RULE 61 (SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE)
CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1) BUENAVENTURA SAN JUAN, PETITIONER
VS HON. MANUEL E. VALENZUELA, JUDGE OF
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL
AND DOROTEA MEJIA, RESPONDENTS, G.R.
NO. L-59906 OCTOBER 23, 1982
PONENTE: ESCOLIN, J.:
CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1) LUI ENTERPRISES, INC, v. ZUELLIG
PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 193494,
March 07, 2014
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.:
(2) MAKATI DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
vs. PEDRO C. TANJUATCO and CONCRETE
AGGREGATES, INC., G.R. No. L-26443, March
25, 1969
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, C.J.:
(3) JOSE A. BELTRAN, ET AL., vs. PEOPLE'S
HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, G.R.
No. L-25138, August 28, 1969
PONENTE: TEEHANKEE, J.:
(4) LEONARDO R. OCAMPO, vs. LEONORA  DEFINITION OF INTERPLEADER
TIRONA, G.R. No.147812. April 6, 2005 
CASE RULING
The ORDER OF DECEMBER 24 FIXING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE is not final in character in the sense that it CAN BE
THE SUBJECT OF MODIFICATION, depending on the changing conditions affecting the ability of the obligor to pay the amount fixed for support.
Unquestionably, the PETITIONER'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE in the manner indicated in his
manifestation, and the approval thereof by the respondent Judge have rendered this petition moot and academic.
Hence, INSTANT PETITION is hereby dismissed for being moot and academic.
RULE 62 (INTERPLEADER)
CASE RULING
DEFAULT OF AN ADVERSE CLAIMANT:
At any rate, an ADVERSE CLAIMANT IN AN INTERPLEADER CASE may be DECLARED IN DEFAULT. A CLAIMANT who FAILS TO ANSWER
WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD may, on motion, be declared in default.
The CONSEQUENCE OF THE DEFAULT is that the COURT may “render judgment barring the defaulted claimant from any claim in respect
to the subject matter.” The Rules would not have allowed claimants in interpleader cases to be declared in default if it would “ironically defeat
the very purpose of the suit.”
JURISDICTION
JURISDICTION OF OUR COURTS OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER of justiciable controversies is governed by Rep. Act No. 296, as amended,
pursuant to which MUNICIPAL COURTS shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil cases "in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the
value of the property in controversy", amounts to not more than "ten thousand pesos."
SECONDLY, "the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts" belongs to Congress and is beyond the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court, which is limited to matters concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law.
THIRDLY, the FAILURE OF SAID SECTION 19 OF RULE 5 OF THE PRESENT RULES OF COURT TO MAKE ITS RULE 63, ON
INTERPLEADING, APPLICABLE TO INFERIOR COURTS, merely implies that the same are not bound to follow Rule 63 in dealing with cases
of interpleading, but may apply thereto the general rules on procedure applicable to ordinary civil action in said courts.
CONFLICTING CLAIMS
RULE 63, SECTION 1 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT (FORMERLY RULE 14) requires as an INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT that
"CONFLICTING CLAIMS upon the same subject matter are or may be made" AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF-IN-INTERPLEADER "who claims no
interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants."
The ACTION OF INTERPLEADER is a remedy whereby a person who has property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly
or partially, without claiming any right in both, COMES TO COURT and asks that the defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims
upon the same property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to LITIGATE AMONG
THEMSELVES in order to determine who is entitled to the property or payment of the obligation.
The REMEDY IS AFFORDED NOT to protect a person against a double liability but to PROTECT HIM AGAINST A DOUBLE VEXATION IN
RESPECT OF ONE LIABILITY."
The ACTION OF INTERPLEADER is a remedy whereby a person who has property in his possession or has an obligation to render wholly
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:
(5) SUBHASH C. PASRICHA AND JOSEPHINE A.
PASRICHA, VS DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC.
G.R. NO. 136409, MARCH 14, 2008
PONENTE: NACHURA, J.:
(6) WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB,
INC., vs LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and
BIENVENIDO A. TAN, G.R. No. L-23851, March
26, 1976
PONENTE: CASTRO, C.J.:
RULE 63 – DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1 & 10) ERLINDA REYES and ROSEMARIE
MATIENZO vs. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ,
SPOUSES BERNARD and FLORENCIA PERL,
HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES,
and SEGUNDO BAUTISTA, G.R. No. 137794,
August 11, 2010
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
(2) CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS
BIR, G.R. No. 172457, December 24, 2008
PONENTE: TINGA, J.:
or partially, without claiming any right in both, COMES TO COURT and asks that the defendants who have made upon him conflicting claims
upon the same property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to LITIGATE AMONG
THEMSELVES in order to determine who is entitled to the property or payment of the obligation.
An ACTION FOR INTERPLEADER IS PROPER when the lessee does not know the person to whom to pay rentals due to conflicting claims
on the property. The REMEDY IS AFFORDED NOT to protect a person against a double liability but to PROTECT HIM AGAINST A DOUBLE
VEXATION IN RESPECT OF ONE LIABILITY."
WHEN ACTION FOR INTERPLEADER IS PROPER
An ACTION FOR INTERPLEADER IS PROPER when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to
conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect). The
The REMEDY IS AFFORDED NOT to protect a person against a double liability but to PROTECT HIM AGAINST A DOUBLE VEXATION IN
RESPECT OF ONE LIABILITY."
PROPRIETY AND TIMELINESS OF AN INTERPLEADER SUIT
A STAKEHOLDER should use REASONABLE DILIGENCE to hale the contending claimants to court. He need NOT AWAIT ACTUAL
INSTITUTION OF INDEPENDENT SUITS AGAINST HIM before filing a bill of interpleader.
He should FILE AN ACTION OF INTERPLEADER within a REASONABLE TIME after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by
either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be BARRED by laches or undue delay. But where he ACTS WITH REASONABLE
DILIGENCE in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.
It has been held that a STAKEHOLDER'S ACTION OF INTERPLEADER IS TOO LATE when filed after judgment has been rendered against
him in favor of one of the contending claimants, especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and
neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is
obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter.
CASE RULING
TWO TYPES OF ACTIONS UNDER RULE 63 / LIST OF INSTRUMENT UNDER RULE 63 IS EXCLUSIVE
The FOREGOING SECTION CAN BE DISSECTED INTO TWO PARTS. The FIRST PARAGRAPH concerns DECLARATORY RELIEF, which has
been defined as a special civil action by ANY PERSON interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are
affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to DETERMINE ANY QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OR VALIDITY arising under
the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
The SECOND PARAGRAPH pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action to
consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase.
This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz, declared that the SUBJECT MATTERS TO BE TESTED IN A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF are
exclusive, viz: Under this rule, ONLY A PERSON who is interested "under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute or ordinance, may BRING AN ACTION TO DETERMINE ANY QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OR VALIDITY arising under
the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." This means that the SUBJECT MATTER must refer to a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to WARRANT DECLARATORY RELIEF. Any other matter not mentioned
therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSSIO ALTERIUS. (Emphasis supplied.)
REQUISITES FOR A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
The REQUISITES FOR A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF TO PROSPER are: (CODE: JPIC)
J - Justiciable controversy;
P - PARTY SEEKING DECLARATORY RELIEF must have a legal interest in the controversy.
I - ISSUE INVOLVED must be ripe for judicial determination.
C - CONTROVERSY must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
(3) CLARK INVESTORS AND LOCATORS
ASSOCIATION INC., vs. SECRETARY OF
FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, G.R. No. 200670, July 6, 2015
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
(4) CRISOSTOMO AQUINO VS MUNICIPALITY
OF MALAY AKLAN, represented by Mayor John
P. Yap, et. Al, GR NO. 211356; SEPTEMBER 29,
2014
PONENTE: VELASCO JR., J.
(5) PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR vs. COURT
OF APPEALS; and CITY OF NAGA, G.R. No.
175064, September 18 (600 SCRA 569)
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
(6) EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA vs.
BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R.
No. 150806, January 28, 2008 (543 SCRA 470)
PONENTE: NACHURA, J
(7) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REGARDING THE
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE NO. 386 OF THE
CITY OF BAGUIO, BAGUIO CITIZENS ACTION
INC., and JUNIOR CHAMBER OF BAGUIO CITY,
INC. vs. THE CITY COUNCIL AND CITY MAYOR
OF THE CITY OF BAGUIO, G.R. No. L-27247,
April 20, 1983
PONENTE: DE CASTRO, J:
(8) COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS et. Al vs.
HON. JUDGE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL and
JOSE and SUSANA COCHINGYAN, G.R. No. L-
21036, June 30, 1977
APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
While this CASE IS STYLED AS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, there is, however, no denying the fact that, in essence, it seeks the declaration
by this Court of the unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned rule, thus PARTAKING THE NATURE, IN REALITY, OF ONE FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.
Accordingly, THIS PETITION MUST FAIL because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law
are involved. The SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF DECLARATORY RELIEF falls under the EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS. The Rules of
Court is explicit that such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
NO BREACH OF THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION (ONE OF THE REQUISTE OF A DECLARATORY RELIEF)
An ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights
arising thereunder. SINCE THE PURPOSE OF AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights
and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and NOT TO
SETTLE ISSUES ARISING FROM AN ALLEGED BREACH THEREOF, it may be entertained before the breach or violation of the statute,
deed or contract to which it refers.
A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another
relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of
obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.
MEANING OF DECLARATORY RELIEF
DECLARATORY RELIEF is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order
or resolution, to determine any QUESTION OF CONSTRUCTION OR VALIDITY arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or
statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder.
ISSUE AND RELIEF
The ONLY ISSUE THAT MAY BE RAISED IN SUCH A PETITION is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute.
IS THERE ANY RELIEF AVAILABLE
The ONLY ISSUE THAT MAY BE RAISED IN SUCH A PETITION is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or
statute.
Corollary is the GENERAL RULE that such an ACTION MUST BE JUSTIFIED, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the
circumstances.
OTHER PARTIES
There is NOTHING IN SECTION 2 OF RULE 64 OF THE RULES OF COURT which says that the NON-JOINDER OF PERSONS WHO HAVE OR CLAIM
ANY INTEREST which would be affected by the declaration is a JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT. Said section merely states that "ALL PERSONS shall be
made parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration; and NO DECLARATION shall, except or otherwise provided in
these rules, prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the action."
The REASON FOR THE LAW REQUIRING THE JOINDER OF ALL NECESSARY PARTIES is that FAILURE TO DO SO would deprive the declaration of
the final and pacifying function the action for declaratory relief is calculated to subserve, as they would not be bound by the declaration and may raise the
identical issue.
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IS INAPPLICABLE
It is obvious from this definition that a THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT is inconceivable when the main case is one for nothing more' than a declaratory
relief. In a THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, the defendant or third-party plaintiff is supposed to seek contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief from
the third-party defendant is respect to the claim of the plaintiff against him.
PONENTE: BARREDO, J
(9) THE VISAYAN PACKING CORPORATION vs.
THE REPARATIONS COMMISSION and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-29673,
November 12, 1987
PONENTE: NARVASA, J.
(11) JELBERT B. GALICTO, - versus - H.E.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,
in his capacity as President of the Republic of
the Philippines; ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary; and
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management, G.R. No. 193978, February 28,
2012
PONENTE: BRION, J.:
(12) THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
vs. AYALA LAND INCORPORATED,
ROBINSON'S LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-  The REQUISITES FOR AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ARE: CODE: JPIC
LA PLAZA CORPORATION and SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC., G.R. No. 177056, September
18, 2009
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
(13) WILSON P. GAMBOA vs FINANCE  EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE THAT THE SUPREME COURT HAS ONLY AN APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, FINANCE
UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND
COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES
AS CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF
THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, G.R. No.
176579, June 28, 2011
PONENTE: CARPIO, J.:
(14) PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT VS MAXIMO BONIFACIO,
CEFERINO R. BONIFACIO, APOLONIO B. TAN,
BENITA B. CAINA, CRISPINA B. PASCUAL,
ROSALIA B. DE GRACIA, TERESITA S.
DORONIA, CHRISTINA GOCO AND ARSENIO C.
BONIFACIO, in their capacity as the surviving
heirs of the late ELEUTERIA RIVERA VDA. DE
BONIFACIO, G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011
APPLICABILITY OF A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM
There is NOTHING IN THE NATURE OF A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF that proscribes the filing of a counterclaim based
on the same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint.
A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION is after all not essentially different from all ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of
Court, except that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the IDENTITY BETWEEN
THEIR FUNDAMENTAL NATURE is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not
inconsistent with or if they may serve to supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
WHEN IS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF PROPER
Under the Rules of Court, PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION are availed of to question judicial, quasi-judicial and mandatory acts.
Since the ISSUANCE OF AN EO is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION is an incorrect
remedy; instead a PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the
PROPER RECOURSE TO ASSAIL THE VALIDITY OF EO 7.
REQUISITES FOR AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF
J - Justiciable controversy;
P - PARTY SEEKING THE RELIEF has a legal interest in the controversy;
I - ISSUE INVOLVED is ripe for judicial determination.
C - CONTROVERSY is between persons whose interests are adverse;
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF TREATED AS PETITION FOR MANDAMUS. At the outset, PETITIONER is faced with a procedural barrier.
AMONG THE REMEDIES PETITIONER SEEKS, only the petition for prohibition is within the original jurisdiction of this court, which however is NOT
EXCLUSIVE but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
The ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, INJUNCTION, AND ANNULMENT OF SALE are not embraced within the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. ON THIS GROUND ALONE, the petition could have been dismissed outright.
However, since the threshold and purely legal issue on the definition of the term capital in SECTION 11, ARTICLE XII OF THE CONSTITUTION has far-
reaching implications to the national economy, the COURT TREATS THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AS ONE FOR MANDAMUS.
FILING BEFORE ANY BREACH OR VIOLATION
An ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since
the PURPOSE OF AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and NOT to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
ENTERTAINED BEFORE THE BREACH OR VIOLATION of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers. A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that
will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO,
PAGE 225)
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J.: In the present case, PETITIONER filed a complaint for quieting of title after it was served a notice to vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the subject
properties. Notably, the COURT OF APPEALS, IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order which granted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera
and the Writ of Possession issued pursuant thereto. AND ALTHOUGH PETITIONERS COMPLAINT IS CAPTIONED AS QUIETING OF TITLE AND DAMAGES, ALL THAT
PETITIONER PRAYED FOR, is for the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that of respondents. This is consistent with the NATURE OF THE RELIEF IN
AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF where the judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay damages or to perform
any act. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 224)

