contemplates a different  Absent proof that the deviation was so complete as would
relationship: one can now be considered as an employee if one constitute cessation or suspension of his service, De Luzon
was acting in the furtherance of the interests of the employer. Brokerage, as the employer, should be held liable.
“He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s
position in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for v. State
his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving ADMINISTRATIVE CODE LOCAL GOVT CODE
at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner.”
Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Section 22. Corporate Powers.
De Leon Brokerage Co. vs. CA (1967) Officers. - (1) A public officer (a) Every local government
shall not be civilly liable for unit, as a corporation, shall
FACTS
acts done in the performance have the following powers:
of his official duties, unless 1. To have continuous
 Angeline Steen was riding a passenger jeepney when it
there is a clear showing of bad succession in its
collided with a cargo truck owned by De Leon Brokerage,
faith, malice or gross corporate name;
driven recklessly by its employee, Augusto Luna. The
negligence. 2. To sue and be sued;
accident injured Steen (left arm was scraped bare of flesh,
3. To have and use a
from shoulder to elbow), which led her to file a criminal
(2) Any public officer who, corporate seal;
action for homicide with physical injuries through reckless
without just cause, neglects to 4. To acquire and
imprudence against Luna and the driver of the passenger
perform a duty within a period convey real or
jeepney. Steen reserved her right to file a separate civil
fixed by law or regulation, or personal property;
action. Luna was convicted, while the jeepney driver was
within a reasonable period if 5. To enter into
acquitted.
none is fixed, shall be liable contracts; and
 Steen later filed an action for recovery of damages against for damages to the private 6. To exercise such
Luna and De Leon Brokerage, presenting during the party concerned without other powers as are
hearing the judgment of conviction in the criminal case, prejudice to such other granted to
and establishing her claim for actual, moral, and exemplary liability as may be prescribed corporations, subject
damages. De Leon Brokerage and Luna countered that by law. to the limitations
Luna was not engaged in the performance of his duties at provided in this
the time of the accident. (3) A head of a department Code and other laws.
or a superior officer shall not (b) Local government units
 De Leon Brokerage and Luna were held solidarily liable to be civilly liable for the may continue using, modify,
Steen for actual expenses (P1,183.70) + unpaid medical wrongful acts, omissions of or change their existing
fees (P3,000) + moral damages (P7,000) + attorney’s fees duty, negligence, or corporate seals: Provided,
(P1,000) + legal interest from the filing of the complaint + misfeasance of his That newly established local
costs. CA affirmed. subordinates, unless he has government units or those
actually authorized by written without corporate seals may
ISSUE order the specific act or create their own corporate
misconduct complained of. seals which shall be registered
 Whether or not De Leon Brokerage may be held liable for with the Department of the
Luna’s negligence, since the latter had deviated from the Sec. 39. Liability of Interior and Local
work route the former set. Subordinate Officers. - No Government: Provided,
subordinate officer or further, That any change of
HELD
employee shall be civilly liable corporate seal shall also be
for acts done by him in good registered as provided hereon.
 Luna was not in the discharge of his duties at the time of
the accident. Luna had been instructed to go to Pampanga
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY TAMAYO | D2020

faith in the performance of his to interpose any lawful defense.

duties. However, he shall be
liable for willful or negligent
acts done by him which are
contrary to law, morals, public
policy and good customs even
if he acted under orders or
instructions of his superiors.
(c) Unless otherwise provided
in this Code, no contract may
be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the
local government unit without
prior authorization by the
sanggunian concerned. A
legible copy of such contract
shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the
provincial capitol or the city,
municipal or barangay hall.
Issue 2: Is the government liable for the negligent act of the
driver of the ambulance? No, it is not.
The Civil Code provides that the state is liable when it acts
through a special agent. It is not responsible for the damages
suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts
performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even
negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents.

(d) Local government units
shall enjoy full autonomy in
the exercise of their
proprietary functions and in
the limitations provided in this
Code and other applicable
laws
Merrit vs Government of the Philippine Islands
Quick facts: Merritt figured in a vehicular accident when he,
riding his motorcycle, was struck by a General Hospital
ambulance which turned unexpectedly without sounding its
horn. Because of the collision, Merritt was severely injured and
had to be hospitalized. After the accident, Merritt’s physical
condition had undergone noticeable depreciation which
affected his work as a contractor. In the end, he had to give up
a contract he had for the construction of a certain building.
Merritt sought to recover damages from the state for the injuries
he sustained. The legislature enacted Act 2457, authorizing
Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine
Islands.
A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or
commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if
he is a special official, so that in representation of the state and
being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust
confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive
agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who
on his own responsibility performs the functions which are
inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the General
Hospital ambulance was not a special agent and therefore, the
government is not liable for his acts.
Fontanilla vs Maliaman
Petitioners’ son was riding a bike along Maharlika highway. His
bike was hit by a pickup owned and operated by National
Irrigation Administration (NIA), driven by Hugo Garcia -
employee and regular driver of NIA. He was injured and
brought to the hospital where he died. NIA were ordered to
pay petitioners death benefits and actual expenses for the
hospitalization and burial incurred by them. Petitioners are,
now, asking for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees from NIA.
Issue: W/N petitioner-spouses are entitled to moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

