derogatory to Makati City Councilor Divina Alora Jacome.
The respondent would
ANA MARIE CAMBALIZA, Adm. Case No. 6290
Complainant,
Present:
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.,
- versus - PANGANIBAN,
SANTIAGO,
CARPIO, and
AZCUNA, JJ.
ATTY. ANA LUZ B. CRISTAL-TENORIO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
July 14, 2004
X- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In a verified complaint for disbarment filed with the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 30 May 2000,
complainant Ana Marie Cambaliza, a former employee of respondent Atty. Ana Luz
B. Cristal-Tenorio in her law office, charged the latter with deceit, grossly immoral
conduct, and malpractice or other gross misconduct in office.
On deceit, the complainant alleged that the respondent has been falsely
representing herself to be married to Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., who has a prior
and subsisting marriage with another woman. However, through spurious means,
the respondent and Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., were able to obtain a false marriage
contract,[1] which states that they were married on 10 February 1980 in
Manila. Certifications from the Civil Registry of Manila[2] and the National Statistics
Office (NSO)[3] prove that no record of marriage exists between them. The false
date and place of marriage between the two are stated in the birth certificates of
their two children, Donnabel Tenorio[4] and Felicisimo Tenorio III.[5] But in the
birth certificates of their two other children, Oliver Tenorio[6] and John Cedric
Tenorio,[7] another date and place of marriage are indicated, namely, 12 February
1980 in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
As to grossly immoral conduct, the complainant alleged that the
respondent caused the dissemination to the public of a libelous affidavit
often openly and sarcastically declare to the complainant and her co-employees
the alleged immorality of Councilor Jacome.
On malpractice or other gross misconduct in office, the complainant
alleged that the respondent (1) cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her
husband, who is not a member of the Philippine Bar; (2) converted her clients
money to her own use and benefit, which led to the filing of an estafa case against
her; and (3) threatened the complainant and her family on 24 January 2000 with
the statement Isang bala ka lang to deter them from divulging respondents illegal
activities and transactions.
In her answer, the respondent denied all the allegations against her. As to
the charge of deceit, she declared that she is legally married to Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr. They were married on 12 February 1980 as shown by their Certificate
of Marriage, Registry No. 2000-9108 of the Civil Registry of Quezon City.[8] Her
husband has no prior and subsisting marriage with another woman.
As to the charge of grossly immoral conduct, the respondent denied that
she caused the dissemination of a libelous and defamatory affidavit against
Councilor Jacome. On the contrary, it was Councilor Jacome who caused the
execution of said document. Additionally, the complainant and her cohorts are the
rumormongers who went around the city of Makati on the pretext of conducting a
survey but did so to besmirch respondents good name and reputation.
The charge of malpractice or other gross misconduct in office was likewise
denied by the respondent. She claimed that her Cristal-Tenorio Law Office is
registered with the Department of Trade and Industry as a single proprietorship,
as shown by its Certificate of Registration of Business Name.[9] Hence, she has no
partners in her law office.As to the estafa case, the same had already been
dropped pursuant to the Order of 14 June 1996 issued by Branch 103 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.[10] The respondent likewise denied that she
threatened the complainant with the words Isang bala ka lang on 24 January
2000.
Further, the respondent averred that this disbarment complaint was filed
by the complainant to get even with her. She terminated
complainants employment after receiving numerous complaints that the
complainant extorted money from different people with the promise of processing
their passports and marriages to foreigners, but she reneged on her
promise. Likewise, this disbarment complaint is politically motivated: some
politicians offered to re-hire the complainant and her cohorts should they initiate
this complaint, which they did and for which they were re-hired. The respondent
also flaunted the fact that she had received numerous awards and citations for
civic works and exemplary service to the community. She then prayed for the
dismissal of the disbarment case for being baseless.
The IBP referred this case to Investigating Commissioner Atty. Kenny H.
Tantuico.
During the hearing on 30 August 2000, the parties agreed that the
complainant would submit a Reply to respondents Answer, while the respondent
would submit a Rejoinder to the Reply. The parties also agreed that the Complaint,
Answer, and the attached affidavits would constitute as the respective direct
testimonies of the parties and the affiants.[11]
In her Reply, the complainant bolstered her claim that the respondent
cooperated in the illegal practice of law by her husband by submitting (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office[12] where the name of Felicisimo R.
Tenorio, Jr., is listed as a senior partner; and (2) a Sagip Communication Radio
Group identification card[13]signed by the respondent as Chairperson where her
husband is identified as Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr. She added that respondents
husband even appeared in court hearings.
In her Rejoinder, respondent averred that she neither formed a law
partnership with her husband nor allowed her husband to appear in court on her
behalf. If there was an instance that her husband appeared in court, he did so as
a representative of her law firm. The letterhead submitted by the complainant was
a false reproduction to show that her husband is one of her law partners. But upon
cross-examination, when confronted with the letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law
Office bearing her signature, she admitted that Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a
lawyer, but he and a certain Gerardo A. Panghulan, who is also not a lawyer, are
named as senior partners because they have investments in her law office.[14]
The respondent further declared that she married Felicisimo R. Tenorio,
Jr., on 12 February 1980 in Quezon City, but when she later discovered that their
marriage contract was not registered she applied for late registration on 5 April
2000. She then presented as evidence a certified copy of the marriage contract
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar General and authenticated by the
NSO. The erroneous entries in the birth certificates of her children as to the place
and date of her marriage were merely an oversight.[15]
Sometime after the parties submitted their respective Offer of Evidence
and Memoranda, the complainant filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint on 13
November 2002 after allegedly realizing that this disbarment complaint arose out
of a misunderstanding and misappreciation of facts. Thus, she is no longer
interested in pursuing the case. This motion was not acted upon by the IBP.
In her Report and Recommendation dated 30 September 2003, IBP
Commissioner on Bar Discipline Milagros V. San Juan found that the complainant
failed to substantiate the charges of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. However,
she found the respondent guilty of the charge of cooperating in the illegal practice
of law by Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility based on the following evidence: (1) the
letterhead of Cristal-Tenorio Law Office, which lists Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., as a