(15) DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND APPLICABILITY OF A COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM / CONVERSION OF AN ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF INTO AN ORDINARY ACTION
MANAGEMENT, represented by SECRETARY
ROMULO L. NERI, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL There is NOTHING IN THE NATURE OF A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF that PROSCRIBES THE FILING OF A COUNTERCLAIM based on the
POLICE, represented by POLICE DIRECTOR same transaction, deed or contract subject of the complaint.
GENERAL ARTURO L. LOMIBAO, NATIONAL
POLICE COMMISSION, represented by A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION is after all not essentially different from an ordinary civil action, which is generally governed by Rules 1 to 56 of the Rules of Court,
CHAIRMAN ANGELO T. REYES, AND CIVIL EXCEPT that the former deals with a special subject matter which makes necessary some special regulation. But the IDENTITY BETWEEN THEIR FUNDAMENTAL
SERVICE COMMISSION, represented by
NATURE is such that the same rules governing ordinary civil suits may and do apply to special civil actions if not inconsistent with or if they may serve to
CHAIRPERSON KARINA C. DAVID, vs
supplement the provisions of the peculiar rules governing special civil actions.
MANILA’S FINEST RETIREES ASSOCIATION,
INC., represented by P/COL. FELICISIMO G.
LAZARO (RET.), AND ALL THE OTHER INP ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF may be converted into an ORDINARY ACTION and the PARTIES allowed to file such pleadings as may be necessary or
RETIREES, G.R. No. 169466, May 9, 2007 proper, if before the final termination of the case "a BREACH OR VIOLATION OF AN … ORDINANCE, SHOULD TAKE PLACE." In the present case, no breach or
violation of the ordinance occurred. The PETITIONER decided to pay "under protest" the fees imposed by the ordinance.
PONENTE: GARCIA, J.:

(16) Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE vs. CAUSE OF ACTION

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, G.R. No. 159357.
April 28, 2004 The FAILURE OF A COMPLAINT TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION is a ground for its outright dismissal. However, in SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J that an ACTION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising
thereunder. Nevertheless, a BREACH OR VIOLATION should be impending, imminent or at least threatened.

