Mangila vs. Court of Appeals personal capacity. Guina should have filed the case either in Pampanga or Paranaque.

nal capacity. Guina should have filed the case either in Pampanga or Paranaque. Since
private respondent filed tis case in Pasay, we hold that the case should be dismissed on the
Petitioner Mangila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under the name and ground of improper venue.
style of Seafoods Products. Private respondent Guina is the President and General Manager of Air
Swift International, a single registered proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business for
shipment of petitioner’s products. Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of private
respondent, and agreed to pay Guina cash on delivery.
On the first shipment, petitioner requested for seven days within which to pay private
respondent, however for the next 3 shipments petitioner failed to pay Guina the shipping charges.
Despite several demands, Mangila never paid private respondents which led to the filing of Civil
Case before the RTC of Pasay City for collection of sum of money against the petitioner.
The sheriff filed his Sheriff’s Return showing that summons was not served on petitioner
because the petitioner transferred her residence to Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that
Mangila had left the Philippines for Guam. Construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as
done with intent to defraud her creditors, private respondent filed a Motion for Preliminary
Attachment.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of improper venue.
Private respondent’s invoice for the freight forwarding service stipulates that “if court litigation
becomes necessary to enforce collection the agreed venue for such action is Makati, Metro Manila.

Issue:
WON there was an improper venue.

Held:
The court dismissed the case on the ground of improper venue but not for the reason
stated by petitioner.
The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue
on which an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not
enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show
that such stipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show that parties’ intention to restrict the
filing of a suit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue.
Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable, do not as a rule
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum, not as
limiting venue to the specified place.
In the instant case, the stipulation does not limit the venue exclusively to Makati. There
are no qualifying or restrictive words in the invoice that would evince the intention of the parties that
Makati is the “only or exclusive” venue where the action could be instituted. Nevertheless, Pasay is
not the proper venue for this case.
Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the general rule is venue in personal actions is
“where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or
any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.” Except to this rule is when the parties
agree on exclusive venue other than the places mentioned in the rules.
The residence of private respondent was not alleged in the complaint. Rather, what was
alleged was the postal address of her sole proprietorship, Air Swift International. It was only when
private respondent testified in court, that she mentioned her residence to be Paranaque City.
A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from
the personality of the owner of the enterprise. Thus, not being vested with legal personality to file
this case, the sole proprietorship is not the plaintiff in this case but rather Loreta Guina in her

1|Page
Fortune Motors v. CA
Private respondent Metropolitan Bank extended various loans to petitioner Fortune Motors in the
total sum of P32,500,000.00, which loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Fortune
building and lot in Makati, Rizal.
Due to financial difficulties and the onslaught of economic recession, the petitioner was not able to
pay the loan which became due.For failure of the petitioner to pay the loans, the respondent bank
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notices were served, posted, and published,
the mortgaged property was sold at public to mortgagee Bank as the highest bidder.
The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on October 24, 1984 with the one-year redemption
period to expire on October 24,1985. Three days before the expiration of the redemption period,
petitioner Fortune Motors filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale
alleging that the foreclosure was premature because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due, the
publication of the notice of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and the price for
which the property was sold was "shockingly low".
Before summons could be served, private respondent Bank filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for the realty covered by
the real estate mortgage is situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The motion was opposed by petitioner Fortune Motors alleging that its action "is a personal action"
and that "the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings" so that it may have a
new one year period to redeem.
The Bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated January 8, 1986 but it was denied by
the lower court.Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals.
A decision was issued by the Court of Appeals, granting the petition for certiorari and
prohibition.The complaint is dismissed without prejudice to its being filed in the proper venue.
There after, the spouses continuously make deposits in their joint account. However when they
issued checks against their joint account, the checks they issued were eventually denied due to the
mistake committed by the bank teller. In this case, the RTC and the IAC ruled in favor of the Sps
Canlas and granted their claim for damages. The Petitioner bank on the other hand has a standing
objection on the case regarding the venue of the proceedings, on which they claim that the action
should be dismissed. The action was filed in the Province of Pampanga. Whereas the bank claims
that the registered residence of the spouses was in Quezon City according to the information given
to them by the spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not the difference of venue from the information given by the spouses would
warrant the dismissal of the case.
HELD: The Court held that, the venue in this case should not affect the ruling of the court.
The Court provides that in civil actions the case may be filed in the place or province where the
defendant is to be found, or the place where the complainant resides. Venue is dependent upon
where the complainant elects to file the case. Therefore in this case the lower courts committed no
error in determining the case on its merits.

