Basics of Hazop

Basics of HAZOP 6-1
CHAPTER 6
Basics of HAZOP
What Did we Do Before HAZOP Came Along?
We relied upon:
Good engineering practices

Codes of practice such as ASME, API, NFPA, etc.
Informal safety reviews
So what slips through the cracks?
Interface problems between equipment and systems

Abnormal conditions not envisioned during design
Human error in design, operation, maintenance
How Do We Know If a Plant Is Safe?
Historical record of plant incidents and near misses

History of incidents on similar plants
Record of onstream time
Can apply some risk ranking, e.g., Dow/Mond indices
Ask: What guarantee do we have that there isn't a serious accident about to happen?
If there is NO guarantee:
What can we do about it?

1=3 Increase Hazards & Risk Awareness
by:
Process Safety Management Program.
© 2003 by CRC Prcss LLC

Basics of HAZOP 6 -2
HAZOP Methodology
HAZOP
Acronym for HAZards and Operability Analysis.
Originated by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in Mond Division.
Basic Concept
Simulate abnormal behavior by considering deviations and disturbances due to causes
likely to impact immediate and surrounding plant resulting in consequences. Then decide
whether the design has adequate features (i.e., safeguards) that can prevent occurrence or
limit the consequential effects. If no such safeguards exist, then consider what actions are
needed to remedy the situation.
High Deviation
Normal (Design Intention)
Low Deviation
Other Deviations typically include:
Reverse of what was intended.

What else can happen?
System only partially functions.
What additional things can occur?

Basics of HAZOP 6 -3
Methodology for Generating Deviations
Guide W o r d + Property = Deviation
For example:
When Property = Parameter:

High + Flow - High Flow
Low + Pressure - Low Pressure
More + Reaction - Greater Reactivity
When Property = Operation:

No + Transfer - No Transfer
Less + Empty - Residue Remaining
When Property = Material:

No + Steam - No Steam
More + Diluent - More Diluent
9DYADEM
Basics of HAZOP 6-4
What Type of HAZOP Should You Use?
Parametric Deviation (e.g., High pressure, Low temperature, etc.)
Good for continuous processes.

Most widely used in world today.
Critical Examination
The approach examines:
Material
= Activities
Sources and Destinations
Good for batch operations, start-up, shut down.
Procedural Methodology
Useful far HAZOPing:
Operating manuals, procedures
Batch operations
Start-up, shut down
Knowledge Based HAZOP (more like 'What i f with established Checklist)

Mainly applicable to:
Well established (continuous) processes
Organizations with very high quality engineering practices & standards

Basics of HAZOP 6-5
Steps in the HAZOP Process
1. Preparation
Assemble:
P&IDs (Full size and reduced copies for the team)

PFDs plus material and energy balances
Equipment specifications
Layout drawings
2. Facilitator and Process Engineer

Break P&IDs down into Nodes.
Nodes are equipment items (or numbers of items).

If nodes are too small you can loose sense of analysis and incur excessive
repetition.
If nodes are too large, hard to handle, becomes confusing.
Question: How do you size a node?
Answer: Based on system function.
Example: Reactor feed system may consist of Pump + Line + Exchanger.
3. Prepare HAZOP Outline with List of Deviations
4. Assemble HAZOP Team
2 DYADEM
5. Facilitator Explains
The facilitator or one of the team members explains the purpose and scope of the
HAZOP and sets the rules for the study.
6. Process Engineer Explains
Process in general
Immediate Node being HAZOPed
7. HAZUP Each Node Using Deviations Listed in Outline Working Through

the P&ZD.
Produce HAZOP worksheet recording the following:
Causes
Consequences
Safeguards
Actions/Recommendations
Remarks
8. At the End of HAZOP, the Facilitator Issues Preliminary HAZOP Report

(issuance is optional) consisting of
Attendance
Outline
Detail Report
Action/Recommendations Register
9. Issue Final Report Giving Full Details
A sample of table of contents is given in page 6- 11.