Issue 1: Did the government, in effect, concede its liability to
plaintiff in it enacting Act 2457? No, it did not.
The Court held that by consenting to be sued a state simply
waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its
liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right
The Court held that since NIA performs non-
governmental/proprietary functions, it assumes the
responsibility of an ordinary employer and therefore liable for
the damages from the tortious act of its driver-employee. This
assumption of liability is predicated on the existence of
negligence on the part of NIA and it was held that NIA was
negligent on the supervision of its driver-employee. NIA was
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees.

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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
Doctrine: The government has 2 functions - governmental and
proprietary.
Activities and functions are “governmental” if it can be
performed only by the government. Generally, the State is
immune from tort liability. But under par. 6 of Art. 2180, the
State has voluntarily assumed liability for damage caused by acts
of its special agents.
Who are special agents? (1) A public official performing a such
task must be foreign to his usual governmental functions and (2)
a private individual performing a special governmental task.
“Proprietary functions” are those which a private corporation
can also provide. The State is liable for the torts of agents within
the scope of their employment.
Rosete vs Auditor General
The appellant's buildings caught fire due to the negligence of a
certain Jose Frayno in igniting recklessly his cigarette-lighter
near a 5 gallon drum into which gasoline was being drained by
the Emergency Control Administration, or ECA (an agency of
the Government). Said drums were stored in the warehouse
that caught fire and burnt the other buildings.
The issue is whether the Auditor General erred in not holding
the government accountable for the said fire under NCC 1903
since the storage of gasoline in the warehouse was in violation
of the Ordinances of the City of Manila.
The SC held the doctrine in the Merritt case with regards to
special agents, and ruled that there is not showing that whatever
negligence may be imputed to the ECA or its officers, was done
by a special agent, because the officers of the ECA did not act
as special agents of the government within the defined meaning
of that word in article 1903 of the Civil Code (as per Merritt) in
storing gasoline in warehouse of the ECA, the government is
not responsible for the damages caused through such
negligence.
Republic of the Philippines vs Palacio
Quick Facts:
Ortiz instituted a civil action against the Handog Irrigation
Association, Inc and the Irrigation Service Unit, to recover
possession, with damages, a 958 sqm lot which the Irrigation
Association allegedly entered and occupied
Solicitor General moved for dismissal on the ground that the
Irrigation Service Unit, being an office or agency under DPWH
TAMAYO | D2020
has no juridical personality to sue or be sued. The Motion was
denied as the Court found that it engaged in the private
business of selling irrigation pumps and construction materials
on installment plan and a writ of execution and order of
garnishment were issued against ISU’s Trust Fund in PNB
Solicitor General filed a motion to lift the order of garnishment
on the ground that the funds subject matter are public funds
and exempt from attachment or execution but was denied.
Issue #1: W/N the pump irrigation trust fund may be garnished
to satisfy a money-judgement against Irrigation Service Unit?
Held: No.
The general rule is that government funds are immune to
garnishment. Even if the liability of the State is ascertained, the
payment for judgement against the State is provided for by the
legislature. Moreover, the fact that ISU was collecting payment
for irrigation pumps did not make it one engaged in business.
The installment payment being collected is not for profit but
merely for the purpose of financing the cost of the pump and its
maintenance and administration. ISU is not engaged in private
business thus there was no waiver of immunity on the part of
ISU and its property and funds are not liable to seizure.
Issue #2: W/N the State can be held liable for allegedly
inducing a private corporation in usurping the land of a private
individual?
Held: No. In cases where the liability of the agency arose from
tort and not from contract, the general rule is the State shall
only be liable for torts caused by its special agents specially
commissioned to carry out acts complained of outside of such
agent’s regular duties. There being no proof that the making of
the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor
its funds can be made liable thereof.
Municipality of San Fernando vs Firme
Quick Facts:
A passenger jeepney, a privately owned truck, and a dump
truck owned by the Municipality of San Fernando figured in a
collision. Several passengers of the passenger jeepney died in
this incident, including Baniña Sr. The heirs of Baniña Sr. filed
a complaint for damages against the Municipality of San
Fernando and its driver and the Municipality raised the defense
of non-suability of the State. Judge Firme, however, deferred
resolution on that defense and rendered a decision finding the
Municipality liable for damages.
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
The Court held that Judge Firme did not commit grave abuse
of discretion when he failed to resolve the issue of suability but
committed grave abuse of discretion in holding the State liable.
The charter of the Municipality provided that it can sue and be
sued, however, the driver of the dump truck was performing his
regular governmental function and was not a special agent.
Thus the Municipality cannot be held liable.
Doctrine: Municipal corporations are generally not liable for
torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown
that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting
such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the
right to show that the defendant was not acting in its
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that
the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing
this, the claimant cannot recover.
Albert vs Gangan
During Albert’s tenure as President of the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corp., the agency approved a loan of P36.8
million for the purchase of a 73-hectare property in Angeles,
Pampanga. Petitioner approved the disbursement upon the
recommendation of his subordinate, the OIC of the Credit and
Collection Group. Upon discovering the irregularities in the
transaction, petitioner filed a complaint with the Ombudsman
against his subordinates who were involved. He also filed a civil
case for sum of money, damages, and annulment against the
parties responsible for the fraud. The Commission on Audit
held petitioner as personally liable for the amount of P36.8
million, on the ground that he was the approving authority and
the employees involved were under his direct supervision. For
his defense, he argued that he cannot be personally liable for
the said amount because there was no proof that he has
knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent transaction.
The Supreme Court held that absent a clear showing of bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence, petitioner cannot be held
liable in his performance of official duty. The mere fact that a
public officer is the head of an agency does not necessarily
mean that he is the party ultimately liable for questionable
transactions of his agency because it would be improbable for
him to check all the details and conduct physical inspection and
verification of documents regarding the approval of loans
considering the voluminous paperwork attendant to his office.
Citing Arias v. Sandiganbayan, the Court said: “All heads of
offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates
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and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
supplies, or enter into negotiations.” Thus, petitioner was
absolved of any liability for the anomalous disbursement of
P36.8 million.
vi. Teachers and Heads of Establishments of Arts
and Trades
Art. 2180 (7), New Civil Code. The obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
(7) Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
Art. 216, Family Code. In default of parents or a judicially
appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order
indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age,
unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed.
Art. 218, Family Code. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child
shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution.
Art. 219, Family Code. Those given the authority and
responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally
and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial
guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority
over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts.
Art. 2180(7), New Civil Code Arts. 218-219, Family Code
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY TAMAYO | D2020

