University of the Philippines

COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law II |Prof. Gwen de Vera

Topic Equal Protection

Case No. G.R. No. 192935; G.R. No. 193036 (December 7, 2010)
Case Name BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
LAGMAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and DBM
Ponente Mendoza, J.

Right Claimed Equal protection of laws

Claimant Louis Biraogo as citizen and taxpayer;
Edcel Lagman, et al. as incumbent members of the House of Representatives
State Actor President of the Philippines
State Action Creation of the Philippine Truth Commission for the specific purpose of investigating
the previous administration

RELEVANT FACTS

2010 Jul 30 At the dawn of his administration, President Aquino signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 to investigate reported cases of
graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices, and accessories.
Unlike the truth commissions in other countries serving as mechanism for transitional
justice, the Commission was not a product of prior internal unrest or civil strife.

The Commission is an investigative body, not a quasi-judicial body. Its mandate is only to
gather, collect, and assess evidence of graft and corruption, and thereafter to make
recommendations.

Two petitions were filed assailing the validity and constitutionality of the E.O.
1. Louis Biraogo, in his capacity as citizen and taxpayer
2. Edcel Lagman, Rodolfo Albano Jr., Simeon Datumanong, Orlando Fua, as incumbent
members of the House of Representative

ISSUES

W/N E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation

W/N E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration, excluding those of other
administrations who may be indictable
 University of the Philippines
COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law II |Prof. Gwen de Vera

RATIO DECIDENDI

Issue
W/N E.O. No. 1 violates the
separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of
Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds
for its operation
Ratio
NO.
While petitioners’ contention is true that the creation of the Commission
finds no legal justification under the Revised Administrative Code, P.D.
No. 17721, and other statutes, it is a valid exercise of the President’s
residual power under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.

The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring

the faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public
accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers
as Chief Executive. That the Constitution does not explicitly grant this
power does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.

W/N E.O. No. 1 violates the YES.

equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for
investigation and
prosecution officials and
personnel of the previous
administration, excluding
those of other
administrations who may be
indictable
There is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted
for investigation by Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons
who abused their public office for personal gain. This selective
classification is not germane to the purpose of the E.O. to end
corruption. It does not pass the test of reasonableness, which requires
that:
1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. It is germane to the purpose of the law
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class

The Arroyo administration is but a member of a class – the class of past

administrations – not a class of its own.

Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes

arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.

1
*P.D. No. 1772 granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the national government,
including the power to group and consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to
standardize salaries and materials. However, as stated in its “Whereas” clause, it was only for the
purpose of transition towards the parliamentary form of government. Hence, it already became functus
officio upon the convening of the First Congress.
 University of the Philippines
COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law II |Prof. Gwen de Vera

RULING

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1

SEPARATE OPINIONS

Bersamin, J.
The President has no power to create a public office as it is essentially a legislative power. The duty of
faithful execution of the laws necessarily presumes the prior existence of a law to execute on the part of
the President. In this case, there is no law or rule that the President has based his issuance of E.O. No. 1

Perez, J.
The Commission is a defiance of the constitutional wisdom that established the politically independent
Ombudsman.

Carpio, J.
E.O. No. 1 does not violate the equal protection clause. A careful reading of Section 17 thereof shows
that its mandate is not limited to the Arroyo administration because the President can expand the same.
The Commission is similar to the PCGG, whose primary task is to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses and their cronies, but may be directed to perform additional tasks as the President may deem
necessary. The Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of the PCGG Charter.

Carpio Morales, J.
Equal protection of laws is not violated because there exists substantial distinction. Fairly recent events
like the exigencies of transition and the reported large-scale corruption explain the determined need to
focus on no other period but the tenure of the previous administration.
Similarly, the proximity and magnitude of particular contemporary events like the Oakwood mutiny and
Maguindanao massacre similarly justified the defined scope of the Feliciano Commission and the
Zenarosa Commission, respectively. The same test of reasonableness rejects the absurd proposition to
widen their respective scopes to include all incidents of rebellion/mutiny and election-related violence
since the First Republic because it is far removed not just from the present time but also from logic and
experience. This explained need for specific information removes the arbitrariness from recognizing the
previous administration as a distinct class of its own.

Sereno, J.
The majority looked at the issue by lumping into a single class all past administrations, spanning 111
years, for purposes of testing a valid legislation. This imposed an impossible condition on the Presidency.
Furthermore, E.O. 1 did not arbitrarily make the previous administration a specific class – what it did
was to prioritize it. This prioritization is justified:
1. The audit of an immediate past administration is usually where audits begin
 University of the Philippines
COLLEGE OF LAW
Constitutional Law II |Prof. Gwen de Vera

2. The evidence of graft and corruption is more likely to still be intact

3. The most immediate deleterious effects of the reported graft and corruption of the preceding
administration will need to be faced by the present administration
4. The resources required for the investigation of the preceding administration alone will take up
all the resources of the Commission
5. Other past administrations have already been investigated