Jurisdiction

People vs Mariano
There were two cases involving the same subject matter, particularly, property belonging to USAID
transferred for the use of the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. These were misappropriated
by Mariano and a civil case for estafa was filed against him.

During the pendency of the case, it turned out that the Military Tribunal had already rendered judgment
against Mayor Nolasco of the Municipality in the malversation case against him.

The RTC judge ruled that the trial court and the military tribunal had concurrent jurisdiction and that the
RTC had lost jurisdiction over the case because the Military Tribunal had taken cognizance and decided
on it first.

ISSUE: Was there concurrent jurisdiction between the RTC and the MT?

Held: NO.

Jurisdiction- is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. The word "jurisdiction" is derived from two
Latin words "juris" and "dico" — "I speak by the law" — which means fundamentally the power or
capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies.

Bouvier: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before
him, acquired through due process of law;" it is "the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance
of and decide cases."

The Constitution confers jurisdiction upon courts and judicial tribunals, and the question of jurisdiction
must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing or defining its jurisdiction, which is the
Judiciary Act of 1948 which provides in Sec 44 (f):

Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: (f) In all criminal cases in which
the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of
more than two hundred pesos

Mariano is penalized for estafa in this case with arresto mayor max to prision correccional min
or 4 mo 1d to 2yrs 4mo. And because the penalty exceeds 6 mo, the jurisdiction is with the
RTC. The respondent judge gravely erred in saying that his court lost jurisdiction. The Military
Tribunal was not vested with jurisdiction over estafa case even when GO 49 was issued, which
redefined the jurisdiction of military courts.

Since the Military Tribunal has no power to hear cases of estafa against Mariano, there is no
concurrent jurisdiction between it and the RTC. Case remanded to the RTC to proceed with
trial.
Auyong Hian vs CTA 19 SCRA 10

Dacoycoy vs IAC 195 SCRA 641

The RTC dismissed motu propio the complaint of Dacoycoy against de Guzman for the annulment of 2
deeds of sale involving a parcel of land. When brought to the CA, they affirmed the dismissal.

Issue: May the court motu propio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue?

Held: No. The trial court is grossly erroneous for dismissing the case. They confused venue with
jurisdiction.

According to Sec 19 (2) of BP 129, the RTC has jurisdiction over "all civil actions which involve the title to,
or possession of, real property, or any interest therein . . ."

Venue may be waived expressly or impliedly when the party does not raise the issue of improper venue
in a timely manner. It is a matter of practicality and convenience to the parties rather than the
substance of the case. Venue is procedural while jurisdiction is substantive. Venue deals on the locality
while jurisdiction treats of the power of the court to decide a case on the merits.

Thus, unless and until the defendant objects to the venue in a motion to dismiss, the venue cannot be
truly said to have been improperly laid, as for all practical intents and purposes, the venue, though
technically wrong, may be acceptable to the parties for whose convenience the rules on venue had been
devised. The trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant's prerogative to object to the improper laying of
the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case.

Case remanded to the trial court to proceed in accordance with law.

Judicial Power
Sec. 1, Art. VIII, Constitution
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Roberto vs Torres (100 phil. 1098)

Unreported?

Lopez vs. Roxas 17 SCRA 756

17 SCRA 756 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Judicial Power Defined
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965 elections. Lopez
won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was
created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:

“There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the Vice-president
elect of the Philippines.”

In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the law and he sought
to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez averred that the PET is
unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution. Also, since the PET is composed of the
Chief Justice and the other ten members of the SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed
before the SC or that there may be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.

HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to the Supreme
Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to determine which body should
decide controversies relating to the election of the President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not
create another court within the SC for pursuant to the Constitution, “the Judicial power shall be vested
in one SC and in such inferior courts as may be established by law”

The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial branch of the
government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but “the” judicial power under our
political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or “all” of said power, except, only, so much as the
Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to “judge all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications” of members of the Senate and those of the House of
Representatives, which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights. The proper exercise of said authority requires legislative action: (1) defining such enforceable
and demandable rights and/or prescribing remedies for violations thereof; and (2) determining the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide said controversies or disputes, in the first instance and/or on appeal.
For this reason, the Constitution ordains that “Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and
apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts”, subject to the limitations set forth in the fundamental
law.

The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added the court’s
jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely conferred upon the SC additional
functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid because the determining of election contests is
essentially judicial.
DISTINGUISH JURISDICTION FROM JUDICIAL POWER

Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings. It means fundamentally the power or
capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies.