(A CAUSE OF ACTION is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Its
essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to
violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
the former to the latter.)

(17) BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC. WHAT IS JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY

(FORMERLY INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION) VS. A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY is a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND by a court of law through the application of a law. In the case at bar, PETITIONER fears the risk of possible sanctions. However, a MERE APPREHENSION OF AN
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. REP. ACT NO. 7925 does not provide for a penalty for noncompliance with Section
COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 161140, JANUARY 31, 21, and as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there are yet no implementing rules or guidelines to carry into effect the requirement imposed by the
2007 said provision. Whatever sanctions petitioner fears are merely hypothetical.
PONENTE: QUISUMBING, J.:
AN ISSUE IS RIPE FOR JUDICIAL DETERMINATION when litigation is inevitable, or when administrative remedies have been exhausted. There is no showing of
either in the present case. Instead, PETITIONER asserts that this case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, specifically
when there is no administrative review provided by law or when the questions involved are essentially judicial. To our mind, PETITIONER should have first raised
its concerns with the NTC, the agency authorized to implement Rep. Act No. 7925. ONLY AFTER A CATEGORICAL DENIAL OF ITS CLAIM OF EXEMPTION FROM
OR DEFERMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 can petitioner proceed to court. As it is now, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that petitioner has
no cause of action.

(18) THE METROPOLITAN MANILA REQUIREMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI
FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority vs VIRON
TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. G.R. No. 170656,
August 15, 2007
The REQUIREMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripening seeds thereof
exist between the parties, ALL OF WHOM are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A
QUESTION BECOMES JUSTICIABLE when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.

PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.:
RULE 64 – REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OR RESOLUTIONS
OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1 AND 5) LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of
CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), vs
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, G.R. Nos. 179431-32, G.R. No.
180443 (621 SCRA 385)
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J
(2) FORTUNE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., v.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA) PROPER; COA
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI-WESTERN VISAYAS; AUDIT
GROUP LGS-B, PROVINCE OF ANTIQUE; AND
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ANTIQUE, G.R. No.
213525, January 27, 2015
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J
(3) DARAGA PRESS, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
and DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AUTONOMOUS
REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, .R. No. 201042, June
16, 2015
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.:
(4) RUBEN REYNA and LLOYD SORIA versus
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent. G.R. No.
167219, February 8, 2011
It CANNOT BE GAINSAID THAT THE E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The CLOSURE OF THEIR BUS TERMINALS would mean, among other
things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, RESPONDENTS claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to
property without due process of law. RESPONDENTS have thus amply demonstrated a "PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST in the case such that [they
have] sustained, or WILL SUSTAIN, DIRECT INJURY AS A RESULT OF [the E.O.’s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a
law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents.
CASE RULING
WHEN TO FILE THE PETITION:
LOKIN has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the
COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales.
The CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE IS NOW IMPLEMENTED BY RULE 64 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, which provides for the review of the
judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As RULE 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a LIMITED PERIOD OF 30 DAYS. Undoubtedly, the COURT has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
(The COURT made clear that while Rule 64 refers to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot be equated, as they provide for
different reglementary periods. RULE 65 provides for a period of sixty (60) days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court, while
SECTION 3, RULE 64 expressly provides for only thirty (30) days. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, page 243)
DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 42 AND PETITION FOR CERTIORARI RULE 64 / REGLAMENTARY PERIODS
There is NO PARITY between the petition for review under Rule 42 and the petition for certiorari under Rule 64. As to the NATURE OF THE PROCEDURES, RULE
42 governs an appeal from the judgment or final order rendered by the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In contrast, the
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 64 is similar to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and assails a judgment or final order of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), or the Commission on Audit (COA). The PETITION is designed to CORRECT ONLY ERRORS OF JURISDICTION, not errors of judgment.
The REGLEMENTARY PERIODS UNDER RULE 42 AND RULE 64 ARE DIFFERENT. In the FORMER, the aggrieved party is ALLOWED 15 DAYS to file the petition for
review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the LATTER, the
petition is FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The FILING OF A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
OR RECONSIDERATION, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the MOTION BE DENIED, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, RECKONED from the notice of denial.
Pursuant to SECTION 3 OF RULE 64, it had ONLY FIVE DAYS from receipt of the denial of its motion for reconsideration to file the petition.
DECISION AND RESOLUTIONS OF COA ARE ACCORDED RESPECT AND FINALITY IN THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
DECISIONS AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT COA may be reviewed and nullified only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION exists when there is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or
to act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim, and despotism.
In the ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, the FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE RESPONDENT COA, which are undoubtedly supported by the evidence on
record, must be ACCORDED GREAT RESPECT AND FINALITY. The RESPONDENT COA, as the duly authorized agency to adjudicate money claims against
government agencies and instrumentalities, pursuant to Section 2649 of Presidential Decree No. 1445,50 has acquired special knowledge and expertise in
handling matters falling under its specialized jurisdiction.
RAISING JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS / FINDINGS OF FACT – NOT REVIEWABLE
In the ABSENCE OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, QUESTIONS OF FACT cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari, under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The

PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
(6) THE LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN
CONSULTA AND GASTARDO vs THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT and/or REYNALDO A. VILLAR and JUANITO G.
ESPINO, JR. in their capacities as Chairman and
Commissioner, respectively, G.R. No. 185544, January
13, 2015
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.:
CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1) BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG vs. SUBIC BAY
DISTRIBUTION, INC., G.R. No. 162575, December 15,
2010
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
(2) EDGAR C. NUQUE v. FIDEL AQUINO AND SPOUSES
ALEJANDRO AND ERLINDA BABINA, G.R. NO. 193058,
July 08, 2015
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
(3) RUBEN C. MAGTOTO and ARTEMIA MAGTOTO vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LEONILA DELA CRUZ, G.R. No.
175792, November 21, 2012
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.:
office of the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is not to correct simple errors of judgment; ANY RESORT TO THE SAID PETITION UNDER RULE 64, IN RELATION TO RULE
65, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE is LIMITED TO THE RESOLUTION OF JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES. Accordingly, SINCE THE VALIDITY OF THE
PREPAYMENT SCHEME is inherently a question of fact, the same should no longer be looked into by this Court.
It is well settled that FINDINGS OF FACT OF QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES, SUCH AS THE COA, are GENERALLY ACCORDED RESPECT AND EVEN FINALITY BY THIS
COURT, if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of their expertise on the specific matters under their jurisdiction.
“EXCEPT AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED”
RULE 64 OF THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE provides the guidelines for filing a petition for certiorari under this rule. Section 2 of the rule specifies that "a
JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OR RESOLUTION OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT may be brought by the aggrieved party
to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, EXCEPT AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED."
The phrase, "EXCEPT AS HEREINAFTER PROVIDED," specifies that any petition for certiorari filed under this rule follows the same requisites as those of Rule 65
EXCEPT for certain provisions found only in Rule 64. ONE OF THESE PROVISIONS concerns the time given to file the petition.
Section 3 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition. — The PETITION shall be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The FILING OF A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION OF SAID JUDGMENT OR FINAL ORDER OR RESOLUTION, if allowed under the
procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. IF THE MOTION IS DENIED, the aggrieved party may file the petition
within the remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of denial.
RULE 65 – CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
CASE RULING
CERTIORARI AS AN ORIGINAL AND INDEPENDENT ACTION; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION
Moreover, CERTIORARI, AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction of a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is an ORIGINAL and INDEPENDENT ACTION that is NOT part of the trial or the
proceedings on the complaint filed before the trial court. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 251)
(Discussion: CONSEQUENCES OF AN INDEPENDENT ACTION: Records remain at the court a quo, unlike in appeal)
PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF CERTIORARI
It must be emphasized that a WRIT OF CERTIORARI is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Hence, HE WHO SEEKS A WRIT OF CERTIORARI must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the
Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To DISPENSE WITH THE
REQUIREMENT OF FILING A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner
failed to do.
CERTIORARI RULE UNDER RULE 65 IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST APPEAL / WHAT IS THE REMEDY FOR AN ADVERSE DECISION - APPEAL
At the outset, it must be pointed out that PETITIONERS’ RESORT TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT is inappropriate.
PETITIONERS’ REMEDY FROM THE ADVERSE DECISION OF THE CA lies in Rule 45 which is a Petition for Review on Certiorari. As such, this PETITION should have
been dismissed outright for being a wrong mode of appeal. EVEN IF THE PETITION IS TO BE TREATED AS FILED UNDER RULE 45, the same must still be denied
for late filing and there being no reversible error on the part of the CA. Records show that PETITIONERS received a copy of the CA Resolution denying their
Motion for Reconsideration on October 30, 2006. They therefore had 15 days or until November 14, 2006 within which to file their Petition for Review on
Certiorari before this Court. However, they filed their PETITION FOR CERTIORARI on December 29, 2006, after the period to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 had expired. Hence, this PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 was resorted to as a substitute for a lost appeal which is not
allowed. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 253)
(4) SAN FERNANDO RURAL BANK, INC VS PAMPANGA
OMNIBUS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, G.R. No.
168088, April 3, 2007
PONENTE: CALLEJO, SR., J.:
(5) SPOUSES RUBEN and MYRNA LEYNES versus
FORMER TENTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 21, BANSALAN,
DAVAO DEL SUR, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 1, BANSALAN, DAVAO DEL SUR, and SPOUSES
GUALBERTO & RENE CABAHUG-SUPERALES, G.R. No.
154462
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
(6) PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC CORPORATION (PHILEC) vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND
MEDIATION BOARD (NCMB), Department of Labor and
Employment, RAMON T. JIMENEZ, in his capacity as
Voluntary Arbitrator, PHILEC WORKERS' UNION (PWU),
ELEODORO V. LIPIO, and EMERLITO C. IGNACIO, G.R.
No. 168612, December 10, 2014
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.:
(7) LE SOLEIL INT'L. LOGISTICS CO., INC., AND/OR BETH
CERTIORARI REVIEWS ERRORS OF JURISDICTION, NOT ERRORS OF JUDGMENT / ERROR OF JUDGMENT VS ERROR OF JURISDICTION
CERTIORARI is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. CERTIORARI WILL ISSUE only to
correct errors of jurisdiction and NOT to correct errors of judgment. An ERROR OF JUDGMENT is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. ERROR OF JURISDICTION is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which ERROR is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. AS LONG AS THE COURT ACTS WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, any
alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal if the aggrieved
party raised factual and legal issues; or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court if only questions of law are involved. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF
RIANO, PAGE 255)
CERTIORARI DISTINGUISHED FROM APPEAL
Between an APPEAL AND A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below.
AS TO THE PURPOSE. CERTIORARI is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment APPEAL IS THE REMEDY.
AS TO THE MANNER OF FILING. OVER AN APPEAL, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power of review. Over a CERTIORARI, the higher court uses its
original jurisdiction in accordance with its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An APPEAL is thus a continuation of the
original suit, while a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is an original and independent action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the
judgment or order complained of. The PARTIES TO AN APPEAL are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the PARTIES TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner) against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
AS TO THE SUBJECT MATTER. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so declare are APPEALABLE. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an
ORIGINAL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI may be directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment; or where there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
AS TO THE PERIOD OF FILING. ORDINARY APPEALS should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. Where a
RECORD ON APPEAL is required, the appellant must file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment or final
order. A PETITION FOR REVIEW should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice of denial of the decision, or of the petitioners timely filed motion
for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In an APPEAL BY CERTIORARI, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days from the notice of judgment or
final order, or of the denial of the petitioners motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. On the other hand, a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI should be filed
not later than sixty days from the notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration was timely filed, the period
shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
AS TO THE NEED FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari,
in order to afford the tribunal an opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate remedy expressly available under
the law. SUCH MOTION is not required before appealing a judgment or final order. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 258-260)
GENERAL RULE ON PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI FILED IN LIEU OF AN APPEAL / EXCEPTIONS
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is a special civil action "adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when
there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." An extraordinary remedy, a PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI MAY BE FILED only if appeal is not available. IF APPEAL IS AVAILABLE, an appeal must be taken even if the ground relied upon is grave abuse of
discretion.
As an EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, this court has allowed petitions for certiorari to be filed in lieu of an appeal "(a) when the public welfare and the advancement of
public policy dictate; (b) when the broader interests of justice so require; (c) when the writs issued are null; and (d) when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority."
PERIOD FOR THE INSTITUTION OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UMALI, REYNANTE MALABANAN, AND EUGENIO S.
YNION, JR. v. VICENTE SANCHEZ, DAVID R. CONDE,
AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R.
No. 199384, September 09, 2015
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.:
(8) SAINT MARY CRUSADE TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY OF
BRETHREN FOUNDATION, INC. vs. HON. TEODORO T.
RIEL, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH
85, QUEZON CITY, G.R. No. 176508, January 12, 2015
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
(9) FELIX UY CHUA, ROBERT IPING CHUA, RICHARD UY
CHUA and Atty. FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR. vs COURT OF
APPEALS, SOFIA O. SANCHEZ, assisted by husband
FORTUNATO SANCHEZ, G.R. No. 121438, October 23,
2000, QUISUMBING, J.:
(10) HUALAM CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORP. and TAN BEE GIOK vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., G.R.
No. 85466 October 16, 1992
PONENTE: DAVIDE, JR., J.:
(11) P/S INSP. SAMSON B. BELMONTE, SPO1 FERMO R.
GALLARDE, PO3 LLOYD F. SORIA, PO1 HOMER D.
GENEROSO, PO1 SERGS DC. MACEREN, PO3 AVELINO L.
GRAVADOR, PO2 FIDEL O. GUEREJERO, and PO1
JEROME T. NOCHEFRANCA, JR. vs. OFFICE OF THE
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICES, OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, Re G.R. No. 197665, January 13, 2016
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
(12) CLARK INVESTORS AND LOCATORS ASSOCIATION
INC., vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 200670, July 6, 2015
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Under the foregoing rules, PETITION FOR CERTIORARI should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to
be assailed. The 60-DAY PERIOD is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of
their case. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit. As a
corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays
and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, THESE RULES are regarded as mandatory.
CERTIORARI IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE OF AN APPEAL
As of then, therefore, the CORRECT RECOURSE FOR THE PETITIONER was to appeal to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal within 15 days from notice of
the denial of its motion for reconsideration. By allowing the PERIOD OF APPEAL TO ELAPSE WITHOUT TAKING ACTION, it squandered its right to appeal.
Its present resort to certiorari is impermissible, for an EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY LIKE CERTIORARI cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal. That the
EXTRAORDINARY REMEDY OF CERTIORARI is not an alternative to an available remedy in the ordinary course of law is clear from Section 1 of Rule 65, which
requires that there must be no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Indeed, NO ERROR OF JUDGMENT BY A
COURT will be corrected by certiorari, which corrects only jurisdictional errors.
WHEN CERTIORARI IS AVAILABLE DESPITE LOSS OF AN APPEAL
A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI CHALLENGING THE RTC WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION may be instituted either in the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court. BOTH have original concurrent jurisdiction. CERTIORARI is an extraordinary remedy AVAILABLE ONLY when there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While ordinarily, CERTIORARI IS UNAVAILING where the appeal period has lapsed, there are
EXCEPTIONS. Among them are (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires;21 (c)
when the writs issued are null and void; (d) or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF
RIANO, PAGE 266)
WHEN CERTIORARI IS AVAILABLE DESPITE AVAILABILITY OF AN APPEAL
It is settled that although the EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI is not proper when an ordinary appeal is available it may be GRANTED where it is shown
that the appeal would be inadequate, slow, insufficient and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained of, or where
appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 279)
OBSERVANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF HEIRARCHY OF COURTS IN FILING A WRIT FOR CERTIORARI
Even in the absence of such provision, the PETITION IS ALSO DISMISSIBLE because it simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA
AND THE RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The CONCURRENCE OF JURISDICTION, however, does
not grant the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The PETITIONER HAS NOT ADVANCED
ANY SPECIAL OR IMPORTANT REASON which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court, a PARTY MAY DIRECTLY APPEAL TO THIS
COURT only on pure questions of law.
STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE POLICY OF JUDICIAL HIERARCHY demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the
CA or the RTC, the SPECIAL ACTION FOR THE OBTAINMENT OF SUCH WRIT must be presented to either court. As a rule, the COURT will not entertain direct
resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the Court.
REQUISITE NUMBER 1: DIRECTED AGAINST A TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
FOR A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI to prosper, the FOLLOWING REQUISITES must concur: (1) it must be DIRECTED against a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the TRIBUNAL, BOARD, OR OFFICER must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
RESPONDENTS do not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. They ISSUED RR 2-2012 in the EXERCISE
OF THEIR QUASI-LEGISLATIVE OR RULE-MAKING POWERS, and NOT JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. Verily, RESPONDENTS did not adjudicate or

