Paper On Civil Indemnity

PERSONAL INJURY AND OFFENDER’S CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION
PERSONAL INJURY AND OFFENDER’S

CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION
I. INTRODUCTION
In his book “The Revised Penal Code (Criminal Law Book One)”,
Retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Luis B. Reyes stated that an
offense, as a general rule, causes two classes of injuries particularly social
injury and personal injury.1 Interestingly, to further comprehend the
underlying concepts of injuries caused by crimes, the ideas incorporated by
John Stuart Mill, the most influential and famous British philosopher of the
nineteenth century, in his renowned Harm Principle are hard to ignore.
According to Mill, in order to constitute harm, an action must be injurious or
set back important interests of particular people, interests in which they have
rights. Moreover, under this principle, Mill demonstrated claims which can be
used to satisfy explanations associated with the injuries or harms caused by
crimes. According to Mill, “[I]t must by no means be supposed, because
damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society,
that therefore it always does justify such interference.” Moreover, he posited
that “[I]f anyone does an act hurtful to others, there is a prima facie case for
punishing him by law or, where legal penalties are safely applicable, by
general disapprobation.”2 Corollary, the interests of society and the offended
parties which have been wronged must be equally considered.3
Our laws recognize a bright line distinction between criminal and civil
liabilities. A crime is a liability against the state. It is prosecuted by and for
the state. Acts considered criminal are penalized by law as a means to protect
the society from dangerous transgressions. As criminal liability involves a
penalty affecting a person's liberty, acts are only treated criminal when the
law clearly says so. On the other hand, civil liabilities take a less public and
more private nature. Civil liabilities are claimed through civil actions as a
means to enforce or protect a right or prevent or redress a wrong.4
This is in line with the fact that in criminal prosecution, it is the State
that prosecutes crimes. The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect
itself and its people from vicious acts which endanger the proper
administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and
punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self-preservation, nay, its
very existence.5 Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits
and sending them to jail in the hope that they will in the future reform and be
productive members of the community rests both on the judiciousness of
1
Reyes, Luis B. (2012). Title Five – Civil Liability (Chapter One – Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies). The
Revised Penal Code (Criminal Law Book One) (page 898). Quezon City, Philippines. REX Book Store.
2
Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University (2007). Mill’s Moral and Political
Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from plato.stanford.edu.
3
The People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Paterno V. Tac-an, G.R. No. 148000, February 27, 2003
4
Gloria S. Dy vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016
5
Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 176389, December 14, 2010
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 1

judges and the prudence of prosecutors.6 As significant as the right of the

accused to speedy trial is the right of the State to prosecute people who violate
its penal laws and who constitute a threat to the tranquility of the community.7
The use of the State of its entire machineries to prosecute crimes is evident of
it being the public offended party whenever an offense has been committed.
In this instance, the State suffers the so-called social injury. As defined by
former Associate Justice Reyes, social justice is produced by the disturbance
and alarm which are the outcome of the offense.8 Crimes are considered as
disturbance against peace and security of the people at large so it is the State
that has the right to prosecute. This is also emphasized by the requirement that
a complaint or information in criminal prosecution must be in the name of the
People of the Philippines under Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2. The complaint or information – The complaint or

information shall be in writing, in the name of the People of the
Philippines against all persons who appear to be responsible for
the offense involved.
The interest of the society to prevent social injury is attributed to the

reality that “each State has the authority, under its police power, to define and
punish crimes and to lay down the rules of criminal procedure. The states, as
a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in creating and
defining criminal offenses.”9 In accordance with State’s police power, it may
safely be affirmed, without further attempting to define what are the peculiar
subjects of limits of the police power, that every law for the restraint and
punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the public peace, health, and
morals, must come within this category.10 Such right was even reiterated by
the Supreme Court of the Philippines in U.S. vs. Pablo, to wit:
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the

attributes that by a natural law belongs to the sovereign power
instinctively charged by the common will of the members of
society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of
every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or

challenged, as the necessity for its existence has been recognized
even by the most backward peoples. At times the criticism has
been made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and
atrocious; at other, that they are light and inadequate to the nature
and gravity of the offense, but the imposition of punishment is
admitted to be just by the whole human race, and even barbarians
and savages themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization are
no exception.11
6
Diosdado Jose Allado vs. Hon. Roberto C. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630, May 5, 1994
7
People of the Philippines vs. Luis Tampal, G.R. No. 102485, May 22, 1995
8
Reyes, Luis B. Title Five – Civil Liability (Chapter One – Persons Civilly Liable for Felonies), 898
9
The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Gregorio Santiago, G.R. No. 17584, March 8, 1922
10
The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Julio Pomar, G.R. No. L-22008, November 3, 1924
11
The United States vs. Andres Pablo, G.R. No. L-11676, October 17, 1916

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also

civilly liable.12 Criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof. Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party and (2) a civil action for the
restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the
losses.13 Hence, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state
because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against
the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason,
rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on
the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated
or there is no private person injured by the crime. In the ultimate analysis,
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair
or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or
omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not
punishable by law.14
This refers now to the second class of injury caused by an offense, the
personal injury. Former Associate Justice Reyes defined personal injury as
the one caused to the victim of the crime who may have suffered damage,
either to his person, to his property, to his honor, or to her chastity. 15 Our
jurisdiction recognizes that a crime has a private civil component. Thus, while
an act considered criminal is a breach of law against the State, our legal system
allows for the recovery of civil damages where there is a private person
injured by a criminal act. It is in recognition of this dual nature of a criminal
act that our Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable
is also civilly liable.16 Unlike social injury which is sought to be repaired
through the imposition of the corresponding penalty provided by law, personal
injury is through indemnity which is civil in nature.17 The rule is that every
act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The
civil aspect of every criminal case is based on the principle that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable. If the accused however, is not found to
be criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be
held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil action.18 This civil liability arising from culpa
criminal is found in Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
12
Dr. Encarnacion C. Lumantas, M.D. vs. Hanz Calapis, G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014
13
Sonny Romero y Dominguez vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 167646, June 17, 2009
14
Occena vs. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, January 22, 1990
15
16
Gloria S. Dy vs. People of the Philippines, supra
17
18
Nissan Gallery-Ortigas vs. Purificacion F. Felipe, November 11, 2013

Various codes of civil law incorporated or defined civil liability. For

example, Section 1383 of the French Civil Code of 1804 provides “[E]veryone
is liable for the damage he causes not only by his acts, but also by his
negligence or imprudence.” Also, Section 823 of the German Civil Code of
1900 founded civil liability on the following manner: “[A] person who,
willfully or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, health, freedom,
property or other right of another is bound to compensate him for any damage
arising therefrom.” It must be understood that the concept of civil liability or
delictual liability originates Roman law.19
In Philippine jurisdiction, civil liability, in general, is not only confined

to those arising from criminal offenses. Corollarily, an act or omission causing
damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of
the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto20, and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
as a felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligation arising from law21; the
19
Civil Liability. Duhaime’s Law Dictionary
20
Article 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. – Every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable. (Revised Penal Code of the Philippines)
21
Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained
of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter. (Civil Code of the Philippines)

intentional torts22; culpa aquiliana23); or (b) where the injured party is granted
a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action.24
Either of these two may be enforced against the offender.25 However, this is
subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.26
22
Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
1. Freedom of religion;
2. Freedom of speech;
3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
5. Freedom of suffrage;
6. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
7. The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
8. The right to the equal protection of the laws;
9. The right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
11. The privacy of communication and correspondence;
12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;
13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress or
grievances;
14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
15. The right of the accused against excessive bail;
16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
17. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one’s self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession except
when the person confessing becomes a State witness;
18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
19. Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes
a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution
(if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes
a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. (Civil Code of the Philippines)
Article 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection
to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall
be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action. (Civil Code of the Philippines)
23
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (Civil Code of
the Philippines)
24
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Civil Code
of the Philippines)
25
L.G. Foods Corporation vs. Hon. Philadelfa B. Pagapong-Agraviador, G.R. No. 158995, September 26, 2006
26
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. vs. Lauro Tangco, G.R. No. 165732, December 14, 2006

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
The Revised Penal Code of the Philippines further provides that the
civil liability includes (1) restitution, (2) reparation of the damage caused, and
(3) indemnification for consequential damages.27
27
Lu Chu Sing vs. Lu Tiong Gui, G.R. No. L-122, May 11, 1946


II. CIVIL LIABILITY
An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives

rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused
damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really
the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done
intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay
forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of
the crime.28 It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal law that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable.29 The civil liability arising from the
crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings.30 To enforce the civil
liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be instituted with the criminal
action the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged unless the offended party waives the civil action, or reserves the right
to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.31 The civil liability arising from the crime may be determined
in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it
adjudged or does not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action against
the defendant. Furthermore, Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code
enumerates the matters covered by the civil liability arising from crimes, to
wit:
Article 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil

liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102, and 103 of this
Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.32
Restitution
Restitution has been defined in other criminal jurisdictions as payment
made by the perpetrator of the crime to the offended parties. 33 However, in
the Philippines, restitution is performed by returning the thing itself. The civil
liability of the offender to make restitution, under Art. 105 of the Revised
Penal Code, does not arise until his criminal liability is finally declared.34 The
purpose of the law is to place the offended party as much as possible in the
same condition as he was before the offense was committed against him. So
if the crime consist in the taking away of his property, the first remedy granted
28
Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, G.R. No. 181658, August 7, 2013
29
People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014
30
Lee Pue Liong vs. Chua Pue Chin Lee, supra
31
People of the Philippines vs. Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, supra
32
Proton Pilipinas Corporation vs. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 165027, October 12, 2006
33
Criminal.findlaw.com
34
Chua Hai vs. Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, G.R. No. L-11108, June 30, 1958

is that of restitution of the thing taken away. If restitution can not be made,
the law allows the offended party the next best thing, reparation.35 When the
crime is not against property, no restitution of the thing can be done. 36 In a
case, the Supreme Court, applying Article 105 37, obliged the appellant to
return the items he took from the spouses BBB and CCC. If appellant can no
longer return the articles taken, he is obliged to make reparation for their
value, taking into consideration their price and their special sentimental value
to the offended parties. Hence, the Court, modifying the decision of the trial
court, as affirmed by the CA, directed the appellant to return the pieces of
jewelry and valuables taken from the spouses BBB and CCC as enumerated
in the Information and proven during trial.38
Also, in the case of Visitacion A. Gacula vs. Pilar Martinez, the agent
as in this case was prosecuted for estafa, convicted, and sentenced to pay the
value of the jewelry or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
And yet, the Court held that the owner could recover said jewelry from the
pawnshop owner, citing in support of its holding the provisions of Article 120
of the old penal code, from which was copied article 105 of the Revised Penal
Code.39 This case has somehow similarities in a case decided before Visitacion
A. Gacula vs. Pilar Martinez where the court applied Article 120 of the old
penal code40. In the latter case, Arenas vs. Raymundo¸ several pieces of
jewelry were delivered by the owner to an agent to be sold on commission,
but the agent instead of selling the jewelry or accounting for their value,
pledged the same to a pawnshop.41 The Court in Arenas vs. Raymundo ruled
that the provisions contained in the first two paragraphs of Article 120 are
based on the uncontrovertible principle of justice that the party injured
through a crime has, as against all others, a preferential right to be
indemnified, or to have restored to him the thing of which he was unduly
deprived by criminal means.42 The same case provided a brief background of
Article 120 of the old penal code from which the present Article 105 was
derived in relation to possession of personal property.
35
The People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Espada, G.R. No. L-5684, January 22, 1954
36
De las Penas vs. Royal Bus Co., Inc., C.A., 56 O.G. 4052
37
Article 105. Restitution – How made. – The restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever
possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value as determined by the court.
The thing itself shall be restored, even though it be found in the possession of a third person who
has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action against the proper person, who may be liable
to him.
This provision is not applicable in cases in which the thing has been acquired by the third person
in the manner and under the requirements which, by law, bar an action for its recovery.
38
People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Evangelio y Gallo, G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011
39
Visitacion A. Gacula vs. Pilar Martinez, G.R. No. L-3038, January 31, 1951.
40
Article 120. The restitution of the thing itself must be made, if be in the possession of a third person, who
had acquired it in a legal manner, reserving, however, his action against the proper person.
Restitution shall be made, even though the thing may be in the possession of a third person, who
had acquired it in a legal manner, reserving, however, his action against the proper person.
This provision is not applicable to a case in which the third person has acquired the thing in the
manner and with the requisites established by law to make it unrecoverable.
41
Visitacion A. Gacula vs. Pilar Martinez, supra
42
Estanislaua Arenas, et al. vs. Fausto O. Raymundo, G.R. No. L-5741

In view of the harmonious relation between the different codes in

force in these Islands, it is natural and logical that the
aforementioned provision of the Penal Code, based on the rule
established in article 17 of the same, to wit, that every person
criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is also civilly liable,
should be in agreement and accordance with the provisions of
article 464 of the Civil Code which prescribes:
The possession of personal property, acquired in good faith, is

equivalent to a title thereto. However, the person who has lost
personal property or has been illegally deprived thereof may
recover it from whoever possesses it.
If the possessor of personal property, lost or stolen, has acquired

it in good faith at a public sale, the owner can not recover it
without reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Neither can the owner of things pledged in pawnshops,

established with the authorization of the Government, recover
them, whosoever may be the person who pledged them, without
previously refunding to the institution the amount of the pledge
and the interest due.
With regard to things acquired on exchange, or at fairs or markets

or from a merchant legally established and usually employed in
similar dealings, the provisions of the Code of Commerce shall
be observed.43
The doctrines laid down in both two cases are compatible with the
decisions of the court in the old cases of Varela vs. Matute and Varela vs.
Finnick. In the former, Nicolasa Pascual received for sale on commission
several jewels owned by Josefa Varela upon condition that she would turn
over to the latter the proceeds thereof when sold, or to return them to her if
they could not be disposed of. Nicolasa Pascual, however, instead of
complying with the agreement, and acting fraudulently and in bad faith,
pledged the said jewels at the pawnshop of Antonio Matute, according to the
pawn ticket issued by him stating that for a certain consideration, which the
said Pascual had received from the pawnbroker, she delivered in pledge the
aforesaid jewelry. The Court, in view of the evidence adduced, ordered to
make restitution of the stolen jewels to Josefa Varela, or otherwise to pay the
value thereof, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding
subsidiary imprisonment.44 In Varela vs. Finnick, it was found that not only
has the ownership and the origin of the jewels misappropriated been
unquestionably proven but also that the accused, acting fraudulently and in
bad faith, disposed of them and pledged them contrary to agreement, with no
right of ownership, and to the prejudice of the injured party, who was thereby
illegally deprived of said jewels; therefore, the owner has an absolute right to
recover the jewels from the possession of whosoever holds them. 45
43
Ibid.
44
Josefa Varela vs. Antonio Matute, G.R. No. L-3889, January 2, 1908
45
Josefa Varela vs. Josephine Finnick, G.R. No. L-3890, January 2, 1908

