To what extent do Muslim States comply with their International Commitments?

Introduction:

Echoes of Chanakya’s ancient claim in Neetishastra that “self interest lies behind every
friendship” continue to be heard in the chambers of international organizations, now
serving as important mediators in our globalised world (Venuvinod, 2004, p.83). Chanakya,
and later Machiavelli’s causal link between human nature, power and security help preserve
this perspective, maintained amongst individuals and states alike under the guise of
neorealism. However, the world has since changed. Infamous work such as Kenchi Ohmae’s
“The End of the Nation-State” and Naomi Klein’s “No Logo” reflect a trend recognising the
proliferation of global issues and their ramifications, particularly post WW2. It is within this
contextual framework this essay will operate.

The question refers to state compliance on the international stage. Its importance in
relation to armed conflict is best articulated by Keohane’s warning that its prevention is
dependent on a “pattern of institutionalised cooperation” amongst nations (Keohane, 1993,
p.53). The rise of transnational threats and the evolution of state-sovereignty have further
exacerbated the need for this study.

Theoretically, this paper pays particular interest towards the behaviour of Islamic countries
in adhering to international commitments. Initially inspired by Edward Said’s “Orientalism”
and the allusion of cultural division between the Western & Islamic World, exploring
whether this dichotomy translates to disobedience is of continued interest. Ultimately, this
essay argues that despite the emphasis of unity within Islamic countries epitomised by the
construction of the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) in 1969, there is great
diversity of compliance between Islamic countries. In particular, I wish to show that
compliancy trends in the Islamic World are reflected by geographical regional trends, rather
than religious unity. This is revealed in my research design that explores compliancy to
international commitments to International Humanitarian Law. This theoretical argument is
expected to hold up to quantitative scrutiny given the current data-sets available, the
exception being rare instances of controversial Western interventions where the Islamic
principle of the dar-al Islam is systemically held.
 Literature Review:

Past literature of three themes will be analysed in relation to international compliance:

human rights, economics and armed conflict.

The opening thematic example evaluated in this review is previous research on state
compliance and international human rights legislation. Goodman & Pegram’s text on the
impact of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI’s) on state conformity is an important
foundation. Goodman and Pegram’s argument centres around NHRI’s establishing
themselves as an integral element of modern statehood, leading to a “one size fits all”
template (Goodman & Pegram, 2011, p.9). However, a uniform model reduces expectations
from nations that would otherwise strive for excellent human rights protections. This is
described by Goodman and Pegram as a “race to the middle” (Goodman & Pegram, 2011,
p.9). In combating this negative aspect, Sally Engle Merry emphasises the role of NHRI’s in
converting international law into a local vernacular as the vital determinant of the
effectiveness of NHRI’s domestically (Sally Engle Merry, 2006). In terms of reprisals, Emilie
Hafner-Burton’s piece on ‘naming and shaming’ by non-state actors remains significant. The
relative success of this strategy is determined by where the spotlight was shone,
nonetheless, her finding that ‘naming and shaming’ often “improves protections for political
rights...passing legislation to increase political pluralism or participation” is an important
finding (Hafner-Burton, 2008, p.691). Despite this, whilst political rights may increase, terror
may continue to ensue. Heads of State will either exert their legislative influence to appease
political rights or undermine international pressure by adapting their terror to more
underground methods. As such, the neorealist critique of liberal institutionalist’s emphasis
on international organisations/commitments remains; the state will continue to use
violence to ensure its survival, even under pressure.

Extrapolating past literature on conflict serves as the second theme of the literature review.
Nicolas Lamp’s text on the nature of “new wars” as a challenge to International
Humanitarian Law is important given our emphasis on the Islamic World. He argues that in
these new conflicts, non-state actors do not comply international humanitarian law, given
most combatants are defined as “loosely organised rebel groups with economic motivations
and mindless ethnic hatred” (Lamp, 2011, p.227). As a result, international commitments
are no longer consensual, rending compliance irrelevant. In most cases, warring parties will
now pursue aims directly in opposition to International Humanitarian law – the Syrian Civil
War an apt example. Given this anarchic environment, Lamp’s solution is predictable. Lamp
stresses the success of UN Peacekeeping and the use of professional forces to combat rebel
groups as “the only way to prevent massive violations of the IHL in the short term” (Lamp,
2011, p.260). Ergo, a clear championing of realist dogma. This sentiment resonates with
earlier philosophical literature, in particular Thomas Hobbes’ idea of a sovereign arbiter in
the text “Leviathan” preventing a return to the state of nature (Hobbes, 1651).