Liable for damages caused by
their students
Teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their
pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they
remain in their custody.
Liable for damages caused by activities whether inside or
minor children outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
The school, its administrators
and teachers… shall have
special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor
child while under their
supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility
shall apply to all authorized

Mercado Palisoc Amadora Salvosa St. Francis

1960 1971 1988 1988 1991

The pupil lives and Students in ● If the student is in Recess by its nature Mere presence of
boards with the attendance/ class, the school does not include teachers and
teacher, such that doing class activities premises in dismissal. Likewise, students does not
the control, in school; teachers pursuance of a the mere fact of make an occasion a
direction and are to provide legitimate student being enrolled or school-sanctioned
influence on the supervision the objective, in the being in the event.
pupil supersedes whole time students exercise of a premises of a school Therefore, the
those of the are in school. legitimate student without more does school will not be
parents. right, and even in not constitute liable for any
the enjoyment of a "attending school" or negligence therein.
legitimate student being in the
right, and even in "protective and
the enjoyment of a supervisory custody'
legitimate student of the school, as
privilege, the contemplated in the
responsibility of law.
the school
authorities over
the student
continues.

Overturned Exception to Palisoc

Mercado

Academic Schools Establishments of Arts and Trades

The teacher-in-charge at the time when the tort was committed The head of the establishment shall be liable for the act of a
shall be vicariously liable for the act of a student under his student under his custody.
custody.

Ylarde Soliman PSBA St. Mary’s St. Joseph’s

28
TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY TAMAYO | D2020

1988 1992 1992 2002 2010

The teacher in charge, Teachers may be held The damage should The negligence of the The negligence of the
not the owner of the liable only for damages have been caused or teacher must be the school must be the
school, is liable for caused by their inflicted by pupils or proximate cause of the proximate cause of the
academic institutions. students, and not by students of the injury. injury. The school can
other people who may educational institution be held liable for the
have a different whose teachers/ heads negligence of a teacher
relationship with the are sought to be held as an employer.
institution. liable.