Varela vs. Finnick explained the relation of Article 17 of the old penal
code and a decision from the supreme court of Spain, to wit:46
Article 17 of the Penal Code provides that —
"Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is

also civilly liable."
In accordance with this provision the supreme court [of Spain] in

its decision of the 3d of January, 1877, has established the
following doctrine:
"In order that civil liability may be decreed in a prosecution it is

necessary that it arise from or be the consequence of criminal
liability; therefore, if the accused was acquitted of a crime, any
court sentencing him by reason of the same to pay certain
indemnity does so in violation of this article."
The doctrine enunciated in Varela vs. Finnick was also applied in a case
decided six years after it. The Court, speaking through Justice Johnson, said
“[T]he record does not show whether or not the ring was returned to its owner,
in accordance with the provisions of article 120 of the Penal Code. It is a
general principle that no man can be divested of his property without his own
consent or voluntary act. In the case of Varela vs. Finnick (9 Phil. Rep., 482)
this court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Torres: ‘Whoever may have been
deprived of his property in consequence of a crime, is entitled to the recovery
thereof, even if such property is in the possession of a third party who acquired
it by legal means other than those expressly stated in article 464 of the Civil
Code.’” Article 464 of the Civil Code can now be found under Articles 559 47
and 1505 48 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.49
46
Ibid.
47
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired
it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid
therefor.
48
Article 1505. Subject to the provisions of this Title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner
thereof, and who does not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires
no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded
from denying the seller's authority to sell.
Nothing in this Title, however, shall affect:
1. The provisions of any factors' act, recording laws, or any other provision of law enabling the
apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner thereof;
2. The validity of any contract of sale under statutory power of sale or under the order of a court of
competent jurisdiction;
3. Purchases made in a merchant's store, or in fairs, or markets, in accordance with the Code of
Commerce and special laws.
49
The United States vs. Vicente F. Sotelo, G.R. No. L-9791, October 3, 1914

Nevertheless, under the Civil Code, a person illegally deprived of any

movable may recover it from the person in possession of the same and the
only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, in which case, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the
price paid therefor.50 This was also reiterated in the previous case of Cruz vs.
Pahati where plaintiff has been illegally deprived of his car through the
ingenious scheme of defendant B to enable the latter to dispose of it as if he
were the owner thereof. The Court said “[I]t appears that "one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the
person in possession of the same" and the only defense the latter may have is
if he "has acquired it in good faith at a public sale" in which case "the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." And
supplementing this provision, Article 1505 of the same Code provides that
"where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does
not sell them under authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer
acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of
the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to
sell.”51
Hence, Article 559 establishes two exceptions to the general rule of

irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been
unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the
thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying any indemnity,
except when the possessor acquired it in a public sale.52 In a case, had the
defendant acquired the carabao in question in good faith at a public sale, he
would be entitled to reimbursement by the real owner upon recovery by the
latter; but he did not obtain the animal at a public sale, but by private purchase
from the other defendant. The registration of the purchase and transfer in the
books of a municipality does not confer a public character upon a sale agreed
to between two individuals only, without previous publication of notice for
general information in order that bidders may appear. He then should restore
the carabao to the real owner thereof.53
In People vs. Juan Alejano y De la Cruz, the appellant contends that

since the defendant has been acquitted, there was no reason for ordering the
return of the ring to its alleged owner, citing cases of the Supreme Court of
Spain, and that of Almeida Ghantangco and Lete vs. Abaroa (40 Phil., 1056).
However, the Court ruling in contrary of his contention said that it must not
be lost sight of that the defendant was not sentenced to pay any indemnity,
nor was anything adverse to him ordered. The defendant did not claim any
right to the ring, having ignored it entirely by denying that he had taken it and
pawned it in the pawnshop mentioned. The return of the ring to its owner,
Pedro Razal, did not injure the defendant or anybody else, except the
50
Jose B. Aznar vs. Rafael Yapdiangco, G.R. No. L-18536, March 31, 1965
51
Jose R. Cruz vs. Reynaldo Pahati et al., G.R. No. L-8257, April 13, 1956
52
Jose B. Aznar vs. Rafael Yapdiangco, supra
53
The United States vs. Garino Soriano, G.R. No. 4563, January 19, 1909

appellant, who, however, until shown to be one of the "pawnshops established

under authority of the Government" mentioned in the third paragraph of article
464, Civil Code, has no right to reimbursement of the amount for which the
ring in question was pledged.54
Reparation
If the crime consists in the taking away of his property, the first remedy
granted is that of restitution of the thing taken away. If restitution can not be
made, the law allows the offended party the next best thing, reparation.55 In
People vs. Mostasesa¸ the Court cited Spanish jurist Viada who, commenting
on the provision of the Revised Penal Code on reparation, said:56
En las causas por robo, hurto, etc. en que no hayan sido recuperados
durante el proceso los objetos de dichos delitos, debe condenarse a
los reos a su restitucion, o, en su defecto, a la indemnizacion
correspondiente en el cantidad en que hayan sido valorados o
tasados por los peritos; . . . . (3 Viada 6)
Under international law, reparation is a principle of law which refers

to the obligation of the offender to redress the damasge caused to the offended
party. Moreover, "reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in
all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed."57
Reparation may not be made by the delivery of a similar thing (same

amount, kind or species and quality), because the value of the thing taken may
have decreased since the offended party was deprived thereof. Reparation,
therefore, should consist of the price of the thing taken, as fixed by the court
(article 106, Revised Penal Code).58
Article 106. Reparation – How made. – The court shall determine

the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the
thing, whenever possible, and its special sentimental value to the
injured party, and reparation shall be made accordingly.
In a case, the Court had the occasion to apply Article 106. Thus, the
value of the stolen ring is another question raised by the appellant, who
contends that it was worth only P200. To the price of P1,200 at which the
appellant claimed to have sold the ring, the Court of Appeals added P800 to
cover its sentimental value to the owner, considering that it was a souvenir
from her mother, thus raising the value to P2,000. Article 106 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that "the court shall determine the amount of damage,
taking into consideration the price of the thing, whenever possible, and its
54
People vs. Juan Alejano y De la Cruz, G.R. No. 33667, October 4, 1930
55
The People of the Philippines vs. Pelagio Mostasesa, G.R. No. L-5684, January 22, 1954
56
Ibid.
57
Redress. What is reparation?. Retrieved from http://www.redress.org
58
The People of the Philippines vs. Pelagio Mostasesa, supra

special sentimental value to the injured party, and reparation shall be made
accordingly." Appellant’s contention that the ring should be appraised at only
P200 is manifestly untenable, he himself having paid P800 for it and having
sold it later for P1,200. In any event, the question raised is one of fact as to
which the finding of the Court of Appeals is final.59 However, if there is no
evidence as to the value of the thing unrecovered, reparation cannot be made
(People vs. Dalena, C.A., G.R. Nos. 11387-R and 11388-R, October 25,
1954).60
In the computation of civil liability, the Court in U.S. vs. Yambao, added
the indemnification of 3 reales and 12 cuartos, the value of the mutilated
garment, which the judge imposed on the defendant, as reparation merely for
the damage caused by this offense against her property, but for the offense
against chastity he should respond for a damage of a different and a higher
entity, and this reparation should always be a civil reparation corresponding
to the character of the crime which injures both honor and chastity. 61
Indemnification
Likewise, reparation and indemnification are similarly defined as the
compensation for an injury, wrong, loss, or damage sustained.62 Thus,
according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual
and compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and
that suffered by her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the commission of
the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the
victim and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending
this case.63 Moreover, in People vs. Sarcia, the Court reiterated that it
explained in People v. Gementiza64 that the indemnity authorized by our
criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended party, in the amount
authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.65
Article 107 66 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the

indemnification for damages includes not only those caused the injured party
but also those suffered by his family or by a third person. This finds
application in the case of Alfredo Copacio, et al. vs. Luzon Brokerage Co.,
Inc., wherein the Court sustained the lower court in the following manner:
59
Jose Cristobal vs. The People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-1542, August 30, 1949
60
61
The United States vs. Jose Yambao, G.R. No. 1662, February 13, 1905
62
People of the Philippines vs. Jose Pepito D. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010
63
People of the Philippines vs. Richard O. Sarcia, G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009
64
People of the Philippines vs. Sabino Gementiza, G.R. No. 123151, January 29, 1998
65
People of the Philippines vs. Richard O. Sarcia, supra
66
Article 107. Indemnification; What is included. - Indemnification for consequential damages shall include
not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason
of the crime.

The appealed judgment sentenced the defendant-appellant to pay

P500 for the death of each of the victims, or a total of P2,000, plus
legal interest. In its second assignment of error the defendant
contends that, at the most, it should have been sentenced to pay the
total sum of P1,500, at the rate of P500 for each family of the
deceased. The argument is based upon the language of the
judgment rendered in the criminal case wherein the court sentenced
the accused to pay, by way of indemnity, P500 to each family of
victims. It is true that there are only three families, because the
deceased Delfin Copiaco and Fidel Copiaco are both children of
the spouses Alfredo Copiaco and Nieves Alarcon. However, we do
not believe that the court committed the error assigned. Article 107
of the Revised Penal Code provides that the indemnization for
damages includes not only those caused the injured party but also
those suffered by his family or by a third person. In the present case
it is undoubted that the family or the heirs of the deceased Delfin
Copiaco and Fidel Copiaco have suffered double damage by reason
of the death of their two children, with the consequence that it is
just to indemnity them in the same measure for the death of each
of the two members of the family.67
Contributory negligence on the part of the offended party nevertheless

reduces the civil liability of the offender. Thus, in a case where Sonny Soriano,
the victim, while crossing Commonwealth Avenue near Luzon Avenue in
Quezon City, was hit by a speeding Tamaraw FX driven by Lomer Macasasa.
Soriano was thrown five meters away, the Court agreed that the Court of
Appeals did not err in ruling that Soriano was guilty of contributory
negligence for not using the pedestrian overpass while crossing
Commonwealth Avenue. The Court even noted that the respondents admit this
point, and concede that the appellate court had properly reduced by 20% the
amount of damages it awarded. The reduction of the amount earlier awarded
was based on Article 2179 of the Civil Code.68
Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the

immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's
lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In Lambert vs. Heirs of Castillon, the Court said that the underlying
precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible
for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must
bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The
determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on
the circumstances of each case. Conclusively, when in a vehicle accident, it
was established that the victim, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the
motorcycle at a high speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has
67
Alfredo Copacio, et al. vs. Luzon Brokerage Co., G.R. No. 46135, September 19, 1938
68
Flordeliza Mendoza vs. Mutya Soriano, G.R. No. 164012, June 8, 2007

imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not wearing a protective
helmet, these circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of
his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The
contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms
of percentages of the total cause. Hence, the heirs of Ray Castillon shall
recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the
damage shall be borne by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be
paid by the petitioner.69
Civil indemnity may also be increased. In a case, the Court ordered the
appellant to indemnify the heirs of the victim since death resulted from the
crime. The heirs of the victim are entitled to an award of civil indemnity in
the amount of ₱75,000.00, which is mandatory and is granted without need of
evidence other than the commission of the crime. Hence, the Court increased
the award for civil indemnity made by the trial court and affirmed by the CA
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. Also, while the CA correctly ordered
appellant to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary damages, the amount
awarded must be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00 in line with current
jurisprudence.70 However, the civil indemnity may be increased only if it will
not require an aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it is
based. In other words, the accused may not, on appeal by the adverse party,
be convicted of a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to
justify the increase in the civil indemnity.71
Exemption from Criminal Liability and Its Effects on Civil Liability

Every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. However, it does
not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability. Exemption from criminal liability does not always include
exemption from civil liability.72 An exempting circumstance, by its nature,
admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed from
criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a crime, but he
cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption granted by
law.73 The rules regarding civil liability in certain cases are governed by
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The

exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2,
3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil

liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by
a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under
69
Nelen Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, February 23, 2005
70
People of the Philippines vs. Joemari Jalbonian, G.R. No. 180281, July 1, 2013
71
Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Hon. Romeo N. Firme, G.R. No. L-54904, January 29, 1988
72
The People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Judge Catalino Castaneda Jr., G.R. No. L-49781-91, June 24, 1983
73
Robert Sierra y Caneda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009

fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall

devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority
or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence
on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor

under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person
be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with
their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the

persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be
civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate

amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even

approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damages have been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be
made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12,

the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily
liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing
the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their
property exempt from execution.
In a case, Anita Tan is the owner of a house of strong materials. The

Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the delivery to the Rural Transit
Company at its garage of 1,925 gallons of gasoline using a gasoline tank-truck
trailer. The truck was driven by Julito Sto. Domingo, who was helped by
Igmidio Rico. While the gasoline was being discharged to the underground
tank, it caught fire, whereupon Julito Sto. Domingo drove the truck across the
Rizal Avenue Extension and upon reaching the middle of the street, he
abandoned the truck which continued moving to the opposite side of the street
causing the buildings on that side to be burned and destroyed. The house of
Anita Tan was among those destroyed and for its repair she spent P12,000. As
an aftermath of the fire, Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico were charged
with arson through reckless imprudence. The case of the Rural Transit Co.
here is predicated on a special provision of the Revised Penal Code
particularly Article 101, Rule 2. The Court explained its decision in the
following manner: “[C]onsidering the above quoted law and facts, the cause
of action against the Rural Transit Company can hardly be disputed, it
appearing that the damage caused to the plaintiff was brought about mainly
because of the desire of driver Julito Sto. Domingo to avoid greater evil or
harm, which would have been the case had he not brought the tank-truck
trailer to the middle of the street, for then the fire would have caused the

explosion of the gasoline deposit of the company which would have resulted
in a conflagration of much greater proportion and consequences to the houses
nearby or surrounding it. It cannot be denied that this company is one of those
for whose benefit a greater harm has been prevented, and as such it comes
within the purview of said penal provision.”74
Civil Liability in case of Imbecility and Insanity
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code75 exempts from criminal liability

an imbecile or an insane person unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval. Imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane
person is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder (1
Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.).76 The Court adopted the criterion for
insanity and imbecility in the case of People vs. Formigonez. In order that a
person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code so as to be exempt from criminal liability, according
to the Court, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime. The provisions of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on paragraph
1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and applying said provisions are
pertinent and applicable. The Court cited Judge Guillermo Guevara on his
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, to wit:77
"The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting
circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there
be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that
is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no
responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment; 46 that there be a complete absence of the power to
74
Anita Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., G.R. No. L-4160, July 29, 1952
75
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are exempt from criminal
liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age.
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which
case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this
Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the
provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family
who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care
of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause.
76
The People of the Philippines vs. Honorato Ambal, G.R. No. L-52688, October 17, 1980
77
The People of the Philippines vs. Abelardo Formigonez, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950

discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will.

