'1

EMPLOYMENT OF T.C. RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALION

IN AN INVASION.

CARROLL C. MULLEN
MAJOR T.C.

Date Submitted, 30 May 1949

Employment of a transportationn corps

railway operating battalion in an invasion
bay Maj E

SECIJRIiT JL

IS A HOLDING OF THE
ARCHIVESESECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT O. R-2128.235 COPY NO. L

CGSC Form 160 Army-CGSC-P2-17i98-7 Mar 52-5M

13 Mar 51

Ayd Y Sii

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" .. .. '
a t' .;: >.o
 CO0 AND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 4021
Department of Logistics
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

_ 3 Dec tubr 194a

STUDENT RESEARCH DIRECTIVE FOR SUBJECT NUMBER 4-9

STUDENTI Mullen, Carroll C M___aj, TC_

(Name) (Rank) (ASN)

FACULTY ADVISOR Maj Rochford 245 r

6297 ,...
~
(Name) (Room No.) (Tele. No.)

SUBJECT Initial Employment of a TO Railway Operating Battalion in an

Invasion (D-Day to D plus 50). _ - .

PURPOSE: To present a practical study of echelonment, employment, and

command control of Military Railway Service troops, TC, in
preparation for and during initial phases of an invasion.

SCOPE: (Brief outline of subject coverage)

1. Grouping of personnel and equipment of Railway Operating Battalion

for movement into zone of invasion and timing.

2. Movement in invasion.

5. Employment on far shore, and channels of command, prior to estab-

lishment of the communications zone.

4. Capabilities for rehabilitating and operation of captured railway.

5. Capabilities for transportation of logistic support of invasion

forces.

6. Make definite recommendations for employment in future operations.

NOTE TO STUDENTS:

1. The scope suggested above is intended as a guide only and is not

to be construed as a limitation on the students perusal of the subject.
The student is encouraged to modify the above scope as he may find necessary
to outline and define the specific problem he visualizes and proposes to
develop in his research study. (
(over)
 2. The references below are furnished to give the student enough materi-
al with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that the student will
make use of other available sources in order to ,ive adequate scope to his
subject, and to include latest developments pei'tining to the subject.

REFERENCES:

Consult Archives Pamphlet Section and Library Index Cards, and Faculty
Advisor.

COORDINATION: (Confer with the authors of these subjects for pertinent

information and coordination)

4-6

RE!MARKS:
 COmvND1 AND GENIAL AFF COLLEGE 4021
Department of Lb idtics
Fort Leavenworth, 1a.hsas

.. .. . . .
18 May
. .
1949

STUDENT RESEARCH DIRECTIVE FOR SUBJECT NUMBER 4-9

STUDENT Mullen, -Carroll C0 Maj ;i7~; C

(Name) (Rank) (ASN)

FACULTY ADVISOR --
Maj Rochford --
245 .. ..
6297
(Name) (Room No.) (Tele. No.)

SUBJECT Rehabilitation of Railroad Tracks, Bridges, Facilities and Train

Dispatcher Communication Circuits in a Theater ofOperations.

PURPOSE: To determine the desirability of using Engineer and Signal Corps

troops for rehabilitation of railway tracks, bridges, and communi-
cations in a Theater of Operations.

SCOPE; (Brief outline of subject coverage)

1. Should Engineer and Signal Corps troops be given special training

in construction techniques peculiar to railroads.

2. Should the Military Railway Service have organic construction

regiments trained in techniques of construction peculiar to railroads.

5. Should the minimum requirements of Signal and Engineer Corps

troops be attached to the Military Railway Service in a Theater of Opera-
tions.

4. What coordination should be effected between communications zone

and army areas as to over-all rail rehabilitation program.

5. Make definite recommendations for future operations.

NOTE TO STUDENTS:

1. The scope suggested above is intended as a guide only and is not

to be construed as a limitation on the students perusal of the subject.
The student is encouraged to modify the above scope as he may find necessary
to outline and define the specific problem he visualizes and proposes to
develop in his research study. v
(over)
 2. The references below are furhished to dive the student enough materi-
al with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that the student will
make use of other available sources in order t&iive adequate scope to his
subject, and to include latest developments peiaiiuhing to the subject.

REFERENCES :

Consult Archives Pamphlet Section and Library Index Cards, and Faculty
Advisor.