Issue:
WON petitioner's action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale of
Fortune Building is a personal action or a real action for venue purposes.
Held:
While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the
property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered
immovable property, the recovery of which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine
is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real
property. It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the
ground of improper venue (Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was timely raised.
"Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the
property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily
an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be
commenced and tried in the province where the property or part thereof lies."
BPI vs. IAC
The issue arose from the action for damages of the sps Canlas against CBTC.
However CBTC then merged with BPI. Initially Mr. Canlas already had an existing account. When
Mr. Canlas and his wife created a joint account the bank teller assisting them commited an error
when she pulled the old file of Mr. Canlas and mistakenly noted his old account number into the
new account.

2|Page

Young Auto Supply vs CA Case Digest
Young Auto Supply vs. Court of Appeals
[GR 104175, 25 June 1993]
Facts: On 28 October 1987, Young Auto Supply Co. Inc. (YASCO) represented by Nemesio
Garcia, its president, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy, sold all of their shares of stock in
Consolidated Marketing & Development Corporation (CMDC) to George C. Roxas. The purchase
price was P8,000,000.00 payable as follows: a down payment of P4,000,000.00 and the balance of
P4,000,000.00 in four postdated checks of P1,000,000.00 each. Immediately after the execution of
the agreement, Roxas took full control of the four markets of CMDC. However, the vendors held on
to the stock certificates of CMDC as security pending full payment of the balance of the purchase
price. The first check of P4,000,000.00, representing the down payment, was honored by the
drawee bank but the four other checks representing the balance of P4,000,000.00 were
dishonored. In the meantime, Roxas sold one of the markets to a third party. Out of the proceeds of
the sale, YASCO received P600,000.00, leaving a balance of P3,400,000.00.
Subsequently, Nelson Garcia and Vicente Sy assigned all their rights and title to the proceeds of
the sale of the CMDC shares to Nemesio Garcia. On 10 June 1988, YASCO and Garcia filed a
complaint against Roxas in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, praying that Roxas be
ordered to pay them the sum of P3,400,000.00 or that full control of the three markets be turned
over to YASCO and Garcia. The complaint also prayed for the forfeiture of the partial payment of
P4,600,000.00 and the payment of attorney's fees and costs. Failing to submit his answer, and on
19 August 1988, the trial court declared Roxas in default. The order of default was, however, lifted
upon motion of Roxas. On 22 August 1988, Roxas filed a motion to dismiss. After a hearing,
wherein testimonial and documentary evidence were presented by both parties, the trial court in an
Order dated 8 February 1991 denied Roxas' motion to dismiss. After receiving said order, Roxas
filed another motion for extension of time to submit his answer. He also filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the trial court denied in its Order dated 10 April 1991 for being pro-forma.
Roxas was again declared in default, on the ground that his motion for reconsideration did not toll
the running of the period to file his answer. On 3 May 1991, Roxas filed an unverified Motion to Lift
the Order of Default which was not accompanied with the required affidavit of merit. But without
waiting for the resolution of the motion, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration by YASCO was to no avail. YASCO and Garcia filed the petition.
Issue: Whether the venue for the case against YASCO and Garcia in Cebu City was improperly
laid.
Held: A corporation has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural
person. But for practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical sense a resident of the place
where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of incorporation. The Corporation Code
precisely requires each corporation to specify in its articles of incorporation the "place where the
principal office of the corporation is to be located which must be within the Philippines." The
purpose of this requirement is to fix the residence of a corporation in a definite place, instead of
allowing it to be ambulatory. Actions cannot be filed against a corporation in any place where the
corporation maintains its branch offices. The Court ruled that to allow an action to be instituted in
any place where the corporation has branch offices, would create confusion and work untold
inconvenience to said entity. By the same token, a corporation cannot be allowed to file personal
actions in a place other than its principal place of business unless such a place is also the
residence of a co-plaintiff or a defendant. With the finding that the residence of YASCO for
purposes of venue is in Cebu City, where its principal place of business is located, it becomes
unnecessary to decide whether Garcia is also a resident of Cebu City and whether Roxas was in
estoppel from questioning the choice of Cebu City as the venue. The decision of the Court of
Appeals was set aside.
___________________________________________________________________
CASE: PHILIPPINE BANK CORPORATION VS TENSUAN
FACTS:
The Philippine Banking Corporation filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary attachment against
Brineil Metal Works Corporation and Spouses Jose and Nally Ang for collection of a loan