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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
1. Mercado vs. CA (1960)
Doctrine: The clause “so long as they remain in their custody”
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on
the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
Facts:
 Augusto Mercado, son of petitioner Ciriaco, was
classmates with Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. at Lourdes
Catholic School. While in school, they both quarrelled
over a “pitogo,” an empty nutshell used by children as a
piggy bank.
 Manuel, Jr., unaware that the “pitogo” belonged to
Augusto, did not want to return the item to Augusto when
the latter tried to claim it. Augusto aggressively pushed
Manuel, Jr, gave successive blows on his stomach, and cut
him on the right cheek with a piece of razor.
 Petitioner avers that since the incident happened in a
Catholic School (during recess), through no fault of the
father, the teacher or head of the school should be held
responsible. He cites Art. 2180.
Issue: Whether the father or the teacher or head of the school
should be held liable
Held: The father is liable for Augusto’s tort.
 The clause “so long as they remain in their custody”
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards
with the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents.
The control or influence over the conduct and actions of
the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the
teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the
pupil.
 In this situation, the pupils go to school during school
hours and go back to their homes with their parents after
school is over, thus they do not “remain in the custody” of
the teachers.
2. Palisoc vs. Brillantes (1971)
Doctrine: The protective custody of the school heads and
teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and
hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities
during the whole time that they are at attendance in the school.
Facts:
 Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio
Daffon were in their school laboratory, working on a
machine. Daffon made a remark that insulted Palisoc, so
the latter slapped Daffon slightly on the face. Daffon gave a
strong flat blow on the face, which eventually led to fist
blows, until Palisoc stumbled backwards onto an engine
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block causing him to fall downward. Palisoc fainted and
was no longer revived.
 Sps. Palisoc filed for damages against Daffon’s parents,
Manila Technical Institute’s owner (Brillantes), President
(Valenton) and teacher (Quibule). Said school is a school
of arts and trades. The lower court absolved the school
officials of liability for the death, citing Article 2180 and
following the Mercado doctrine.
Issue: Whether the defendant-school officials are jointly and
severally liable as tortfeasors
Held: Yes as to school president Valenton and teacher
Quibule, but not as to school owner Brillantes.
 The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence,
it becomes their obligation as well as that of the school
itself to provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at attendance
in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the
necessary precautions to protect the students in their
custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably
be anticipated, including injuries that some student
themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on
their fellow students.
 No liability attaches to defendant Brillantes as a mere
member of the school's board of directors. The school
must be impleaded for it to be liable. Parents of Daffon are
not involved because Daffon is already of age.
3. Amadora vs. CA (1988)
Doctrine: Although Art. 2180 (7) only mentions
“establishments of arts and trades”, the provision applies to
both establishments of arts and trades and academic schools. In
both instances, the school’s liability is merely subsidiary.
 As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school
premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in
the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student
continues.
Facts:
 After classes had ended, Alfredo Amadora, a graduating
4th year high school student, went to the Colegio de San
Jose Recoletos to submit a physics report. While in the
school’s auditorium, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a
gun which hit Amadora and caused his death.
 Daffon was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence.
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
 Amadora’s parents filed this civil case against the Colegio
de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal,
the dean of boys, and the physics teacher.
 The CFI of Cebu found the defendants liable for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The
CA reversed the CFI and absolved all the defendants,
ruling that Art. 2180 does not apply as the school was not
an establishment of arts and trades.
Issue: Whether any of the defendants are liable
Held: No.
 Supervision over the students does not end when the
school year does. Liability applies whenever the student is
in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is
under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has
already ended at the time of the happening of the incident.
 Art. 2180 does not only apply to establishments of arts and
trades, but also to academic schools such as Colegio de
San Juan - Recoletos.
○ Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for
the tort committed by the student will attach to
the teacher in charge. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head
thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable.
○ Historically, the head of the school of arts and
trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils
than the head of the academic school. In
academic schools, the teacher-in-charge is usually
the one who holds direct supervision over the
students.
 Hence, the school being an academic institution, only the
teacher-in-charge should be held directly liable.
○ In this case, the evidence presented didn’t
establish who exactly the teacher-in-charge was.
The physics teacher was not required to be there
that day, and no sufficient evidence was presented
to prove that he was liable.
 The school, whether academic or vocational, can only be
held to be subsidiarily liable. In this case, absent the direct
liability of the teacher-in-charge, the school cannot be held
liable as well.
4. Ylarde vs. Aquino (1988)
Doctrine: The degree of care required to be exercised must
vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for
himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care
as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the
average conduct of persons of his age and experience
Facts:
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 In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the
principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public
educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan-
Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher
therein.
 The School was fittered with several concrete blocks.
In 1962, one teacher decided to start burying them
after realizing they were hazardous to children.