COORDINATION: (Confer with the authors of these subjects for pertinent

information and coordination)

REIARKS:
 COMBINED ARMS RESEARCHLIBRARY
FORT LEAVENWORTH. KS

.4f III 11111

111111 II I III
3 1695 00513 8300
IA
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

FORT LEAVENWORTH' KANSAS.

Logistics Specialized Course.

Regular Class 1948-1949

EMPLOYMENT T.C. RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALION

IN AN INVASION

Carroll C. Mullen
Major T.C.

Date submitted, 30 May 1949.

R-0tC

,rBt)iarW* 1 S«'

a,7r
ib !
v 3A
4 Nr
~
STAFF STUDY ;e . rector, Department of Logistics
Command and General Staff College
FILE: 4-9 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1 June 19h9

SUBJECT: Employment of TC Railway Operating Battalion in an

Invasion (D-Day to D plus 30).

TO: Director, Department of Logistics, C&GSC.

1. PROBLEM.--To determine the employment and command of TC Mili-

tary Railway Service troops in preparation for and during invasions.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.--a. That Ry Operating Bns assigned to the NRS of

a TofOpns will be attached to a TF.

b. That the comd of the invasion TF will pass to the TA&H

at an appropriate time.

c. That ry facilities exist in the objective area.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.--This study is based upon the

invasion experiences of Ry Operating Bns and pertinent doctrine as

set forth in FM -5555.

4. DISCUSSION.--a. Effective over-all rail opns in a TofOpns or

invaded area, depends on centralized control at the hq comdg both

the combat and Co s areas. Directives necessary to coordinate Ry,

Sig, Engr trps, and those aspects pertaining to foreign RR owner-

ship, must be issued early for efficient over-all rail effort.

Information as to capabilities and relation to other arms and ser-

vices of Ry Operating Bns should be available for the guidance of

all mil agencies. (Annex 3; par 2a-f, 7c.)

b. Pre-invasion planning for rail opns must be adequate as

to int, selection of ry targets for bombing, phasing of ry trps,

requirements of supplies and material for rehabilitation and opn

of rys in objective area. MRS pers should aid in planning at all

levels of comd when RRs are involved. (Annex 3; par 3a-c.)

c. Ry Operating Bns or elements thereof should be available

for employment by D plus 2 in invaded areas and an additional Bn

available before rail opns have exceeded 150 mi. (Annex 3; par 4a-h.)
d. For maximum trans capability the employment of Ry Operating
Bns should be limited primarily to ry opns and maintenance for

which they are designed. (Annex 3; par 5a-c.)

e. Ry Operating Bns have excellent RR rehabilitation capa-

bilities but not the capacity to keep up with a rapid advance of

the combat forces. (Annex 3; par 6a-f.)

f. Ry Operating Bns trans capability depends on the char-

acteristics of the RR, adequacy and condition of equip captured.

Under favorable conditions they can trans tonnage in excess of

normal needs for a type field army. (Annex 3; par 7a-h.)

5. CONCIUSION.--In invasion opns, Ry Operating Bns are capable

of performing their normal mission of ry opns and maintenance.

They should be available for employment on D plus 2. Adequate

planning, centralized control at TF and/or TAB level is essential.

6. RECOWEND TIONS.--a. Recommend approval by the CofS, USA, of

comd control plan for the IRS, Annex L. This plan permits unity

of over-all ry opns and flexibility of control of Log rail tonnage

movements in combat and Conis.

b. That policies for the guidance of all levels of comd be

issued by the GSUS&, covering the capabilities, limitations, au-

thority, relation to other arms and services, of TC IRS units in

a TofOpns.

c. That this study be forwarded to the Dir, Log Div, GSUSA,

for his consideration and appropriate a tion.

CARROLL C MJLLEN
ANNEXES: Major, TC, Student
1. Memo transmittal to Director of Logistics, C&GSC.
2. Letter to Director, Logistics Division, GSUSA.
3. General Discussion of Staff Study.
}. Chart for Command Control of RS in TofOpns.
5. Bibliography.

CONCURRENCES.--Omitted.

NONCONCURRENCES .-- Omitted.

CONSIDERATION OF NONCONCURRENCES.--Omitted.

ANNEXES ADDED.--None.

-2-
 June 1949

APPROVED.

