Aristotelian vs.

Galilean Forms of Explanation

William S. Abruzzi
(2004)

"The development of thought since Aristotle could, I think, be summed up by

saying that every discipline as long as it used the Aristotelian method of
definition has remained arrested in a state of empty verbiage and barren
scholasticism and that the degree to which the various sciences have been
able to make any progress depended on the degree to which they have been
able to get rid of this essentialist method."
--Karl R . Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies 1950, p. 206.

Aristotle explained the behavior of an object, such as a rock, in terms of the “essential
nature” of that object. For Aristotle, a non-measurable force existed within an object
that compelled it to behave in a certain manner. A stone, for example, was classified by
Aristotle as a heavy object, while fire was defined as a light object. Since heavy objects,
likes stones, tend to fall downwards and light objects, such as fire, tend to move
upwards, these behaviors --gravity and levity respectively-- were deemed by Aristotle to
be part of the essential nature of those objects. The significant point here is that the
factors determining the behavior of an object, according to Aristotle, all originate within
the object to be explained, and depend upon the unobservable nature of that object.

One of the consequences of Aristotle’s method of explanation was that he proposed

two kinds of motion: natural motion and unnatural motion. Stones do not always move
downward. When thrown they may proceed upward before returning to the earth. This
upward motion of the stone was considered unnatural to Aristotle because the force
causing the stone to move upwards originated from outside the stone and, hence, did
not result from the stone’s own volition (its nature). One of the important components of
an Aristotelian explanation, therefore, is that thebehavior which is typically associated
with a particular object becomes viewed as the “natural” behavior of that object.
Because rocks tend to move downward, it thus becomes the “nature” of rocks to move
downward in Aristotelian philosophy. We, thus, have two explanations for the movement
of the rock: one explanation for the rock’s downward motion and a very different
explanation for the rock’s movement in any direction but downward. All of these other
movements become “exceptions to the rule.” The result, however, is that Aristotelians
cannot really explain the movement of the rock at all --why it moves faster or slower, at
various angles, etc. Only vague generalizations can be made: “Rocks will normally
move downwards”.
 Then came what has become known as The Mechanical Revolution. Initiated by
Galileo and later synthesized by Isaac Newton, The Mechanical Revolution resulted not
only in a different conception of the physical world, but, more importantly, in
a completely new way of analyzing that world. It ushered in a whole new concept
of what actually constitutes science. Hand in hand with the rejection of the earlier
Aristotelian theories, was the repudiation of the analytical methods upon which those
theories were based. Galileo, Newton, and others were now asking completely different
questions, and arriving at significantly different answers. One result of this new way of
looking at the world was a substantially greater precision in the new explanations.
However, this precision was not the significant part of the revolution; it was the result of
that revolution. The true revolution was in the methodological procedures followed.

First of all, there was now little concern for classifying objects into abstract categories
as a basis for building theoretical explanations. Instead, scientists were concerned
with the interaction of specific variables that could be discerned to have an effect upon a
particular event. There was no longer a concern with the “nature” of an object, but rather
with a more precise determination of the variables contributing to a situation. An event
was to be explained as the interaction of specific measurable variables (both internal
and external to the object), rather than resulting from either “natural” or “unnatural”
forces. Variables rather than types formed the cornerstone of the new explanation. This
resulted from an important shift away from a concern with the abstract averages
common to a group to the full consideration of a specific situation.

Explanation assumed a whole new form. Instead of rolling a number of balls down an
inclined plane and calculating the average of the group, basing the “law of movement on
an inclined plane” on that average, Galileo followed a completely different procedure.
He considered all of the variables that could influence the motion of the ball and what
their effect on the ball’s motion would be. How would the angle of the inclined plane, the
shape of the ball, the surface of both the ball and the plane, the medium surrounding
the ball, etc. affect the movement of the ball? By viewing each of these factors
as measurable variables, Galileo could postulate how a change in one or more of these
variables would affect the overall movement of the ball, making it move faster, slower --
or even upwards! The various movements were not considered natural or unnatural,
but rather predictable consequences of different constellations of ball shape, plane
angle, etc. As a result, several different explanations were replaced by one
single systemic explanation. The concept of natural vs. unnatural motion became
superfluous. Occam’s Razor made these two concepts irrelevant. All motion
was conditional. In addition, Galileo’s principles of motion (and the principles of those
who followed him) could now be applied not only to balls rolling down an inclined plane,
but any kind of motion/behavior associated with any kind of object. In the place
of separate and distinct Aristotelian explanations for the movement of different objects
based on the non-measurable “nature” of those objects, we had a single Galilean
explanation for the movement, not just of the ball but of a whole variety of objects, using
a simple set of principles that predicted each behavior as a consequence of the
measurable relationship among the relevant variables. Better and better explanations
could now be proposed and tested (and accepted or rejected) by comparing how
accurately and precisely they explained the motion of a variety of objects.