Bouvier: "Jurisdiction is the right of a Judge to pronounce a sentence of the law in a case or issue before
him, acquired through due process of law;" it is "the authority by which judicial officers take cognizance
of and decide cases."

Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such
rights.

Jurisdiction is what determines whether a court or tribunal may exercise its judicial power over a certain
justiciable controversy. Each part of the whole “court” has its own judicial power but may only exercise
it if it has jurisdiction over the controversy.

WHAT CONFERS JURISDICTION

Lions Clubs International vs Amores

GR No. L-61259

26 April 1983

FACTS:

Josefa, respondent, and So, petitioner, filed their certificates of candidacy for the position of District
Governer of Lions Club International District 301-AI for the fiscal year 1982-83. Before the election, an
agreement was executed between Josefa and So for the purpose of avoiding an expensive, full-blown
election contest, whereby So withdrew his certificate of candidacy in favor of Josefa, and said withdrawal
was duly accepted by Governor Huang. However, news items were published conveying the idea that So
had not withdrawn from the gubernatorial raceamong others. It also further alleged that armed men by
force and intimidation prevented known leaders and followers of Josefa from entering the Plenary
Session; and forced by the deteriorate peace and order in the convention hall and by virtue of the powers
vested in him by the State Council of Governors, as well as the Rules of Procedure, Gov. Huang changed
the venue of the election from Little Theater to Admiral Hotel, made with no objections.

However, So and some members of the Council of Past District Governors continued to hold and supervise
an illegal election at the old site where voting and non-voting delegates and alternates were allowed to
cast their votes without ballots, ballot boxes or issuance of valid accreditation papers. The election in
Admiral Hotel supervised by Gov. Huang declared Josefa the Governor-elect, but defendant Lions Club
International unlawfully recognized So as the winner.
Josefa filed an action for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order
enjoining So from assuming the powers and prerogatives of the office of Governor and Lions Club
International from recognizing and proclaiming So as the Governor

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE- Granted the writ and TRO filed for by Josefa. So filed motion to dismiss which
was denied, but the court set aside the said restraining order.

COURT OF APPEALS- Affirmed, ruled in favor of herein respondents (Josefa).

ISSUE:

WON courts of justice may take cognizance of the instant case

HELD/DOCTRINE:

No. The general rule of non-interference in the internal affairs of association wherein the courts will not
interfere with the internal affairs of an unincorporated association so as to settle disputes between
members, or questions of policy, discipline, or internal government, is however subject to exceptions,
only in the following cases:

1) when law and justice so require;

2) when there is fraud, oppression, or bad faith;

3) the action complained of is capricious, arbitrary, or unjustly discriminatory;

4) property or civil rights are invaded and there is arbitrariness, fraud or collusion;

5) the proceedings in question are violative of the laws of the society or the law of the land, as by
depriving a person of due process of law;

6) there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the tribunal conducting the proceedings, where the
organization exceeds its powers, or where the proceedings are otherwise illegal.

Absent any of said exceptions, the decision of the governing body or established private tribunal of the
association is binding and conclusive and not subject to review or collateral attack in courts.

The instant controversy between petitioner So and respondent Josefa falls within the ambit of the rule of
judicial non-intervention or non-interference. The elections in dispute, the manner by which it was
conducted and the results thereof, is strictly the internal affair that concerns only the Lions association
and/or its members, and the Court find from the records that the same was resolved within the
organiztion of Lions Clubs International in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws which are not
immoral, unreasonable, contrary to public policy, or in contravention of the laws of the land.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995

ANICETO G. MATEO, MAXIMO SAN DIEGO, QUIRINO MATEO, DANIEL

FRANCISCO, and LEONILA KUIZON, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A. MARAVE, and
EDGAR STA. MARIA, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Upon complaint of some Morong Water District (MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board
Members of MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent Edgar Sta. Maria, then
General Manager.1 On December 13, 1992, private respondent was placed under preventive
suspension and Maximo San Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager. He
was later dismissed on January 7, 1993.