(13) JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR
HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF QUEZON CITY,
CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY
ASSESSOR OF QUEZON CITY, G.R. No. 210551, June 30,
2015, PERALTA, J.
(14) SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-South Network
(SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and
ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., versus - ANTI-
TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE
CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
PONENTE: CARPIO MORALES, J.
(15) CECILIA RACHEL V. QUISUMBING v. LORETTA ANN
P. ROSALES, MA. VICTORIA V. CARDONA AND
NORBERTO DELA CRUZ, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, G.R. No. 209283,
March 11, 2015
PONENTE: BRION, J.
(16) GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON,
DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V. APOLINARES, MA. LUISA
S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN
C. CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q. ROSALES, MA. LUISA
NAVARRO, AND THE PHILIPPINE PUBLIC HEALTH
ASSOCIATION, INC. v. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA,
determine the rights of the parties.
WHAT IS JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION
We agree that RESPONDENTS neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.
A RESPONDENT IS SAID TO BE EXERCISING JUDICIAL FUNCTION where he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and
then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.”
BEFORE A TRIBUNAL, BOARD, OR OFFICER MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of
persons or property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the CONTROVERSY ENSUING therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed
with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
The ENACTMENT BY THE QUEZON CITY COUNCIL OF THE ASSAILED ORDINANCES was DONE IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS LEGISLATIVE, not judicial or quasi-judicial,
function. Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), LOCAL LEGISLATIVE POWER shall be exercised by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod for the city. Said law likewise is specific in providing that the power to impose a tax, fee, or charge, or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the
sanggunian of the local government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance.
REQUISITE NUMBER 1: DIRECTED AGAINST A TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER EXERCISING JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
Preliminarily, CERTIORARI DOES NOT LIE against respondents (ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL) who do NOT EXERCISE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS.
SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT is clear: SECTION 1. PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.—When any TRIBUNAL, BOARD OR OFFICER exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a PERSON AGGRIEVED thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, PETITIONERS do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
AN EXERCISE OF FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION – NOT EQUIVALENT TO A JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION
The OSG correctly argued that the RESPONDENTS, IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AS CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS OF THE CHR, did not engage in judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; they did not adjudicate the rights and obligations of the contending parties but simply undertook to initiate the investigation of the
allegations against the petitioner. The INQUIRY was not a quasi-judicial proceeding, where offenses were charged, parties were heard and penalties were
imposed. It was at most, an EXERCISE OF FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION, which is entirely distinct and different from the concept of adjudication. The POWER
TO INITIATE AN INVESTIGATION AND TO REFER THE MATTER TO THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN is within the power of the CHR as an entity with its own
distinct personality and is recognized by no less than the Constitution. Thus, the CHR did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in its actions.
ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT BY THE SECRETARIES OF THE DBM, CSC AND DOH OF THE QUESTIONED JOINT CIRCULARS - EXERCISE OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINSITRATIVE FUNCTION, NOT ANY JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL, OR MINISTERIAL CAPACITY
At the outset, the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION FILED BY PETITIONERS is not the appropriate remedy to assail the validity of respondents’ circulars.
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertaking to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH (DOH); AND FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION (CSC), G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
(17) MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON,
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M.
TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS
MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI
ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE;
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF
BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG
KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO,
CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA,
CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
(18) FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA
VALLEY PROVINCE v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R.
No. 211833, April 07, 2015
PONENTE: REYES, J.:
(19) SERGIO R. OSMEÑA III v. POWER SECTOR ASSETS
AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
EMMANUEL R. LEDESMA, JR., SPC POWER
CORPORATION, AND THERMA POWER VISAYAS,
INC.,GR No. 212686, Sep 28, 2015,
QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS apply to the actions and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, in their exercise of discretion of a judicial nature.
MINISTERIAL FUNCTIONS are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
BEFORE A TRIBUNAL, BOARD, OR OFFICER MAY EXERCISE JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS, it is necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights
under which adverse claims are made, and the CONTROVERSY ENSUING THEREFROM is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to determine
the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the contending parties.
In this case, RESPONDENTS did not act in any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their issuance of the assailed joint circulars. In ISSUING AND IMPLEMENTING
THE SUBJECT CIRCULARS, respondents were not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial nature. The
ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT BY THE SECRETARIES OF THE DBM, CSC AND DOH OF THE QUESTIONED JOINT CIRCULARS were done in the EXERCISE OF THEIR QUASI-
LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS. It was in the NATURE OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION, promulgated by them in their exercise of delegated power.
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government.
(EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER OF REVIEW) REMEDIES OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION ARE APPLICABLE – TO SET RIGHT, UNDO AND RESTRAIN ANY ACT OF
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT (EVEN
THOUGH IT DOES NOT EXERCISE JUDICIAL, QUASI-JUDICIAL OR MINISTERIAL FUNCTION)
With respect to the Court, however, the REMEDIES OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the WRIT OF CERTIORARI
OR PROHIBITION MAY BE ISSUED to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions but ALSO to SET RIGHT, UNDO AND RESTRAIN ANY ACT OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION BY ANY BRANCH OR INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, EVEN IF THE LATTER does NOT exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra. (The Constitution states that JUDICIAL POWER includes the DUTY
OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE not only "(1) to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable" but also (2) "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable.)
Thus, PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts
of legislative and executive officials.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL – DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AGENCIES THAT EXERCISE JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
In this case, it is clear that the JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) does NOT fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising JUDICIAL OR QUASI-
JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS. In the PROCESS OF SELECTING AND SCREENING APPLICANTS, the JBC neither acted in any JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL CAPACITY nor
assumed unto itself any performance of JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE.
However, since the FORMULATION OF GUIDELINES AND CRITERIA, including the POLICY that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the
exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
CERTIORARI IS APPLICABLE IF THERE ALLEGATIONS OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE SALE OF A POWER PLANT (EXERCISE OF THE JUDICIAL POWER OF
REVIEW)
The CONSTITUTION UNDER SECTION 1, ARTICLE VIII expressly directs the JUDICIARY, as a MATTER OF POWER AND DUTY, (1) not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but, to (2) determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. We thus have the DUTY TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF ALLEGATIONS OF GRAVE
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
(20) JAY CANDELARIA and ERIC BASIT vs. REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 42, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO;
(Pampanga) represented by its Presiding Judge HON.
MARIA AMIFAITH S. FIDER-REYES, OFFICE OF THE
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO,
PAMPANGA and ALLIED DOMECQ PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No.173861, July 14, 2014
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.:
(21) MILWAUKEE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION versus -
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondents. G.R. No. 173815,
November 24, 2010
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:
(22) CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS
ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA) vs. THE SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No. 183409, June 18, 2010,
PEREZ, J.:
ABUSE OF DISCRETION in this case, involving the SALE BY PSALM OF A POWER PLANT, which supposedly contravenes the policy on competitive public bidding.
Specifically SECTION 51 (M) OF THE EPIRA empowered PSALM "to restructure the sale, privatization or disposition of NPC assets and IPP contracts and/or their energy
output based on such terms and conditions which shall optimize the value and sale prices of said assets." ANY ACT OF PSALM THAT VIOLATES THESE PROVISIONS AND
OTHER APPLICABLE LAWS may CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. There is GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION (1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AND ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DURING THE COURSE OF A TRIAL – CORRECTIBLE ONLY BY APPEAL,
NOT BY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
It is to be stressed that in EVERY SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION UNDER RULE 65, a PARTY SEEKING THE WRIT WHETHER FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION OR MANDAMUS, must
be able to show that his or her resort to such extraordinary remedy is justified by the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. He must ALLEGE IN HIS PETITION AND ESTABLISH FACTS to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. Pursuant to the foregoing, the
INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is DISMISSIBLE for FAILURE TO ALLEGE THAT THERE IS NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY in the
ordinary course of law as to justify resort to certiorari.
When the COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT, any mistake in the application of the law and the appreciation of evidence
committed by a court may be CORRECTED ONLY BY APPEAL. The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its
jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Hence, settled is the rule that RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS AND ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DURING THE COURSE OF A TRIAL are
interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly
taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case. As such, ANY PERCEIVED ERROR IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW AND ITS ASSESSMENT
OF EVIDENCE is CORRECTIBLE BY APPEAL, NOT CERTIORARI, as the same would only be considered an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
In order for a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TO SUCCEED, the FOLLOWING REQUISITES MUST CONCUR, namely: (a) that the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board, or any
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) SUCH TRIBUNAL, BOARD, OR OFFICER has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
WITHOUT JURISDICTION denotes that the tribunal, board, or officer acted with absolute lack of authority. There is EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when the public respondent
exceeds its power or acts without any statutory authority. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION connotes such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be
EQUIVALENT to lack or excess of jurisdiction; otherwise stated, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility;
and SUCH EXERCISE is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
As a rule, the GRANT OR DENIAL OF A MOTION FOR POSTPONEMENT is addressed to the sound discretion of the court which should always be predicated on
the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties, the ends of justice and fairness should be served thereby. It CANNOT BE
SAID THAT THE CTA ARBITRARILY DENIED MILWAUKEES SUPPOSED SIMPLE REQUEST OF RESETTING because it had already given the latter several months to
prepare and gather its rebuttal evidence.
DOCTRINE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS / EXCESS OF JURISIDCITION DISTINGUISHED FROM ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION
Primarily, although this COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, SUCH CONCURRENCE does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
Thus reaffirms the JUDICIAL POLICY THAT IT WILL NOT ENTERTAIN DIRECT RESORT TO IT unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the
extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.
EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES WERE HELD PRESENT IN THE FOLLOWING CASES: (a) Chavez v. Romulo, on citizens’ right to bear arms; (b)

