Public Management Research Association

Ethics Complaints and Local Government: The Case of Florida

Author(s): Donald C. Menzel and J. Edwin Benton
Source: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 1, No. 4
(Oct., 1991), pp. 419-435
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research
Association
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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government:
The authors wish to acknowledge the
competent research support and
assistance provided by Celeste
Gutierrez-Sanders and Adam Smith,
students in the Public Administration
Program at the University of South
Florida. We would also like to express
our appreciation to several anony-
mous reviewers for their constructive
criticism and encouragement. All
errors of omission and commission,
however, rest with the authors alone.
A previous version of this paper was
presented at the annual meeting of
the American Political Science Asso-
ciation, 1990, San Francisco.
J-PART, 1(1991):4:419435
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The Case of Florida
Donald C. Menzel
J. Edwin Benton
University of South Florida
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes complaints about ethics at the local
government. Several databases, including ethics complaints f
the Florida Commission on Ethics, are drawn on to test hyp
that might explain why officials in some Florida counties r
more or fewer ethical complaints than do officials in other c
The findings indicate that those counties that experience po
growth pressures and that have highly educated populations
likely to have more ethics complaints filed against their offi
are counties with the opposite characteristics. These finding
though tentative and limited to Florida, point to the need t
more fully and to understand the contextual influences on
complaints. In addition, the study results suggest that expla
for ethical wrongdoing may need to reach beyond finding fa
weaknesses in individuals who commit such acts or in the o
zations that conduct the public's business.
Wrongdoing in local government has a long history. The
demise of big-city political machines at the turn of the
twentieth century was due in part to the belief that it was no
longer acceptable to use government for personal gain. The
end of political machines in places like New York, Phila-
delphia, Kansas City, and Chicago did not end wrongdoing in
America's cities and states. Nor have ethical problems and
issues disappeared as a result of (1) good government reforms
(such as council-manager structures, at-large electoral districts,
and nonpartisan elections), (2) ethics laws adopted by many
states in the 1970s and 1980s, or (3) the establishment of state-
wide ethics commissions or boards to police ethical trans-
gressions. There is scant evidence to suggest that the adoption
of ethics codes by cities and counties or even by professional
associations has made any real difference in the number of
ethical transgressions committed by appointed and elected
officials.
419/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

Very little data exist that document the extent to which

ethical problems occur at local levels of government. There are
many anecdotal accounts of ethical problems, but it is not
known whether those accounts and the incidents they repre-
sent are becoming more or less common. Nor is it known
whether ethical problems are more prevalent in some juris-
dictions than in others. Few hypotheses are offered to explain
why different communities experience different numbers of
ethical problems.

Similarly, there is little information about those who are

the targets of ethics complaints, what the complaints deal with,
or the extent to which such complaints have validity. Students
of government have done little to examine the possible link-
ages between political and administrative corruption and
ethical decision making.

This paper takes a step toward closing these research gaps

by documenting and analyzing ethics complaints at local levels
of government. Specifically, our study examines ethics com-
plaints in Florida during the period 1975-1990. The findings,
although tentative and limited to Florida, show the need to
more fully study and understand the community context in
which ethical issues arise.

The next two sections provide brief overviews of the

ethics and corruption literatures, respectively. Then the series
of hypotheses that guided the study effort is set forth; this is
followed by a discussion of ethics complaint trends and prac-
tices in Florida. Descriptions of the data collection and the
analysis precede the presentation of the conclusions.