F A HENNING
Colonel, FA
Director, Department of
Logistics
 COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
SUBJECT: Staff Study - Employment of TO Ry Operating Bn in an Invasion
(IDENTIFY THIS MEMORANDUM SLIP WITH PAPERS TO WHICH ATTACHED.)

TO SUBJECT MATTER
DATE AND Ii

Commandant 1. I concur in the recommendation of the attached 1 June 1919

C&GSC research study.

2. Request that this study be transmitted to the

Director, Logistics Division, GSUS&, by means of a letter,
Annex 2, which has been prepared for your signature. F A HENNING
Col, FA
Dir, Dept of
Logistics

ANNEX 1
(USE REVERSE SIDE IF NECESSARY) P9-1328-C&GSC-15 Feb 49-20M
 COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

1 June 1949

SUBJECT: Employment of a TO Railway Operating Battalion in an

Invasion (D-Day to D plus 30).

FILE: 4-9
TO: The Director
Logistics Division, G. S., U. S. Army
Washington 25, D. C.

1. The attached staff study, 'Employment of a TC Railway

Operating Battalion in an Invasion," is transmitted to you for con-

sideration and appropriate action.

2. The research study was prepared by a student in this

College and concurred in by the Director, Department of Logistics,

C&GSC. The recommendations made for command and coordination of TO

Military Railway Service units in a Theater of Operations appear to

have considerable merit.

M. S. EDDY
Lt. Gen., U. S. Army
Commandant

ANNEX 2
 ANNEX 5

EMPLOYMENT OF A RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALION IN AN INVASION

GENERAL DISCUSSION

1. RECENT BACKGROUND OF THE MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE.

a. As a result of the experiences of the AEF in Europe during World

War I, the need for a Military Railway Service organization in the armed

forces for war-time service was recognized by the War Department.

b, During the period between World War I and World War II, the Corps

of Engineers after considerable study prepared TO&E for various MRS units, . H.

among which was the Engineer Railway Operating Battalion.

r;:.om I'~f.

c. There was no peace-time need, training facilities or technical

experienced personnel in the regular military establishment for a Military

Railway Service. to organize affiliated MRS units

Plans were effected .-

with Reserve Corps personnel from the civilian railroads, to be activated

on "M" day.

d. Shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, many Railway Operating

Battalions were organized and then trained dn various civilian railroads

throughout the United States.

e. About the time of the invasion of North Africa in November 1942,

the MRS was transferred from the Corps of Engineers to the Transportation

Corps.

f. Unfortunately, over-all policy and Army-wide knowledge as to

responsibilities, capabilities and command of the Military Railway Service

and its Operating Battalions was very vague.

g. With the above background, operating units of the MRS were inte-

grated into the military operations in North Africa in 1942.

2. COMMIAND RELATION OF MRS UNITS WITH OTHER ARMY COMMANDS.

a. During the early part of World War II, many difficulties as to the

command relation to other arms and services of Railway Operating Battalions

and their operation of rail facilities were encountered.

":~":-
:$ ~~1~Cf~i 'B-)I ~"j' ~"-
 b. The following difficulties are enumerated to point up the effect

they had on the employment plans and operations of Railway Operating Bat-

talions during the early part of the war.

(1) MRS advance parties were diverted to other duties or detained

from performing their assigned mission by other military commands. As a

result, arrangements for employment of Railway Operating Battalions were

not effected prior to their arrival.

(2) The following MRS units echeloned into the invaded area were

thrown on their own ingenuity and resourcefulness to effectively employ

themselves.

(5) Local area military commanders assumed control of these units,

detached personnel, equipment, and otherwise employed the units in various

service missions.

(4) Some local or area commanders not recognizing the intersec-

tional nature of rail operations attempted to divide the over-all opera-

tions of a railway battalion and take over control of personnel and rail

operations within their respective areas.

(5) Many combat and service unit commanders would take over and

occupy railway facilities such as yards, machine shops, freighthouse and

railway signal communications, etc, for their use exclusive of the over-

all rail transportation requirements of other military agencies,

c. Factors contributing to these difficulties from the point of view

of the railway units in the field were as follows:

(1) High-level directives or policy as to responsibilities, com-

mand, employment and capabilities of the MRS were not firm or adequate for

the guidance of major military commands in their early planning. As a re-

sult, many directives were issued throughout the progress of the war simi-

lar to GO 19, AFHQ, APO 512, dated 14 February 1945, subject: Development

and Operation of Railways. Many other directives were issued as indicated

in articles authored by Major General Carl R Gray, Jr, and published in

the MILITARY REVI~T . ~

(2) Although the mission, command, and relation to other arms and

.. il2'j- "
....................
services of MRS Railway Operating Battalions were published in War Depart-

ment Technical Manuals, it appeared that this information had not been dis-

seminated to various army commands as a whole2

(5) Railway Operating Battalions attached to task forces during

invasions were not represented on the special staff of these forces, and
8 9
for this reason coordination was difficult.' This was further compli-

cated by a lack of coordinating Transportation Corps teams in the field,

such as Rail Transportation Offices. 10

d. All of these factors indicated that the intersectional nature of

the operations of Railway Operating Battalions made over-all centralized

control necessary.

e. In view of difficulties such as these, it became evident during

January and February 1943 that if the railway units in North Africa were

to become an effective coordinated organization, a strong MRS headquar-

ters was necessary. Upon the recommendation of Railway Operating Battalion

commanders through the Chief of Transportation, AFHQ, General Somervell,

while on a visit to that headquarters immediately ordered Headquarters

First Military Railway Service from the ZI. 0

f. The following recommendations are made:

(1) Invasion force commanders should retain operational control of

attached Railway Operating Battalions directly under the invasion force

Transportation Officer and not delegate this control to subordinate com-

mands. See Chart 1, Annex 4.

(2) When invasion operation has progressed to a degree where a

communications zone section is established, over-all technical operational

control of the railway operation and units should revert to the headquar-

ters commanding both communications zone and combat forces. Thus, neces-

sary over-all coordination of rail operations would be effected between

2
the communications zone and combat areas. See Chart 1, Annex 4.

(5) The logistical tonnage movement operations of Railway Operat-

ing Battalions would be coordinated by the communications zone and army

Transportation Officers within their respective areas. Rail Transporta-

IIIIllll I,,I,
tion Regulating Teams in the field, representing the army or communica-

tions zone Transportation Officer, would effect local coordination between

railway operating and using agencies.

5. PRE-INVASION PLANNING FOR EMPLOYMENT OF RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALIONS.

a. The following experiences and observations of MRS units in the

field indicated over-all pre-invasion planning was not adequate:

(1) Intelligence as to condition, characteristics, type, quantity

and location of enemy rail equipment and facilities in the area to be in-

vaded was not available to the railway operating units involved.

(2) Strategic and tactical pre-invasion bombing of rail facili-

ties was directed not only towards sensitive points immobilizing enemy

rail facilities, but in addition the total destruction of many facili-

ties that had to be repaired before they could be operated for our

forces.12

(3) Initial supply for railway operating and rehabilitation re-

quirements, such as coal, oil, brass, babbit and bridging material,

15
either was not planned for or was inadequate.

(4) Signal Corps and Engineer Corps troops were not adequate

in number or training for rapid rehabilitation of necessary rail facili-

ties}4 ' 15, 16, 17

(5) Planning for the phasing of Railway Operating Battalions into

18 27
the invasion area varied in timing from D plus 2 to D plus 45. This to

some extent indicated a marked difference of opinion of planners as to

phasing of a major means of transportation service into the objective

area.

(6) Plans for over-all railway development and for command or

coordination of railway operating units in the objective area were not

firm.

b. Planning for invasion operations should include the following:

(1) Intelligence, covering all aspects of the enemy rail opera-

tions, installations, facilities and equipment that can be obtained.

(2) Number of Railway Operating Battalions required.

4
 (5) Number of Engineer and Signal Corps troops required for

rehabilitation of rail facilities in area to be invaded.

(4) Quantity of supplies and material needed to operate and

rehabilitate railways in the area to be invaded.

(5) Time of phasing railway operating units into the area.

(6) Command and coordination of MRS units attached to the task

force.

(7) Over-all plan for rail operation and rail rehabilitation.

(8) In cases where railroads to be operated are in areas of

friendly or co-belligerent nations, plans as to' operational and finan-

cial aspects of their railroads should be considered.

c. Experienced railway officers should take part in planning at

all levels when military operation involves rail operation or destruc-

tion of rail facilities.

4. ECHELONMENT OF RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALIONS INTO THE INVASION AREA.

a. The phasing of Railway Operating Battalions varied as to group-

ing and timing as follows:

(1) In some operations, advance parties of MRS personnel of

in-
higher headquarters preceded Railway Operating Battalions into the

vasion area to effect plans for their employment.

(2) In other operations, a Railway Operating Battalion was

formed into three groups and phased into the invasion area as shipping
8 See paragraph c(l) be-
space and the tactical situation would permitl

low.

(5) The planned time or priority of phasing of Railway Operating

Battalions into the invasion area varied from D plus to D plus 45.

The time of phasing depended upon the availability of water transport,

and the invasion force commander's concept of the capabilities, desir-

ability or relative importance of a Railway Operating Battalion as com-

pared to units of other arms and services.

b. After-action reports of invasion operations in many cases indi-

cated that the tactical units soon outdistanced their re-supply transpor-

- . .
tation capabilities and, for this reason, the impetus of their advance

was slowed down or stopped. This was true during the invasion of

Southern France where on D plus 2 the urgent need for railway transpor-

tation became evident and the priority of movement of a Railway Operat-

ing Battalion was advanced from D plus 45 so that unit actually arrived
27
on D plus 15.

c. During the invasion of Sicily, the advance echelon of a Railway

Operating Battalion was phased in on the afternoon of D plus 2 and was

operating trains of supplies forward from the beaches on D plus 5. This

battalion was divided into three groups and arrived during the period D

plus 2 to D plus 15 as follows:

(1) Group A, of approximately 60 officers and enlisted men,

divided into two sections with the following mission:

(a) One section was responsible for effecting rail opera-

tions in the immediate beach area and as far forward as the situation

permitted.

(b) The second section was responsible for continued recon-

naissance of captured rail lines and plans for employment of the remain-

ing elements of the battalion.

(2) Group B, of approximately 500 troops and equipment.

(5) Group C, of remaining troops and heavy equipment.

d. This arrangement of grouping was very successful in this opera-

tion.

e. A Railway Operating Battalion and equipment can be transported

over water on two or three LSTs, depending on the distance and accommo-

dations for personnel.

f. From experience it was found that the equipment of a Railway

Operating Battalion should accompany the troops. Otherwise, much of the

equipment was lost and the battalion efficiency was greatly reduced.

g. The Railway Operating Battalion commander, after being advised

of his mission and all available information pertinent thereto, should

be permitted to submit his recommendations as to details of grouping and

6
phasing into invasion area of his unit.

h. Railway Operating Battalion, or elements thereof, should be

available for landing on D plus 2. A second Railway Operating Battalion

should be landed before rail operations in the invaded area have exceeded

150 miles.

5. EMPLOYMENT OF A RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALION.

a. In order to determine the proper employment of a Railway Operat-

ing Battalion, its organization, mission, and objective should be con-

sidered.

(1) A Railway Operating Battalion is the basic unit of the IS

and consists of a headquarters and headquarters company, a maintenance of

way company, a maintenance of equipment company and a transportation com-

pany. It is a balanced organization capable of normally performing all

functions incidental to the operation, maintenance and running repair of

25
a railway division, a large railway terminal or a combination of both.

(2) "The mission of a Railway Operating Battalion is to operate ,go;

W
NEW
:i B';ifaii;ui4i
i

and maintain a division of a standard military railway in the theater of

alMINE

' iiiSu
i:S'iii'rr:5ii":iS.f'r
SFSi:e: S, .

operations. It may be required by higher authority to destroy the line

24
over which it is operating."

(5) "The principle objective for railway troops taking over a

new line is immediate movement of supplies and replacements to the front

24
and evacuation therefrom."

b. During World War II, Railway Operating Battalions in addition to

their normal mission or function performed a large proportion of the re-

construction of railway signal communications. They also were employed

in railway track and bridge rehabilitation and construction. This was

necessary due to inadequacy in number and training of Signal and Engineer

Corps troops for this work. Railway Operating Battalions also found it

necessary to perform the many functions that could have been performed by

RTO teams in the communications zone and army areas had they been avail-
4, 10
able.

c. All of these extra functions performed demonstrated the flexi-

7
bility and cooperation of the Railway Operating Battalions. However,

looking at the over-all picture of the various military operations, it

becomes apparent that if adequate supporting units to perform these

functions had been provided, the efficiency of the over-all transporta-

tion support to the combat elements would have been greatly increased.

For this reason, the employment of these units in functions other than

operation and maintenance should be held to the minimum.

6. CAPABILITY OF A RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALION FOR REHABILITATION OF

CAPTURED RAILROADS AND FACILITIES.

a. The maintenance of way company of a Railway Operating Battalion

was equipped and designed to maintain the tracks, bridges, signal commu-

nications and other pertinent facilities of a military railway division

of 70 to 150 miles. These companies generally were manned with experi-

enced men who had been employed in similar work on civilian railroads.

b. Due to the shortage of Army Signal and Engineer Corps units, the

Maintenance of Way Company of the Railway Operation Battalions were nor-

mally employed in rehabilitation and reconstruction of rail facilities.

Their performance in this work was equal to or superior to that of the

Signal and Engineer Corps units of relative size, due to their experi-

ence in the requirements of construction and operations peculiar to rail-

ways.

c. Difficulty was often encountered by the MRS in coordinating the

over-all theater rail line rehabilitation policy for the following

reasons:

(1) Headquarters Military Railway Service was under the command

of the communications zone commander.

(2) Signal Corps and Engineer Corps units employed in railway re-

habilitation were under the command of the communications zone engineer

and the various army engineers in their respective areas.

(5) Army engineers often by-passed difficult rail rehabilitation

projects, particularly destroyed bridges, on rail lines that wvere vital

to over-all railway operations. Here again, Maintenance of Way Companies

8I
of Railway Operating Battalions were designated to perform this work.

d. Typical examples of the rehabilitation and construction capabili-

ties of the Maintenance of Way Company of a Railway Operating Battalion

6
were as follows:6

(1) Construction of steel railroad bridges over Volturno, Cecina,

and Garigliano Rivers in Italy.

(2) Construction of 2400 feet of pile, timber and steel railroad

bridges over the Rhone and Soane Rivers in France.

(5) Spanning of destroyed masonry arch bridges at Beitingheim,

Germany.

e. During invasion and subsequent military operations, it was evident

that Railway Operating Battalions had a very substantial rehabilitation

and construction of rail line capability.

f. However, where rail lines were badly damaged, they could not re-

habilitate them rapidly enough to keep up with the rapid advance of an

army unless very greatly augmented with additional units similar to the

Maintenance of Way Company.

7. CAPABILITIES FOR TRANSPORTATION AND OPERATION OF CAPTURED RAILWAYS

AND FACILITIES. TiTVJ .

: +l:tRi:: Y""i" !i. .'s:C
a. During World War II, Railway Operating Battalions in all areas

of the Africa-European theaters demonstrated their ability to quickly

operate strange foreign locomotives and railway facilities. During the

invasion of Sicily, the advance echelon of a Railway Operating Battalion

18
was operating a train within four hours after landing.

b. Considering the rapidity with which an advance echelon of 60 men

of a Railway Operating Battalion can start rail operations and the fact

that one train may transport more tonnage in a day than three or four

truck companies, the value of their early employment in an invasion opera-

tion is very apparent. While it may not always be possible to start rail

operations so quickly as per paragraph 7a, it is desirable to have rail-

way personnel available early to perform the necessary ground work for

the earliest possible rail operation.

a #F A5

;t iF

9
 c. In invasion operations, Railway Operating Battalions initially

depend upon the use of captured enemy rail equipment and facilities.

Thus, the adequacy of their transportation support is dependent more on

the condition of captured facilities than their own operating capabili-

ties,

d. The tonnage capacity of a railroad may be limited by one or more

of the following factors:

(1) Physical characteristics of the railroad, particularly the

gradient and whether double or single track.

(2) Quantity and condition of cars, locomotives, and other faci-

lities.

(5) Availability of coal, water, fuel oil and other supplies.

(4) Amount of destruction inflicted on the rail facilities by

friendly and enemy forces.

e. Generally speaking, the railroads which are operating for the

enemy can be rapidly placed in operation for the invasion forces. Even

in Italy through the Salerno-Naples-Rome area, where damage to railroads

was extensive, they were operated in part very soon after they were cap-

tured.

f. The planning factors of tonnage capacity of rail lines indicated

in Draft FM 101-10 in general agree with the average operating capacities

28
as performed by Railway Operating Battalions in the European Theater.

In many operations under favorable operating conditions, these factors

were exceeded.' 21

g. Other factors which greatly influenced the capabilities of Rail-

way Operating Battalions were whether invasion area was enemy, co-

belligerent or friendly, and how quickly native railway personnel could

be employed in rail operations. It was found that American methods of

train dispatching and operation were much more efficient than European

methods, especially during the initial phases of an invasion and in the

combat zone and areas adjacent thereto. As the combat elements moved

forward and rail operations in the rear areas approached normalcy,

10
native railroad personnel were employed, thus releasing the military

railway units to the forward area.

h. Operations of Railway Operating Battalions in invaded areas

indicated tonnage move bould increase from 400 to more than 12,000 tons

per day as the military operation progressed. One Railway Operating

Battalion is capable of moving the normal tonnage supply requirements

26 5
of a type field army 90 to 150 miles per day.2 5

11
 ANNEX 3 (continued)

EMPLOYMENT OF A RAILWAY OPERATING BATTALION IN AN INVASION

REFERENCES (See Bibliography)

FOOT
NOTES

The 727t j Rai ieati ttalion in Wold WrII.

Page 17, column 2.

Page 37, column 2, second paragraph.

Page 17, column 1, third paragraph.

Page 47, column 1.

Pages 37, 55, 82.

Pages 49, 72, 78, 88.

The Seventh United States Ary in the Sicilian C a~a1.

Page E-19, column 2, paragraph 2.

Page E-1, Section II, paragraph 5.

Page E-2, Section V, paragraph 2.

10 Page E-19, paragraph 5.

11 Page E-19, Recommendation, paragraph 2.

,:s !iil;. s a
?'f 6it.i So
12 Page E-19, column 1, Structures. t .

15 Page E-19, column 1, paragraphs 1 and 5.

14 Page E-19, column 1, Supply.

15 Page E-19, column 2, paragraph 1, Recommendations.

16 Page E-15, column 2, paragraph Communications.

17 Page E-16, columns 1 and 2, paragraph Track.

18 Page E-16, column 1, paragraph 1.

19 Page E-16, column 1, paragraph 1.

20 Page E-16, paragraphs Communications and Track.

21 Page E-17.

The Mlitary Review, May 1948 issue.

22 Page 10.

12
 cplre

FOOT
NOTES d1~
lma

waraJ1 De aasrnl Field anvual 55-55. R :

23 Paragraphs 2, 15, 14.

24 Paragraph 2.

25 Paragraphs 3, 9.

26 Paragraph 9.

The United States .rtRepof Operations France and

Ger, 144945.

27 Pages 318 to 320.

DrtF4l .M-anual-x0103 dated Septeraber 1948.

28 Section VII, paragraph 704.

The Mil ry Review, May 1948 issue.

29 Pages 7 and 9.

30 Page 10.

The i tit Remiw, June 1948 issue.

31 Pages 20, 22, 23.

52 Page 25, column 1, fourth paragraph.

53 Page 26, column 1, top of column.

(,k ,~~-, ter.";i'

13
q~w~MLITARY RAILWA Y r3LE'Vv CE TWAr-,"R OF CFERL",TO

1 - ono or more units

doeesA hg nr si szeof.

ape r atA i t
 RESTRICTED

ANNEX 5

EMPLOYMENT OF A RAILWtAY OPERATING BATTALION IN AN INVASION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Report of Operations. The United States Se~en th . rance aid

Germa l94d l 945,Volume 1.

2. to ort of peration5 The United Sta tes Seventh Army 1 The Sicilian

Cam.iT, 10July 17 August 1945.

5. Unit History, Tae 727h tai j~ia Op;eratng Battaion in WorId War II.

(15 March 1942 to 3 October 1945.) Simmons Boardman Publishing

Company, 1948.

4. Gray, Carl R, Jr, Major General, "The Military Railway Service up to

the Italian Campaign," i il. tar l ,Volume XXVIII, Number 2,

May 1948.
t
5. Gray, Carl R, Jr, Major General, " The Military Railway Service in

Italy and Northwest Europe," T ilaitary Review, Volume XXVIII,

Number , June 1948.

6. WD TMi 5-405, 1940.

7. DD FPM 55-55, 1944.

8. C&GSC Draft FM 101-10, 1948.

i
.............................

, ' ' f7 i. ifjfi+l: 1

y

] .

1.