(23) JM DOMINGUEZ AGRONOMIC COMPANY, INC.,
HELEN D. DAGDAGAN, PATRICK PACIS, KENNETH
PACIS, and SHIRLEY DOMINGUEZ vs. CECILIA LICLICAN,
NORMA D. ISIP, and PURITA DOMINGUEZ, G.R. No.
208587, July 29, 2015
PONENTE: VELASCO, JR., J.:
(24) GREAT SOUTHERN MARITIME SERVICES
CORPORATION, FERRY CASINOS LIMITED and PIONEER
INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION vs. JENNIFER
ANNE B. ACUA, HAYDEE ANNE B. ACUA, MARITES T.
CLARION, MARISSA C. ENRIQUEZ, GRACIELA M.
TORRALBA and MARY PAMELA A. SANTIAGO, G.R. No.
140189, February 28, 2005
PONENTE: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
(25) JESUS G. CRISOLOGO and NANETTE B. CRISOLOGO
vs. JEWM AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, Res G.R.
No. 196894, March 3, 2014
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.:
Government of [the] United States of America v. Hon. Purganan, on bail in extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, on
government contract involving modernization and computerization of voters’ registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora, on status and
existence of a public office; and (e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the
approval of the conversion to agro-industrial area.
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION as distinguished from ABSENCE OF JURISDICTION means that an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not
authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are
wanting. WITHOUT JURISDICTION means lack or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with
reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it
must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Moreover, the SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The
ISSUANCE AND ENFORCEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM OF THE QUESTIONED DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED, AND MEMORANDUM NO.
88 were done in the exercise of his quasi-legislative and administrative functions and NOT of judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The CHALLENGED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT were issued in grave abuse of discretion. We have previously ruled that GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION MAY ARISE when
a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION is meant, such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The ABUSE OF DISCRETION MUST BE GRAVE as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The WORD "CAPRICIOUS," usually used in tandem with the term "ARBITRARY," conveys the notion of willful
and unreasoning action. Thus, WHEN SEEKING THE CORRECTIVE HAND OF CERTIORARI, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.
MATERIAL DATES TO BE STATED IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65
SECTION 3 OF RULE 46 OF THE RULES OF COURT provides that there are THREE MATERIAL DATES that must be STATED IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BROUGHT
UNDER RULE 65: (a) the DATE when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the DATE when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration when
one such was filed, and, (c) the DATE when notice of the denial thereof was received. This requirement is for the PURPOSE of determining the timeliness of the petition,
since the PERFECTION OF AN APPEAL IN THE MANNER AND WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY LAW is JURISDICTIONAL and FAILURE TO PERFECT AN APPEAL AS
REQUIRED BY LAW renders the judgment final and executory.
As a GENERAL RULE, these requirements are mandatory, meaning, NON-COMPLIANCE THEREWITH is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
In view of the retroactive application of procedural laws, SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 00-2-03 which took effect
on September 1, 2000, is the governing provision. It provides that WHEN A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS TIMELY FILED, the 60-day period for filing a petition for
certiorari shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. WHILE RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED 16 DAYS LATE, the NLRC
nonetheless acted thereon and denied it on the basis of lack of merit. In resolving the merits of the motion despite being filed out of time, the NLRC undoubtedly
recognized that it is not strictly bound by the technicalities of law and procedure.
Thus, the 60-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI should be reckoned from the date of the receipt of the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration, i.e., May 30, 1997, and thus, the filing made on July 18, 1997 was well within the 60-day reglementary period.
THIRD REQUISITE - THERE IS NO APPEAL, OR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW; EXCEPTION – NO OTHER
RECOURSE
The rule is that a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 IS PROPER only if there is no appeal, or any plain speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In this case, NO ADEQUATE RECOURSE, at that time, was available to Spouses Crisologo, except resorting to Rule 65.
At any rate, the REMEDY AGAINST AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, NOT SUBJECT OF AN APPEAL, is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, PROVIDED that the
interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Only then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. This
takes particular relevance in this case where, as previously discussed, RTC-BR. 14 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in not recognizing Spouses Crisologo as
indispensable parties to the pertinent action.
(26 AND 27) LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. v. ZUELLIG
PHARMA CORPORATION AND THE PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents, G.R. No. 193494,
March 07, 2014
PONENTE: LEONEN, J.:
(28) THE CITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY MAYOR
JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., AND MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, IN
HER CAPACITY AS THE CITY TREASURER OF MANILA v.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA–CUERDO, IN HER CAPACITY
AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 112, PASAY CITY; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER;
SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE PHILIPPINES, INC.;
WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.;
JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING
CORPORATION AND SIGNATURE LINES, G.R. No.
175723, February 04, 2014
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
(29) CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS
THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., G.R.
Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
(30) ATTY. FORTUNATO PAGDANGANAN, JR., ATTY.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IS APPLICABLE – IF TRIAL COURT DECLARED A DEFENDANT IN DEFAULT WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION (BUT NOT ALLOW THE
DEFENDANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF)
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY ALSO BE FILED if the trial court declared the defendant in default with grave abuse of discretion.
SIMILAR TO AN APPEAL, A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI does NOT ALLOW THE DEFENDANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS OR HER
BEHALF. The DEFENDANT can only argue that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring him or her in default. Thus,
should a DEFENDANT PREFER TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON HIS OR HER BEHALF, he or she must file either a motion to set aside order of
default, motion for new trial, or a petition for relief from judgment.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI TREATED AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
It is equally–settled rule that a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it WILL LIE ONLY if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it CANNOT
be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, TREATED A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI, particularly (1) if the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a
petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is SUFFICIENT REASON to justify the relaxation of the rules. Considering that
the PRESENT PETITION was filed within the 15–day reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and
because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, TREAT THE INSTANT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
It can be fairly interpreted that the POWER OF THE CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA,
BY CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases. Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded
that the AUTHORITY OF THE CTA TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI QUESTIONING INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS ISSUED BY THE RTC IN A LOCAL TAX
CASE is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
NECESSITY FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; EXCEPTIONS
Hence, as a GENERAL RULE, a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari or prohibition since a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The RATIONALE FOR THE PRE-REQUISITE is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
In this light, CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS WERE CRAFTED TO THE GENERAL RULE REQUIRING A PRIOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BEFORE THE FILING OF A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition. CODE: QUISO – P
Q – QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE CERTIORARI PROCEEDINGS have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the SAME as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court.
U – URGENT NECESSITY for the resolution of the question and ANY FURTHER DELAY would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner.
- UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, a motion for reconsideration would be useless.
I – IN A CRIMINAL CASE, relief from the order of arrest is urgent and the GRANTING OF SUCH RELIEF by the trial court is improbable.
- ISSUE RAISED is one purely of law.
S – SUBJECT MATTER of the action is perishable.
O – ORDER is a patent nullity, as where the COURT A QUO has no jurisdiction.
P – PETITIONER was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief.
- PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT are a nullity for lack of due process.
- PROCEEDINGS were done ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object.
- PUBLIC INTEREST is involved.
RECKONING PERIOD FOR THE PURPOSE OF FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI – NOTICE TO COUNSEL
ABIGAIL D. SUAREZ, and EUGENIO A. VILLANUEVA vs.
FLORENTINO P. SARMIENTO, G.R. No. 206555,
September 17, 2014
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
(31) SARA LEE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. EMILINDA D.
MACATLANG, ET AL., G.R. No. 180147, June 4, 2014
PONENTE: PEREZ, J.:
(32) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO vs PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), G.R. No. 220598
BENIGNO B. AGUAS vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), G.R. No. 220953
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
(33) REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO
S VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, AND TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR. VS. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET.AL, G.R NO. 231658, JULY
14, 2017
PONENTE: DEL CASTILLO, J.
Under SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, an AGGRIEVED PARTY has SIXTY (60) DAYS from receipt of the
assailed decision, order or resolution within which to file a petition for certiorari, viz.: SEC. 4. WHEN AND WHERE TO FILE PETITION. – The PETITION SHALL BE
FILED not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL is timely filed,
whether such motion is required or not, the PETITION SHALL BE FILED not latter than SIXTY (60) DAYS counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
In the present case, and as correctly pointed out by petitioners, the 60-DAY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD for the purpose of filing a petition for certiorari should be
reckoned from January 12, 2011,the DATE ATTY. BORROMEO, SARMIENTO’S THEN COUNSEL OF RECORD, had the notice of the December 30, 2010 Resolution,
and NOT February 10, 2011, the date when Sarmiento was personally notified thereof. This is inconsonance with the well-settled rule that if a LITIGANT IS
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, notices of all kinds, including court orders and decisions, must be served on said counsel, and notice to him is considered notice to
his client.
APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL COURTESY
We, however, have qualified and limited the APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL COURTESY in Go v. Abrogar and Republic v. Sandiganbayan. In these cases, we expressly
DELIMITED THE APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL COURTESY to maintain the efficacy of Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and held that the PRINCIPLE OF
JUDICIAL COURTESY APPLIES ONLY "if there is a strong probability that the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and moribund as a result
of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court."
Through these cases, we clarified that the PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL COURTESY remains to be the exception rather than the rule.
AS A GENERAL RULE, DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE – NOT REVIEWABLE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; EXCEPTION – WHEN NECESSARY TO PREVENT A
SUBSTANTIAL WRONG OR TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE / TWO FORMS OF CONSPIRACY
The SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI IS GENERALLY NOT PROPER to assail such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court BECAUSE of the availability of
another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover, SECTION 23, RULE 119 OF THE RULES OF COURT expressly provides that "THE ORDER DENYING THE MOTION
FOR LEAVE OF COURT TO FILE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE OR THE DEMURRER ITSELF shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." BUT, THE WRIT
WILL BE GRANTED where necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
The EXERCISE OF THIS POWER TO CORRECT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has
the bounden constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is committed. Thus, NOTWITHSTANDING THE INTERLOCUTORY
CHARACTER AND EFFECT OF THE DENIAL OF THE DEMURRERS TO EVIDENCE, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the
denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. As we shall soon show, the SANDIGANBAYAN AS THE TRIAL COURT was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it
capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence DESPITE the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the
absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.
In TERMS OF PROVING ITS EXISTENCE, CONSPIRACY TAKES TWO FORMS. The FIRST IS THE EXPRESS FORM, which requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-
conspirators to commit the crime. However, CONSPIRACIES are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the SECOND FORM, the IMPLIED
CONSPIRACY. An IMPLIED CONSPIRACY exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
EACH DOING A PART so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment. IMPLIED CONSPIRACY IS PROVED through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest. But to be CONSIDERED A
PART OF THE CONSPIRACY, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for
without being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own acts.
The PROSECUTION did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and Uriarte.
"IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING" DOES NOT REFER TO A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED UNDER SECTION 1 OR 5 OF ARTICLE VIII
It could NOT HAVE BEEN THE INTENTION OF THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION that the phrase "IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING" would refer to a
Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII. The STANDARD OF REVIEW IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is whether the respondent
has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions. Thus, it is NOT THE PROPER
TOOL to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. It must be emphasized that under SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII, COURT is
tasked to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's exercise of emergency powers. Put differently, if this COURT applies the standard of review

CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1) MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON,
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN; JUDY M.
TAGUIWALO, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES DILIMAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON,
PAGBABAGO; HENRI KAHN, CONCERNED CITIZENS
MOVEMENT; REP. LUZ ILAGAN, GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY REPRESENTATIVE; REP. CARLOS ISAGANI
ZARATE, BAY AN MUNA PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVE;
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF
BAYAN; MANUEL K. DAYRIT, CHAIRMAN, ANG
KAPATIRAN PARTY; VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO,
CHAIRPERSON, ANAKBAYAN; VICTOR VILLANUEVA,
CONVENOR, YOUTH ACT NOW vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C.
AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; AND FLORENCIO B. ABAD, SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
(2) DESTILERIA LIMTUACO & CO., INC. and CONVOY
MARKETING CORPORATION, VS ADVERTISING BOARD
OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 164242, November 28,
2008, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J
used in a petition for certiorari, the same would emasculate its constitutional task under Section 18, Article VII.
To conclude that the "APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING" refers to a Petition for Certiorari filed under the expanded jurisdiction of this Court would, therefore,
contradict the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution to place additional safeguards against possible martial law abuse for, invariably, the THIRD
PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII would be subsumed under Section 1 of Article VIII. In other words, the framers of the Constitution ADDED THE
SAFEGUARD UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII on top of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court.
The unique features of the THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII clearly indicate that it should be treated as sui generis separate and different from
those enumerated in Article VIII. Under the third paragraph of Section 18, Article VII, a petition filed pursuant therewith will follow a different rule on standing as
any citizen may file it. Said provision of the Constitution also LIMITS THE ISSUE to the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise by the Chief Executive of his
emergency powers. The USUAL PERIOD FOR FILING PLEADINGS IN PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is likewise not applicable under the third paragraph of Section 18,
Article VII considering the limited period within which this Court has to promulgate its decision.
In fine, the phrase "IN AN APPROPRIATE PROCEEDING" appearing on the THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 18, ARTICLE VII refers to any action initiated by a
citizen for the purpose of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief Executive's emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be
DENOMINATED as a complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
RULE 65 – CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
CASE RULING
PETITION FOR PROHIBITION / PURPOSE OF A WRIT FOR PROHIBITION
A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function.
PROHIBITION is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to DESIST FROM FURTHER PROCEEDINGS when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or
person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. PROHIBITION LIES against judicial or ministerial functions, but NOT against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the PURPOSE OF A
WRIT OF PROHIBITION is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.
PROHIBITION IS THE PROPER REMEDY to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in
handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy
available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained.
WHERE THE PRINCIPAL RELIEF SOUGHT IS TO INVALIDATE AN IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "RESPONDENTS ARE PERFORMING OR THREATENING TO PERFORM
FUNCTIONS WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order.
REQUISITES OF A WRIT OF PROHIBITION / NON-APPLICATION OF THE WRIT TO PERSONS ACTING IN PIURELY PRIVATE CAPACITY
Under SECTION 2, RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the FOLLOWING REQUISITES: (a) it must be
DIRECTED against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the TRIBUNAL, CORPORATION, BOARD
OR PERSON has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is NO appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A respondent is said to be exercising JUDICIAL FUNCTION by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are,
and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION is a term which applies to the
action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. MINISTERIAL FUNCTION is one which an officer or