 Aquino assisted in the effort by gathering a group of
students and ordering them to dig a hole after class
dismissal.
 Work was left unfinished and the following pupils
returned the next day : Reynaldo Alonso, Francisco
Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde,
 The students dug until the excavation was one meter
and forty centimeters deep. At this point, Aquino
alone continued digging while the pupils remained
inside the pit throwing out the loose soil that was
brought about by the digging.
 Aquino then left the children in order to find rope,
cautioning the students not to touch the stone.
 A few after he left the students continued playing in
the hole. Abaga jumped on the block causing it to
slide into the pit, crushing Ylarde. He died three days
later.
 Ylarde's parents filed a suit for damages against both
private respondents Aquino and Soriano.
o against private respondent Aquino on Article
2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged
negligence that caused their son's death
o against respondent Soriano as the head of
school is founded on Article 2180 of the
same Code.
 The lower court dismissed the complaint on the
following grounds:
o that the digging done by the pupils is in line
with their course called Work Education;
o that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of
a very cautious person;
o that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own
reckless imprudence.
 The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Issue: Whether both Soriano and Aquino can be held liable for
damages
Held: Only Aquino is liable.
Soriano as the head of the school is not liable.
 Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only
the teacher and not the head of an academic
school who should be answerable for torts
committed by their students. This Court went on
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
to say that in a school of arts and trades, it is only
the head of the school who can be held liable.
 Soriano, as principal, cannot be held liable for the
reason that the school he heads is an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades.
Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent
Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not give
any instruction regarding the digging.
Aquino as the teacher in charge is liable.
 It is very clear that private respondent Aquino
acted with fault and gross negligence when he:
o failed to avail himself of services of adult
manual laborers
o required the children to remain inside
the pit even after they had finished
digging, knowing that the huge block was
lying nearby
o ordered them to level the soil around the
excavation when it was so apparent that
the huge stone was at the brink of falling
o went to a place where he would not be
able to check on the children's safety
o left the children close to the excavation,
an obviously attractive nuisance.
 The negligent act of Aquino in leaving his pupils
in such a dangerous site has a direct causal
connection to the death of the child Ylarde.
 We cannot agree with the finding of the lower
court that the injuries which resulted in the death
of the child Ylarde were caused by his own
reckless imprudence.
o It should be remembered that he was
only ten years old at the time of the
incident, As such, he is expected to be
playful and daring
o In ruling that the child Ylarde was
imprudent, it is evident that the lower
court did not consider his age and
maturity. This should not be the case.
o The degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with the capacity of
the person endangered to care for
himself. A minor should not be held to
the same degree of care as an adult, but
his conduct should be judged according
to the average conduct of persons of his
age and experience
5. Salvosa vs. IAC (1988)
Doctrine: Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the
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premises of a school without more does not constitute
"attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory
custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law.
Facts:
 Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF) is an academic
institution and it is also an institution of arts and trade.
o Its brochure shows that BCF has a full-
fledged technical-vocational department offer
Communication, Broadcast and Teletype
Technician courses as well as Electronics
Serviceman and Automotive Mechanics
courses
 Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit,
the Baguio Colleges Foundation Reserve Officers
Training Corps (ROTC) Unit.
 The Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC Unit had
Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer.
 On 3 March 1977, at around 8:00 p.m., in the parking
space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro
a student of the University of Baguio with an
unlicensed firearm which the former took from the
armory of the ROTC Unit of the BCF.
 Napoleon Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was
prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of
Homicide by Military Commission No. 30, AFP.
 The heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages,
impleading Jimmy B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos
(ROTC Commandant Benjamin Salvosa (President
and Chairman of the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa
(Executive Vice President of BCF), Libertad D.
Quetolio (Dean of the College of Education and
Executive Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants.
 Trial Court rendered a decision:
o Sentencing defendants Jimmy B. Abon,
Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges
Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay
private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon
Castro: a) P12,000.00 for the death of
Napoleon Castro, (b) P316,000.00 as
indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of
the deceased, (c) P5,000.00 as moral
damages, (d) P6,000.00 as actual damages,
and (e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus
costs
o Absolving the other defendants
o Dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for
lack of merit
 IAC affirmed with modification the decision of the
Trial Court:
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
 Reducing the award for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by
way of temperate damages.
 Increasing the indemnity for the death of
Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners can be held solidarily liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B.
Abon
Held:
 Art. 2180 — 'so long as (the students) remain in
their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school,
including recess time.
 In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at
attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat.
 A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the
phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates
a situation of temporary adjournment of school
activities where the student still remains within call
of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the
school premises, or the area within which the
school activity is conducted.
 Recess by its nature does not include dismissal.
Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being