For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time
of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of
intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his
mental faculties does not exclude imputability.
"The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness

cannot be equalled to imbecility or insanity.
"The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.

Without positive evidence that the defendant had previously lost
his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a
normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be
voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted
unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis
of his mental. condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are
proved."
As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement,

assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a
morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his
wife. From the case of United States v. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we
quote the following syllabus:
"Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further

than to indicate that the accused was moved by a wayward or
hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the
effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted
absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense
of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement
appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced
by remorse."
When insanity of the defendant is alleged as a ground of defense or

reason for his exemption from responsibility, the evidence on this point must
refer to the time preceding to act under prosecution or at the very moment of
its execution. In such case, it is incumbent upon defendant’s counsel to prove
that his client was not in his right mind or that he acted under the influence of
a sudden attack of insanity or that he was generally regarded as insane when
he executed the act attributed to him. In order to ascertain a person’s mental
condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of his
mental condition during a reasonable period before and after. Direct testimony
is not required nor are specific acts of disagreement essential to establish
insanity as a defense. A person’s mind can only be plumbed or fathomed by
external acts. Thereby his thoughts, motives and emotions may be evaluated
to determine whether his external acts conform to those of people of sound
mind. To prove insanity, clear and convincing circumstantial evidence would
suffice. In a case, the Court was convinced that the testimonial and
documentary evidence marshalled in the case by acknowledged medical
experts have sufficiently established the fact that appellant was legally insane

at the time he committed the crimes. His previous confinements, as early as

1972, his erratic behaviour before the assaults and the doctor’s testimony that
he was having a relapse all point to a man deprived of complete freedom of
will or a lack of reason and discernment that should thus exempt him from
criminal liability. However, he was still made civilly liable under Article 101
of the Revised Penal Code.78
Civil Liability in case of Minority
Another exemption was also explained in a case pursuant to the

applicable provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 otherwise known as the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. In this case, 19 year old AAA, a
household help of the spouses Constantino and Elvira Cueva, while on her
way to her parents' house, met appellants Vergel and Allain who wanted to go
with her but she refused. They suddenly held her hands but she was able to
get free from their hold. She then decided to return to her employers' house
but when she thought about her parents' need for the money, she just stayed
and waited at the side of the road hoping that the appellants would go away.
Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her
parents' house but appellants reappeared and held her hands again. She
shouted for help and struggled to be freed from their hold but appellant Allain
covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in
the stomach which caused her to lose consciousness. When AAA regained her
consciousness, she noticed that she was only wearing her t-shirt as her bra,
panty and maong pants were on her side. She felt pain all over her body. Her
vagina hurt and it was covered with blood. She went back to her employers'
house and told them that she was raped by appellants. Dr. Mary Ann Jabat of
the Severo Verallo Memorial District Hospital conducted an examination on
AAA finding in the perineum and hymen, her labia majora had erythema and
slight edema; and the vaginal swab indicated the presence of spermatozoa.
She said that the lacerations in the perineum and the hymen were due to the
insertion of a foreign object or the male organ and that the presence of
spermatozoa signifies recent sexual intercourse.79
The Court held that RA No. 9344 should be considered in determining

the imposable penalty on the appellant even if the crime was committed seven
years earlier. Appellant Allain was only 17 years old when he committed the
crime. Hence, the following provisions of R.A. No. 9344 were given due
consideration:80
[Sec. 68 of Republic Act No. 9344] allows the retroactive

application of the Act to those who have been convicted and are
serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission
78
The People of the Philippines vs. Roger Austria y Navarro, G.R. No. 111517-19, July 31, 1996
79
People of the Philippines vs. Vergel Ancajas, G.R. No. 199270, October 21, 2015
80
Ibid.

of the offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case
wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review.
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child

fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the
child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) yours but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with
discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not

include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
Thus, a determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of

R.A. No. 9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not on the
civil liability. In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset
that the ages of both the petitioner and the complaining victim are material
and are at issue. The age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his
entitlement to exemption from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while
the age of the latter is material in characterizing the crime committed and in
considering the resulting civil liability that R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.81
The intent of the State to promote and protect the rights of child in
conflict with the law is enshrined in R.A. No. 9344.82 The current law also
drew its changes from the principle of restorative justice83 that it espouses; it
considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative years and gives minors of these
ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion and intervention
measures. This is the reason why this law modifies the minimum age limit of
criminal irresponsibility as well for minor offenders; it changed what
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, previously provided i.e., from under nine years of age and above
81
Robert Sierra y Caneda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009, supra
82
Section 2(d) of R.A. No. 9344 provides “[P]ursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the State recognizes the right of every child alleged as, accused of, adjudged, or
recognized as having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of
the child's sense of dignity and worth, taking into account the child's age and desirability of promoting
his/her reintegration. Whenever appropriate and desirable, the State shall adopt measures for dealing with
such children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards
are fully respected. It shall ensure that children are dealt with in a manner appropriate to their well-being
by providing for, among others, a variety of disposition measures such as care, guidance and supervision
orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and vocational training programs and other
alternatives to institutional care”
83
Section 4(q) of R.A. No. 9344 provides “"[R]estorative Justice" refers to a principle which requires a
process of resolving conflicts with the maximum involvement of the victim, the offender and the
community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation of the offender, the offended and
the community; and reassurance to the offender that he/she can be reintegrated into society. It also
enhances public safety by activating the offender, the victim and the community in prevention strategies.”

nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) to fifteen
years old or under and above fifteen but below 18 (who acted without
discernment) in determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing
exemption, the new law as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC
did presume that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence to
distinguish right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed involuntary ones
for which they cannot be held accountable.84
It is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the

exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPS; the complete
absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the
second element of dolus, Albert has stated that “[T]he second element of dolus
is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and
because … the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from
criminal liability.” It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of
age and below are not capable of performing criminal act.85 For one who acts
by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a
crime, by complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will
or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises.86
In Sierra v. People, the Court explained minority as an exempting

circumstance. To wit:
R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took
effect on May 20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the
rights of a child in conflict with the law or a child at risk by
providing a system that would ensure that children are dealt with
in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety of
disposition measures such a scare, guidance and supervision
orders, counseling, probation, foster care, education and
vocational training programs and other alternatives to
institutional care. More importantly in the context of this case, this
law modifies as well the minimum age limit of criminal
irresponsibility for minor offenders; it changed what paragraphs 2
and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended,
previously provided i.e., from under nine years of age and above
nine years of age and under fifteen (who acted without
discernment) to fifteen years old or under and above fifteen years
but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in determining
exemption from criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new
law as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did
presume that the minor offenders completely lack the intelligence
to distinguish right from wrong, so that their acts are deemed
involuntary ones for which they cannot be held accountable. The
current law also drew its changes from the principle of restorative
84
Robert Sierra y Caneda vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009, supra
85
John Philip Guevarra v. Honorable Ignacio Almodovar, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989
86
Joemar Ortega v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 151085, August 20 2008

justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as

formative years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right
their wrong through diversion and intervention measures.87
The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the
accused shall continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal
liability. The extent of civil liability depends on the crime that could have been
committed had the accused not been found to be exempt from criminal
liability.88 However, this must also yield to the question of whether or not the
accused has acted with or without discernment in order to determine criminal
liability and the appropriate civil liability. In modifying the criminal liability
of an accused, the Court had the occasion to apply such law in the case of
People of the Philippines v. Gambao89 where pursuant to the passing of R.A.
No. 9344, a determination of whether she [the accused] acted with or without
discernment is necessary. Discernment has been defined as the mental
capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act
and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case.90 In this case, Perpenian, the accused, acted with discernment when she
was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Her minority
should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged
mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code91.
Subsidiary Liability
In Calang vs. People of the Philippines, the prosecution charged Calang
with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence before the RTC. The RTC found Calang
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The RTC
ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay P50,000.00 as
death indemnity to the heirs of Armando, the victim; P50,000.00 as death
indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag, another victim; and P90,083.93 as actual
damages to the private complainants. The petitioners claim that there was no
basis to hold Philtranco, employer, jointly and severally liable with Calang
because the former was not a party in the criminal case (for multiple homicide
with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence) before the RTC. The Court, holding that the RTC and CA both
87
Robert Sierra y Caneda v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182941, July 3, 2009
88
Robert Sierra y Caneda v. People of the Philippines, supra
89
People of the Philippines v. Halil Gamboa y Esmail, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013
90
Raymund Madali and Rodel Madali v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180380, August 4, 2009
91
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides: “Penalty imposed upon a person under eighteen years of
age – When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions
of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by
reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty
shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the
crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.”

erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang,

emphasized that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC and,
undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of
action against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in
holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-
delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-
delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does not apply
to civil liability arising from delict. If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be
subsidiary. Article 10292 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil
liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments.
Moreover, the said subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to
Article 10393 of the Revised Penal Code.94 The employer becomes ipso facto
subsidiary liable upon his employee's conviction (e.g., his driver) and upon
proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not
only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary
liability for such criminal negligence.95
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are

subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their employees in the
event of the latter’s insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
subsidiary liability are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to
which they are applicable. In the absence of any collusion between the
accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of conviction should
bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. The decision convicting an
employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount. The liability of an employer cannot be separated from that of the
employee. However, before the employer’s subsidiary liability is exacted,
however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that:96
92
Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. — In
default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within
their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests
shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such
goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his
representative may have given them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability
shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the
innkeeper's employees.
93
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of
industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the
discharge of their duties.
94
Rolito Calang vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190696, August 3, 2010
95
Maria Luisa Martinez vs. Manuel H. Barredo, et al., G.R. No. L-49308, May 13, 1948
96
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 147703, April 14, 2004

(1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees;

(2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry;
(3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of
their duties; and
(4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency. (e.g., The employer becomes ipso facto subsidiary
liable upon conviction of his employee and upon proof of the
latter's insolvency; that the only proof of the employee's insolvency
in the case was a certificate, of the Director of Prisons, regarding
service of subsidiary imprisonment by the accused involved
therein; that a similar certificate, issued by the Provincial Sheriff
appears in the record hereof; that defendant has impliedly
admitted the insolvency of its driver97)
Pursuant to the warning98 enunciated by the Court in Martinez vs.

Barredo, the Court reiterated that it is true that an employer, strictly speaking,
is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee but in
substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon
him by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his
interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the
defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his
failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee
is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard
to complain, if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability,
that he was not given his day in court.99
Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the

employer under the Revised Penal Code and the employer's primary liability
under the Civil Code which is quasi-delictual or tortious in character. The first
type of liability is governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal
Code while the second kind is governed by the following provisions of the
Civil Code:100
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
97
Hilario S. Nagrampa vs. Mulvaney Macmillan & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-8326, October 24, 1955
98
“It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and
deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a
result of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and
consequently doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be done, the American
rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied.”
99
Jose Miranda vs. Malate Garage & Taxicab Inc., G.R. No. L-8943, July 31, 1956
100
Spouses Federico Franco and Felicisima R. Franco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 71137,
October 5, 1989

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the defendant.
Art. 2180. The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable

not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry,
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Both the Revised Penal Code and the Civil Code of the Philippines are
applicable in determining subsidiary liabilities. In Salen & Salbanera vs.
Balce, the Court applied the provisions of both Code as to the subsidiary
liability of a father. Hence, in holding that the civil liability of the son of
appellee arises from his criminal liability and, therefore, the subsidiary
liability of appellee must be determined under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, and not under Article 2180 of the new Civil Code which only
applies to obligations which arise from quasi-delicts. The Court while
agreeing with the theory that, as a rule, the civil liability arising from a crime
shall be governed by the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, it disagreed
with the contention that the subsidiary liability of persons for acts of those
who are under their custody should likewise be governed by the same Code
even in the absence of any provision governing the case, for that would leave
the transgression of certain right without any punishment or sanction in the
law. Such would be the case if we would uphold the theory of appellee as
sustained by the trial court. In justifying the ruling, the Court stated:101
It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father
is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the
latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, over 9 but
under 15 years of age, who act without discernment, unless it
appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is
because a son who commits the act under any of those conditions
is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions
1, 2 and 3, Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act
entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person
who has the deliquent minor under his legal authority or control.
But a minor over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from
criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the
subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that
101
Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, G.R. No. L-14414, April 27, 1960

case, resort should be had to the general law which is our Civil
Code.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the
pertinent portion of which provides: "The father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused
by the minor children who lived in their company." To hold that
this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only
covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result in the
absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes
the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is
caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that apparently exists
in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision
of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions
of this Court which cover equal or identical cases.
The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by
the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company,
educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives
them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieved themselves of
this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish
Civil Code.)102
The Court also had the opportunity to correlate Article 102 and 103 of
the Revised Penal Code to pertinent provisions of Workmen’s Compensation
Law in the case of Heirs of Generoso vs. Universal Textile Mills, Inc. where
it stated that Sections 5103 and 6104 of the Workmen's Compensation Law and
articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code are statutes in pari materia
and they should be construed together. This case resolved the question of
102
Sabina Exconde vs. Delfin Capuno, G.R. No. L-10134, June 29, 1957
103
SEC. 5. Exclusive right to compensation. - The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee
by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies
accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer
under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)
104
SEC. 6. Liability of third parties. - In case an employee suffers an injury for which compensation is due
under this Act by any other person besides his employer, it shall be optional with such injured employee
either to claim compensation from his employer, under this Act, or sue such other person for damages, in
accordance with law; and in case compensation is claimed and allowed in accordance with this Act, the
employer who paid such compensation or was found liable to pay the same, shall succeed the injured
employee to the right of recovering from such person what he paid:
Provided, That in case the employer recovers from such third person damages in excess of those
paid or allowed under this Act, such excess shag be delivered to the injured employee or any other person
entitled thereto, after deduction of the expenses of the employer and the costs of the proceedings.
The sum paid by the employer for compensation or the amount of compensation to which the
employee or his dependents are entitled under the provisions of this Act, shall not be admissible as evidence
in any damage suit or action.