On January 18, 1993, private respondent filed a Special Civil Action for Quo
Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction2 before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Branch 78, challenging his dismissal by petitioners. The petition embodied three (3) causes of
action. It reads:

xxx xxx xxx

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

II-2 Petitioner is the General Manager of the MOWAD since August 1984 with concomitant
security of tenure in office and could not be removed either temporarily or permanently,
except for cause and only after compliance with the elementary rules of due process;

II-3 However, on December 14, 1992, contrary to the tenets of justice and fairness, as well
as for want of procedural due process, the respondents (petitioners) and members of the
Board of Directors of the MOWAD have arbitrarily, whimsically, and unilaterally stopped and
prohibited the petitioner from exercising his rights and performing his duties as General
 Manager of the MOWAD and, in his place, have designated the respondent (petitioner)
Maximo San Diego as Acting General Manager . . .

II-4 On December 15, 1992, while petitioner was out of office on official travel, . . . thru
stealth and strategy, the respondents have conspired and helped one another in removing
the petitioner from the Office of the General Manager of the MOWAD by forcibly destroying
its door and locked it with a replaced door-knob and all attempts on his part to gain access
and entry proved futile; . . .

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

III-2 On January 7, 1993, . . . in confabulation with his co-respondents and members of the
Board of Directors of the MOWAD, the respondent Aniceto G. Mateo slapped the petitioner
with an Order terminating his services as General Manger . . .

III-5 Petitioner has a clear right to the Office of General Manager of the MOWAD which is
being usurped or unlawfully held by respondent Maximo San Diego in conspiracy with his co-
respondents; . . .

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

xxx xxx xxx

IV-1-a Petitioner is entitled to the relief mandated, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission, or continuance of the acts complained of more
particularly the continuous acts of repondents in stopping and prohibiting him from exercising
his rights and performing his duties as General Manager of the MOWAD and from stopping
and prohibiting him to gain access and entry to office. 3

Petitioners, in turn, moved to dismiss the case on two (2) grounds: (1) the court had no jurisdiction
over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service
Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy.4 Respondent Judge Arturo Marave
denied the Motion to Dismiss on April 26, 1993, and the Motion for Reconsideration on June 9,
1993.5

Petitioners then elevated the matter to this Court through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which
was referred to respondent Court of Appeals for adjudication. In its Decision, dated November 24,
1993, respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and in its Resolution,
dated January 11, 1994, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.6

The main issue in this petition for review is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has
jurisdiction over Sp. Civil Case No. 014-M involving dismissal of an employee of quasi-public
corporation.

We hold that it has no jurisdiction.

There is no question that MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential

Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended.7 In Davao
City Water District v. Civil Service Commissions 8 the Court en banc ruled that employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, viz:

xxx xxx xxx

As early as Baguio Water District v. Trajano et, al., We already ruled that a water district is a
corporation created pursuant to a special
law — P.D. No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are covered by
the Civil Service Law.

In another case (Hagonoy Water District v. NLRC), We ruled once again that local water
districts are quasi-public corporations whose employees belong to the Civil Service.
(emphasis omitted)

Indeed, the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of goverment-own and
controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and
Regulations. 9

Presidential Decee No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, 10 and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum
Circular No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private
respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a
decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of
services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent
could go on certiorari to this Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by
the ruling of the Civil Service Commission. So We held in Mancita v. Barcinas, 11 viz:

xxx xxx xxx

[N]o appeal lies from the decision of the Service Commission, * and that parties aggrieved
thereby may proceed to this Court alone on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof, pursuant to section 7, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution. We quote:

Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any

decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof.

The Civil Service Commission under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests
relating to the Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to
this Court's certiorari judgment.

Mancita, however, no longer governs for under the present rule, Revised Circular No. 1-91 as
amended by Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 which took effect on June 1, 1995, final
resolutions of the Civil Service Commission shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals. In any
event, whether under the old rule or present rule, Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to
entertain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law.

IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated
November 24, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 1, 1994 in CA G.R. SP No. 31530 are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

WHAT CONFERS JURISDICTION

Tijam vs Sibonghanoy
GR No. L-21450

15 April 1968

FACTS:

Barely one month after the effectivity of the Judiciary Act of 1948, spouses Tijam commenced a civil action
against spouses Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of P1,908, with legal interest.

CFI of Cebu—issued a writ of attachment against defendants’ propertues, but the same was soon
dissolved upon filing of a counter-bond by the defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
(Surety).

The Court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and after the same had become final and
executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants.

The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against Surety’s bond against which the Surety filed a written opposition for failure to execute
and absence of demand upon Surety for the payment of the amount due under the judgment. The Court
denied the motion for execution.

A necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety for the satisfaction of the
judgment, the plaintiff filed a 2nd motion for execution against the counterbond. During the hearing, the
Court, upon motion of Surety’s counsel, granted the latter a period of 5 days within which to answer the
motion. Surety failed to file such answer, and the Court granted the motion for execution and the
corresponding writ was issued.

Surety moved to quash the writ on the gorund that the same was issued without the required
summary hearing provided by Rules of Court.The Court denied the motion.

COURT OF APPEALS- Granted Surety’s motion asking for an extension of time within which to file a motion
for reconsideration.

2 days later, Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, alleging substantially that the
appellees action was filed with CFI of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908 only;
that a month before Judiciary Act of 1948 had already become effective, Sec. 88 of which placed within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter or
the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000, exclusive of interests and costs; that the CFI therefore
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. CA certified the case to the SC.
ISSUE:

WON respondents herein can invoke lack of jurisdiction to dismiss the case against them

HELD:

No. It is an undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the CFI of Cebu against
Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908 only—an amount within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which
had taken effect about a month prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annuling
everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. The action was commenced in the CFI
of Cebu on July 19, 1948, almost 15 years before Surety filed its motion to dismiss in January 12, 1963
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. Upon filing of the first motion for execution
against the counter-bond the Surety not only filed a written opposition thereto praying for its denial but
also asked for an affirmative relief—that it be relieved of its liability under the counter-bond upon the
grounds relied upon in support of its opposition—lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo not being one of
them.

Laches—is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandone it or declined to assert
it.

The fact of this case show that from the time Surety became a quasi-party on Jul 31, 1948, it could
have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the CFI of Cebu to take cognizance of the present
action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within
the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the
proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the CA, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain
affirmative relief and submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the CA that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction.
Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, we would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the
judgment creditors to go up their Cavalry once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only
patent but revolting.
13. SANTIAGO VS VASQUEZ

FACTS:

 A “Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for
the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to Set
Pending Incident for Hearing” was filed by MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO immediately before the
Supreme court without following the hierarchy of courts
 On May 13, 1991 a criminal case was filed against Santiago for allegedly violation RA 3019 otherwise
known as Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act.
 On May 14 – the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest with bail of P15,000.00 against Santiago
The lawyer of Santiago thereafter filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for
and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,"
- As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which
required surgical intervention
- Santiago seeks leave of Court
- that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of Court,
- further seeks leave of Court that the recommended bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is
posting in cash be accepted
 The said motion asked by Miriam was granted by the court:
- Miriam my post bail
- Her physical appearance is not required until JUNE 5
 On MAY 21- respondent Ombudsman Vasquez filed a manifestation that Santiago appeared before
his office on May 20
 Due to such manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued an order rescheduling her arraignment from
June 5 to May 27
 On MAY 24- Santiago filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan
and the RTC from proceeding with Criminal Cases
 Such petition was granted by SC and issued a TRO against RTC and SANDIGANBAYAN
Rationale: Her arraignment was rescheduled to an earlier date which may ignore her to ask
for other reliefs that she may avail
 On January 18, 1992: SC reversed its MAY 24 decision
- SC dismissed the petition for Certiorari filed by Santiago
- Lifted the TRO previously granted
 On SEPT 1992: Santiago filed a MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION which was subsequently denied
 MEAN WHILE!!! SANDIGAN BAYAN issued a HOLD DEPARTURE order against Santiago
RATIONALE of the ORDER: Santiago announced (MEDIA ) she will leave the country for
academic purposes (U.S.)
ISSUES:
1. Did the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over her person considering
that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has
not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan disregard the rule of judicial comity when it issued the hold departure order?
3. Whether the filing of the special civil action for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its
jurisdiction over the case
 4. Whether the hold departure order violates her right to due process, right to travel and freedom of
speech. ( The hold departure order was issued by Sandiganbayan in its own instance)
5. Whether leaving for abroad to pursue further studies is a sufficient justification for the impairment
of her constitutional right to travel.
Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only when so required in the interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as may be provided by law
6. Whether the petitioner can disregard the hierarchy of courts and immediately go to SC

SUPREME COURT:
ISSUE 1:
- Yes , respondent court has jurisdiction over the person of the accused and validly posted
bail
- petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of
respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for
Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago
- Petitioner cannot claim otherwise for, by her own
representations, she is estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier
recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over
the afore stated pleadings she filed therein.
ISSUE 2:
- Santiago claims that Sandiganbayan disregard the rule of judicial comity when it issued
the hold departure order while her MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was still pending
before the SC
Judicial Comity: term where the courtesy of the court that respects a judicial decisions of another state
(international law principle)
- Santiago is WRONG
- SC already dismissed/denied her motion for Reconsideration
- Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by
the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its
rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal.
+ And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution
of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is
taken or during the pendency of an appeal
+ There is no reason why it should not apply to a TRO.
Rationale: even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an
action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the general
rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal
of the action.