CASE NUMBER/TITLE/G.R NO/PONENTE
(1) STAR SPECIAL WATCHMAN AND DETECTIVE
AGENCY, INC., CELSO A. FERNANDEZ and MANUEL V.
FERNANDEZ vs PUERTO PRINCESA CITY, MAYOR
EDWARD HAGEDORN and CITY COUNCIL OF PUERTO
PRINCESA CITY, G.R. No. 181792, April 21, 2014
PONENTE: MENDOZA, J.
(2) ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, - versus -
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety
or impropriety of the act done.
The ACTS SOUGHT TO BE PROHIBITED IN THIS CASE are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions. What is at contest here is the POWER AND AUTHORITY OF A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION, COMPOSED OF SEVERAL MEMBERS-ORGANIZATIONS, which
power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, PROHIBITION WILL NOT LIE IN THIS CASE. The DEFINITION AND PURPOSE OF A WRIT OF
PROHIBITION excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the WRIT WILL NOT BE ISSUED
against private individuals or corporations so acting. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGES 304 TO 305)
RULE 65 – CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
CASE RULING
WHEN WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS AVAILABLE / WHEN IT WILL NOT ISSUE
MANDAMUS is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court,
tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person REQUIRING THE PERFORMANCE OF A PARTICULAR DUTY THEREIN SPECIFIED, WHICH DUTY results from
the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and clearly
excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest. The WRIT IS A PROPER
RECOURSE FOR CITIZENS who seek to enforce a public right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public right involved is
mandated by the Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, MANDAMUS WILL LIE if the tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station.
The COURT cannot blame petitioners for resorting to the remedy of mandamus because they have done everything in the books to satisfy their just and
demandable claim. They went to the courts, the COA, the Ombudsman, and the DILG. They RESORTED TO THE REMEDY OF MANDAMUS because in at least
three (3) cases, the Court sanctioned the remedy in cases of final judgments rendered against a local government unit (LGU). The Court ruled that a CLAIMANT
may RESORT TO THE REMEDY OF MANDAMUS to compel an LGU to enact the necessary ordinance and approve the corresponding disbursement in order to
satisfy the judgment award. Clearly, MANDAMUS IS A REMEDY AVAILABLE to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a
municipality or city, as in this case.
The WRIT OF MANDAMUS, HOWEVER, WILL NOT ISSUE to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do, or to
give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. NOR WILL MANDAMUS ISSUE to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or as to which a
substantial doubt exists, although objection raising a mere technical question will be disregarded if the right is clear and the case is meritorious. Recognized
further in this jurisdiction is the PRINCIPLE THAT MANDAMUS CANNOT BE USED to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE to
enforce purely private contract rights, and WILL NOT LIE against an individual UNLESS some obligation in the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.
The WRIT IS NOT APPROPRIATE to enforce a private right against an individual. The WRIT OF MANDAMUS LIES to enforce the execution of an act, when,
otherwise, justice would be obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public and to the government; hence, it is CALLED A PREROGATIVE
WRIT. To PRESERVE ITS PREROGATIVE CHARACTER, mandamus is not used for the redress of private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the public.
Moreover, an IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE FOLLOWED IN THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT is that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked. In other words, MANDAMUS CAN BE ISSUED only in cases where the usual modes of
procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to afford relief. Although classified as a legal remedy, mandamus is equitable in its nature and its issuance is
generally controlled by equitable principles. Indeed, the GRANT OF THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS lies in the sound discretion of the court. [Emphasis supplied]
REQUISITES OF A WRIT OF MANDAMUS / DISTINCTION BETWEEN A MINISTERIAL AND DISCRETIONARY ACT
For mandamus to lie, the FOLLOWING REQUISITES MUST BE COMPLIED with: (a) the PLAINTIFF has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the
DUTY OF THE DEFENDANT to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the DEFENDANT unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by
law; (d) the ACT TO BE PERFORMED is ministerial, NOT discretionary; and (e) there is NO appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 311-312)
The DISTINCTION BETWEEN A MINISTERIAL ACT AND A DISCRETIONARY ONE HAS BEEN DELINEATED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: The distinction between a
ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A PURELY MINISTERIAL ACT OR DUTY is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, WITHOUT regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty

(3) FIDELA R. ANGELES - versus - THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON
CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
Respondents, Respondents, March 9, 2010
PONENTE: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
(4) SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED
BY ITS CHAIRMAN, ROBERTO P. CERICOS vs. NESTOR
M. CANDA, BIENVENIDO LIPA YON, JULIAN D.
AMADOR, BOHOL PROVINCIAL CHIEF, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, AND NATIONAL DIRECTOR, RESPECTIVELY,
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, ALL SUED IN BOTH THEIR OFFICIAL AND
PRIVATE CAPACITIES, G.R. No. 160932, January 14,
2013
PONENTE: BERSAMIN, J.:
(5) FROILAN DEJURAS - versus - HON. RENE C. VILLA, in
his official capacity as Secretary of Agrarian Reform;
the BUREAU OF AGRARIAN LEGAL ASSISTANCE, the
CENTER FOR LAND USE AND POLICY PLANNING
INSTITUTE, the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, all of the Department of
Agrarian Reform; CONCHITA DELFINO; ANTHONY
DELFINO; ARTEMIO ALON; and SM PRIME HOLDINGS,
INC., G.R. No. 173428, November 22, 2010
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.:
is DISCRETIONARY and not ministerial. The DUTY IS MINISTERIAL only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 312 TO 313)
The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the Presidents mandatory 90-day period to appoint is MINISTERIAL, but its selection of the
candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The OBJECT OF THE PETITIONS FOR MANDAMUS
herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful
neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty. For MANDAMUS TO LIE AGAINST THE JBC, therefore, there should be an
unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President.
PURPOSE OF MANDAMUS / CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT
It is settled that MANDAMUS IS EMPLOYED to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but NOT to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. MANDAMUS WILL NOT ISSUE to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. It is nonetheless
likewise AVAILABLE to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but NOT to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 317)
Likewise, the WRIT OF MANDAMUS CAN BE AWARDED only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be
compelled is clear and complete. Under RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT, a CLEAR LEGAL RIGHT is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as
a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the RIGHT SOUGHT
TO BE ENFORCED IS IN SUBSTANTIAL DOUBT OR DISPUTE, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RINAO, PAGE 312)
The ISSUANCE BY THE LRA OFFICIALS OF A DECREE OF REGISTRATION is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the
double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the REGISTER OF
DEEDS CANNOT BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels
of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. NEITHER COULD RESPONDENT LRA ADMINISTRATOR be
mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his
letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his
refusal to grant petitioners request.
PURELY MINISTERIAL ACT OR DUTY
A key principle to be observed in dealing with PETITIONS FOR MANDAMUS is that such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial in nature, NOT those that are discretionary. A PURELY MINISTERIAL ACT OR DUTY is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, WITHOUT regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. The DUTY IS MINISTERIAL only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
EXCEPTION (WHEN MANDAMUS MAY LIE TO COMPEL DISCRETIONARY ACTS)
Established is the procedural law precept that a WRIT OF MANDAMUS GENERALLY LIES to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but NOT the
performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of judgment. Thus, when the ACT SOUGHT TO BE PERFORMED INVOLVES THE
EXERCISE OF DISCRETION, the respondent may only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. It is, nonetheless, ALSO AVAILABLE
to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but NOT to direct the exercise of judgment in a particular manner. However, this
RULE ADMITS OF EXCEPTIONS. MANDAMUS IS THE PROPER REMEDY in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of
authority. (CITED IN THE BOOK OF RIANO, PAGE 318)
Clearly, the GRANT OF AN INJUNCTIVE RELIEF in this case is NOT PROPERLY COMPELLABLE BY MANDAMUS inasmuch as it requires discretion and judgment on
the part of both the DAR and the DARAB to find whether petitioner has a clear legal right that needs to be protected and that the acts of SMPHI are violative of

(6) CLARK INVESTORS AND LOCATORS ASSOCIATION
INC., vs. SECRETARY OF FINANCE AND COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 200670, July 6, 2015
PONENTE: VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
such right. On this score alone, the COURT OF APPEALS cannot be faulted for its refusal to issue the writ of mandamus prayed for.
WRIT OF MANDAMUS IS NOT ISSUED IN DOUBTFUL CASES
Certainly, MANDAMUS is never issued in doubtful cases. It CANNOT BE AVAILED against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion
or judgment. For a WRIT TO ISSUE, petitioners should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to
perform the act sought to be mandated.
The POWERS TO CONFER DEGREES AT THE PMA, GRANT AWARDS, AND COMMISSION OFFICERS IN THE MILITARY SERVICE are discretionary acts on the part of the
President as the AFP Commander-in-Chief. There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. DISCRETION appears to be of the essence. In terms of
Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a PRIVILEGE RATHER THAN A RIGHT. He in this case, CADET 1CL CUDIA cannot therefore
satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding.