LIM v.
COURT OF APPEALS By virtue of such report, he was able to obtain a decree nullifying his church marriage to
214 SCRA 273 (1992)
Facts: Juan Sim filed a suit for annulment against Nelly Lim on the ground that the latter has been
suffering from schizophrenia before, during or and after the marriage. As an expert witness, Sim
announced his intention to present Dr. Acampado, the Chief of the Female Services of the National
Mental Hospital. Lim’s counsel opposed the introduction of said witness as Dr. Acampado had
examined and diagnosed Lim, and hence, was bound by the physician-patient confidentiality rule.
Sim’s counsel, however, claimed that Dr. Acampado was there as an expert witness and not to
testify on any information acquired during Lim’s examination.
The RTC judge allowed Dr. Acampado to testify, but the latter was qualified by Sim’s counsel as an
expert witness and asked hypothetical questions. Dr. Acampado neither revealed what illness she
examined and treated Lim for nor disclosed the results of Lim’s examinations and the medicines
prescribed.
Issue: Is Dr. Acampado’s testimony violative of the Physician-Patient Privilege?
Held: No. The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physicians of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion and be enabled to safely
and efficaciously treat his patient.
The requisites of the privilege are that: 1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; 2) the person
against whom said privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics; 3) such person acquired the information while attending to the patient in his professional
capacity; 4) said information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and 5) said
information was confidential, and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The privilege, though duly claimed, is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert opinion
testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical and
mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based
strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient.
Moreover, assuming that Dr. Acampado’s testimony is privileged, the failure to seasonably object
thereto constitutes a waiver thereof.
Doctrine: The physician-patient privilege is not violated by permitting a physician to give expert
opinion testimony in response to a strictly hypothetical question in a lawsuit involving the physical
and mental condition of a patient whom he has attended professionally, where his opinion is based
strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated, excluding and disregarding any personal professional
knowledge he may have concerning such patient.
KROHN v. COURT OF APPEALS
233 SCRA 146
Facts: Ma. Paz Fernandez underwent psychological testing to ease her mental strain. In 1973, she
and her husband, Edgar Krohn, with whom she had three kids, separated. Krohn was able to
obtain a copy of the Psychiatric Evaluation Report signed by one Dr. Banaeg and one Dr. Reyes.
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Fernandez. A voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership was granted by the Pasig RTC, and
in 1990, Krohn filed for the annulment of his marriage with the Makati RTC. Krohn used the
contents of the aforesaid Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in his testimony, to which
Fernandez objected on the ground of Physician-Patient privilege.
Issue: Is the Psychiatric Evaluation Report prohibited as evidence for being violative of the
Physician-Patient privilege?
Held: No. The person against whom the privilege is being claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics, as he is simply Fernandez’s husband who wishes to testify
on a document executed by medical practitioners. He is therefore not barred by the privilege, and
neither can his testimony be deemed a circumvention of the prohibition as his testimony cannot
have the same force and effect as a testimony made by a physician who examined the patient and
executed the report.
Doctrine: A person not duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics, who wishes to
testify on a document executed by duly licensed medical practitioners is not barred by the
Physician-Patient Privilege.
State Secrets
UNITED STATES v. NIXON
418 U.S. 683 (1974)
Facts: On March 1, 1974, the grand jury of the District Court returned an indictment charging
seven individuals with various offenses, including conspiracy to defraud the U.S. and to obstruct
justice, and naming the President, among others, as an unindicted co-conspirator. On April 18,
1974, A third-party subpoena duces tecum was issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, directing the President to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aides and advisers. The President then publicly released edited transcripts of
43 conversations. Portions of 20 conversations subject to the subpoena were included.
The next day, the President’s counsel filed a “special appearance” and a motion to quash the
subpoena on the ground of absolute executive privilege, which was denied. The President’s
counsel argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the subpoena as the matter was an intra-
branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive Branch and hence not
subject to judicial resolution. He also argued that the federal courts should not intrude into areas
committed to other branches of the Government. Since the Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, a President's decision is
final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. Although the President
has delegated to the Special Prosecutor certain powers, he has not “waived nor delegated to the
Special Prosecutor the President’s duty to claim privilege as to all materials… which fall within the
President’s inherent authority to disclose to any executive officer.”
The President’s counsel invoked two grounds in support of his claim of absolute privilege: 1) that
there is a valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and
those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties; and 2) the doctrine
of separation of powers. The independence of the Executive Brach within its own sphere insulates
a President from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects
confidential Presidential communications.

Issue: Should the subpoena be quashed as it demands “confidential conversations between a
President and his close advisors that would be inconsistent with the public interest to produce”?
Held: No. Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. While the President's need for complete
candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts, when the privilege
depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such
conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, the confidentiality of Presidential communications
cannot be invoked. To read the Article II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege
as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized
claim of the public interest in confidentiality of non-military and non-diplomatic discussions would
upset the constitutional balance of "a workable government" and gravely impair the role of the
courts under Article III.
The allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a
criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic
function of the courts. A President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications
of his office is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant
evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair adjudication of a particular
criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to specific facts a criminal prosecution
may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality of communications will not
be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to have some
bearing on the pending criminal cases.
Doctrine: When the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial.
BANCO FILIPINO v. MONETARY BOARD
142 SCRA 523 (1986)
Facts: RTC, Makati, issued an order granting the motion of Banco Filipino for the production,
inspection and copying of certain papers and records allegedly needed by Banco Filipino for the
preparation of tis comments, objections, and exceptions to the Conservator’s report dated January
8, 1985, and Receiver’s Report dated March 19, 1985. The documents asked to be produced,
inspected, and copied included tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the
closure of Banco Filipino and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985.
The Monetary Board assailed the order, claiming that the tapes and transcripts of its deliberations
are confidential pursuant to Sec. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act, and that the deliberations were
held after the submission of the Central Bank reports; hence, they did not enter into the making of
those reports and can have no materiality to any question of fact that may be raised in relation to
their contents.
Banco Filipino, meanwhile, asserted that the Monetary Board cannot claim privilege in refusing to
produce the Central Bank records as it is based solely on the generalized interest in confidentiality.
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U.S. v. Nixon was cited, which states that “when the ground for asserting privilege as to
subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law.
ISSUE: Are the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations privileged
communications pursuant to Sec. 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, and under Sections 13 and
15 of the Central Bank Act?
Held: No. The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There
is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Secs. 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits
absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or
material to a matter subject of a suit pending before it. Disclosure is not being sought here to obtain
information for personal gain, and there is no indication that such disclosure would be detrimental
to the government, to the bank or to third parties. As a matter of fact, it is the bank itself that is
interested in obtaining what it considers as information useful and indispensably needed by it to
support its position in the matter being inquired to by the court below.
It is true that Sec. 21(e), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court states that “a public officer cannot be
examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official
confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure.” However, this
privilege is not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Where
there is no public interest that would be prejudiced the rule will not be applicable. Here, the
Monetary Board has failed to establish that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the
papers and documents sought by Banco Filipino. As the bank was already closed as of January
25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no
danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets.
On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only
the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be
informed as to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the bank’s closure.
Doctrine: Sec. 21(e), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is not for the protection of public officers but
for the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced the
rule will not be applicable.
PEOPLE v. ONG
432 SCRA 470 (2004)
Facts: On July 23, 1998, a confidential informant of the Special Operations Division, PNP
Narcotics Group, reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ferro about the alleged illicit drug activities of a
certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male partner. Upon evaluation of the information,
Ferro decided to conduct a buy-bust operation, with SPO1 Gonzales serving as poseur-buyer.
The buy-bust operation was conducted, and William Ong and Ching de Ming a.k.a. Robert Tiu
were subsequently charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 for the alleged
illegal sale of shabu. During trial, however, the confidential informant who had sole knowledge of
how the selling of shabu started and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His
testimony was given instead by SPO1 Gonzales, who himself had no personal knowledge of the
same. When asked, however, the prosecution claimed that the identity of the confidential informant
was privileged.
Issue: Is the identity of the confidential informant considered privileged?

Held: Yes. The Court recognizes the compelling considerations as to why confidential informants
are usually not presented by the prosecution. One is the need to hide their identity and to preserve
their invaluable service to the police; while another is the necessity to protect them from being
objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. All these
considerations, hwoever have to be balanced with the right of an accused to a fair trial.
What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the Government’s privilege to
withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with enforcement of that law. The purpose is the furtherance and protection of the
public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to
communicate their knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by
perserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation. The scope of the privilege,
however, is limited by its underlying purpose. Where the disclosure of the contents of the
communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are not privileged.
Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who would have cause to
resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable. Moreover, where the disclosure of
an informer’s identity, or the contents of his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense
of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. Some
of the factors which may be considered in balancing the state interest against the individual’s right
to prepare his defense are: 1) the crime charged, 2) the possible defenses, 3) the possible
significance of the informer’s testimony, and 4) other relevant factors.
In this case, the crime charged against Ong and Tiu is capital in character and can result in the
imposition of the death penalty. They have foisted the defense of instigation, in sharp contrast to
the claim of entrapment by the prosecution. The latter has to prove all the material elements of the
alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is
indispensable, it should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high importance in
our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a value of higher significance.
Doctrine: The scope of the informer’s privilege is limited by its underlying purpose. Where the
disclosure of the contents of the communication will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer,
the contents are not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to
those who would have cause to resent the communication, the privilege is no longer applicable.
Moreover, where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or the contents of his communication, is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause,
the privilege must give way.
Parental & Filial Privilege
PEOPLE v. PUBLICO
17 car (2s) 703 (1972)
Facts: While walking back home, Aurelio chanced upon Alfredo Lagat and Leonardo Publico, who
were engaged in a heated discussion. Publico remarked to him, “Are you another one?” When
Aurelio said “No” and continued on his way, Lagat followed and boxed the former at the back of his
waistline. Aurelio faced Lagat and asked why he was boxing him, but instead of responding, Lagat
took out his bolo. Aurelio ran away, but Lagat chased him. The two grappled for the possession of
the bolo. Aurelio was able to stab Lagat during the fight that ensued, and the latter later died of
shock due to hemorrhage.
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During trial, Aurelio raised interposed the plea of self-defense in the killing of Lagat. To disprove
this, the prosecution cited the testimony of Patrolman Julian Urmatam, who declared that he
brought the bolo, which Aurelio had surrendered to the police, to the house of Aurelio, and when he
asked the son and the wife of Aurelio, they replied that it was the same bolo they used in their
kitchen. Aurelio’s wife, however, denied making such statement, which denial was corroborated by
Patrolman Oandasan, who claimed he too went to Aurelio’s house with the bolo, and upon asking
the wife and the son regarding the bolo, they showed him their own bolo.
Issue: Are the alleged information given by Aurelio’s wife and son to Patrolman Urmatam excluded
as evidence for being violative of the parental-filial privilege?
Held: Yes. Information given to a witness by the wife and child of the accused is in the nature of
evidence against the accused and should not be admitted in evidence. Insofar as the information
allegedly given by the wife is concerned, the same is covered by the evidentiary rule of exclusion
that a wife cannot be examined for or against her husband without his consent. Insofar as the
information allegedly given by the child is concerned, the same is covered by the evidentiary rule
that no descendant can be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
ascendants.
Though no formal objection was given to the admissibility of the testimony of Patrolman Urmatam
about the alleged statements of Aurelio’s wife and child, by presenting the wife of the accused to
deny the testimony of the witness regarding the alleged information, the defense had thereby
invoked its objection to the inadmissible testimony of Urmatam. Without the testimony of Urmatam,
the testimony of Aurelio that the bolo which he surrendered to the police belonged to Lagat is now
unchallenged and must be accepted to be true.
Doctrine: Information given to a witness by the wife and child of the accused is in the nature of
evidence against the accused and should not be admitted in evidence. Insofar as the information
allegedly given by the child is concerned, the same is covered by the evidentiary rule that no
descendant can be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants.
GUILLERMO VIACRUCIS, ET AL. v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-29831, March 29, 1972
Facts: On June 8, 1936, Pedro Sanchez executed a deed selling the subject lot to Anastacio
Orais. Said deed was registered. Sanchez subsequently executed another deed selling a portion of
the same lot to Balentin Ruizo, who in turn sold it to Guillermo Viacrucis on October 10, 1945.
Orais made oral demands for Viacrucis to vacate said portion and surrender it to him, but
Viacrucis refused, and instead executed a deed selling the said portion to his brother-in-law Claros
Marquez. The deeds of sale in favor of Ruizo, Viacrucis and Marquez, have not been registered
with the Register of Deeds.
The Sps. Viacrucis and the Sps. Marquez insist that the failure of Orais to bring the present action
earlier constituted an omission that “may be given in evidence against him,” as provided in Sec. 22,
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court. They also claim that when Orais had tried to obtain a loan from the
PNB, with OCT No. 243 as collateral security, and PNB refused the offer on the ground that the
land was not his property, Orais said nothing, which should have been considered an admission in
silence, pursuant to Sec. 23, Rule 130. They also objected to the fact that the CA considered in
favor of Orais, allegedly in violation of Sec. 25, Rule 130, the admission of Mrs. Beatriz Costelo, to
the effect that, although the land was physically in the possession of her now deceased husband,
he and she recognized Orais as the owner of said land.
 P5,000 on November 30, 1971, and thereafter every 30th day of the month for 3 years until the
Issue 1: Was Orais’s failure to bring an action against the Viacrucises and the Marquezes an obligation is fully satisfied, and to substitute the Manahan mortgage with one on Adao’s lot.
omission falling under the coverage of Sec. 22, Rule 130?
Issue: Should the documentary evidence above be deemed admissions on the part of COB
Held 1: No.The effect or import of the failure of Orais to file the present action until November 15, regarding its liability to EKC?
1960, is a matter relevant to the issue of whether the sale attested to by Exhibit B is simulated, as
contended by petitioners herein, or is a true and authentic sale, as Orais maintains. The decision of Held: Yes. Under Sec 22, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court, the act, declaration or omission of a
the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the trial court and sustaining the claim of Orais, constitutes a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him “as admissions of a party.” The
finding of fact, which is final in this proceeding for review on certiorari. second chattel mortgages, though ineffective for lack of consent of the first mortgagee, served the
purpose of being admissions of the liability of COB to Keller. The admissions of the president of
COB are also supported by the documentary evidence presented by Keller, such as the invoices
Issue 2: Should Orais’s silence when the PNB rejected his offer of collateral on the ground that he
with delivery receipts, together with a tabulation thereof, and a statement of account showing
did not own the property being offered be deemed an admission in silence?
COB’s liability to Keller, as reflected in the customer’s ledger. COB’s president also admitted that
Keller sent COB monthly statement of accounts. Moreover, the stockholder’s letter to EKC also
Held 2: No. There is no competent evidence on whether or not Orais had said anything in
serve as admissions of liability.
response to said statement. Moreover, OCT NO. 243 was in the name of Pedro Sanchez, and no
matter how real the sale by the latter to Orais may be, the bank would not accept the land in
Doctrine: Pieces of documentary evidence, such as the chattel mortgages and the stockholders’
question as security for said loan, unless and until OCT No. 243 shall have been cancelled and a
letter in this case, may be deemed admissions of liability falling under Sec. 22, Rule 130 of the
transfer certificate of title issued to Orais. This could not take place before the filing of his loan
Rules of Court which provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a releveant fact
application because the owner’s duplicate of said OCT, admittedly delivered by Sanchez to Orais,
may be given in evidence against him “as admissions of a party.”
had been lost in the possession of Orais’s counsel, to who Orais had turned it over in connection
with a criminal case.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BIENVENIDO PARAGSA
G.R. No. L-44060, July 20, 1978
Issue 3: Was the admission of Mrs. Costelo properly considered in Orais’s favor?
Facts: On July 13, 1971, twelve year-old Mirasol was alone in her parents’ house, having been told
Held 3: Yes. The said testimony of Mrs. Costelo, and this recognition by the now deceased Pelagio
by her mother not to go to school that afternoon so she could look after the pigs and cook their
Costelo, which were confirmed by a public document, constitute a declaration of the Sps. Costelo
feed. While doing so, Bienvenido Paragsa, armed with a hunting knife, entered the house and
adverse to their interest, which is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Sec. 32 of Rule 130.
approached Mirasol from behind. Pointing the hunting knife at her breast and threatening to kill her
Petitioners have no reason to object to the consideration in favor of Orais of said admission, the
if she shouted, he pushed her to a bamboo bed nearby and raped her. Out of fear, the girl did not
same having been made in 1936, more than 5 years before their predecessor in interest, Ruizo,
put up any resistance whatsoever. Upon hearing Mirasol’s aunt, Lita Parochel, calling for Mirasol,
had entered into the picture, when Orais and Costelo were the only parties who had any interest in
Paragsa ran to the storeroom upstairs. Parochel, however, saw through the gate Paragsa running
the object of said admission. Pursuant to said legal provision, such admission “may be received in
away and Mirasol putting on her panties, but the latter did not tell her aunt what happened when
evidence,” not only against the party who made it “or his successors in interest,” but also “against
asked because she was afraid as Paragsa was still inside the house, nor did she tell her family
third persons.”
what happened when they returned. It was Mirasol’s aunt who told her mother, who confronted
Mirasol about the incident.
Doctrine: The legal provision regarding admissions adverse to the interest of the one making the
admission may be received in evidence, not only against the third party who made it or his
Paragsa denied the rape charges, claiming that he and Mirasol were sweethearts and that it was
successor in interest, but also against third persons.
actually their third sexual intercourse, as corroborrated by two witnesses.
KELLER v. COB
Issue: Should Mirasol’s repeated silence be deemed an admission in silence under the Rules of
141 SCRA 86 (1986)
Court?
Facts: COB Group Marketing (COB) was the exclusive distributor of Edward Keller & Co.’s (EKC)
Held: Yes. The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of
household products in Panay and Negros, with EKC selling on credit said products to COB. As
the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases. But before the silence of a
security for the credit purchases, a certain Manahan assumed solidary liability with COB by
party can be taken as an admission of what is said, it must appear: 1) that he heard and
mortgaging her land to EKC. A second sales agreement later extended COB’s territory to Northern
understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was
and Souther Luzon, with a certain Lorenzo executing a real estate mortgage in favor of EKC.
in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling,
Eventually, COB’s liability to Keller amounted to P179,000. A settlement agreement was entered
naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted
into, whereby COB executed 2 second chattel mortgages in favor of Keller. However, said
or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of
mortgages did not become effective as the first mortgagee, Northern Motors, did not consent
admission by silence all obtain in this case.
thereto. Hence, two COB stockholders, Adao and Lorenzo, proposed, via a letter, to pay Keller
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Mirasol did not bother at all to rebut the testimony of Paragsa and his witnesses to the effect that
he and Mirasol were actually sweethearts and that they had had two previous sexual
communications before July 13, 1971, one of which happened on June 29, 1971, in the house of
Paragsa, where he and Mirasol slept together in the evening of the same day after Paragsa’s
mother and Mirasol had returned from the town fiesta of Bantayan, Cebu.
Doctrine: The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth of
the statements uttered in his presence is applicable in criminal cases.
PEOPLE v. RAMIRO ALEGRE, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-30423, November 7, 1979
Facts: 57 year old Adelina Sajo was found dead inside the bathroom of her house, having been
strangled to death. Evidence showed that her bedroom was ransacked. In the latter part of the
same month, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in the act of pawning a bracelet belonging to
Sajo. He admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo in an extrajudicial confession
before the police authorities, implicating several others at the same time. When brought to the
Pasay City police headquarters, he again executed an extrajudicial confession, narrating in detail
the participation in the commission of the crime of his co-accused. On the basis of the same, an
Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed against Cudillan, Celso Fernandez, Jesus
Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas, and one John Doe.
The recital of facts contained in the disputed decision convicting the accused was based principally
and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Cudillan and the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla, the
investigating officer, and Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner to whom three of the accused
allegedly admitted their involvement in the crime. However, Cudillan repudiated both the sworn
statements as the product of compulsion and duress and that he was not assisted by counsel when
investigated by the police.
Issue 1: Can the silence of the other accused while under police custody, in the face of Cudillan’s
statements implicating them in the crime, be considered as tacit admissions of their participation
therein?
Held 1: No. The silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify,
may not be taken as evidence against him, and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating
question. Prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial
investigation. The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects,
therefore, the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence. It was error for the trial court
therefore to draw from appellants’ silence while under police custody, in the face of the
incriminatory statements of Cudillan the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly
admitted their guilt.
Doctrine 1: The silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another
implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to
such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in
the commission of the crime. Such an inference or acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure
to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-
incrimination.
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Issue 2: Can Cudillan’s extrajudicial confessions be used as evidence against his co-accused?
Held 2: No. Such extrajudicial confessions, on the pasis of which the trial court was able to
reconstruct how Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not
competent proof against Alegre and Medalla, under the principle of “res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet,” there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the
extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not
have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other
accused are concerned. While there are exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances in this
case do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions.
Doctrine 2: As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately
made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-accused.
GRIFFIN v. CALIFORNIA
380 U.S. 853 (1965)
Facts: Eddie Dean Griffin was charged with murder of the first degree. During the trial on the issue
of his guilt, Griffin did not testify; however, he testified at a separate trial on the issue of penalty.
The trial court stated that Griffin had a constitutional right not to testify. However, “as to any
evidence or facts against him which [Griffin] can reasonably be expected to deny or explain
because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if, though he does testify, he fails to
deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that failure into consideration as tending to
indicate the truth of such evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that may be
reasonably drawn therefrom those unfavorable to the defendant are more probable.” The court
further stated, though, that such failure does not create a presumption of guilt nor by itself warrant
an inference of guilt nor relieve the prosecution of any of its burden of proof.
Griffin was convicted and sentences to death.
Issue: Should Griffin’s failure to testify have been taken against him?
Held: No. The right against self-incrimination has due regard to those who might prefer to rely
upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives to everyone, and not wish to be witnesses.
It is not everyone who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the
charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain
transactions of a suspicious character, and offenses charged against him, will often confuse and
embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him.
Indeed, it is not everyone, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the
witness stand. Moreover, a comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the inquisitorial
system of criminal justice.
Doctrine: Failure to testify by the accused cannot be taken as evidence of guilt, as this will go
against the right of the accused against self-incrimination.
EL VARADERO DE MANILA v. INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY
G.R. No. 21911, September 15, 1924
Facts: El Varadero, pursuant to no express agreement other than an implicit understanding that
the price would be as low as, or lower than, what could be secured from any other company,
satifactorily completed certain repairs on a lighter, Tatlo, belonging to the Insular Lumber
Company. The Insular Lumber, however, believed that the bill presented to them was grossly
exorbitant, and failing to reach a compromise, the matter was taken to court. The CFI of Manila
ordering Insular Lumber to pay P5,210.70, plus legal interest. El Varadero appealed, asking for an
increase in the amount of the judgment to P12,412.62, which was the amount in the itemized bill
presented by El Varadero.
During the course of negotiations for compromise, El Varadero had been willing to accept
P10,241.37, while Insular Lumber had been willing to pay P8,070.12.
Issue: Should compromise be excluded as evidence?
Held: Yes. Under the general rules of evidence, the offer of compromise must be excluded, except
that as the amounts named in the offers to accept certain sums in settlement appear to have been
arrived at as a fair estimate of value, they are relevant. Here, there was no denial of liability and the
only question discussed was the amount to be paid which the plaintiff insisted should not be more
than P8,070.12.
Doctrine: An offer of compromise, under the general rules of evidence, must be excluded.
U.S. v. TORRES AND PADILLA
34 Phil 994 (1916)
Facts: George Walker, a secret service agent of the Cebu Customhouse, testified that, upon
receiving information that Regino Torres would go to the house of the widow of a certain Franco to
get some opium, he and his co-agent, Juan Samson, stationed themselves in the street where the
house stood. When Torres and Pablo Padilla came out the door, Samson seized Torres while
Walker chased Padilla. Upon passing by Samson and Torres, Walker saw 2 tins of opium. He
ordered Padilla to halt, but the latter continued to run. Walker fired a shot in the air, and Padilla
threw a tin over a fence. Upon the arrest of Torres and Padilla, Walker and Samson found the tins.
Samson corroborated Walker’s testimony and added that Torres made an offer to compromise the
case by paying a fine.
Issue: Was Torres’s offer of a compromise an admission of guilt?
Held: No. It is true that Torres attempted to compromise the case and that Walker was willing to
accept the payment of P1,500, but subject to the approval of his superiors. However, an offer to
compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence. In the matter of public
crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatsoever may be entered into as
regards the penal action, though it is possible with respect to the civil liability. A compromise
necessarily implied two elements: the offer and the acceptance, in order that the penal action may
be extinguished and there remain only the civil liability to deal with. Ordinarily it is the defendant
who makes the offer – a lawful act sanctioned by law in this class of prosecutions – and no
presumption of guilt must be raised against the maker. The offer may have been prompted simply
to avoid the annoyance of a prosecution.
At any rate, the compromise is not a necessary evidence to convict Torres and Padilla.
Doctrine: In the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise
whatsoever may be entered into as regards the penal action, though it is possible with respect to
the civil liability.
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PEOPLE v. DANNY GODOY
G.R. Nos. 115908-09
Facts: Mia Taha accused Danny Godoy of raping her when she went to the boarding house of her
cousin, Merlylyn Casantosan, near the school where she was studying. Upon entering through the
kitchen door, he grabbed her from behind, poked a knife on her neck and dragged her by the hand,
telling her not to shout. She was forced to lie down on the floor and raped at knife-point. Although it
was dark, Taha recognized her Physicas teacher, Godoy, as her assailant. Godoy threatened her
not to tell anyone or else he would kill her and her family. The next day, Godoy arrived at her
parents’ house and asked permission from Taha’s parents for her to accompany him to solicit
funds because she was a candidate for “Miss PNS Pulot.” She was forced to go for fear of getting
her parents into trouble. She was taken to Sunset Garden and detained for three days, where she
was constantly raped at knife-point. Then, she was taken to the house of Godoy’s friend, where
she was again raped three times. Upon finding that Taha had been reported as a missing person in
the police blotter, Taha was released only after her parents agreed to settle the case with Godoy.
Godoy denied the allegations, claiming that they were having an affair, and that it was Taha who
repeatedly chased after him and who went with him to the Sunset Garden out of fear of her parents
because she thought she was pregnant.
It was however alleged that Godoy’s mother gave them P30,000 as settlement in exchange for an
affidavit of desistance on the part of Mia Taha. There was also an alleged offer of marriage.
Issue: Was the offer of compromise an admission of guilt?
Held: No. In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against
the party making it. It is a legal maxim that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the
public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action.
However, in such cases, the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue
therefrom.
In this case, the evidence for the defense overwhelmingly proves Godoy’s innocence of the offense
charged. Further, the supposed offer of marriage did not come from Godoy, but was actually
suggested by an imam who informed him that he could convert into Muslim to be able to marry
Taha despite already being married. However, Godoy refused. As for the P30,000 paid by Gody’s
mother, Godoy himself was actually unaware of this, not until the trial proper. The only ones
present during the negotiations were Taha, her parents, and Godoy’s mother. Where the accused
was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration was made, such offer of
compromise would not save the day for the prosecution. No implied admission can be drawn from
the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did not take part in any of
the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in accordance with the established tribal
customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions, in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the
relation between the parties.
Doctrine: In criminal cases, an offer to compromise is generally admissible as evidence against
the party making it. However, in such cases, the accused is permitted to show that the offer was
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or
for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was
not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom.
PEOPLE V. GENER DE GUZMAN
G.R. No. 117217, December 2, 1996
Facts: Gilda Ambray, a sales clerk at the Anson Department Store, was waiting by the gate of
Meadow Wood Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, for a tricycle ride toward her house when she
noticed Gener de Guzman sitting at the guardhouse. After asking him some questions, she started
walking, but de Guzman got onto his tricycle and offered her a ride. While on board, Gilda noticed
that he took a different route, stopping once in a while to tell her that the tricycle was not in good
condition. Upon reaching Phase II of the same subdivision, near an unfinished house, de Guzman
told Gilda to push the tricycle. Gilda got out and paid him P5.00, which de Guzman refused. As she
was walking away, de Guzman embraced her from behind and threatened her not to shout. Then,
he dragged her to a vacant lot near the unfinished house, and raped her as she struggled despite
his threats to kill her.
It was also alleged that de Guzman’s parents, wife and children had gone to Gilda to plead for her
forgiveness, which she rejected.
Issue: Should the plea for forgiveness made by de Guzman’s parents, wife and children be
deemed an admission of guilt?
Held: Yes. De Guzman did not disown the acts of his parents, wife and children in pleading for
Gilda’s forgiveness, which were testified to by his kumadre, Resurreccion Quiocho, and Gilda
herself. He chose not to deny their testimony. Moreover, despite the unequivocal pronouncement
by the trial court that his guilt was “strongly established by the acts of his parents, wife and
relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim to ask her forgiveness and seek a compromise,”
the accused dared not assign that finding and conclusion as an error and his Appellant’s Brief is
conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then, the accused was a party to the decision to seek for
forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or
confirmed and ratified the act of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law.
A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In criminal
cases, except those involving quasi-offense or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one
would ask for forgiveness unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve,
to pardon, to cease to feel resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to
requittal from or retribution upon an offender.
Doctrine: A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise. In
criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense or those allowed by law to be compromised,
an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission of
guilt.
PEOPLE v. CRISPIN YPARRAGUIRRE
G.R. No. 117702, February 10, 1997
Facts: Rosita Bacaling, a housemaid of Crispin Yparraguirre and his wife, was cooking porridge for
the spouses’ two children, who were both asleep, when Yparraguirre arrived from work.
Yparraguirre handed Rosita a small white envelope said to contain medicine for a skin disease
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Rosita had allegedly contracted from one of the children. Rosita opened the envelope and found 15
tablets inside, all of which Yparraguirre told her to take. Upon doing so, she felt weak and fell
down. Yparraguirre dragged her to the spouses’ bed where he, while pointing a hunting knife at her
neck and threatening to kill her if she moved, raped her. Yparraguirre threatened to kill her if she
told her parents about the incident. A month later, Rosita left the Yparraguirres and went back
home to her mother’s house. She was submitted for medical examination, and then confined at the
Davao City Mental Hospital for observation and treatment for a week, after which, she revealed
that she was raped.
It was also alleged that Yparraguirre’s wife went to the mother of Rosita to negotiate for the
dropping of the case.
Issue: Did Mrs. Yparraguirre offer to compromise with the mother of Rosita?
Held: Yes. There is evidence that after Rosita revealed the rape to her mother, Mrs. Yparraguirre
offered Mrs. Bacaling P15,000 to dissuade her from filing the complaint. When Mrs. Bacaling
refused, Mrs. Yparraguirre increased the offer to P25,000, which Mrs. Bacaling still refused. It is
true that no criminal complaint had yet been filed at that time, but the rape incident was already
known to Mrs. Yparraguirre. Mrs. Yparraguirre herself testified that Mrs. Bacaling told her about it
the day when the former first offered the money.
Doctrine: An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the
offer can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the
crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.
U.S. v. JUAN MAQUI
G.R. No. L-8931, March 14, 1914
Facts: Juan Maqui was convicted for the theft of the caraballa and her calf. Maqui’s counsel claims
that the trial court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of one Dagsa; in accepting proof
as to certain extrajudicial admissions allegedly made by Maqui, including an offer to compromise
the case by the payment of a sum of money; and in declining to accept as true the testimony of
Maqui in his own behalf.
With respect to the alleged offer to compromise, Maqui’s counsel claims that the extrajudicial
statements made by Maqui should have been excluded on the ground that there is no formal proof
that they were made voluntarily, hence they were inadmissible as proof of an admission or
confession of guilt.
Issue: Should Maqui’s extrajudicial statements, including the offer to compromise, have been
deemed admissions of guilt?
Held: Yes. There is no showing that the extrajudicial statements were not made voluntarily. The
record clearly discloses that these extrajudicial statements were made in the course of offers to
compromise and that they were made by the accused voluntarily, though doubtless these offers to
compromise were made in the hope that if accepted, he would escape prosecution. Such offs
negate the possibility that the extrajudicial statements were made involuntarily.
The weight both of authority and of reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to
compromise, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made under a
consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue
therefrom.
Doctrine: An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or promise, and
the reply thereto, are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime.
PEOPLE v. SABAS RAQUEL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996
Facts: At midnight of July 4, 1986, Agapito Gambalan answered the door, thinking of a neighbor in
need. Instead, heavily armed men came through the door, declared a hold-up and fired their guns
at him. Upon hearing the gunshots, Agapito’s wife, Juliet, went out of their room and found his
lifeless body while a man took Agapito’s gun and left hurriedly with the others. George Jovillano
responded to Juliet’s plea for help and reported the incident to the police, who found Amado
Ponce, one of the accused, wounded and lying near the Gambalan’s house. Ponce revealed to the
police that Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime and that they may be
found in their residence. The Raquels were later apprehended on different occasions.
The trial court found all the accused guilty of the crime.
Issue: Can the extrajudicial statement of Ponce pointing at the Raquels as his co-perpetrators of
the crime be used as a basis to convict them?
Held: No. The lone eyewitness, Juliet, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband. The
identification of the accused as the culprits was based chiefly on the extrajudicial statement of
Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. Ponce himself had escaped from jail
before he could testify in court and has been at large since.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against
the latter, unless they are repeated in open court. If the accused never had the opportunity to
cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, the same are hearsay as
against said accused. Extreme caution should be exercised by the courts in dealing with the
confession of an accused which implicates his co-accused. A distinction should be made between
extrajudicial and judicial confessions. The former deprives the accused of the opportunity to cross-
examine the confessant, while in the latter, his confession is thrown wide open for cross-
examination and rebuttal.
Except for Ponce’s extrajudicial statement, there exists no evidence linking the Raquels to the
crime. Said statement was also made in violation of the constitutional rights of Ponce, as admitted
in the testimony of the investigating officer. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial
investigations without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the
adjudication of the case.
Doctrine: The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant
and is not admissible against his co-accused.