senior partner; (2) the Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card of
Atty. Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., signed by respondent as Chairperson; (3) and the
Order dated 18 June 1997 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court in Criminal Cases
Nos. 20729 20734, whereinFelicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., entered his appearance as
counsel and even moved for the provisional dismissal of the cases for failure of the
private complainants to appear and for lack of interest to prosecute the said
cases. Thus, Commissioner San Juan recommended that the respondent be
reprimanded.
In its Resolution No. XVI-2003-228 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board
of Governors adopted and approved with modification the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner San Juan. The modification consisted in
increasing the penalty from reprimand to suspension from the practice of law for
six months with a warning that a similar offense in the future would be dealt with
more severely.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of Commissioner San Juan as
approved and adopted with modification by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
At the outset, we find that the IBP was correct in not acting on the Motion
to Withdraw Complaint filed by complainant Cambaliza. In Rayos-Ombac vs.
Rayos,[16] we declared:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly
executed by complainant does not, in any way, exonerate the
respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed
regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts
borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
 defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from
the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The
attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an
officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called
the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is
in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the
outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record
warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred
despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the
charges.
Hence, notwithstanding the Motion to Withdraw Complaint, this disbarment case
should proceed accordingly.
The IBP correctly found that the charges of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct were not substantiated. In disbarment proceedings, the complainant has
the burden of proving his case by convincing evidence.[17] With respect to the
estafa case which is the basis for the charge of malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office, the respondent is not yet convicted thereof. In Gerona vs.
Datingaling,[18] we held that when the criminal prosecution based on the same act
charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the
same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory
findings.
We, however, affirm the IBPs finding that the respondent is guilty of assisting in
the unauthorized practice of law. A lawyer who allows a non-member of the Bar to
misrepresent himself as a lawyer and to practice law is guilty of violating Canon 9
and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which read as follows:
Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
The term practice of law implies customarily or habitually holding oneself
out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of livelihood or in
consideration of his services. Holding ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by
acts indicative of that purpose like identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in
court in representation of a client, or associating oneself as a partner of a law
office for the general practice of law.[19] Such acts constitute unauthorized practice
of law.
In this case, Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., is not a lawyer, but he holds
himself out as one. His wife, the respondent herein, abetted and aided him in
the unauthorized practice of the legal profession.
At the hearing, the respondent admitted that the letterhead of Cristal-
Tenorio Law Office listed Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., Gerardo A. Panghulan, and
Maricris D. Battung as senior partners. She admitted that the first two are not
lawyers but paralegals. They are listed in the letterhead of her law office as senior
partners because they have investments in her law office.[20] That is a blatant
misrepresentation.
The Sagip Communication Radio Group identification card is another proof
that the respondent assisted Felicisimo R. Tenorio, Jr., in misrepresenting to the
public that he is a lawyer. Notably, the identification card stating that he is Atty.
Felicisimo Tenorio, Jr., bears the signature of the respondent as Chairperson of the
Group.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper
standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the
canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his professional
services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauthorized
practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a
misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the
unauthorized practice of law.[21]
WHEREFORE, for culpable violation of Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Ana Luz B. Cristal-Tenorio is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months
effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
ATTY. EDITA NOE-LACSAMANA, A.C. No. 7269
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Promulgated:
Respondent. November 23, 2011
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Edita Noe-
Lacsamana (Noe-Lacsamana) against Atty. Yolando F. Busmente (Busmente)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Antecedent Facts
Noe-Lacsamana alleged in her complaint that she was the counsel for Irene Bides,
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. SCA-2481 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 167, while Busmente was the counsel for the defendant Imelda
B. Ulaso (Ulaso). Noe-Lacsamana alleged that Ulasos deed of sale over the
property subject of Civil Case No. SCA-2481 was annulled, which resulted in the
filing of an ejectment case before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), San Juan,
docketed as Civil Case No. 9284, where Busmente appeared as counsel. Another
case for falsification was filed against Ulaso where Busmente also appeared as
counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged that one Atty. Elizabeth Dela Rosa or Atty.
Liza Dela Rosa (Dela Rosa) would accompany Ulaso in court, projecting herself
as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Dela Rosa signed the minutes of the court
proceedings in Civil Case No. 9284 nine times from 25 November 2003 to 8
February 2005. Noe-Lacsamana further alleged that the court orders and notices
specified Dela Rosa as Busmentes collaborating counsel. Noe-Lacsamana alleged
that upon verification with this Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, she
discovered that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal
assistant for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment with him
ended in 2000 but DelaRosa was able to continue misrepresenting herself as a
lawyer with the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes former
secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not representUlaso in Civil Case No. 9284
and that his signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by Noe-Lacsamana was
forged.
The Decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) found that Dela Rosa was not a lawyer and that she
represented Ulaso as Busmentescollaborating counsel in Civil Case No. 9284. The
IBP-CBD noted that while Busmente claimed that Dela Rosa no longer worked for
him since 2000, there was no proof of her separation from employment. The IBP-
CBD found that notices from the MTC San Juan, as well as the pleadings of the
