CAPIN-CADIZ VS. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGE, GR 187417, February 24, 2016.

“x x x.

The doctrine of management prerogative gives an employer the right to "regulate, according to his own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working
methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees lay-off of workers,
and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees."48 In this case, Brent imposed on Cadiz the condition
that she subsequently contract marriage with her then boyfriend for her to be reinstated. According to
Brent, this is "in consonance with the policy against encouraging illicit or common-law relations that would
subvert the sacrament of marriage."49 Statutory law is replete with legislation protecting labor and
promoting equal opportunity in employment. No less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that the "State
shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. "50 The Labor Code of the Philippines,
meanwhile, provides:

Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise
prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.

With particular regard to women, Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta of Women51 protects
women against discrimination in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to
choose freely a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their free and full consent.52 Weighed
against these safeguards, it becomes apparent that Brent's condition is coercive, oppressive and
discriminatory. There is no rhyme or reason for it. It forces Cadiz to marry for economic reasons and
deprives her of the freedom to choose her status, which is a privilege that inheres in her as an intangible
and inalienable right.53 While a marriage or no-marriage qualification may be justified as a "bona
fide occupational qualification," Brent must prove two factors necessitating its imposition, viz: :
(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job
involved; and (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.54 Brent has
not shown the presence of neither of these factors. Perforce, the Court cannot uphold the validity of said
condition.

CASE DIGEST : Rubi Vs Prob Brd of Mindoro.

G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919 RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant. D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff. Office of the Solicitor-
General Paredes for defendant.
 FACTS : February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25. That said
resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the Secretary of the
Interior of February 21, 1917. December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive
order No. 2. Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. That Rubi and
those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to
be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711. That the undersigned has not information
that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by
virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711. It thus appears that the provincial
governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their
habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and
approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said
action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This,
therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.

ISSUE : WON Whether or not the said law is constitutional

HELD : By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the
Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term “non-Christian” should not be given a
literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The
term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more
directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the
provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public
interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police
power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines
constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among
landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and
makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general
prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police
power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that the liberty of
the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They
are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal
protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
Immorality as a basis to dismiss a worker:
"...premarital sexual relations between two
consenting adults who have no impediment to
marry each other, and, consequently,
conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from
a purely public and secular view of morality,
does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral
conduct..."
CAPIN-CADIZ VS. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGE, GR 187417, February 24, 2016.

“x x x.

Immorality as a just cause for termination of employment Both the LA and the NLRC upheld Cadiz's
dismissal as one attended with just cause. The LA, while ruling that Cadiz's indefinite suspension was
tantamount to a constructive dismissal, nevertheless found that there was just cause for her dismissal.
According to the LA, "there was just cause therefor, consisting in her engaging in premarital sexual
relations with Carl Cadiz, allegedly her boyfriend, resulting in her becoming pregnant out of wedlock."29
The LA deemed said act to be immoral, which was punishable by dismissal under Brent's rules and which
likewise constituted serious misconduct under Article 282( a) of the Labor Code. The LA also opined that
since Cadiz was Brent's Human Resource Officer in charge of implementing its rules against immoral
conduct, she should have been the "epitome of proper conduct."30 x x x.

X x x.

Thus, the question that must be resolved is whether Cadiz's premarital relations with her boyfriend and
the resulting pregnancy out of wedlock constitute immorality. To resolve this, the Court makes reference
to the recently promulgated case of Cheryll Santos Leus v. St. Scholastica s College Westgrove and/or
Sr. Edna Quiambao, OSB, G.R. No. 187226, January 28, 2015.

X x x.

Jurisprudence has already set the standard of morality with which an act should be gauged -it is public
and secular, not religious. 40 Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those conducts which
are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the existence and progress
of human society. The fact that a particular act does not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain
sectarian institution is not sufficient reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not
confonn to public and secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to
establish that premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral.41
The totality of the circumstances of this case does not justify the conclusion that Cadiz committed acts of
immorality. Similar to Leus, Cadiz and her boyfriend were both single and had no legal impediment to
marry at the time she committed the alleged immoral conduct. In fact, they eventually married on April 15,
2008.42 Aside from these, the labor tribunals' respective conclusion that Cadiz's "indiscretion"
"scandalized the Brent community" is speculative, at most, and there is no proof adduced by Brent to
support such sweeping conclusion. Even Brent admitted that it came to know of Cadiz's "situation" only
when her pregnancy became manifest.43 Brent also conceded that "[a]t the time [Cadiz] and Carl R.
Cadiz were just carrying on their boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, there was no knowledge or evidence by
[Brent] that they were engaged also in premarital sex."44 This only goes to show that Cadiz did not flaunt
her premarital relations with her boyfriend and it was not carried on under scandalous or disgraceful
circumstances. As declared in Leus, "there is no law which penalizes an unmarried mother by reason of
her sexual conduct or proscribes the consensual sexual activity between two unmarried persons; that
neither does such situation contravene[s] any fundamental state policy enshrined in the Constitution. "45
The fact that Brent is a sectarian institution does not automatically subject Cadiz to its religious standard
of morality absent an express statement in its manual of personnel policy and regulations, prescribing
such religious standard as gauge as these regulations create the obligation on both the employee and the
employer to abide by the 46 same.

Brent, likewise, cannot resort to the MRPS because the Court already stressed in Leus that "premarital
sexual relations between two consenting adults who have no impediment to marry each other, and,
consequently, conceiving a child out of wedlock, gauged from a purely public and secular view of
morality, does not amount to a disgraceful or immoral conduct under Section 94(e) of the 1992 MRPS."47

MORFE V MUTUC
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND ASSOCIATES DECEMBER 29,
2011 SALN
Declaratory relief (Appeal)
Date of Promulgation: January 31, 1968
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)
Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive Secretary) et al.
Facts:
The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption
of office “and within the month of January of every year thereafter”, as well
as upon termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of
the office to which he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn statement of
assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of
his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the
amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year”.
Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission
“within the month of January of every other year thereafter” of their sworn
statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an
oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable
search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-
incrimination.
Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation
Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of
general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a
legitimate exercise of police power.
CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit
of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause

Issue/s:
Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An
oppressive exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an
unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition
against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal integrity and official
dignity of public officials.

Ruling: Decision reversed.

Ratio:
Presumption of validity
Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement
for employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and
liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to
rebut the presumption of validity.
“If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting,
but where the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate Hotel v.
Mayor of Manila)
Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process
Clause
“inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice
Malcolm)
The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the
limits of its domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights)
Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power
to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the
protection of due process.
It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to
protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he
considers as an infringement of his liberty.
Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as
due process is observed.
The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action
must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
“It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and
compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the
call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement
as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn
statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon
assuming office…There was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police
power.”
Right to privacy
Right to be let alone
“It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for
disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to
privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a
requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in
precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a
public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional
protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement
of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income
taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no
unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere.”
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion.
Right against self-incrimination
We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a
man’s conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action
taken, mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS (177 SCRA 668)
Case Digest
Facts:

After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his
family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the court
to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin the
implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights that
the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because only
a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor, according to
the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel because no law
has authorized her to do so.

Issue:

Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines?

Ruling:

The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.

This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the
peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times
of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of maintaining
peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon.

The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers
to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
state and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent
they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The
petition is DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency
via the non-violent “people power” revolution and was forced into exile.
Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences
to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane
of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble
from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the
respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the
implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning
in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in
the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision
was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life,
liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They
also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court
order.
Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the

Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning
to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return.

Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers.
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in
the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President,
i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the
constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the
Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the
people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare &
advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual
powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do
anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),
inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American
President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of
emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible
depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be
allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely
of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right
to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must
be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual
unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or
not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the
national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events
that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection
of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring

1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the

imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of law. We are
undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present
danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent
a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political &
economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in the country.
Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting

1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in

his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the Consti to all
individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose
a threat to national security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit
her powers & not expand.

Paras, Dissenting

1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair
Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies,
he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state
is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict
this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such
be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be
arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or
public safety. Fears are speculative & military admits that it’s under
control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.

Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting

1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national

security should be agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be
clear & present.

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to
seven, dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not act
arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of
former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest
and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September
28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of
the safety of those who will take the death of Marcos in widely and
passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state
and society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in
the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the
following arguments:

1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to
return to their country of birth and all other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if
she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former
President Marcos.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed
to return in the Philippines be granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration
denied because of lack of merit.
Ratio:

1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant

reconsideration.
2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not
changed. The threats to the government, to which the return of the
Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not
been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President
 Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of
executive power. Enumerations are merely for specifying principal
articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general
grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the
Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise
power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by
constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to
dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of
legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied
powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of
the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty and there is no proof
that she acted arbitrarily

Imelda Marcos vs Sandiganbayan

Due Process
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a
dubious transaction done in 1984 while they were officers transacting
business with the Light Railway Transit. The case was raffled to the
1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice
Garchitorena with J Balajadia and J Atienza as associate justices. No
decision was reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s dissent in favor
of Imelda’s innocence. Garchitorena then summoned a special division of
the SB to include JJ Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores
then asked Garchitorena to be given 15 days to send in his manifestation.
On the date of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received manifestation from
J Balajadia stating that he agrees with J Rosario who further agrees with J
Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve
the special division and have the issue be raised to the SB en banc for it
would already be pointless to wait for Amores’ manifestation granted that a
majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor. The SB en banc ruled
against Imelda.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process has been observed.
HELD: The SC ruled that the ruling of the SB is bereft of merit as there was
no strong showing of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda
was deprived of due process by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for
Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural flaws committed by respondent
Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its ”decision” convicting petitioner.
Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in
view of the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division.
At that stage, petitioner had a vested right to be heard by the five (5)
justices, especially the new justices in the persons of Justices Amores and
del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At that
point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change
their mind and agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the
turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of
Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario
had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled
meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not
the opinion contemplated by law. But what is more, petitioner was denied
the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200334 July 30, 2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent-Appellee,

vs.
VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
LEONEN, J.:

The mantle of protection upon one's person and one's effects through
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution is essential to allow citizens to
evolve their autonomy and, hence, to avail themselves of their right to
privacy. The alleged compromise with the battle against dangerous drugs is
more apparent than real. Often, the compromise is there because law
enforcers neglect to perform what could have been done to uphold the
Constitution as they pursue those who traffic this scourge of society.

Squarely raised in· this appeal1 is the admissibility of the evidence seized
as a result of a warrantless arrest. The police officers identified the alleged
perpetrator through facts that were not based on their personal knowledge.
The information as to the accused’s whereabouts was sent through a text
message. The accusedwho never acted suspicious was identified by a
driver. The bag that allegedly contained the contraband was required to be
opened under intimidating circumstances and without the accused having
been fully apprised of his rights. This was not a reasonable search within
the meaning of the Constitution. There was no reasonable suspicion that
would allow a legitimate "stop and frisk" action. The alleged waiver of rights
by the accused was not done intelligently, knowingly, and without improper
pressure or coercion.

The evidence, therefore, used against the accused should be excluded

consistent with Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution. There being no
possible admissible evidence, the accused should be acquitted.

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005,

Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan) of the San Gabriel
Police Station in San Gabriel,La Union, "received a text message from an
unidentified civilian informer"2 that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin
Bugat) "[would]be transporting marijuana"3 from Barangay LunOy, San
Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.4

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect."5 PSI
Bayan ordered SPO1 Jaime Taracatac, Jr. (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of
the San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of
passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.6 A passenger
jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s
checkpoint.7 The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1
Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying
marijuana.8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who
were later identified as Victor RomanaCogaed and Santiago Sacpa
Dayao.9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was
holding a yellow bag.10

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their
bags.11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know
since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomatenamed
Marvin.12 After this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing
three bricks of what looked like marijuana.13Cogaed then muttered,
"nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoymet gayam ti nagyanna,"which
translates to "Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the
bag."14 "SPO1 Taracatac arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought
them to the police station."15 Cogaed and Dayao "were still carrying their
respective bags"16 inside the station.17

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley
Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
bags.18 Inside Cogaed’s sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected
marijuana fruiting tops,"19 and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of
suspected marijuana.20

PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing.21 PSI
Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime
Laboratory.22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector Valeriano Panem
Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were
indeed marijuana.23 The marijuana collected from Cogaed’s blue bag had a
total weight of 8,091.5 grams.24 The marijuana from Cogaed’s sack
weighed 4,246.1 grams.25 The marijuana collected from Dayao’s bag
weighed 5,092 grams.26 A total of 17,429.6 grams werecollected from
Cogaed’s and Dayao’s bags.27

According to Cogaed’s testimony during trial, he was at Balbalayan, La

Union, "waiting for a jeepney to take him"28to the Poblacion of San Gabriel
so he could buy pesticide.29 He boarded a jeepney and recognized Dayao,
his younger brother’s friend.30 Upon arrival at the Poblacion of San Gabriel,
Dayao and Cogaed alighted from the jeepney.31 Dayao allegedly "asked for
[Cogaed’s] help in carrying his things, which included a travelling bag and a
sack."32 Cogaed agreed because they were both going to the
market.33 This was when SPO1 Taracatac approached them, and when
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed what was inside the bags, Cogaed replied
that he did not know.34 SPO1 Taracatac then talked to Dayao, however,
Cogaed was not privy to their conversation.35Thereafter, SPO1 Taracatac
arrested Dayao and Cogaed and brought them to the police
station.36 These facts were corroborated by an eyewitness,Teodoro Nalpu-
ot, who was standing across the parking lot where Cogaed was
apprehended.37

At the police station, Cogaed said that "SPO1 Taracatac hit [him] on the
head."38 The bags were also opened, but Cogaed never knew what was
inside.39

It was only later when Cogaed learned that it was marijuana when he and
Dayao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Republic Act No. 9165.40 The information against them states:

That on or about the 25th day of November, 2005, in the Municipality of

San Gabriel, Province of La Union, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused VICTOR COGAED Y
ROMANA and SANTIAGO DAYAO Y SACPA (who acted with
discernment) and JOHN DOE,conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
knowingly, without being authorized by law, have in their control, custody
and possession dried marijuana, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of
seventeen thousand,four hundred twenty-nine and sixtenths (17, 429.6)
grams.

CONTRARY TO Section 11 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II, of

Republic Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").41

The case was raffled to Regional Trial Court, Branch 28 of San Fernando
City, La Union.42 Cogaed and Dayao pleaded not guilty.43 The case was
dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 years old at that time
and was exempt from criminal liability under the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006 or Republic Act No. 9344.44Trial against Cogaed
ensued. In a decision45 dated May 21, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found
Cogaed guilty. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Victor Cogaed y Romana GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002") and sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, and to pay a
fine of one million pesos (Php 1,000,000.00).46

The trial court judge initiallyfound Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that
"Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was shown that hewas about to do so or that had just done so.
He just alighted from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was illegal, the
warrantless search should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial
court stated that notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waived
his right to object to such irregularity"49 when "he did not protest when
SPO1 Taracatac, after identifying himself, asked him to open his bag." 50

Cogaed appealed51 the trial court’s decision.However, the Court of Appeals

denied his appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.52 The Court of
Appeals found that Cogaed waived his right against warrantless searches
when "[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1 Taracatac, [he] voluntarily
opened his bag."53 Hence, this appeal was filed.

The following errors were assigned by Cogaed in his appellant’s brief:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED

DANGEROUS DRUGS AS EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE BEING THE RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S NON-
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER
CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE ARRESTING OFFICER’S FAILURE TO
PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE
SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS.54

For our consideration are the following issues: (1) whether there was a
valid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether
the evidence obtained through the search should be admitted; and (3)
whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the
accused.

In view of the disposition of this case, we deem that a discussion with

respect to the requirements on the chain of custody of dangerous drugs
unnecessary.55

We find for the accused.

II

The right to privacy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our

Constitution. It has many dimensions. One of its dimensions is its
protection through the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures in
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determinedpersonally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.

This provision requires that the court examine with care and diligence
whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a general rule,
searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of this
provision are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable
cause that can only be determined by a judge.56 The existence of probable
cause must be established by the judge after asking searching questions
and answers.57 Probable cause at this stage can only exist if there is an
offense alleged to be committed. Also, the warrant frames the searches
done by the law enforcers. There must be a particular description of the
place and the things to be searched.58

However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when
warrantless.59 In the Rules of Court, searchesincidental to lawful arrests are
allowed even without a separate warrant.60 This court has taken into
account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose
of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the
manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured."61 The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures
are:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. . . ;

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," . . . ;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government,

the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant
committed a criminal activity;

4. Consentedwarrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.62 (Citations omitted)

III

One of these jurisprudential exceptionsto search warrants is "stop and

frisk". "Stop and frisk" searches are often confused with searches incidental
to lawful arrests under the Rules of Court.63 Searches incidental to a lawful
arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and the search
conducted within the vicinity and withinreach by the person arrested is
done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence.64
On the other hand, "stop and frisk"searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime. For instance, the search in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals65 was similar "to a ‘stop and frisk’ situation whose object is either
to determine the identity of a suspicious individual or to maintain the status
quomomentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information."66 This court stated that the "stop and frisk" search should be
used "[w]hen dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal
situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to secure . . .
a search warrant."67

The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it
did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the
Constitution.

"Stop and frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terrysearches68) are

necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the
legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should
be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance
with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation

where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly
based on the experience ofthe police officer. Experienced police officers
have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior.
Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based on facts that they
themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his
or her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion
of an illicit act.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals,69 the police officers were initially informed

about a place frequented by people abusing drugs.70 When they arrived,
one of the police officers saw a man with "reddish eyes and [who was]
walking in a swaying manner."71 The suspicion increased when the man
avoided the police officers.72 These observations led the police officers to
conclude that the man was high on drugs.73 These were sufficient facts
observed by the police officers "to stop[the] petitioner [and] investigate."74

In People v. Solayao,75 police officers noticed a man who appeared

drunk.76 This man was also "wearing a camouflage uniform or a jungle
suit."77 Upon seeing the police, the man fled.78 His flight added to the
suspicion.79After stopping him, the police officers found an unlicensed
"homemade firearm"80 in his possession.81 This court ruled that "[u]nder the
circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a
search warrant first."82 This was also a valid search.

In these cases, the police officers using their senses observed facts that
led to the suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a
swaying manner, based on their experience, is indicative of a person who
uses dangerous and illicit drugs. A drunk civilian in guerrilla wear is
probably hiding something as well.

The case of Cogaed was different. He was simply a passenger carrying a

bag and traveling aboarda jeepney. There was nothing suspicious,
moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the
jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed
was "suspicious."

This is supported by the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac himself:

COURT:

Q So you don’t know what was the content while it was still being carried by
him in the passenger jeep?

WITNESS:

A Not yet, Your Honor.83

SPO1 Taracatac likewise stated:

COURT:

Q If the driver did not make a gesture pointing to the accused, did you have
reason to believe that the accused were carrying marijuana?

WITNESS:

A No, Your Honor.84

The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He would not have been
identified by the police officers otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a
reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not
adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify
that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.85 Anything
less than this would be an infringementupon one’s basic right to security of
one’s person and effects.

IV

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an
opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable cause. In Posadas
v. Court of Appeals,86 one of the earliest cases adopting the "stop and frisk"
doctrine in Philippine jurisprudence, this court approximatedthe suspicious
circumstances as probable cause:

The probable causeis that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the
police officers to inspect the same.87 (Emphasis supplied)

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable

ground of suspicionsupported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged."88

Malacat v. Court of Appeals89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not

have to be probable cause,but it cannot be mere suspicion.90 It has to be a
"genuine reason"91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk"
exception:92

Other notable points of Terryare that while probable cause is not required
to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in
light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him.93 (Emphasis supplied, footnotes omitted)
In his dissent for Esquillo v. People,94 Justice Bersamin reminds us that
police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance.95 There
should be "presence of more than oneseemingly innocent activity, which,
taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."96 The
Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures."97 Certainly,
reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in
a reasonable search.98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was
no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless
arrest. The person searched was noteven the person mentioned by the
informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person
searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by
saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained
only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to
search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this

exception, unless there is compliance with the "genuine reason"
requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the
public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of

effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals
is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.99 (Emphasis supplied)

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for
the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in
101
Manalili, jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving
dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta.102 In that

case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be
bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police
officers prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed at a woman
crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police
apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look
inside her bag.107The bag contained marijuana leaves.108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was
illegal.109 There were no suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s
arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.110 It was only the informant
that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The evidence obtained was
not admissible because of the illegal search.112 Consequently, Aruta was
acquitted.113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver,
not the police’s informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious."

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v.

Aminnudin.114 Here, the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a
tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs.115 The NBI waited
for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was disembarking
from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag
and found bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana leaves.117 The court
declared that the searchand seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was
acquitted.119

People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this

case, the police had been receiving information that the accused was
distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City."121 One night,
the police received information that thisdrug dealer would be dealing drugs
at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout.122 A car "arrived
and parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the police that the man
parked at the hotel was dealing drugs.125 The man alighted from his
car.126 He was carrying a juice box.127 The police immediately apprehended
him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in the
juice box he was holding.128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about
Chua’s situation when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here
was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’."129
VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the

evidence to be admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to
a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a
warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a

private person may, withouta warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest.

None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court were present whenthe arrest was made. At the time of his
apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was
about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of
in flagrante delictoto be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the
person to bearrested must execute anovert act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the view of the arresting
officer."130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed was
131
arrested. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers
that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not
have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest.
VII

There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we

assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags.
As this court previously stated:

Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search.

The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.132(Citations omitted) Cogaed’s
silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into
his private space. The prosecution and the police carry the burden of
showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to
be presumed.

The coercive atmosphere created by the presence of the police officer can
be discerned again from the testimony of SPO1 Taracatac during cross-
examination:

ATTY. BINWAG:

Q Now, Mr. witness, you claimed that you only asked them what are the
contents of their bags, is it not?

WITNESS:

A Yes, ma’am.

Q And then without hesitation and voluntarily they just opened their bags, is
it not?

A Yes, ma’am.

Q So that there was not any order from you for them to open the bags?

A None, ma’am.
Q Now, Mr. witness when you went near them and asked them what were
the contents ofthe bag, you have not seen any signs of hesitation or fright
from them, is it not?

A It seems they were frightened, ma’am.

Q But you actually [claimed] that there was not any hesitation from them in
opening the bags, is it not?

A Yes, ma’am but when I went near them it seems that they were
surprised.133 (Emphasis supplied)

The state of mind of Cogaed was further clarified with SPO1 Taracatac’s
responses to Judge Florendo’s questions:

COURT:

....

Q Did you have eye contact with Cogaed?

A When I [sic] was alighting from the jeepney, Your Honor I observed that
he was somewhat frightened.1âwphi1 He was a little apprehensive and
when he was already stepping down and he put down the bag I asked him,
"what’s that," and he answered, "I don’t know because Marvin only asked
me to carry."134

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, it is not
sufficient that the police officerintroduce himself or herself, or be known as
a police officer.1âwphi1 The police officer must also inform the person to
be searched that any inaction on his orher part will amount to a waiver of
any of his or her objections that the circumstances do not amount to a
reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in
a language known to the person who is about to waive his or her
constitutional rights. There must be anassurance given to the police officer
that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental
nature of a person’s constitutional right to privacy requires no less.

VIII
The Constitution provides:
Any evidence obtained in violation of [the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures] shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.135

Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from Stonehill v.
Diokno.136 This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that
encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained
through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures."137 It ensures that the fundamental
rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed
upon and are upheld.

Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded

on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search
means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.

Drugs and its illegal traffic are a scourgeto our society. In the fight to
eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be equipped with the
resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we cannot, in
any way, compromise our society’s fundamental values enshrined in our
Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowlydismantling the very
foundations of the society that we seek to protect.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, San
Fernando City, La Union and of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 03394 are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant VICTOR
COGAED Y ROMANA is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED
from confinement unless he is being heldfor some other legal grounds. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Hong Kong v. OlaliaG.R. No. 153675Facts

The

P h i l i p p i n e s a n d Ho n g K o n g s i g n e d a n “ A g r e e me n t f o r t h e S u r
r e n d e r o f A c c u s e d a n d Convicted Persons.”Private respondent
Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court. Department of
Justice(DOJ) received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of privaterespondent Muñoz. The DOJ
then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI)which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application
for the provisional arrest of privaterespondent. The NBI agents arrested
and detained him.Muñoz filed a petition for bail which was denied by Judge
Bernardo, Jr.

holding that there is noPhilippine law granting bail in extradition cases and
that private respondent is a high “flight risk.” After Judge Bernardo, Jr.
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled
off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the Order denyinghis application for bail and
this was granted by respondent judge.

ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private respondent to
bail?

HELD
No, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in allowing private
respondent to bail.Accordingly, although the time-
honored principle of
pacta sunt servanda
demands that thePhilippines honor its obligations under the Extradition
Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong
SpecialAdministrative Region it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, thePhilippines should diminish a
potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process
guaranteed bythe Constitution
. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution,
but also byinternational conventions, particularly
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
, t o w h i c h t h e Philippines is a party.
We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail,
provided that acertain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in
 Purganan
, t h e n Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
proposed that a new standard which he termed“clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him,this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable
doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a
flightrisk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition
court.In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented
evidence to show that he is nota flight risk. Consequently, this case should
be remanded to the trial court to determine whether privaterespondent may
be granted bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.”

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED

to the trial court to determinewhether private respondent is entitled to
bail on the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.” If not, thetrial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter,conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.