whether the employer's payment of workmen's compensation to Generoso's

heirs bars them from claiming from the employer the civil indemnity due to
the same heirs under the Revised Penal Code since Generoso's killer failed to
pay it. The Court held that in view of the textile corporation's payment of
workmen's compensation, its obligation to pay, in a subsidiary capacity (or in
default of the killer), the civil indemnity adjudged against him in the criminal
case, was extinguished. The instant case is an exception to the rule in article
103 of the Revised Penal Code.105
Share of Persons Civilly Liable

Article 109 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “[I]f there are two
or more persons civilly liable for a felony, the courts shall determine the
amount for which each must respond.” Notwithstanding the determination of
the respective liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories within
their respective class, they shall also be subsidiarily liable for the amount of
civil liability adjudged in the other classes. Article 110106 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that [t]he principals, accomplices, and accessories, each within
their respective class, shall be liable severally (in solidum) among themselves
for their quotas, and subsidiarily for those of the other persons liable. As
courts are given a free hand in determining the apportionment of civil liability,
previous decisions dealing with this matter have been grossly inconsistent.107
In People vs. Tamayo, the Court ordered the accused-appellant to pay

jointly and severally with the other accused the civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000 for each count.108 In People vs. Saul, the Court ordered as well the
appellants to pay jointly and severally Rodrigo Serojo the amount of
P34,448.40 as actual damages.109 The same with People vs. Galapin where
both accused parties are likewise ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Pillora the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latter’s death,
and to the widow, Lydia Pillora, the sum of P25,000.00 as moral damages.110
Likewise, in People vs. Continente, both appellants Itaas and Continente were
ordered to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000.00 to the heirs of
the victim, Col. James Rowe, by way of civil indemnity.111 In People vs. Sotto,
all the accused were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to solidarily indemnify the heirs of Maximo Monilar, Jr. in the amount of
105
Heirs of Marcelo Generoso vs. Universal Textile Mills, Inc., G.R. No. L-28586, January 22, 1980
106
Art. 110. Several and subsidiary liability of principals, accomplices and accessories of a felony;
Preference in payment. — Notwithstanding the provisions of the next preceding article, the principals,
accomplices, and accessories, each within their respective class, shall be liable severally (In solidum) among
themselves for their quotas, and subsidiaries for those of the other persons liable.
The subsidiary liability shall be enforced, first against the property of the principals; next, against
that of the accomplices, and, lastly, against that of the accessories.
Whenever the liability in solidum or the subsidiary liability has been enforced, the person by whom
payment has been made shall have a right of action against the others for the amount of their respective
shares.
107
People of the Philippines vs. Bartolome Tampus, G.R. No. 181084, June 16, 2009
108
People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Tamayo, G.R. No. 138608, September 24, 2002
109
People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Saul, G.R. No. 124809, December19, 2001
110
People of the Philippines vs. Elezer Galapin, G.R. No. 124215, July 31, 1998
111
People of the Philippines vs. Donato B. Continente, G.R. Nos. 100801-02, August 25, 2000

P50,000.00, in addition to paying Nida Sultones P700.00 representing the

value of the unrecovered cash forcibly taken from her.112 Luis Toring,
principal, and Diosdado Berdon, accomplice, were also ordered to jointly and
severally pay the heirs of Samuel Augusto an indemnity of P30,000.00 in
People vs Toring.113
In the cases mentioned above, the principal and accomplice were made
to pay equal shares of the civil indemnity. This makes the accomplice who
had less participation in the commission of the crime equally liable with the
principal for the civil indemnity. The degree of their participation in the crime
was not taken into account in the apportionment of the amount of the civil
indemnity. This is contrary to the principle behind the treble division of
persons criminally responsible for felonies, i.e., that the liability must be
commensurate with the degree of participation of the accused in the crime
committed. In such a situation, the accomplice who just cooperated in the
execution of the offense but whose participation is not indispensable to the
commission of the crime is made to pay the same amount of civil indemnity
as the principal by direct participation who took a direct part in the execution
of the criminal act. It is an injustice when the penalty and liability imposed
are not commensurate to the actual responsibility of the offender; for criminal
responsibility is individual and not collective, and each of the participants
should be liable only for the acts actually committed by him. The proportion
of this individual liability must be graduated not only according to the nature
of the crime committed and the circumstances attending it, but also the degree
and nature of participation of the individual offender.114
In Garces vs. People, a change in the apportionment was ordered by the

Court, where Rosendo Pacursa and Petitioner Ernesto Garces were ordered to
pay complainant P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto. Being an
accomplice, petitioner is held solidarily liable with the principal only for half
of the amount or P25,000.00 and their subsidiary liability shall be enforced in
accordance with Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is likewise
ordered to pay complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages. 115 In People vs.
Ragundiaz, accused, accomplice, was held solidarily liable with co-accused
Isabelo Ragundiaz for one-half of the amounts of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity, P11,500.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages
or a total amount of P55,750.00 and he is held subsidiarily liable for the other
half, in case of the latter’s insolvency.116
In these cases, the accomplice was made jointly and severally liable
with the principal for only half of the amount of the civil indemnity and moral
damages, only for purposes of the enforcement of the payment of civil
indemnity to the offended party. When the liability in solidum has been
112
People of the Philippines vs. Agustin Sotto, G.R. No. 106099, July 8, 1997
113
People of the Philippines vs. Luis B. Toring, G.R. No. L-56358, October 26, 1990
114
People of the Philippines vs. Bartolome Tampus, supra
115
Ernesto Garces vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173858, July 17, 2007
116
People of the Philippines vs. Isabelo Ragnudiaz, G.R. No. 124977, June 22, 2000

enforced, as when payment has been made, the person by whom payment has
been made shall have a right of action against the other persons liable for the
amount of their respective shares. As against each other, whoever made the
payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share that corresponds to
each, with interest for the payment already made. In these cases, therefore,
payment is made by either the principal or the accomplice, the one who made
the payment to the victim could demand payment of the part of the debt
corresponding to his co-debtor. If for example the principal paid the victim
the entire amount of the civil indemnity, he could go against the accomplice
for one-fourth (1/4) of the total amount of civil indemnity and damages. The
principal was primarily liable for only one-half (1/2) of the total amount of
civil indemnity and he was solidarily liable with the accomplice for the other
half. Since the principal paid for the half which the accomplice is solidarily
liable with, he could claim one-half (1/2) of that amount from the accomplice.
Thus, the principal would have become ultimately liable for three-fourths
(3/4) of the total amount of the civil indemnity and damages, while the
accomplice would have become liable for one-fourth (1/4) of such amount.117
In People vs Nulla, the court particularly determined the amount for

which each shall respond. This is consistent with Article 109 and Article 110
of the Revised Penal Code, which require that the courts should determine the
amount for which the principals, accomplices and accessories must respond
to and upon specifying this amount, the principals are solidarily liable within
their class for their quota, the accomplices are solidarily liable among
themselves for their quota and the accessories are solidarily liable for their
quota. If any one of the classes is unable to pay for its respective quota, it
becomes subsidiarily liable for the quota of the other classes, which shall be
enforced first against the property of the principals; next, against that of the
accomplices; and lastly, against that of the accessories (the principal was
ordered to pay P20,000.00, the accomplice was ordered to pay P10,000.00,
and the accessory was ordered to pay P2,000.00). However, the Court stressed
the following: 118
We must stress, however, that the courts discretion should not be

untrammelled and must be guided by the principle behind differing
liabilities for persons with varying roles in the commission of the
crime. The person with greater participation in the commission of
the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those
who played a minor role in the crime or those who had no
participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each
principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of
indemnity and damages than every accomplice, and each
accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against
every accessory. Care should also be taken in considering the
number of principals versus that of accomplices and accessories. If
for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and
the total of the civil indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court
117
People of the Philippines vs. Bartolome Tampus, supra
118
Ibid.

cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and damages to the

principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the
principals, as a class, have a greater share in the liability as against
the accomplice-- since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is P2,000.00,
while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00-- when the civil
liability of every person is computed, the share of the accomplice
ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because
the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principalsor P4,000.00is still
divided among all the four principals, and thus every principal is
liable for only P1,000.00.


III. DAMAGES
This Court endeavored to end, once and for all, the confusion as to the
proper award of damages in criminal cases where the imposable penalty for
the crime is reclusion perpetua or death in People vs. Combate. As a rule, the
Court awards three kinds of damages in these types of criminal cases: civil
indemnity and moral and exemplary damages.119
First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our

criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing
judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems
from Art. 100 of the RPC which states, Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.120
The other kinds of damages, i.e., moral and exemplary or corrective

damages, have altogether different jural foundations.121
The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages,
which are also compensatory in nature. Similarly, in American jurisprudence,
moral damages are treated as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain
and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong. They may also be
considered and allowed for resulting pain and suffering, and for humiliation,
indignity, and vexation suffered by the plaintiff as result of his or her
assailants conduct, as well as the factors of provocation, the reasonableness
of the force used, the attendant humiliating circumstances, the sex of the
victim, [and] mental distress.122
Third, exemplary damages are only imposed in criminal offenses when

the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, be they
generic or qualifying.123
119
People of the Philippines vs. Jose Pepito D. Combate, G.R. No. 189301, December 15, 2010
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.

Indemnity for Lost Earnings

The formula for the lost income capacity must be computed in the
following manner:124
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income -

reasonable and necessary living expenses).
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula:
2 / 3 x [80 age of deceased at the time of death]
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, shall
be computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of Combined
Experience Table of Mortality.125
In the computation of the second factor, it is computed by multiplying

the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings
less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less
living and other incidental expenses. The loss is not equivalent to the entire
earnings of the deceased, but only such portion that he would have used to
support his dependents or heirs.126 Only net earnings, not gross earnings, are
to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary in
the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental
expenses. When there is no showing that the living expenses constituted a
smaller percentage of the gross income, we fix the living expenses at half of
the gross income. To hold that one would have used only a small part of the
income, with the larger part going to the support of one’s children, would be
conjectural and unreasonable.127 Hence, we deduct from his gross earnings the
necessary expenses supposed to be used by the deceased for his own
needs. The Court explained in Villa Rey:128
[(The award of damages for loss of earning capacity is)] concerned

with the determination of losses or damages sustained by the
private respondents, as dependents and intestate heirs of the
deceased, and that said damages consist, not of the full amount of
his earnings, but of the support they received or would have
received from him had he not died in consequence of negligence of
petitioners agent. In fixing the amount of that support, we must
reckon with the necessary expenses of his own living, which should
be deducted from his earnings. Thus, it has been consistently held
that earning capacity, as an element of damages to ones estate for
his death by wrongful act is necessarily his net earning capacity or
his capacity to acquire money, less necessary expense for his own
living. Stated otherwise, the amount recoverable is not the loss of
124
Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Florentina J. Sugata-on, G.R. No. 163212, March 13, 2007
125
Lambert v. Heirs of Ray Castillon, G.R. No. 160709, 23 February 2005
126
Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Florentina J. Sugata-on, supra
127
Endreo Magbanua vs. Jose Tabusares, Jr., G.R. No. 152134, June 4, 2004
128
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-25499, February 18, 1970

entire earning, but rather the loss of that portion of the earnings
which the beneficiary would have received. In other words, only
net earnings, and not gross earnings are to be considered that is, the
total of the earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such
earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses.
In computing the third factor, the necessary living expense, a survey

of more recent jurisprudence shows that this Court consistently pegged the
amount at 50% of the gross annual income. The Court held in Smith
Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency Corp. v. Borja, that when there is no showing
that the living expenses constituted the smaller percentage of the gross
income, we fix the living expenses at half of the gross income.129
Applying the aforestated jurisprudential guidelines in the computation

of the amount of award for damages set out in Villa Rey, let us see the
following example:
Life expectancy = 2 / 3 x [80 minus age of deceased at the time of

death]
2 /3 x [80 minus 30]
2 / 3 x [50]
Life expectancy = 33
With 33 more years of life expectancy and a monthly income

of P10,000.00, as evidenced by pay slips duly presented before the
court.
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income -

reasonable and necessary living expenses).
= 33 x (P120,000.00 minus P63,800.00)
= 33 x (P56,200.00)
Net Earning Capacity = P1,854,600.00
In case there is no proof of living expenses, the following computation

may be given consideration.
The amount of damages recoverable for the loss of earning capacity

of the deceased is based on two factors: 1) the number of years on
the basis of which the damages shall be computed; and 2) the rate
at which the losses sustained by the heirs of the deceased should be
fixed. As there is no proof of Biag’s living expenses, the net income
is estimated to be 50% of the gross annual income. Thus, the loss
of earning capacity of the deceased is computed as follows:130
129
Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Florentina J. Sugata-on, supra
130
People of the Philippines vs. Renato Lagat y Gawan, G.R. No. 187044, September 14, 2011

Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x [gross annual income

living expenses]
= 2/3 [80-age at time of death] x [gross annual income - 50% of
gross annual income]
= 2/3 [80-56] x [₱109,500.00 - ₱54,750.00]
= 16 x ₱54,750.00
= ₱876,000.00
Damages for loss of earning capacity are awarded pursuant to Article