ISSUE 3:
- The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes,
an invocation for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts.
- It does not have the effect of divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired
over the case pending before them
- The mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a
case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter
when there is no writ of injunction restraining it.
ISSUE 4:
- Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general
grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them
- Hence, the court has powers to issue interlocutory orders such as HOLD DEPARTURE
orders to protect its jurisdiction
ISSUE 5:
- A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines
ISSUE 6:
- It is a judicial policy that SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the
exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
- Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to leave the country from the
very same courts who issued the hold departure order.

HELD: THE MOTION IS DENIED

DOCTRINE(S)
1. An order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective (immediately executory), even
though it is not final. A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining order or temporary injunction
has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction and no formal order of dissolution is
necessary to effect such dissolution.
2. Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must
be a new exercise of judicial power.
3. Hold departure order is but an exercise of court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.

PADRE VS CA (1992)
FACTS:

 Original Action: Quieting of Title of 2 parcels of land

According to the PLAINTIFFS (PADRE):

The land was originally owned by Jose Padre until a time when he gave the land to Fausta
-

Padre (there is no document showing transfer) and the latter declared the land for taxation
purposes in her name
- 1966: she sold a portion of the land to Avelino Paranada married to Vicente Viernes.
- The late Jose Padre had been in possession of the same up to the time it was given to
Fausta.
Fausta is also in possession of the disputed property until the years 1973, 1974 and 1975
when Juliana Pacleb Parel began to cut down trees on the land.
According to the defendants:
 - The disputed parcel of land was formerly owned by the late Silvestre Paa who sold it to Blas
Pacleb (there is no deed of transfer or conveyance)
- Some of the adjoining lots were the properties of Bartola Pero, the deceased grandmother
of Juliana Parel, one of the defendants and a portion of it was the land of Roman Pacleb (no
document of ownership), the predecessors-in-interest of the defendant Juliana Pacleb Parel.
- During the cadastral survey, the said parcels of land were consolidated into one parcel of
land under one Tax Declaration but with different Lot numbers. Plaintiffs tried to assert their
ownership when defendants cut down trees and tried to bulldoze the land subject of
controversy sometime in 1968.
 The parties admitted the identity of the parcels of land
RTC:

 The plaintiffs has not proven their ownership and possession of the subject lots
 The defendants are in actual possession of the land in dispute. Being in actual possession under
claim of ownership, it is presumed that defendants are the owners
CA:

 Ordered the plaintiffs to vacate the subject land

ISSUES:

1. Whether the respondent court has the authority to convert the action from quieting of title to
accion plenaria de posession ( accion publiciana)
NOTE: Wala g chika g unsa pag convert from quieting title to accion publiciana

2. Whether the lower courts or only the Director of lands have the authority to decide on issues
involving prior possession

SC: ON ISSUES 1 AND 2

- After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it
is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (The plaintiffs only
questioned the competence and jurisdiction of the court after it rendered an adverse
decision
- The authority given to the Lands Department over the disposition of public lands does not
exclude the courts from their jurisdiction over possessory actions, the public character of
the land notwithstanding. This is such an action and the fact that on her complaint
respondent claimed the lands in ownership did not change the nature of her action. The
allegation of ownership should be regarded as a mere surplusage.
- Neither is the court persuaded into accepting petitioners' contention that the appellate
Court seriously erred in converting the action from quieting of title into accion publiciana,
 because in order to afford complete relief to the parties, the court may determine
incidentally the ownership, or the status of the legal title to the property, of the right to the
possession thereof
HELD: PETITION DISMISSED

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners,

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

FACTS:

 The spouses bought Lot 19 from LUCKY HOMES

 The said lot was mortgaged by the spouses to SSS
 However, LUCK HOMES mistakenly identified LOT 19 as LOT 18
 Hence, the spouses constructed their house on LOT 18
 LUCKY HOMES informed the spouses about the error
 The spouses then offered to buy lot 18 and continued to stay on the lot
 When the spouses defaulted in paying SSS: the latter then foreclosed the LOT 19 it being the lot
mortgaged. A new title was then issued in favour of SSS
 The Spouses went to lucky homes asking that for swapping of lots and reformation of contract.
 However, LUCKY homes refused

Hence, the spouses filed a case before the RTC

RTC: DISMISSED THE CASE

1. The spouses are no longer the owner of LOT 19.

2. They are also not the owner of lot 18 since they only offered to buy the said lot
3. The contract cannot be reformed anymore since the spouses are no lonher the owner of the lot
and the contract clearly reflected the intentions of the party.
- The real object of the contract is really Lot 19.
- Lucky homes only made an error in physically identifying the lot.
4. To allow reformation and swapping will leave lucky homes with nothing and the spouses will
unjustly enrich themselves

 Then, the spouses went to the CA raising that Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
has the proper jurisdiction of the case and not the RTC
 CA: MAINTAINED RTC

- The spouses are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the case

ISSUE: WHETHER THE SPOUSES ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIAL
COURT

SUPREME COURT:

YES

- A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that
same jurisdiction
- It was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting
an action for reformation of contract against private respondents.
- It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted
their cause from start to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the
court’s jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years

MANILA BANKERS LIFE INSURANCE CORP. vs. EDDY NG KOK WEI

GR. 139791 Dec 12, 2003

FACTS:

 Eddy Ng Kok Wei (respondent) is a Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the Philippines.
 In a Letter of Intent addressed to Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation, petitioner, expressed his
intention to purchase a condominium unit at Valle Verde Terraces.
 Respondent paid the reservation fee then eventually paid 90% of the purchase price.
 Petitioner executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent.
 The contract expressly states that the subject condominium unit shall substantially be completed and delivered
to the respondent within fifteen (15) months from February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990.
 April 5, 1990, petitioner informed respondent of the substantial completion of his condominium unit, however,
due to various uncontrollable forces (such as coup d etat attempts, typhoon and steel and cement shortage),
the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.
 July 5, 1990, He found the unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
 Petitioner issued another notice advising respondent scheduled to move in on August 22, 1990.
 October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find that his condominium unit was still
unlivable. He was constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990 demanding payment for
the damages he sustained. But petitioner ignored such demand.

RTC

 Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against the former for specific performance and
damages,
 During the pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and on April 12, 1991,
occupied the same. Thus, respondents cause of action has been limited to his claim for damages.
 RTC found the petitioner liable for payment of damages due to the delay in the performance of its obligation
 to the respondent.

CA:

 CA - affirmed in toto the trial courts award of damages in favor of the respondent.

 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the CA

SC:

ISSUE : WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the instant case.

HELD : Trial Court has jurisdiction.

On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case, Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree
No. 1344, as amended, provides:

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to
its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)][ shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following
nature:

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision
lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

It is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the instant case. Complaints for specific performance with damages
by a lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners active participation in the
proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

 Petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In
effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now
in estoppel and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.

Factual findings of the trial court are given weight when supported by substantial evidence and carries more weight
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Whether or not petitioner incurred delay and thus, liable to pay damages
as a result thereof, are indeed factual questions.

The jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of is limited to reviewing only
errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings being assailed are not supported by evidence on record or the
impugned judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts. These exceptions are not in the case

THUS, the petition is DENIED. Decision of Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
United States vs Cañete et. Al.
GR No.. 11612; 38 Phils 253 June 21, 1918

FACTS:

 The appellants Simeon Canete and others published a charge in writing against Father Acebedo, a parish
priest of Leyte, who they accused of maladministration and misappropriation of funds and property of the
church of Dagami under his charge, drunkenness, taking indecent liberties of women of his congregation, illicit
relations and general immoral and indecent behavior.
 The publication was defamatory in character and admitted by the appellants. They based their defense upon
an attempt to prove the charges were true and the contention that the communication was privileged.
 The appellants were found guilty of the crime of libel as rendered by the CFI.
 Hence, this appeal from such judgment.

ISSUE:

Which court has jurisdiction in matters purely ecclesiastical in nature.

HELD:

It is the established doctrine of the American courts that in matters purely ecclesiastical the decisions of the proper
church tribunals are conclusive upon the civil tribunals. A church member who is expelled from membership by the
church authorities, or a priest or minister who is by them deprived of his sacred office, is without remedy in the civil
courts, which will not inquire into the correctness of decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals. (Landis vs. Campbell, 79
Mo., 433; Watson vs. Garvin, 54 Mo., 364; Stack vs. O'Hara, 98 Penn., 213.) The right of such ecclesiastical tribunals
to try members offending against the canons of conduct established by the church being thus recognized it is
reasonable that their decisions should be privileged, however derogatory they may be to the reputation of the persons
affected.