Basics of HAZOP 6-7
Variations in HAZOP Types

Three basic types:
Guide Word HAZOP

Knowledge Based HAZOP
"Creative Checklist"
The Guide Word method is the most accepted method. There are five main variations:
Cause-by-cause
Consequence-by-consequence
Deviation-by-deviation
Exception only
Action/Recommendation item only
Cause-By-Cause Methodology
Correlates Consequences, Safeguards and Actions to each particular Cause of a Deviation.
Precise method
Reduces ambiguity
Detail print-out can be followed, is fully auditable
Example: Deviation: Line Rupture
Cause #I Consequence Safeguard Action

Line overstressed Flammable release, fire Pipe stress analysis Check fire protection
Cause #2 Consequence Safeguard Action

Brittle fracture Flammable release, fire Charpee tested steel Check fire protection

Vehicular impact Flammable release, fire None Provide crash barrier
Cause-By-Cause provides full cross-referencing.

Basics of HAZOP 6-8
Consequence-By-ConsequenceMethodology
Correlates Consequences, Safeguards and Actions to each particular Consequence of a
Deviation.
Precise method
Reduces ambiguity
Detail print-out can be followed, is fully auditable
Cause #I Consequence Safeguard Action

Line overstressed Flammable release Pipe stress analysis
Fire Checkfire protection

Brittle fracture Flammable release Charpee tested steel
Fire CheckJre protection

Vehicular impact Flammable release None Provide crash burrier
Fire Checkfire protection
Consequence-By-Consequence providesfull cross-referencing.
Deviation-By-DeviationMethodology
All Causes, Consequences, Safeguards and Actions are related only to a particular
Deviation.
Fairly simple to execute

Some ambiguity
Fairly rapid
Detail print-out hard to follow

Basics of HAZOP 6-9
Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions

Line overstressed Flammable release, fire Pipe stress analysis Checkfire protection
Brittle fiacture Charpee tested steel Provide crash barrier
Vehicular impact
Deviation-By-Deviation provides no cross-referencing.
Exception Only Methodology (Not Recommended)

Includes only those deviations for which team believes there are credible causes.
Reduces time
Cannot be audited
Citations have been issued by OSHA in the USA against covered facilities using this
method.
ActiorulCecommendations Item Only Methodology (Not Recommended)

Only suggestions that team makes for action items are recorded. (No proper analysis).
Not auditable
9DYADEM
Basics of HAZOP 6-10
Preparation of HAZOP Reports
Basic Report Should Consist of

1. HAZOP Outline
Nodes
Deviations
Guide Words
Parameters
Design Intent
Design Conditions
2. Detail Report
Lists output of sessions.
For each Node and Deviation lists:
Causes
Consequences (+ Risk Ranking)
Safeguards
Actions/Recommendations
Remarks
3. Attendance Register
Facility, Unit
Location
Team members and expertise
Attendance (Present/Absent/Not required/Part-time)
)DYADEM
4. Action/Recommendations Register
Action/Recommendations Item
Person(s) responsible for follow-up
Prioritization
Status
Target date for completion (Resolution)
Other
Risk ranking
Categorization
Final Report
1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction
3. Process Description
4. Hazards of the process
5. Hazard and Operability Methodology
6. Conclusions and Recommendations
Appendices
o Outline of Hazard and Operability Study
o Drawings
o Project Information Report
o Drawing Report
o Team Members Report
o Risk Matrix Report
o Worksheet Report
o Action~RecommendationsReport
o Computer files
9DYADEM
HAZOP Example
Table 6-1: Scope of HAZOP and Process Description
E?&&pslqk XYE Processing Corporation

t
LPenibw byplace
Pm$a3 IR: , A X W l
t
Start Date: If2IReMI;I;
I '
end'rnk- 1
r
C-t: LIGHT ENDS RECOVERY UNIT (See Figures 6- 1 and 6-2)
To imuam the li&hta& pottion of a liquid feed stream containing 50%, by weight, of light 4 s us& a
d m M 6 m t ~ . The feed rate is 100,000 lbhour and the intent is ta r-wr 81% af the light em& w ,k
hF in ,orderto prpduue a1W h ,by weight, light ends distillate.
RYPOess Description:
The lmit is W &QXII aq uptream &d dnxm,V- 101. Liquid feed is sqpplied at a btw@ MI
pdgdat 22Q P. The f& Is pre-heated by heat exchange with the light emis wippwr bmggp&&m @ 3QQF, in
that &&&M&m ~~b EX-101, before it enters the light ends stripper, C-101..
C-lQl, is a 22 plate fractionation column, ushg valve-type h y s w l i h b ~ P m d

The light end$ t@l~per+ ImWd
on plate 12.
Overhead vapors from the light ends stripper, C- 101, pass to the light ends condenser, EX-102, which is water
cooled. Fluids from this condenser flow to the reflux drum, V-102. Non condensible vapors entering the reflux
drum, V-102, are vented to the flare system while the condensed liquids pass to the reflux pump, P-101 or spare.
The total distillate is split so that product distillate is sent directly to storage while the main portioo is reflusedbaak
to the top of the light ends stripper, C- 101.
At the base of the light ends stripper, C-10 1, there is a vertical thermosiphon reboiler, EX-103,which is heated by
300 psig steam on the shell side. Bottoms liquid from the base of the light ends stripper, C-101, is pumped by a
bottoms pump, P-102 or spare, to the tube side of the feedhottoms exchanger, EX-101, in which it is cooled by feed
before passing to storage.
Process Controls:
The feed to column is under flow control via loop FRC-10 1.
The reflux flow is under flow control via loop FRC-116.
Distillate withdrawal is under level control via loop LlC-107, from the reflux drum level.
Non-condensibles bleed off under pressure control via loop PIC- 106 based on the overheads column pressure.

> DYADEM
The rate of bottoms withdrawal is under level control via loop LIC-119 based on the column bottom level.
The steam flow to the reboiler is under composition control via temperature control loop TRC-126 based on the
process side of the reboiler outlet.
Protective Devices:
Relief valve PSV-105, protects against overpressuring of the light ends stripper and connected components.
Relief valve, PSV-106, protects against thermal expansion on the cooling water side of the light ends condenser.
High and low level conditions, LAH-120, LAL-12 1 and LAH & LAL-107, are alarmed respectively on the light
ends stripper and the reflux drum. The low level condition, LSL-12 1, on the stripper is also interlocked to stop the
bottoms pump. The low low level condition on the reflux drum stops the reflux pump.
In event of failure of the bottoms pump, the spare pump is started by a low low pressure switch, PSLL-125. The
same arrangement, for the reflux pump, is also supplied by a low low pressure switch, PSLL-109.
High or low column pressures are alarmed by PAH & PAL- 106 respectively.
Loss of reflux is alarmed by FAL- 116.
Loss of steam to the reboiler is alarmed by TAL- 126.
A minimum flow bypass on the bottoms pump protects against the no flow condition.
Remotely operable motor operated valve, MOV-122, can be manually initiated in an emergency, such as bottoms
line leaklfiacture, to prevent significant flammables inventory loss and fire.
The instrument air failure positions of the control valves are indicated as F.C. (fail close) or F.O. (fail open).
Car seal open (CSO) valves are as indicated.
Assumptions:
During a normal HAZOP you would normally have access to full equipment specifications, plant layout drawings,
piping specifications, line lists, tie points and other pertinent documents. As this sample demonstrates PHA-Pro,
rather than being an exercise in design, such documents are not included. Therefore make whatever assumptions
you think reasonable if you wish to modify or extend the HAZOP as shown.
Normal Operating Conditions:
Stream #1, Feed @ 220 F, 90 PSIG, 100,000 LbIHour, 50% Light Ends
Stream #2, Overhead @ 200 F, 75 PSIG, 135,000 LbIHour, 90.2% Light Ends
Stream #3, Bottoms @ 300 F, 120 PSIG, 50,000 LbIHour, 9.5% Light Ends
Stream #4, Reflux @ 200 F, 75 PSIG, 85,000 LbIHour, 90% Light Ends
Stream #5, Non Condensibles @ 200 F, 75 PSIG, 5,000 LbMour, 95% Light Ends
Stream #6, Distillate @ 200 F, 150 PSIG, 45,000 LbIHour, 90% Light Ends
Stream #7, Reboiler Feed @ 300 F, 80 PSIG, 185,000 LbIHour, 9.5% Light Ends
Stream #8, Steam Flow @ 420 F, 300 PSIG, 25,000 LbIHour
2 DYADEM
.--,
Y1
T-l.I*--" ",--'-'.""'" "
l
.
l
- l-.l...-.. .
Heat Exchanger Duties:
Condenser, EX- 102: 19.5 MMBTUIHR

FeedlBottoms Exchanger, EX-] 01 : 1.9 MMBTUIHR
Reboiler, EX-103: 19.9 MMBTUIHR
)DYADEM
Figure 6-1: P&ID of Light Ends Process
9DYADEM
Figure 6-2: Process Flow Diagram
FOR L I G H T S W O V E B Y I
m
HEATCONDENSER: 19.5 MMBTUl?W

FEEDIBCYITOMS EXCHANGER: 1.9 MMBTUlRR
REBOILER. 19.9 MMBTUIISR

Table 6-2: List of Deviations
Node: 1. Light Ends Recovery Unit Drawings: 1. Process Flow Sketch of Light Ends
'
I Recovery Unit; 2. Piping & Instrumentation Diagra~
Types: Centrifugal Pump, Column, Heat Exchanger, Line, # PCD-A1
Maintenance problems, Vessel
' ~ ~ u i ~ r nID:
e nDistillation
t
bottoms heating feedstream
unit with heat recovery from 7
r
Design ConditionsIParameters: Design conditions are listed
in Process Flow Sketch of Light Ends Recovery Unit
~rovided
Deviation Guide Word Parameter

In
Sessio
I I
Revision # Design Intent
r
1.1. High Flow High Flow 1
, ---I---- As per Process Flow
Diagram
1.2. LowINo Flow LowINo
/ 1 1 As per Process Flow
Diagram
1.4. Other than Flow

d I1 lo
--7"-7;
1.3. ReverseJMisdirected Flow ReverseIMisdirecte
Other than
Flow
O
As per Process Flow
Diagram
As per Process Flow
Diagram
I -
1.5. High Temperature
1.6. Low Temperature
1.7. High Pressure
1.8. Low Pressure

I
1.9. High Level
1.10. Low Level

I
1.11. Cavitation
1.12. Column Flooding

I ---
1.13. Low Tray Level
1.14. High Concentration of

Impurities
t
1.15. Leak
2DYADEM
-- - - -- - - - -
1
- .
I t
Dev~ation G u ~ d eWord l Parameter 1 Sessio Revision # Design Intent
I
1.16. Rupture I Other than
1.17. Start-~ip1Shutdown I Other than 1 start- ,0 1 As per Operating

Hazards
. .
1
/ ~~plshutdown I Instructions
1
1.18. Maintenance Hazards Other than Maintenance 12 ,O 1 As per Maintenance
I 1 Data
&2-w-sik-&& &> ,>a3k i b d & k , It L
bSa-&"@&$~&&SY R~&QSI I $53 s ,wLk%**~~Q,&SI&&- 2 $-&&V.!~V& fik& "bbAi3ba2&.&#*& &&~-~t%%& "*>ihaw- &k 2) -
), DYADEM
Table 6-3: Sample Worksheet
Node: 1. Light Ends Recovery Unit Drawings: 1. Process

r Flow Sketch of Light
Types: Centrifugal Pump, Column, Heat Exchanger, Line, Ends Recovery Unit,
Equipment ID: Distillation unit with heat recovery from bottoms heating feedstream 2. Piping &
r Instrumentation
Design ConditionslParameters: Design conditions are listed in Process Flow Sketch of
Diagram # PCD-A I
Light Ends Recovery Unit provided
1.1. High Flow
2. Investigate recycling
line and/or additional
101 (dwg. no. PCD-

AA1) to trip FV- 101
closed using solenoid
3?, DYADEM
- -- -.- * *-
Causes ' Consequences 1 Safeguards 1 S Responsible

4. Control j 4.1. High bottoms 14.1. PSV-105 j I ' Tom Volke
valve or ' temperature I 1 room monitored as
' fails CV
' i;ff-spec Products
I opposed to local device
and add high
TV-126 I temperature switch and
open or '
' bypass left
Phillip
1
open j
, I
I
I
I control valve TV- 126 Smith
14.3. Over-pressuring 14.2. TI- 1 17 so that on fill1 opening
of column column will be in likely
to flood due to excess
vapor flow
8. Add high To111Volke
temperature alarm,
TAH- 126
of c o l ~ ~ m n
-- i
I
5 Control 5 . 1 Column will 15.1. PAL-106 I 9. Add independent Tom Volke
valve or i depressure to flare
; / (provided 1 pressure monitor on
controller
fails CV
-
, 5.2. Loss of products
1w
! 1 column overheads with

high and low pressure
PV- 106 ! 5.3. Off-spec products / switches and alar~ns
open or i
bypass left
open
- --- -" - - -- - - -- I
I - ---- - -- -- I
6. Control
,valve or
6.1. Loss of products
- -- -- -
1 6.1. LAL- 12 1 16.1. $
I 1 Safegilards f '
Ir.<
controller ,
6.2. Off-spec prodi~cts 1
I I are
9
falls CV , [adequate
6.2. LSL- I2 1 4
LV- 107
open or
bypass left
- -
6.3. Low level in

trips P-1021s II $.
9
=,'
I
open column c o ~ ~ l d
I
2
I
iSi
k
I bottoms pumps P- 1%
";:
, 1021s
- - 1
7. Control 7.1. Excess reflux to 7.1. None 4 1 10. Add high flow .:'
valve or column i
I
I alarm to FRC- I 16
6 I
I controller 1 1. Consider
I 7.2. Unecononiical 1 i\
CV
FV-116
performance 11 monitoring steam flow sE
3
to column by adding
open or ; i flow indicator on 3"-S- !i
bypass left '
open I
I
i
!
10 1 as check on energy
, consumption
II 15
8. PSV-105 8.1. Column will 8.1. Block 18.1, 9 d
fails open depressure to flare and bypass Safeguards
' due to
. -
spring
failure
8.2. Loss of products
. .
,8.3. Off-spec products
I valves
PSV
1 nl~lrPI- 1 04
I
1
? k,A A ,4& &<
are
,
adequate
W . 2 h &a
2
A,
'
- . . .&
R
*
i!
)DYADEM
Basics of HAZOP 6-2 1
I
Causes Consequences Safeguards I
RR Recommendations Responsible Remarks
8.4. [Failure too for manual
infrequent to raise pressure
significant concerns] relief when
PSV-105 is
removed for
repair
I
9. Steam 9.1. Steam wastage 9.1. None 1 1. Consider Tom Volke
monitoring steam flow & Carl
trap on 3"-
S-102 sticks
9.2. Uneconomical 1 to column by adding Hanks
open flow indicator on 3"-S-
10 1 as check on energy
consumption
1.2. Low/No Flow I
I--
maintenance inspection of
flow devices, such as FE-
system to make up in the

event of sudden loss of
steam to reboiler

> DYADEM
--- - .- -- 1
- - -
Causes Conseq~~ences Safeguards L 'RR Responsible , Remarks
- - - -- --
closed 4.2. Poss~ble " "-I Ii 14. Interlock reflux return, Tom Volke
1 vacuum in I FV- 1 16, and feed, FV- I0 I
1 column causing 1I to close when PAL- 106 is
1 tray damage I act uated
- -
I -
5. Control 5. I . Column will 15. I. PAH-106 9. Add independent Tom Volke
valve or overpressure (provided pressure monitor on
' controller P1C- 106 is column overheads with
5.2. Loss of
fails CV PV- fi~nctional) high and low pressure
products
z 106 closed switches and alarms
/ - "- 1 .
6. Control 16.1. Loss of / 6. I . LAH- 107 15. Add high level switch Tom Volke
valve or 1products 1 (provided and alarm on reflux drum
controller v - 102
fails CV
LV- 107
closed
. -- " - - - . .. -
7. Control 7.1. Loss of 17.1.FAL-I16 1 1. Consider monitoring Tom Volke
valve or reflux to column (provided
- - "
1 steam flow to c o l ~ ~ mbyn & Carl
' controller 'FIC-116is adding flow indicator on Hanks
fails CV FV- 7 . 2 Off-spec fLlnctional) 3"-S- 10 1 as check on
products
1 16 closed
16. Add independent Tom Volke
- .- pressure monitor on
1 7.3. Over- co1~11nnoverheads with
high and low pressure
f -
/ column
-- --
switches and alarms
8.1. None 1 1. Consider monitoring Tom Volke

steam flow to column by & Carl
102 sticks
closed
/1 8.2, Lois of
products
adding flow indicator on
3"-S-101 as check on
Hanks
energy consumption
I - -
'- __" - - " - - - " !
9. Bottoms 19.1. No '9.1.

pump P- I
withdrawal of / Safegnards
1021s stops j bottoms product l are
"- ...
19.2. Loss of 9.2. Spare
products
9.3. High level in 9.3. LG- 1 18
base of column
" .
10. Reflux 10.1. Loss of 10.1. FAL- j 10.1.
pump P- reflux to column 116 1 Safeguards
1o 1IS stops ; are
10.2. PSV-
products 105
-E-had t$asP&42- :,34&w&
)DYADEM
1
Causes Responsible Remarks
1
10.3. Spare
pressuring of
column
t
11. MOV- 11.1.
122 fails would Interlock on MOV- 122 positioner ZC-
closed cavitateldamage MOV-122 122 to stop bottoms pumps
bottoms pumps P- positioner when MOV- 122 valve
1021s stops bottoms closes
pumps when
valve closes
12.
Temporary would strainers on P- 101IS are
strainers on cavitateldamage cleaned and removed when
P-1011s bottoms pumps P- no longer required
plugged 1021s
r
13. Loss of 13.1. 13.1. Low 2 3 19. Check PSV-105 for
overhead Overpressuring of flow alarm controlling case for sizing
condenser. column to relief FAL-116 on valve. Must handle fire
condition. loss of reflux. case, tube rupture in
I
reboiler,total loss of reflux,
13.2. Pressure
loss of cooling medium,
relief valve
instrument or controller
failure, instrument air
failure, power failure, etc.
20. PV-106 to be checked Phillip
for maximum discharge Smith
flow in event of cooling
106 & PV- water failure to EX-102.
106 opening
to flare.
I
1
1.3. ReverseIMisdirected Flow
1.1. Possible explosive
9DYADEM
Table 6-4: List of Recommendations
- . - ... ..
, -. -
- ...
-. .-. .. . - - ..-
nsider monitoring stea

3"-S-101 as check on
/ _._
17. ' Provide interlock on M
num discharge flow in event of
)DYADEM
1
7
# Recommendation Resp Status Pri Place(s

Used
I
22. Check on flow regime in 6"-P-113 to
slugging
'23. Check that line 3"-P-104 is both self-venting and is not pocketed Phillip ~ m i t h
I
7
F
1.4.1
r
24. Evaluate need for emergency depressuring to prevent BLEVE in Phillip Smith Study
event of fire
I
25. Provide sample point on inlet feed. Also consider need for on-line Tom Volke Incomplete
analyzer for column feed.
' 26.1 Provide quality control check on feed stream to column / Carl Hanks 1 Study
Add high temperature alarm on overheads to indicate trend towards
off-spec distillate
TR- 103 only
I Tom Volke
I Incomplete
Phillip Smith Incomplete
'
r
29.1 Add low temperature alarm to TR- 103. ITom Volke / Incomplete
30. Consider adding independent high high level switch and alarm on
reflux drum
31. Check sizing of control valve TV-126 so that CV is not oversized
Tom Volke
i
Phillip Smith Study
Study
and could cause column flooding when fully open. If necessary & Tom
consider adding upper limit stop on control valve. Volke
Check as to whether upstream water separation
Reconvene meeting if not met.
33. Provide bolt torquing procedure as part of
I
34. Consider need for environmental monitors. Mary Incomplete

Patterson
Add isolation valve immediately upstream of stripper on reflux line
2"-P- 110.
t
I
36. Make valve on 3"-P-102 feed to column car seal open. Phillip Smith Incomplete
37. Add check valve to 3"-P-102, close to stripper feed inlet. Allen Brown Incomplete
rm that C-101 a
3 DYADEM
SUGGESTED READING (URLs current at time of publication)

"Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" by AIChE, CCPS, 2"d edition, 1992 plus
"Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures" by AlChE, CCPS, I st edition, 1985
www.aiche.orr/puL>cat/seadtl.as~'?Ac~k4in=2i~
"HAZOP and HAZAN" by T.Kletz, published by IChemE, 1992
htn~
www.icl1e1ne.or~/framesetsiia1~o~1ti1~S~iiii~est.
"Size up plant hazards tllis way" by H.G.Lawley, Hydrocarbon Processing, April 1976, pages
247 to 258
icatiotis,:'hp/
www.livdrocarbon~~rocessin~.co~n~conte~~ts/pul~l
"Eliminating Potential Process Hazards" by T.Kletz, Chemical Engineering, April 1, 1985, pages
48 to 59
www.che.com/
"An Introduction to Hazard and Operability Studies - The Guide Word Approach" by
R.E.Knowlton, published by Chemetics International, 198 1
www.kvaerner.co~n/co~i~pa~~ics!co~iipan
iesdctai I.asp'?id::.::.79(i
"A Manual of Hazard & Operability Studies - The Creative Identification of Deviations and
Disturbances", published by Chemetics International, 1992
w~vw.kvae1ner.con1/co11i~.~atii~s/~o1ii~~ai1iesdetai.asp~!id=796
"Some Features of and Activities in Hazard and Operability (Hazop) Studies", by J.R.Roach and
F.P.Lees, The Chemical Engineer,October, 198 1, pages 456 to 462
tusfra~nesethtln
\vwcv.ichenie.or~/fr~1111esets/i1bo~1
-
"HAZOP: Guide to best practice" by F.Crawley, M.Preston, B.Tyler, IChernE, 2000

~vww.icherne.o~/fi.amesets/aboutusframesct.l~t~n
"The HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) Method" (Website)
w~\~\\!.acusafc.co~n/I
Iazard_A~ialysis/lIAZ0PTccliriiquc.pdf
"Hazard and Operability Studies", by M.Lihou (Website)
M!M!W. l i l ~ o i ~ t e c I ~ . c o ~1 fi.m.htm
~i/h~p
"Hazard and Operability Studies", University of Florida, (Website)
litt~:l.'pie.clie.i~fl.edi~/~i~ideslhazopiindex.litn~l
"Process Hazards Analysis" by I.Sutton, published by SWISutton & Associates, 2002
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Basics of Hazop

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Basics of Hazop

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Basics of HAZOP 6-1

Good engineering practices

So what slips through the cracks?

Interface problems between equipment and systems

How Do We Know If a Plant Is Safe?

Historical record of plant incidents and near misses

What can we do about it?

© 2003 by CRC Prcss LLC

Originated by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) in Mond Division.

Normal (Design Intention)

Other Deviations typically include:

Reverse of what was intended.

© 2003 by CRC Prcss LLC

Methodology for Generating Deviations

Guide W o r d + Property = Deviation

When Property = Parameter:

When Property = Operation:

When Property = Material:

What Type of HAZOP Should You Use?

Parametric Deviation (e.g., High pressure, Low temperature, etc.)

Good for continuous processes.

Good for batch operations, start-up, shut down.

Knowledge Based HAZOP (more like 'What i f with established Checklist)

© 2003 by CRC Prcss LLC

Steps in the HAZOP Process

P&IDs (Full size and reduced copies for the team)

2. Facilitator and Process Engineer

Nodes are equipment items (or numbers of items).

Question: How do you size a node?

Answer: Based on system function.

Example: Reactor feed system may consist of Pump + Line + Exchanger.

3. Prepare HAZOP Outline with List of Deviations

4. Assemble HAZOP Team

6. Process Engineer Explains

7. HAZUP Each Node Using Deviations Listed in Outline Working Through

8. At the End of HAZOP, the Facilitator Issues Preliminary HAZOP Report

9. Issue Final Report Giving Full Details

A sample of table of contents is given in page 6- 11.

© 2003 by CRC Prcss LLC

Variations in HAZOP Types

Guide Word HAZOP

Example: Deviation: Line Rupture

Cause #I Consequence Safeguard Action

Cause #2 Consequence Safeguard Action

Cause #3 Consequence Safeguard Action

Cause-By-Cause provides full cross-referencing.

© 2003 by CRC Prcss LLC

Example: Deviation: Line Rupture

Cause #I Consequence Safeguard Action

Cause #2 Consequence Safeguard Action

Cause #3 Consequence Safeguard Action

Consequence-By-Consequence providesfull cross-referencing.

Fairly simple to execute

© 2003 by CRC Prcss LLC

Example: Deviation: Line Rupture

Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions

Deviation-By-Deviation provides no cross-referencing.

Exception Only Methodology (Not Recommended)

ActiorulCecommendations Item Only Methodology (Not Recommended)

Preparation of HAZOP Reports

Basic Report Should Consist of

For each Node and Deviation lists:

Table 6-1: Scope of HAZOP and Process Description

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