in the premises of a school without more does not
constitute "attending school" or being in the
"protective and supervisory custody' of the school,
as contemplated in the law.
 Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have
been "at attendance in the school," or in the
custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon
Castro.Therefore, petitioners cannot under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarily liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from
his acts
6. PSBA vs. CA (1992)
Doctrine: In loco parentis rule - Art. 2180 (7) plainly provides
that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils
or students of the educational institution whose teachers/ heads
are sought to be held liable for the acts of their pupils or
students while in their custody.
Facts:
 On August 30, 1985, Carlitos Bautista, a 3rd year
commerce student, was stabbed to death on the second-
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floor balcony of the PSBA. His assailants were neither
enrolled nor affiliated with the school.
 Bautista’s parents filed a civil case against the president,
vice president, treasurer, chief of security, and asst. chief of
security of the school seeking to adjudge them liable for the
victim’s demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and
methods before, during and after the attack on Bautista.
 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was
denied by the lower court and the CA. Thus this petition.
Issue: Whether PSBA was liable for the acts of the assailants
under Art. 2180
Held: No.
 The assailants were not enrolled in the school.
PSBA cannot be held liable for the stabbing
incident, even if it took place in the school
premises, simply because the assailants were not
under its control. Thus, Art. 2180 does not apply.
 However, the fact that PSBA cannot be liable
under the rules on quasi-delict does not mean that
it is exculpated from liability. It may be sued on
the basis of breach of contract.
 When an academic institution accepts students
for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations
which both parties are bound to comply with.
 For its part, the school undertakes to provide the
student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession.
On the other hand, the student covenants to
abide by the school's academic requirements and
observe its rules and regulations.
 Schools have the "built-in" obligation of providing
their students with an atmosphere that promotes
or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can
absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and
other sciences when bullets are flying or grenades
exploding in the air or where there looms around
the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb. The school must ensure that adequate steps
are taken to maintain peace and order within the
campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.
 The case must be remanded to the trial court in
order to fully determine whether the school
breached its contractual obligations to Bautista by
being negligent in providing security measures.
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
7. Soliman vs. Tuazon (1992)
Doctrine: Art. 2180, par. 7, clearly provides that teachers may
be held liable only for damages caused by their students, and
not by other people who may have different relationship with
the institution. A student’s cause of action against his/her school
may be based on a breach of contract.
Facts:
 Maximino Soliman Jr. (petitioner) filed a complaint for
damages against Republic Central Colleges, RL Security
Agency, and Jimmy B. Solomon (security guard).
 Soliman was a regular enrolled student of Republic
Central.
 Aug. 13, 1982. When Soliman was in the school premises
of Republic Central, Solomon, who was the guard on duty,
assaulted and shoot Soliman on the abdomen with a .38
caliber revolver.
 Soliman was brought and treated in Angeles Medical
Center. The attending physician said that he may not be
able to attend to his regular classes and will be
incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of 3-4 months.
Republic Central’s argument (motion to dismiss)
 Soliman had no cause of action against it.
 It is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by
Solomon for the reason that the school was not the
employer of the security guard, Solomon.
 NCC, Art. 2180 par. 7 does not apply, since said paragraph
holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and
trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, while Solomon was a security
guard, and not a pupil, student, or apprentice.Ergo, it is not
responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon.
NB. Art. 2180, par. 7 states that teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as
they remain in their custody.
 Judge Ramon Tuazon granted the motion to dismiss and
said that Solomon was not an employee of the school, and
so the latter cannot be held responsible for his (Solomon’s)
acts or omissions.
Issue: Whether Republic Central may be held liable for
damages
Held: No, at least not on the basis of a quasi-delict (Art. 2180,
par. 7). But it may be held liable on the basis of breach of
contract.
 There is no basis to hold Republic Central liable under
Art. 2180, par. 7. The employer of Solomon was RL
Security Agency, which recruits, hires, and assigns the work
of its security guards. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
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committed by the security guards attach to the employer-
agency, and not to the latter’s clients.
 The fact that a client company may give instructions or
directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by
itself render the client responsible as an employer.
Solomon was neither a pupil nor a student of Republic
Central. Hence, the provision with regard to the liability of
teachers and heads is also not available to make Republic
Central liable for damages.
 Nevertheless, Republic Central may be held liable on the
basis of an implied contract between it and Soliman,
because of its obligation to maintain peace and order
within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof. Should this be case, the school may still avoid
liability by proving that the breach of its contractual
obligation to the students was not due to its negligence.
 Judge Tuazon was in serious error when he supposed that
Soliman could have no cause of action other than one
based on Art. 2180, par. 7. He should have not granted the
motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of
justice, allowed Soliman to prove acts constituting breach
of an obligation ex contractu (arising from contract) or ex
lege (by law) on the part of Republic Central.
8. St. Francis High School vs. CA (1991)
Doctrine: The negligence of the school must be the proximate
cause of the injury. The school can be held liable for the
negligence of a teacher as an employer.
Facts:
 A picnic at a beach was organized wherein two
freshman sections were to participate. Because of
short notice, the parents of Ferdinand Castillo (a
freshman), Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Cadiz
Castillo did not allow their son to join the picnic.