evidenced by two (2) promissory notes. The court granted the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment, however, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the same on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants and for improper venue. Accordingly, the summons
were served on the corporation’s customer who was not authorized to receive the summons for
and in behalf of the corporation and also, the venue indicated in the promissory note was in Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue of the action was improperly laid?
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the lower court has acquired jurisdiction over the case even if Manila
was indicated to be the venue of any action arising from the said promissory note.
Although it can be inferred that the parties intended to fix the venue of action in connection with the
written contracts sued upon in the proper courts of Manila, notwithstanding that neither of them
was a resident of Manila, the same was not exclusive, but rather permissive.
As a general rule, all personal actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides, or may be found or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff. However, by written agreement of the parties, the venue of action may be
changed or transferred from the province to another. And in the absence of any qualifying or
restricting words, the specified venue be considered merely as an agreement on additional forum
and not as limiting venue as to the one specified.
3|Page
Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank In this case, each one of the appellants and the stockholders had determinable interest;
each one had a right only to receive his respective portion of the stocks. No one of them
Doctrine: had the right to a stock to which another was entitled. Thus, several, not common or
- Elements for a class suit are accordingly: general as required by law.
_________________________
- (1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons, and Ortigas & Company v. Ruiz
- (2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the Facts:
court.
Petitioner is the duly registered owner of several adjacent lands situtated in Ugong, Pasig,
Facts: containing an area of 162 hectares consolidated in one parcel under TCT-NO 227758. A said
- Ismael Mathay etc. were former stockholders of Consolidated Mines Inc (CMI). portion is the mandaluyon estate over which petitioner, thru its predecessor-in-interest, has been in
- They filed a case for a class suit against CMI containing six causes of action. continuous possession since 1862 or 125 years.
- Mathay alleged that the defendants unlawfully acquired stockholdings in the In 1967, Civil case no. 10339 was filed against petitioner by Pedro del Rosario and three others, in
Consolidated Bank in excess of what they were lawfully entitled which deprived the their own behalf and in behalf of 104 others, as a class suit, in the CFI of Rizal seeking the
petitioners of their right to subscribe at par value, in proportion to their equities the declaration of petitioner's titles null and void allegedly for lack of publication in the land registration
Capital Stocks. proceeding from which they derived and alleged fraud employed in registering certain parcels
- RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the class suit could not be maintained which forms part of the mandaloyon estate. In this case, respondent court issued a restraining
because of the absence of a showing in the complaint that the Mathay etc. were order ex parte.
sufficiently numerous and representative and that the complaint failed to state a cause of On August 10, 1971, Civil case no. 15043 was filed by Inocencio Bernardo and five others, in their
action. own behalf and in behalf of 37 others against petitioner, filed as a class suit concerning another
- The CA affirmed the ruling. portion of the mandaluyon estate. The complaint is generally identical to case no. 10339 seeking to
Issue: declare petitioner's title null and void for alleged fraud in registering the parcels claimed by plaintiffs
- Whether or not this is a class suit. therein.
Held:
Petitioner argues, among others, that class suit is improper in civil case no. 15043 pursuant to sec
- Petition dismissed, not a class suit
11, rule 3 of rules of court averring that a class suit presupposes a common and general interest by
several plaintiffs in a single specific thing. Consequently, it cannot be maintained when each of the
- Elements for a class suit are:
impleaded as alleged plaintiffs has only a special or particular in the specific thing completely
different from another thing in which the defendant have a like interest. Thus, filed an omnibus
(1) that the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
motion praying for the court to order dropping of persons as plaintiffs except Inocencio Bernardo.
many persons, and
(2) that such persons be so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all to the Issue:
court. WON class suit is proper in Civil Case no. 15043.
- The petitioners must allege the : Held:
Petitioner's contention is meritorious. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of
(1) existence of necessary facts. all or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment Or decree is
(2) existence of the class. indispensable to make each member of the class as an actual party.
(3) number of members in the said class.
In the case at bar, a class suit would not lie because each of the defendants has an interest only in
a particular portion of the land he is actually occupying and not on the portions individually
So that the court may determine whether the members of the said class are so
occupied by the other defendants. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject
numerous as to make it impractical to bring them all to court.
matter of the controversy. Hence, only principal plaintiff Inocencio Bernardo can remain as a party
plaintiff and all the rest must be dropped from the case.
In this case, petitioners failed to allege the number of the stockholders involved in the
complaint. Thus, the court could not determine.