2206 of the Civil Code.131
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime

or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death[.]
As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the

claim for loss of earning capacity. Hence, damages for loss of earning capacity
as a nature of actual damages and as a rule, must be duly proven by
documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of a
widow.132 By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when:133
1. the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum

wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may
be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work, no
documentary evidence is available; or
2. the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
In another case, the Court deleted the award for loss of earning capacity
to the victim’s heirs because the prosecution failed to establish this claim. As
a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for
loss of earning capacity. While there are exceptions to this rule, these
exceptions do not apply to the victim as he was a security guard when he died;
he was not a worker earning less than the current minimum wage under
current labor laws.134
131
Leticia Tan vs. OMC Carriers, Inc., G.R. No. 190521, January 12, 2011
132
Paulita Edith Serra vs. Nelfa T. Mumar, G.R. No. 193861, March 14, 2012
133
Leticia Tan vs. OMC Carriers, Inc., supra
134
People of the Philippines vs. Teofilo Rey Buyagan, G.R. No. 187733, February 8, 2012

In compensating for the loss of earning capacity, it is not required that

the victim is gainfully employed. Thus, in the 2017 case of Romulo Abrogar
vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, the Court reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court for not recognizing the right of the petitioners to recover the loss
of earning capacity of the victim. The Court emphasized that it should have,
for doing so would have conformed to jurisprudence whereby the Court has
unhesitatingly allowed such recovery in respect of children, students and other
non-working or still unemployed victims. The legal basis for doing so is
Article 2206 (l) of the Civil Code, which stipulates that the defendant "shall
be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning
capacity at the time of his death."135
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, damages for

loss of earning capacity were granted to the heirs of a third-year high school
student of the University of the Philippines Integrated School who had been
killed when she was hit and run over by the petitioner's passenger bus as she
crossed Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. The Court justified the grant in
this wise:136
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but

for loss of capacity to earn money. Evidence must be presented that
the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death, was reasonably
certain to complete training for a specific profession. In People v.
Teehankee, no award of compensation for loss of earning capacity
was granted to the heirs of a college freshman because there was
no sufficient evidence on record to show that the victim would
eventually become a professional pilot. But compensation should
be allowed for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of
a minor who has not yet commenced employment or training for a
specific profession if sufficient evidence is presented to establish
the amount thereor.137
In People v. Sanchez, damages for loss of earning capacity was also

allowed to the heirs of the victims of rape with homicide despite the lack of
sufficient evidence to establish what they would have earned had they not
been killed. The Court rationalized its judgment with the following
observations:138
Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at

UPLB, the country's leading educational institution in agriculture.
As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have
graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived
them of their future time and earning capacity. For these
135
Romulo Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, G.R. No. 164749, March 15, 2017
136
Ibid.
137
Metro Manila Transit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.116617, November l6, 1998
138
Romulo Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, supra

deprivation, their heirs are entitled to compensation. However,

considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due
time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to
assume that in 1993 they would have earned more than the
minimum wage. All factors considered, the Court believes that it is
fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that the two would
have earned in 1993 at ₱8,000.000 per month (or ₱96,000.00/year)
and their deductible living and other incidental expenses at
₱3,000.00 per month (or ₱36,000.00/year).139
In Perena v. Zarate, the Court fixed damages for loss of earning

capacity to be paid to the heirs of the 15-year-old high school student of Don
Bosco Technical Institute killed when a moving train hit the school van
ferrying him to school while it was traversing the railroad tracks. The RTC
and the CA had awarded damages for loss of earning capacity computed on
the basis of the minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. Upholding
said findings, the Court opined:140
x x x, the fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings

should not be taken against his parents and in favor of the
defendants whose negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his
right to work and earn money, but also deprived his parents of their
right to his presence and his services as well. x x x. Accordingly,
we emphatically hold in favor of the indemnification for Aaron's
loss of earning capacity despite him having been unemployed,
because compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of time
or earnings but for loss of the deceased's power or ability to earn
money.141
Moral Damages
Moral damages are recoverable only when physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shocks, social humiliation, and similar injury are the proximate result
of a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, quasi-delicts causing
physical injuries, seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts, adultery
or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest, illegal search, libel,
slander or any other form of defamation, malicious prosecution, disrespect for
the dead or wrongful interference with funerals, violation of specific
provisions of the Civil Code on human relations, and willful injury to
property.142 Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals explained the nature and purpose
of moral damages, viz:
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to

compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering,
mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood
to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature,
139
People vs. Sanchez, G.R. Nos. 121039-121045, October 18, 2001, 367 SCRA 520
140
Romulo Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, supra
141
Perena vs. Zarate, G.R. No. 157917, August 29, 2012, 679 SCRA 208, 234
142
Oscar Ventanilla vs. Gregorio Centeno, G.R. No. L-14333, January 28, 1961

calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered.

Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount
of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court, it is
imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by
the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
cases expressed in Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil
Code.143
Article 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following

and analogous cases:
1. A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
2. Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
3. Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
4. Adultery or concubinage;
5. Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
6. Illegal search;
7. Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
8. Malicious prosecution;
9. Acts mentioned in Article 309;
10. Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29,
30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused,
referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters
may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the order
named.
Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for

awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies
to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith.
Where the appellant's cause of action for recovery of moral damages is

not predicated upon any of those specifically enumerated, the trial court did
not err in declining to award moral damages to him. 144 However, in the case
of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral
damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and
alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. In order that an award of moral
damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to satisfactorily
prove that he has suffered such damages and that the injury causing it has
sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil
Code. Then, too, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. The claimant must establish the factual basis of the
damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of
moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation or
physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant;
143
Mariano L. Del Mundo vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104576, January 20, 1995
144
Oscar Ventanilla vs. Gregorio Centeno, supra

secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that

the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated
on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article
2220 of the Civil Code.145
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes

physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral
damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In
culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is
found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage,
illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation.146
In B.F. Metal vs. Spouses Lomotan (2008), the Court stated

jurisprudence shows that in criminal offenses resulting to the death of the
victim, an award within the range of P50,000.00 to P100,000.00 as moral
damages has become the trend. Under the circumstances, because respondent
Umuyon did not die but had become permanently incapacitated to drive as a
result of the accident, the award of P30,000.00 for moral damages in his favor
is justified. However, there is no legal basis in awarding moral damages to
Spouses Lomotan whether arising from the criminal negligence committed by
Rivera or based on the negligence of petitioner under Article 2180. Article
2219 speaks of recovery of moral damages in case of a criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries or quasi-delicts causing physical injuries, the two
instances where Rivera and petitioner are liable for moral damages to
respondent Umuyon. Article 2220 does speak of awarding moral damages
where there is injury to property, but the injury must be willful and the
circumstances show that such damages are justly due. There being no proof
that the accident was willful, Article 2220 does not apply. 147
Exemplary Damages
Our jurisprudence sets certain conditions when exemplary damages
may be awarded: First, they may be imposed by way of example or correction
only in addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount
of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant. Second, the
claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. Third, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad
faith, and the award would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.148
145
B.F. Metal vs. Spouses Rolando M. Lomotan and Linaflor Lomotan, G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Mariano C. Mendoza vs. Spouses Leonora J. Gomez and Gabriel V. Gomez, G.R. No. 160110, June 18,
2014

In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary damages may be awarded

where the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend simple
negligence and be tantamount to positive or affirmative misconduct rather
than passive or negative misconduct. In characterizing the requisite positive
misconduct which will support a claim for punitive damages, the courts have
used such descriptive terms as willful, wanton, grossly negligent, reckless, or
malicious, either alone or in combination.149
There have been instances wherein exemplary damages were awarded

despite the lack of an aggravating circumstance. This led the Court to clarify
this confusion in People v. Dalisay, where it categorically stated
that exemplary damages may be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show
the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender, to wit:150
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,

courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases
when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying,
had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime,
even if the same was not alleged in the information. This is in
accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the
promulgation of the Revised Rules, courts no longer consider the
aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the
determination of the penalty and in the award of damages. Thus,
even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not
alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages. x x x
xxxx
Nevertheless, People v. Catubig laid down the principle that courts

may still award exemplary damages based on the aforementioned
Article 2230, even if the aggravating circumstance has not been
alleged, so long as it has been proven, in criminal cases instituted
before the effectivity of the Revised Rules which remained pending
thereafter. Catubig reasoned that the retroactive application of the
Revised Rules should not adversely affect the vested rights of the
private offended party.
Thus, we find, in our body of jurisprudence, criminal cases,

especially those involving rape, dichotomized: one awarding
exemplary damages, even if an aggravating circumstance attending
the commission of the crime had not been sufficiently alleged but
was consequently proven in the light of Catubig; and another
awarding exemplary damages only if an aggravating circumstance
has both been alleged and proven following the Revised Rules.
Among those in the first set are People v. Laciste, People v. Victor,
People v. Orilla, People v. Calongui, People v. Magbanua, People
of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Cadag Jimenez, and People of the Philippines
v. Julio Manalili. And in the second set are People v. Llave, People
of the Philippines v. Dante Gragasin y Par, and People of the
149
Ibid.
150
People of the Philippines vs. Jose Pepito D. Combate, supra

Philippines v. Edwin Mejia. Again, the difference between the two

sets rests on when the criminal case was instituted, either before or
after the effectivity of the Revised Rules.
xxxx
Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis

for the grant of exemplary damages taking into account simply the
attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a
crime, courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary
damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on this point, thus
Also known as punitive or vindictive damages, exemplary or

corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings
and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In
common law, there is preference in the use of exemplary
damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings
and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and
wantonly inflicted, the theory being that there should be
compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible
conduct of the defendant associated with such circumstances as
willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud that
intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages
are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from
similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be

awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance,
but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly
reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the
same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary
damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays
down the very basis of the award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio,
the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually
abusing their own daughters. Also, in People v. Cristobal, the
Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral
corruption, perversity and wickedness of the accused in sexually
assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the
Philippines v. Cristino Caada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito
Neverio and The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr.,
the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to
serve as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and
to protect the latter from sexual abuse.
It must be noted that, in the said cases, the Court used as basis
Article 2229, rather than Article 2230, to justify the award of
exemplary damages. Indeed, to borrow Justice Carpio Morales

words in her separate opinion in People of the Philippines v. Dante

Gragasin y Par, [t]he application of Article 2230 of the Civil Code
strictissimi juris in such cases, as in the present one, defeats the
underlying public policy behind the award of exemplary damages
to set a public example or correction for the public good.151
Temperate Damages
According to Article 2224152 of the Civil Code, temperate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be
recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. For
this purpose, the determination of the temperate damages rests in the sound
discretion of the courts. To illustrate, in People v. Murcia, the Court reduced
the amount of ₱250,000.00 fixed by the RTC, although affirmed by the CA,
to ₱200,000.00 by way of temperate damages upon noting that the former
amount had been based only on the complainant’s estimate of the value of his
house. Consequently, the Court holds that the amount of ₱500,000.00 in the
form of temperate damages is reasonable considering that the dwelling of the
Spouses Cogtas had been completely burned down.153
In another case, the Court, notwithstanding the absence of receipts to

prove actual damages, found it imperative to award the amount of P25,000.00
as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. Under Article 2224 of the
Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that
the heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was
not proved.154 In Ventanilla vs. Centeno, the Court did not award temperate
damages because, considering that the appellant is not entitled to actual or
compensatory damages but has been awarded nominal damages by the trial
court, such award precludes the recovery of temperate or moderate damages,
and so the trial court did not err in refusing to award temperate or moderate
damages to the appellant.155
Actual Damages
He who claims actual or compensatory damages must establish and
prove by competent evidence actual pecuniary loss.156 Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense
for, loss or injury sustained. They simply make good or replace the loss caused
by the wrong. Article 2202157 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and
quasi delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the
151
People of the Philippines vs. Antonio Dalisay y Destresa, G.R. No. 188106, November 25, 2009
152
Art. 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
can not, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty.
153
Gilfredo Bacolod vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206236, July 15, 2003
154
People of the Philippines vs. Bingky Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011
155
156
157
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is

not necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably
been foreseen by the defendant. Article 2199158 of the same Code, however,
sets the limitation that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an award of actual or
compensatory damages, the claimant must prove that the damage sustained is
the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and, moreover, the
claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage.159 Actual
damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply
rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be
competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to
claims which are duly supported by receipts. Considering that the actual
damages suffered by private respondents were based only on a job estimate
and a photo showing the damage to the truck, there is absence of competent
proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered.160
The Court, therefore, time and again, has emphasized that actual
damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out
specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne. An award of actual damages is
“dependent upon competent proof of the damages suffered and the actual
amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on
the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote,
speculative and unsubstantial proof.”161 Credence can be given only to claims
which are duly supported by receipts.162
158
Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages.
159
Mariano C. Mendoza vs. Spouses Leonora J. Gomez and Gabriel V. Gomez, supra
160
Viron Transportation Co., Inc., vs. Alberto Delos Santos y Natividad, G.R. No. 138296, Novermber 22,
2000
161
International Container Terminal Services, Inc. vs. Celeste M. Chua, G.R. No. 195031, March 26, 2014
162
People of the Philippines vs. Victoriano Villar, G.R. No. 202708, April 13, 2015


IV. CIVIL LIABILITY IN CERTAIN CASES
Death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
Date/Year Applicable Statute or Doctrine Enunciated Amount