This revolution in science was a fundamental consequence of by far the most unique
aspect of the methodological innovations introduced by the Mechanical Revolution, i.e.
the rejecting of any reference to the historically given in the formulation and
determination of lawfulness. Whether an event described by a law occurs rarely, often,
or not at all is irrelevant to the validity of the law. What becomes lawful is not the
historical association between items, but rather the theoretical relationship between
variables. The historical occurrences are not lawful; rather, they are deduced by aid of
the laws. Consequently, “historical rarity is no disproof, historical regularity no proof of
lawfulness” (Lewin, 1935: 26). “The Newtonian achievement rendered Aristotelian
patterns of explanation logically incoherent” (Wilson, 1969: 298).
 How does all of this relate to explaining human behavior? We need to ask ourselves to
what extent people in their daily lives, as well as sociologists and anthropologists in their
research, use concepts and explanations that are fundamentally Aristotelian. For
example, when we use the concept “mother’s instinct” to explain maternal behavior, are
we attempting to explain certain behavior typically associated with women by proposing
non-measurable essentialist forces considered “natural” to females? If so, this is
Aristotelian! Similarly, if we discuss domestic violence or warfare in terms of the
more aggressive “nature” of males, we are also relying on non-
measurable essentialist forces attributed to the category male based on the fact that
men fight wars and that physical violence in our society is more typically associated with
males. Again, we are being Aristotelian. If we do adopt such approaches, then how do
we explain maternal child abuse? Do we consider these as "exceptions to the rule"? If
so, aren’t we saying that one form of behavior (nurturing children) is “natural” to women
while the other form of behavior (child abuse) is “unnatural”? This is Aristotelian. If we
assume that male-on-female domestic violence results because males are “naturally”
more aggressive than females and that warfare is a product of male aggressiveness,
then how do we explain the fact that most men do not beat their wives and children and
that governments generally have to resort to the draft (which many men resist) in order
to raise armies, or that lower-income males are far more likely to join the army than
upper-income males? Also, how do we explain husband abuse by wives, as well as the
well-documented domestic violence that occurs in both gay and lesbian
relations? Furthermore, if these “natural” tendencies exist in all males and females, how
do we explain the fact that rates of murder, domestic violence, child abuse, infanticide,
etc. vary from one society to another, in the same society through time, and among
different segments of a specific community? Similarly, how do we explain the fact that
the incidence of warfare varies significantly among human societies, as well as for the
same society over time? If we are going to argue that males are “naturally” more
aggressive because of their higher involvement in violence, then we must also argue
that African Americans are naturally more aggressive because they display a higher
incidence of violent behavior as well. Otherwise, we are being logically inconsistent. If
we are going to base the existence of natural characteristics on behavior that is typical
of men and women, then we must be consistent and apply it to all behaviors that are
typically associated with one sex or the other, or with different social groups. We would
need to argue, as many individuals do, that men are more naturally leaders because
they fill more leadership positions, while women are naturally subservient because they
have more typically been nurses rather than doctors and secretaries rather than bosses.
We would also have to claim similar natural differences between whites and blacks, as
some people do. Indeed, such Aristotelian thinking underlies all gender and ethnic
stereotypes. Such reasoning can’t, of course, explain the radical changes that have
taken place in our own society in the past 40 years. Thus, just as the Aristotelian
approach to the motion of a heavy object such as a ball cannot explain all of the
variation in a ball’s motion, so also are Aristotelian concepts in the social sciences
unable to explain the considerable variation that exists in human behavior. Put very
simple, a constant cannot explain a variable, be that constant the nature of a ball,
maternal instinct, ethnic/racial stereotypes, or the culture of a particular population.
 We need to abandon essentialist Aristotelian explanations in the social sciences in
favor of conditional explanations that account for variationin social behavior in terms of
the different material circumstances in which individuals and populations find
themselves. If, for example, we can explain differences in gender-related behavior by
focusing on such quantifiable variables as the work load of men vs. women, the division
of labor between men and women in the household economy, differences between men
and women in control over household resources, the role of men and women in the
larger political economy, the role of men vs. women in warfare, etc., without ever having
to mention purported “natural” characteristics, then the principle of Occam’s
Razor states that such concepts are irrelevant and should be abandoned. They add
nothing to the explanation. They are superfluous.

Likewise, if we can explain various social behaviors among different human societies
without using the concept of culture (which is a notoriously subjective and non-
measurable concept), then Occam’s Razor suggests that this concept is also
superfluous and needs to be abandoned if we hope to
develop systematic and testable theories of human social behavior that are able to
explain and predict human behavior in any meaningful way. When we use the concept
of culture, for example, to explain the behavior of people, we are making an Aristotelian
generalization: “Most of the people in this place behave in a certain way; it must be
because they all share this non-measurable set of values and beliefs that cause them to
act that way.” But what about the people who do not behave in the way that is typical
for the group? Also, what about people who live in other societies who do the same
thing? For example, the Iroquois Indians practice both matrilocal residence and
matrilineal descent. So do the Navajo, as well as the Bemba peoples in Africa. How do
we explain their behavior? Do we attribute the Iroquois behavior to Iroquois culture,
Navajo behavior to Navajo culture and Bemba behavior to Bemba culture, or do we see
post-marital residence and kinship as part of a larger system of behavior in which
different sets of ecological and economic circumstances produce different residence
patterns, family structure, kinship systems, political organization, etc.? Which gives us
a better scientific understanding of the post-marital residence and kinship: having
several different Aristotelian explanations based on the non-measurable cultural forces
associated with each distinct group, or a single Galilean explanation based on the
relationship among a specific set of social variables from which the different forms of
residence, kinship systems, political organization, etc. can be predicted? Also, how do
we explain the fact that before they acquired the horse, such Plains Indians as the
Cheyenne, Sioux, Arapaho, Crow, etc. were matrilocal and matrilineal, whereas
afterwards their residence and kinship became more strongly male-oriented? Is it
necessary --or even useful-- to talk about Cheyenne culture, Sioux culture, etc., or can
we dispense with these concepts and focus instead on the impact of the horse and the
gun on the role of men and women in subsistence, the ownership of property,
participation in external trade relations, etc.? Do we need a different explanation for
each group, or will one systemic explanation that applies to all groups suffice? In other
words, does the concept of culture add to the explanation, or is it superfluous?
 Similarly, how useful are such essentialist Aristotelian concepts
as Patriarchal and Matriarchal society? Are these operationally definable concepts?
Don’t those who apply these concepts in their analysis of gender relations attribute
specific inherent “natures” (that is, essentialist characteristics) to societies defined by
these terms? Furthermore, if so many different societies are defined as Patriarchal, then
how useful is this concept? How meaningful is it to use the same concept to describe
both the U.S., (where women inherit property, participate in the labor force, comprise
over 50% of students in college, medical school, law school, etc.) and the Inuit (where
women do not inherit property but rather are the property of their husbands, where
female infanticide is practiced, and where husbands lend their wives to other men for
sexual purposes)? How does the application of this concept help explain the much
greater incidence of rape and violence against women in the U.S. than in Japan, which
most individuals would describe as more patriarchal than the U.S.? Can this concep be
used in a systematic way to explain differences in gender relations over time and in
different societies, or is it, like the concept of culture, too vague and too subjective to be
of any meaningful scientific value? If it does prove unnecessary, it should, like other
Aristotelian concepts, be discarded as irrelevant.

Various patterns of social behavior occur cross-culturally with regard to ecology,

kinship, gender, religion and many other aspects of human social behavior. I submit that
we can better understand the cross-cultural diversity and similarity of human social
behaviors if we approach them through the application of systemic models that attempt
to explain such behaviors as a consequence of underlying ecological and economic
conditions, rather than through the use of vague and operationally indefinable concepts
that result in logically unconnected and non-systematic explanations or in explanations
that are so vague and subjective as to lack scientific credibility.