- It is also required that the subject-matter of the controversy be of common interest to

numerous persons

4|Page
NEWSWEEK, INC vs. IAC HELD:

Private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental
claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812
in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of
Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters
Fred Bruning and Barry Came.
The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by the
publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly
news magazine Newsweek. The article supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros
Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited
the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also brutalized and killed them
with imprunity.
They prayed that defendants be ordered to pay them PlM as actual and compensatory damages,
and such amounts for moral, exemplary and corrective damages as the court may determine, plus
expenses of litigation, attorney's fees and costs of suit. A photo copy of the article was attached to
the complaint.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the printed article sued upon is not
actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less
support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-libelous nature of the article and, consequently,
the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to
the motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a reply.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the grounds on which the motion to
dismiss are predicated are not indubitable as the complaint on its face states a valid cause of
action; and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon is actionable or not is a matter
of evidence. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
First, petitioner argues that private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action because
the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the article complained of regarding
sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private respondents; that libel can be
committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases where libel is claimed to have been
directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if the libel can be said to reach beyond the
mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual group member's reputation.
We agree with petitioner.
Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or
class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need
be.
Second, private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any actionable
basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar
planters.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all
or where the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to
make each member of the class an actual party We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs
has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court seeking the annulment of the
aforecited trial court's Orders. However, respondent Court affirmed the trial court's decision and
ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint contains
allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari under Rule 65
cannot be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a proper time.
Subsequently, the respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid
decision, hence this petition.

ISSUES:

(1) whether or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action; and

(2) whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.