case, were all sent to Busmentes designated office address. The IBP-CBD stated
that Busmentes only excuse was that Dela Rosa connived with his former
secretary Macasieb so that the notices and pleadings would not reach him.
The IBP-CBD rejected the affidavit submitted by Judy
M. Ortalez (Ortalez), Busmentes staff, alleging Macasiebs failure to endorse
pleadings and notices of Civil Case No. 9284 to Busmente. The IBP-CBD noted
that Ortalez did not exactly refer to Ulasos case in her affidavit and that there was
no mention that she actually witnessed Macasieb withholding pleadings and
notices from Busmente. The IBP-CBD also noted that Macasieb was still working
at Busmentes office in November 2003 as shown by the affidavit attached to a
Motion to Lift Order of Default that she signed. However, even
if Macasieb resigned in November 2003, Dela Rosa continued to
represent Ulaso until 2005, which belied Busmentes allegation that Dela Rosa was
able to illegally practice law using his office address without his knowledge and
only due to Dela Rosas connivance with Macasieb. As
regards Busmentes allegation that his signature on the Answer was forged, the
IBP-CBD gave Busmente the opportunity to coordinate with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) to prove that his signature was forged but he failed to submit
any report from the NBI despite the lapse of four months from the time he
reserved his right to submit the report.
The IBP-CBD recommended Busmentes suspension from the practice of law for
not less than five years. On 26 May 2006, in its Resolution No. XVII-2006-
271,3 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of
the IBP-CBD, with modification by reducing the period of Busmentes suspension to
six months.
Busmente filed a motion for reconsideration and submitted a report4 from the NBI
stating that the signature in the Answer, when compared with standard/sample
signatures submitted to its office, showed that they were not written by one and
the same person. In its 14 May 2011 Resolution No. XIX-2011-168, the IBP Board
of Governors denied Busmentes motion for reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly
assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that warrants his suspension from
the practice of law.
The Ruling of this Court
We agree with the IBP.
Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Canon 9. A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
The Court ruled that the term practice of law implies customarily or habitually
holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services.5 The Court further ruled that holding
ones self out as a lawyer may be shown by acts indicative of that purpose, such as
identifying oneself as attorney, appearing in court in representation of a client, or
associating oneself as a partner of a law office for the general practice of law.6
The Court explained:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the
unauthorized practice of law is founded on public interest and policy.
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject
to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the
client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained.
Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin him not to permit his
professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible
the unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate.
And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his part, subject to disciplinary
action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.7
In this case, it has been established that Dela Rosa, who is not a member of the
Bar, misrepresented herself as Busmentes collaborating counsel in Civil Case No.
9284. The only question is whether Busmente indirectly or directly
assisted Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law.
Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas employment in his office ended in 2000 and
that Dela Rosa was able to continue with her illegal practice of law through
connivance with Macasieb, another member of Busmentes staff. As pointed out by
the IBP-CBD, Busmente claimed that Macasieb resigned from his office in 2003.
Yet, Dela Rosa continued to represent Ulasountil 2005. Pleadings and court notices
were still sent to Busmentes office until 2005. The IBP-CBD noted that Dela Rosas
practice should have ended in 2003 when Macasieb left.
We agree. Busmentes office continued to receive all the notices of Civil Case No.
9284. The 7 December 2004 Order8 of Judge Elvira
DC. Panganiban (Judge Panganiban) in Civil Case No. 9284 showed that Atty.
Elizabeth Dela Rosa was still representing Ulaso in the case. In that Order,
Judge Panganiban set the preliminary conference of Civil Case No. 9284 on 8
February 2005. It would have been impossible for Dela Rosa to continue
representing Ulaso in the case, considering Busmentes claim that Macasieb already
resigned, if Dela Rosa had no access to the files in Busmentes office.
Busmente, in his motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. XVII-2006-271,
submitted a copy of the NBI report stating that the signature on the Answer
submitted in Civil Case No. 9284 and the specimen signatures submitted
by Busmente were not written by one and the same person. The report shows
that Busmente only submitted to the NBI the questioned signature in the Answer.
The IBP-CBD report, however, showed that there were other documents signed
by Busmente, including the Pre-Trial Brief dated 14 November 2003 and Motion to
Lift Order of Default dated 22 November 2003. Noe-Lacsamana also submitted a
letter dated 14 August 2003 addressed to her as well as three letters dated 29
August 2003 addressed to the occupants of the disputed property, all signed
by Busmente. Busmente failed to impugn his signatures in these other documents.
Finally, Busmente claimed that he was totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and
he only came to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to inquire
about its status. Busmentes allegation contradicted the Joint Counter-
Affidavit9 submitted by Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides stating that:
a. That our legal counsel is Atty. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE of the YOLANDO
F. BUSMENTE AND ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES with address at suite 718
BPI Office Cond. Plaza Cervantes, Binondo Manila.
b. That ELIZABETH DELA ROSA is not our legal counsel in the case
which have been filed by IRENE BIDES and LILIA VALERA in
representation of her sister AMELIA BIDES for Ejectmentdocketed as Civil
Case No. 9284 before Branch 58 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of San
Juan, Metro Manila.
c. That we never stated in any of the pleadings filed in the cases
mentioned in the Complaint-Affidavit that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA was our
lawyer;
d. That if ever ELIZABETH DELA ROSA had affixed her signature in the
notices or other court records as our legal counsel the same could not be
taken against us for, we believed in good faith that she was a lawyer; and
we are made to believe that it was so since had referred her to us (sic),
she was handling some cases of Hortaleza and client of
Atty. Yolando F. Busmente;
e. That we know for the fact that ELIZABETH DELA ROSA did not sign any
pleading which she filed in court in connection with our cases at all of
those were signed by Atty. YOLANDO BUSMENTE as our legal counsel; she
just accompanied us to the court rooms and/or hearings;
 f. That we cannot be made liable for violation of Article 171 (for and in
relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code) for the reason that the
following elements of the offense are not present, to wit:
1. That offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated;
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Busmentes personal record in the
Office of the Bar Confidant. Let a copy of this Decision be also furnished to all
chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.

2. There must be wrongful intent to injure a 3rd party; SO ORDERED.

3. Knowledge that the facts narrated by him are absolutely false;

4. That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in the narration

of facts.

And furthermore the untruthful narrations of facts must affect the integrity which
is not so in the instant case.

g. That from the start of our acquaintance with ELIZABETH DELA ROSA
we never ask her whether she was a real lawyer and allowed to practice
law in the Philippines; it would have been unethical and shameful on our
part to ask her qualification; we just presumed that she has legal
qualifications to represent us in our cases because Atty. YOLANDO F.
BUSMENTE allowed her to accompany us and attend our hearings in short,
she gave us paralegal assistance[.] (Emphasis supplied)

The counter-affidavit clearly showed that Busmente was the legal counsel in Civil
Case No. 9284 and that he allowed Dela Rosa to give legal assistance to Ulaso.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD that there was sufficient
evidence to prove that Busmente was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We agree with the recommendation of the IBP,
modifying the recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should be
suspended from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Yolando F. Busmente from the practice of law for
SIX MONTHS.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23467 March 27, 1968
AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for
himself and as General President,
ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ATTY. LEONARDO C.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No.
70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union,
Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier, general president of
said union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for
unfair labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Industrial Peace
Act. Made respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central
Company, Inc. (Biscom), Rafael Jalandoni, its president and general manager;
Gonzalo Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent; and
Fraternal Labor Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president.
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated
June 30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), 2respondents Biscom, Jalandoni, and Guillen, on
July 9, 1957, answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union
and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12, 1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial
commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared
and testified. Two of these ten were permanent (regular) employees of
respondent company; the remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular
employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal workers were
Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag,
Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and Brigido Casas.
On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez,
rendered judgment, which provides, inter alia, that the two regular employees
(Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of
seniority and other benefits which should have accrued to them had they not been
illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to
the time of their actual reinstatements, minus what they have earned elsewhere in
the meantime" and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted to their
positions as seasonal workers of respondent company (Biscom), with back wages
as seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-
1956 milling season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually
reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this
Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without costs.
Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of
November 13, 1962. The judgment became final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to
determine the actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the Chief
Examiner of its Examining Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute
the back wages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back
wages due the ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the complainants
moved for reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on
September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on
July 15, 1963 in the same case — CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu — a "Notice of
Attorney's Lien." He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for
the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the inception of the preliminary
hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel
thereof"; that he "had actually rendered legal services to the laborers who are
subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956,
more or less"; that the laborers "have voluntarily agreed to give [him],
representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to
25% thereof which agreement is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25%
attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration
the length of services he rendered and the nature of the work actually performed
by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of
Attorney's Lien," which in part reads:
3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on
February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned
Counsel herein, representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such
amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever money claims
that may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement,
in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English
language are hereto attached as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above-entitled Case was
already decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers
who are also Complainants in this Case begged from the Undersigned
Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent
(25%) only for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty.
Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)
although the latter's actual services rendered was so insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the
President of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and
consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to only Twenty-Five Per
Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon in
1956.
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in
court a document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the discharge, release and
dismissal — thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof) —
of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of the lawyers of the complainants in CIR
Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February 28, 1963.
On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds
for his discharge specified in the board resolution were "malicious and motivated
by greed and ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect
the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees.
On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and
complainants' motions for resonsideration objecting to the Chief Examiner's Report
and also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge
Martinez' order reads in part:
(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount
representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as
attorney's fees;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the
respondent company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the Court
upon the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing procedures; ....
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964
order with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his grounds are that
CIR has no jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the award of
25% as attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This
motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964
resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar motion filed
on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the
motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge Martinez
authorized the Cashier of the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of
P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and deducting therefrom all legal fees
incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and
the ten employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of CIR, direct to
this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority
to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their reasons: (1) a
dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not
one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's authority; and (2) to consider such a
dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume
jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end
feature of the main case, CIR No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which undoubtedly is within CIR's
jurisdiction. And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has
acquired jurisdiction over a case under the law of its creation, it retains that
jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related
thereto." 5 Expressive of the rule on this point is this —
4. It is well settled that:
A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual
incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly
constituted court has power to do all things reasonably necessary
for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction,
and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates, even
though the court may thus be called upon to decide matters which
would not be within its cognizance as original causes of action.
While a court may be expressly granted the incidental
powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In
re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for
the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of,
the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be
taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the Court may thus be, called on to consider and decide
matters, which as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21 C.J.S.
pp. 136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August
18, 1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that
the court having jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the
relief incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise, be outside its
competence. 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners
advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation abhorred by the
rules. Thus it is, that usually the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made
before the court which renders the judgment. 8 And, it has been observed that
"[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or
where money has been paid into court, is for the attorney to file an intervening
petition and have the amount and extent of his lien judicially
determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this point, is the recent ruling
in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967,
where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P. Dizon, explicit pronouncement was
made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of Industrial
Relations obviously had jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full
jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for
attorney's fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10) successful
complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys' fees 30% of
the amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30%
attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes, union president
and one of the 10 successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since
"they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent
amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly
dated February 3, 1956 — before the 48 employees have even filed their
complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever amount the ten might
recover. Strange enough, this contract was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning
claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the
signing of this contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty.
Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract only after the receipt of the
decision.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered
into by the union and its officers thru its President Javier and said two lawyers,
Atty. Carbonell and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall be
divided equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty. Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez
and Felisberto Javier, the union president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25%
attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active conduct
and prosecution of the above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the
appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty. Carbonell manifested that
"Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct
of the case." It noted, too, that petitioner Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of
Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president
should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this
arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal
services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may
seek compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union
president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we
emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an
attorney is to receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the circumstances
of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees
whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is
unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction....
xxx xxx xxx
Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on
a quantum meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive,
unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court
officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering
impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be
subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy
demands that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever
they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the
debtor or mortgagor. See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, L-12735, October
30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is between the
debtor and the creditor, and not between attorney and client. As courts
have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must
necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in
a mortgage contract, is valid. Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138.
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and
unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a monthly
salary of P175, the other successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a
daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long period of time that they were
illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the
favorable money judgment as a serum to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty
per cent (30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this
judicial antidote.
The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-
fetched to assume that they have not reached an educational attainment
comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the
other hand, are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation between
laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of
attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14 For, as in the present case, the real
objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the
complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly dismissed from the service. While it is
true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to bite
the hands that fed them, still lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share
of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid to the
laborers is not windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal
services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to the
end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award
of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably compensates the whole
of the legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be
shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all,
they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez
cannot deny this fact. The pleadings filed even at the early stages of the
proceedings reveal the existence of an association between said attorneys. The
pleadings were filed under the name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a
common effort of the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those
pleadings up to judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent
Fernandez.
 We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys
Fernandez and Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on November 26,
1962, complained to CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate
with him nor to inform him about the incidents of this case." He there requested
that he be furnished "separately copies of the decision of the court and other
pleadings and subsequent orders as well as motions in connection with the case."

Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift
in their professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion to Name and
Authorize Official Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to
Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the same court. Although filed
under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by
petitioner Atty. Carbonell.

On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for

Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On September 24, 1963,
he filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR
regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. On September 24,
1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and
other pleadings that were filed later were signed solely by petitioner Atty.
Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly
observed by CIR that a good portion of the court battle was fought by respondent
Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered
by Atty. Carbonell. For, important and numerous, too, were his services. And, they
are not negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty. Carbonell must
have a share in the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As
to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.

6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse
to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is 25% of the
amount recovered. In the event payment actually was made, he should be
required to return whatever is in excess of the amount to which he is entitled in
line with the opinion expressed herein. 15

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five per cent (25%)
attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of
March 19, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964
and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the
Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and
determine, the respective shares of Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney
Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees
or both. No costs. So ordered.
 EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty.
James Benedict C. Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for
allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a
spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is
the legitimate spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they
are estranged and living separately from each other. They have two children
namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James Benedict H. Florido,
Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant filed a
case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case
No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile,
there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of marriage which is
pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235
entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants
residence in Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their
two minor children be surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of
an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his
motion for temporary child custody.[2]Complainant called up her lawyer but the
latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child
custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution
of the Court of Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then
examined the resolution closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12,
2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss, she refused to give
custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her
children in the ABC Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by
armed men, suddenly arrived and demanded that she surrender to him the
custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them away with the help
of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City
Police. The responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station
where the matter could be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station,
respondent caused to be entered in the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted
by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate courts
resolution/order.[3] In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow
the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not
take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the
presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger
Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information
that a van arrived at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to
take them to Bacolod City. Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children
to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the children on the basis of the
alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified the
authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18,
2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002,
respondent did not appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent
violated his attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court
of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent
abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The
IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of three years with a warning that another offense of this nature will
result in his disbarment.[6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with
the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held
administratively liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious
Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith
in invoking the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be
authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the
spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least
two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed
as Special Proc. Case No. 3898,[7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is
presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of
allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then
that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients
cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the Code of
professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the
Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper, the language or the argument of an
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
that which has not been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his
pleadings in describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should
be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.[9] The lawyers arguments
whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and
should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to
another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a
vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech
demanded of a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They
constitute gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed
by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore.- A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation
of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the
practice of law. However, we find that the period of six years is too harsh a
penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which we deem
commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent
as a member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the
country.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-25503 December 17, 1966
LEON DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO CHINGCUANGCO, Associate Judge of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF of NUEVA ECIJA and TOMAS
IMPERIO, respondents.
Manuel A. Cordero for petitioner.
Angel C. Imperio for respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction principally assailing an
order of the Court of Agrarian Relations denying a motion to stay execution of its
judgment dispossessing the tenant until he is indemnified for alleged expenses
and improvements.
As leasehold tenant, petitioner, Leon del Rosario, occupied a parcel of land owned
by respondent Tomas Imperio, situated in Cabocbocan Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Said
land became the subject matter of litigation between said parties before the Court
of Agrarian Relations, Fourth regional district, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE '61 and
2902-NE '62. And on July 12, 1963, a decision was rendered therein, the
dispositive portion running as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: (1) ordering the ejectment of
Leon del Rosario from the landholding in question subject to Section 43
and Section 50, paragraph (a), R.A. No. 1199, as amended by R.A. No.
2263; and(2) ordering Tomas Imperio to pay Leon del Rosario the value of
the excess rentals received by him for the agricultural years 1961-62 and
1962-63.
Said judgment was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals on March 26, 1965.