However, he was allowed to bring food to the teachers
for the picnic, with the directive that he should go back
home after doing so. But because of persuasion of the
teachers, Ferdinand went with them to the beach.
 At the beach, one of the teachers were drowning.
Some students including Ferdinand came to the
rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand who
drowned. Efforts to resuscitate him failed. When he
was brought to the hospital, he was pronounced dead
on arrival.
 Sps. Castillo filed a complaint for damages against St.
Francis HS, represented by Sps. Lacandula, Mr.
Ilumin (principal), and several teachers (de Chaves,
Vinas, Arquio, Aragones, Jaro, and Cadiz) for the
death of their son.
Lower courts’ decisions
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TORTS REVIEWER | PROF. DANNY UY
● The trial court ruled in favor of Sps. Castillo and
against Arquio, de Chaves, Vinas, Aragones, Jaro,
and Cadiz. It dismissed the case against St.
Francis HS, Illumin, and Aurora Cadorna (no
idea who she is!!)
● The appellate court ruled that St. Francis HS and
Illumin are liable under Art. 2176 taken together
with pars. 1, 4, and 5 of Art. 2180. It held Jaro
and Aragones not liable.
Issue: Whether there was negligence attributable to the school
officials which will warrant the award for damages to Sps.
Castillo
Held: No.
 The school officials are not guilty of their own
negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those
under them. Based on the cross-examination of
Sps. Castillo, it was found that they allowed their
son to join the excursion.
Issue: Whether Art. 2180, in relation to Art. 2176, is applicable
to the case at bar
Held: No, not applicable to the case at bar.
 Before an employer may be held liable for the
negligence of his employee, the act or omission
which caused damage or prejudice must have
occurred while an employee was in the
performance of their assigned tasks.
 The incident happened not within the campus
and students were holding a purely private affair,
a picnic. It is clear from the beginning that the
incident happened while some members of
Ferdinand’s class were having a picnic at a beach.
This picnic had no permit from the school head
(Mr. Illumin) because this picnic is not a school
sanctioned activity neither is it considered as an
extra-curricular activity.
 Mere knowledge by the school and Mr. Illumin of
the planning of the picnic by the students and
their teachers does not in any way or in any
manner show acquiescence or consent to the
holding of the same.
Issue: Whether the award of exemplary and moral damages is
proper under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar
Held: No.
 No negligence could be attributable to the teachers to
warrant the award of damages to Sps. Castillo. The
class adviser of Ferdinand’s section, Ms. Arquio did
her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to
all the students who joined the picnic.
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Dissent (Padilla): Although the excursion may not have been
attended by the appropriate school authorities, the presence or
stamp of authority of the school nevertheless pervaded by
reason of the participation not of one but of several teachers.
As found by the lower court, the excursion was an activity
“organized by the teachers themselves, for the students and to
which the student, naturally, acceded.
Having known of the forthcoming activity, Mr. Illumin, as
school principal, should have taken appropriate measures to
ensure the safety of his students. His silence and negligence in
performing his role as principal head of the school that must be
construed as an implied consent to such activity.
As administrative head (principal) of the school, Mr. Illumin
acted as the agent of the school. Art. 2176 in conjunction with
Art. 2180 pars. 1 and 5 are applicable to the situation. In the
application of these provisions, the negligence of the employee
in causing injury or damage gives rise to a presumption of
negligence on the part of the owner/manager of the
establishment. While this presumption is not conclusive, it may
be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the
owner/manager exercised the care and diligence of a GFF in
the selection/supervision of the employees causing the injury or
damage. I agree with the CA that no proof was presented to
absolve the owner/manager (Sps. Lacandula), and Mr. Illumin.
They too must be held accountable for the death of Ferdinand.
9. St. Mary's Academy vs. Carpitanos (2002)
Doctrine: For teachers to be held liable for damages, it must be
proven that their negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury.
Facts:
 Case claiming damages for the death of their only son,
Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II
and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada Daniel,
the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys
Academy before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City.
 Sherwin, and some other students and teachers of St.
Mary's were on an enrollment drive going to different
schools with prospective enrollees.
 During the trip, when the vehicle was in the control of
the jeepney driver, James Daniel II (15 y.o.), one of
the students, drove the jeep.
 While driving, the steering wheel of the jeep got
detached, James lost control of the jeep, and it turned
turtle.
 The injuries Sherwin got from the incident led to his
death.
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Issue: Whether the school could be held liable for the death of
Carpitanos
Held: No.
 Art. 218 of the Family Code applies to field trips,
excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever
authorized by the school or its teachers. However,
it must still be proven that the negligence of the
teacher is the proximate cause of the damage.
 Here, the proximate cause of Sherwin's death was
not negligence of teacher or student; but that the
jeep's steering wheel got detached.
 Further, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive
the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent
Vivencio Villanueva, who had possession and
control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and
he allowed James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the
jeep at the time of the accident.
 Considering that the negligence of the minor
driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva
was an event over which petitioner St. Marys
Academy had no control, and which was the
proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may
not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
 The registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
10. St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda (2010)
Doctrine: A teacher will be held liable for damages if his or her
negligence is the proximate cause of an injury.
The school may be held liable under the principle of
Respondeat Superior, where it is to be solidarily liable for
tortuous acts of the employee.
Facts:
 The class to which respondent Jayson Val Miranda
belonged was conducting a science experiment about
fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the
tutelage of Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject
teacher and employee of SJC.
 Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment
without having adequately secured it from any
untoward incident or occurrence.
 In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups, checked the
result of the experiment by looking into the test tube
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with magnifying glass. The test tube was being held by
one of his group mates who moved it close and
towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the
compound in the test tube spurted out and several
particles of which hit Jayson's eye and the different
parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a
result thereof, Jayson's eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo
surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon
filing of this case in the lower court, Jayson's wound
had not completely healed and still had to undergo
another surgery.
 Jayson's mom even had to come home from working
abroad.
 He and his family suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury
due to the school's fault and failure to exercise the
degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each
one of them.
 The family asked the school to pay for hospital bill,
but they refused. They then filed the case at bar.
Defense of the school
 Trying to invoke St. Mary's, the petitioner said that the
negligence of the teacher and the school wasn't the
proximate cause of the injury.
 Proximate cause was supposedly the negligence of
Jayson himself.
 They also said that the school cannot be held liable
because it exercised due diligence.
Issue: Whether the teacher's negligence is the proximate cause
of Jayson's injury
Held: Yes.
 The incident could have been prevented had Tabugo
been in the classroom while the experiment was being
conducted. The immediate cause of the accident was not
the negligence of Jayson when he curiously looked into
the test tube when the chemicals suddenly exploded
which caused his injury, but the sudden and unexpected
explosion of the chemicals independent of any
intervening cause. This could have prevented the mishap
if the teacher and the school exercised a higher degree of
care, caution and foresight.
Issue: Whether the school could be held responsible for the
negligence of the teacher
Held: Yes.
 They could be held liable under the principle of
Respondent Superior, and could be solidarily liable for
the tortuous or negligent acts of its employees.
Moreover, the school itself was also negligent, as seen in
the ff. facts:
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o Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to
avert damage and injury to its students although it
had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments conducted by the students
during class;
o Petitioner school did not install safety measures to
protect the students who conduct experiments in
class;
o Petitioner school did not provide protective gears
and devices, specifically goggles, to shield students
from expected risks and dangers; and
o Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom
the whole time her class conducted the
experiment, specifically, when the accident
involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size
of the class, fifty (50) students, conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
C. Joint Tortfeasors
Civil Code, Art. 2194
Article 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who
are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
D. Particular Persons Held Liable by Law
i. Possessor or user of animal
Civil Code, Art. 2183
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may
make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it
may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come
from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has
suffered damage.
ii. Owner of motor vehicle
Civil Code, Art. 2184-2186
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily
liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the
misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was
negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or
violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next
preceding two months.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of
article 2180 are applicable. (n)
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation. (n)
Article 2186. Every owner of a motor vehicle shall file with the
proper government office a bond executed by a government-
controlled corporation or office, to answer for damages to third
persons. The amount of the bond and other terms shall be
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fixed by the competent public official. (n)
iii. Manufacturers/Processors of Foodstuffs
Civil Code, Art. 2187
Article 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs,
drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death
or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used,
although no contractual relation exists between them and the
consumers. (n)
iv. Provinces, cities and municipalities
Civil Code, Art. 2189
Article 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
v. Proprietor of building/structure/thing
Civil Code, Art. 2190-2192
Article 2190. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial
collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Article 2191. Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages
caused:
(1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been
taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation
of explosive substances which have not been kept in a
safe and adequate place;
(2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons
or property;
(3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or
lanes, if not caused by force majeure;
(4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits
of infectious matter, constructed without precautions
suitable to the place.
Article 2192. If damage referred to in the two preceding
articles should be the result of any defect in the construction
mentioned in article 1723, the third person suffering damages
may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor
in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.
Civil Code, Art. 1723
Article 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans
and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within
fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same
should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and
specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The
contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice
falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the
construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished
by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If
the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be
solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply
waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect
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mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the
collapse of the building.

vi. Head of family

Civil Code, Art. 2193

Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a
part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things
thrown or falling from the same.

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