PEOPLE v. ROSARIO CABRERA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-37398, June 28, 1974
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Facts: On January 17, 1972, Police Sgt. Mario Tanfelix received an instruction to proceed to Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital to investigate an abandoned person found at the North Diversion Road
suffering from stab wounds. The abandoned person was Luis dela Cruz, who gave an ante-mortem
statement naming Rosario Cabrera as the person who hired his jeep and who was with the three
unidentified men who stabbed him and took his money and jeep. The next morning, Cabrera was
arrested, and two days later, executed an extra-judicial confession, pointing to Conrado Villanueva
as the mastermind of the robbery. She herself merely hired the jeep upon instructions, but the
robbery and killing itself were done by Villanueva and two others. One Dante Marcelo also testified
that, on the night of the robbery, he had seen Cabrera riding on the jeep of dela Cruz, but did not
notice whether there were other passengers. Cabrera and Villanueva were convicted on the basis
of Cabrera’s extra-judicial confession.
Issue: Is Cabrera’s extrajudicial statement admissible against Villanueva?
Held: No. The extrajudicial statement of Cabrera is inadmissible against Villanueva, who made
timely objection thereto. Cabrera’s inculpatory statements were made during the investigation
conducted by the Valenzuela police on January 20, 1972, two days after the date of the incident in
question. For this reason alone, said statement was not made during the existence of the alleged
conspiracy between her and Villanueva, but after said supposed conspiracy had already ceased
and when she was already in the hands of the authorites. Hence, Sec. 27, Rule 130, of the Rules
of Court, which allows the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence to be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration, cannot be availed of.
Doctrine: Where the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy is made after
such conspiracy has ceased and the conspirator is already in the hands of the authorities, such act
or declaration can no longer be given in evidence against the co-conspirator.
PEOPLE v. NICASIO YATCO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-9181, November 28, 1955
Facts: Juan Consunji, Alfonso Panganiban and another unknown individual, were charged with
having conspired together in the murder of Jose Ramos. During the trial, as the prosecution was
questioning a witness, Atty. Arturo Xavier of NBI, in connection with the making of a certain extra-
judicial confession by Consunji, Panganiban’s counsel interposed a general objection to any
evidence on such confession on the ground that it was hearsay and therefore incompetent as
against Panganiban. The trial court ordered the exlusion of the evidence objected to on the ground
that the prosecution could not be permitted to introduce the confessions of Consunji and
Panganiban to prove conspiracy between them, without prior proof of such conspiracy by a number
of definite acts, conditions, and circumstances.
Issue: Was the extrajudicial statement of Consunji properly excluded from the evidence?
Held: No. Under the rule of multiple admissibility of evidence, even if Consunji’s confession may
not be competent as against his co-accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to the latter, or to
prove conspiracy between them without the conspiracy being established by other evidence, the
confession of Consunji was, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of his own guilt, and should
have been admitted as such.
As for the rule providing that “the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration,” the rule refers to statements made by one
conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object, and not
to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
Besides, the prosecution had not yet offered the confessions to prove conspiracy between the two
accused, nor as evidence against both of them. The alleged confessions had not yet even been
identified, much less offered in evidence. The prosecution might still be able to adduce other proof
of conspiracy between Consunji and Panganiban before their confessions are formally offered in
evidence. It was premature for the court to exclude them completely on that ground.
Doctrine: Sec. 30, Rule 130, applies only to statements made by one conspirator during the
pendency of the unlawful enterprises and in furtherance of its object, and not to a confession
made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
PEOPLE v. CHAW YAW SHUN, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-19590, April 25, 1968
Facts: On July 15, 1959, Hector Crisostomo, an officer of the Presidential Fact Finding
Commission charged with the apprehension of dollar smugglers, was found dead in his Borgward
sedan car at Marilao, Bulacan. He had suffered three gunshot wounds on the head. Upon
examination of a bag inside the car, the investigators found a Philippine Trust Co.’s check in the
amount of P1,000.00, drawn by Victorio Alvarez in favor of Crisostomo, with a receipt signed by the
latter acknowledging receipt, with a further statement of an unpaid balance of P24,500. Suspecting
Alvarez had something to do with the killing, he was picked up for questioning. Alvarez made a
tape recorded statement admitting that he alone shot and killed Crisostomo near Manga Avenue,
Manila. The next day, he executed a handwritten statement in narrative form, affirming that a
certain Johnny was the one who shot and killed Crisostomo in Marilao, Bulacan. On the same day,
he made another statement in the form of questions and answers repeating substantially the facts
contained in his handwritten statement. However, the next day, Alvarez executed another
statement admitting that he was the only one who short and killed Crisostomo at Marilao Bulacan,
giving a detailed narration of the participation of one Chaw Yaw Shun a.k.a George Chua, who was
allegedly engaged in dollar smuggling, in the commission of the crime. Chua allegedly had chosen
Alvarez to be the trigger-man and had promised to pay him P35,000, plus P400 a month for killing
Crisostomo. A complaint was then field against Alvarez, Chua, one Johnny Yao and two John
Does.
Chua surrendered to the police. He was investigated, and the investigation was reduced to writing.
However, believing that he was not telling the truth, the investigator destroyed the statements. In
spite of knowledge by Capt. Yapdiangco that a complaint against Chua had already filed, he
brought Chua to the PC headquarters in Alabang, where Chua was investigated in the presence of
several CIS agents. Chua made a written statement, confessing that he ordered the killing of Capt.
Crisostomo because Chua’s partners in Hongkong had gotten angry at him when a sum of money
amounting to $132,000 entrusted to a lady leaving for Hongkong was confiscated by the local
authorities at the airport.
Issue: Were the statements made properly admitted as evidence?
Held: No. There is no evidence, oral or documentary, other than the several confessions of
Alevarez, the confession of Chua, and the testimony of Arturo Cayetano, that would tend to prove
any overt act of Chua indicating some connection between him and the other accused, establishing
a common criminal design to commit the crime.
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Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The admissibility
of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case must relate to statements made
by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in
furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy
had been brought to an end. Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. It must be proved as
the crime itself, independent from the confession. In this case, the trial court admitted the
conflicting confession of Alvarez which are not binding on Chua for being hearsay, aside from
having been repudiated by Alvarez himself during the trial. There is, therefore, no inter-locking
confession so to say, for there being no independent evidence establishing an overt act of Chua
connected to the crime, conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.
Doctrine: Conspiracy must be proved by independent evidence other than the confession. The
admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other in the same case must relate to
statements made by one conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its
existence) and in furtherance of its objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long
after the conspiracy had been brought to an end.
PEOPLE v. CENON SERRANO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7973, April 27, 1959
Facts: On October 16, 1950, Eulogio Serrano told Cenon Serrano, and other co-accused that
Pablo Navarro had been including and prompting people to call on Senator Pablo Angeles David
and testify on the Maliwalu massacre, and for that reason, he manifested to them his desire and
plan to do away with Navarro. Eulogio instructed the others to wait for Navarro in Bacolor, lure him
to go with them to barrio Dolores and there kill him. Pursuant to this, the accused waited for
Navarro, then invited him to drink, after which, they went to Dolores, Bacolor, with the already
drunk Navarro. There, they tied Navarro and accued of bringing witnesses to the house of Senator
David to testify on the Maliwalu massacre. When he denied the charge, they began beating him up.
Later, he was shot to death and his body was shoved into a pit and covered with earth. Another
man, Simplicio Manguerra, was also killed and buried in a pit.
The accused were charged with illegal detention with murder for the deaths of Pablo Navarro and
of Simplicio Manguerra in separate criminal cases. Upon motion of the asst. provincial fiscal,
Anastacio Reyes was discharged to testify as witness for the prosecution. They were found guilty
of the crime. Of all the accused, only Domingo Cadiang, Santiago Yumul and Filemon Cenzon
appealed.
The appellants claimed that in order that the testimony of a conspirator (Anastacio Reyes) may be
admissible in evidence against his co-conspirators, it must appear and be shown by evidence,
other than the admission itself, that the conspiracy actually existed and that the person who is
bound by the admission was a privy to the conspiracy. As there is nothing but the lone testimony of
Reyes, a co-conspirator, conspiracy was not established and the trial court erred in convicting the
appellants on the basis of the testimony of Reyes.
Issue: Is Reyes’s testimony admissible against his co-conspirators?
Held: No. The rule that “the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration,” applies only to extra-judicial acts or declaration, but
not to testimony given on the stand at the trial, where the defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine the declarant. And while the testimony of accomplices or confederates in crime is always
subject to grave suspicion, “coming as it does from a polluted source,” and should be received with
great caution and doubtingly examined, it is nevertheless admissible and competent.
Doctrine: Where the testimony was given on the stand at trial, where the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant, the rule that requires that conspiracy be shown by
evidence other than the act or declaration of the conspirator making the testimony does not apply.
ELADIO ALPUERTO v. JOSE PEREZ PASTOR, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-12794, October 14, 1918
Facts: Eladio Alpuerto and Jose Perez Pastor are both claiming title to three parcels of land
formerly owned by Juan Llenos, with Alpuerto as party in possession under a contract of sale with
pacto de retro, and Pastor as purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against
Llenos. Alpuerto claimed that, by virtue of a contract of sale with right to repurchase, he acquired
title to the land for a consideration of P2,500, as paid, with the right to repurchase fixed for a period
of two years. Said document was acknowledged before a notary public.
Pastor, however, claimed that the transaction by which Alpuerto claims to have acquired title was
simulated or fictitious and that the supposed conveyance was effected for the purpose of
defrauding Pastor as creditor of Llenos. Pastor asked the court to declare him as the true owner of
the property and to order Alpuerto to surrender possession to him.
Issue: Who is entitled to the property?
Held: Article 1225 declares that a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to
those who signed it and their privies, the same force as a public instrument. The term “legally
recognized” must be taken to mean recognized, or acknowledged by the person or persons,
executing or emitting the document, in this case, the vendor Juan Llenos and the vendee, Alpuerto.
The act of legal recognition occurred when the ddocument was signed by the parties and delivered
in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who were called upon to bear witness to the transaction.
The term “privies,” meanwhile, denotes the idea of succession, not only by right of heirship and
testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by singular title, derived from acts inter vivos, and
for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a credit, and one subrogated to it will be privies. In
short, he who by succession is placed in the position of one of those who contracted the juridical
relation and executed the private document and appears to be substituting him in his personal
rights and obligations is a privy.
Here, Pastor, the purchaser at a public sale under an execution directed against Llenos, must be
considered a privy or successor in interest of the execution debtor. He is therefore undoubtedly
bound by the instrument which conveyed the property to Alpuerto, and this from the date of the
execution of that instrument as a private document.
However, circumstances show that the sale made by Llenos to Alpuerto was one in fraud of
creditors; hence, the deed must be annulled and the property delivered to Pastor.
Doctrine: a private document legally recognized shall have, with regard to those who signed it and
their privies, the same force as a public instrument. The term “privies” denotes the idea of
succession, not only by right of heirship and testamentary legacy, but also that of succession by
singular title, derived from acts inter vivos, and for special purposes; hence, an assignee of a
credit, and one subrogated to it will be privies.
CITY OF MANILA v. DEL ROSARIO
10 | P a g e
5 Phil 227 (1905)
Facts: Lorenzo del Rosario acquired the subject two lots in Calle Clavel and Barcelona from
Cipriano Roco, and later sold it to his brother, Jacinto. The City of Manila, however, wanted to
recover said lots and wanted to make use of two documents made Lorenzo, the authenticity of
which Lorenzo admitted. Said documents consisted of a petition dated September 26, 1891, to the
mayor and a letter dated October 9, 1901, to the Municipal Board of Manila, both containing an
offer to buy the land from the City of Manila (as Lorenzo mistakenly thought that the City owned
said land. However, he was informed by some city officials that the land was owned by Roco, not
by the municipality. Lorenzo only signed the letter because the Municipal Board President advised
him to do so to avoid litigation with the city.
Issue: Should Lorenzo’s offer in the two documents be deemed admissions and therefore
competent against Jacinto, the present owner?
Held: No. Lorenzo signed the first document before he acquired the land from Roco and the
second one after he had transferred the land to del Rosario, who took possession of the same and
had it registered. Whatever statements he might have made in the documents, they are not binding
upon Jacinto. Under Sec. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Rule 130, Sec. 31), where one
derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act or omission of the latter, in relation to
that property, is evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title. In this
case, the statements were made when Lorenzo no longer had title to the lands; hence, they are no
longer binding upon Jacinto.
Doctrine: Where one derives title to real property from another, the declaration, act or omission of
the latter, in relation to that property, is evidence against the former only when made while the
latter holds the title.
PEOPLE v. MARLO COMPIL Y LITABAN
244 SCRA 135 (1995)
Facts: Robbers broke into MJ Furnitures, which also served as the dwelling of its proprietors, the
Spouses Manuel and Mary Jay, by detaching the window grills on the second floor where the Jays’
bedroom was located. The two maids were herded in the bathroom and Mary was tied and gagged
in the bedroom as the robbers ransacked the room, taking P35,000 in cash and jewelry worth
P30,000. Upon noticing that the two men guarding them had already left, the two maids rushed to
the bedroom and freed Mary, and they all rushed to the ground floor, where they found Manuel,
who apparently had just come home from their other furniture store, Best Wood Furniture, sprawled
on the floor among pieces of furniture that were in disarray. He eventually died from 13 stab
wounds.
Jessie Bartolome, who worked at the store, told the police that he and his girlfriend, while inside an
owner-type jeep parked near the furniture shop, had seen his co-workers, Marlo Compil, Baltazar
Mabini and Jose Jacale, going to the back of the shop. Moreover, Compil, Mabini and Jacale all
failed to report for work the day after the incident. Upon being arrested, Compil admitted his guilt
and pointed to the arresting officers his co-perpetrators in the heist from a picture of the baptism of
the child of Mabini’s sister. Compil was further investigated at the Tayabas Police Station, and
again in Manila. He confessed that he had been with the group that robbed MJ Furnitures, claiming
he merely served as a lookout, for which he received P1,000, but did not go into the shop since he
would be recognized. Compil claimed that his cohorts stabbed Manuel to death. Compil also
claimed that, after the robbery, they all met in the house of his co-conspirator’s brother to share the
loot and drink beer. The owner of said house confirmed the facts in Compil’s confession. The day
after his arrest, Compil, in the presence of his lawyer and three relatives, executed a sworn
statement admitting his participation in the crime as a lookout and named his six cohorts. The
police, however, failed to arrest said cohorts, and an Information for robbery with homicide was
later filed against Compil, who entered a plea of not guilty.
Issue: Are Compil’s extrajudicial confessions admissible as evidence against him?
Held: No. "The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions
from respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting forced or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation for the commission of the offense."
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
In this case, Compil was subjected to interrogation and confessed to the commission of the crime
thrice without the assistance of counsel. The belated arrival of the CLAO lawyer the next day, even
if prior to the actual signing of the uncounseled confession, does not cure the defect since the
investigators had already extracted incriminatory statements from Compil. The operative act, it has
been stressed, is when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the
police to carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements,
and not the signing by the suspect of his supposed extrajudicial confession. However, Compil was
still found guilty of the crime, such guilt having been established through circumstantial evidence.
Doctrine: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions
from respondent/accused. Extrajudicial confession extracted without the assistance of counsel is
inadmissible in evidence, even if such counsel was present at the time of the signing of the
supposed confession.
PEOPLE v. WONG CHUEN MING
256 SCRA 183 (1996)
Facts: The 11 accused, all Malaysian nationals, arrived in Manila from Hong Kong as a tour group
arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Upon reaching Customs, Au Wing Cheung, the
tour guide, handed to the Customs examiner, Danilo Gomez, the tour group's passenger's
manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports. Upon finding a number of Alpen Cereal
boxes in each of the baggage of the accused, however, Gomez became suspicious and opened
one of them. The baggage was found to contain a white crystalline substance which was later
found to be “shabu.” The group group was then ordered to proceed to the district collector's office,
where the baggage of the other members of the tour group were further examined. A total of 30
boxes of Alpen Cereals containing a white crystalline substance were recovered from the baggage
of the 11 accused. Gomez bundled said boxes with masking tape and handed them over to
Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio, Chief of the Collection Division and Acting Duty Collector of the Customs
Office at the NAIA. Bonifacio then called out the names of accused as listed in the passengers'
11 | P a g e
manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking tape placed on the boxes. A field test was
conducted, the substance was revealed to be shabu, and the 11 accused were arrested.
At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having
identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance inside the boxes bearing their signatures. A further examination by the forensic chemist
of the PNP Crime Lab confirmed that the white crystalline substance was shabu.
Co-accused Lim Chan Fatt admitted being responsible for bringing the boxes of Alpen Cereals into
the country, but denied any knowledge that they contained shabu. Lim claimed that a certain Ah
Hong, a co-boarder and a Hong Kong businessman, had asked him to bring with him boxes of
cereals to the Philippines, where a certain Ah Sing would get them from him. In exchange, Ah Sing
would see to it that Lim would have a good time in the Philippines. Ah Hong allegedly even opened
one box to show that it really contained cereals. Lim acceded to Ah Hong's request, but since his
baggage could not accommodate all 30 boxes, he requested two of his co-accused to
accommodate some of the boxes in their baggage.
The tour guide, Cheung, and Wong Chuen Ming denied that the boxes were recovered from their
baggage, claiming they affixed their signatures on the boxes only because they were threatened by
police authorities present during the examination inside the collector's office.
All the accused were later found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of R.A. 6425.
Issue: Are the signatures of the accused on the cereal boxes admissible as evidence against
them?
Held: No. Accused were not informed of their right to remain silent and to counsel and any
statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix their
signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic
bags when they were already taken in custody at Camp Crame. By affixing their signatures,
accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of shabu is
punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extrajudicial
confession which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12 (1)(3), Article III, 1987
Constitution). They are, therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the
accused in violation of their constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all
accused are foreign nationals does not preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the
constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of Rights are given and extend to all persons, both
aliens and citizens.
Among the prosecution witnesses, only Gomez testified that all the seized baggage,
including those owned by Chuen Ming and Wing Cheung, contained a box or boxes of shabu.
However, Gomez's testimony inculpating accused-appellants was not corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties accorded to
Gomez cannot, by itself, prevail over the constitutional right of accused-appellants to be presumed
innocent especially in the light of the foregoing testimonies of other prosecution witnesses.
Doctrine: Extrajudicial confession extracted in violation of the accused’s constitutional rights is
inadmissible as evidence against him. That fact that he is a foreign national does not preclude
application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of
Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
 PEOPLE v. RAMIRO ALEGRE, ET AL.
94 SCRA 109 (1979)
Facts: 57 year old Adelina Sajo was found dead inside the bathroom of her house, having been
strangled to death. Evidence showed that her bedroom was ransacked. In the latter part of the
same month, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in the act of pawning a bracelet belonging to
Sajo. He admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Sajo in an extrajudicial confession
before the police authorities, implicating several others at the same time. When brought to the
Pasay City police headquarters, he again executed an extrajudicial confession, narrating in detail
the participation in the commission of the crime of his co-accused. On the basis of the same, an
Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed against Cudillan, Celso Fernandez, Jesus
Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas, and one John Doe.
The recital of facts contained in the disputed decision convicting the accused was based principally
and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Cudillan and the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla, the
investigating officer, and Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner to whom three of the accused
allegedly admitted their involvement in the crime. However, Cudillan repudiated both the sworn
statements as the product of compulsion and duress and that he was not assisted by counsel when
investigated by the police.
Issue: Is the extrajudicial confession of Cudillan admissible as evidence against all the accused?
Held: No. Such extrajudicial confessions, on the pasis of which the trial court was able to
reconstruct how Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not
competent proof against Alegre and Medalla, under the principle of “res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet,” there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the
extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not
have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other
accused are concerned. While there are exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances in this
case do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions.
Doctrine 2: As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately
made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-accused.
PEOPLE v. YIP WAI MING
264 SCRA 224 (1996)
Facts: Yip Wai Ming and Lam Po Chun, both Hong Kong nationals and engaged to be married,
came to Manila on vacation on July 10, 1993. The next day, Chun wa found brutally beaten up and
strangled to death in their hotel room. On that day, Ming was allegedly touring Metro Manila with
Filipino welcomers while Chun stayed in the hotel room allegedly due to a headache.
Ming was charged for murder. As witness for the prosecution, Cariza Destresa, the couple’s hotel
neighbor, testified that she heard a loud argument inside the couple’s room and a struggle where
there was supposedly a faint cry and a loud thud. The front desk clerk also testified that Ming, at
about 10 a.m., came down later to meet with Gwen de los Santos who was to accompany them to
a tour around Manila. Ming left his fiancée Chung in their room, giving specific instructions not to
disturb her. He was perspiring and kind of in a hurry. During his absence, until his return at 11pm,
he did not call Chun to verify her physical condition. When Ming returned, he asked the receptionist
for the key of his room, then, together with a room boy, proceeded to Room 210. They found Chun
dead, lying face down on the bed covered with a blanket. Ming exclaimed 'My God, she is dead',
12 | P a g e
but did not even embrace his fiancee. Instead, he asked the room boy to go down the hotel to ask
someone to call the police. Upon examination of the room and the body of the victim, the police
found no signs of forcible entry and observed that no one can enter from the outside without a key.
The body, meanwhile, was already in state of rigor mortis, indicating that Chung had been dead for
10 to 12 hours. It was also learned that her life was insured with the Insurance Company of New
Zealand in Causeway Bay, Hong Kong, with Ming as the beneficiary. The premium paid for the
insurance was more than the monthly salary of the deceased as an insurance underwriter in Hong
Kong.
Issue: Were the confessions made by Ming during the custodial investigations as to his guilt of the
crime of murder admissible in evidence against him?
Held: No.The custodial interrogation of Yip Wai Ming was violative of Section 12, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, hence, the confessions accused-appellant made during the same are
inadmissible as evidence. Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right
to silence and to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence.
Here, Ming was arrested without a warrant on the basis of a series of circumstancial evidence. The
arresting officer had no personal knowledge of Ming having committed the crime. Ming, meanwhile,
claimed he had been tortured and beaten up until he admitted the crime charged, participated in a
re-enactment, and signed an extrajudicial statement. All the while, he was not informed of his right
to remain silent nor did he have counsel of his choice to assist him in confessing the crime.
Doctrine: Any confession, including a re-enactment without admonition of the right to silence and
to counsel, and without counsel chosen by the accused is inadmissible in evidence.
PEOPLE v. HECTOR MAQUEDA, ET AL.
242 SCRA 565 (1995)
Facts: On August 27, 1991, British Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, was
brutally slain, while his Filipina wife, Teresita, was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of
a robbery in their home. Prima facie evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante as one of the suspects.
Richard Malig and, later, Hector Maqueda, were included in the information for robbery with
homicide and serious physical injuries, though Malig was later dropped for lack of sufficient
evidence against him. Maqueda was arrested on March 4, 1992, and was brought to the
headquarters of the 235th PNP Mobile Force Company. SPO3 Armando Molleno, upon order of
Maj. Virgilio F. Renton, got Maqueda's statement, claiming that he informed the latter of his
Constitutional rights. Maqueda thereafter signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his
participation in the crime at the Barker house.
On April 9, 1992, Maqueda filed an application for bail, asking to be made a state witness as it
appeared that “he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Prosecutor Zarate then
talked to Maqueda regarding such statement, asking him if he was with Salvamante during the
robbery. Upon receiving an affirmative answer, Zarate told Maqueda that he would oppose the
motion for bail since he was the only accused on trial. In the meantime, Ray Dean Salvosa got
permission from Zarate to talk to Maqueda. Maqueda narrated to Salvosa that Salvamante
brought him to Baguio City in order to find a job as a peanut vendor but found out later that they
were going to rob the Barkers. He initially objected to the plan, but later on agreed to it. He
admitted having hit Mrs. Barker with a lead pipe after she came down and in helping Salvamante
beat up Mr. Barker who had followed his wife downstairs. When the Barkers were already
unconscious on the floor, Salvamante looted the house. They made their escape through Baguio
City and then rode a Philippine Rabbit Bus heading for Manila.

During trial, however, Maqueda denied having been in Benguet at the time of the robbery and
claimed he was working as a caretaker in a polvoron factory in Sukat, Muntinlupa. This was
denied however by the owner of the polvoron factory Fredesminda Castrence. The trial court found
Maqueda guilty and convicted him "based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti" as well
as on circumstantial evidence.
Issue: Was the sinumpaang salaysay admissible as a confession?
Held: No. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of
a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense." Ordinarily, once a criminal complaint or information
is filed in court and the accused is thereafter arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the arresting officer must make a return of the
warrant to the issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person,
it would be improper for any public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate him in
connection with the commission of the offense for which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is
subjected to such investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and the
jurisprudence thereon must be faithfully complied with. Here, the sinumpaang salaysay of
Maqueda made after his arrest was taken in palpable violation of the said Constitutional provision,
contrary to the claim of SPO2 Molleno. As disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even
told of any of his constitutional rights under the said section. The statement was also taken in the
absence of counsel. Such uncounselled Sinumpaang Salaysay is wholly inadmissible pursuant to
paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Zarate and to Salvosa are not governed
by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to
Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as
a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private person. The provisions of
the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on government, declaring the rights that exist without
governmental grant, that may not be taken away by government and that government has the duty
to protect, or restrictions on the power of government found "not in the particular specific types of
action prohibited, but in the general principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that
governmental power is not unlimited.'' They are the fundamental safeguards against aggressions of
arbitrary power, or state tyranny and abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the
government and fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the
relationships between individuals.
Doctrine: A sinumpaang salaysay made in palpable violation of the Constitutional right to remain
silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights is inadmissible in evidence. However, such
exclusionary rule under the Bill of Rights do not apply to extrajudicial admissions voluntarily and
freely made not in the course of an investigation or given to a private person.
HARRY PARKER v. JAMES RANDOLPH, ET AL.
442 US 62 (1979)
Facts: William Douglas, a professional gambler, was shot and killed in a Memphis apartment. It
was revealed that Douglas, with Woppy Gaddy and Tommy Thomas, cheated Robert Wood into
losing his money in a series of arranged games of chance. Convinced that he was cheated,
Robert explained the situation to his brother, Joe Wood, and the two men decided to recover the
13 | P a g e
money by staging a robbery of the upcoming fourth game. To carry out the stage robbery, Joe
enlisted Hamilton, one of his employees, and the latter in turn associated Randolph and Pickens.
Douglas and Robert sat down for the fourth contest, with Joe and Thomas there as spectators.
During the course of the game, Douglas armed himself with a .38-caliber pistol and an automatic
shotgun. In response, Joe pulled a derringer pistol on Douglas and Thomas, gave the gun to
Robert and left to tell Hamilton, Randolph and Pickens to move in on the game. Before the three
arrived, however, Douglas reached for his pistol, but was shot and killed by Robert. Moments later,
Hamilton, Randolph and Pickens, and Joe broke down the apartment door, Robert gathered up the
cash left on the table, and the gang of five fled into the night. Hamilton, Randolph and Pickens
were subsequently apprehended by the police and they confessed to their involvement in the
crime.
The five were jointly tried and convicted of murder committed during the commission of a
robbery. Hamilton, Randolph and Pickens did not take the witness stand, and they couldn’t be
clearly and positively identified as one of the men involved in the robbery. The State’s case against
the three thus rested primarily on their oral confessions, found by the trial court to have been freely
and voluntarily given. A written confession signed by Pickens was also admitted into evidence
over his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. The trial court
instructed the jury that each confession could be used only against the defendant who gave it and
could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant’s guilt. Ultimately, the Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld the conviction, holding that admission of respondents’ confessions did not violate the
rule of Bruton v. United States which held that a defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the admission, at a joint trial, of the confession of a
codefendant who did not take the stand.
Issue: Was the admission of their co-defendant’s confessions against the respondents proper?
Held: Yes. In Bruton, introduction at a joint trial of a non-testifying codefendant’s confession had a
“devastating” effect on the non-confessing defendant’s case. Introduction of such incriminating
extrajudicial statements of a codefendant will seldom, if ever, have the same devastating
consequences to a defendant who has himself confessed. The constitutional rights of cross-
examination protected by Bruton has far less practical value to a defendant who has confessed to
the crime than to one who has consistently maintained his innocence. Nor does the natural
“motivation to shift blame onto others,” recognized in Bruton to render the incriminating statements
of codefendants “inevitably suspect,” require application of the Bruton rule when the incriminated
defendant has corroborated his codefendant’s statements by heaping blame onto himself.
The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial
statement by a non-testifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the defendant.
And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant’s extrajudicial statement only
against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant’s confrontation
right. When the defendant’s own confession is properly presented before the jury, as in the case at
bar, the possible prejudice resulting from the jury’s failure to follow the trial court’s instructions is
not so devastating or vital to the confessing defendant as to require departure from the general rule
allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions.
Doctrine: The Confrontation Clause does not bar admission into evidence of every relevant
extrajudicial statement by a non-testifying declarant simply because it in some way incriminates the
defendant. And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant’s extrajudicial statement
only against its source is generally sufficient to avoid offending the implicated defendant’s
confrontation right.

PEOPLE v. ENCIPIDO
146 SCRA 478 (1986)
Facts: On March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes was found dead by his wife and children near the hut
in their farm. Encipido and seven others were charged with the killing of Lacumbes. As witness for
the prosecution, Alciso narrated how Encipido had ordered Lacumbes killed. This was corroborated
by several other witnesses. Encipido and Manatad, however, denied all these and claimed that he
was sawing lumber for Norberto Bukid most of the day that Lacumbes was killed and rested at
Bukid’s house afterwards. He claimed that, when he surrendered his .45 caliber pistol to the
municipal mayor for fear of being apprehended for having an unlicensed firearm, he was arrested
and placed in jail, along with Manatad and De La Pena. Encipido and his 7 co-accused were taken
to the Philippine Constabulary headquarters at Surigao City, where they were allegedly severely
maltreated and Encipido was forced to sign an affidavit admitting that he is "Commander Tanga"
responsible for the killing of the Lacumbes and other persons. He, however, denied having
identified himself to the Station Commander and to the Municipal Mayor as "Commander Tanga" or
that he had killed the Lacumbes and other persons besides.
Issue: Was the confession made by Encipido is admissible?
Held: Yes. Encipido’s and De La Pena's extrajudicial acknowledgments of guilt to the Municipal
Mayor and the INP Station Commander are not necessarily incredible for, in their minds, they were
not "confessing" but bragging of their exploits in the belief that they were saving the community
from the alleged witchcraft of the Lacumbes and the evil doings of some people. There is no proof
whatsoever that the extrajudicial admissions in question were coerced or concocted by those
officials, who are responsible public officers and presumed to have regularly performed their
functions and against whose impartiality nothing has been proven. The fact that no arrest were
made by them immediately after the disclosures do not necessarily belie their testimonies since the
spirit of "reciprocal goodwill" pervaded the encounters. Arrests were made, however, the day after.
Moreover, Encipido had the opportunity during trial to refute their verbal admissions as in fact, they
denied having made them, but their denials do not ring with truth.
Doctrine: Where there is no proof that an extrajudicial confession was obtained through coercion
or concocted by the law enforcers, the latter are presumed to have regularly performed their
functions and such confession is admissible in court.
PEOPLE v. EDWARD ENDINO
352 SCRA 307 (2001)
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, Gerry Galgarin,
uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and
stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Aquino managed to free himself and tried to run away, but
Endino, who harbored ill-feelings towards Aquino and the latter's girlfriend, Clara Agagas (whose
love the two men once shared), shot Aquino. Galgarin and Endino fled, and Aquino expired shortly
thereafter.
Galgarin was arrested and was interviewed by ABS-CBN reporters, to whom he
admitted his guilt while pointing to Endino as the gunman and appealing for the latter to give
himself up to the authorities. However, Endino disowned the confession, claiming that it was
induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession
was constitutionally infirm and inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III,
14 | P a g e
of the Constitution. The video footages, however, was admitted in evidence upon a finding that
Galgarin’s confession was made before a group of newsmen that could have dissipated any
semblance of hostility towards him. Endino was convicted of murder.
Issue: Was the videotaped confession of Galgarin admissible in evidence?
Ruling: Yes. The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt
willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of
custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit
sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing,
he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been
sympathetic with him.
However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for
admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several cases, it is prudent that trial
courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further admitting similar confessions.
For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may
attempt to legitimize coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary
rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to
the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. In other words,
courts should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary have been freely
given.
Doctrine: A confession willingly, openly and publicly given in the presence of newsmen through an
interview does not form part of custodial investigation as it was not given to police officers but to
media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Hence, it is admissible
in evidence. However, courts must exercise caution and should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have been freely given.
PEOPLE v. ABULENCIA
363 SCRA 496 (2001)
Facts: Ten-year old Rebelyn Garcia’s naked body was found floating in a creek in San Manuel,
Pangasinan, with marks of bruises, burns and injuries manifesting that she was defiled and later
drowned to death. Rebelyn was last seen with Rolly Abulencia before she was found dead.
Abulencia surrendered to Mayor Felipe Sevilleja of San Manuel, Pangasinan. PO3 Randy
Bergado, a PNP officer who was then in the mayor’s house, was informed by Abulencia that “he
had a small girl companion that he accidentally bumped at the Aburido bridge” and who “might
have been dead because the flow of the river is so fast.” Dennis Mojares, a radio commentator of
DZWN Bombo Radio, testified that on August 6, 1998, Abulencia admitted to him in a taped
interview made at the Municipal Jail having raped Rebelyn and that she fell off the bridge.
Abulencia was charged with rape with homicide.
In his defense, Abulencia denied the charge. He claimed that on August 4, 1998, he noticed
Rebelyn folowing him as he was going to the market to buy dilis, but he just ignored her. However,
upon reaching the market, he decided not to buy dilis anymore, and instead proceeded towards
San Manuel while Rebelyn continued to follow him closely. Annoyed, he told her he was going to
San Manuel, but she insisted on following him because she wanted to go to his house. They then
took the provincial road, but upon reaching the Aburido bridge, he distanced himself from the
girl. However, she ran towards him. While she was running, he tried to tell her to go home, but in
doing so he accidentally tripped (napatid) her off, causing her to fall from the bridge. He got
nervous and proceeded to the house of his Auntie Deciang Delfin and asked her to accompany him
to the authorities so he could surrender.

Abulencia was found guilty of the charges and convicted.

Issue: Was the confession made to the radio commentator admissible in evidence against
Abulencia?

Held: Yes. Abulencia admitted having raped Rebelyn when he was interviewed by Dennis Mojares,
a radio commentator of Bombo Radio. Mojares’ testimony lends support to the finding of guilty. It
has been held that “a confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said
reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it
is apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.”

Doctrine: A confession to a radio reporter is admissible where it was not shown that said reporter
was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is
apparent that the suspect confessed to the killing out of fear.

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