ETHICS STUDIES

Scholarly interest in government ethics has grown con-

siderably over the past decade. Most treatments have focused
on philosophical or theoretical issues of individual behavior,
although often in the context of complex public organizations
(Wilbem 1984; Thompson 1980 and 1985; Stewart 1984; Bow-
man 1981; Morgan 1987; McSwain and White 1987; Dobel 1990;
Denhardt 1988). Other scholars have written at length about
ethics codes (Burke and Benson 1989; Chandler 1983; Robin et
al. 1989). Systematic empirical research has centered primarily
on surveys of (1) practicing public administrators, to learn how
they view ethical issues and problems (Bowman 1990; Hayes
and Gleissner 1981; Jennings and Mitchell n.d.; Schmidt and
Posner 1986), and (2) academics responsible for training public
administrators (Hejka-Elkins 1988). In addition, a number of
scholars have conducted empirical studies of whistleblowing

420/J-PART, October 1991

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'A series of studies have also been
completed that examine the conse-
quences of political corruption on the
electoral process, induding the cost
in votes for incumbents seeking re-
election. See Peters and Welch (1978
and 1980), Rundquist et al. (1977), and
Krasno and Green (1988).
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Ethics Complaints and Local Government
and whistleblowers (Jos et al. 1989; Miceli and Near 1985; Near
and Miceli 1986; Perry 1991).
The ethics literature, although it is expanding rapidly, has
been largely silent in documenting and analyzing ethics as a
community concern. Few hypotheses have been offered or
tested that explain why some communities experience more
ethical problems than do other communities. The whistle-
blowing literature comes closest in this regard, with attention
given to the interplay between the organizational context and
the act of blowing the whistle. Still, whistleblowing research
has concentrated primarily on the motivations of whistle-
blowers. "Significantly less research," Perry notes, "has been
devoted to putting the whistleblowing process into its larger
social context" (1991, 6). (See also Johnson and Kraft 1989.)
Corruption literature, although it focuses mainly on
national and state communities, has not been silent in this
regard.
CORRUPTION STUDIES
Students of political and administrative corruption have
focused primarily on the causes and consequences of corrup-
tion. This has taken several forms. At the national and inter-
national levels, there has been a long-standing interest in
assessing the extent to which corruption is functional or dys-
functional in the evolution of the modern nation-state (Werner
1983; Nye 1967).1 At the subnational level, particularly in
studies of the American states, there have been several efforts
to identify and assess the determinants of political corruption
(Nice 1983; Johnston 1983; Peters and Welch 1980).
In a recently completed study Meier and Holbrook-
Provow (1990) use corruption conviction data collected by the
U.S. Department of Justice to assess several models that
purport to explain corruption in the American states. They
conclude that political corruption is heavily conditioned by
historical and cultural conditions (especially urbanization and
education), political factors, governmental structure (particu-
larly fragmentation), and bureaucratic opportunity and size.
For instance, their combined empirical model shows that,
among several key indicators, urbanization and the growth of
bureaucracy are accompanied by corruption, while high levels
of education and voter turnout appear to discourage it. Their
regression model indicates that urbanization has the greatest
influence, followed by bureaucratic size.
Other studies have documented similar influences, al-
though with some inconsistencies. Nice (1983) found that high
421/J-PART, October 1991

2We do not offer a political culture
hypothesis based on Daniel J. Elazar's
typology of moralistic, traditionalistic,
and individualistic political cultures.
To the best of our knowledge, the
only attempt to date to map those
cultures in Florida was by Kincaid
(1982). This effort was limited to
urban areas and, according to his
statistics, resulted in the state as a
whole being dominated by a Tradi-
tionalistic political culture.
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Ethics Complaints and Local Government
levels of education, interparty competition, economic growth,
and a moralistic political culture resulted in low conviction
rates for political corruption. Urbanization, however, did not
show a statistically significant relationship. Johnston (1983),
using a similar methodology but focusing on eighty-five
federal judicial districts, found that conviction totals varied
according to population size, voter turnout, and the presence
or absence of a moralistic political culture. Johnston's study
did not document a statistically significant relationship
between conviction levels and historical, cultural, and
bureaucratic influences.
These studies, although limited to state-level analyses, are
suggestive for research on ethics issues, including complaint
making at local levels of government. Indeed, it is plausible to
suggest that some corruption hypotheses might explain vari-
ation in ethics complaints among cities and counties.
HYPOTHESES
A set of ten hypotheses were developed, using these liter-
atures, to explain ethics complaints at local government levels.
They were broken into five areas: historical/cultural, political,
reform structure, bureaucratic, and demographic influences.
Historical/Cultural2
Hi: As the education level of the population increases, the
number of complaints filed against local officials will
decrease.
Rationale: A more-educated population is likely to be
aware of the potential for wrongdoing and therefore be a
deterrent. Education can also serve as a surrogate measure of
middle-class values, which are generally believed to be incom-
patible with wrongdoing in government. A competing hypoth-
esis drawn from the citizen-contacting literature can also be
offered. As education levels increase, the greater is the
propensity to contact public officials in general and to register
complaints for perceived ethics violations.
H2: As economic distress and growth pressures increase, the
number of complaints filed against local officials will
increase.
Rationale: Economic distress usually makes government a
more important provider of public goods, which, in turn,
breeds competition for securing those goods. Population
growth is typically accompanied by economic development
422/J-PART, October 1991
 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

and profit making, particularly by land-development firms that

need the support of local officials, who are often subjected to
intense pressure by developers and others. The strain of
growth is also believed to weaken the social norms and insti-
tutions of a community, which can produce socially undesir-
able behavior.

H3: As urbanization increases, the number of complaints filed

against local officials will increase.

Rationale: Historically, urbanization and its attendant

crowding effects have been associated with corruption in
government. Moreover, urbanization typically results in in-
creased demands for public goods, which makes government
more important in the community and an attractive target of
economic opportunity.

H4: Greater participation and membership in religious organi-

zations will result in fewer ethical complaints made
against public officials.

Rationale: As the ethical consciousness of a community

increases (and insofar as it is reflected in church membership)
wrongdoing will be deterred; this is similar to the deterrent
rationale offered for education. This hypothesis also has some
links to Elazar's concept of moralistic political culture, which
emphasizes the public good and communitarianism. As Elazar
(1970, 263) puts it, where the moralistic political culture is
dominant, "there is also much less of what Americans consider
corruption in government and less tolerance of those actions
which are considered corrupt."

Political

H5: As party competition increases, the number of complaints

filed against local officials will decrease.

Rationale: The more vigorous the political system is, the

more likely it is that those who would commit ethical viola-
tions run a higher risk of exposure. Therefore, vigorous party
competition is expected to deter acts of wrongdoing by public
officeholders.

H6: As voter-turnout levels increase, the number of complaints

filed against local officials will decrease.

Rationale: Basically the same as H5 in that a more par-

ticipatory electorate demands more information about office-
holders and office seekers. Thus, those who engage in un-

423/J-PART, October 1991

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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

ethical behavior are likely to be exposed, which in turn acts as

a deterrent to wrongdoing.

Reform Structure

H7: Reformed local governments will have fewer complaints

filed against their officials than will unreformed local
governments.

Rationale: Reformed governments (such as those with

appointed chief administrative officers) are supposed to bring
about "better" government, including more ethical practices by
local officials.

Bureaucratic

H8: As the size of government increases, the number of

complaints filed against local officials will increase.

Rationale: More and larger government supposedly

breeds greater opportunity and importance for those who
occupy positions of authority. The temptation to engage in
wrongdoing is greater because the rewards are more
substantial in larger governments.

Demographic

H9: The larger the population, the larger the number of

complaints filed against local officials.

Rationale: Sheer numbers should generate more

complaints.

H10: As the age of the population increases, the number of

complaints filed against local officials will increase.

Rationale. A leisure or retirement-based rationale for this

hypothesis can be offered, especially in the context of Florida
where there are many retired persons. Retired persons have
more leisure time and therefore may pay more attention to
local affairs than those who are in the workforce. Another
rationale, one based on moral-development theories such as
Kohlberg's (1976), can also be offered. Although Kohlberg does
not equate aging and moral maturation as a linear process,
there is an implication that aging is more than a process of
physical change; it is also a state of mind. Aging can be
accompanied by wisdom and spiritual growth, which can be
thought of as moral maturation. It is plausible, therefore, to
suggest that older people may take a more ethical outlook on

424/J-PART, October 1991

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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

their life than do younger people. Consequently, communities

with many older persons may be more aggressive in identify-
ing wrongdoers and filing ethics complaints.

To examine these ten hypotheses, data were assembled on

local governments in Florida.

ETHICS COMPLAINTS IN FLORIDA

The number of ethics complaints filed against public

officials in Florida has increased steadily since 1974 when the
Florida Commission on Ethics was created. The 271 complaints
filed in 1990 was quadruple the total filed ten years earlier.
Exhibit 1 shows the total number of complaints filed between
1975 and 1990.3 It also shows that most complaints were
directed at city and county officials. The trend line for city-
county complaints parallels that for complaints against other
government officials (e.g., state officials). Citizens tended to
register more complaints against city officials (city complaints)
than against county officials (county complaints). In the 1982-
86 period, however, city complaints declined or held steady
while county complaints increased steadily. Finally, the
number of complaints rose sharply in the 1980s.

Exhibit 1
Ethics Complaints in Florida, 1975-1990

Number of Complaints
300

250

200

150-

0 X LE1 FE- n nl
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
3The number of complaints filed Year

against city and county officials was

estimated for 1985 and 1989 because Total I City+Cnty L Counties _ Cities

of incomplete or unavailable data.

Estimates were generated by averag- Source: Florida Commission on Ethics. City/county est. for 1985-89-90
ing previous levels and they tend to
be conservative.

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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

The overall upward trend in ethics complaints might be

explained in several ways. First, it may reflect exactly what
was happening-that is, more wrongdoing by public officials.
Second, it may be that people became more informed about
both local government and the Florida Ethics Commission and
filed more complaints. Third, the upward trend may simply
mirror growth in the population of Florida.

Some perspective on this last explanation can be gained

by inspecting the trend line in Exhibit 2. It indicates that from
1975 to 1990 the number of complaints per 100,000 population
increased, suggesting that complaint making, at least in the
aggregate, is a product of more influences than just population
size.

Exhibit 2
Ethics Complaints Per 100,000 Population

Num-ber per 100,000

2.5

1.5

75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Year

Source: Florida Commission on Ethics.

The state of Florida established an ethics complaint-

making process so citizens would have the legal means to
identify and prevent ethical wrongdoing by public officials.
Filing a sworn complaint, of course, does not necessarily mean
that an ethical transgression has occurred-other than in the
mind of the complainant. Technically and legally, the state's
ethics laws are not violated until the commission conducts an
investigation and renders a decision. This process is intended
to protect officeholders from persons motivated to file com-
plaints for political, personal, or idiosyncratic reasons. (The law
prohibits the filing of a complaint against a candidate for

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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