5|Page
Sulu ng Bayan Inc. V. Gregoria Araneta Inc.
Facts:
Plaintiff, a non-stock corporation, filed an action on behalf of its members for the
recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land against defendant before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Bulacan. Plaintiff averred that its members were owners of land subject of
dispute and that the defendants, through force and intimidation, ejected them. Defendants filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action. It further stated that a corporation cannot institute a complaint on behalf of its members,
having separate and distinct personality from each other. Plaintiff contended that the instant
complaint should be deemed as class suit, pursuant to Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
CFI dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. When plaintiff elevated
the matter before the CA, the court denied the appeal of the plaintiff and affirmed the decision of
the lower court. Hence, the plaintiff submitted the case before the SC.
Issue:
WON, the complaint has cause of action and is considered as a class suit?
Ruling:
NO. The SC held that the plaintiff has no cause of action in filing the instant case. A
corporation is a distinct legal entity to be considered as separate and apart from individual
stockholders or members who compose it and it is not affected by the personal rights, obligations
and transactions of its stockholders or members. Furthermore, the instant case cannot be
considered as a class suit. In order that a class suit may proper, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many
persons and (2) the parties are so numerous thaat it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court.
MARIA G. AGUAS, FELIX GUARDINO and FRANCISCO SALINAS, vs HERMOGENES LLEMOS
On 14 March 1960, Francisco Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly
filed an action with the CFI, to recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the latter
had served them by registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession, with notice
that the same would be submitted to the said court, that in view of the copy and notice served,
plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila accompanied by their lawyers, only
to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant Llemos maliciously failed to
appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble turned out to be in vain, causing them
mental anguish and undue embarrassment.
Before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died. Upon leave of court, plaintiffs amended
their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a motion to dismiss, and by
order, the court below dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative, and not the heirs,
should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action being for recovery of
money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the claim filed therein (Rec. on
Appeal, pp. 26-27).
Motion for reconsideration having been denied, the case was appealed to us on points of law.
Plaintiffs argue with considerable cogency that contrasting the correlated provisions of the Rules of
Court, those concerning claims that are barred if not filed in the estate settlement proceedings
(Rule 87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive and may be prosecuted against the
executor or administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is apparent that actions for damages caused by
tortious conduct of a defendant (as in the case at bar) survive the death of the latter. Under Rule
87, section 5, the actions that are abated by death are:
(1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent;
(2) judgments for money; and
(3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied".
None of these includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants; for it is not enough that the claim against
the deceased party be for money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied", to include all
purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. Upon the
other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or
administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2)
actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or
property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury
to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which
personal estate is injured or diminished.
To maliciously cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly
injurious to that party's property. Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from the
CFI that the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their differences, and that they have
agreed to dismiss this appeal. The settlement has been approved and embodied in an order of the
Court of First Instance.The case having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the
questions raised therein. This appeal is, therefore, ordered dismissed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
6|Page
THE BOARD OF LIQUIDATORS1 representing THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE authority to continue the present suit, from the Board of Liquidators. If for this reason alone, we
PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellant, cannot stay the hand of the Board of Liquidators from prosecuting this case to its final
vs. conclusion. 16 The provisions of Section 78 of the Corporation Law — the third method of winding
HEIRS OF MAXIMO M. KALAW,2 JUAN BOCAR, ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CASIMIRO up corporate affairs — find application.
GARCIA,3 and LEONOR MOLL, defendants-appellees.
We, accordingly, rule that the Board of Liquidators has personality to proceed as: party-plaintiff in
The National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) was chartered as a non-profit governmental this case.
organization created for the protection, preservation and development of the coconut industry in
the Philippines. NACOCO's charter was amended and it engaged in copra trading activities. Kalaw
as general manager entered into contracts for the delivery of copra in behalf of NACOCO.
However, four devastating typhoons visited the Philippines as a result coconut trees throughout the
country suffered extensive damage. Copra production decreased, the prices spiraled, and the
warehouses were destroyed. The corporation suffered financial problems. NACOCO partially
performed the contracts.

The buyers threatened damage suits. Some of the claims were settled. But one buyer, Louis
Dreyfus & Go. (Overseas) Ltd., sued NACOCO before RTC Manila. All the settlements sum up to
P1,343,274.52. NACOCO seeks to recover the above sum of P1,343,274.52 from Kalaw, Bocar,
Casimiro, and Moll. It charges Kalaw with negligence under Article 1902 of the old Civil Code (now
Article 2176, new Civil Code); and defendant board members, including Kalaw, with bad faith
and/or breach of trust for having approved the contracts.

RTC dismissed the case On appeal, the defendants raised that the Board of Liquidators has lost its
legal personality to continue with this suit because NACOCO, together with other government-
owned corporations, was abolished, and the Board of Liquidators was entrusted with the function of
settling and closing its affairs; and that, since the three year period has elapsed, the Board of
Liquidators may not now continue with, and prosecute, the present case to its conclusion.

Issue: Whether or not the Board of Liquidators has legal personality to continue with the suit.

Ruling:

The Board of Liquidators has legal personality to continue the suit.

The executive order abolishing NACOCO and creating the Board of Liquidators stated under
Section 1 of Executive Order 372, whereby the corporate existence of NACOCO was continued for
a period of three years from the effectivity of the order for "the purpose of prosecuting and
defending suits by or against it and of enabling the Board of Liquidators gradually to settle and
close its affairs, to dispose of and convey its property in the manner hereinafter provided. It will be
readily observed that no time limit has been tacked to the existence of the Board of Liquidators and
its function of closing

By Executive Order 372, the government, the sole stockholder, abolished NACOCO, and placed its
assets in the hands of the Board of Liquidators. The Board of Liquidators thus became
the trustee on behalf of the government. It was an express trust. The legal interest became vested
in the trustee — the Board of Liquidators. The beneficial interest remained with the sole
stockholder — the government. At no time had the government withdrawn the property, or the

7|Page
Algura vs City of Naga
Facts: In 1999, the City of Naga demolished a portion of the house owned by spouses Antonio and
Lorencita Algura for allegedly being a nuisance as the said portion of the house was allegedly
blocking the road right of way.
In September, the spouses then sued Naga for damages arising from the said demolition (loss of
income from boarders), which to the spouses is an illegal demolition. Simultaneous to their
complaint was an ex-parte motion for them to litigate as indigent litigants. The motion was granted
and the spouses were exempted from paying the required filing fees.
In February 2000, during pre-trial, the City of Naga asked for 5 days within which to file a Motion to
Disqualify Petitioners as Indigent Litigants. Under the Rules of Court (then Sec. 16, Rule 141), a
party may be qualified as a pauper litigant (for those residing outside Metro Manila) if he submits
an affidavit attesting that a.) his gross monthly income does not exceed P1,500.00 (now not more
than double the monthly minimum wage) and b.) he should not own property with an assessed
value of not more than P18,000.00 (now not more than P300k market value). The City asserted
that the combined income of the Alguras is at least P13,400 which is way beyond the threshold
P1.5k. The City presented as proof Antonio’s pay slip as a policeman (P10,400) and Lorencita’s
estimated income from her sari-sari store. The claim of the spouses that they were property-less,
as proven by the City Assessors’ Certification, was not disputed by the City.
The spouses argued that since the boarding house was demolished by the city, they only relied on
the income of Antonio which was barely enough to cover their family’s need like food, shelter, and
other basic necessities for them and their family (they have 6 children).
The judge, however, granted the motion of the City and so the spouses were disqualified as
pauper-litigants. Subsequently, the case filed by the spouses against the City was dismissed for
the spouses’ failure to pay the required filing fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses should be disqualified as pauper-litigants.
HELD: No, there was no hearing on the matter hence the case was remanded back to the lower
court. In this case, the Supreme Court reconciled the provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 3 and Sec. 19,
Rule 141 (then Sec. 16, Rule 141).
Sec. 21, Rule 3, merely provides a general statement that indigent litigants may not be required to
pay the filing fees. On the other hand, Sec. 19, Rule 141 provides the specific standards that a
party must meet before he can be qualified as an indigent party and thus be exempt from paying
the required fees.
If Sec. 19, Rule 141 (in this case, then Sec. 16, Rule 141) is strictly applied, then the spouses
could not qualify because their income exceeds P1.5k, which was the threshold prior to 2000. But if
Sec. 21, Rule 3 is to be applied, the applicant (the Spouses) should be given a chance in a hearing
to satisfy the court that notwithstanding the evidence presented by the opposing party (Naga), they
have no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and other basic necessities for
their family, and are thus, qualified as indigent litigants under said Rule. Therefore, the court
should have conducted a trial in order to let the spouses satisfy the court that indeed the income
they’re having, even though above the P1.5k limit, was not sufficient to cover food, shelter, and
their other basic needs.
White Light Corp vs. City of Manila
Facts:
City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance prohibiting short time admission
in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar houses in the City of Manila.
The Malate Tourist and Development Corp. (MTDC) filed a complaint with TRO before
the RTC. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its
prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Petitioners filed a motion to intervene on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects
their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila.
The RTC granted the motion to intervene and issued a TRO directing the City to cease
and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering “wash-up rates”, their
business is being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that
the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered with.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patron’s
equal protection rights.
Held:
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient
connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the
case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers,
sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions
rendered by its co-equal branches of government.
The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly
from the Constitution. In this jurisdiction, the extancy of “a direct and personal interest” presents the
most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner’s standing.
Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the
Ordinance. We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of
their clients to patronize their establishments for a “wash-rate” time frame.
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Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for
upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of
the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the
same.
to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public
interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion.
The power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying
fears or addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government,
the Court must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental
principles of constitutional law.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior
agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations
began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General
Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of
Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance
of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information
on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them
the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated
signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a
public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.

Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its
constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?

Held:
Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA
will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of
paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating,
any right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg
to stand on. They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this
Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of
opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A
justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that
the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is
conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue
advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The
limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned

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