Subsequently, on October 26, 1965, Imperio filed with the Court of Agrarian
Relations a motion for execution of the aforestated judgment. Del Rosario however
opposed it, on the ground that he has a right of retention over the land until he is
indemnified for expenses and improvements, alleging that in the present case he
is entitled thereto. Acting thereon, the Court of Agrarian Relations, on November
18, 1965, issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution, stating that the
judgment had become final and executory, and that Del Rosario's claim for
indemnity, if any, should be filed with said court for determination, but cannot
stop execution of said judgment. Del Rosario filed a motion for reconsideration but
this was denied by the same court on December 14, 1965. And on December 16,
1965, the corresponding writ of execution was issued.
Petitioner Del Rosario then filed, on December 27, 1965, the present special civil
action herein.
Respondents, on January 4, 1966, were required by Us to answer the petition; and
on January 8, 1966, We issued a writ of preliminary injunction addressed:
To: Hon. Bienvenido Chingcuangco (reg.-Spl.-del.)
Judge, Court of Agrarian Relations
Cabanatuan City
The Provincial Sheriff of Nueva Ecija
(reg.-spl.-del.)
Cabanatuan City
stating:
NOW, THEREFORE, until further orders from this Court, You, your agents,
your representatives and/or any person or persons acting in your behalf
are hereby restrained from implementing the Writ of Execution dated
December 16, 1965, in CAR Cases Nos. 2652-NE-61 and 2902-NE-62 of
the Court of Agrarian Relations of Cabanatuan City entitled "Leon del
Rosario, plaintiff, versus Tomas Imperio, defendant."
On January 20, 1966, respondents filed their answer. Further developments came
by way of two petitions for contempt: First, a petition filed by respondent Imperio
dated February 5, 1966, to declare petitioner's counsel in direct contempt, on the
alleged ground that in his petition herein said lawyer cited a fictitious authority.
Second, a petition filed by Del Rosario, dated June 20, 1966, to cite for contempt
respondent Imperio, and three non-parties, the Chief of Police of the Municipality
of Rizal, Nueva Ecija (Eduardo Dumlao), and policemen Remigio Baldonado and
Romeo Miguel, for having allegedly sought to eject Del Rosario from the land in
question notwithstanding, this Court's preliminary injunction. To this a
supplementary petition for contempt was filed, dated July 25, 1966, alleging
further that with the full backing of said policemen, Imperio caused the plowing
and harrowing of the landholding and prevented Del Rosario from reaping the
crops therein.
After the respective parties had filed their comments to the petitions for contempt,
We deferred their resolution until consideration of this case upon the merits.
At issue on the merits of this petition for certiorari is the proper interpretation or
application of Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act) which
provides:
SEC. 43. Rights and Obligations of Tenant-Lessee.—With the creation of
the tenancy relationship arising out of the contract between the
landholder-lessor and tenant-lessee, the latter shall have the right to enter
the premises of the land, and to the adequate and peaceful enjoyment
thereof. He shall have the right to work the land according to his best
judgment, provided the manner and method of cultivation and harvest are
in accordance with proven farm practices. Upon termination of the
relationship, he shall be entitled to one-half of the value of the
improvements made by him, provided they are reasonable and adequate
to the purposes of the lease. (Emphasis supplied)
in relation to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations,
stating:
Rule 15.—Writ of Execution.
Section 1. Requisites for Issuance of Writ of Execution in Case of Final
Judgment Ejecting Tenant.—In cases where the dispossession is
authorized by final judgment no writ of execution shall issue unless upon
certification of the corresponding Judge that the tenant has been fully
indemnified of his claim under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 1199 in case
of share tenancy or under Section 43 thereof in case of leasehold tenancy.
It is the position of respondents that Section 43 of Republic Act 1199 merely
grants the tenant the right to recover one-half of the value of improvements he
made on the land, without giving him any right of retention over the land until he
is so reimbursed. As to Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, they contend that the same had been superseded with the advent of
the Agricultural Land Reform Code (R.A. 3844), effective August 8, 1963, which
replaced the Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations with the Rules of Court (Sec.
115, R.A. 3844). And, they emphasize that there can be no vested right on
procedure, arguing that petitioner's right under the former Rules of the Court of
Agrarian Relations cannot be anything more than procedural.
There is no merit to the view that Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of the Court of
Agrarian Relations is not applicable in this case for having been abrogated with the
enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Said Code, it is true, provides
that the Court of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court. (Sec.
155, R.A. 3844). And neither the Rules of Court then obtaining nor the present
Rules of Court contain a similar provision requiring payment to the tenant of one-
half of the value of his improvements before there can be execution of a judgment
dispossessing him. Nonetheless, since the Rules of Court were applied to the Court
of Agrarian Relations only on August 8, 1963, pursuant to Republic Act 3844 as
aforestated, its effectiveness to pending cases as of that time, such as the instant
case, should follow the norm set forth in Rule 133 therein; "These rules . . . shall
govern all cases brought after they take effect, and also all further proceedings in
cases then pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their
application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the
former procedure shall apply."
Should it turn out that indeed petitioner tenant had made improvements on the
landholding, — a point not for Us now to decide — then Section 43 of Republic Act
1199 clearly gives him the right to one-half of their value, thereby imposing upon
the landholder dispossessing him the correlative duty of paying the same. The rule
prevailing during the pendency of this case in the Court of Agrarian Relations
required that this account be settled before any judgment of ejectment can be
executed. It is therefore not difficult to see that to apply the Rules of Court, which
do not contain a similar provision, would be unjust to the tenant. In this event, the
former procedure is to be followed, namely, Section 1 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Respondent Imperio's argument that petitioner failed to show that improvements
were in fact made, should be addressed to the Court of Agrarian Relations. The
point is that the tenant's claim for reimbursement under Section 43 of Republic Act
1199 should first be threshed out, determined and resolved before the tenant can
be dispossessed by writ of execution. This recourse is but in accordance with the
policy of the law to protect the rights of tenants upon the principle of social justice
(Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199).
The petition for contempt filed by respondent Imperio charges petitioner's counsel
of having cited a fictitious case and a non-existing ruling. The record bears out
that petitioner's counsel alleged in page 5 of the petition for certiorari herein, thus:
Section 1, Rule 15, Rules of the Courts of Agrarian Relations, predicated
on Section 43 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, supra, has been
upheld to be valid by this Honorable Tribunal so that now no writ of
 execution can be issued unless it is complied with first (Paz Ongsiako, Inc. issuing a writ of execution for the said tenant's dispossession. The petitions for
vs. Celestino Abad, et al., G.R. No. L-121447). This ruling, in effect, contempt are denied for lack of merit. No costs. So ordered.
created and established or confirmed the prior substantial right of a tenant
to indemnification before he is finally ejected from his holding. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Petitioner's counsel obviously had in mind this Court's decision in Paz Ongsiako,
Inc. vs. Celestino Abad, L-12147, July 30, 1957. Although he cites as docket
number L-121447 instead of L-12147, the same is plainly but a slight typographical
mistake not sufficient to place him in contempt, especially because the names of
the parties were given correctly. As to said counsel's interpretation of this Court's
decision in said case, or of what the ruling therein "in effect" created, established
or confirmed, the same are mere arguments fully within the bounds of earnest
debate, rather than a deception urged upon this Court. The first petition for
contempt is therefore without merit.