election within five days preceding the election date.) In

addition, an ethics complaint that is found to have merit repre-
sents a violation of state law. Thus, the Ethics Commission and
its staff give considerable attention to the intent and meaning
of the law. Stated differently, when a complaint becomes a
violation it is transformed from a perception and allegation of
ethical wrongdoing into an act of ethical wrongdoing that fits a
narrow legal definition.
'The Ethics Commission does not
have the authority to initiate inves-
A legal definition of wrongdoing (defined as a violation
tigations; it can only investigate com-
plaints that have been received from or, in most corruption studies, a conviction) may be a minimal
the public. Complaints must be sworn and not altogether satisfactory definition of ethical wrong-
statements and must provide pertin- doing. Ethics complaints, although only perceptions from a
ent facts and details of the alleged
legal point of view, may serve as more meaningful barometers
wrongdoing. When it receives a com-
plaint, the commission staff reviews
of ethical problems in a community than do actual violations
the complaint to determine that it is of the law. For example, analysis of several hundred cases
sufficient from a legal point of view, (described in the next section) shows that about one of every
e.g., is relevant to state ethics laws. If four complaints is eventually judged by the Ethics Commission
the complaint is found to be insuffi-
to be a violation of state law. Furthermore, when complaints
cient, it is dismissed. If it is found to
be legally sufficient, a preliminary
are aggregated at the city and county levels, strong statistical
investigation to determine probable correlations exist between the number of complaints filed and
cause is conducted. If the commission the number of complaints found to have (a) legal sufficiency,
then finds reason for probable cause (b) probable cause to believe there has been a violation of
to exist, a full and final investigation
ethics laws, and (c) been rendered a violation.4 Thus, even
is conducted (if the alleged violator is
not a legislator or an impeachable
though the number of complaints cannot be correlated to the
officer, in which case the complaint is amount of wrongdoing, the change over time in the numbers
forwarded to the appropriate body). of complaints filed in a particular jurisdiction would appear to
Among the 883 city-county cases be a reasonable indicator of the changes in the extent of ethical
reviewed for this study, 506 were
problems.
found to have legal sufficiency, 251
were found to have probable cause,
DATA AND METHODS
and 208 were found to represent vio-
lations of Florida's ethics laws. The
Pearson correlation coefficients for These aggregate statistics, although useful, are limit
city complaints per county and find- must be disaggregated in order to conduct a more detaile
ings of sufficiency, probable cause, analysis. To do this, the commission's records for the p
and violations are .95, .79, and .73,
1975-1984 and 1986-90 were searched to identify all the co
respectively. The coefficients for
county complaints per county and
plaints filed against local government officials. (Because
findings of sufficiency, probable cause, person is known to have filed 145 complaints in 1985, tha
and violations are .83, .58, and .56, was excluded from this portion of the analysis.) This re
respectively. All are statistically in 940 cases that could be coded by type of local official' and
significant at the p < .001.
government-city (N = 552), county (N = 330), and special dis-
5The breakdown by type of local offi-trict (N = 58).6 The largest number of complaints (N = 319)
cial is as follows: elected officials = alleged that an official had "misused his/her position." Failure
512; appointed officials = 247; employ- to disclose a financial interest involving the official and an
ees = 135; others = 14; missing = 32. outside party was the second most common subject of com-
plaints (N = 138). Other complaints dealt with voting conflicts
6We were unable to secure all cases
for 1989 and 1990 because some were (N = 56), conflict of interest with respect to employment or
still open. We had access only to those contractual arrangements (N = 30), solicitation or acceptance of
no longer under official investigation gifts, salary and expenses, disclosure of information, and other
by the Ethics Commission. matters.

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7The model was also tested with
ED12, percent of the population
having twelve or more years of
education. The findings were similar
to those reported for ED16, although
the model did not perform as well
overall.
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Ethics Complaints and Local Government
A second database was also compiled. Social, econonmc,
demographic, and political data were extracted from the U.S.
Census Bureau's 1988 County and City Census Book, 1988 Florida
Statistical Abstract, Florida County Comparisons 1988-a docu-
ment published by the Florida Department of Commerce-and
Churches and Church Membership in the United States 1980
(Quinn et al. 1982). A single, integrated dataset was assembled
and served as the primary database for the analysis that
follows.
The indicators and variables listed in Exhibit 3 were
drawn on to test the ten hypotheses. Due to limitations on the
availability of data at the municipal level, it was necessary to
limit the analysis to Florida's sixty-seven counties. Jacksonville-
Duval County, a consolidated city-county government, was
excluded from the analysis.
ANALYSIS
Multiple regression analysis was used to examine the fit
of the model suggested in Exhibit 3 and to assess the relative
influence of the independent variables. Exhibit 4 shows the
results of the regression model. Overall, the model explains 34
percent of the variance in ethics complaints using the
unweighted coefficients or 20 percent using the weighted
coefficients.
The regression results document some expected and some
unexpected findings. Among the expected findings is the in-
fluence of population growth rate (GROWTH) on the number
of complaints filed. Population growth has, according to the
size of the beta weight (.36; sig. p < .03), the single greatest
influence on the number of complaints filed against county
officials. In contrast, the beta weight (.23) for population size is
smaller. Growth pressures apparently do beget opportunities
for wrongdoing and, insofar as complaints accurately reflect
wrongdoing, are accompanied by wrongdoing.
The second largest influence on the number of complaints
filed is education (beta = .30-ED16). A more-educated popula-
tion is likely to file more complaints. This finding, although not
consistent with some findings reported in the corruption
literature, might be explained several ways. It may be that the
college-educated public is more attentive to the affairs of local
government and thus more inclined to be ethics watchdogs.7
Moreover, an awareness of ethical wrongdoing, in contrast to
criminal behavior associated with political corruption, may
require an even more attentive and informed public. Political
corruption, although not easy to monitor, may not be as
428/J-PART, October 1991
 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

Exhibit 3
Variables and Indicators

The direction of the hypothesized relationships are indicated in parentheses below the name of
each independent variable. Some variables use 1984 as the baseline because it is the approximate
midpoint of the complaint data range. Fifty-seven percent of all complaints examined in this study
occurred between 1984 and 1989. Other variables use data that reflect change over time or are available
only for certain years.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Historical/Cultural CTNYTOT:** total number of complaints filed

ED16: percentage of population with against county officials, 1975-1989

(-) sixteen or more years of formal LOGCTNY: natural logarithm of CTNYTOT
education in 1984

POVERTY: percentage of 1980 population All calculations use LOGCTNY due to the
(+) below poverty level in 1979 positive skew in the distribution of CTNYTOT.

DENSITY: persons per square mile in 1984

(+)

CHURCH: percentage of population who

(-) were adherents to 111 church
denominations in 1980

Demographic

POP: population in 1984

(+)

GROWTH: percentage growth in population *The negative direction

(+) 1980-1988
since a low value represents a greater degree of
PER65: percentage of population age 6 competition. Substantively, the negative sign
(+) or over in 1984 should be interpreted to mean that competition

Political varies inversely with complaint making.

GOVRACE:* percentage margin of victory in **Nice (1983) used the number of convictions for
(-) 1986 gubernatorial election political corruption per 100,000 federal, state and
VOTEPER: percentage voting turnout in 1986 local public employeess and Meir and Holbrook-
(-) gubernatorial election Provow (1990) used the number of convictions
for political corruption per 100 elected officials in
Bureaucratic a state. Johnston used conviction totals per

TOTALEXP: total county expenditures, 1984 federal judic

(+) 'of state convictions for each district. Like
Johnston, we used raw totals because we believe
Reform/Structure it is important to find out what variables are

GOVPER: percentage change in dollars per significant after po

(-) capita for county personnel expen- Moreover, it made little
ditures, 1981-88 lations per elected officials in Florida counties
since the number of elected officials, with the
ADMIN: dichotomized by presence or ab- exception of Duval County, is nearly the same in
(-) sence of appointed administrator all counties-ranging from 10 to 12.

429/J-PART, October 1991

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above.
8For an excellent review of this
literature, see Coulter (1988).
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Ethics Complaints and Local Government
Exhibit 4
Regression Model-Ethics Complaints in Florida Counties
(N = 66)*
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Beta t-score sig.
Age 65+ (PER65) .11 .72 .47
College Graduates (ED16) .30 1.87 .07
Church Membership (CHURCH) -.09 -.68 .50
Population Growth (GROWTH) .36 2.24 .03
Population Size (POP)** .23 1.34 .19
Population Density (DENSITY) .09 .54 .59
Poverty (POVERTY) .21 1.04 .30
Voter Turnout (VOTEPER) -.18 -1.11 .27
Party Competition (GOVRACE) .07 .55 .58
County Personnel Exp (GOVPER) -.15 -1.10 .28
Structure (ADMIN) .19 1.14 .26
R2 = .34 Adj. R2= .20 R= .58 F= 2.48 p < .05
Dependent Variable = LOGCTNY
*Jacksonville-Duval County is omitted from the data base.
**TOTALEXP, the indicator of bureaucratic size of county govern-
ment, was dropped from the analysis due to the high (.95)
intercorrelation with POP. Separate regression analyses using
TOTALEXP without POPSIZE produced results similar to those
difficult to monitor as the ethics behavior of public office-
holders. Furthermore, a primary responsibility of law-
enforcement authorities (rather than the public at large) is to
monitor and prosecute criminal behavior. In essence, the public
must police public officials who engage in unethical behavior.
An alternative explanation for the relationship between
education level and ethics complaint making, as suggested
earlier, is that more educated persons are likely both to be
more informed of the ethics complaint-making process and
more willing to use it. The validity of this explanation rests
largely on the extent to which the filing of a sworn statement
that alleges an ethics violation can be regarded as just another
case of citizens making demands. Moreover, studies of citizen-
contacting behavior have not been consistent in documenting a
linkage between socioeconomic variables, such as education
and urbanization, and contacting propensity.8
430/J-PART, October 1991
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9We also tested this model with the
charter status of a county. Twelve of
Florida's sixty-seven counties have
home-rule charters. Since Duval
County, a charter county, was ex-
cluded from the analysis, the N was
reduced to eleven. Nonetheless, the
findings were similar to those
reported for the commission-
administrator form of government.
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Ethics Complaints and Local Government
The third largest influence, according to the regression
model, is population size (beta = .23). Although not statistically
significant at p < .05, it is in the predicted direction and is
consistent with the statewide aggregate data portrayed in
Exhibit 2.
One unexpected finding has to do with the relationship
between administrative structure (ADMIN) and the level of
ethics complaint making. It has a positive, although modest
and statistically nonsignificant beta weight of .19. Counties
with appointed administrators are likely to have more com-
plaints registered against their officials than are counties
without appointed administrators. One should exercise caution
in making too much of this finding. It could be that the
measure of complaint making (an aggregated measure over
time) does not accurately capture the effect of "before and
after" when a county installs an administrator to handle day-
to-day affairs of govemment. Conversely, it could be that
ethical problems in a county can actually be a catalyst for the
adoption of a commission-administrator form of government.9
Unfortunately, the validity of this explanation cannot be
determined with the present study design.
In contrast to the anomaly of the ADMIN finding, the
other measure of reform-GOVPER-is in the hypothesized
direction. That is, counties that experienced larger increases in
their spending on personnel between 1980 and 1988 were the
counties that received fewer ethics complaints. Specifically,
there is a negative relationship (b = -.15) between county
personnel expenditures (GOVPER) and the level of complaint
making. This could mean that those counties that were willing
to provide their employees larger pay increases or that were
more responsive in meeting the demands placed on them by
the community may be reaping the benefits of better-paid
employees and of professionalism in government-less ethical
wrongdoing, or at least a perception of less ethical
wrongdoing.
Other variables in the regression model also have signs in
the predicted direction. Age-PER65-for example is in the
correct direction but has a small beta coefficient (.11). Counties
with older residents are likely to have more complaints filed
against their officials than are counties with younger residents.
Population density-the single measure of urbanization-also
is related to higher levels of complaints, although the co-
efficient is smaller than that for age. CHURCH, the single
measure of ethical sensitivity, has a small, negative coefficient
that suggests counties with larger percentages of church
members experience a smaller number of ethics complaints.
431/J-PART, October 1991
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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

POVERTY is in the hypothesized direction but has a modest

size coefficient (beta = .21). A similar finding emerges for
bureaucratic size. Although not shown in Exhibit 4, when
bureaucratic size (TOTALEXP) is entered into the equation in
place of POP, the beta weight for TOTALEXP is .10.