The final theme evaluated in the literature review is past literature on economic
compliance. Beth Simmons’s liberal institutionalist examination of compliance in
International Monetary Fund serves as an effective example of the success of the IMF’s
charter. Governments make international commitments to further their interests,
reinforcing their international reputation in having predictable behaviour on the world stage
(Simmons, 1995). This theory is embodied by the role of Article VIII in the IMF’s charter.
Simmons demonstrates the correlation of the IMF’s demands and the adoption of liberal,
democratic policies. Fundamentally, compliance with these legal commitments and often
push countries onto “a behavioural trajectory from which it is decreasingly likely to deviate”
(Simmons, 1998, p.832). The allusion in this analysis to game theory in state decision making
is one also explored by Eric Reinhart’s paper on General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and
its enforcement mechanisms. He argues that states comply at the earliest opportunity (the
equilibrium level) thus saving itself from both retaliation and the belief of suffering further
costs (Reinhart, 2001). This is important in appreciating state psychology to economic
agreements, applied in the theoretical argument to the Islamic World.

Given the previous research, I am compelled to argue that different models of compliance
are effective for different elements of state decision making.

Theoretical Argument:

Mohammad Fadel’s belief that “contemporary Muslim countries are committed both to
general international norms as well as a vague set of weak and idiosyncratic international
commitments arising out of vague sentiments of Islamic solidarity” serves an accurate
depiction of the contemporary Islamic World’s behaviour (Cismas, 2014, p.243). In this
theoretical evaluation, three factors will be reviewed: human rights, economics and armed
conflict.

The primary interaction in this essay between Islamic Countries and International
commitments relates to human rights legislation. Historically, the orthodox Islamic response
to the adoption of the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 is exemplified by Iranian Sufi
leader Sultan Reza Alishah arguing the declaration “has not promulgated anything that was
new nor inaugurated innovations”. This viewpoint implies anything of note in the
declaration had already been established within Islamic theology (Runzo, Martin, Sharma,
2003). Nevertheless, the belief amongst state leaders was that the declaration neglected
many integral elements of Islamic scripture, leading to efforts within the Muslim World to
redress it. The Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (initiated by the OIC and signed in
1990) represents a direct Islamic alternative to an established international commitment,
the UNDHR. Despite sharing many parallels to the UN Declaration, Article 24 of the Cairo
agreement affirms all rights and freedoms are subject to Shari’a, thus prioritising theological
scripture and the belief of an international Ummah over trans-national commitments
(Forsythe, 2009). In evaluation, it is my belief this example of a seemingly unified defiance
by the Islamic World to an international commitment does not reveal the diversity of
interests of specific regions. Almost immediately after the Cairo agreement was ratified, the
Arab states composed a reformed human rights charter containing only spurious references
to Shari’a and the provision strong protections for women’s rights by advocating positive
discrimination. The intended consequence of this was allowing the region to align itself
more with international human rights standards whilst serving as a key “regional
instrument” in bridging the divide between contentious legal regimes and international law
(Mattar, 2013, p.94). In this general climate of defiance, this case serves as an example of a
“region-state” tempering its prior religious commitments in an attempt to “reconcile
international standards with domestic practices” (Mattar, 2013, p.96). To conclude, this
view is reverberated by Mayer’s assertion that “as of 1996, it was becoming rarer to see
Muslim countries put forward the idea that Islamic law was in conflict with international
human rights law” (Mayer, 1998, p.43). This statement is continually verified by the
cooperation between the UN Human Rights Council and the OIC’s Independent Permanent
Human Rights Commission in moving away from traditional emphasis on sharia towards
established ideas of state sovereignty in determining its human rights instruments
(Kayaoğlu, 2013).

Exploring the Islamic World’s relationship to international economic and trade

commitments serves as the second factor in the theoretical argument. The propagation of
internationalization has led to an increase in the mediatory roles of trans-national trade
organisations. Crudely, international trade organisations provide incentives to comply by
providing market access, influencing export competitiveness. This is especially important for
developing nations wanting to exploit the potential of absolute or comparative cost
advantages in a specific market. Countries will look to exploit the spill-off benefits of joining
global value chains, leading to a reduction in trade costs and an increase in trade output
efficiency. Despite this, the level of compliance is often linked to how developed the country
is and provides a significant barrier of entry for developing countries that lack the
prerequisite level of infrastructure needed for quality checks. In relation to the Islamic
World, the case study on Senegal’s compliance mechanisms by COMCEC sheds light on the
length developing countries make to adhere to international commitments (COMCEC
Coordination Office, 2016). In particular, Senegal’s ability to leverage external regional
institutions such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union has been a key method
of development. Senegal has been able to enjoy the benefits of compliance by effectively
sharing the costs of quality infrastructure, allowing for an increase in economic
harmonization. In agreement with Reinhart, Islamic countries (like any other) will comply
with trade agreements at the earliest opportunity with non-compliance often only occurring
out of deficiency rather than disobedience.

Finally, the most important factor evaluated is the association of state compliance to
international law in a climate of armed conflict. In direct contrast to Samuel Huntington’s
statement that “Islam’s borders and bloody and so are its innards”, I will argue that the
proliferation of Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) has greatly undermined the level
of compliance for Muslim States (Huntingdon, 1993). However, although the increase of this
type of Lamp’s “new wars” represents a larger share of conflicts, Muslim states are more
likely to comply with International Humanitarian Law in interstate conflicts. As such, one can
observe both the importance of international organizations and agree with Hafner-Burton’s
argument that states will conceded to international pressure, but this often will not stop
other forms of intra-state violence. Zoli, Schneider and Schuster’s influential text on "Armed
Conflict and Compliance in Muslim States” supports this thesis stating that in the regions of
Africa and the Middle East “states complied with IHL in the cases of IAC’s one and a half
times as more than they violated IHL” but the exact opposite in NIAC’s where no matter
what region, state actors are “highly likely” to violate the conditions of IHL. (Zoli, Schneider
and Schuster, 2015, p.736). One natural explanation for this is that international law is not
relevant to non-state actors since they have not consented, thus allowing for systemic
disobedience to humanitarian law as well as a general disregard for the Geneva
Convention’s “principle of proportionality” (Fitzpatrick, 1994, p.60). In response to
Huntington’s polemic statement, it is regional trends that are the predominant reason for
Islamic state’s non-compliance rather than an inherent “warlike” nature that exists within
the religion. This can be observed by contrasting the type of conflict in the two regions with
the most Muslim countries: Africa and the Middle East. According to Zoli, Schneider and
Schuster, the majority of African conflicts (65.45%) were NIACs, whereas in the Middle East
the majority of conflicts (55.565) were IACs (Zoli, Schneider and Schuster, 2015, p.734).
Ergo, one can extrapolate these regional conflict trends to the level of state compliance to
International Humanitarian Law.

In conclusion, Islamic countries are more likely to comply with international commitments
on the basis of regional trends rather than theological values. This general appreciation for
regionalism is evidenced by the success of state policy derived from similar interests of its
neighbours opposed to strict adherence to Sharia. These findings will be valuable to
appreciating the diversity of Islamic countries, especially given the climate of mistrust often
conveyed in sections of Western society. Whilst previous research has explored specific
factors, this piece alleviates the importance of regionalism as significant across all facets of
policy formation for Islamic countries. The aforementioned argument compels me to expect
that contemporary Muslim countries will show trends of compliance with International
Humanitarian Law with other states in their geographical region rather than a unified trend
throughout the Islamic world.
 Research Design:

This research design contains a cross national and annual time-series dataset. In comparing
the effects of region on the level of International Humanitarian law compliance, my sample
contains all 57 countries currently in the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation. This is done
to observe the behavioural trends of all Muslim states. The data spans the time period
reflects the level of available contemporary data measuring the effects of the “War on
Terror”. As such, this research design examines the behavioural compliance trends of
Muslim States from 2001-2014. Whilst this time period is short, the period represents an
unprecedented level of activity for Muslim states in relation to international relations,
reflecting the worldwide proliferation of theories of globalization and cooperation. The unit
of analysis are country years.

Dependant Variable: Muslim states compliance to International Humanitarian Law is my

dependant variable. This variable will be tested by an interval indicator where 0 represents
no compliance with IHL and 10 represents complete compliance. The data for this indicator
is obtained by the Muslim State Armed Conflict and Compliance (MSACC) Dataset from
1947-2014. (CITATION)

Independent Variable: The Independent variable/s for this research design are the different
world regions where Muslim states are most prominent: Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
These indicators will be measured as nominal variables where Middle East = 1, Africa = 2
and Asia = 3. The definitions for these geographical regions are provided by the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program.

Control Variables: There are a number of control variables that must be kept constant in
order to isolate the effect of regional trends on IHL compliance. Firstly, domestic economic
performance (exemplified by GDP) must be held constant. One can observe a causal link
between the offset of war, the deterioration of the state’s economy, an economic recession
and subsequent potential for civil unrest and state violation of IHL. It will be expressed by
the indicator US$ with the data derived from the World Bank’s development indicators.
Secondly, Ethnic composition, ceteris paribus, remain the same. An influx of an ethnic group
may lead to state violence and subsequent violations of IHL, not directly related to armed
conflict. Regime characteristics/level of democracy should also be kept the same. The
indicator mirrors the 21-point Polity Score where +10 = strongly democratic and -10 =
strongly autocratic. The data is obtained by Polity IV. Finally, spatial contagion must be
controlled. This is defined by Gleditsch and Ward in 1999 as the proportion of neighbouring
countries experiencing ongoing conflict to the total number of neighbours. The data is
available from the Conflict Data Project.
 Operationalization of Variables:

Variable Indicator Source

Dependant Variable: Interval Index of

compliance where 0
State compliance to represents no compliance Zoli, Schneider and Schuster
International and 10 represents (2015)’s MSACC Dataset
Humanitarian Law complete compliance to
IHL.

Independent Variable:

Regions (Africa, Asia Defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program at:
and Middle East) Conflict Data Program, in www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP.
accordance with their
datasets.

Controlled Variables:

GDP per capita: US$ World Bank: World

Development Indicators

Ethnic Composition: Converted into a 10 point PRIO: Ethnic Composition Data

index: 0 = low diversity,
10 = high diversity.

Regime
Type/Democracy: Polity Score: + 10 for Polity IV
strongly democratic, - 10
for strongly autocratic

Spatial Contagion: Means Scores calculated Conflict Data Program at:

separately for each www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP
dependant variable

The influence of the independent variable on the dependent variable can be assessed by the
following model:
Y = α + βX + C 1 + C2 + C3 + C4 + C5 (where C’s 1 to 4 represent the control variables).
1
 Conclusions:

In accordance with the above findings, Muslim States experience differing levels of
compliance to international commitments. In economic instances, this disobedience is often
the result of deficient quality infrastructure rather than isolationist policies. This is
consistent with the importance of free market policies in what Ohmae regards as a
borderless world (Ohmae, 1995). Nevertheless, one overriding feature has dominated this
essay, that is the importance of regional trends in behaviour of Muslim States. These
findings have theoretical importance given the traditional dichotomy alluded to by Saïd in
Orientalism in dispelling the notion that the behaviour of the Islamic world is homogenous.
This is further verified by Professor Askari’s recent study on the level of “Islamicity” that
shows ‘how Muslim’ a country is and the variation (Askari, 2015). In terms of policy setting
for the above research design, further research should be done in combating the spread of
NIAC’s throughout the Islamic World. Their ability to circumvent international law has, and
will continue to have far reaching consequence both to state policy and its citizens.

Word Count: 2,975

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