The second petition for contempt is against respondent Imperio and three others,
not parties herein: the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Rizal, Nueva Ecija,
Eduardo Dumlao; policeman Remigio Baldonado; and, policeman Romeo Miguel.
Said petition as well as the supplemental petition thereto, allege that respondent
Imperio, with the aid of the three law enforcement officers, disturbed petitioner in
the possession and cultivation of the land, on June 13, 1966; caused its plowing
and harrowing on June 27, 1966; and prevented the petitioner from reaping the
second rice crop on July 16, 1966. The foregoing acts, if true, would be a ground
for contempt only if at the time this Court's writ of preliminary injunction was
issued, respondent court's writ of execution had not yet been carried out. From
the sheriff's return,1 however, it would appear that respondent Imperio was
placed in possession of the land by virtue of the writ of execution as of December
18, 1965. This Court's preliminary injunction, restraining implementation of the
writ of execution, was issued only on January 8, 1966. Respondents, therefore,
may not be held in contempt. Nonetheless, the premature implementation of the
writ of execution being illegal, petitioner should be restored to peaceful and
undisturbed possession of the landholding, until his claim for payment of
improvements (one-half of their value) is settled by respondent court.

WHEREFORE, respondent court's orders of November 18, 1965 and December 14,
1965, denying petitioner's motion to stay execution pending settlement of his
claim for one-half of the value of alleged improvements, as well as the writ of
execution already issued, are hereby set aside; respondents are ordered to restore
petitioner to the landholding, and to proceed according to Section 1 of Rule 15 of
the former Rules of the Court of Agrarian Relations, by first determining
petitioner's claim for improvements under Section 43 of Republic Act 1199, before

[G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998]
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, petitioner, vs. HON. TOMAS B. NOYNAY, Acting
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Allen, Northern Samar, and
DIOSDADA F. AMOR, ESBEL CHUA, and RUBEN MAGLUYOAN, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The pivotal issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari with mandamus is
whether R.A. No. 7691[1] has divested Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over
election offenses, which are punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding six (6)
years.
The antecedents are not disputed.
In its Minute Resolution No. 96-3076 of 29 October 1996, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to file an information for violation of Section 261(i)
of the Omnibus Election Code against private respondents Diosdada Amor, a public
school principal, and Esbel Chua and Ruben Magluyoan, both public school
teachers, for having engaged in partisan political activities. The COMELEC
authorized its Regional Director in Region VIII to handle the prosecution of the
cases.
Forthwith, nine informations for violation of Section 261(i) of the Omnibus Election
were filed with Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Allen, Northern Samar,
and docketed therein as follows:
a) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442, against private respondents Diosdada
Amor, Esbel Chua, and Ruben Magluyoan.
b) Criminal Case No. A-1443, against private respondents Esbel Chua and Ruben
Magluyoan.
c) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1444 and A-1445, against private respondent Esbel Chua
only;
d) Criminal Cases Nos. A-1446 to A-1449, against private respondent Diosdada
Amor only.
In an Order[2] issued on 25 August 1997, respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay, as
presiding judge of Branch 23, motu proprio ordered the records of the cases to be
withdrawn and directed the COMELEC Law Department to file the cases with the
appropriate Municipal Trial Court on the ground that pursuant to Section 32 of B.P.
Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691,[3] the Regional Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the cases since the maximum imposable penalty in each of the
cases does not exceed six years of imprisonment. Pertinent portions of the Order
read as follows:
[I]t is worth pointing out that all the accused are uniformly charged
for [sic] Violation of Sec. 261(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which under Sec.
264 of the same Code carries a penalty of not less than one (1) year but not more
than six (6) years of imprisonment and not subject to Probation plus
disqualification to hold public office or deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Sec. 31 [sic] of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P.) Blg. 129 as
Amended by Rep. Act. 6691 [sic] (Expanded Jurisdiction) states: Sec. 32.
Jurisdiction Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts in Criminal Cases Except [in] cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Municipal Trial
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinance
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with an
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount or fine and
regardless of other imposable accessory and other penalties including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of time [sic],
nature, value and amount thereof, Provided, However, that in offenses including
damages to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.
In light of the foregoing, this Court has therefore, no jurisdiction over the cases
filed considering that the maximum penalty imposable did not exceed six (6)
years.
The two motions[4] for reconsideration separately filed by the COMELEC Regional
Director of Region VIII and by the COMELEC itself through its Legal Department
having been denied by the public respondent in the Order of 17 October
1997,[5] the petitioner filed this special civil action. It contends that public
respondent has erroneously misconstrued the provisions of Rep. Act No. 7691 in
arguing that the Municipal Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try and
decide election offenses because pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code and this Courts ruling in Alberto [sic] vs. Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction over election offenses.
On 17 February 1998, we required the respondents and the Office of the Solicitor
General to comment on the petition.
In its Manifestation of 5 March 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General informs us
that it is adopting the instant petition on the ground that the challenged orders of
public respondent are clearly not in accordance with existing laws and
jurisprudence.
In his Manifestation of 12 March 1998, public respondent avers that it is the duty
of counsel for private respondents interested in sustaining the challenged orders to
appear for and defend him.
In their Comment, private respondents maintain that R.A. No. 7691 has divested
the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction over offenses where the imposable penalty
is not more than 6 years of imprisonment; moreover, R.A. 7691 expressly provides
that all laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with its provisions are deemed
repealed or modified accordingly. They then conclude that since the election
offense in question is punishable with imprisonment of not more than 6 years, it is
cognizable by Municipal Trial Courts.
We resolved to give due course to the petition.
Under Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, Regional Trial Courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings
for violation of the Code except those relating to the offense of failure to register
or failure to vote.[6] It reads as follows:
SEC. 268. Jurisdiction of courts. - The regional trial court shall have the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other
criminal cases.
Among the offenses punished under the Election Code are those enumerated in
Section 261 thereof. The offense allegedly committed by private respondents is
covered by paragraph (i) of said Section, thus:
SEC. 261. Prohibited Acts. The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the
civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or
member of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines, or any police forces, special forces,
home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units
that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly,
intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity,
except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
Under Section 264 of the Code the penalty for an election offense under the Code,
except that of failure to register or failure to vote, is imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six years and the offender shall not be subject to
probation and shall suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of
the right of suffrage.
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691, provides as
follows:
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Court and of the Sandiganbayan,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances
committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or
amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof.
We have explicitly ruled in Morales v. Court of Appeals[7] that by virtue of the
exception provided for in the opening sentence of Section 32, the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts does not cover those criminal cases which by specific
provisions of law fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial
Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, regardless of the penalty prescribed
therefor. Otherwise stated, even if those excepted cases are punishable by
imprisonment of not exceeding six (6) years (i.e., prision correccional, arresto
mayor, or arresto menor), jurisdiction thereon is retained by the Regional Trial
Courts or the Sandiganbayan, as the case may be.
Among the examples cited in Morales as falling within the exception provided for
in the opening sentence of Section 32 are cases under (1) Section 20 of B.P. Blg.
129; (2) Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (3) the Decree on
Intellectual Property;[8] and (4) the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,[9] as
amended.
Undoubtedly, pursuant to Section 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, election
offenses also fall within the exception.
As we stated in Morales, jurisdiction is conferred by the Constitution or by
Congress. Outside the cases enumerated in Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe, and apportion
the jurisdiction of various courts. Congress may thus provide by law that a certain
class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such law
would be a special law and must be construed as an exception to the general law
on jurisdiction of courts, namely, the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, and the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. R.A. No. 7691 can by no means be
considered as a special law on jurisdiction; it is merely an amendatory law
intended to amend specific sections of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980. Hence, R.A. No. 7691 does not have the effect of repealing laws vesting
upon Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear and decide the cases therein specified. That Congress never intended that
R.A. No. 7691 should repeal such special provisions is indubitably evident from the
fact that it did not touch at all the opening sentence of Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129
providing for the exception.
It is obvious that respondent judge did not read at all the opening sentence
Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. It is thus an opportune time, as any,
remind him, as well as other judges, of his duty to be studious of the principles
law,[10] to administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
the law itself,[11] to be faithful to the law, and to maintain professional
competence.[12]
Counsel for petitioner, Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV of petitioners Law
Department, must also be admonished for his utter carelessness in his reference
to the case against Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr. In the motion for
Reconsideration[13] he filed with the court below, Atty. Balbuena stated:
As a matter of fact, the issue on whether the Regional Trial Court has exclusive
jurisdiction over election offenses is already a settled issue in the case of Alberto
Naldeza vs- Judge Juan Lavilles, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-94-1009, March 5, 1996, where
the Supreme Court succinctly held:
A review of the pertinent provision of law would show that pursuant to Sec. 265
and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, has the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the
Code and the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan, or
MTC, by way of exception exercises jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure
to register or to vote. Noting that these provisions stand together with the
provisions that any election offense under the code shall be punishable with
imprisonment of one (1) year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation
(Sec. 263, Omnibus Election Code), we submit that it is the special intention of the
Code to vest upon the RTC jurisdiction over election cases as a matter of
exception to the general provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under
B.P. 129 by RA 7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election
offenses despite its expanded jurisdiction. (Underscoring ours)
Also, in this petition, Atty. Balbuena states:
16. This Honorable Supreme Court, in the case of Alberto -vs- Judge Juan Lavilles,
Jr., 245 SCRA 286 involving the same issue of jurisdiction between the lower
courts and Regional Trial Court on election offenses, has ruled, thus:
With respect to the other charges, a review of the Pertinent Provision of Law
would show that pursuant to Section 265 and 267 of the Omnibus Election Code
the Comelec has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigations all
of
election offenses punishable under the code and the Regional Trial Court shall
to
have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
of
proceedings for violation of the same. The Metropolitan Trial Court, by way of
of exception exercise jurisdiction only on offenses relating to failure to register or to
vote. Noting that these provisions stands together with the provision that any
election offense under the code shall be punishable with imprisonment for one (1)
year to six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation (Section 264, Omnibus
Election Code). We submit that it is the special intention of the code to vest upon
the Regional Trial Court jurisdiction over election cases as matter of exemption to
the provisions on jurisdiction over criminal cases found under B.P. Reg. 129, as
amended. Consequently, the amendment of B.P. Reg. 129 by Republic Act No.
7691 does not vest upon the MTC jurisdiction over criminal election offenses
despite its expanded jurisdiction.

If Atty. Balbuena was diligent enough, he would have known that the correct
name of the complainant in the case referred to is neither Alberto Naldeza as
indicated in the motion for reconsideration nor Alberto alone as stated in the
petition, but ALBERTO NALDOZA. Moreover, the case was not reported in volume
245 of the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) as falsely represented in the
paragraph 16 of the petition, but in volume 254 of the SCRA.

Worse, in both the motion for reconsideration and the petition, Atty. Balbuena
deliberately made it appear that the quoted portions were our findings or rulings,
or, put a little differently, our own words. The truth is, the quoted portion is just a
part of the memorandum of the Court Administrator quoted in the decision.

Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility [14] mandates

that a lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the text of a decision
or authority.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The

challenged orders of public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997
and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A-1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET
ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases with
purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4
and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his

duty to the court as a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.