Persons who join churches . . . voluntarily submit themselves to the jurisdiction of these bodies, and in matters of
faith and individual conduct affecting their relations as members thereof subject themselves to the tribunals established
by those bodies to pass upon such questions, and, if aggrieved by a decision against them, made in good faith by such
judicatories they must seek their redress within the organization, as provided by its laws or regulations.
(Landis vs. Campbell, supra.)

The right of ecclesiastical tribunals to hear and decide cases involving the conduct of their officers and members
being recognized, and this of necessity involving immunity from charges of libel and slander based upon statements
made in good faith by the members of such tribunals and by parties or witnesses giving evidence before them
(York vs. Pease, 68 Mass., 282), a like immunity must be extended to person who, in good faith, make charges, written
or oral, to the church authorities, intended to provoke an investigation concerning the conduct or character of a member,
officer, or minister of the institution. That such charges are privileged communications, if made without actual malice,
is the settled doctrine of the courts of the United States and of Great Britain.

In the case at bar, the communication in question was in no proper sense a private communication as it was clearly
made with the intention and in the hope that it would be followed by a public investigation.

The court is convinced that the conduct of defendants in making the complaint which has led to these prosecutions
has conformed to the conditions upon which the qualified privilege they claim may be enjoyed for they acted without
actual malice. Thus, the judgment of the trial court in is reversed and the appellants are acquitted.
Topic: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Provident Tree Farms, INC. (PTFI) vs Hon. Batario & AJ InternationL Corp. (AJIC)
GR 92285 March 28, 1994
DOCTRINE:
Cases before the BOC must be fully fleshed out before it prior to elevating the issues to a regular court in keeping with the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. (primary jurisdiction)

FACTS:

 PTFI is a Phil corporation engaged in industrial tree planting. It supplies to a local match manufacturer solely for
production of matches.
 There’s a state policy to encourage qualified persons to engage in industrial tree plantation under Revised Forestry
Code which provides a set of incentives to corporations like PTFI and is a qualified ban against importation of wood.
 Respondent, AJIC, imported matches from Indonesia which the BOC released which violates the Revised Forestry
Code’s ban of importing wood and wood-derivated products.

RTC:

 PTFI filed with the RTC of Manila a complaint for injunction and damages with prayer for a TRO against
Commissioner of Customs to prohibit the latter from importing matches.
 AJIC moved to dismiss the complaint alleging that:
o The Commissioner of Customs and not the regular court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the legality
of an importation.
o The release of importations had rendered injunction moot and academic.
o The prayer for damages has no basis as the Commissioner’s acts are in accordance with law.
o The complaint for injunction cannot stand it being only a provisional relief and not a principal remedy.
 PTFI opposed the motion to dismiss.
 AJIC’s motion to dismiss was denied.
 AJIC filed a motion for reconsideration and the Court reconsidered and dismissed the case on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction to determine what are legal or illegal importations.

 PTFI seeks to set aside the order of respondent court and prays for the continuation of the hearing of the case
contending that what was brought before the trial court was a civil case for injunction for the purpose of securing
compliance with the provision of the RFC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Bureau of Customs holds jurisdiction in the matter of wood product importation.

HELD:

The only subject of this incentive is a ban against importation of wood and wood products which is to be enforced
by Bureau of Customs since it has under the Tariff and Customs Code the exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture cases. To allow the regular court to direct the Commissioner is clearly an interference with the exclusive jurisdiction
of the BOC.

PTFI’c correspondence with the BOC contesting the legality of match importations may already take the nature of
administrative proceedings the pendency of which would preclude the court from interfering with it under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña, 20 the court held that —

. . . . under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary

jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply
with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar
Mining Co., Inc., 94 Phil. 932, 941 [1954].)
 In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with
the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical
matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has
become well indispensable . . . .

The court cannot compel an agency to do a particular act or to enjoin such act which is within its prerogative, except
when in the exercise of its authority it gravely abuses or exceeds its jurisdiction. In the case at bench, we have no occasion to
rule on the issue of grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction as it is not before us.

Thus, the order of the RTC was affirmed and the petition for review was denied.