The political variables-voter turnout (VOTEPER) and

party competition (GOVRACE)-are not consistently related to
ethics-complaint levels. Voter turnout is inversely related (as
hypothesized) to complaints (beta = -.18). The single measure
of party competition (GOVRACE) has a small coefficient and is
in the opposite direction to that predicted. It could be that this
measure, which focuses on a competitive gubernatorial race in
1986, does not adequately reflect competition. County-specific
measures might produce different results but were not used
because of difficulty in securing comparable data.

In summary, the regression model explains approximately

one-third of the variance in ethics-complaint levels across
Florida counties. This appears to be a reasonable fit, since the
filing of an ethics complaint could be the product of many
influences-not least of which could be diverse and unique
motivations among individuals in a community.

CONCLUSIONS

This study reaches several conclusions. First, growth

pressures like those experienced in Florida bring benefits and
costs. The results here suggest that growth pressures have a
significant influence on ethics complaint making across
Florida's counties. State officials, these findings seem to imply,
need to be especially alert to the probability of ethical
wrongdoing in rapidly growing areas. Cities and counties may
need to be more vigilant in monitoring public officials and,
perhaps, to be more creative in devising mechanisms that
enable citizens to be more active guardians of the public trust.

Second, the finding that high levels of education are

positively associated with ethical complaints filed against
county officials, while contrary to the findings reported in
political-corruption studies, suggests that an educated public
may play an important role in monitoring the ethical behavior
of public officials. Education, as suggested by state political-
corruption studies, may challenge wrongdoing but may do so
in a still different way. A more-educated public may actually
turn citizens into ethics watchdogs, rather than merely serve as
an ethics screen or filter for those who occupy positions in
government. In addition, this finding can be viewed as a re-
affirmation of society's investment in education as a bulwark

432/J-PART, October 1991

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 Ethics Complaints and Local Government

against those who would corrupt democratic institutions and

processes. An educated and informed citizenry, as democratic
theorists contend, is a necessity not a luxury.10

Professionalism in local government also appears to foster

more ethical government. The statistics reported here suggest
that those counties that are willing to invest more in their
public officials experience fewer ethics complaints. Although
the measure of spending (percent increase in personnel expen-
ditures per capita between 1981 and 1988) is not as precise as
would be preferred, the findings are suggestive of the possible
return that a community might receive from a better-paid and
presumably more professional workforce.

These findings are a tentative first step toward more fully

and carefully delineating the influences on ethics complaint
making at local levels of government. The steady increase in
complaints, at least in Florida, suggests that ethics issues and
problems are not disappearing. Perhaps more important, the
study results suggest that the explanations given for reporting
ethical wrongdoing may need to reach beyond finding fault
with individuals who commit such acts and with the organiza-
tions that conduct the public's business.

Studies should be conducted in other states, even across

states, to corroborate or modify the findings reported here."'
'0While the education finding may be Moreover, comparative studies that deal with corruption in the
contrary to corruption studies, it is in American states, although useful and important, need to be
line with voting and political- complemented by studies of local government. While some
participation studies such as Erikson
corruption hypotheses were helpful in explaining ethics com-
et al. (1988), Flanigan and Zingale
(1987), and Verba and Nie (1972). plaint making, others were not. Research is needed along these
lines to determine whether an operant theory of corruption can
"This task, although desirable, may be developed that informs research on ethics in government.
not be easy to accomplish with a Likewise, ethics research is needed and is necessary to inform
methodology that relies on ethics
emerging theories of corruption.
complaints. There is considerable
variation from state to state in terms
of the authority, size, composition, Finally, a fruitful line of research might be one that links
and reporting practices of ethics empirical studies of whistleblowing, particularly those that
boards or commissions. States most
examine contextual variables such as size, resources, and
similar to Florida include Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts.
organizational culture, with studies that examine contextual/
Wisconsin, although significantly community influences on ethical behavior. It would be valu-
smaller in the scale of its operations, able, for example, to know how those who are motivated to
may also be a suitable candidate for blow the whistle on ethical wrongdoers find that behavior
study.
reinforced or muted by community influences.

433/J-PART, October 1991

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