November The United States vs. Basilio Bastas and 500.00 pesos
10, 1905 Dionision De la Serna (G.R. No. 2322)
1908 The United States vs. Indon (11 Phil. 64 1,000.00 pesos
(1908))
June 3, Commonwealth Act No. 284 a reasonable sum, upon
1938 consideration of the
pecuniary situation of
the party liable and
other circumstances,
but it shall in no case
be less than two
thousand pesos.
March 11, People of the Philippines vs. Lope Amansec y 6,000.00 pesos
1948 Bucao, G.R. No. L-927
1950 Article 2206, Civil Code of the Philippines At least 3,000.00 pesos
October The People of the Philippines vs. Getulio 12,000.00 pesos
11, 1968 Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793
Example of case: People of the Philippines 50,000.00 pesos
vs. Rolando Dagani y Reyes, G.R. No.
153875, August 16, 2006
See the following cases: 75,000.00 pesos
 People of the Philippines vs. Roberto
Quiachon y Bayona, G.R. No. 170236,
August 31, 2006
 People of the Philippines vs. Samuel
Anod, G.R. No. 186420, August 25,
2009
 People of the Philippines vs. Roel
Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September
17, 2009
February People of the Philippines vs. Ford Gutierrez y 50,000.00 pesos
4, 2010 Dimaano, G.R. No. 188602
June 29, People of the Philippines vs. Mitsuel L. 75,000.00 pesos
2010 Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539
February People of the Philippines vs. Victoriano Dela 50,000.00 pesos
11, 2010 Cruz y Lorenzo, G.R. No. 187683
June 8, People of the Philippines vs. Alberto 75,000.00 pesos
2011 Anticamara y Cabillo, G.R. No. 178771
February People of the Philippines vs. John Alvin 50,000.00 pesos
27, 2013 Pondivida, G.R. No. 188969
April 5, People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta, 100,000.00 pesos
2016 G.R. No. 202124

Article 2206 of the Civil Code enumerates the damages that may be
recovered from the accused or defendant for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict, to wit:
Article 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime

or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(l)The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity
of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the
latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded
by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at
the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the

provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to
the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to
be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and

ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental
anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
The first item of civil liability is the civil indemnity for death, or death
indemnity.
Civil indemnity comes under the general provisions of the Civil

Code on damages, and refers to the award given to the heirs of the deceased
as a form of monetary restitution or compensation for the death of the victim
at the hands of the accused. In People vs. Molina, the Court said that civil
indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. 163 The mandatory character of
civil indemnity in case of death from crime or quasi-delict derives from the
legal obligation of the accused or the defendant to fully compensate the heirs
of the deceased for his death as the natural consequence of the criminal or
quasi-delictual act or omission. This legal obligation is set in Article 2202 of
the Civil Code, viz.:164
Article 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be

liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not
necessary that such damages have been foreseen or could have
reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
163
People of the Philippines vs. Judito Molina, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009
164
People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Oandasan, Jr., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016

Article 2206 of the Civil Code, supra, has fixed the death indemnity to
be "at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances." Yet, the granting of civil indemnity was not
introduced by the Civil Code, for the courts had granted death indemnity to
the heirs of the victims even long prior to August 30, 1950, the date of the
effectivity of the Civil Code.165
The award of civil indemnity dated back to the early years of the Court.
In the 1905 case of U.S. vs. Bastas and De la Serna¸ a murder case, the Court
sentenced Dionisio de la Serna to fifteen years’ imprisonment (cadena
temporal) with the accessory penalties of article 56 of the Penal Code, and to
pay an indemnity to Venancio Araneta of 500 pesos, and costs.166 In US vs.
Indon, a 1908 case, the amount of P1,000.00 was awarded to the heirs of the
deceased.167
There was also legislation on the matter, starting with Commonwealth

Act No. 284, approved on June 3, 1938, which provided in its Section 1 the
following:168
Section 1. — The civil liability or the death of a person shall

be fixed by the competent court at a reasonable sum, upon
consideration of the pecuniary situation of the party liable
and other circumstances, but it shall in no case be less than
two thousand pesos.
In fixing the civil indemnity, the Legislature thereby set a minimum.

The Civil Code, in Article 2206, took the same approach by specifying the
amount to be at least P3,000.00, which was directly manifesting the
legislative intent of enabling the courts to increase the amount whenever the
circumstances would warrant. Civil indemnity for death has been increased
through the years from the minimum of P2,000.00 to as high as P100,000.00.
The increases have been made to consider the economic conditions, primarily
the purchasing power of the peso as the Philippine currency.169
In the 1948 case of People vs. Amansec, the Court modified the
appealed decision and, according to article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
sentenced the appellant to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to pay, besides the costs, to the
heirs of the deceased Pedro Intal, an indemnity of P6,000.00, taking into
consideration the difference between the value of the present currency and
that at the time when the law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000.00 was
enacted.170 However, in 1968, the Court, in People v. Pantoja, the Court
165
Ibid.
166
The United States vs. Basilio Bastas and Dionisio De la Serna, G.R. No. 2322, November 10, 1905
167
The United States vs. Indon, 11 Phil. 64 (1908)
168
People of The Philippines vs. Mariano Oandasan, Jr., supra
169
Ibid.
170
The People of the Philippines vs. Lope Amansec y Bucao, G.R. No. L-927, March 11, 1948

ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of Angel Marasigan the sum of P12,000
as compensatory damages, and to pay the heirs of Wenceslao Hernandez the
sum of P12,000 as compensatory damages.171 To justify the upgrade, the
Court included a review of the more recent history of civil indemnity for death
in this jurisdiction, to wit:
In 1947, when the Project of Civil Code was drafted, the Code
Commission fixed the sum of P3,000 as the minimum amount of
compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict.
The Project of Civil Code was approved by both Houses of the
Congress in 1949 as the New Civil Code of the Philippines, which
took effect in 1950. In 1948 in the case of People vs. Amansec, 80
Phil. 424, the Supreme Court awarded P6,000 as compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime "considering the difference
between the value of the present currency and that at the time when
the law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 was enacted." The
law referred to was Commonwealth Act No. 284 which took effect
in 1938. In 1948, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso was
one-third of its pre-war purchasing power. In 1950, when the New
Civil Code took effect, the minimum amount of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict was fixed in
Article 2206 of the Code at P3,000. The article repealed by
implication Commonwealth Act No. 284. Hence, from the time the
New Civil Code took effect, the Courts could properly have
awarded P9,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a
crime or quasi-delict. It is common knowledge that from 1948 to
the present (1968), due to economic circumstances beyond
governmental control, the purchasing power of the Philippine peso
has declined further such that the rale of exchange now in the free
market is U.S. $1.00 to almost £4.00 Philippine pesos. This means
that the present purchasing power of the Philippine peso is one-
fourth of its pre-war purchasing power. We are, therefore, of the
considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory
damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be
P12,000.
Increases were made from time to time until the death indemnity
reached the threshold of P50,000.00 (e.g., appellant Santiano is further
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity in People vs. Dagani)172, where it remained for a long time. In that
time, however, the Court occasionally granted P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
for death. For example, in People vs. Quiachon, the Court said that
notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364, the
Court has resolved to maintain the award of P75,000.00 for rape committed
or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death
penalty would have been imposed prior to R.A. No. 9346. In justifying such,
the Court pronounced:173
171
The People of the Philippines vs. Getulio Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, October 11, 1968
172
People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Dagani y Reyes, G.R. No. 153875, August 16, 2006
173
People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Quiachon y Bayona, G.R. No. 170236, August 31, 2006

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant

because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in
People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty
attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that
the award of P75,000.00 shows “not only a reaction to the apathetic
societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations
over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of
the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity.”
The Court retained the death indemnity at P75,000.00 in subsequent

cases, as in People v. Dela Cruz (2007) and People v. Buban.174
The Court mad a qualification in People v. Anod decided on August 5,

2009 stating that the award of P75,000.00 was appropriate only if the
imposable penalty was death but reduced to reclusion perpetua by virtue of
the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition
of Death Penalty), to wit:175
It is worth stressing that, at the outset, the appellant, together with

Lumbayan, was sentenced by the RTC to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Thus, the CA's reliance on our ruling in People
v. dela Cruz was misplaced. In dela Cruz, this Court cited our ruling
in People v. Tubongbanua, wherein we held that the civil indemnity
imposed should be P75,000.00. However, the instant case does not
share the same factual milieu as dela Cruz and Tubongbanua. In the
said cases, at the outset, the accused were sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death. However, in view of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death
Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty meted to the accused was
reduced to reclusion perpetua. This jurisprudential trend was
followed in the recent case of People of the Philippines v. Generoso
Rolida y Moreno, etc., where this Court also increased the civil
indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Based on the foregoing
disquisitions and the current applicable jurisprudence, we hereby
reduce the civil indemnity awarded herein to P50,000.00. We
affirm all the other awards made by the CA.
Hence, where the proper imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua,

death indemnity in murder remained at P50,000.00. Yet, the Court, in an
apparent self-contradiction less than a month after Anod, promulgated People
v. Arbalate, herein it fixed P75,000.00 as death indemnity despite the
imposable penalty being reclusion perpetua, with the Court holding that death
indemnity should be P75,000.00 regardless of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances provided the penalty prescribed by law was death or reclusion
perpetua, to wit:176
174
People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Oandasan, Jr., supra
175
People of the Philippines vs. Samuel Anod, G.R. No. 186420, August 25, 2009
176

As regards damages, we find it proper to award the following: PhP

75,000 as civil indemnity; PhP 75,000 as moral damages; and PhP
30,000 as exemplary damages without proof or pleading. These
amounts should be awarded when the accused is adjudged guilty of
a crime covered by RA 7659 regardless of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. Thus, where the penalty prescribed by
law is death or reclusion perpetua to death, the damages should be
in the abovementioned amounts.177
Death indemnity of P75,000.00 became the standard in murder where

the penalty was reclusion perpetua.178 However, the consistency in applying
the standard was broken in 2010, in People v. Gutierrez, a murder case, where
the Court reverted to the reiteration that “[I]n murder, the grant of civil
indemnity, which has been fixed by jurisprudence at ₱50,000.00, requires no
proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the
accused's responsibility therefor.”179 Inconsistent with the ruling in Gutierrez,
on June 29, 2010, or two months before the promulgation of Apacible, the
Court promulgated People v. Orias that in cases of murder and homicide, civil
indemnity of PhP 75,000 and moral damages of PhP 50,000 are awarded
automatically.180
The Court reverted to the flat amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity

in murder in the 2010 case of People v. Dela Cruz where the Court said that
the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed, considering that
there was neither any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance. The heirs of
the victim are entitled to a civil indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00, which is
mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the culpability of
the accused for such death.181 Subsequently, the Court went back to
P75,000.00 in People v. Anticamara. In People v. Escleto, the Court,
prescribing reclusion perpetua upon not finding any aggravating circumstance
to be attendant, imposed P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the
victim. The Court did the same thing in People v. Camat and People v. Laurio
where the Court, prescribing only reclusion perpetua due to lack of any
aggravating circumstance, awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for death.
In People v. Buyagan, the Court, in awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity
for the deaths of each of the victims, said that the civil indemnity should be
increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 inasmuch as the imposable penalty
against the appellant would have been death had it not been for the enactment
of Republic Act No. 9346.182
177
People of the Philippines vs. Roel Arbalate, G.R. No. 183457, September 17, 2009
178
179
People of the Philippines vs. Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano, G.R. No. 188602, February 4, 2010
180
People of the Philippines vs. Mitsuel L. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010
181
People of the Philippines vs. Victoriano Dela Cruz y Lorenzo, G.R. No. 187683, February 11, 2010
182

However, in 2013, the Court once again changed its mind in People vs.
Pondivida where it ordered the accused to pay complainant Rodelyn
Buenavista ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto.183 Incidentally, the civil
indemnity for homicide remained pegged at P50,000.00 for almost two
decades.184
In People of the Philippines vs. Mariano Oandasan, Jr., the Court

explained the rationale of death indemnity, to wit:185
It is again timely to raise the civil indemnity for death arising from
crime or quasi-delict. We start by reminding that human life, which
is not a commodity, is priceless. The value of human life is
incalculable, for no loss of life from crime or quasi-delict can ever
be justly measured. Yet, the law absolutely requires every injury,
especially loss of life, to be compensated in the form of damages.
For this purpose, damages may be defined as the pecuniary
compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained,
or, as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences that the law
imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
As such, damages refer to the amount in money awarded by the
court as a remedy for the injured. Although money has been
accepted as the most frequently used means of punishing, deterring,
compensating and regulating injury throughout the legal system, it
has been explained that money in the context of damages is not
awarded as a replacement for other money, but as substitute for that
which is generally more important than money; it is the best thing
that a court can do. Regardless, the civil indemnity for death, being
compensatory in nature, must attune to contemporaneous economic
realities; otherwise, the desire to justly indemnify would be
thwarted or rendered meaningless. This has been the legislative
justification for pegging the minimum, but not the maximum, of
the indemnity.
On April 5, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision in People v.

Jugueta (G.R. No. 202124), whereby it adopted certain guidelines on fixing
the civil liabilities in crimes resulting in the death of the victims taking into
proper consideration the stages of execution and gravity of the offenses, as
well as the number of victims in composite crimes. Other factors were
weighed by the Court. In the case of murder where the appropriate penalty
is reclusion perpetna, the Court has thereby fixed P75,000.00 for moral
damages, P75,000.00 for exemplary damages, and P75,000.00 for civil
indemnity as the essential civil liabilities, in addition to others as the records
of each case will substantiate.186
183
People of the Philippines vs. John Alvin Pondivida, G.R. No. 188969, February 27, 2013
184
185
Ibid.
186
Ibid.

In the abovementioned case, the Court reiterated the following:187
As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and

the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua
because of R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity and moral damages that
should be awarded will each be ₱100,000.00 and another
₱100,000.00 for exemplary damages or when the circumstances of
the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, the
civil indemnity and moral damages should be ₱75,000.00 each, as
well as exemplary damages in the amount of ₱75,000.00. If,
however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil
indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be
₱50,000.00, and an award of ₱25,000.00 civil indemnity and
₱25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its
attempted stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the
stages is mainly due to the disparity in the outcome of the crime
committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for
each stage of the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and
moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their frustrated or
attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed
constitute complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC. For
example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount
of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is
₱100,000.00 each, while in the attempted murder, the civil
indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is ₱25,000.00
each.
Rape
For simple rape, the Court in People vs. Lascano said that the award of
civil indemnity to the rape victim is mandatory upon the finding that rape took
place. Moral damages, on the other hand, are awarded to rape victims without
need of proof other than the fact of rape, under the assumption that the victim
suffered moral injuries from the experience she underwent. Therefore, this
Court affirms the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages, based on prevailing jurisprudence.188
In rape cases, when the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent
of the victim, the imposable penalty is death. However, with the enactment of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death
Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty is now prohibited.
In lieu of the penalty of death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the RPC. Consequently, courts can no longer impose the penalty of death.
Instead, they have to impose reclusion perpetua. Nonetheless, the principal
consideration for the award of damages is the penalty provided by law or
imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty
187
People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016
188
People of the Philippines vs. Alias Kino Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21 2012

actually imposed on the offender. Pertinently, as early as July 9, 1998, this

Court has held that when the circumstances surrounding the crime would
justify the imposition of the penalty of death were it not for RA 9346, the
award of civil indemnity for the crime of rape should be PhP 75,000,
racionating that [t]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception
of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity.189
Moreover, in another case, the trial court appreciated not just one, but
three (3) aggravating circumstances, namely: (a) the use of a deadly weapon;
(b) the act was committed in the dwelling of the private complainant; and (c)
entrance to the private complainants dwelling was obtained by unlawful entry.
The first two aggravating circumstances were sufficiently alleged in the
criminal information and were also adequately proved by the prosecution
during trial. Considering the presence of aggravating circumstances, the
proper imposable penalty is death. However, due to Republic Act No. 9346,
which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the CA correctly modified
the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The Court said that although the CA was
correct in awarding PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages, the award of moral
damages should be increased to PhP 75,000 in addition to the amounts of
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. There should also be an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the finality of judgment until
fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.190
Article 266-B of RA 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of

1997, states that whenever rape is committed through force, threat or
intimidation, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. However, whenever the
rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, such as a knife, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death. In the first incident of rape, it was
committed with the use of a knife which is a deadly weapon, thus the penalty
imposable is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
Code states that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. In a case decided in 2017, since no aggravating nor any mitigating
circumstance had been proved, the RTC correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. As to the second rape incident in such case, since the
moral ascendancy of appellant over AAA took the form of threat and
intimidation on her, the RTC likewise correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua on the appellant. However, the Court modified the
damages awarded by the RTC in the two rape cases pursuant to the ruling in
People v. Ireneo Jugueta. The civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages should all be increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape. In
189
People of the Philippines vs. Juanito Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011
190
People of the Philippines vs. Feliciano Saysot Cias, G.R. No. 194379, June 1, 2011

addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed
on all monetary awards from date of finality of this decision until fully paid.191
Rape where the offended party is a mental retardate

The Court, in People vs. Gambao192, set the minimum indemnity and
damages where facts warranted the imposition of the death penalty, if not for
prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to
have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00 as exemplary
damages to set an example for the public good. When the Information averred
that the offended party was a mental retardate and that the appellant knew of
this mental retardation, these circumstances raised the crime from statutory
rape to qualified rape or statutory rape in its qualified form under Article 266-
B of the Revised Penal Code. Since the death penalty cannot be imposed in
view of Republic Act No. 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of the
Death Penalty in the Philippines).
Consequently, the Court thus increased the awarded civil indemnity

from P75,000.00 to Pl00,000.00; moral damages from P75,000.00 to
Pl00,000.00; and the exemplary damages from P30,000.00 to Pl00,000.00.193
Rape by Sexual Assault

In People vs. Brioso involving rape by sexual assault, the RTC and the
CA awarded in AAA's favor the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages for the
rape committed under paragraph 1 (d) of Article 266-A194. In recent rulings
of the Court, the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary
damages have been increased in cases where the penalty for the crime
committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed because of RA 9346.
In the most recent case of People v. Ireneo Jugueta, the increase in the
amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages has been
explained in detail. As it now stands, in cases of simple or qualified rape,
among others, where the imposable penalty is death but the same is reduced
to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346, the amounts of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages are pegged uniformly at
P100,000.00. Thus, the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages and
191
People of the Philippines vs. Ludigario Belen y Marasigan, G.R. No. 215331, Janaury 23, 2017
192
People of the Philippines vs. Gambao, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013, 706 SCRA 508, 533
193
People of the Philippines vs. Alexander “Sander” Bangsoy, G.R. No. 204047, January 13, 2016
194
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal
orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

exemplary damages, given to AAA, should be increased to P100,000.00 each.

With respect to the rape through sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-
A, accused should pay AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, in
accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.195
In People vs. Pusing, the Court modified the award of civil indemnity
from ₱50,000.00 to ₱100,000.00, moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to
₱100,000.00, and exemplary damages from ₱25,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 for
qualified rape through carnal knowledge; the award of civil indemnity from
₱50,000.00 to ₱100,000.00, moral damages from ₱50,000.00 to ₱100,000.00,
and exemplary damages from ₱25,000.00 to ₱100,000.00 for qualified rape
through sexual assault; and retained the award of civil indemnity and moral
damages of ₱50,000.00, but increase the exemplary damages from ₱25,000.00
to ₱30,000.00 for acts of lasciviousness against AAA.196 The amount in
current jurisprudence is far from the 2009 case of People vs. Abello where
Court said that avictim of rape by sexual assault is entitled to an award of
P30,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000 as moral damages.197
Civil Liability Ex Delicto in Estafa Cases

Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of
pecuniary estimation through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code.198In the 2016 case of Dy vs. People of the Philippines, the Court
195
People of the Philippines vs. Jaime Brioso Alias Talap-Talap, G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016
196
People of the Philippines vs. Edilberto Pusing y Tamor, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016
197
The People of the Philippines vs. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, G.R. No. 151952, March 25, 2009
198
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall
not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided
that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
a. By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of value which the
offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such
obligation be based on an immoral or illegal consideration.
b. By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods,
or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.
c. By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and
by writing any document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the
offended party or of any third person.

explained the civil liability ex delicto in estafa cases and the development of
doctrines throughout the years.199
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or
deceit in order to cause damage. As this Court previously held, "the
element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable." Our law abhors the
act of defrauding another person by abusing his trust or deceiving
him, such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances

which constitute estafa. Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) states
that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence.
In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal
is the act of misappropriation or conversion. When the element of
misappropriation or conversion is missing, there can be no estafa.
In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil liability ex
delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission
from which any civil liability may be sourced. However, when an
accused is acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the
existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability
may still be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to
prove fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court
to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts
to estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
a. By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of other similar deceits.
b. By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or
business.
c. By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to
the action for calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring
against the offender. In this case, the offender shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty.
d. [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The
failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)]
e. By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn,
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like
without paying therefor, with intent to defraud the proprietor or manager
thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house, lodging
house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by abandoning
or surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel, inn, restaurant,
boarding house, lodging house or apartment house after obtaining credit, food,
refreshment or accommodation therein without paying for his food,
refreshment or accommodation.
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
a. By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.
b. By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.
c. By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record,
office files, document or any other papers.
199
Gloria S. Dy vs. People of the Philippines, supra

sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any criminal penalty,

civil liability exists.
Our jurisprudence on this matter diverges.
Earlier cases ordered the dismissal of the civil action for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto whenever there is a finding that there
was no estafa but rather an obligation to pay under a contract.
In People v. Pantig, this Court affirmed the ruling of the lower
court acquitting Pantig, but revoked the portion sentencing him to
pay the offended party the amount of money alleged to have been
obtained through false and fraudulent representations, thus —
The trial court found as a fact that the sum of P1,200, ordered to be
paid in the judgment of acquittal, was received by the defendant-
appellant as loan. This finding is inconsistent with the existence of
the criminal act charged in the information. The liability of the
defendant for the return of the amount so received arises from a
civil contract, not from a criminal act, and may not be enforced in
the criminal case.
The portion of the judgment appealed from, which orders the

defendant-appellant to pay the sum of P1 ,200 to the offended
party, is hereby revoked, without prejudice to the filing of a civil
action for the recovery of the said amount.
This was also the import of the ruling in People v. Singson. In that
case, this Court found that "the evidence [was] not sufficient to
establish the existence of fraud or deceit on the part of the accused.
x x x And when there is no proven deceit or fraud, there is no crime

of estafa."While we also said that the established facts may prove
Singson's civil liability (obligation to pay under a contract of sale),
we nevertheless made no finding of civil liability because "our
mind cannot rest easy on the certainty of guilt" considering the
above finding. The dispositive portion stated that Singson is
acquitted "without prejudice to any civil liability which may be
established in a civil case against her.”
However, our jurisprudence on the matter appears to have changed

in later years.
In Eusebio-Calderon v. People, this Court affirmed the finding of

the CA that Calderon "did not employ trickery or deceit in
obtaining money from the private complainants, instead, it
concluded that the money obtained was undoubtedly loans for
which [Calderon] paid interest." Thus, this Court upheld Calderon's
acquittal of estafa, but found her civilly liable for the principal
amount borrowed from the private complainants.
The ruling was similar in People v. Cuyugan. In that case, we

acquitted Cuyugan of estafa for failure of the prosecution to prove
fraud. We held that the transaction between Cuyugan and private
complainants was a loan to be used by Cuyugan in her business.

Thus, this Court ruled that Cuyugan has the obligation, which is
civil in character, to pay the amount borrowed.
We hold that the better rule in ascertaining civil liability

in estafa cases is that pronounced in Pantig and Singson. The
rulings in these cases are more in accord with the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code, and the Rules of Court. They are also
logically consistent with this Court's pronouncement in Manantan.
Under Pantig and Singson, whenever the elements of estafa are

not established, and that the delivery of any personal property was
made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from
the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because
the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex
delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting the
crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be
recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.
The situation envisioned in the foregoing cases, as in this case, is

civil liability ex contractu where the civil liability arises from an
entirely different source of obligation. Therefore, it is not the type
of civil action deemed instituted in the criminal case, and
consequently must be filed separately. This is necessarily so
because whenever the court makes a finding that the elements
of estafa do not exist, it effectively says that there is no crime.
There is no act or omission that constitutes criminal fraud. Civil
liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be sourced from
something that does not exist.
When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a

contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position completely
inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts
with his money because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a
contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give
something or to render some service. In estafa, the accused's failure
to account for the property received amounts to criminal fraud. In
a contract, a party's failure to comply with his obligation is only a
contractual breach. Thus, any finding that the source of obligation
is a contract negates estafa. The finding, in turn, means that there
is no civil liability ex delicto. Thus, the rulings in the foregoing
cases are consistent with the concept of fused civil and criminal
actions, and the different sources of obligations under our laws.
We apply this doctrine to the facts of this case. Petitioner was

acquitted by the RTC Manila because of the absence of the element
of misappropriation or conversion. The RTC Manila, as affirmed
by the CA, found that Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner
pursuant to a loan agreement. Clearly, there is no crime of estafa.
There is no proof of the presence of any act or omission constituting
criminal fraud. Thus, civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded
because there is no act or omission punished by law which can
serve as the source of obligation. Any civil liability arising from
the loan takes the nature of a civil liability ex contractu. It does not
pertain to the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.

In Manantan, this Court explained the effects of this result on the

civil liability deemed instituted with the criminal case. At the risk
of repetition, Manantan held that when there is no delict, "civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any,
which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than
the delict complained of."51 In Dy's case, the civil liability arises
out of contract—a different source of obligation apart from an act
or omission punished by law—and must be claimed in a separate
civil action.
Summary of Award of Damages200
I. For those crimes like Murder, Parricide, Serious Intentional Mutilation,

Infanticide, and other crimes involving death of a victim where the
penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
A. Where the penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua
because of RA 9346:
Civil Indemnity 100,000.00 pesos
Moral Damages 100,000.00 pesos
Exemplary Damages 100,000.00 pesos
1. Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated
b. Attempted
B. Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, other than the above-
mentioned:
1. Where the crime committed was not consummated:
a. Frustrated
b. Attempted
200
People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

because of RA 9346:
1. Where the crime committed was not consummated but merely attempted:
mentioned:
2. Where the crime committed was not consummated, but merely attempted:
III. For Complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code where
death, injuries, or sexual abuse results, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and exemplary damages will depend on the penalty, extent of
violence and sexual abuse; and the number of victims where the penalty
consists of indivisible penalties:
because of RA 9346:
mentioned:
The above Rules apply to every victim who dies as a result of the crime committed. In
other complex crimes where death does not result, like in Forcible Abduction with Rape,
the civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages depend on the prescribed penalty and
the penalty imposed, as the case may be.

IV. For Special Complex Crimes like Robbery with Homicide,

Robbery with Rape,
Robbery with Intentional Mutilation,
Robbery with Arson,
Rape with Homicide,
Kidnapping with Murder,
Carnapping with Homicide or Carnapping with Rape,
Highway Robbery with Homicide,
Qualified Piracy,
Arson with Homicide,
Hazing with Death, Rape, Sodomy or Mutilation
and other crimes with death, injuries, and sexual abuse as the composite crimes,
where the penalty consists of indivisible penalties:
because of RA 9346:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the above
if the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua although death did
not occur.
1. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not
for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
2. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
mentioned:
In Robbery with Intentional Mutilation, the amount of damages is the same as the
above if the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua.
1. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds and could have died if not
for a timely medical intervention, the following shall be awarded:
2. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
In Robbery with Physical Injuries, the amount of damages shall likewise be dependent
on the nature/severity of the wounds sustained, whether fatal or non-fatal.
The above Rules do not apply if in the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the robber/s
or perpetrator/s are themselves killed or injured in the incident.
Where the component crime is rape, the above Rules shall likewise apply, and that for
every additional rape committed, whether against the same victim or other victims, the

victims shall be entitled to the same damages unless the other crimes of rape are treated
as separate crimes, in which case, the damages awarded to simple rape/qualified
rape shall apply.
V. In other crimes that result in the death of a victim and the penalty
consists of divisible penalties, i.e., Homicide, Death under Tumultuous
Affray, Infanticide to conceal the dishonour of the offender, Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide, Duel, Intentional Abortion and
Unintentional Abortion, etc.:
A. Where the crime was consummated:
B. Where the crime committed was not consummated, except those crimes where
there are no stages, i.e., Reckless Imprudence and Death under tumultuous
affray:
1. Frustrated
2. Attempted
If an aggravating circumstance was proven during the trial, even if not alleged in the
Information, in addition to the above mentioned amounts as civil indemnity and moral
damages, the amount of
₱50,000.00 exemplary damages for consummated;
₱30,000.00 for frustrated; and
₱20,000.00 for attempted, shall be awarded.
VI.
A. In the crime of Rebellion where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua
and death occurs in the course of the rebellion, the heirs of those who died are
entitled to the following:
B. For the victims who suffered mortal/fatal wounds in the course of the
rebellion and could have died if not for a timely medical intervention, the
following shall be awarded:
C. For the victims who suffered non-mortal/non-fatal injuries:
VII. In all of the above instances, when no documentary evidence of burial

or funeral expenses is presented in court
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages shall be awarded.


V. INSTITUTION OF CIVIL ACTION AND

EXTINGUISHMENT OF CIVIL LIABILITY
Institution of Criminal and Civil Actions

In the 2008 case of Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok
Ching Teng vs. Vicente Balboa, The Court explained the concept of Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court. Here, at the time of filing of Civil
Case No. 97-82225 and Criminal Cases Nos. 277576 to 78, the governing rule
is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal

action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the

Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission of the accused.
Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability
arising from an offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal
proceedings, unless (1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or (2)
there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or (3) the civil action was filed
prior to the criminal complaint.201 The new Section 1 or Rule 111 now
provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When

a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action

shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary
damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on
the judgment awarding such damages.
201
Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng vs. Vicente Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January
28, 2008

Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the

complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be
paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be

required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed

by the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22

shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks
to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based
on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged
but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the court,
the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first
lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof
has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal
action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of
the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
The last paragraph of Section 2202 of the said rule provides that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that
202
Section 2. When separate civil action is suspended. — After the criminal action has been commenced,
the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the
criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall
be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last
until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the
criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence already adduced
in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the
right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal
case and of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be
tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil
action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled. (n)
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.

the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Also,
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action,
there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the criminal
action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the
Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the
action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The private
complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger
of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits. 203
In case of offenses falling under B.P. No. 22, even under the amended
rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability is allowed when
the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case. This is rationalized in the
Hyatt case.204 In the Hyatt case, the Court further negated the claim that there
are no identity of parties and causes of action in the criminal and civil
complaints for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 where a criminal case
against the corporate officers is filed ahead of the civil case against the
corporation. The parties in the civil case against the corporation represent the
same interest as the parties in the criminal case. As to the issue of identity or
non-identity of relief sought, this Court held that the criminal case and the
civil case seek to obtain the same relief. Thus:205
With the implied institution of the civil liability in the criminal

actions before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. Hence, the relief sought in
the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-00300
is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is,
the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to
[HIMC], represents the amount to be paid by [ADEC] for its
purchases. To allow [HIMC] to proceed with Civil Case No. MC
01-1493 despite the filing of I.S. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-
00300 might result to a double payment of its claim. 206
203
Anamer Salazar vs. The People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 151931, September 23, 2003
204
Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng vs. Vicente Balboa, supra
205
Silangan Textile Manufacturing Corporation vs. Hon. Avelino G. Demetria, G.R. No. 166719, March 12,
2007
206
Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. vs. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., G.R. No. 163957, July 29, 2005

In Hyatt and Silangan cases, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular
No. 57-97207 effective September 16, 1997, which provides:208
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall

be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action,
and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or
recognized.
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:209
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the
offended party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to
recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary
damages, the offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of
these damages are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees
based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has
not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in
207
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states that the
criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also
requires the complainant to pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally,
no filing fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in complaints
for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the filing of the complaint. This
rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use
the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the
payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being
paid, the trial court is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is
expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead of instituting two
separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be
stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The
Rules even prohibit the reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a
separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules
encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have previously observed that a separate
civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount of the dishonored checks would only prove to be
costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of
the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in
the proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted. (Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. vs. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., G.R. No. 163957, July
29, 2005)
208
Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng vs. Vicente Balboa, supra
209
Ibid.

accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of

the civil and criminal actions.
Independent Civil Action

Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.210
Objections were raised to the inclusion in this Rule of quasi-delicts

under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. However, in view of
Article 2177 of the said code which provides that the offended party may not
recover twice for the same act or omission of the accused, and in line with the
policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits, these objections were overruled. In
any event, the offended party is not precluded from filing a civil action to
recover damages arising from quasi-delict before the institution of the
criminal action, or from reserving his right to file such a separate civil action,
just as he is not precluded from filing a civil action for damages under Articles
32, 33 and 34 before the institution of the criminal action, or from reserving
his right to file such a separate civil action. It is only in those cases where the
offended party has not previously filed a civil action or has not reserved his
right to file a separate civil action that his civil action is deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. It should be noted that while it was ruled
in Abella vs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right to file an
independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under
the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or
instituted.211 The Court in San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals cited
the analysis of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado of the historical changes in
Rule 111 since the 1964 Rules of Court which is equally illuminating, to
wit:212
1. Under Rule 111 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the civil liability
arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless such civil action was expressly
waived or reserved. The offended party was authorized to bring
an independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles
31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code provided such right
was reserved.
In the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same Rule 111

thereof reiterated said provision on the civil liability arising
from the offense charged. The independent civil actions,
210
Rafael Jose-Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
211
San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119771, April 24, 1998
212
Ibid.

however, were limited to the cases provided for in Articles 32,

33 and 34 of the Civil Code, obviously because the actions
contemplated in Articles 31 and 2177 of said Code are not
liabilities ex-delicto. Furthermore, no reservation was required
in order the civil actions in said Articles 32, 33 and 34 may be
pursued separately.
2. The present amendments introduced by the Supreme Court

have the following notable features on this particular
procedural aspect, viz:
a. The civil action which is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, barring a waiver, reservation or prior
institution thereof, need not arise from the offense
charged, as the phrase "arising from the offense
charged" which creates that nexus has been specifically
eliminated.
b. The independent civil actions contemplated in the
present Rule 111 include the quasi-delicts provided for
in Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, in addition to the cases
provided in Arts. 32, 33 and 34 thereof. It is necessary,
however, that the civil liability under all the said articles
arise "from the same act or omission of the
accused." Furthermore, a reservation of the right to
institute these separate civil actions is again required
otherwise, said civil actions are impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the former are waived
or filed ahead of the criminal action.
As regards to the application of Article 33, in a case, the Court ruled

that as reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three
crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil
action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said offense.
Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes
under the general rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action
is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same criminal act notwithstanding
that the injured party reserved 2 his right to institute a separate civil action. In
the language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the
criminal action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal
act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil
action for damages based upon the same act.213
Given this concept of independent civil action, forum-shopping is not

present when a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property is filed based on the Revised Penal Code and a civil action for
damages is filed based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two
actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of
action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the
Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. The essence of
213
Laura Corpus vs. Felardo Paje, G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969

forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.214
Prejudicial Question
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which
is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action,
it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those
upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence
of the accused would necessarily be determined.215 On December 1, 2000, the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure became effective and by Sec. 7 of Rule
111, the following are the elements of prejudicial question.216
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a

prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Aptly put, the following requisites must be present for a civil action to
be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case: (1) the civil
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another
tribunal.217 Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law
as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision
before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said
question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the
institution of the criminal action.218 This must be harmonized with Article 36
of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any

criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be
governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall
promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of
this Code.
214
Avelino Casupanan vs. Marlo Llavore Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002
215
People of the Philippines vs. Victoria R. Arambulo, G.R. No. 186597, June 17, 2015
216
Dreamwork Construction, Inc., vs. Cleofe S. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009
217
People of the Philippines vs. Victoria R. Arambulo, supra
218
Dionisio L. Torres vs. Hon. Francis F. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27, 2002

In Dreamwork Construction, Inc. vs. Janolia, Art. 36 of the Civil Code

and Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are susceptible of an
interpretation that would harmonize both provisions of law. The phrase
previously instituted civil action in Sec. 7 of Rule 111 is plainly worded and
is not susceptible of alternative interpretations. The clause before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed in Art. 36 of the Civil Code
may, however, be interpreted to mean that the motion to suspend the criminal
action may be filed during the preliminary investigation with the public
prosecutor or court conducting the investigation, or during the trial with the
court hearing the case. This interpretation would harmonize Art. 36 of the
Civil Code with Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court but also with Sec. 6
of Rule 111 of the Civil Code, which provides for the situations when the
motion to suspend the criminal action during the preliminary investigation or
during the trial may be filed. Sec. 6 provides:219
SEC. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition

for suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be filed in the office of
the prosecutor or the court conducting the preliminary
investigation. When the criminal action has been filed in court for
trial, the petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
Thus, under the principles of statutory construction, it is this

interpretation of Art. 36 of the Civil Code that should govern in order to give
effect to all the relevant provisions of law.220
Right to Intervene in Prosecution of Criminal Case

Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution
of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with
the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.221
Section 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal

action. — Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is
instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended
party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
In Villalon vs. Chan, the Court affirmed that CA found no such waiver
from or reservation made by the respondent. The fact that the respondent, who
was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the
Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the
219
Dreamwork Construction, Inc., vs. Cleofe S. Janiola, supra
220
Ibid.
221
Leonardo A. Villalon vs. Amelia Chan, G.R. No. 196508, September 24, 2014

prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the
petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have
disqualified Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the
respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate
through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil
aspect of the case.222
Thus, while all criminal actions commenced by complaint or

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public
prosecutor, when the civil action for civil liability is instituted in the criminal
action pursuant to Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the offended
party may intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of the offense.223 Under
Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party
may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as
private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the
speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the
purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for
both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity
of suits must be avoided. With the implied institution of the civil action in the
criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding,
with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the
criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform
and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order.224
However, the intervention of the private offended party, through

counsel, and his prosecution of the case shall be under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor until the final termination of the case. A
public prosecutor who has been entrusted by law with the prosecution of
criminal cases is duty-bound to take charge thereof until its final termination,
for under the law, he assumes full responsibility for his failure or success since
he is the one more adequately prepared to pursue it to its termination. The
prosecution of offenses is a public function. Indeed, the sole purpose of the
civil action is the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual
or felonious act of the accused. The public prosecutor may turn over the actual
prosecution of the criminal case, in the exercise of his discretion, but he may,
at any time, take over the actual conduct of the trial. However, it is necessary
that the public prosecutor be present at the trial until the final termination of
the case; otherwise, if he is absent, it cannot be gainsaid that the trial is under
his supervision and control.225
222
Ibid.
223
Mobilia Products Inc. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 149357, March 4, 2005
224
Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 140567, December 13, 2004
225
Mobilia Products Inc. vs. People of the Philippines, supra

Effects of Acquittal on Civil Liability

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the
civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance
closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based
on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. This is the situation
contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for
damages is “for the same act or omission.” Although the two actions have
different purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those
discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal
proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact
there determined, even though both actions involve the same act or omission.
The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily,
different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioner’s acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29
applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioner’s
negligence or reckless imprudence.226
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also
releases him from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances of
miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in
the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is
that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the criminal offense,
when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.227
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate

and deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private
rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other
is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and
proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused,
the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of
indemnifying the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved
beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation of every private
right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable
by the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).228
226
George Manantan vs. The Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107125, January 29, 2001
227
Roy Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984
228
Ibid.

The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the

guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence only.229
A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily

civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution
(proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability
(mere preponderance of evidence230). In order to be completely free from civil
liability, a person’s acquittal must be based on the fact he did not commit the
offense. If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may
still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act
complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the
offense charged. 231Hence, the acquittal of the accused does not automatically
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability
where:
(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based
upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.
In Lumantas vs. Calapiz¸ the Court declared that even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. 232 This
Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is based on Article 29 of the Civil
Code:233
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted

on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon

reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
229
George Manantan vs. The Court of Appeals, supra.
230
Preponderance of evidence is [defined as] the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence or
greater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of
belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. (Emilia Lim vs. Mindanao Wines & Liquor Galleria,
G.R. No. 175851, July 4, 2012)
231
Nissan Gallery-Ortigas vs. Purificacion Felipe, G.R. No. 199067, November 11, 2013
232
Dr. Encarnacion C. Lumantas, M.D. vs. Hanz Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014
233
People of the Philippines vs. Gerry Lipata y Ortiza, G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016

declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the

decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished

if mere is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. 234
234
Jeffrey Reso Dayap vs. Pretzy-Lou Sendiong, G.R. No. 177960, January 29, 2009

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PERSONAL INJURY AND OFFENDER’S CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE JURISDICTION

PERSONAL INJURY AND OFFENDER’S

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 1

judges and the prudence of prosecutors.6 As significant as the right of the

Section 2. The complaint or information – The complaint or

The interest of the society to prevent social injury is attributed to the

The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the

The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 2

It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 3

Various codes of civil law incorporated or defined civil liability. For

In Philippine jurisdiction, civil liability, in general, is not only confined

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 4

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 5

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 6

PERSONAL INJURY AND OFFENDER’S

II. CIVIL LIABILITY

An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives

Article 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 7

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 8

In view of the harmonious relation between the different codes in

The possession of personal property, acquired in good faith, is

If the possessor of personal property, lost or stolen, has acquired

Neither can the owner of things pledged in pawnshops,

With regard to things acquired on exchange, or at fairs or markets

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 9

Article 17 of the Penal Code provides that —

"Every person criminally liable for a crime or misdemeanor is

In accordance with this provision the supreme court [of Spain] in

"In order that civil liability may be decreed in a prosecution it is

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 10

Nevertheless, under the Civil Code, a person illegally deprived of any

Hence, Article 559 establishes two exceptions to the general rule of

In People vs. Juan Alejano y De la Cruz, the appellant contends that

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 11

appellant, who, however, until shown to be one of the "pawnshops established

Under international law, reparation is a principle of law which refers

Reparation may not be made by the delivery of a similar thing (same

Article 106. Reparation – How made. – The court shall determine

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 12

Article 107 66 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 13

The appealed judgment sentenced the defendant-appellant to pay

Contributory negligence on the part of the offended party nevertheless

Article 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 14

Exemption from Criminal Liability and Its Effects on Civil Liability

Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The

First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the civil

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 15

fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the

The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate

When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12,

In a case, Anita Tan is the owner of a house of strong materials. The

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE © 2017 16

Civil Liability in case of Imbecility and Insanity

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code75 exempts from criminal liability